The RKD Title of Record is Unenforceable

Plaintiff,Delmo L. Zanetteis moving this court to reargue the decision on March 8, 2010 of Judge Jennings, to vacate the. Notice of LisPendens, dated December 10, 2008. This decision to vacate the LisPenenswas filed by defendant on March 12, 2010to give constructive notice. Further, no notice of the rendition has ever been served upon plaintiff to date.

The Notice of LisPendensby the plaintiff is dated December 10, 2008by his attorney Mark F. Katz, Esq. and recorded in the Greenwich Land Records on December 10, 2008 against properties known as 1353 & 1357 King Street, Greenwich, Connecticut. Plaintiffdispute that affects the properties isthat the instruments of title to R.K.D. Venture, LLC and R.K.D. Venture Two, LLCare fraudulent, a product of constructive fraud, and exists as a constructive trust..

As this motion to reargue is pursuant to Conn. Practice §11-12. Motion to Reargue. Whereby, defendant stands upon C.P.§11-12, for his position to be heard in this action. Thereby, defendant can be finally granted procedural due process and be afforded an opportunity to ensure his right to be heard in a court of equity.

C.P.§11-12, states a party who wishes to reargue a decision or order rendered by the court shall, within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the rendition Whereas defendant is moving this court to reargue the decision on March 8, 2010, to vacate the. Notice of LisPendens dated December 10, 2008. This was filed by the plaintiff Delmo L. Zanette by his attorney Mark F. Katz, Esq. and recorded in the Greenwich Land Records on December 10, 2008 against properties known as 1353 King Street, Greenwich, µConnecticut where fraudulent instruments

identifying the defendant R.K.D. Venture, LLC and R.K.D. Venture Two, LLC having title were unlawfully filed and is a bad title.

As this motion to reargue is pursuant to Conn. Practice §11-12. Motion to Reargue. Whereby, defendant stands upon CP §11-12, for his position to be heard in this action. Thereby, defendant can be finally granted procedural due process and be afforded an opportunity to ensure his right to be heard in a court of equity.

(a) A party who wishes to reargue a decision or order rendered by the court shall, within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the rendition of the decision or order, file a motion to reargue setting forth the decision or order which is the subject of the motion, the name of the judge who rendered it, and the specific grounds for reargument upon which the party relies.

"[ T|hepurpose of a reargument is. . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts.' (Jeser v. Jaser37 Conn. App. 194, 202,655 A.2d 790 (1995). the decision or order, file a motion to reargue setting forth the decision or order which is the subject of the motion, the name of the judge who rendered it, and the specific grounds for reargument upon which the party relies.


"[ T|hepurpose of a reargument is. . . todemonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts.' (Jeser v. Jas«rt37 Conn. App. 194, 202,655 A.2d 790 (1995).

Pursuant to CGS§47-12a, plaintiff submits an affidavit of facts relating to title in real estate of 1353 and 1357 King St to be recorded by the Town Clerk. This is with stating the facts relating to the matters affecting the title in RKD properties, and having knowledge of the facts to testify concerning them in open court. The matter is that RKD corporations obtained adverse possession through fraud and deceit, in violation of the ³Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,§52-552g´: ³§52-552g(1)A transfer is made: (A) With respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a mid-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permitsthe transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee . . .´ Defendants obtained control of plaintiffs¶ property by the May 27 th 2004 agreement to buy the property for three million or sell it for four million by the end of 2006. Yet, no money was ever paid to plaintiff to buy his property to unequivocally establish that the transference of title was never perfected. Rather defendants¶ claim to tile is strictly based on constructive fraud and other outrageousmisconduct. ³A transfer of personal property, unaccompanied by a corresponding change of possessionis fraudulent per se, and void as to as to credit´ (Lake v. Morris (1861) 30 Conn. 201;Toby v. Reed (1832) 9 Conn. 216). In effect,defendant¶sclandestine conveyance correspondents to:

§52-552g, Tile 52, note 6,³§4. Elements of, fraudulent intent´

³Party seeking to set aside conveyance all fraudulent bears burden of proving either that conveyance was made without substantial consideration and rendered transferor unable to meet his obligations, or that conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in which grantedparticipated; only one of two alternatives need be satisfied.´ (Tyers v. Coma (1990) 570 A.2d/ 186, 214 Conn. 8. See, also, Rocklen, Inc.v.Radulesco (1987) 522 A.2d 846, 10 Conn.App, 271).

§52-552g, Tile 52, note 6,³§7 Constructive fraud, fraudulent intent´ ³To prove constructive fraud, for purposes of showing a fraudulent conveyance, a plaintiff must show that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and that the conveyance rendered the transferor unable to meet an obligation to the plaintiff.´(Gaudio v. Gaudio (1990) 580 A.2d 1212, 23 Conn.App. 287, cerlihcation denied 584 A.2d 471, 217 Conn. 8l).

³Even an estoppel by deed is subject to the limitation that it cannot be invoked by one through whose imposition and misrepresentation a statement was inserted in the deed.´ (Capitol Nat'l BK. & Trust v. David B. Roberts, Inc., 129 Conn. 194, 195, 27 A.2d 116 (1942)).

The fact of the matter is that RKDs¶ legal claim to title exists as a constructive trust. Since defendants¶claim of ownership is misrepresented as operation of law against plaintiff. This false pretense of right was achieved by actual and constructive fraud, by duress, abuse of confidence, omission of wrongs; along with various other forms of unconscionable conduct, such as: fraud upon the court, and through the collusion of all four of plaintiff¶s lawyers. In addition, the housing judges assigned to evict plaintiff from his property by violating his right to be heard in a court of equity, and acted with outrageous favoritism extended to the defendants.


While, simultaneously these judges acting with profound ill-will towards plaintiff to ensure his rights to be heard were denied. Since defendant had no legal right to seek plaintiff¶s eviction and never substantiated they possessed paramount or quiet title, in face of plaintiff¶s submitted evidence validating their fraud. Thus, the housing court judges acted to deny plaintiff¶s defenses to be considered. Along withunjustifiably vacated the lispendenson a bogus pretense. This raises questions if favoritism was extended by Judge Jennings from havinghad worked with defendants¶ lawyer in the same law firm. µµA constructive trust arises contrary to intentionand in invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual orconstructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commissionof wrong, or by any form of unconscionableconduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means,or who in any way against equity and good conscience,either has obtained or holds the legal right to propertywhich he ought not, in equity and good conscience, holdand enjoy. . . . A constructive trust arises wheneveranother¶s property has been wrongfully appropriatedand converted into a different form . . . [or] when aperson who holds title to property is subject to anequitable duty to convey it to another on the groundthat he would be unjustly enriched if he were permittedto retain it.¶¶ (Cadle Co. v. Gabel, 69 Conn. App. 279, 288,794 A.2d 1029 (2002)).

Consequently, defendants obtained and hold legal right to the subject propertiesin accordance to the doctrine of constructive trust. This is along with hundreds of thousands of dollars of plaintiff¶s personal property consisting of a massive collection of art, antiques and collectables. However, defendants should not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy the real and personal property rightfully belonging to plaintiff.


µUnjust enrichment applies wherever justice requires compensation to be given for property . ..under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract.¶¶ (Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).

The May 27, 2004µcontract¶ was utilized by defendant to establish a façade of a legal right. Thereby,the µcontact¶ was misused as a devise to pervert the power of law to benefit as a conveyance beneficiary even with a total failure of consideration to establish such right.

Consequently,plaintiff seeks a constructive trust actionto set things right, since hecan clearly prove the frauddefendants employed.Insomuch asthe defendants¶wrongdoing was to deprive plaintiff of his property rights by their dishonest methods or schemes, by trick, chicane, and overreaching. Therefore, the defendant would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to retain the proceeds they extracted from the equity in plaintiffs¶ property in the past and at this time.

The only money plaintiff ever received was directed to a $40,000.00 mortgage on his property granted to him as the ³borrower.´This is shown in the November 2004 two million mortgage deed that identifies Ronald Pecunies as the ³lender.´ At that time a $2,000,000.00 lean was clandestinely leveraged on plaintiff¶s property by defendants, which only had a debt of about $950,000.

Essentially, Pecunies and Watson used theextra one million for their own use and benefit, it was granted by the open-end loan that they secured without plaintiff¶s authorization. This is where Pecunies and Watson became borrowers of the million open-end-loan. Yet, they haveneglected to make payments, and now the properties have gone into foreclosure. Consequently, at this


timedefendants are telling plaintiff that if he doesn¶t agree to sign the conveyance to third party to share whatever equity is realized he will get nothing. This constitutes extortion based on fear of economic loss, in violation of the Hobbs Act.

Moreover, the quit-claim deed, states for ³price received´ that corresponds to a mortgagedeed where unbeknown to plaintiff had divested his title to Pecunies and Watson. Albeit, was based on receiving a $40,000.00 mortgage on his own property, which he is named as responsible for the debt. Yet, plaintiffwas tricked and signed all of these unnumbered and uninitialedpapers under false pretenses that they only corresponded to the two $20,000.00 loans and for defendants to obtain refinancing. This is where the first $20,000.00 was received as a loan in May 2004 and the second was in November 2004.

Noteworthy, is that plaintiff¶s health-aid, Joanna Grammacy signed as the attesting witness on the Mortgage Deed conveyance under the same material misrepresentations presented to him. Since Mrs. Grammacy attended all the meetings he had with Pecunies and observed how Pecunies tricked him to sign the misrepresented documents. This is without being given a chance to read the agreements or take them with him to be reviewed. In effect plaintiff¶s signatures were obtained by trickery through statutory forgery.

Plaintiff did not ask for the loans, but Pecunies insisted that he wanted him to have the money. (This is when he said I wantyou to buy some flowers, and plaintiff¶s response was that he didn¶t need money to buy flowers as he has a supplier who gives him plants on credit). It was


unbeknown to him that although Pecunies paid him with converted what I thought was two loans to a $40,000.00 mortgage.

Although, plaintiff was led to believe until recently that he received a $40,000.00 loan from Ron Pecunies in two $20,000.00 checks written from his business account. The loan was introduced as an act of demonstrating good will by my giving him time to buy his property. However, what plaintiff did not know was that the $40,000.00 was applied to a mortgage on his own property to give Pecunies a lender legal right and interest in the title to his property.

Yet, plaintiff was never notified until 2009 about being in default of the $40,000.00 mortgage that he was required to make monthly payments (6% rate of interest).Moreover, this $40, 0000 mortgage was further converted into a mortgage-deed that placed his property with equity of three million as collateral for the $40,000.00 loan. The mortgage deed was not known to exist by plaintiff, but it embodied a mortgage with a conveyance of the titleto Pecunies. Thereby, to affect the transfer of plaintiff¶s propertyto Pecunies if he defaulted on paying back the $40,000.00 in a timely manner.

Consequently, plaintiff waspledging his properties as security for a loan; where the mortgage deed represents the lender's ownership in the property.Thus, the clandestine filing of the mortgage deed and quit instruments placed a lien on the property based on the $40,000.00 mortgage as Pecunies being the lender, even though he is not a legal financial institution.In effect, the operation of law implies that Pecunies can foreclose on the property since plaintiff did not make the timely payments required. Yet, this would be unenforceable in a court of equity


Noteworthy is that Pecunies never gave actual notice and only first notified plaintiff in 2009. However, Pecunies hindered plaintiff¶s ability to pay the mortgage. Since in a systematic manner defendants unlawfully maliciously interfered with plaintiff obtaining the contractually agreed rental revenues. In addition to recently acting to misappropriate the vast amount of personal property that plaintiff planned to convert to cash at the Elephants Trunk flea market. Along with liquidating his collectables to the collectors plaintiff has lined up to buy them. This would instantly be tens of thousands of dollars. Consequently, plaintiff is now destitute as a result of such interference by defendants.

However, what Phillips may not have realized how the facts and circumstances can validate that the loan and filed instruments indicate culpability to a scheme and an artifice to defraud.Essentially, the loan was a scheme or artifice to defraud plaintiff. Since the loan was offered in the agreement confirms it was a calculated course of action intended to deceive plaintiff. Thereby, defendants sought to achieve a desired result to obtain plaintiff¶s wealth through fraud and deceit. This is by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, money and property from deception and falsification of transference instruments.

In effect, the loan was dedicated to deprive plaintiff of his intangible rights to quite enjoyment of his propertyand as a basis to victimize him with other criminal conduct. USC Title 18, §944 Proof of Scheme and Artifice to Defraud ³To sustain a conviction the government must prove the existence of a scheme; it is not required, however, to prove all details or all instances of allegedly illicit conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 442 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1984) ("It is well established that proof of every allegation is not required in order to convict; the government need

only prove that the scheme to defraud existed."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981)

Furthermore, plaintiff only authorizeddefendants to obtainrefinancing to achieve a better rate. However, the rate of 11½ % replaced the existing rate of 8½ % and defendant never purchased the property ascontractually promised. This was stated in the May 27th, 2004 agreement to buy the properties by 2006, which defendants breached (exh.A).

Yet, defendants¶ purchase of plaintiff¶s property was the very basis of the expressed purpose to obtain the refinancing as a pre-request before defendants purchased the disputed property. Attached are compilations of facts and documents of the title recording. This is an accounting corresponding to the facts and circumstances of validating that defendants have µbad title¶ and that the law supports plaintiff¶s legal entitlement to µquiet title.¶

The RKD Venture and RKD Venture II recording of instruments exists as a constructive fraud. Since the circumstances of material fact show that defendant¶s unethical actions gave them an unfair advantage over plaintiff by unfair means (deception and trickery). Consequently, a court of equity would surelydecide from the methods used.

Thereby, the result is that the tier of facts should treat the situation as if there was actual fraud even if all the technical elements of fraud have not been proven.Insomuch all the documents recordedhas all actual consequences and all legal effects of actual fraud, as a breach of legal and equitable duty which, can be declared by law to be fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others or violate confidence.

³Actual fraudulent intent, as required to support liability in fraudulent conveyance action, under both New York and Connecticut law, may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the relationship among the parties and the secrecy, haste, or unusual nature of the transaction. (National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc. v. Caro & Graifman, P.C., D.Conn.2003, 259 F.Supp.2d 172).

Essentially, the RKD Venture and RKD Venture II recording of instruments exists as a constructive fraud. Since the circumstances of material fact show that defendant¶s unethical actions gave them an unfair advantage over Delmo Zanette by unfair means (fraud, deception and trickery). ³To prove constructive fraud, for purpose showing a fraudulent conveyance, a plaintiff must show that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and that the conveyance rendered the transferor unable to meet an obligation to the plaintiff.(Gaudio v. Guadio (1990) 580 A.2d 1212, 23 Conn. App. 287, certification denied 584 A.2d 471, 217 Conn, 803)

Consequently, a court of equity would surely decide from the methods used and the result that it should treat the situation as if there was actual fraud; even if all the technical elements of fraud have not been proven.Insomuch all the documents recordedhas all actual consequences and all legal effects of actual fraud, as a breach of legal and equitable duty. This can be declared by law to be fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others that RKD legitimately possesses ownership.


Thus, it canreadily be legally established for plaintiff¶sjudicial relief that the title of record to his rights of ownership exists as aconstructive possession. This is wherean unbroken chain of tilepursuant to §52-552g can be established through the operation of law, seeking a µmarketable title¶ from injunctive relief. Even though, the defendants recording of RKD Ventures had casted a cloud on its title, the law is clear as to who possess µquite title.¶ Since defendants¶ recording of RKD, clearly indicates is a very bad title.Consequently, in all past judicial proceedings, defendants never revered totheir recording. This is even thoughthe defendants¶spent perhaps two hundred thousand dollars of the properties rental revenue to pay RKD¶s legal fees against plaintiff they never showed their instruments of title.

Rather, defendants acted to try title to the land through a massive degree of fraud and other acts of judicial misconduct in Superior and Housing Court to achieve a desire result as is stated in: ³All property equitable distribution schemes: ³It does not limit, either by timing or method of acquisition or by source of funds, the property subject to a trial court s broad allocative power.´ (Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792, 663 A.2d 365 (1995)).

Such as where defendants allegedin Housing Court that plaintiff¶s claim to possession was by statutory trespass and unlawful occupancy.Since, the characteristics of RKD¶sdeed of ownership to the subject properties attest to it beingonly a semblance of conveyance, in clear violation of State laws. This canbe established by only one fact of defect, where the mortgage-deed was not properly delivered to plaintiff by defendant with chargeable and actual notice.

The r eco rdingwas wit hout const ruct ive not ice, insomuch as it was not implied or imputed by law as being properly executed. Whereby, the recording was done without required


authorization or notice to the plaintiff and was clandestinely executed with his fraudulently obtained signatures on the quit claim and mortgage deed. Thus recording by defendants was without the required authorization in accordance to statues to establish a good title. As in accordance to µEffect of Recording of Unauthorized Instruments¶, Standard 2.4, Conn. Bar Assoc. Inc. (1999).´ ³If an instrument is not authorized by statute to be recorded, the unauthorized recording of that instrument is not constructive notice of the same.

³Comment 1.The belief that one has the right to record any written document one wishes, with the corresponding duty of the town clerk to accept and record the same, has no validity. No document or instrument placed on record without statutory authority gives constructive notice to the world of its existence or contents.´

³The fact that an instrument has been copied into an official book in the office of a register of deeds or other recording officer does not necessarily make the copy a record within the terms of a recording act. If its copying is not authorized by a statute in effect at the time or thereafter enacted, it is no more a record than would be the case if the copy appeared in some other book in any other office.´

³Copies which are authorized and properly made constitute records, and these possess incidents not held by unofficial copies; for example, presumptions of authenticity, delivery, and acceptance, value per se as evidence, the attribute of affording record notice, etc. In the absence of special statute, the unauthorized copy possesses none of these qualities. Even its power to give inquiry notice to one who sees it, or otherwise has knowledge of its existence, has been stated to be no greater than that from knowledge of any other copy .... 4 American Law of Property § 17.31 (1952).

Although, the town record identifies the RKD Ventures as the holder of title, its charter is fraudulent and the two signature of plaintiff on the LLCs was fraudulently obtained under false

pretenses. In fact, the very existence of the RKD Ventures LLCs is to carry out a criminal activity to defraud plaintiff in violation of RICO. Essentially, RKD Ventures operates in ultra vires as is in violation of performing according to law. Since plaintiff¶s agreement that defendants could secure refinancingwas obtained by deception as were his signatures on the quit claims and the mortgage deed to surrender his legal rights of ownership. This was achieved by: ³The elements of a fraud action : (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker; (3) the statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the statement to his detriment.´ (Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 217-18, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991)).

Not to mention, the deed is held as an equitable mortgage that lacks the capacity to hold the title, due to it being fraudulent on face andclearly,totally defective.In effect, a color of title exists since the final stage of transference of a reasonable consideration of payment to plaintiff at a fair price was neglected to have been performed by the defendants.

Thus, petitioner possesses legal title to the disputed properties, since defendants did not complete the final requirement of paying plaintiff for the rights and privileges of ownership tohis properties. While,due to defendant¶s omission of buying the property, they fraudulently procured and entered the deed. Thus, in operation of law, defendants attempted to create a facade of title, but this is as a very bad title, since amongst its numerous defects, it exists as being broken chain of title. This means by law defendant¶s claim of possessing ³legal title´ is unequivocally bogus and legally unenforceable.


Insomuch as,no conveyance occurred for the transference between parties to have occurred,due todefendant¶s neglect to pay the agreed price of three million dollars,oranything whatsoever. Such a gross deficiency of not paying anything means it is impossible to even consider if a legal title in the name of RKD ventures was ever established. In addition, anyone paying the filing fee with a willing lawyer to sign on can file a conveyance of tile; since the Town Clerk doesn¶t review the instruments, only attests to the final signatures.

Yet, the most relevant factor is that the ³UniformFraudulentConveyance Act´ requires ³substantial consideration´ of payment to receive a good title. Of which must be a ³fair price´ for the transference to be legally binding.

Essentially, defendants¶ title of ownership is an ultra vires deed, given under falsified corporate resolution in the name of RKD ventures.Moreover, the delivery of the instruments is defectiveand was not properly authorized by plaintiff. Whereas, RonaldPecunies and Author Watson signed on to the mortgage-deed with false impersonation of being the property owner, this is where it states they are the sole owner of the property.Thus, it is a material fact that the face appearance of the mortgage deed constitutes a manifestation of constructive fraud.

Moreover, the signatures of plaintiff on the µquit claim deed,¶ and on other instruments were obtained by statutory forgeryand under false pretenses. Not to mention, the instruments to the title of RKD Ventures, consist as improper compilation of documents and improperly recorded documents.


This is where the major flaw in recording is that no chargeable notice was given to plaintiff. Since a notice that a two million dollar lean was to be leveraged on the property he owned was implied and imputed by law as a required notice to plaintiff that the mortgage deed was to be executed. In effect, the defendants¶ lack of notice to plaintiff of the mortgage-deeds was insufficient of what the law requires. Whereby, Pecunies gave title of the land to M&T as the grantee of the land, yet neglected to give notice to plaintiff as the law states ³a grantee of land is chargeable with notice of the facts appearing in all deeds in his chain of title ...´ (Republic National bank of Dallas v. Eiring, Tex. Civ. App.1951, 240 S.W.2d, 414).

Consequently, the one million open-end-credit granted to Pecunies and Watson, was only achieved by leveraging the property behind plaintiff¶s back. This is where Pecunies falsely stated having sole ownership and the record of RKD¶s title is totally devoid of plaintiff¶s authorization that was legally required. Since defendants have established a claim on record that plaintiff still owns the other 50% of the properties that theyfalsely claim to own 50%.

³Landrecords exist to preserve evidence of deeds andother instruments and to charge any B-linterested with a constructive notice equivalentto the actual knowledge which would be acquired from perusal of any original instruments.´ (Lilian v. Ealahan(1922) 119 A. 349, Conn, 176).

Thus, the mortgage-deed was not delivered to plaintiff in his capacity as the grantor, yet M&T Bank gave the mortgage in absence of plaintiff being given actual notice. This appears to have been achieved by Pecunies falsely attesting to be the sole owner of the property on the mortgagedeed. Another most distinctive characteristic of the mortgage deed is numerous omissions of signatures throughout the entire instrument to create a defective color of title on face. This is

where the lender, the vice president of M&T bank, doesn¶t sign in the only place designated for his signature. Further, it appears wherever signatures are required beneath attesting liability by Pecunies and Watson they are not signed. In fact just on the omission of one signature can create a defective color of title. While most designated places for signatures in the mortgage deed above their names were left blank.

The other irregularity is that the rate of interest is left blank, instead a reference is made that the rate for a three year, interest only mortgage is to be ³½% below the maxim rate.´ This happens to be the usury rate 11½%, at that time in Connecticut. Yet at that time, short term three year mortgages were available for as low as 5%. ³Title torealty should appear upon the records in orderthat it may be easily and accurately recorded, thus preventing fraud and adding to the security of land titles. (Sadd v. Heim(1956) 124 A2d 522, 143,Conn. 582).

The conveyance of tile consisted of having plaintiff¶ signature on two µquit claim deeds¶ that state:³for price received.´ However for price received, a warranty deed is the proper instrument for such a transaction as a quit claim deed is deficient of containing a legal guaranties of right to convey title. Insomuch as, a quit claim deed is most often used for the sole purpose to disclaim any interest in a property, rather than to be utilized for selling a property that one owns.

Essentially, the quitclaim deeds are used for transfers not involving a normal commercial quidquo pro transaction. Such as between family members, gifts, placing personal property into a


business entity, to eliminate clouds on title, or in other special or unusual circumstances; such as with tax deed sales to authorize the property to be auctioned off to pay an outstanding tax debt. Whereas, the most common use for a quitclaim deed is a divorcein which one party is granting the other full rights to, and eliminating any interest in, a property in which both parties held an interest. If a husband and wife own a home and divorce, and the wife acquires the home in the decree, the husband would enact a quitclaim deed to eliminate interest in the property.

The fact isdefendants tricked plaintiff into signing the quit claim deeds by misrepresenting it as corresponding to refinancing and the paperwork to $40,000.00 loan, applied as a mortgage. Thereafter, theses quit claim deeds of plaintiff were applied for placing his personal property into a business entity of the LLC¶s. Yet, it states on the quit claims: ³for consideration paid,´ but the only consideration paid to plaintiff was by a $40,000.00 mortgage on his own property. This $40,000.00 mortgage is identified ina ³promissory note´ to RKD¶s title filed on the town record.Thereby, the promissory note appears to be a ridiculous attempt to correspond to: ³for the price received´ as the act that defendants may claim consummated the transference between parities.

Moreover, to constitute for the ³price received´ is a ³MORTGAGE DEED´says: DELMO L. ZANETTE, an individual with an address of 1357 King Street, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830, (herein the "Mortgagor") for the consideration of FORTY THOUSAND ($40,000.00) DOLLARS received to his full satisfaction from RONALD E. PECUNIES and ARTHUR K. WATSON, JR., individuals, each with an address c/oWatson Enterprises Incorporated, 261 West Putnam Avenue, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830, (jointly and severally herein the "Mortgagee")


DOES GIVE, GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL AND CONFIRM unto the said Mortgagee: Those certain tracts, pieces and parcels of land, with all the buildings and improvements thereon, situated at 1353 and 1357 King Street, Greenwich, Connecticut, more particularly described in Schedule A, attached hereto and made a part hereof. Subject to all prior mortgages and items of record. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above granted and bargained premises, with the appurtenances thereof, unto him, the said Mortgagee, and his and their heirs and assigns forever, to his and their own proper use and behoof.

Yet the ³mortgage ³Deed¶ is just the cover page to the unnumbered page that was not only signed by plaintiff, but also by his health aid Joanne Grammacy. MsGramacy was a material witness to all the meetings that plaintiff had with defendant. This was when they discussed about purchasing the property with the understanding that the price of three million instead of the four million valuation price was in consideration of a consessession. Specifically, that Plaintiff was given the right to occupying the large red building with his produce store on the commercial property for the rest of his life by contributing a $1,000.00 towards taxes each month.

Consequently, due to the profoundly defective title, the defendants dare not present it, instead they substituted the May 27 agreement as being a binding conveyance of title. Yet, the only basis of possible validity of conveyance is to attempt to interpret the agreement as an express trust.

However, the appearance of the agreement on face falls far short from every legally being considered as an express trust. This is because the intent of the agreement and the bargain of it as a contract is to sell the property within 2 and ½ years, not to bestow a giftto defendants. Since,


due to the nonperformance of defendants, a contractually expressed gift is the only basis defendant can argue.

Whereby, defendant¶s legal strategy has been to make false claims on record. Such as about having initially saved the property from pending foreclosure and maintain the property by paying off its debts out of their own pocket. However, the truth is the opposite where without legal right they have been extracting the equity from the property, primarily by the usurpation of its rental revenue and a fraudulently obtaining loan of one million dollars from placing a lean on the properties.

The defendants have never introduced the LLC¶s tile of exclusive ownership contained in the town records. In fact, their representation, Robert Kaelin, stifled Ronald Pecunies in midsentence when he attempted to verify his legal right of ownership by saying : ³we have two titles.´ As this is for good reason, since even in a court with the most unbridled bias, to introduce the mortgage-deed as the title of ownership would create profound dissidence, even for a mercenary judge who had been bribed. Since, no judge could ever rule on such a defective instrument as validating defendant¶s possessing a good or valid title, when on face it is a clearly an extraordinary µbad title,¶ many times over.

Upon a cursory viewing of the title that exists as a mortgage-deed would indicate to any lawyer that it is a product of constructive fraud. In fact, the signatures of plaintiff were obtained under false pretenses as an act of statutory forgery. Specifically, as shown by the µquit claim deed¶ signed by Mr. Zanette¶s expressed intent to transfer the tile to his two properties to RKD Venture


and RKD Venture 2. This is where the tile on the quit-claim deed states conveyance from Mr. Zanette is ³for the price received;´ yet, this is for properties collectively worth four million for only $40,000.00. Further. the $40,000.00 is not even a quid-quo pro payment, but for a loan to Mr. Zanette by Pecunies as an individual, that is applied to a mortgage on the property he previously 100% owned before transferring title to the LLC¶s.

Consequently, according to promissory note of the mortgage-deed Mr. Zanette owes the $40,000.00 to Ron Pecunies as an individual, in his capacity as executive director of the LLCs. Since the $40,000.00 came out of the one million open end credit that Pecunies and Watson drew upon for their own use and benefit $480,000 upon receipt of conveyance in November 2004. The one million open-end-credit was achieved by leveraging a two million lean on the property. Consequently, it is not a surprise, the other half million credit upon a lean on the property has since been depleted by Pecunies and Watson.

Defendants pleaded during the course of the 2007 eviction action that the instrument that attests to them possessing a 50% title. Yet, on December 15thhad pleaded that the legal ownership was now 100% on the parcel containing plaintiff¶s home, while on the other property it was 50%. However, the defendant¶s instrument to title of ownership, the May 27th µagreement,¶ does not state the transference of title is in exchange for the$40,000.00 as payment.

However, this is the instrument that the court is going by, and in accordance to judicial estoppel, defendant needed to show evidence as to what instrument is to substitute the agreement.


Thereby, to disturb the courts established status quo, to affirm the title had been modified from the 50% of record to be readjusted to have changed into currently being 100%.

Therefore, the court erroredin its discretionary judgment by overlooking that it had an official duty of implied responsibility to ask to be provided with the instruments of tile; if not but for the sake of judicial economy. In effect deciding which party possessed legal or paramount titled was the core issue to the dispute and the pivotal issue to be determined to resolve their legal dispute.

Specifically, the court is told to change the previously established claim of ownership previously entered into evidence as a material fact to be 50% to be substituted with a new claim of 100% ownership. Thus, with the accepted proof of record of claiming only owning 50% shared with plaintiff to be transformed to 100%, the court should have asked to show proof of the contradiction to the past entry of proof of title. Since the rule of law is that one is restricted to what one has attested to claim by judicial estoppel that places a bar on self-contradiction. Thus the court should have demanded the instrument showing the conveyance of the other 50% on record attesting to plaintiff¶s ownership.Of which defendants in a breeched exclusive option to buy by November 2006, has been applied as an express trust.

The $40,000.00 mortgage is the µpromissory note¶ to the mortgage on the property as corresponding to the price received as quid-quo-pro to the transference of title established on the quit claims. This is where Pecunies is identified as being the ³lender´ in his capacity as the ³executive director´ of the LLC¶s on the mortgage deed. Pecunies and Watson are identified as being borrowers of one million dollars each that is leveraged on the property.


Consequently, technically on the face of the mortgage Mr. Zanette currently owes the $40,000 plus accrued interests to Pecunies in his capacity of representing the business interests of RKD Ventures that Mr. Zanette conveyed the title by the two quit claims he signed that were misrepresented as paperwork to the loan and/or refinancing the property before it was purchased. Yet at the time the properties prior mortgage was paid off of $944,000, which produced an openend credit where Pecunies and Watson drew out $480,000 for their own use and benefit. Albeit minus the $40,000.00 appropriated to Mr. Zanette from a mortgage on the property.

³A constructive trust, also known as, involuntary trust or implied trust, arises against one who, by actual or constructive fraud, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by some other form of unconscionable conduct, has obtained or holds legal title to property which in equity and good conscience he ought not to hold and enjoy.1 It is substantially a remedy against unjust enrichment,2 and it is raised by equity where property has been acquired by fraud, or where, although originally acquired without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by the person holding it.´3

³The situations in which a constructive trust will be declared are practically unlimited, including the acquisition by fraud of legal title to property to which another has a better right; the acquisition of property by abuse of confidence; and the acquisition of property on a misrepresentation as to the person or property on a misrepresentation as to the person or purpose for which it is withheld.4

The mortgage/deed as a µclaim to title¶appears as if defendants¶ lawyer, Charles H. DeBovis,

1See 2See

Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts §§ 200, 201. Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 205. 3See Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 211. 4See, Estate of Campbell, 1997 ME 212, 704 A.2d 329 (Me. 1997) 23

prepared the instrumentsfor theirgain to be legitimately constructed upon defendant¶s liability. However, through the wisdom of the legislators, our laws protect us from acts of µconstructive fraud¶ achieved under µfalse pretenses.¶ Not to mention,the principal of the doctrine of µunclean hands¶states that those with µdirty hands¶ are not entitled to relief in equity. Moreover, the clean hands doctrine means one who has defrauded his adversary in the subject matter of the action would not be herd to assert his right in equity. Under this doctrine, the court of equity may deny relief to a party whose conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and deceitful. As this doctrine is applicable when the reprehensible conduct complained of pertains to the controversy at issue.

Whereas, Phillips¶ bungling adventurous representation of defendants, Pecunies and Watsonhas lead them into being in a deep abyss of verifiable liability. This is where Philips as their lawyer signed on to all their instruments as a witnesscorresponding to the fraudulent title transference, million dollar open ended loan, and mortgage. Asthe conveyance of title was strictly based on the prior owner (plaintiff)having received a $40,000 mortgage on his property. . .that is issued by Pecunies,identified on the mortgage as being plaintiff¶s³lender.´

While, plaintiff first learned that conveyance of the title to his property had occurred five years after the fact with not knowing he has signed quit claims that were misrepresented as the paperwork for his $40,000 loan. Rather, the court and his lawyers have been going by his contract (exh. A) and the establishment of the shared ownership in the charter of the LLCs that legally empowered defendants with a claim to title of 50% ownership. However, although the terms of the contract were misrepresented not to include things that were included (such as where plaintiff would only get $100, 000.00 a year until he was 103 years old); still as one side


as the terms are it does state plaintiff was authorizing for refinancing (to get a better rate) and a $40,000.00 pay-out with the refinancing he approved.

In addition that the collection of the rents were to be directed to paying off the properties debts, perhaps two hundred thousand dollars of the rental revenue is reported towards going towards legal fees to act in bad faith of the terms of the agreement. Such as with defendants evicting plaintiff from his farm produce store and now from his home to force him to agree for them to sell his properties as if it was their own.

Therefore as defendant has entered theµagreement¶ as evidence to their claim of legal right within the dynamics of the agreed bargain between parties, they are barred by judicial estoppel to deviate or contradict its terms. Exactly what is occurring at this time where defendant are estopped from now being able to prove that they have legal ownership on the basis that the RKD Venture and RKD Venture Two, states on each charter that plaintiff assigns 25% to both Pecunies and Watson in each LLC that identifies (albeit by a past typo) 1753 Kings St on each LLC.

However, for the court to go by the signatures on the LLC¶s that were established for a sale that never occurred, as verifying to the veracity of defendants claim of 100% is substantiated, they are ruling outside the courts own established jurisdiction. Since the defendants had entered into evidence the agreement as proving the conveyance of tile to be 50-50 as a material fact to the satisfaction of the court. Thus, the inherent principals of jurisprudence prevents them from now


changing their claim that in 2004 when the alleged conveyance occurred it was not to be 50-50, but that they obtained100% ownership of defendants home.

Albeit not by giving plaintiff any money whatsoever, but by the enforceable power of plaintiff¶s signature on the agreement. Even though petitioner pleads, the agreement was obtained through false pretenses and trickery and that its term had lapsed over three years ago when defendants breeched its core condition. This was that they agreed to buy the property by the end of 2006 for 3 million, or if the property was sold to an outsider it would be for $4 million and they would receive $500,000 under the term of the contract. Yet when plaintiff had two buyers wanting to pay 4 million they wanted more money to allow the sale to go through.

Yet, for the last three years the Norwalk Court recognizes the agreement as an enforceable claim to tile for defendants. This is on the basis it says that the property is to have 50-50 ownership and that plaintiff agrees defendants are to manage his property. Consequently, the court has long participated with affirming defendants agenda that plaintiff should cooperate with their interest to sell his property as if it is their legal right.

As nowwith Judge Grogins¶ outrageously inappropriate order of execution of eviction from plaintiffs home to make him homeless and destitute, upon plaintiff¶s default because he is too ill to travel for another 6 weeks. This is where the agreement is acknowledged by the rulings of Judge Hickey, Grogins, and Moore of the Norwalk Court as constituting defendant¶s claim of paramount and quiet title to plaintiff¶s property.


The lending institution neglected their implied professional duty of responsibility to do due diligence to insure that the tile transfer was the intention of the prior owner. Not to mention, the one million open-end-loan assigned to Pecunies and Watson. Thereafter, they drew down the entire $900,000.00 upon their whim, plus additional exorbitant interest and penalties being leveraged on plaintiff¶s property. Although one would think that upon review of the mortgage¶s structure the lending bank (M&T) before approving the mortgage/loan would have been motivated to consult with plaintiff, if not but for their own business interests.

Insomuch as it was by an application of a non-relative and non-licensed individual, who only produced some signed papersof another person to qualify them to receive a pre-approved million dollar cash payout. Thismoney was offered by the placinga two million dollar lean on thebasis of signed papers with the name of the owner of property to give the cash to the applicant. How could such deficiency of demonstrated authorization from the owner notbe viewed as having the potential of being problematic?

An example corresponding to what occurred with plaintiff and defendant¶sdisingenuous ³business relationship´ isanalogous to where the ³borrower´ could have turned out to have been a home-aid. Yet,after paying out the trusting senior the $40,000.00, has since left the country with the $900,000 that they got through leveraging it on the seniors property. Albeit such a deed trust was by a third party who offered to do asenior¶s paperwork toget them a$40,000 payout and a better rate of mortgage from refinancing their property. As exactly what occurred where defendant obtained plaintiff¶s signatures under the false pretense. Specifically, the bargain in the


µagreement¶ was it was for getting a better rate on the mortgage and a ³40, 000.00 loan´ which they got from a mortgage on his property

Consequently, such a scenario would place the lending institution in a precarious position to enforce the additional million dollar debt on the unsuspecting senior who only received $40,000.00 of the million dollar pay out. On the other hand, Pecunies and Watson are not someone who are without assets and earning twenty thousand a year. Rather, they have fiduciary credibility and financial substance that they may have benefited from to plaintiff¶s detriment.

Accordingly, when an actor wants to impose a $900,000 debt (the open end loan) on another person for their own benefit by manner of imposing a lean or liability on another, a written authorizationis required from the party bearing the accountability. Since, no such authorization exists the lender is stuck with going after Pecunies and Watson for the two million that they borrowed to pay off about 1.1 million of the properties debts.

Insomuch as, the over two million dollar lean on defendants property most likely will prove to be unenforceable under the fraud statutes. Although with plaintiff will benefit from the unencumbering of his property due to defendants being liable for the over two million debt they won¶t benefit when the compensatory damages are tallied up to determinetriple damage judgment under RICO.

While it seems that Phillips, who specializes in the practice of Tax Law, felt that hisapproval of the instruments, legally served the business interests of his clients, Pecunies and Watson.


However, the law will prove their signing on to theseirregular instruments would have a profoundly detrimental effect of severely injuring their financial interests. Not to mention, the legal instruments Philipsproduced and instruments of tile he attested as a witness or notarized are all unenforceable in a court of law.

Consequently, the fact that Pecunies and Watson each signed on to the mortgages for one million dollars as the µborrower¶means that they are stuck with the debt and plaintiff has no bank debt on his property. Since, the two million dollar lean on the properties was obtained without proper authorization and Pecunies and Watson received one million each as being the ³borrowers,´ while they committed bank fraud by each signing to:.

³THE CONDITION OF THIS DEED IS SUCH, that whereas the Mortgagor is justly indebted to the Mortgagee in the sum of Two Million and 00/100 Dollars ($2,000,000.00) the Mortgagor hereby represents, warrants and covenants with the Mortgagee that the Mortgagor is the sole owner of the Premises; is lawfully seized and possessed of the same in fee simple; that the same are free from all encumbrances, except as provided on Exhibit B; that the Mortgagor has good right, full power and lawful authority to give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey the same in the manner as aforesaid.´

The manner of second malpractice injury is that on face,petitioners¶ claim of right to title exists only as a µColor of Title.¶Since petitioners¶ claim of ownership to the disputed properties, corresponds to receiving the transfer of title properties in an egregiously irregular regular. Such as where thefiled documents are defective in content and appear to be the product of ³constructive fraud.¶Since the mortgage filed has major defects with the admission of signing onto the liabilityfor the one million mortgages for each property.


Insomuch, as the mortgage substituted petitioner having purchased the property. Instead, the consideration for the transference of title was solely based on the breech promise to buy contained in an agreement.This is just one of numerous elements of material facts exhibited in the documents of record that constitutes an irregular chain of title to justify petitioner¶s claim has no standing in fact and law.

However, fortunatelyfor Philips, the doctrine of µunclean hands,¶ shields him from being sued by Pecunies and Watson for malpractice. On the other hand, Philips shares full culpability in criminal and tort court for all the injury that his clients inflicted upon defendant, under the law of conspiracy. In Conn. Civil Actions: Title 52,ch. 923a Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 52-552e (4)Elements of, fraudulent intent: ³Party seeking to set aside conveyance as fraudulent bears burden of proving either that conveyance was made without substantial consideration and rendered

transferorunable meet his obligations, or that conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in which grantee participated; only one of two alternatives need be satisfied.´ (Tyers v. Coma (1990) 570 A.2d 186, 214 Conn. 8).

³Insolvency is not necessary element of fraudulent conveyance if it is established that conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in which grantee participated; rather, conveyanceis fraudulent if motivated by desire to circumventany debt or duty.´ (Rocklen, Inc. v. Radulesco (1987) 522 A.2d 846, 10 Conn.App. 271).

However, the immediate liability is to the µtitle insurer¶ after the properties reverts back to defendant as always having been the legitimate owner. Since the insurer guarantees against any


loss, due to any defects in title and when property is illegitimately sold or is mortgaged. In addition they coverconveyances altered before recording, persons of unsound mind, falsification of records, forged deeds, or releases obtained by fraud, duress, or coercion in securing essential signatures. Yet, although a title insurer for their