-------------------------------------x Delmo L. Zanette : Plaintiff : v. : Ronald Pecunies : Author K. Watson Jr. : Joe Cotraneo : Donald Brown Sr. : Weihart Realtors : Elsie Peorin: John Dimattia : Steven G. Philips : Robert E. Kaelin : Murtha Cullina LLP : John McKenna, agent : Shawn Kahanec, agent : Lt. Brown : Michael Panza : DemetroisAdamis: Donald M. Brown : Michael Panza : Mark Katz : Brian Harold : Hon. Sheridan L. Moore : Hon. Jack L. Grogins : Hon.William F. Hickey, Jr. : M&T Bank : Jeffrey J. Stempien, Dect. : AbrimHeisler: Heather Scanlon Fiore : Anthony Carmardello: John L. Cox : Lauren Cositore: Defendants : -------------------------------------x Index No.3:2009cv01845

The Hon. Janet Bond Arterton



Plaintiff seeks relieffrom injuries sustained from defendants violation of the Hobbs Act

and Sherman¶s Act (through the Clayton Act) according to 18 USCA § 1964(c) . . . that

providesto any person injured in his or her business or property by reason of a violation of 18 USCA § 1962 may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover treble the damages sustained and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorneys' fee.


1. 06830

Delmo L. Zanette, the plaintiff is a citizen of Connecticut, at 1357 King St., Greenwich

The primary defendants to be hereafter known as: p-defendants are: 2. Ronald Pecunies, a citizen of New York and resides at 220 Central Park South, NY;

owns 25%, of Mercedes Benz of Geenwich [CT] that is the business office of the LLCs 3. Author K. Watson Jr., a citizen of Connecticut and resides at 718 North St, Greenwich

CT; owns ³Watson Enterprises´ and 75% of ³Mercedes Benz of Geenwich.´ 4. Steven G. Philips, a citizen of Connecticut, resides and operates a law practice at 177

Broad St, Stamford CT. Whereby, the p-defendants are the organizers and direct beneficiaries of the criminal enterprise that injured plaintiff. The secondary defendants to be hereafter known as s-defendants are: 5. 6 Robert Kaelin, law office, CityPlace I-185 Asylam St., Hartford CT, 06103 Mark F.Katz, law office 196 North St., Stamford, CT 06905

7. 8. 9. 12.

DemetroisAdamis, law office at 2900 Westchester Ave Donald M. Brown Jr., law office, 1200 Summer St., suite 107, Stamford CT 06902 Elsie Pecorin manager of Wiehart Realtors in Greenwich CT Lauren Cositore, Mark Katz, law office at 196 North St., Stamford CT 06905

The third level defendants to be hereafter known as t-defendants are: 10. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 16 22. 23. 17 18. 19 Hon.William F. Hickey, Jr. Hon. Sheridan L. Moore Hon. Jack L. Grogins John L. Cox is a citizen of Connecticut who operate Anthony Carmardello Joe Cortrano is a citizen of New York. Murtha Cullina LLP, law firm: M&T Bank, commercial bank, 1 M&T Plaza, Buffalo, NY 14203 Weihart Realtors Inc., 1625 Rte. 10 E, Morris Plains, NJ 07950-2905, John McKenna, agent FBI, investigator Shawn Kahanec, agent FBI, Mortgage Fruad Division Bridgeport Office Captain Stephan. Brown, Greenwich Policedept

20 21. 11. 13.

Michael Panza, State¶s Attorney Office, DCJ Investigator, Stamford John Dimattia, Supervising A.S.A. Elder Abuse Crimes CT Michael Panza, of the state attorney¶s office Brian Harold

Whereby, plaintiff declaresall the s-defendants were aware their acts were furthering the fraud by p-defendants with the requisite degree of particularity under Rule 9(b); except s-defendant, Anthony Carmedello. Since his misconduct is linked to the two acts of criminal harassment, without any evidence of scienterindicating his criminal acts furthered p-defendant¶s scheme to defraud; as the others had to of know by the very nature of their wrongful acts. As: ³Malice may be inferred from wrongfully interfering with another¶s property with knowledge that one has no right to do so and such knowledge can be acquired vicariously.´ (Racoosin v. LeSchack, 103 Misc. 2d 629, 426 N.Y.S. 2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1980).

The complained wrongdoings that the p-defendantsperpetrated,iswith their unlawful taking over control of plaintiff¶s property to steal its equity. This is with equity skimmingof over $600,000, whichoccurred fromJune2004 until the present and their intendedact of grand larceny to fraudulently misappropriate for themselves about a million dollars upon the sale of plaintiff¶s property (that they unlawfully control). This ambition to extracting a million dollarswhen


plaintiff sells his property is verifiable as an unimpeachable material fact. As Pecunies has established on record in his testimony before theNorwalk CT, court when in of 2007 he said: ³

Whereas, the p-defendants exploited plaintiff¶s unbridled trust, along withhis gracious concessions of profoundly compromising his business interests for their financial benefit. Sinceplaintiff generously extended good will to P&Wby accommodating what they asked; such that only a father would extend towardsa son in a business arrangement. Yet, they turned plaintiff¶s belief in their honesty and the altruistic good will he extendedto victimize him with outrageous acts of criminal simulation.This is furthered throughconstructive fraud and conspiracy to commit a breach of all the fiduciary duties that they owed plaintiff, such as being entrusted to be the manager of his property. Thereby, perverting their fiduciary relationship with plaintiff, albeit was based on plaintiff¶sconfidence and trust in them that they redounded to perpetrate numerous acts of conversion.

Insomuch asthe p-defendants,willfully and intentionally, violated plaintiff¶s confidence in their professional integrity to consummate fraudulent transactions, which abused their position of trust to the extreme detriment of plaintiff. This is where their claim of right of ownership of plaintiff¶s property exists as a constructive trust,which is the product of fraud and deceit . . . that is furthered by misusing the state courts and apparent bribery of plaintiff¶s lawyers to perform in support of their legal agendas. Along with being supported by the egregiously inappropriate conduct of a judge of the Superior Court, Judge


Since Judge Grogins denied plaintiffof his guaranteed right to be heard in court of equity in a matter in disputeinvolving conflicting claims ofrent payments and right to possession. Thus,in an arbitrary and capricious manner, he decided that the stipulation should not be subjected to being vacated. Since he interfered with plaintiff¶s right to plead his case and refute the prior testimony of Pecunies proclaiming his bogus rights of entitlement and falsified standing. This was on the issue if plaintiff was to be evicted from his property by the LLCs the judge knew he owned 50%. Whereby, on the basis of plaintiff having had signed a one sided stipulation that he was seeking to vacate. Thereby, for plaintiff to be afforded an opportunity to have a trial on the eviction action, since he waved that right before by the stipulation settlement that he claimed not to understand.

The basis of p-defendants¶scheme was built upon having deceivedplaintiff tosignonto documents corresponding to what the p-defendants placed before him. Whereas, all thedocumentsplaintiff signed wereegregiously misrepresented. . . that was to such a degree that plaintiff would never had signed them if not but for these major misrepresentations.

In addition these signed documentscould have been later altered with addition text added,orwere the product of forgery.Since p-defendants filed the transference of title of the deeds from his nameto P&W¶s half ownership, yet this was never presented to plaintiff would occur, and plaintiff¶s witness toall the business meetings at the time would certainly have taken notice.

On the other hand, plaintiff relied on P&W¶s verbal promisesthat were intentionally made in bad faith to induce plaintiff to sign the µcontract¶ where what was verbally promised was not stated.

Yet, even the terms contained in this one sided µcontract¶ were intentionally not adhered to by pdefendants although plaintiff was in full compliance. The agreement was drawn up by pdefendant, Phillips, dated May 27th, 2004(the µcontract¶). Such as wherep-defendants promised plaintiff that they would still allow plaintiff to maintain possession and residential occupancy of the building Purdy¶s Farms building until the property was sold. This is where he could live above the Purdy¶s farm store, in exchange for paying $1,000.00 a month towards the taxes. Although for years plaintiff paid the $1,000 and oversaw However in the past plaintiff had refused all those who asked if he wanted to sell because he did not want to abandon his way of life with farming his land and interacting with the public in his farm store.

Whereby, the negotiations of plaintiff and P&W was with averbal promise of buying the land, but keeping him on as a tenanthad deterred him from ever advertising his property, or seeking out those who had approached him in the past that he arbitrarily rejected by saying he was not interested in selling. Thus, in effect, p-defendants were the only entity that plaintiff ever considered, even though he was once offered 3.2 million in __________ just for the farm land to build a hotel.

Consequently, from p-defendants¶ fraudulent misconduct, their acquisition of 50% ownership was devoid of anyconsent or quid quo pro; but ratheras shown by the µcontract,¶ contained phenomenally inappropriate accommodations, clearly detrimental to plaintiff¶s reasonable business expectations readily obtainable in the free market place. Essentially, plaintiff extendedgenerous concessions compromising his self-interests in the µcontract¶, because pdefendants made verbal promises that they had no intention to perform; such as with

promising___________________ _________________________________. In addition, P&G made numerous verbal promises that were not incorporated in the contract or were intentionally misrepresented that would not be in the µcontract¶, yet were and Pecunies testified to

Most revealing of malicious intent to violate promises that says:

is the last line of the contract

Verbal agreements cannot be raised as incorporated within the intent of a contract according to the Parole Rule. However, the law says that verbal agreements in conflict with a contractual agreement can be raised when

In fact the loan was never a loan because the money was mortgaged from own property a material misrepresentation of what Pecunies told plaintiff,.

of him to facilitate their business interests for theproperty purchase to be the most profitable venture. However, they abused plaintiff¶s good faith accommodations as an opportunity to usurp his rights and powers of owning his property to be substituted with their exclusive control.

In effect, the p-defendants acted to defraud plaintiff bygetting him to sign onto an agreement to sell his property to them on May 27th, 2004. This agreement was presented to plaintiff by pdefendants as to allow them to manage his property in the interim while they made preparations

to buy his property within a two year period(exh. A). Yetwithout putting up any money it gave them exclusivity to buy in a robust market that had increased by more than 21%??over the last year period. Whilethe consensus of the experts at the time was that this property appreciation was expected to continue; as it did substantially by double digits over the next two years.

In effect, p-defendants acted with evil intentto achieve their goal of looting the equity in plaintiff¶s property through criminal activity that §1962(c) defines as a pattern of racketeering. Since they got control through fraud and deceit andthen maintainedtheir control through coercion.Currently the p-defendants are pursuing a buyer for plaintiff¶s property and established their intentionis to take half of the revenue its sale would create after the property¶s debts.

Essentially, through constructive fraud the p-defendantscoerced plaintiff under duressto accept their domination over controlling his property according to their will. Not to mention

The tortious activities of defendantsare dedicated tointimidateplaintiffto fear economic lossif he does not cooperate with whatever they want. Since they convinced plaintiff to believe he can¶t do anything with his property without their consent;and insist they have the right to do whatever they want with his property without even giving him notificationand can call the police to have him removed as a trespasser.

Except with defendants acknowledgingthelegally requirement of notification of plaintiff for him to approve a sale of his property with their equal share after its sale. (Such as where without consulting plaintiff to have rewarded the father of plaintiff¶s double dealing attorney,

Brown;being paid by both sides for the real estate listing to sell plaintiff¶s property for a three digit commission of approximately two hundred thousand. This is received by Defendant Coppiconsis earmarked as who falsely testified to plaintiff¶s malicious conduct that has victimized them by his wanton compulsion to break into the property that he no longer owns but is entitled to have any right but to have of the yielded equity produced by its sale.).

Thus, thep-defendants effectively imposed upon plaintiff that they will only allow his authority to be restricted to where he is required to approve the sale of his property. (This would be with signing away his last rightassociated to his possession corresponding to co-owning the LLCs). Hence, plaintiff¶sonly option to obtain revenue from his property is to allow the sale that they want, since they have maliciously interfered with his ability to benefit from his property.

Currently, the p-defendants have not applied the approximate $10,000.00 monthly revenue the property was producing to pay the mortgage. (Since they deprived plaintiff from receiving these rents and directed it to themselves that they co-mingled with their own funds). Rather, they conducted a scheme to manipulateplaintiff¶s property to be going into foreclosure as a circumstance to coerce his submission to their demands.

Clearly, these are willful and wanton acts of extortion to force plaintiff¶s compliance to what pdefendants want by his capitulation to their self-dealing designs. This was achieved by his signing an agreement on May 27th, 2004 for Pecunies and Watson to manage his property. Then when plaintiff attempted to buy them out in 2006 for offers of $100,000.00 and thereafter


for$600,000.00,they refused. The $600,000.00buyout was before the property was listed and plaintiff found two parties who offered him $4,000,000.00 in 2006.

Yet, although p-defendants did nothing constructive, only pocketing many tens of thousands in rental revenue in addition to$380,000.00 embezzlement, they still said$600,000.00 wasn¶t enough money for them to allow the sale to go through. (Noteworthy was that the $380,000.00 was explained to plaintiff by his own lawyer Aldamis to correspond to penalties that he accepted and did not consider in the buy-out equation. Specifically, plaintiff was duped to believe the penalty occurred from the six months that the p-defendants waited to pay the mortgage after taking over management in May 2004. Consequently, the buyout would have been more around 1.2 million that they refused)


In effect,through fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts, defendants¶ deceived plaintiff into believing that he was helpless before their proclaimed power of legal right. . .that was confirmed by plaintiff¶s lawyers who were in collusion. While all the time unbeknownst to plaintiff until October 2009,fraudulent conveyances of titles to the LCC¶s they controlledwere filed in November 10th 2004. Since, the quit-claims were produced without plaintiff¶s consent or knowledge. Then with refinancing, instead of the p-defendants securing a new fixed mortgage for 4.75% as promised they got an open-end mortgage in the form of a deed trust for 11.5% and clandestinely transferred ownership of his property to the LLC¶s through the bogus quit claims.


Defendant¶s explanation to plaintiff for the setting up the LLC¶s was confined for the only purpose to get refinancing before they purchased the property. Thereafter, plaintiff was tricked and the good faith he extended was transformed into a criminal enterprise of extortion. Thereby, from p-defendants pursuit to obtain ill-gotten gains at the expense of plaintiff, they haveacted to deprive him of receiving millions by selling his property on the open market.

ARGUMENTS OF FACTS CORRESPOND TO LAW CLAIM OF § 1928 VILOLATIONS TORTIOUS ACTS UNDER STATE CIVIL LAW Malicious interference with reasonable business expectancies

Breech of Contract, dated May 27th 2004, in accordance to: § 52-576 (a) Actions for account or on simple or implied contracts : (a) ³No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues . . .´ "[I]n analyzing whether a declaratory judgment action is barred by a particular statutory period of limitations, a court must examine the underlying claim or right on which the declaratory action is based."Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 116 (1992).

As such, since the wrongful acts perpetrated by the defendants flowed out from the µcontract¶ the appropriate statue of limitations period is the six-year statute for written contracts.

Conversion activityis applicable upon the µcontract¶ and the LLC agreement as in accordance to § 52-576 (a). Whereby, plaintiff redounded upon the µcontract¶ with acts of conversion. Thereby,

to conduct unauthorized acts to deprive plaintiff of his rights to his property for an indefinite time and embezzle funds; as: ³Conversion is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right of dominion and to his harm.´ (Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 329 (2004). Consequently, plaintiff can fulfill showing the criteria required for : ³The elements of civil theft are identical to the elements of conversion, with the exception that civil theft requires an additional showing of intent.´ (Sullivan v. Delisa, 101 Conn. App. 605, 620, cert, denied, 283 Conn. 908 (2007)). ³To establish a cause of action for conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) 2) 3) ³The defendant, without authorization; assumed and exercised ownership over property belonging to another; to the exclusion of the owner's rights.´ (News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v.

Marquis, 86 Conn. App. 527 (2004), aff'd, 276 Conn. 310 (2005).

Elder Abuse Fraud Coercion Harassment



Fraudulent conveyance of property(2 acts) occurred on two falsified µQuit-

Claims¶; dated April 22, 2004 and November 3, 2004« that were known to exist by plaintiff, but were filed by p-defendantswith the County Clerk on April 27, 2004 and November 10, 2004. Yet, without the authorization and knowledge of the plaintiff, at best they tricked plaintiff to sign additional papers. Their existence was without his caretaker¶s knowledge; who had accompanied plaintiff to the business meetings whose sure she would have identified.

In fact, plaintiffonly first learned that the tile of his property was transferred to the LLC¶s in the middle of October 2009.The reason to explainthis is because plaintiff relied on all of his four lawyers to perform due-diligence to establish his legal position. Whereby, the circumstances and evidence validates that these lawyers were working for the opposition. Even though by first glance of the case gives a foregone conclusion of bribery, insomuch as what they submitted in their billing was not done; such as where Aldamis stated he researched the records and Katz stated he fileda Notice of Pendance.

Accordingly,plaintiff has absolutely no recollection of ever signing anything except documents represented by p-defendants as corresponding to refinancing and a loan. (In addition, plaintiff was accompanied by his care taker who witnessed all the business meetings and signings. Thus, she certainly would have taken notice if at any time it was mentioned that plaintiff was to willfully transfer title from his possession). This was for two $20,000 loanshe was to receivethat were transferred into mortgages on his property. Therefinancing was for a new mortgage for the LC¶s to get the ratereduced from approximately 8.5% to less than 5%.


As the circumstances is according to what the second circuit court says: ³Actual fraudulent intent, as required to support liability in fraudulent conveyance action, under both New York and Connecticut law, may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the relationship among the parties and the secrecy, haste, or unusual nature of the transaction. (National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc. v. Caro &Graifman, P.C., D.Conn.2003, 259 F.Supp.2d 172).

Whereby, Philips either tricked plaintiff to sign the conveyance of tile to the p-defendants, or the words µquit-claim¶were inserted thereafter, or plaintiff¶ssignature was the product of forgery. Essentially this was where plaintiff transferred his ownership to the LCCs. Whereby, the LLCs were owned: 25%by Pecunies, 25%by Watson, whileplaintiff owns the other 50%.

However, the 50% ownership by Pecunies and Watson was promised to plaintiff wasonlyto be temporary, until refinancing was achieved and then plaintiff would own 100%. Since Pecunies explained to plaintiff it was for theone purpose for him and Watson to getto get the lowest rate possible from their AAA creditthan if plaintiff¶s credit considered.

Consequently, on the basis of the oral bargain plaintiff agreed before assigning the 50% to Pecunies and Watson under the false pretext that as soon as the new mortgage was granted the ownership in the LLCs¶ would be changed to him owning 100%. However, when plaintiff asked Pecunies and Watson for assignment of 100% as promised right after the refinancing was done int


______________???, they both outright refused. Consequently, plaintiff then realized he was dealing with immoral and dishonest individuals who were out to cheat him by exploiting the good faith he extended to them.

Not surprising the contract says all oral bargains will not be honored to deprive from of our guaranteed to rights to be herd ion a court of law on matters of rights to equity




bank fraud (two acts) occurred on November 17th. This is where in

November 2004 defendants fraudulently misappropriated 480,000.000 and the other $500,000 thereafter. This was achieved by the defendantsemploying a scheme or artifice to trick plaintiff to sign two quit claims to thereafter defraud plaintiff by falsification of financial instruments. Thereby, defendantsfraudulently obtain a million dollar loan that they applied for their own use and benefit by unlawfully leveraging a lean on defendant¶s property. In fact it was years later that plaintiff first discovered the lean was placed on his property. Bank Fraud in18 U.S.C. § 1344 states: Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice² (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.


Attempted larceny( 3 acts)a) executed by the p-defendant¶s intent to make available as

preapproved the addition extended credit. This in the form of an open-ended mortgage that cannot be justified by any innocent explanations since the interest rate was usury at 11½ %, as opposed to the 5% rate that was obtainable at the time--since the property was able to generate $10,000 in revenue per month and its value was about 3 to 4 million.


executed by the p- defendant¶s intent to collect half of the revenue

produced after they sold the property. c). beyond the $ executed by the p-defendant¶s intent to collect additional rents

they collected that was agreed to go to defendant as stated below in no. 4.


Extortion and racketeering (4 of 3 acts) ±18 §1951 (a) In April 2009 the

LLCs sent notice to the tenants on the property to quit paying rent to defendant and to direct the payments to them (exh. ). Consequently, all of these tenants were intimidated to immediately quit paying their rent to defendant. Thereby this malicious act cut of his major source of income that he was dependent upon to meet his cost of living expenses; as he has no savings and is in deep debt. "The purpose of the Racketeering Act . . . is to eliminate the infiltration and illegal acquisition of legitimate economic enterprise by racketeering practices and the use of legal and illegal enterprises to further criminal activities." (New Mexico v Andy Rael, Op. no. 1999-NMCA-068)


Embezzlement (numerous acts) -the amount of revenue misappropriated to

Pecunies and Watson¶s personal benefit from rental revenue they collected. Specifically, that was in excess of what was directed to paying the note of $4, monthly, taxes of $5, annually



Extortion and other unlawful criminalacts that injury flowed out from to

cause plaintiff injuries and pose a threat of continued activity are listed below under RICO violations

I. Plaintiff claims federal jurisdiction pursuant to numerous federal questions raised in

this action that are invoked pursuant to:


18 U.S.C. Sec. 242.1 -where defendants willfully deprived plaintiff of his rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be deprived of property without due process of law. As in accordance to statues that state: ³The elements of an 18 U.S.C. § 242 offense are: (1) the defendant's acts must have deprived someone of a right secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the defendant's illegal acts must have been committed under color of law; (3) the person deprived of his rights must have been an inhabitant of a State, Territory, or District; and (4) the defendant must have acted willfully.´ (United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1956)).

³The "constitutional deprivation" element of the section 242 offense charged here consists of three concepts: the right to "property," a "deprivation," and "due process." It is clear that the right to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property is protected by the Constitution. (United States v. Konovsky,202 F.2d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 1953).


Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) ; to vacate final judgment of eviction against petitioner from

his own property, by proving the decision was a product of a fraud upon the court (Power of a court to vacate judgment for fraud regarded as inherent and independent of statutory provisions authorizing the opening of judgments and, hence, judgments obtained by may be attacked at any time. (Kenworthy v. Kenworthy (1980) 429 A.2d 837, 180 Conn. 129).;


28 USCA § 1331, which provides for the jurisdiction of the United States

district courts over RICO claims arising under the laws of the United States. (Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ;


Sherman AntitrustActviolations;criminalizes not only the acts of restraint of trade and

monopoly, but any attempt, intent, or conspiracy to engage in restraint of trade or monopoly.(It does not explicitly define either restraint of trade or monopoly, so wide authority is granted de facto to the Government and Courts). This law prohibits contracts or agreements that restrain trade ³unreasonably.´ Violations are determinedwhen the wrongdoer tries to maintain or acquire a monopoly position through ³unreasonable methods.´For the courts, a key factor in determining what is unreasonable is whether the practice has a legitimate business justification. Section §1 - Outlaws every contract, combination«, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. ³Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any


combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony.´ Whereby, defendants acted in conspiracy to further the common goal of restraining plaintiff from the ability to benefit from a market value return from the equity in his property. This is through malicious conduct of interference and illegitimately imposing their control and pecuniary involvement to benefit by fraudulent claims of right, based on agreements, contracts and misuse of the State Courts. This was vigorously perpetrated with activities to affect an illegal restraint withtrade by interfering with free competition in plaintiff¶s business with his property and its commercial transactions. Section§2 -Monopolizing Trade ; ³Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States« shall be deemed guilty of a felony.´

Whereby, the p-defendants without any legitimate business justification have imposed their dominance to maintain a monopoly position tocontrol the sale of plaintiff¶s property. This wasachieved over the last 3½ years,through methods constituting a ³coercive monopoly,´ made possible by the collusion of plaintiff¶s lawyers. In fact, allof the p-defendants¶ claim of right is bogus and is fraudulently based on the existence of the LCCs . . . that came about through a breeched contractual agreement to buy or sell plaintiff¶s property by May 2006;and thesubsequent intended sale of the property involves interstate commerce.


³Suits by persons injured´±for violations of the Sherman act is applicable under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,Title 15 U.S.C.chapter 1, §15: . . . (b)³any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court«, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney fee.´ (Corresponds to commerce and trade, involving monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade; and injuries to flow out from these actions)

Essentially,the offended conduct of defendants is in a conspiracy under the auspices of the LCCs¶for the furtherance of the LLCs¶ intent of establishment to create interference with trade. Specifically, this interference is where the agenda of the LLCs¶ existence is applied as a constructive trust to impose a restraint in plaintiff¶s ability to sell his own property.

This is wherethe contractual agreement between opposing parties had set up the LCCs as a 50-50 partnership, which is in effect a trust corpus exploited toact in bad faith of the µcontract.¶ Thereby, to undermine, block,and usurp plaintiffof exercising his rights, privileges and desire to sell his property himself on the ³open market´ independent of their dreaded involvement. This would bein accordance to plaintiff¶s independent will and legitimate rights to engage in trade unfettered by the p-defendant¶s dominance and exclusivecontrol under the color of the LLCs.

Yet, even if the best light scenario was considered on the face of the LLCs being 50-50 owned between parties, such as µe.g.¶ if there was equal investment. Still p-defendants¶ conduct with the shutting out plaintiff from having any say or involvement with the sale of his property, or administration thereof, is in violation of our guaranteed rights to the equity we own.

Not to mention,defendants conduct is averse to the principals of corporate and contract law. Since they requireplaintiff must be adjoined in any decision made. Whereby, mutual consent is required for any decisions concerning any property equally owned by two parties. However, the ongoing and present situation of the 50-50 partnership is where p-defendants act independentof plaintiff¶s expressed interests of what he wants.In fact, once plaintiff signed as a member of the LCCs, no other inclusion ever occurred, neither was he sent the filed reports, only fist seeing them in January 2010.In fact it can be said that all the conduct of p-defendants with doing business with plaintiff is averse to the laws of theland.

Consequently, it appears all ofp-defendants activities under the auspices of the µcontract¶ and in the name of the LCCs,is to force plaintiff to yield their evil and malicious intentions. Since through extortionist conduct, they have clearly defined their intentions to extract the lion¶s share of the equity out of plaintiff¶s property. Such as, to illegitimately receive proceeds from the sale of plaintiff¶s property. This is from by having positioned themselves to maintain total control of its ability to be the only privilegedparty to collect rents-even if they are not applying it to the property debts as contractual agreed under the contract. Essentially p-defendants act with perverting the law as artifice to exploit for extortion and to control its sale as if they were the rightful owners.

Thereafterits sale, it is a material factof record that they intend to misappropriate to themselves half of the revenue the property produces upon its salethrough fraud and deceit. (Not to mention


they are in a position to impose a sale with a kickback to themselves if they so desire; and are paying off one of their conspirators with a real estate commission at plaintiff¶s expense).

In effect, thep-defendants, under the color of the existence of the LCCsrefer to this as the basis for them to usurp plaintiff¶s rights and powers to control his own property. Whereby,Pecunies and all four of plaintiff¶s lawyersgave false declarations to harm his legal position and fraudulently support the case of his opposition. This is verified by the record of the Norwalk Court. Whereeveryone except plaintiff played fast and loose with the truth. Such as saying pdefendant promised for in return for p-defendants saving property from foreclosure was that after the property was sold they would be entitiled to half of what it could be sold for.promised by plaintiff that they could have half of the equity created upon the sale of his property in return for their involvement.

§ 5Federal Trade Commission Act±³Unfair methods of competitionis outlawed,´(but does not define unfair, restraint in trade, or monopoly). The Supreme Court ruled violations of the Sherman Act are violations of Section 5 of FTC laws. This is under: Title 15, Chapter 2, subchapter 1, §45 ; ³Unfair methods of competition that is unlawful ; (a)Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; (2)The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.´


³An act or practice is deceptive if it involves a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and the representation, omission, or practice is material.´ (Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Minuteman Press, 53 F. Supp. 2d 248, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).

Whereby, the p-defendants conducted a ³coercive monopoly´ to prohibit plaintiff from selling his property independent of their fiduciary involvement (which was self-dealing). This is with ³unfair methods of competition [and]with unfair or deceptive acts or practices,´ in or affecting [interstate] commerce. Consequently according to this law, their business conduct as persons, the µcontract,¶ and the LLCs as a functioning corporation, engaged in conduct that egregiously violatesthe antitrust laws.

Defendants acted in a systematic manner to unlawfully monopolize plaintiffs approach to the real estate marketto require they get a share of any money he receives that they arbitrarily determine. Essentially, they ran roughshod over the principals of fair play and the laws protecting his rights.Thereby, to force plaintiff¶s compliance to their demands, they used tactics of harassment, threats, and intimidation. Although, the greatest pressure that defendants are bringing to bear on plaintiff is with abusing the authority of the LLCs to make him homeless and destitute. Since, defendants violated the agreement made before the contract that plaintiff could live off the $2,600.00 monthly revenue from collected rents. This is where P&G would receive $6,700.00 monthly rents to pay of the properties debts (mostly embezzled) and plaintiff could collect the rest. Yet,they forced these tenants who were paying rent to plaintiff to quit in April 2009, by imposing such a demand; yet this was with plaintiff¶s primary income.

Insomuch as under the Sherman Act,the prohibited activitiesperpetrated by defendants was with material misconduct executed by³persons, partnerships, and corporations.´ This is where defendantsutilized these afore stated entities to carry out unfair methods of competition, in or affecting commerce,to cause plaintiff to sustain injury.Whereby, the defendants acted in consort to defraud plaintiff, by applying a palpable degree of deceitful conduct and with unconscionable business practices to coerce his compliance.

In effect,the prohibited activities of defendants werededicated to ensure theyfinancially benefited from whenplaintiff¶s property was sold. Thus, through racketeering activities they acted to guarantee they would share in his financial windfall. This was actedout in a scheme to depriveplaintiff of exercising the option to sell his property independent of defendants control and involvement. Most noteworthy is that Pecunies laid bare his intentions in _______ of 2007 to cheat plaintiff. This is when he testified on the Norwalk court record and said: ³

Thispurposed one million compensation to plaintiff forhis property is in sharp contrast to the amounthe would have received if not but for hissigning the µcontract¶; and the subsequentimposedcontrol of the LLC¶s. (This is with considering the property¶s production of $9,000.00 monthly rental revenue applied towards covering the property¶s debts from May 2004, instead of going into P&G¶s pockets). Insomuch asthe four million sale in _____ 2006 was interfered by the LLCs without any legitimate justification. Consequently, plaintiff would have netted about three million without defendants¶ involvement, based on a deviously deigned sales agreement composed with ill intent.

Not to mention,the purposed sale of plaintiff¶s property through the µcontract¶ and the LLCs produced absolutely no benefit for plaintiffwhatsoever, only creating emotional distress. Since the µcontract¶ was presented by the defendants in bad faithtogain an unfair advantage to exploit and mistreat plaintiff. Thereby,through the µcontract¶s¶ creation of the LLCs, it was applied as an artifice to a scheme to impose financial lossesupon plaintiff. Thereafter, the lost revenue of plaintiff could then be directed towards defendants¶benefit and agenda to obtainill-gotten financial enrichment at plaintiff¶s expense. This appears to be by any means possible; even with driving him to an early grave, where he would not be able to contest their fraudulent claims.

Wherefore, plaintiff was maliciously injured by defendants¶ violation of antitrust laws. Specifically, by their outrageous misuse and intentional perversion of the µcontract,¶ presented as a purchase agreement, and their activities in the operation of the corporation LCCs. Whereby, as persons they acted as empowered by right under the color of the existence of the ³contract¶ and the LLCs as corporations. This is with their abuse to establish the basis for defendants¶ dominion over plaintiff¶s right to sell his property and privilege to benefit from its potential equity, such as its rental income.

In effect, defendant¶s control and interference is contributed to their material misconduct with constructive fraud and extortion . . .that was intended to create a coercive monopoly and restrain plaintiff from benefiting from selling his property in the open marketplace.


Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 violations where :

use of civil RICO action (18 USCS § 1964) as a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against respected and legitimate enterprises allegedly engaged in pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct.(Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co.(1985) 473 US 479, 87 L Ed 2d 346, 105 S Ct 3275). . .Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) applies to allegations of fraud brought under § 1964, part of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 USCS §§ 1961-1968.(Flores v Emerich&Fike (2006, ED Cal) 416 F Supp 2d 885).

in 18 USCS § 1964 the civil remedies are where the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section §1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.

in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise¶s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. In order to state a RICO claim under § 1962, a plaintiff must first demonstrate statutory standing under RICO.


Whereas, plaintiff has standing for a civil RICO action because he meets the two threshold showings established inMaio v. Aetna: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury to his business and to the equity from his property; and (2) that the plaintiff¶s injury was proximately caused by the defendant¶s violation of § 1962. (Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000).

³Section 1961(4) states that an enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal entity." The entities which have been held to be RICO enterprises are numerous and include individuals and corporations. (United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987), affd, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 924 (1990) ;. . . partnerships, (Silverman v. Niswonger, 761 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ;courts.´ (United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d United States v. Brennan, 629 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), offd, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986),cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1022 (1989).

Wherefore, the RICO enterprise in this matter could be considered to exist as: µindividuals and corporations¶; µpartnerships¶ and by activities carried out in the µcourts.¶The defendants act on behalf of, and under the purview of the LLCs, where they are associated together for a common purpose in a course of conduct to defraud plaintiff. As statues state: ³For purposes of 18 USCS § 1962(c), corporation can simultaneously be RICO "enterprise" and "person." (District 65¶ v Prudential Sec. (1996, ND Ga) 19 EBC 2786,.)


Whereby, plaintiff can state and validate facts to establish : ³(i) the existence of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce; (ii) that defendants were employed by or associated with the enterprise; (iii) that the defendant participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and (iv) that defendants participated through a pattern of racketeering activity with numerous racketeering acts. (Sedima, S.P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).

in accordance to §1961(4), the LLCs¶ can be defined as a RICO µenterprise¶ and all the defendants are involved with the LLCs as associated in fact. Outside of plaintiff having 50% ownership in the LLCs, he has been completely shut out from having any say or involvement in all of its business. Rather, the LLCs¶ affairs and activities have been under the total purview of the defendants. In effect, the LLCs from its conception has existed as essentially defendants color of right to empower them with the authority (albeit bogus) to dominate over plaintiff and trump his expressed interests and wants.

The fact history with the circumstances and evidence indicates the defendants function as a continuing unit; and that the LLC¶s are utilized as their platform. Thereby, the LLCs¶ existence has cloaked the defendantswith an appearance of legitimacy. Since the activities of the defendants indoing business with plaintiff in the name of the LLCs iswith conducting a criminal enterprise.

Essentially, the existence of the LLCs is what defendants utilize as a ³structure´ to base their operations upon that is a separate entity apart from their pattern of criminal activity. Essentially,

the LLCs are a façade of legitimacy, fabricated with bad faith intentions from fraud and deceit. Consequently, defendants in the name of the LLCs perpetrated criminal acts,constituting a pattern of racketeering activity. Since the activity by defendantsin the name of the LLCs involved similar purposes, results, participants and targeted plaintiff as its victim.

In effect, the defendants¶ actions to support the agenda of the enterprise involved deception and an extortion scheme perpetrated against plaintiff. This is where defendants continued to use wrongful threats and some members acted surreptitiously to support the interests of the enterprise. Not to mention, deceit was material to the success of the conspiracy. Consequently, the result of all of the acts of misconduct by the defendants is that through intimidation, for over five years,they have extorted plaintiff out of exercising and benefiting from the rights to his property. As the predicate acts defendants perpetrated conspiracy to further the extortion involve theft, bribery and various types of fraud done in a palpable and pervasive pattern.

Consequently, the LLCs can be viewed as an enterprise that is associated with all of the defendants¶ actions. Essentially, the LLCs¶ exists with an established hierarchical structure, as where the p-defendants maintain a role of authority. This is where the p-defendants can be assumed to have the authority for decision-making and controlling and directing group affairs on what performance is expected from the s-defendants.

Thus, the overall relationship of the p-defendants with the s-defendants and their collective actions constitutes an ongoing organization which had organized framework for making decisions and overseeing and coordinating the commission of various predicate offenses.

Furthermore, the wrongful activities in the name of LLCs have existed as an ongoing and continuous basis rather than ad hoc basis. (SeeRicobene, 709 F.2d at 222).

The prohibited activities, set forth by §1962, is where p-defendants conspired in a criminal conspiracy in violation of §1962. Insomuch as they unlawfully received income derived directly, or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity tosteal from plaintiff. This is where they redirected funds that plaintiff was legally entitled to receive for their own use and benefit; such as from the rental revenue generated by plaintiff¶sproperty. Since the p-defendants utilized the LLCs as an enterprise to unlawfully demanded rent from the tenants in a pattern of racketeering. Specifically the most obscene instance is where defendants boldly interfered even without the slightest justification they could refer to in a constructive context of right. In a nutshell, the indictable criminal activities of a RICO nature, perpetrated by defendants are brazen acts of antitrust, extortion, embezzlement, and bank fraud.

-Insomuch as the initial agreement of a verbal nature was___________?


18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) -extortion obtaining property from another with his consent

induced, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force fear..orunder the color of official right.


18 U.S.C.§1957 - Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from

specified unlawful activity (a) knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary


transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity


18 U.S.C. § 213 - Acceptance of loan or gratuity by financial institution examiner


18 U.S.C. § 215 - Receipt of commissions or gifts for procuring loans


18 USCS § 1001 -Fraud and False Statements :


In violation of § 1001(a) (1) - Defendants falsified, concealed, and covered up

by trickery, scheme, and fraudulent quit claims the material fact that after the agreement expired in may of 2006


In violation of §1001(a) (2) Defendants made materially false, fictitious, or

fraudulent statement or representation; or


In violation of §1001(a) (3) makes or uses any false writing or document

knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry of :

4). following:

In violation of §1001(c) Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the



that they had the right and authority to demand for rents being paid

to plaintiff to be redirected to them on April 2009. b).


18 U.S.C. §1014 - making false statements on loan applications

All of the defendants acted in a conspiracy that according to § 2. Principals committed offenses against the laws of the United States criminal code. This is where they acted in concert to further the goals of the conspiracy by aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, to induce or procure its commission. Furthermore, all of the defendants willfully and intentionally caused the criminal acts produced by the conspiracy to be done. Consequently all participants perpetrating wrongful acts in furtherance of the goals of the conspiracy are punishable as the principal wrongdoers.

Petitioner is complaining of defendants "racketeering activity", as defined in section 1961 (l) and in the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951); where they acted in a conspiracy to further the p-defendantsactivities of deception, extortion and terrorization. This is by defendants usurping plaintiff¶s rights and powers to his property, under the color of law and right, as: "Generally under section 1961 (1) racketeering activity consist of no more or less than the commission of a predicate act." (Selma, SPRL v Imrex Co., Inc, 473 U.S. 479,495 [1985]). Defendants harmed plaintiff by engaging in a criminal enterprise through ³racketeering activity´ to violate § 1961 (1) (A).Whereas, their activitiesconstituted crimes of attempted robbery and

attempted extortion and consummated acts ofrobbery and extortion. Moreover,defendants committed specific penal violationsunder § 1961 (1) (B)of Title 18 of the U.S. Codethat are listed below«and with consideration of the circumstances and the evidence can be considered as indictable:


§ 201 - Bribery of public officials and witnesses

According to defendants own accounting Philips received $103,000 under the pretext of being a trustee that was unlawfully debited upon plaintiff and to date is applied to his use and benefit. (exh )Consequently, this can be concluded that it was to influenced Philips to commit fraudulent notarization on the authenticity of instruments that he had to have known were fraudulent, This was where he applied official acts of being a notary to aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, or make opportunity for the commission of a fraud, on the United States; via the County clerk who participated with exercising her official duty. This was manifested by accepting the filling of the fraudulent quit claims and derivative lean on plaintiff¶s property.

k) l) m)

§ 1341 - mail fraud§ 1341 - wire fraud § 1344 (2) - financial institution fraud ;

Whereby,through a scheme to defraud the p-defendantsobtained funds "under the custody or control of" a bank that were debited upon plaintiff on or about November 17, 2004. This was

achieved by plaintiff authorizing release of funds from a bank to cover refinancing with a new mortgage. Yet p-defendants violated this authorization and took $380,000 more for their own use and benefit; plus they opened a line of credit of another $520,000.00 by putting a 2 million lean on plaintiff¶s property. To wit now the $520,000.000 line of credit is now exhausted by P&G¶s neglect to apply the approximately $7,000.00 monthly rental revenue they collected that they directed into their own pockets.

Thereby, perpetrating two acts of fraud involving bank fraud by their unlawful securing and profiting from an open-end mortgage they secured in 2004. Although the open end total amount of approximately $900,000.00 was not drawn upon,they clandestinely stole $380,000.00 of the excess cash generated from their refinancing the mortgage. Since thep-defendants misrepresented to plaintiff that the refinancing that they had him authorize was only to obtain a lower mortgage rate. Insomuch as defendants duped plaintiff to believe that his authorizing the refinancing and the setting up of the LLCs was only for that purpose.

Whereby, the open-end mortgage that the p-defendants obtained is a security instrument, subject to being traded, not the type of note corresponding to a common mortgage. This loan was absolutely not authorized by plaintiff, rather plaintiff was duped to cooperate with signing the documents they wanted under the falsehood it was to reduce the mortgage rate from 8½ % to below 5%. However, they obtained a usury rate of 11 ½ %, established a note thatis as a deed trust and a derivative that leveraged $2,000.000 on plaintiff property.


Wherefore, p-defendants exploited the LLCs as an enterprise for the commission of the stated embezzlement, which involved interstate commerce. This is by the financial institution of M&T Real Trust, located in Buffalo New York, requiring a wire transfer of funds between states. Whereas according to statues, p-defendants embezzlement on face constitutes wire and mail fraud in violation of RICO.

The hundreds in thousands in rents that W&P collected did not go towards paying the mortgage as was agreed, instead this money was embezzled by them. Consequently, the $520,000 balance was applied from the open-end credit in lieu of mortgage payments for the property to now be in default and foreclosure.In addition, it can be concluded that these ill-gotten funds defendants obtained from the mortgage derivative and rental revenue were applied to maintain their RICO enterprise. Since, these were funds that directly or indirectly, could be used to maintain their interest and control of the enterprise; such as with the court costs in housing court and compensating the participating lawyers.

n). o). p). q). r).

§ 1503 - obstruction of justice and corruptly influencing Officers of the Court. § 1512 - tampering with a witness, and victim..); § 1513 - retaliating against a victim«) ; § 1546 - fraud and misuse of documents ; § 1951 - interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion;


³Defendants RICO liability is predicated on activity found to be "extortion" by causation of fear which preventedplaintiff from exercising his property rights, such as right to make business decisions free from wrongfully imposed outside pressures is violation of 18 USCS § 1951. (Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v McMonagle (1988, ED Pa) 689 F Supp 465. s). t). § 1952 - racketeering ; § 1957 - engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from

specified unlawful activity ; In addition to violating other statutory provision under Title 18 that are:


§241 - Conspiracy against rights-

Defendants conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate plaintiff, in the free exercise or enjoyment of his rights and privileges corresponding to ownership of his property . . .that is secured to him by the Constitution and/or laws of the United States. Moreover, defendants, willfully acted with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of his rights and privileges afforded by his ownership.


§ 242. - Deprivation of rights under color of law-

This is where defendants willfully subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.


§ 1623 - false declarations before the court


The extortion existed from the point in time in ________? of200_______? when plaintiff realized that the p-defendants were acting in bad faith. Consequently, plaintiff communicated the desire he no longer be bound to the agreement. Yet, defendants were able to impress upon plaintiff the belief that he was bound by the agreement and with the collaboration of a plaintiff¶s own lawyers communicated to him the belief that he could not do anything with his property independent of the will of the p-defendants. Thereby, the result was that defendant was coerced to accepted defendant dominance to control

In addition, defendant¶s extortion of plaintiff was clearly defined by their acts during the course of the legal proceeding to evict plaintiff and gain an unlawful advantage to cheat plaintiff.

This was in Norwalk Housing Court and later in the Connecticut Superior Court Mediation Division. Essentially, defendants¶ cause of action was completely propped up by perpetrating a hoax on the court.

The goal of this litigation is to prove defendants committed extortion under color of official right by misusing the authority and powers of the court to deprive plaintiff of his rights and powers. This was achieved by perverting the discretionary powers of the judges as public officers to innocently participate in ruling according to the designs of their scheme. As the artifices to scheme are the falsified court instruments, and a massive degree of fraud upon the court. This is where plaintiff¶s own lawyers Adamis, Brown and Heisler to participated in the scheme. Since


they coerced plaintiff to sign onto stipulations; such that agreed to open the door for defendants to petition the execution of final judgment of eviction.

In addition, the pleadings and relief that defendants sought was to utilize a court order to stifle plaintiff was achieved by the signed stipulation. This was to prohibit plaintiff from communicating the facts corresponding to right of title or that he was expecting $1.9 million after the properties sale. Since it would be a concern of defendants that plaintiff should not contradict their expressed ambitions that they intended to only share half of what would be left over after the 1.5 million note was paid off. This is where defendants imposed a $400,000 debt upon plaintiff that they pocketed for their own benefit. Or any other information plaintiff might say about the status of his ownership in the property or the property sales co-venture.

Even though the co-venture agreement was moot having expired years before in May 2006, the LCC still existed under the color of law and defendants imposed their authority to control plaintiffs property against his wishes that was substantiated as a matter of defendants legal right by plaintiff¶s own lawyers. Since, they acted in collusion to defraud plaintiff by the defendants forcing their control over his property. This is where plaintiff¶s lawyers told him that there was nothing he could legally do accept to settle with defendants______________________ ????

Moreover, the fact history supports the conclusion that defendants executed a devious scheme to sell the disputed property and appropriate to themselves half of the equity. Albeit after the approximately 1.5 million debt that they incurred was met. Now with considering that defendants have already pocketed $500,000 means that if they share two million net of the sale they would

walk away with 1.5 million. Yet, this is without putting up a cent of their money and simultaneously depriving plaintiff from receiving three million. This is the money plaintiff would have been paid in 2006, if not but for their malicious interference, which substituted with him receiving approximately one million instead of the three million.

Since in order for the defendants to sell the property they would need the unreserved authorization of plaintiff to verify that there was clear title that was legitimately obtained. Yet, the fact that defendants did not achieve their final goal with selling the property does not mean they cannot be held liable for extortion to appropriate the equity from the sale of the property. This is even after the agreement lapsed, along with the 3 year statute of limitation for fraudulent conveyance in civil court and 5 years for criminal prosecution. This time of defendants¶ inaction was directly due to the apparent complicity with supporting the defendants¶ agenda.

The additional $500,000 line of credit via a preapproved leveraging of a lean on the property was not exploited. This can be established as material fact by the court records involving defendant¶s testimonies. Specifically, with declaring the intention based on a bogus claimed agreement and entitlement to share half of the profits from the sale of both properties is a crime; as:

³In the Hobbs act´ the mere threat of an effect on interstate commerce will make the statute applicable even if the actual effect never occurs. (United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59 (7th Cir.)).


In fact, plaintiff was routinely subjected to mental dominance and emotional abuse by his lawyer, defendant, Donald Brown. Brown¶s mistreatment of plaintiff constituted elder abuse, since he shamelessly bullied Plaintiff to coerce compliance to his demands. Such as when Brown would dictate to plaintiff what to do, say or sign something he frequently would scream µfuc*ing¶ profanities to coerce plaintiff µs compliance to his demands through his own will, averse to defendants expressed volition.

Shamelessly, plaintiff¶s lawyer, Brown, bullied and exploited his vulnerability to be easily subjected to comply with coercion to force compliance. This was by his dominating his will to eventually overpower the weak and timid mind of plaintiff. Thereby, Brown routinely pressured plaintiff into arbitrary compliance, such as with forcing him to sign the stipulation by unrelentingly badgering him until he complied. Moreover, Brown misrepresented to plaintiff that it was of importune necessity and urgency he sign the stipulation, because if he did not they would be able to suck out all the equity out of his property and he would lose everything. Thus, defendant was tricked to have feared that if he did not comply with the demands of his lawyer to sign the stipulation this would cause him to endure a devastating economic disaster as a result.

Robert Kalin who represented them in their actions as an attorney at law is by defacto a public attorney, and an officer of the court, who is issued a commission, is certified and licensed for a fixed tenure by the state. Kalin perpetrated fraud upon the court to create the facade of how some standing in a cause of action according to the law. Steven Phillips perverted plaintiff¶s trust when he had him sign papers for two loans and at each time tricked him to sign a quit-claim by misrepresenting them as additional paperwork for the loan

The mortgage note defendants obtained was averse to the agreement that it was to be strictly for refinancing at a rate below 5%, was in all actuality a security for a credit derivative. Specifically, a financial instrument that is equity based derived from the tangible assets of leveraged real estate.

Even, though the known market value of plaintiff¶s property had an underlying value of about $4,000,000, and about 1.1 million in notes owed. This made a 1.5 million mortgage not a high risk as consistent to the type of note defendants obtained. Yet, M & T Real Estate leveraged a two million dollar lean on the two properties to secure its note.

In effect, the defendants achieved authorization from plaintiff to refinance by promising plaintiff of securing a mortgage rate of less than 5%. This was consistent to what was available on the mortgage market at the time. Yet, the refinancing was transformed into a security note, a fungible, negotiable instrument representing financial value of two million dollars. This is on the basis of M & T Real Estate putting up $1, 480, 000, and 00.00 to set up the derivative. This clearly was not a mortgage refinancing, rather a negotiable instrument representing a financial value of two million that could be sold as financial paper.

It shocks the conscience that the rate of the note was set at 11 & 1/2% for 2 years of only interest, which was ½ % below the maxim legal rate of the usury 12% for high risk. Yet, this is in spite of the fact that the legal rate at the time was 8%, and interest rates of 4.75% fixed for 2 years were readily available. Especially since the amount obtained was about 38% of the true

appraised value of the property. Consequently, obtaining a low rate of 4.75 or better for 2 years could have been easily secured as a normal mortgage without any consequential lean placed on the properties.

Noteworthy, is that the commercially published statistics of the National Monthly Averages of in November 2004: 5.26% 15 year FRM ; 5.83% 30 years FRM ; and 4.23% 1 year ARM.

Whereby, when Steven Philips signed on to the two quit-claims, he abused and perverted his power, authority and the public¶s trust of sovereignty to attest to the genuineness of documents. Since, by Philips signing onto the quit-claims he implemented his official power as a certified notary. Consequently, he committed two incorporated offenses to constitute a predicate act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) and under § 1951 by his extortion of Del under color of official right. This was consummated by Philips filing under the color of law, two instruments with the County Clerk that he misused the clerk¶s discretionary authority without her knowledge. Not to mention defendants Phillips has limited power of attorney and the other name of Philips has power over the

The extortion was carried out by defendants under the color of official right that is in violation of the The Hobbs Act(18 U.S.C. § 1951), § 50.03 Instruction 50-18 Definition of ³Extortion Under Color of Official Right´:

Extortion under color of official right is the use of one's position as a public official, or the authority of public office, to obtain money or services not due the official or his public office.

(United States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2000) ; United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1982) .

Defendants¶ misconduct constituted various proscribed activities of extortion; this was achieved by fraudulently attesting to right of total control of the property, depriving plaintiff of any rights whatsoever. In effect, mental dominance of plaintiff to block plaintiff from affirming his expressed wishes of vigorous adjudication of the matter. Consequently, defendants usurped plaintiff¶s rights to his equity and powers inherent to owning property by substituting his rights with theirs. Such as by defendants collecting numerous hundreds of thousands of its equity for their own use and benefit.

Defendants even evicted plaintiff from his own property by misuse of the judicial process. Plaintiff¶s own lawyers participated with the opposition¶s perpetration of a fraud upon the court. Consequently, plaintiff was forced to live in a cheap hotel for 6 months until he gained enough self confidence to move back into his previous home on 1357 King. In effect, Plaintiff moved back onto his other property than the one he was evicted from occupying seven months ago.

This action is based on mortgage and security fraud, fraudulent conveyance of tile of two properties composing four acres in Greenwich Connecticut.


harassment, coercion, intentional and unintentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, extortion, bribery, and racketeering

Defendants while acting under color of law, willfully and unlawfully exacted and took $380,000.00 by deceitfully leveraging a two leans against plaintiff¶s property. This was a derivative, an open end mortgage, cashed at 1.5 Million and pre approval for up to another $500,000.00 upon demand of Pecunies who signed onto the instrument as the µexecutive director¶ of the LCs.

------In addition, defendants

In effect, defendants¶ under the color of right perverted their positions as µmanagers¶ to pocket funds yielded as a surplus of rents, in the numerous tens of thousands to be determined. Not to mention blatant acts constituting racketeering, such as with demanding by legal notice, and other coercive pressuring resulted in all of the tenants who were the primary source of plaintiff¶s revenue immediately quit and every since ³paying him their rent, and thereby, redirect this rent to them intimidation interfered with the tenants payment of rents

--------extracting revenue harassing plaintiff to force him to vacate his own property Thereby, defendants willfully deprived plaintiff of his right under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be deprived of property without due process of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 242.

The elements of an 18 U.S.C. Sec. 242 offense are: (1) the defendant's acts must have deprived someone of a right secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the defendant's illegal acts must have been committed under color of law; (3) the person deprived of his rights must have been an inhabitant of a State, Territory, or District; and (4) the defendant must have acted willfully.´(United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1956)).

The "constitutional deprivation" element of the section 242 offense charged here consists of three concepts: the right to "property," a "deprivation," and "due process." It is clear that the right to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property is protected by the Constitution. (United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 1953).

In effect, this is exactly how defendants in an unrelenting manner and for over the last five and a half years wantonly injured plaintiff to defraud him by coercive dominance and intimidation.

--------to their extorting plaintiff out of his rights and powers by forcing him to submit to their taking over his property and assets. Thereby, defendants extracted the equity out of plaintiff¶s property for their own use and benefit. .As a result of defendants¶ malicious mistreatment of plaintiff his prior prosperous quality of life was substituted with feelings of outrage, anger, misery, poverty from the horror of being victimized.

Defendants were outrageously cruel in the manner they mistreated plaintiff to achieve their goal of illegitimately taking over plaintiff¶s property and terrorize him to cause a premature death.

Since, plaintiff early death would clearly support the evil designs defendants have implemented as a scheme and artifices to extort plaintiff.

This was done in a palpable and pervasive pattern of dishonesty, sustained by a myriad of fraudulent misrepresentations including falsified instruments of the court. Consequently, it is clear that defendants are engaged in a criminal enterprise where each defendant carried out specific acts in its furtherance. This was with acts of collusion of plaintiff¶s own lawyers with other defendants, and fraud upon the court. Since all the lawyers performed the important steps in execution to guarantee the materialization of defendants¶ criminal objectives. Thus, their conduct verifies the existence of a conspiracy engaged in an enterprise to deprive plaintiff of the rights to his property. The issue of fraud upon the court has been determined as a matter of law by the 10th and 7th Circuit Courts that say:

³Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court. . . Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted." (Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985)). . . [It] embrace(s) that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication a decision


produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.´(Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968)).

In addiction fraud on the court corresponds to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--decided in the 2nd Circuit court: [That] rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment on the basis of fraud.´ (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-46 64 S.Ct. 997, 1000-01, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.) (percuriam), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 883, 93 S.Ct. 173, 34 L.Ed. 2d 139 (1972); DankeseEng'g, Inc. v. Ion

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) provides that a party to an action may by motion seek to vacate a judgment on the grounds of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence, or (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party, within one year of the entry of a final judgment.´. . . ³Relief from a final judgment may also be obtained at any time by way of an independent action to set aside a judgment for "fraud upon the court.". . .

Plaintiff alleges that under federal statutes many of his constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities have been violated and that the facts form the basis of criminally conducting a scheme and artifices that includes fraudulent security instruments, constituting interference with interstate commerce:


For over the last 5 &1/2 years the defendants engaged in a conspiracy with a palpable pervasive pattern of outrageous criminal activity to inflict harm onto plaintiff. Their misconduct is dedicated to extort property belonging to plaintiff by intimidate, fear and coercion.

Thereafter, plaintiff¶s property has been misapplied for their exclusive use and benefit as if they were the owners. Clearly, such misconduct is prohibited by RICO, as with: 1) acquiring or maintaining control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity 2) and conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and (3) conspiring to do any of the above. These are the activities constituting a RICO offense, determined in United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1196 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Zang, 703 F. 2d. 1186).

RICO also permits civil suits; by anyone injured in his business or property because of a RICO violation. Prohibited activities of Racketeering is defined as "the organized use of threats, coercion, intimidation. . . ." 74 C.J.S.Racketeer (1951). Congress' intent, which was to eliminate labor racketeering, is found in the House and Senate Reports on the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979, which was the precursor of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).

Defendants extorted control and rights of ownership from plaintiff by coercing him under the color of law, and by perpetrating a hoax in Housing Court with fraud upon the court to extort equity from his property.


Whereby, a violation of civil RICO in §1962 (c) requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. The plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these elements to state a claim. Conducting an enterprise that affects interstate commerce is obviously not in itself a violation of §1962, nor is mere commission of the predicate offenses.

Accordingly, plaintiff¶s standing is that he: ³can recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.´ (473 U. S. 479, 496-97, 105 S, Ct 325. 3285) This is consistent to the RICO misconduct of defendants, which caused plaintiff to endure devastating harm to his property of equity and quality of life.

Thus, this action arises under Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 1961-68) (1994).

"The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, which forbids a person to conduct an "enterprise" through, or make use of income derived from, "a pattern of racketeering activity." "Conspiracy to engage in such conduct is also prohibited" in 18 U.S.C. 1962(a)-(c) (1994).

Wherefore, plaintiff is pursuing the relief RICO affords with granting caused, threatened or unfulfilled expressed evil intentions, plus triple damages and attorney fees. Accordingly, plaintiff can show defendants extorted many hundreds of thousands of dollars through a pattern of racketeering activity to qualify as RICO violations.


In addition to defendants activities of malicious interference with plaintiff achieving reasonable business expectations; such as with blocking plaintiff from being able to carry out his intent to sell the property in 2006 to several interested parties. This would have been for at least four million. Thus, their malicious interference was the proximate of not selling the property. Even when I was to increase the $100,000,00 buyout

----------cause caused a consequential financial loss corresponding to the current devaluation of the fair market expectation to be well over a million. In addition, to act to deprive monies from the revenue from the rentals miss appropriated for personal application by Pecunies and Watson.

Since a RICO civil action can¶t be pursued in Connecticut Courts, plaintiff embraces his right to be heard in District Court, as:

³Significant conduct furthering 18 USCS § 1962, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act conspiracy occurred in U.S., and Congress surely intended that there be recourse to American courts and remedies. (Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v Alvarez Renta(2008, CA11 Fla) 530 F3d 1339, 21 FLW Fed C 812.

It has been five years since defendants obtained $380,000.00 from a financial institution in another state through unlawful securities transaction to impose this gain as a debt upon plaintiff. This 3.8K fiduciary misappropriation was achieved by clandestinely placing a two million dollar lean on plaintiff¶s property through falsifying financial documents.

This said financial instrument was an open-end mortgage, preauthorizing Pecunies to collect another $500,000.00 upon demand. On the other hand it was devastatingly destructive to plaintiff¶s business interests. Insomuch as plaintiff¶s outstanding debt of approximately 1.1 million was cured after a security instrument was created in the form of an open-end mortgage with M&T bank that initially granted $1, 480,000. The instrument provided for additional monies of up to another $500,000 to be issued to defendants upon their demand, and subsequently placed a two million lean on the disputed property.

However, plaintiff¶s authorization for refinancing was based on refinancing the $960,000.00 note on his property. This was at approximately eight and a half percent and $5000 monthly payment to be replaced with $4,500 interest only when the principal

³To prove constructive fraud, for purpose showing a fraudulent conveyance, a plaintiff must show that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and that the conveyance rendered the transferor unable to meet an obligation to the plaintiff.(Gaudio v. Guadio (1990) 580 A.2d 1212, 23 Conn. App. 287, certification denied 584 A.2d 471, 217 Conn, 803)

The RICO Law corresponding to the Collection of Unlawful Debt says: ³The substantive provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute [RICO] proscribe the investment of income derived through collection of an

unlawful debt in which the defendant has participated as a principal within the meaning of 18 USCA § 2 in an interstate enterprise, 18 USCA § 1962(a) [see § 6], the acquisition or maintenance of an interest in or control of an interstate enterprise through collection of an unlawful debt, 18 USCA § 1962(b) [see § 7], and the conduct of or participation in an interstate enterprise.´

The "Racketeering activity" plaintiff is complaining about includes a multitude of state and federal offenses, concentrating on a palpable and pervasive pattern of fraud to achieve extortion. That is furthered by the conspirators¶ separate acts in their participation in a criminal enterprise dedicated to overpower plaintiff¶s ability to affirm his rights in equity to his property. This was achieved by defendant¶s scheme propped up by indictable conduct of fraud and deceit, bribed witnesses, coercion, harassment to force plaintiff off his property by the order of the city marshal.

Consequently, due to defendant causing the plaintiff to live in a hotel while defendants rented the premises in his property as if they were full owners of the properties In spite of the fact that defendants totally disregarded that plaintiff possessed 50% ownership of the LCC¶s. The very LCC¶s that defendants exploited to fraudulently obtain title to impose their rights and powers of imposing ownership the property ³To take over legitimate enterprise and loot it through criminal activity that statute defines as pattern of racketeering is one of forms of misconduct punishable under 18 USCS § 1962(c), and to use one's position in enterprise to line one's pocket through pattern of racketeering activity is so closely related as to be indistinguishable.´ (United

States v Ambrose (1984, CA7 Ill) 740 F2d 505, cert den (1985) 472 US 1017, 87 L Ed 2d 614, 105 S Ct 3479 ) ; (United States v Desimone (1992, CA7) 1992 US App LEXIS 6602) and (Simon v City of Naperville (2000, ND Ill) 88 F Supp 2d 872).

These activities are traditionally conducted between private parties whereby funds are obtained from the victim with his consent produced by the use of force, fear, or threats.

Whereby, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969) says:

³Extortion is typically employed by organized crime to enforce usurious loans, infiltrate legitimate businesses, and obtain control of labor unions. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime 35 (1967).Prosecutions under the Travel Act for extortionate offenses involving only private individuals have been consistently maintained. (United States v. Hughes, 389 F.2d 535 (C.A.2d Cir.1968); McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274 (C.A. 8th Cir.1967); Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999 (C.A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966).

Moreover, the professional representation performed by plaintiff¶s past lawyers indicates collusion as the apparent result of under the table bribery. Since all of plaintiff¶s lawyers vigorously acted in furtherance of defendant¶s agenda by their constant and continuous acts in support of defendants goals. This is through ruthless and shameless misconduct to extort plaintiff through bullying and mental dominance to impose their will and block plaintiff from achieving

his objectives. Not to mention, plaintiff¶s lawyers acted maliciously and with evil intent to intimidate him and inflict devastating harm and the suffering that flows out from such mistreatment. This consorted activity of abusive mistreatment and cruel abuse vigorously pursued in a pattern of coercion in the hope of sending him to an early grave.

Defendants extorted by mental dominance of controlling plaintiff by bullying to be intimidated to act in support of the business and legal interests of defendants. Bribery according to RICO is the voluntary giving of property for receipt of an illicit benefit. In fact it is directly due to the lawyers perversion of plaintiff¶s trust by affirming the defendants¶ ability to achieve their criminal intentions for the last 5 and a half years. Since, plaintiff relied on his lawyers to support and articulate his business and legal interests. Yet, they intentional interfered and substituted their advocacy for that of the opposition.

Yet, the facts and circumstances, supports the conclusion that plaintiff¶s lawyers intentionally allowed the other defendants get away with their scheme to defraud. Insomuch as the fact history indicates bribery of plaintiff¶s lawyers must have occurred deeded to motivate them to intentionally neglect to perform the duty they owed. As anyone educated in law would know that the signed contract was an outrageously unconscionable agreement and defendants could not enforce it in any court of law. Especially, after the two year term to buy the property had expired in May 2006. In effect, all of the terms of the contract were now moot, due to defendant¶s noncompliance to buy or sell the property as in accordance to the essential intention of the contract.


This is where plaintiff¶s lawyer, Aldamis told him that even though the contract had expired after its two year time restriction to buy the property it was still a gray area. This is where he fraudulently claimed that due to the existence of the LCCs, the expired agreement was not applicable to be resolved by legal. Thus, plaintiff¶s lawyers duped him to believe he signed away his way of life to Pecunies and Watson whom he trusted by tricking him to sign away his farm to them. Evil doers who wanted to cause paramount emotional injury from their cruel treatment that is dedicated to drive plaintiff to an early gave.

------remedy outside of a monetary settlement. Rather than informing plaintiff that the bad faith by the opposition by not fulfilling the purchase of the property in the two year period made the contract unenforceable. Thereby, summarily subject to dissolution or recession of the LCC¶s that he agreed to enter in good faith and the other party breech their primary promise to purchase the property.

-commercial bribery statute applicable to giving of money to attorney with intent of influencing his conduct with relation to his client's affairs over defendant's objection that he was "public servant" and did not fall within ambit of commercial bribery statute.´(New York: People v. Tuttle, 45 A.D.2d 750, 356 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)

This afore stated victimization of plaintiff manifested as malicious assaults against his well being by wanton acts perpetrated by various defendants commissioned constantly and continuously over 5½ years. Thereby, defendant's wrongful misconduct constituted a criminal conspiracy and a profoundly extensive pattern of racketeering activity. Whereas Supreme Court efforts define

this pervasive pattern of criminal misconduct - as "a series of related predicates," as entailing "continuity plus relationship"; and this matter is a continuous onslaught of criminal acts dedicated to inflict devastating harm to plaintiff s already frail and traumatized psyche. There a myriad amount of wrongful acts overwhelming the two isolated criminal predicate act requirement to qualify for relief by embracing RICO.

-Joint trials are favored in cases that are asserted under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USCS§ 1961 et seq., because RICO counts are often intended to allow joinder of separate incidents and defendants into single trial; even if all defendants are not charged with all predicate acts, joinder is proper to prove existence of enterprise and by establishing requisite relationship.´ (United States v Megale (2005, DC Conn) 363 F Supp 2d 359).

An additional predicate offense particular to this case, is with defendants' engaging in similar activity related to "collection of an unlawful debt," as proscribed in § 1962(a) - (c). This crime was consummated by the defendants¶ conspiracy as in the deed records indicate in the Greenwich County Clerk. On November 10th , 2004 and the embezzlement of $380,000 under the color of refinancing both of plaintiff¶s properties.

In effect, the primary misconduct of the defendants was to fraudulently acquire with malicious intent to steal the equity in plaintiff¶s property, by seizing control through trickery and fraudulent deceptions. This is where the defendants tricked plaintiff to sign title over to them and duped him to name them as the managers of his property.

On the basis of Plaintiff signing for Pecunies and Watson to be managers of his property, they demanded $6,700.00 monthly revenue of its rents that they collected for 5 years. This was under the false misrepresentation to plaintiff that the $6,700 would be exclusively applied to pay off the mortgage and other maintenance applications. Although, defendants initially agreed with Plaintiff to allow him to collect the other $3,700 in rents, in March 2009 they without right or authority, demanded by written notice from plaintiffs tenants that the $3,700 was to be paid to them. As a result due to the defendants unlawful pressuring plaintiff

The result of defendants¶ unlawful demand that rents are paid to them is that Plaintiff from his primary source of income, the rent from his property. Further, the defendants have imposed exclusive control to sell plaintiff¶s property is that has been listed since last May of 2009. This control over plaintiff¶s property has been accomplished through the participation of the other defendants in a conspiracy to control his property through continuous acts of fraud, coercion and harassment.

Consequently, the accumulated result of defendant's actions to deprive plaintiff of his rights to his property is that they interfered with his ability to sell his property at the height of the market in 2006. This deprived him of well over a million dollars in addition to the many hundreds of thousands of revenue they illegally pocketed as a result of imposing their control. This is where the overt acts of each of the defendants facilitated the current success of the criminal enterprise that would not have happened without their collective participation, as the law says:


³In RICO an "enterprise" refers to virtually any grouping, business or otherwise, (broadly defining "enterprise" to include any "group of persons associated together for a common purpose in a course of conduct" (United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 [1981]). In re: 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (1994)... "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.

³There is sufficient evidence that could readily support defendant's indictment for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy . . . that is in violation of 18 USCS § 1962(d) Even though there was no direct evidence that defendant entered into agreement to violate RICO, the tier of facts could infer from evidence that defendant entered into agreement with fellow members of Outlaw Motorcycle Club to violate RICO by operating drug ring.´(United States v Lawson (2008, CA6 Ohio) 535 F3d 434, 2008 FED App 273P.

Plaintiff relied on his lawyers to support his legal position and his business interests. Yet, the fact history supports the conclusion that their professional conduct was clearly dedicated to support the defendants¶ legal agenda. Thus, as a causation of this situation, plaintiff was isolated from knowing his true legal position. Consequently, plaintiff was only able to find out about that the defendants had filed a transfer of title in mid October of 2009 when a friend researched the deed. The title transfer occurred after defendants tricked petitioner to sign two quit-claims.

Moreover, plaintiff¶s own council duped him to believe he had no legal option after signing onto an outrageously unconscionable agreement to sell his property to defendants Pecunies and

Watson. Hence, according to the "injury discovery" rule, a civil RICO cause of action accrues upon a plaintiffs discovery that he or she has been injured.´ (Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1989). This rule has been applied in the first (Rodriguez v, Banco Central, 917 F,2d 664,665-66 (Is Cir. 1990)); Second (Bankers Trust Co. v Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988).

At the time of November 3rd 2004, Philips tricked plaintiff to sign on to the second quit-claim on the fraudulent pretext it was paperwork for a $20,000.00 loan. Thereafter, Philips signed onto this instrument in his official capacity as Stephan G. Philips, Commissioner of the Superior Court, Fairfield County, Connecticut (exh,). This quit claim accompanied other instruments filed with the County Clerk, misrepresented to plaintiff to be for refinancing of an approximately one million mortgage on his two properties. This is where the two properties had a combined mortgages believed to be somewhere around 8½% and the two mortgage notes placed a constructive lean of about a million dollars.

Yet, the new mortgaged defendants filed with the county clerk along with the second quit-claim transformed the mortgage on the two properties to be 11½% and imposed $2,000,000.00 lean. It is comical that years later when plaintiff was told by a real estate friend that there was a two million dollar lean on his property, and had subsequently asked Phillips about it, he said: ³it was placed on the property for our own protection.

This can be verified as a material fact by his health-aid Joanne Gramacy. Since she was present and a witness to the material fact that plaintiff was tricked by sham loans to unknowingly sign


away title to his properties. This is for four acres in Greenwich, surrounded by mansions that are each worth well over a million.

Consequently, a forensic appraisal of November 2004 is expected to verify that plaintiff could have netted $3,000,000.000 on the open market for what he signed over for $40,000.00 in exchange. This is where Johanna¶s presence is verifiable on the April 21st signing onto the quitclaim as a witness to the $20,000.00 mortgage.

Yet, MsGramacy was deceived on the November 3rd signing of the quit claim. Since she was present to be a witness to what she was always against plaintiff singing anything whatsoever with Pecunies, Watson and Philips. . . that it was a meeting for plaintiff¶s personal loan and refinancing, and certainly not for plaintiff to transfer away ownership of his property without him receiving anything in return. This signing occurred in the Mercedes Benz office in Greenwich with µQUIT CLAIM DEED¶ written in bold type, and signed ³in the presence of:´ and witness to defendants John L Cox (account for Mercedes Benz of Greenwich and Lauren Cositore, alleged to be an employee of the same Mercedes Benz dealership). Consequently, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that QUIT CLAIM was added after plaintiff signed the instrument, especially since plaintiff was accompanied by his companion

In addition, Phillips identified himself on a document that was a proposed instrument of an accounting that he had received $103,000 under the color of being the Trustee of the LCC¶s (exh.). Yet, in actuality Philips was a trustee de son tort, since Del is lawfully 50% owner of the two LCC¶s that Philips is the trustee and the LCC never had one meeting. Thus Del along with

the other principals was required to appoint any new member and the assigning Philips as a trustee would not be legal, due to conflict of interest rules.

1). Malicious interference with reasonable business expectancies: Whereby, without any legitimate right or justification ___________ blocked plaintiff¶s expressed intention to sell the property for $4,000,000.00 in 2006 ³An action for tortious interference with a prospective business relation protects the right 'to pursue one's business, calling, or occupation free from undue influence or molestation.´ (Printing Mart v Morristown, 563 A.2d at 36 (quoting Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 175 A. 62, 66 (N.J.1934)..(Lightning Lube v Witco Corp. (1993, CA318 USCS § 1962 NJ) 4 F3d 1153, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8379, 38 Fed Rules EvidServ 902, 26 FR Serv 3d 1468, subsequent app (1994, CA3 NJ) 39 F3d 1170 and (criticized in Schudel v GE (1997, CA9 Wash) 120 F3d. 2). Intentional infliction of emotional distress

DISCREPANCIES ON TITLE AND MORTAGE The mortgage/deed as a µclaim to title¶ appears as if defendants¶ lawyer, Charles H. DeBovis, prepared the instruments for their gain to be legitimately constructed upon defendant¶s liability. However, through the wisdom of the legislators, our laws protect us from acts of µconstructive fraud¶ achieved under µfalse pretenses.¶ Not to mention, the principal of the doctrine of µunclean hands¶ states that those with µdirty hands¶ are not entitled to relief in equity. Moreover, the doctrine means one who has defrauded his adversary in the subject matter of the action would

not be herd to assert his right in equity. Under this doctrine, the court of equity may deny relief to a party whose conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and deceitful. As this doctrine is applicable when the reprehensible conduct complained of pertains to the controversy at issue.

Whereas, Phillips¶ bungling adventurous representation of defendants, Pecunies and Watson has lead them into being in a deep abyss of verifiable liability. This is where Philips as their lawyer signed on to all their instruments as a witness corresponding to the fraudulent title transference, million dollar open ended loan, and mortgage. As the conveyance of title was strictly based on the prior owner (plaintiff) having received a $40,000 mortgage on his property. . .that is issued by Pecunies, identified on the mortgage as being plaintiff¶s ³lender.´

While, plaintiff first learned that conveyance of the title to his property had occurred five years after the fact with not knowing he has signed quit claims that were misrepresented as the paperwork for his $40,000 loan. Rather, the court and his lawyers have been going by his contract (exh. A) and the establishment of the shared ownership in the charter of the LLCs that legally empowered defendants with a claim to title of 50% ownership. However, although the terms of the contract were misrepresented not to include things that were included (such as where plaintiff would only get $100, 000.00 a year until he was 103 years old); still as one side as the terms are it does state plaintiff was authorizing for refinancing (to get a better rate) and a $40,000.00 pay-out with the refinancing he approved. In addition that the collection of the rents were to be directed to paying off the properties debts, perhaps two hundred thousand dollars of the rental revenue is reported towards going towards legal fees to act in bad faith of the terms of


the agreement. Such as with defendants evicting plaintiff from his farm produce store and now from his home to force him to agree for them to sell his properties as if it was their own.

Therefore as defendant has entered the µagreement¶ as evidence to their claim of legal right within the dynamics of the agreed bargain between parties, they are barred by judicial estoppel to deviate or contradict its terms. Exactly what is occurring at this time where defendant are estopped from now being able to prove that they have legal ownership on the basis that the RKD Venture and RKD Venture Two, states on each charter that plaintiff assigns 25% to both Pecunies and Watson in each LLC that identifies (albeit by a past typo) 1753 Kings St on each LLC.

However, for the court to go by the signatures on the LLC¶s that were established for a sale that never occurred, as verifying to the veracity of defendants claim of 100% is substantiated, they are ruling outside the courts own established jurisdiction. Since the defendants had entered into evidence the agreement as proving the conveyance of tile to be 50-50 as a material fact to the satisfaction of the court. Thus, the inherent principals of jurisprudence prevents them from now changing their claim that in 2004 when the alleged conveyance occurred it was not to be 50-50, but that they obtained100% ownership of defendants home. Albeit not by giving plaintiff any money whatsoever, but by the enforceable power of plaintiff¶s signature on the agreement. Even though petitioner pleads, the agreement was obtained through false pretenses and trickery and that its term had lapsed over three years ago when defendants breeched its core condition. This was that they agreed to buy the property by the end of 2006 for 3 million, or if the property was sold to an outsider it would be for $4 million and they would receive $500,000 under the term of

the contract. Yet when plaintiff had two buyers wanting to pay 4 million they wanted more money to allow the sale to go through.

Yet, for the last three years the Norwalk Court recognizes the agreement as an enforceable claim to tile for defendants. This is on the basis it says that the property is to have 50-50 ownership and that plaintiff agrees defendants are to manage his property. Consequently, the court has long participated with affirming defendants agenda that plaintiff should cooperate with their interest to sell his property as if it is their legal right.

As now with Judge Grogins¶ outrageously inappropriate order of execution of eviction from plaintiffs home to make him homeless and destitute, upon plaintiff¶s default because he is too ill to travel for another 6 weeks. This is where the agreement is acknowledged by the rulings of Judge Hickey, Grogins, and Moore of the Norwalk Court as constituting defendant¶s claim of paramount and quiet title to plaintiff¶s property.

The lending institution neglected their implied professional duty of responsibility to do due diligence to insure that the tile transfer was the intention of the prior owner. Not to mention, the one million open-end-loan assigned to Pecunies and Watson. Thereafter, they drew down the entire $900,000.00 upon their whim, plus additional exorbitant interest and penalties being leveraged on plaintiff¶s property. Although one would think that upon review of the mortgage¶s structure the lending bank (M&T) before approving the mortgage/loan would have been motivated to consult with plaintiff, if not but for their own business interests.


Insomuch as it was by an application of a non-relative and non-licensed individual, who only produced some signed papers of another person to qualify them to receive a pre-approved million dollar cash payout. This money was offered by the placing a two million dollar lean on the basis of signed papers with the name of the owner of property to give the cash to the applicant. How could such deficiency of demonstrated authorization from the owner not be viewed as having the potential of being problematic?

An example corresponding to what occurred with plaintiff and defendant¶s disingenuous ³business relationship´ is analogous to where the ³borrower´ could have turned out to have been a home-aid. Yet, after paying out the trusting senior the $40,000.00, has since left the country with the $900,000 that they got through leveraging it on the seniors property. Albeit such a deed trust was by a third party who offered to do a senior¶s paperwork to get them a $40,000 payout and a better rate of mortgage from refinancing their property. As exactly what occurred where defendant obtained plaintiff¶s signatures under the false pretense. Specifically, the bargain in the µagreement¶ was it was for getting a better rate on the mortgage and a ³40, 000.00 loan´ which they got from a mortgage on his property

Consequently, such a scenario would place the lending institution in a precarious position to enforce the additional million dollar debt on the unsuspecting senior who only received $40,000.00 of the million dollar pay out. On the other hand, Pecunies and Watson are not someone who are without assets and earning twenty thousand a year. Rather, they have fiduciary credibility and financial substance that they may have benefited from to plaintiff¶s detriment.


Accordingly, when an actor wants to impose a $900,000 debt (the open end loan) on another person for their own benefit by manner of imposing a lean or liability on another, a written authorization is required from the party bearing the accountability. Since, no such authorization exists the lender is stuck with going after Pecunies and Watson for the two million that they borrowed to pay off about 1.1 million of the properties debts. Insomuch as, the over two million dollar lean on defendants property most likely will prove to be unenforceable under the fraud statutes. Although with plaintiff will benefit from the unencumbering of his property due to defendants being liable for the over two million debt they won¶t benefit when the compensatory damages are tallied up to determine triple damage judgment under RICO.

While it seems that Phillips, who specializes in the practice of Tax Law, felt that his approval of the instruments, legally served the business interests of his clients, Pecunies and Watson. However, the law will prove their signing on to these irregular instruments would have a profoundly detrimental effect of severely injuring their financial interests. Not to mention, the legal instruments Philips produced and instruments of tile he attested as a witness or notarized are all unenforceable in a court of law. Consequently, the fact that Pecunies and Watson each signed on to the mortgages for one million dollars as the µborrower¶ means that they are stuck with the debt and plaintiff has no bank debt on his property. Since, the two million dollar lean on the properties was obtained without proper authorization and Pecunies and Watson received one million each as being the ³borrowers,´ while they committed bank fraud by each signing to:. ³THE CONDITION OF THIS DEED IS SUCH, that whereas the Mortgagor is justly indebted to the Mortgagee in the sum of Two Million and 00/100 Dollars ($2,000,000.00) the Mortgagor hereby represents, warrants and covenants with the

Mortgagee that the Mortgagor is the sole owner of the Premises; is lawfully seized and possessed of the same in fee simple; that the same are free from all encumbrances, except as provided on Exhibit B; that the Mortgagor has good right, full power and lawful authority to give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey the same in the manner as aforesaid.´

The manner of second malpractice injury is that on face, petitioners¶ claim of right to title exists only as a µColor of Title.¶ Since petitioners¶ claim of ownership to the disputed properties, corresponds to receiving the transfer of title properties in an egregiously irregular regular. Such as where the filed documents are defective in content and appear to be the product of ³constructive fraud.¶ Since the mortgage filed has major defects with the admission of signing onto the liability for the one million mortgages for each property. Insomuch, as the mortgage substituted petitioner having purchased the property. Instead, the consideration for the transference of title was solely based on This is just one of numerous elements of material facts exhibited in the documents of record that constitutes an irregular chain of title to justify petitioner¶s claim has no standing in fact and law.

However, fortunately for Philips, the doctrine of µunclean hands,¶ shields him from being sued by Pecunies and Watson for malpractice. On the other hand, Philips shares full culpability in criminal and tort court for all the injury that his clients inflicted upon defendant, under the law of conspiracy. In Conn. Civil Actions: Title 52, ch. 923a Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 52-552e (4) Elements of, fraudulent intent: ³Party seeking to set aside conveyance as fraudulent bears burden of proving either that conveyance was made without substantial
CON sideration



transferorunable meet his obligations, or that conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in which grantee participated; only one of two alternatives need be satisfied.´ (Tyers v. Coma (1990) 570 A.2d 186, 214 Conn. 8).

³Insolvency is not necessary element of fraudulent conveyance if it is established that conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in which grantee participated; rather, conveyance is fraudulent if motivated by desire to circumventany debt or duty.´ (Rocklen, Inc. v. Radulesco (1987) 522 A.2d 846, 10 Conn.App. 271).

However, the immediate liability is to the µtitle insurer¶ after the properties reverts back to defendant as always having been the legitimate owner. Since the insurer guarantees against any loss, due to any defects in title and when property is illegitimately sold or is mortgaged. In addition they cover conveyances altered before recording, persons of unsound mind, falsification of records, forged deeds, or releases obtained by fraud, duress, or coercion in securing essential signatures

GRIEVANCE AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS The facts and circumstances of plaintiff¶s grievance meets the elements of a section 1983 claim under the µdue process clause¶ to establish his entitlement for relief. Since" . . .Every person . . .,"including, state judges may be sued for conduct performed in their official capacity for declaratory or injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Judges, Hickley, Grogins, and Moore of the Norwalk Housing Court ³ . . . who under the color of [state law] . . . ´ ³have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law; and made possible only because they are clothed with the authority of state law;" and such actions constitute abuses of the position given to them by the state.

The complained decisions of these Judges were to such a degree of being unfair, arbitrary and capricious so as to shock the conscious of society. Thereby, causing ³ . . . the deprivation of rights . . . ´ for plaintiff¶s to be heard in a court of equity to protect his rights to the possession of the property he owns; and, ". . . subjects or causes to be subjected . . ."his rights to his property;and these judges" . . . shall be liable . . . in an action at law, . . . or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ;"such as with petitioners applicationfordeclaratory and injunctive relief. Whereas the rulings over the last month by Judge Moore and Grogins against plaintiff were to deny him the time that he required to appear at the trial was totally unreasonable. Insomuch with considering the tremendous weight of the extraordinary facts and circumstances brought to these judges¶ attention in papers by plaintiff¶s pleadings to readily justify the continuance until April 3rd was justified. In addition to having shown in movant papers to Judge Moore that the ruling of granting ³U& O¶ was a product of ³fraud upon the court´ by the opposition; and subsequently must be vacated, since it was obtained by their making a false declaration of his clients having 100% ownership. Yet, Judge Moore denied the movant for vacating the Use & O,´ without any commentary of explanation, and turning a blind eye to rule on the other elements of relief that were sought in the movant. Even though defendant was collaterally estopped, by having prior entered into the record the µagreement¶ that states their 50% claim of ownership. Moreover, although the corresponding motion of defendant to Judge Moore (based on her ruling of the ³U&O´ ) was served on the opposition and filed on the 29th of January her ruling was made 4 & ½ weeks later on the 23rd of


February. Albeit was restricted to just a decision on the denial of the application for the continuance (exh. ). Moreover, the time the decision of denial was received by plaintiff in Florida on the 26th of February, one day after the trial. This deprived plaintiff of the ability to decide to put his health in serious jeopardy to avoid the execution of a default judgment that has occurred. However, even the option of appearing on the 25th would not have been possible because plaintiff did not have the funds required to pay for any mode of transportation. Essentially, it is a material fact that plaintiff is completely broke, heavily in debt, and all his credit cards are maxed out. Since, the last rental revenue from plaintiff¶s tenant from renting his garage and the masonry business using his land was recently maliciously blocked by defendants conduct of interference with his business expectations This makes it not possible that plaintiff could have obtained the funds need to get to Connecticut to have appeared if he wanted to before being driven to Connecticut at the beginning of April. Whereby, although the trial was set for 2:00 AM, Judge Grogins declared a default judgment entered a 2:12 PM when a trial brief and Affidavit in support by plaintiff was filed at 2:27 PM. Consequently, at this time plaintiff is moving to vacate the default judgment for cause, and seeking for his constitutional rights to be affirmed in accordance to the µdue process clause´ of the 14th Amendment. As this grants plaintiff withprocedural due process rights requiring that certain steps, such as a hearing, be followed before a person's life, liberty, or property can be taken away by the state court.


Accordingly, plaintiff¶s side has not been fully heard and the pleadings of defense and counterclaim stated in his filed papers have been ignored by Judge Groggins and Moore. Judge Grogins¶ policy was to make it a requirement plaintiff pays the petitioning party to an eviction action $3,350 in order to have the trial adjourned six weeks when I am physically able to appear. Consequently, due to my medically verified inability In effect, as I reported Even though plaintiff documented the certainty of his ability to prevail. As this was in extraordinary great detail showing in facts, circumstances and law in detailed and comprehensive moving papers to Judge Grogins on the 25 and 26 of January (exh ) and Judge Moore on the 29th of January. This is where plaintiff informed the judges that the party seeking to evict him

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands: for relief of declaratory judgment, divestment, dissolution, other injunctive relief; specifically for the title to the two disputed properties is to be recognized as a constructive trust. As this court shall enforce ownership rights; starting reinstatement of the title of ownership to be reverted back to the name of plaintiff. Consequently, plaintiff seeks recovery of all inflicted damages of a compensatory nature; an award for the amount imposed to be misappropriated by unfulfilled attempted schemes for additional extortions under color of

right; damages as a result of malicious interference with reasonable business expectancies; and the afore stated damages in totality are to be granted treble damages. As is provided under provision 18 USC 1964 (c), attorney's fees, and whatever other relief the court may deem to be just and proper.

³Claim for relief under treble damage provision of 18 USCS § 1964 may properly be based upon allegation of conspiracy between defendant corporation and its agents or employees to violate 18 USCS § 1962. (Callan v State Chemical Mfg. Co. (1984, ED Pa) 584 F Supp 619.

Philips unduly influenced plaintiff and through deception has power of attorney, trustee of the LCC


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