Case No. 403868V


NOW COMES Defendant Aaron J. Walker, Esq., and files this Motion for a Hearing as
Soon as Practicable Under Maryland’s Anti SLAPP Statute (MD CODE Cts. & Jud. Proc. §5807(d)(1)) and states the following:
Since there is no case law interpreting MD CODE Cts. & Jud. Proc. §5-807 (the “AntiSLAPP Statute”), this case presents an instance of pure statutory interpretation, and the first step
of statutory interpretation is to look at the statute itself. First, the term “SLAPP statute” is
operatively defined in §5-807(b) as follows:
(b) Nature. -- A lawsuit is a SLAPP suit if it is:

Brought in bad faith against a party who has communicated with a
federal, State, or local government body or the public at large to
report on, comment on, rule on, challenge, oppose, or in any other
way exercise rights under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution or Article 10, Article 13, or Article 40 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights regarding any matter within the authority of
a government body or any issue of public concern;


Materially related to the defendant’s communication; and


Intended to inhibit or inhibits the exercise of rights under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or Article 10, Article 13, or
Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

There can be little doubt that most of these statutory requirements are met on the face of the
Plaintiff’s complaint. For instance, there can be no doubt that it was “[b]rought... against a party
who has communicated with... the public at large to... exercise rights under the First
Amendment... regarding... any issue of public concern” because the Plaintiff is alleging that the
Defendants communicated with the public at large about SWATting, a matter of obvious public
concern, satisfying part of §5-807(b)(1). Likewise, there can be little doubt that this suit is
materially related to that communication as required under §5-807(b)(2). Nor can there be any
real doubt that the lawsuit is “[i]ntended to inhibit or inhibits the exercise of rights under the
First Amendment” under §5-807(b)(3) given that the Plaintiff continues to seek “[a]n order
enjoining Defendants from engaging in future tortious conduct against Plaintiff.”1
While this Court correctly recognized in the September 3, 2015, motions hearing
(“Motions Hearing”) that bad faith is required for this Court to find definitively that this is a
SLAPP suit, not every remedy offered by the Anti-SLAPP Statute requires a definitive finding
that the suit is a SLAPP suit. The remedies offered by §5-807(d) are described as follows:

Scope of immunity. -- A defendant in a SLAPP suit is not civilly liable for
communicating with a federal, State, or local government body or the
public at large, if the defendant, without constitutional malice, reports on,
comments on, rules on, challenges, opposes, or in any other way exercises
rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or Article 10,
Article 13, or Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights regarding
any matter within the authority of a government body or any issue of
public concern.


Remedies of defendant. -- A defendant in an alleged SLAPP suit may
move to:

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Since the Plaintiff doesn’t provide page numbers in his
FAC, this claim can be found in his “Prayer for Relief” on the fifty-ninth page out of sixty.



Dismiss the alleged SLAPP suit, in which case the court shall hold
a hearing on the motion to dismiss as soon as practicable; or


Stay all court proceedings until the matter about which the
defendant communicated to the government body or the public at
large is resolved.

Thus, §5-807(c) offers limited immunity, but only to “[a] defendant in a SLAPP suit.” A plain
reading of that subsection is that a finding that the case is a SLAPP case is required before a
Defendant is entitled to that limited immunity. By contrast, the remedies under §5-807(d) are
available to “[a] defendant in an alleged SLAPP suit.” A plain reading of that subsection is that
the mere allegation is sufficient to trigger the remedies under §5-807(d).
This makes sense. The remedy Mr. Walker is seeking at the moment—a hearing as soon
as practicable on his renewed Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 105) (“Renewed MTD”)—shouldn’t
trigger a requirement that this Court conduct an evidentiary inquiry. Further, as this Court noted
in the Motions Hearing, it is difficult to determine whether a suit is a SLAPP suit in a motion
hearing. Therefore, the Maryland legislature set the bar low before granting the remedy of
expedited consideration. All Mr. Walker has to do is allege that this is a SLAPP suit, and that is
However, even though a simple allegation is sufficient to trigger §5-807(d)’s remedies,
the allegation of bad faith can be proven in this case if necessary.
During the Motions Hearing, this Court denied relief to Defendants Malkin, Twitchy,
Breitbart, Glenn Beck, Mercury Radio Arts and The Blaze under the anti-SLAPP statute as
And to the extent that the Court is asked to grant relief under the [SLAPP] suit
statute, I find with respect to that statute that there’s no evidence based upon these
motions that I could find at this time that he’s acting in bad faith which I would be

required to apply the [SLAPP] suit statute.
Motions Hearing Transcript, Attached as Exhibit I (“Mot. Hrg. Tr.”) at 88. This Court carefully
limited its findings to the arguments and information presented by those Defendants and left
open the door to the possibility that such proof of bad faith might be shown later. Mr. Walker
believes that subsequent events and evidence not placed before this Court in the Motions
Hearing, will carry this Court across the threshold into a finding of bad faith.
There are four reasons why this Court should now find bad faith. First, as a preliminary
matter, Mr. Walker adopts by reference all of the evidence and arguments of parties who were
dismissed with prejudice at the Motions Hearing (Dkt. Nos. 44, 48 and 49). Second, the Plaintiff
continued in the FAC to advance legal theories against Mr. Walker that have already been
rejected by this Court. Third, the Plaintiff continued to include parties in the FAC who shouldn’t
be included at this late stage. Fourth, the Plaintiff has repeatedly misstated the truth, often doing
so after Defendants pointed out his falsehoods. For all of these reasons, this Court can find bad
faith where it didn’t at the Motions Hearing.

The Plaintiff Continues to Include Legal Arguments That Have Been Rejected by
This Court.
One way the Plaintiff has demonstrated his bad faith is that his FAC continues to force

the Defendants to answer arguments that this Court has already rejected. For instance, this Court
has already found that the Plaintiff is defamation-proof and that allegations of SWATting cannot
seriously offend a reasonable person in the Plaintiff’s position. Renewed MTD at 3-4. Since
both of these rulings preclude any cause of action based on false light, why did the Plaintiff
continue to assert false light against any Defendant?
Similarly, the Plaintiff continued to assert tortious interference with his employment
relationship even though this Court agreed that “[a]s a matter of both law and logic, his

relationship with an entity he controls cannot be interfered with, tortiously or otherwise,” and
that full disruption is required. Id. at 11. Likewise, this Court found that the Plaintiff had failed
to properly allege interference with his music career on terms that applied to all Defendants. Id.
at 11-12. So if these fatal flaws persist in relation to every Defendant, why did the Plaintiff
continue to assert tortious interference?
Further, as demonstrated in Mr. Walker’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 111) (“MSJ”), the Plaintiff has had his day in court on whether Mr. Walker had intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on the Plaintiff. MSJ at 12-13. The Plaintiff has had the opportunity
to try to prove that Mr. Walker defamed the Plaintiff or placed him in a false light by the
following statements (among others): 1) that the Plaintiff cost Mr. Walker his job, 2) that Mr.
Walker didn’t batter the Plaintiff, and 3) the Plaintiff attempted to frame Mr. Walker for that
crime. MSJ at 6-9. Indeed, on the subject of battery, the Plaintiff has had two opportunities to
prove battery and failed both times. MSJ at 9-10. So if these previous courts have made all of
these findings, why did the Plaintiff continue to assert these claims against Mr. Walker?
Additionally, during the Motions Hearing, this Court patiently explained that peacefully
attending a court hearing is not stalking. Mot. Hrg. Tr. 17. Apparently, this statement by this
Court went in one ear and out the other, because the Plaintiff continued to allege in the FAC that
Mr. Walker stalked him simply by peacefully attending court hearings. FAC ¶ 62 (“Virtually
every time Plaintiff appears in Court, Defendants Walker and Hoge have stalked him”). Why did
the Plaintiff continue to make this allegation against Mr. Walker (or Mr. Hoge)?
This Court also told the Plaintiff that any protest of Judge Vaughey’s rulings was not his
business: “And then on page 22, you say Walker, Hoge, Frey, and Stranahan condemned Judge
[Vaughey], which relates to Judge [Vaughey] not so much you.” Mot. Hrg. Tr. 11. Yet, the FAC


continued to complain about Mr. Walker’s criticism of Vaughey in paragraph 66. Why did the
Plaintiff leave this allegation in the FAC (¶ 66)?
This Court also told the Plaintiff that Mr. Walker (and Mr. Hoge) have a right to contact
the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office and demand the Plaintiff’s arrest and
prosecution. Mot. Hrg. Tr. 11. In Mot. Hrg. Tr. 11-12 and 14, this Court told the Plaintiff that
people have a right to complain to officials (including congresspersons) and demand
investigations of the Plaintiff. So why did the Plaintiff continue to complain that the Defendants
have sought to have the Plaintiff investigated (FAC ¶¶ 80, 110, 121, 124 and 150), arrested (FAC
¶¶ 60, 99 and 150), and prosecuted (FAC ¶ 66, 80, 152)?
At the same Motion Hearing, this Court said that a mere agreement to blog about the
Plaintiff, such as the “Everyone Blog About Brett Kimberlin Day” on May 25, 2012, was not
tortious. Mot. Hrg. Tr. 84. So why did the Plaintiff continue to complain about that event as
though it was tortious (FAC ¶ 53) or about a similar event aimed to draw attention to official
misconduct in Howard County (FAC ¶ 66)?
The obvious answer to each of these rhetorical questions is that the Plaintiff continued to
assert them because his goal in pursuing this case isn’t to obtain justice but to vex the Defendants
for as long as possible. That supports a finding of bad faith.

The FAC Continued to Include Parties Who Should Have Been Excluded.
First, at the Motions Hearing, Defendants Malkin, Twitchy, Breitbart, Glenn Beck,

Mercury Radio Arts, and The Blaze were all dismissed for failure to state a claim with prejudice
and without leave to amend. Despite that ruling, the Plaintiff continued to assert that they are
Defendants in the FAC. In fact, the Plaintiff included references to RedState, Erickson (FAC 69)
and Ace of Spades, all of whom were dismissed pursuant to settlement agreements. The Plaintiff


even describes Erickson and/or Ace of Spades as Defendants in paragraphs 70, 121 and 123,
which is almost certainly a violation of those settlement agreements.
Further, the Plaintiff, by his own reasoning, should have dropped Mandy and Ginny Nagy
from this suit. When asked by this Court, “[l]et me ask you this as a practical matter if what you
want to do is to stop this, why sue an incompetent person?” Mot. Hrg. Tr. 91, the Plaintiff
answered that he wanted the material she had written to be removed or deleted. The only thing
she is alleged to have done with any particularity is to publish two articles.
The first, attached as Exhibit II and referenced in FAC 26, was published outside of the
statute of limitations as the Plaintiff himself acknowledged, Mot. Hrg. Tr. 63. Further, if this
Court reads that article, it will see that there isn’t a word in it that is false or, indeed, anything in
it that is not carefully sourced from other writings.
Likewise, the inclusion of the second article doesn’t withstand scrutiny. A print out of
that article is attached as Exhibit III. Not a word in the article is defamatory. The article also
links to a video and an audio recording (referred to as a podcast), contained in Exhibit IV,
featuring interviews with both Erick Erickson and Patrick Frey. 2 The fact these interviews
occurred and what was said in these interviews is something which can be validly reported on.
Ms. Nagy’s description of the these interviews are not false in the slightest detail. So if there is
anything defamatory about either interview, Mr. Kimberlin’s beef is with Messrs. Erickson or
Frey, not Ms. Nagy.
Furthermore, Ms. Nagy cannot take the material down and the Plaintiff was informed of
that by Bruce Godfrey, Esq. Mot. Hrg. Tr. 92. Godfrey’s focus was on whether Mandy Nagy
was physically capable of the kinds of tasks necessary to remove the post in light of her stroke.
Exhibit IV is a disk containing two files. The first is entitled “Erickson CNN Interview” and is
in mp4 video format. The second is entitled “Podcast Patrick Frey” and is in mp3 sound format.
Both should play easily in Windows Media Player.


However, as a mechanical reality, an individual author does not have the ability to unilaterally
delete, remove, or correct any part of any article one has written on the Breitbart site without
approval from the company’s executives. Exhibit V. Therefore, even if she hadn’t suffered a
stroke, she wouldn’t be able to take any of her articles down if she wanted to. The only way the
Plaintiff can get anything taken down from is if the corporation agrees to do so.
So the articles are not actionable; Ms. Nagy has neither the ability nor the permission to
take them down, and every other allegation against her is purely conclusory. She should have
been removed from this case, and the fact that she —as well as the Defendants who were
dismissed at the Motions Hearing—haven’t been removed from this suit provides further
evidence of the Plaintiff’s bad faith.

The Plaintiff has Repeatedly Misstated the Truth, Both in the Motions Hearing and
His FAC.
While this Court will be understandably leery of a detailed search through the available

evidence, several falsehoods can be proven fairly easily.
Turning first to the FAC, Mr. Walker has already noted in his Second Petition for
Contempt (Dkt. No. 92) at 4-5 that the Plaintiff falsely alleged that Mr. Walker and Mr. Frey
accused the Plaintiff of SWATting them on Glenn Beck’s radio show on May 25, 2012, and the
Plaintiff repeats that accusation in paragraph 75 of the FAC . The Plaintiff, in his response (Dkt.
No. 104), noticeably doesn’t deny he made a false statement but simply “pounds the table”
hoping the Court will mistake his anger at being caught for righteous indignation.3
In the current FAC, the Plaintiff adds a new whopper. On the fifth attempt to allege a
The same petition for contempt also noted that the Plaintiff presented falsified evidence even
after this Court warned him not to submit altered evidence in the future, saying: “[D]on’t
understand from that that’s some statement by me that I’m unconcerned about people filing
altered documents. I’m not, okay.” Mot. Hrg. Tr. 106-7. The fact he has done this after being
warned by both Judge Ryon and Judge Mason can be considered further evidence of bad faith.


cause of action against Mr. Hoge or Mr. Walker, the Plaintiff unveils this fanciful vignette:
Defendant Walker made many trips to Maryland in furtherance of that conspiracy.
He met with Defendant Hoge and provided him with derogatory information
about Plaintiff which Defendant Hoge published, including the false allegation
that Plaintiff committed perjury in a court filing in May 2012. Mr. Hoge wrote in
a May 25, 2012 post, “From the transcripts of the recent Maryland Circuit Court
cases, it looks as if there is a prima facia (sic) case of perjury again.”
Putting aside the fact that the Plaintiff hasn’t properly pled this new allegation of false light
against Mr. Hoge, the entire meeting is a hallucination. As demonstrated by Exhibits V and VI,
Mr. Walker and Mr. Hoge met for the first time on July 5, 2012, when Mr. Hoge attended a Peace
Order appeal (Kimberlin v. Walker (II), No. 8526D (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2012)). Therefore,
there was no meeting in May between Mr. Hoge and Mr. Walker, and Mr. Walker asks that the
Plaintiff be required to produce any evidence apart from his active imagination such a meeting
occurred. Most likely, the Plaintiff will pound the table some more.4
In another example, the Plaintiff claimed that he received a message from the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Office that read “LEAVE HIM ALONE. DON’T GO THERE” which
the Plaintiff claims is a threat. The Plaintiff first made this allegation in Kimberlin v. National
Bloggers Club, et al. (I), No. GJH-13-3059 (D. Md. 2013). In an Opposition to Messrs. Walker
and Hoge’s Motions to Dismiss he made an identical accusation, and he included the original
alleged message as an exhibit. That exhibit is attached as Exhibit VII to this Motion, and the
Court can see for itself all it says is “don’t go there.” The capitalization and the additional words
are the Plaintiff’s invention, a fact he has tried to conceal from this Court by not providing a
Indeed, in the Plaintiff’s fantasy world, how would he know such a meeting took place?
Littered throughout the FAC are descriptions of alleged conversations that he was not a party to,
descriptions of events he was unlikely to have witnessed, and so on. If any of the sordid
allegations were true, Mr. Walker would take it as prima facie evidence that the Plaintiff is
engaged in exactly the kind of obsessive stalking and investigation he accuses his enemies of
engaging in. However, the truth is that the Plaintiff sees a “statement of facts” as an opportunity
to let his imagination run wild, not to make allegations based on provable facts.


copy of the same alleged message with his Complaint.
Another falsehood comes in paragraph 152 of the FAC, where the Plaintiff writes that
“Defendant Walker has even imputed in a recent blog post that Plaintiff’s teenage daughter is fair
game for destruction because of ‘corruption of blood.’” As demonstrated in Exhibit V, Mr.
Walker said literally the opposite of that: he rejected to doctrine of the corruption of blood, as the
Constitution does.
In another example, the Plaintiff also spends a great number of words obsessing on how
the National Bloggers Club allegedly defrauded donors by saying that they were attempting to
obtain tax exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). For instance, in FAC ¶ 55, the Plaintiff
wrote that “[d]uring the time alleged in the Complaint, Defendant National Bloggers Club...
never filed for 501(c)(3) status with the IRS[.]” Likewise, in FAC ¶ 54, he wrote that “Even
after people asked for proof that Defendant National Bloggers Club was granted 501(c)(3) status,
and Defendant Akbar failed to provide that proof, Defendants continued to solicit donations for
Defendant National Bloggers Club.”
Putting aside the sheer irrelevance of these allegations, the Plaintiff doesn’t mention that
the National Bloggers Club has, in fact, achieved tax exempt Public Charity status under
§ 501(c)(3). The Plaintiff knows of this fact because Defendant Hoge provided proof in court
documents. Specifically in his Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in Kimberlin
v. National Bloggers Club (I), (ECF No. 149), he attached as an “Exhibit A” a print out from the
IRS website demonstrating that the National Bloggers Club had been granted § 501(c)(3) status
—a fact one would never guess from reading the FAC filed more than a year later. That print out
is attached as Exhibit VIII to this motion.
Likewise, in FAC ¶¶ 85 and 86, the Plaintiff accuses Defendant Dan Backer of sending an


“extortionate” settlement offer. However, in a Memorandum Opinion filed in Kimberlin v.
National Bloggers Club (I), Judge Hazel specifically told the Plaintiff that even if the lawsuit
was baseless, an offer to settle it could not be extortion as a matter of law.5
Furthermore, the Plaintiff also misled this Court in easily verifiable ways in the Motions
Hearing. For instance, in Mot. Hrg. Tr. 33 the Plaintiff and the Court has this exchange:

...I’m not trying to silence anybody at all. I’m not trying –


But I mean –


That’s what anti-[SLAPP] is about.


-- realistically you are.




I mean you want them to stop doing what they’re doing
which is basically publishing information about you, right?


No, I don’t want that at all. I don’t care if they publish
anything about me. I care if they publish lies about me, if
they portray me in a false light, if they accuse me of
criminal swatting when I had nothing to do with it, that’s
when I want them to stop. That’s simple. They can write
about something that happened 40 years ago, I don’t care.

This is one of several attempts the Plaintiff makes to make it appear that censorship is not the
goal of this suit. Later on, the Plaintiff pretends to recognize the right to call him a bomber:

...Of course these things you know they can say that I’m a
bomber. They can do all that kind of stuff all day long.


You agree they can say it?


I can say that, yeah. I don’t have any problem with that.

Mot. Hrg. Tr. 65. Both of these claims of tolerance are refuted simply by reading the Original
Complaint and the FAC. For instance, in FAC ¶¶ 32 and 120 the Plaintiff continues to complain
that various defendants have called him a “bomber,” while in FAC ¶ 121, the Plaintiff continues
to complain “the Defendants… wrote defamatory articles… calling Plaintiff a criminal and
A copy of this opinion was provided to this Court as Exhibit B to Mr. Walker’s MSJ, and the
passage can be found on pages 13-14.


terrorist” after he has been convicted of bombing a town for nearly a week.
Further, his claim that the Defendants are allowed to talk about him as much as they
choose as long as they do not make false statements about him cannot be reconciled with the fact
that he has specifically asked this Court, even in the FAC, to prohibit the Defendants from using
his name or likeness in the future. Specifically, in his prayer for relief, he has asked this Court
for “[a]n order enjoining Defendants from engaging in future tortious conduct against Plaintiff.”
Among the tortious conduct alleged in this case is “Appropriation of name” complaining that the
following acts are tortious:
From July 1, 2014 through the present time, Defendants Walker, Frey, DB Capitol
Strategies, and Backer have appropriated and traded on Plaintiff’s first and last
names for commercial purposes, including raising funds, selling merchandise and
creating fraudulent financial scams. They have placed Plaintiff’s name in the
titles of blog posts and in keywords attached to those posts. They then promoted
those blog posts through their Twitter accounts, again using Plaintiff’s name in
those regular tweets. They did and do this to raise their Search Engine results and
drive traffic to his site [sic]. Once on their sites, they ask for money....
Plaintiff has never given Defendants permission to use his name in any manner
and has repeatedly asked Defendants in various venues to leave him alone.
FAC ¶ 43, 46.6 Therefore, the Plaintiff wants to render it contempt to simply write the Plaintiff’s
name on a blog even if it is to criticize the Plaintiff. Putting aside that this fundamentally
misunderstands the tort of invasion of privacy by misappropriation of name or likeness (see
Renewed MTD 9-10), according to the Plaintiff’s bizarre legal theory, merely writing his name
would be a tortious act. Thus, eleven days after he told this Court that the Defendants were free
to write about him if they so choose, he filed a FAC claiming that they are not.
In another example of the Plaintiff misstating the truth in the Motions Hearing, in Mot.
Hrg. Tr. 72, the Plaintiff says “I’ve only sued five people or five suits in the last five years.” Of
Once again, the paragraph numbers are not entirely sequential in the FAC. This refers to the
second 43rd and 46th paragraph. These paragraphs are on pages 53-54, although that information
is of limited utility to this Court because the Plaintiff didn’t number his pages.


course the Plaintiff has sued more than five people in this case, but presuming he recognized his
own error and was correcting himself when he said he only filed five suits, that claim is false as
well. Going from September 3, 2010, to the date of the Motion Hearing, the instant Plaintiff has
been the plaintiff in the following suits (with brief summaries of their subject matter in
parenthesis): (1) Kimberlin v. Allen (I), No. 339254V (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2010)
(defamation), (2) Kimberlin v. Allen (II), No. 0601SP031592011 (Md. Mont. Co. Dist. Ct. 2012)
(peace order), (3) Kimberlin v. Walker (I), No. 0601SP005392012 (Md. Mont. Co. Dist. Ct.
2012) (peace order), (4) Kimberlin v. Walker (II), No. 0601SP019792012 (Md. Mont. Co. Dist.
Ct. 2012) (peace order), (5) Kimberlin v. Norton, No. 0601SP033892012 (Md. Mont. Co. Dist.
Ct. 2012) (peace order), (6) Kimberlin v. Elliott, No. 0602SP017482013 (Md. Mont. Co. Dist. Ct.
2013) (peace order against his wife’s paramour), (7) Kimberlin v. Walker, et al., No. 380966V
(Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2013) (defamation), (8) Kimberlin v. KimberlinUnmasked, No. RWT-1302580 (D. Md. 2013) (copyright suit), (9) Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), No.
GJH-13-3059 (D. Md. 2013) (RICO, Civil Rights), (10) Kimberlin v. Hunton and Williams, Case
GJH-15-00723 (D. Md. 2015) (RICO), (11) Kimberlin v. Home Depot, No. 401958V (Md. Mont.
Co. Cir. Ct. 2015) (data breach) and (12) Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (II) No.
403868V (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2015) (this case). In addition to that litigation, he has
instituted two suits purported to be on behalf of the elder daughter of Tetyana Kimberlin (who
will only be identified here as “K.K.”): (13) K. K. v. Tetyana Kimerblin, No. 0601SP027212013
(Md. Mont. Co. Dist. Ct. 2013) (domestic violence protective order), and (14) K.K. v. William
Hoge III, No. 0601SP012712015 (Md. Mont. Co. Dist. Ct. 2015) (peace order). In addition to
that, upon information and belief, the Plaintiff filed a false petition to have Ms. Kimberlin
committed. That would be fourteen lawsuits in the last five years alone—a bit more than the five


he claimed. Nor is this a minor, academic point. He uttered this falsehood in the middle of a
discussion of whether he was a good faith litigant or a vexatious one, and this falsehood might
very well have helped to convince this Court that he was not vexatious.
Therefore, because of this and the other falsehoods outlined in this section—which are
only the most easily proven falsehoods, and not every falsehood—this Court should find that the
Plaintiff has acted in bad faith, supporting a finding that this is a SLAPP suit.
The remedy of expedited consideration is available on the mere allegation that the suit is
a SLAPP suit, and, accordingly, Mr. Walker asks that his Renewed MTD be considered as soon
as practicable as per the statute.
Further, there is ample evidence that this is a SLAPP suit. The only element of §5-807(b)
operative definition of a SLAPP suit that is reasonably in contention is whether bad faith is
present. However, the evidence of bad faith at this stage is abundant even without a detailed
examination of the evidence. Apart from the issues raised in prior motions regarding SLAPP
suits, this motion has shown that the Plaintiff 1) continued to advance legal theories that had
already been rejected by the court, 2) continued to include parties who should have been left out
of the FAC, and 3) repeatedly misstated the truth before this Court. All of these reasons support
a finding without delay of bad faith, and given that bad faith, a finding that this is a SLAPP suit.


Tuesday, October 13, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

Aaron J. Walker, Esq.
Va Bar# 48882
7537 Remington Road
Manassas, Virginia 20109

I, Aaron Walker, solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury that the contents of the
foregoing paper are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief and that all
exhibits attached are true and correct copies of the originals.


I certify that on the
day of
, 2015, I served copies of this
document on Brett Kimberlin at [redacted], Bethesda, Maryland 20817, via U. S. Mail and on the
following co-Defendants via email: William Hoge via Patrick Ostronic; DB Capital Strategies
and Dan Backer, Esq. via Dan Backer, Esq.




Case No. 403868V


Upon consideration of “Defendant Walker’s Motion for a Hearing as Soon as Practicable
Under Maryland’s Anti-SLAPP Statute” and any opposition thereto, it is this _________ day of
__________________, 2015, hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Walker’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss [cite] and his Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment shall be heard on

, 2015.

Hon. Michael D. Mason
Judge, Circuit Court of Maryland for Montgomery County