This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
The entire proceedings (past and present) has been corrupted. Even the stipulations the court went by to order the past eviction of plaintiff is a product of material misrepresentations by his own attorneys to support the opposition¶s legal agenda. Consequently, plaintiff is complaining his rights to a fair trial have been usurped not only by the opposition, but by the outrageousmisconduct of his own attorneys. Since they worked hand and hand to ensure the legal and business agenda of the opposition were affirmed; albeit based on coercion, fraud and deceit. "Fraud on the court" consists of conduct: (1) on part of officer of the court, (2) that is directed to judicial machinery itself, (3) that is intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard for the truth, that is positive averment or is concealment when one is under duty to disclose, that deceives court. (Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing denied, certiorari denied Rison v. Demjanjuk, 115 S.Ct. 295, 513 U.S. 914, 130 L.Ed.2d 205 (Ohio) 1993.²Fed CivProc 2654.´. . .errors are so prejudicial and fundamental that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful, if not futile.µ (Salvatore v. State of Florida, 366 So. 2d 745 [Fla. 1978], cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 177, 62 L. Ed. 2d 115 ).
-Fraud on the Court by the opposition¶s lawyer, Kaelin and Philips,and even by the four lawyers plaintiff hiredacted to circumvent him from obtaining fair hearings in a court of law.
-Judges denied plaintiff from receiving due process of law in the Norwalk Housing Court. This is where the offending Judges,Heckley, Grogins, and Moore, as officials of state government must respect all of the legal rights guaranteed by the constitution is owed to citizens. Particularly under the Fourteenth Amendment that states:
The lawyers representing plaintiff perverted their discretional authority, and misapplied their power to cause devastating harm to plaintiff¶s legal position. Sinceby sabotaging and undermining plaintiff¶s legal position during the proceedings, these lawyerswillfully acted to deny himof his right to receive a fair and impartial trial. Thereby, thecausational result of such professional misconduct is that with certain probability the matter of legal right of ownershipof the property would have been expediently decided in plaintiffs favor; if not but for the extreme and outrageous professional misconduct of the judges and the lawyers on both sides. ³ an officer of the court«are all attorneys´ (People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 ). ³Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." (Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23). The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
³Litigant commits "fraud on court" when litigant and attorney concoct some unconscionable scheme calculated to impair court's ability fairly and impartially to adjudicate dispute. (Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83.²Fed CivProc 1741.
³Fruad on the court¶ may occur when acts of party prevent his adversary from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense(Abatti v. C.I.R., 859 F.2d 115, Me., (1990).²Fed CivProc 2654 . . . ³Plaintiffs' fraudulent scheme of manufacturing evidence to support their business loss claim and subsequently covering-up their scheme constituted "fraud on the court" warranting sanctions. (Derzack v. County of Allegheny, Pa., 173 F.R.D. 40ff affirmed 118 F.3d 1575 (Pa. 1996).²Fed CivProc 2791. Fraud Upon the Court by Phillips and Kaelin
Fraud Upon the Court by the Plaintiff¶s own Attorneys
Whereby, plaintiff¶s attorneys, as officers of the court, perpetrated a continuous and pervasive pattern of interfering with his ability to obtain his right to justice in the courts. Since, they circumvented him from receiving due process provided under the Laws of the Land. This is by acting with a copious amount of outrageously perverted acts of foul play through blatant professional misconduct.
Plaintiff¶s four attorneys acted within the range of their insight to be fully aware of the foreseeability to the proximate-cause equation of how their conduct affected his legal position. This is where all of plaintiff¶s lawyers surelyknew how their professional conduct was deficient of what was required to achieve a favorable result; or how their detrimental actions caused thedesecration of plaintiff achieving his legal opportunities where he could have prevailed.
In effect, plaintiff¶s lawyers and those of the opposition acted in concert with corrupt intent. This is with engaging in a scheme and artifice to defraud plaintiff out of obtaining his rightsto relief offered through due process of law. Thereby, constituting constituent elements of malfeasance and misfeasance conduct, dedicated to be averse to plaintiff¶s legal position, while beneficial to
the position of defendants. Clearly, the plaintiff¶s lawyers perverted their discretionary position of trust,whenthey willfully and wantonly acted with intentional professional misconduct for the opposition to gain an undue advantage. Their conduct is indicated by the record is focused tomaliciously interfere with plaintiff¶s opportunity to establish his legal rights to justice and obtain equitable relief in a court of law. ³Fruad on the court¶ doctrine permits court to overturn settled decrees and orders, and as a result is narrowly construed and is defined to most egregious cases, such as bribery od judge or juror, or improper influence exerted on court by attorney, in which integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially is directly impaired. Fed Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 609b0930, 28 U.S.C.A. (outen v. Baltimore County Md, 177F.R.D. 346. Affirmed 164 3F3d 625-Fed CivProc 2654
As in accordance with Attorney Malpractice, Chpt.2, Standard of Care, § 2:7. - Fraud. ³ Fraudis defined as: Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of another, and so intended, by inducing him to part with property or surrender some legal right. Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a word, silence, the suppression of truth, or any other device contrary to the plain rules of honesty. (Ballentine s Law Dictionary. 3rd Edition ) It has been held that an attorney¶s opinion, as opposed to fact if knowingly false when offered, may be the basis for a finding of fraud. (Lietz v. Primcok  84 Ariz 273, 327 P2d 288, 67 ALR2d 1262)
The occurrence of µFraud Upon the Court¶ warrants dismissal, as: ³Fraud on the court´ justifying dismissal occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that party has at least sentinently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with judicial system¶s ability to adjudicate matter by improperly influencing tier or unfairly hampering presentation of opposing parties claim
or defense (Perna v. Electronic Data Systems, Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388, (N.J. 1995).² Fed CivProc 2791, 2820.
³To be entitled to relief from judgment on theory that defendants committed "fraud on the court," plaintiffs had to show that defendants acted with intent to deceive or defraud court by means of deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme. Fed.Rules Civ. Proc.Rule 60(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.²Hall v. Doering, 185 F.R.D. 639 (Kan. 1999).²Fed CivProc 2654. While it is crystal clear to plaintiff by prima facie evidenceof which supports the conclusion that the four lawyers he hired were in collusion with the opposition. Since the fact history shows the assertive conduct by plaintiff¶s lawyers affirmed and furthered the legal agenda of the other side. Yet, due to the particulars and circumstances can¶t be excused by innocent explanations, such as the result ofgross neglect, or from lack of an ability to know and practice the law appropriately.
Moreover, the factson record indicate that during the course of past legal proceedings, a tremendous amount of incidents constituting contemptible foul play had occurred. Thereby, demonstrating a continuous and pervasive pattern existed of palpable proportions. This is where the corrupted lawyers of plaintiff perverted their position of trust with his representation to profoundly support the cause of the opposition.
Whereas the court records and letters sent to plaintiff by his lawyers support the conclusion that his lawyers were in collusion with the other side. Insomuch asthis as circumstantial evidence clearly indicates a conscious effortwas evident, dedicated to undermine plaintiff¶s ability to prevail in court. This is where plaintiff¶s lawyers perverted their position of trust to be substituted with ensuring the oppositions¶ ability to achieve their legal agenda. Albeit, this was achieved by plaintiff¶s lawyers working as a double agent. This is where the loyalty of duty
forthese lawyers to perform was not directed to the one who hired them. Rather their representation of plaintiff was misdirected to benefit theambitions of their opposition, which is to misuse the judicial process to cheat their own client.
³To demonstrate "actual conflict of interest," defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must be able to point to specific instances in record which suggest impairment or compromise of his interests for benefit of another party. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. (Whyte v. Commissioner of Correction, 736 A.2d 145, 53 Conn.App. 678 (1999), certification denied 738 A.2d 663, 250 Conn. 920.²Crim Law 641.5(0.5). Essentially, plaintiff¶s lawyersegregiously devastated plaintiff¶s legal position. Thereby, depriving plaintiff of pursuing his availableopportunitieswhere he absolutely could have prevailed, which they substituted with consummating the legal agenda of the opposition. Since, lawyers and judges are µofficers of the court,¶ any fraudulent misrepresentations they may make ona central matter in a legal dispute, constitutes a perpetration of a µFraud Upon this Court.¶
All of plaintiff¶s lawyers performed in a similar manner to ensure his expressed interests were not achieved, as is described of the conductby plaintiff¶s first lawyer, DemetroisAdamis. WhereasAdamis did not require of plaintiff to be paid for his representation, nor did he even want to protect his legal right to be compensated by entering into a µletter of engagement.¶Thus, by Adamis not wanting to have a letter of engagement he deprived himself of being able to enforce payment for legal services. Since, Adamis provided plaintiff with the legal right to refuse to compensate him for professional services rendered, even if he performed brilliantly and expediently achieved everything plaintiff wanted.
Essentially,Aldamis worked on speculation, yetneglected to pursue available options to affirm plaintiff¶s legal right to relief and afford himself an opportunity to be compensated for services. Rather, Adamis¶s representation of plaintiff during its entire course was not only nonproductive, but was disastrouslydetrimental to his legal interests. This is with acts of deception, where Aldamisacted with misfeasance and malfeasance. Thereby, to ensure he was not compensated for his legal services. Consequently, through Adamis¶s willful interference, and performance of professional ineptness plaintiffwas deprived from obtaining justice in equity.
In effect, Adamis wantonly exploited plaintiff¶s trust and authority as his legal representation to participate in a criminal enterprise to defraud his client. Consequently, after two years of extremely incompetent and ineffective representation, plaintiff eventually fired Adamis, yet only after it evolved to the point he was absolutely convinced of his ineptness, to thereafter hirethree other lawyers who performed with more of the same type of misconduct.
Specifically, all four of plaintiff¶s lawyers related to plaintiff in the same manner to control and deceive him. This even manifested where both of plaintiffs lawyers,Aldamis and Brown, executed the exact same tactics to manipulate and coerce plaintiff to sign imposing stipulations in housing court. Even when signing the stipulations was adverse to plaintiff¶s expressed wishes of not wanting to sign on to the stipulations they successfully pressured him to eventually sign.
Adamis represented plaintiff during the first stage of the eviction proceeding. This is when he tricked plaintiff into signing the stipulation, by telling him it didn¶t matter because he was
immediately going to file an action for dissolution of the contract thereafter. However, he subsequently outright refused to file the action.
Whereby, this stipulation has a contingency of staying the eviction provided plaintiff does not interfere with the property being sold by being a nuisance to prospective buyers. This gave the opposition the ability to falsely claim that he was maliciously interfering with prospective buyers viewing the property. Thus they fraudulently claimed this as being in violation of the stipulation to bring him back into court to manufacture more false claims on record and get Del to sign the second stipulation by having his lawyer coerce his compliance.
Plaintiff¶s second lawyer, Donald Brown, mistreatment evolved into terrorizing him with threats and blatant harassment. Plaintiff retained Brown, based upon the enthusiastic recommendation of a stranger at his farm stand who engaged him in conversation, Donald Brown senior,the father of the lawyer he hired upon his urging. Donald Brown laterin the housing court assigned the real estate listing to his father¶s office of Weihart Reality of Greenwich as plaintiff¶s representation. Yet, this was without first consulting his plaintiff if it was his wishes that his property be listed.
Here lies the µconflict of interest¶ by Brown not doing his job of exposing that the existence of a constructive trust; insomuch as the opposition never paid any money for the title transfer. Thus, Brown neglected to pursue under the ³Uniform Fraudulent Transference Act´ for the full title of ownership to be reverted back to his client. However, if Brown got the total rights of ownership for plaintiff he would not of had the opportunity to have RKD Ventureslist with Weihart for his father to benefit from the approximate $150,000.00 commission.
Brownrelated to plaintiff with palpable bullying with coercion and intimidate and overpower him from being able to act upon his own volition. This is by imposing mental dominance over plaintiff¶s frail persona to deprive plaintiff from having the ability to control his own pleadings in court. Thereby, to be substituting with the stifling of plaintiff¶s desire and guaranteed right to be heard by pleading and affirming his defense on why he should not be evicted from his own property. This was achieved by coercing compliance by imposing his will to dominate over plaintiffso he could not act upon his own volition in court. As a result of pressuring and deception, plaintiff needlessly agreed to settle by a stipulation for accepting final judgment for eviction.
Plaintiff prepared with performing all possible measures to protect himself from being evicted, even with borrowing from someone with high interest to pay back $24.000. He was behind in the rent because of the mysterious flood that occurred when he was in Florida. This is when he was told not to pay rent and apply the money to restore what was damaged. Then the wrongdoers took him to court and ignored that he spent $15,000 out of his own pocket in lieu of paying rent. that the insurance was suppose to cover. Yet, even though plaintiff had gave Brown the $24,000 check he would not introduce into the court and plaintiff was subsequently surprised when the judge knew nothing about the money,
However, Brown refused to apply it satisfy the court¶s consideration of delinquency or being up to date with the rent used the money as leverage to tell Del after both council met in chambers
that the only way he could get the money back is when he shows the court a lease to new place to live after he has vacated. Del at that time was in a horrible position where he only had revenue of $613 from his social security check and had borrowed many tens of thousands from friends and maxed out his credit cards. borrowed from Injunction lease was never filed by Brown neither did he tell the court about the $24,000 only being known when Del asked the judge who did not know about it. This is when attorney Highland for the opposition said ³we don¶t want the money released we want to hold it as a hammer over his head. To wit, Del said when I woke up this morning and looked in the mirror I did not look like a nail.
-Abrim Heisler, Brown referred plaintiff to Heisler his law associate, on the basis of convincing plaintiff that he specialized in housing matters. Yet, what plaintiff did not consider is that associates in the same law firm the court records verifies that they were working for the other side.
Heisler told Del that if he didn¶t sign the stipulation that he would lose everything and Del complied out of fear. At the time Heisler wrote up the stipulation with the other side, Del overheard the two attorney¶s describing it as a gag order. To wit, Del told Heisler that he did not want a gag order included. Subsequently, under duress, Del signed it not realizing that almost every element composing the stipulation is about agreeing not to talk about the property in one manner or the other.
Heisler introduced into the record that the bargain of Del¶s agreement with the wrongdoers was that they were legally entitled to 50% of the profits. (see transcript exh D) At the time Del heard
this he was shocked because he never told his lawyers anything remotely related to what Heisler declared was a material fact.
Although, plaintiff did not know that his pleadings could be estopped in the future from making any claim in contradiction to my being in agreement with the opposition¶s bogus claim. Since, this opened the door for them to bar me from contradicting this by raising judicial estoppel. Specifically, if I was to thereafter say in a court of law I was duped to sign on the agreement by it being misrepresented as only a sales agreement. Not surprising the opposition in their papers raises collateral estoppels to block Del from contesting to their wrongdoings.
Rather, plaintiff told Heisler and gave him the signed contracts in support that all his agreements with the opposition revolved around their promise to buy most of the property for $3,000,00.00;as was to be within an expired two year period. This is with leaving plaintiff with ownership of the parcel that he was operating as a farm stand, which was his very incentive to go with them because the other buyers wanted all of the land. (Instead of having a farm stand adjoining a residential development that would be devalued).
Currently, plaintiff¶s lawyers Heisler and Brown outright refused to release to him his files, or will only on the condition he get a notarized statement from Brown. (Consequently, plaintiff decided he will not get his file from them, so as not to bother Katz).
Consequently, in the oppositions cause of action to evict Del consisted of totally outrageous bold faced lies that were readily impeachable. Such as saying he never paid any rent and the
agreement has become a bottomless pit, by sucking away their money and I am driving away prospects interested in buying the property. Yet, in actuality, not only a couple of cents they paid for the papers they duped me to sign. While, Del on the other hand to date have appropriated well over $50,000 sponsoring their adventure as a byproduct of signing in good faith. In fact in total, they collected upwards of $300,000.00 from rents and in actuality, Del managed the property overseeing its maintenance, and even with collecting rents to hand over to them.
Not to mention, the extra $400, 000, 00 they obtained through excessive mortgaging, as an act of conversion under the color of refinancing. This liberty of helping themselves is refuted by our agreement, which only authorizes them to get a better rate of mortgage, not transforming a one million lean on my property into being two million. Thus, they shed crocodile tears by implying they are the aggrieved party from our agreement. Further implying I responded to their extending good faith with my ill-intent in return. Yet when shone in the light of truth is extrinsic fraud of Herculean proportions, and the perpetration of a hoax on the court for the record books.
Not surprising that in their actions they sought Del from being precluded from entering evidence outside of the occupancy issue and needed his lawyers to coerce him to sign the stipulations.
Fraud Upon the Court by Plaintiff¶s Attorneys
This is where plaintiff¶s ability to affirm his legal rights and to subsequently present thelegal issues to be heard in the Norwalk Court was essentially hijacked. As this was the causation of wanton acts of malicious interference, that undermined his rights, guaranteed under our constitution and by State Laws.
Whereas there is clear indication there has been malicious interference of plaintiff¶s ability to plead his cause. This is in accordance to theavailable legal opportunities to be heard for this Court¶s consideration.
³Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic within this rule where it prevents a party having a trial or from presenting all of his or her case, or where it operates on matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it was procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy; or on the other hand, fraud has been regarded as intrinsic within this rule where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein.´ [N.Y. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 256; N.Y. Jur. 2d § 72].³ Under the CPLR, fraud in its procurement is a ground for«.or granting a party relief from a judgment.´ (Verplanck v. Van Buren, 76 N.Y. 247, 1879 WL 10618 ) Fraud Upon the Court by the Oppostion¶s Attorneys
Norwalk Court lacked jurisdiction for its declaratory decree that defendant is landlord to plaintiff as its tenant. Sincethe Norwalk Housing Court is without jurisdiction over the matter to recognize defendant as landlord of plaintiff. Consequently the Norwalk court has no control over the subject matter and the parties in eviction proceedings . . . especially in a µsummary process¶ proceeding, when the rights to possession is to be clear and unambiguous. Not to mention, the matter of rent owed is not to be considered as a part of such action, just the rights of the landlord to reestablish his possession to the disputed premises. However, the court ruledfor reasons it has yet to explain, that it determined the May 27th2004 agreement constituted being a lease. Even though the opposition breached it bargain and the force of its terms expired in 2006.
Accordingly, with any eviction proceeding brought by defendantin that housing court had lacked jurisdiction to apply the law, make decisions, and declare judgments. Since the said court has
wrong cognizance of parties with identifying defendant as landlord and plaintiff as the tenant of landlord. Consequently, the said court has no power and authority to hear and determine in a judicial proceeding with defendant as landlord and plaintiff as tenant. Hence the past final judgment of evicting tenant from the commercial property at 1353 was executed without the said court having jurisdiction over the matter; and should be vacated as a ruling made in ultra vires.
This is with considering the said court bootstrapping itself to hear the matter on the contract being a lease was in excess of its powers granted. Although not prohibited on the basis of being able to determine by its discretionary determination if a document is admitted as the lease it ruled wrongly when it had no jurisdiction. Such as if someone presented a utility bill to the court to say this is to qualify as the lease to establish my co-owner on a 50-50 share is my tenant, since it names him of making monthly payments to occupy our property.
Whereby, plaintiff is embracing - 42 U.S.C., ch, 21, sub I, §1983;. . .that provides this courts with the jurisdiction to render declaratory judgment and injunctive relief over State Judges. (See 3 mem. of law)
Whereas 42 U.S.C.§1983says : ³Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer¶s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense, protects state and local government officials from section 1983 damages liability when their allegedly unconstitutional conduct was
objectively reasonable in light of then-existing law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). However, the discretionary activities of these judges violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."A 1983 action against a judge will only succeed if the judge's constitutional violations were non-judicial actions, or actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Whereas in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) says: ³The US Supreme court first addressed the issue of judicial immunity inRandall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7Wall) 523 (1868). This is when the Court said where judges of courts of general jurisdiction acted in excess of their jurisdiction, they might be held liable if such acts were found to have been done maliciously or corruptly. . .Although absolutely barring damage actions, the doctrine of immunity does not preclude suits under 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against state judges see Mitchem v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
The LLC¶ Title to the properties exists as a constructive trust,
Misconduct of Plaintiff¶s lawyers Donald Brown junior, authorization Weichert¶s listing with the housing court. Yet this is absent of plaintiff¶s authorization, or even with notification that his representation intended to authorize plaintiffs property to be sold by Weichart with the opposition as their client.
Consequently, plaintiff is completely shut out from having any involvement in the sale and is currently in the position of being confined to approving the sale to go through. Thereby, to legally establish by plaintiff¶s consent that the opposition is legally entitled to half of the equity created by the sale of two properties. Not to mention, whatever else the opposition may write into the sales agreement to protect themselves from liability.
proclaimed all the excellent legal work he could have his son perform for Del., yet Brown and his partner Heisler just performed with more of the same extreme incompetence as Adamis and acted diametrically averse to Dell¶s expressed legal agenda. Essentially, all their representation was clearly dedicated to inflict devastating harm on to Dell¶s legal positions of opportunities and to consummate the evil intent of his opposition.
BASIS FOR MISTRIAL -The court lacks jurisdiction and cannot bootstrap itself to the case. Since the complaint is outrageously defective in truth and with the facts stated.
-The entire proceeding has been corruptedbyfoul play and with majormisrepresentations of material factsto the point of making a mockery of justice. Thus, nowfor the case now to proceed to trial would not only be futile to conduct jurisprudence, but would be in effect the usurpation of plaintiff¶s right to receive a fair and impartial hearing in a court of equity. As is where a:
³Mistrial" should be granted . . . as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it the defendant cannot have a fair trial and the whole proceedings are vitiated. Furthermore, [t]he trial court has a wide discretion in passing on motions for mistrial. (Ferinov. Palmer, 133 Conn. 463, 466, 52 A.2d 433);Bansahv. Pawelcsyk, 173 Conn. 520, 522, 378 A.2d 569 (1977).The defendant must prove to the trial court that the remarks made . . . were so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived of the opportunity for a fair trial and the entire proceedings were tainted.
³A well-established rule is that a statement by counsel, not under oath, of a material fact pertinent to the issues unsupported by evidence, and prejudicial to the opposing party, constitutes reversible error unless it appears that the prejudicial effect has been effectively
averted by an instruction to disregard the statement, or otherwise." (State V. Sant ello,120 Conn. 486, 490, 181 A. 335 (1935).
-Evidence was improperly admitted and omitted,
- Favoritism shown for the other sidethe court has been unfair with this issue that it appears to be partial to the other side.
-Ill-willwas shown to defendant by the court
Evidence testimonial and declarations of fact systemically falsified by plaintiff.
-Plaintiff has dirty hands. Whereby the doctrine of unclean hands states, see attached:
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.