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TOPIC: Bargaining History

CASE: National Association of Free Trade Union (NAFLU) vs


Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union
(MALDECO)
CITATION: GR No. 79526. December 21, 1990
Petitioner alleges that the employer MALDECO was
composed of two bargaining units, the Sawmill Division in
Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley,
Kitcharao, Agusan Norte, about 80 kilometers distant from
each other. They had two separate CBA's. from 1979-1985,
the Ministry of Labor and Employment recognized the
existence of two separate bargaining unit at MALDECO, one
for its Logging Division and another for its Sawmill Division.
But significantly, out of 201 employees of MALDECO, 175
consented and supported the petition for certification
election, thereby confirming their desire for just one
bargaining representative.
Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a
factor that may be reckoned with in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or
conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping its community or mutuality of interests. This is so
because "the basic test of asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights".
Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the
employers of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division.
Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the
other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be difference as to the nature o their individual
assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant
the formation af a separate bargaining unit.
TOPIC: Bargaining History
CASE: Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union vs. Court of
Industrial Relations
CITATION: GR No. 14656. November 29, 1960
FACTS:
On March 25, 1956, the Industrial Court held a certification
election to determine which of the two contending labor
unions shall be the sole collective bargaining agent of San
Carlos Milling Co., the two unions are: Philippine Land-Air-Sea
(PLASLU) and Allied Workers' Association of the Philippines
(AWA).
Prior to the election AWA filed an urgent motion to exclude
144 employees from participating in the election. The motion
however is denied.
After the election and within 72 hours after such election,
AWA filed a petition contesting the election on the ground of
ineligibility of 148 votes which is challenged. The Industrial
Court ordered that all the challenged be opened and
canvassed. PLASLU moved for reconsideration which was
however denied. Adding the votes to the results of the
certification election the final count was: AWA=377 votes and
PLASLU=239. Hence, the petition of PLASLU for review by
certiorari of the order of the CIR.
ISSUE: WON casual employees and those employed on day to
day basis must be considered separate to the regular
employees.
RULING:
Yes. The employees whose vote were challenged wore hired
on temporary or casual basis and had work of a different
nature from those of the laborers permitted to vote in the
certification election.
The most efficacious bargaining unit is one which comprised
of constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of
interest. This is so because the basic test of a bargaining
unit's acceptability whether it will best secure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
Hence, piece workers employed on casual basis or day to day
basis cannot considered to have such mutuality of interest as
to justify their inclusion in a bargaining unit.
BELYCA CORPORATION vs. FERRER CALLEJA
G.R. No. 77395 November 29, 1988
Facts:
June 3, 1986, Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a
legitimate labor organization filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all

the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca Corporation


(Livestock and Agro-Division). But petitioner contends that
the bargaining unit must include all the workers in its
integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry,
to supermarts and cinemas so as not to split an otherwise
single bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units.
Issue:
whether or not the proposed bargaining unit is an
appropriate bargaining unit.
Held:
It is beyond question that the employees of the livestock and
agro division of petitioner corporation perform work entirely
different from those performed by employees in the
supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted difference
are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay,
including the categories of their positions and employment
status. As stated by petitioner corporation in its position
paper, due to the nature of the business in which its
livestock-agro division is engaged very few of its employees
in the division are permanent, the overwhelming majority of
which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees.
Definitely, they have very little in common with the
employees of the supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the
employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns
cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of
constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest.
Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestock-agro
division fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both
requirements of classification according to employment
status and of the substantial similarity of work and duties
which will ultimately assure its members the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPILKATIPUNAN) vs. TRAJANO
G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991
Facts:
February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions
(NAFLU) was declared the exclusive bargaining
representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron
Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON).
April 11, 1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election
among the employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly
counted with the support of more than thirty percent (30%)
of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition. The Med-Arbiter however
ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a certification election be
held at VIRON as prayed for, after ascertaining that KAMPIL
had complied with all the requirements of law and that since
the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining representative
in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been
executed between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition
for certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in
process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in
fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to
file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances
constituted a bar to the petition for election.
Issue:
Whether or not KAMPIL's petition for certification
election is barred because, before its filing, a bargaining
deadlock between VIRON and
NAFLU, had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lockout.
Held:
It seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for
election in this case, there was no such "bargaining
deadlock ... (which) had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of
strike or lockout." To be sure, there are in the record
assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the
negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the
latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain
collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken any action
to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to
bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair
labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a
legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain

collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are


assertions by NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain
collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to
the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining
representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate
substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent
initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON.
LMG CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. DOLE
G.R. No. 127422
April 17, 2001
Facts:
LMG Chemicals Corporation is engaged in the manufacture
and sale of various kinds of chemical substances. It has three
divisions, namely: the Organic Division, Inorganic Division
and the Pinamucan Bulk Carriers. There are two unions within
petitioner's Inorganic Division. One union represents the daily
paid employees and the other union represents the monthly
paid employees. Chemical Workers Union, respondent, is a
duly registered labor organization acting as the collective
bargaining agent of all the daily paid employees of
petitioner's Inorganic Division.
December 1995, the petitioner and the respondent started
negotiation for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
as their old CBA was about to expire. They were able to agree
on the political provisions of the new CBA, but no agreement
was reached on the issue of wage increase. The economic
issues were not also settled.
With the CBA negotiations at a deadlock, despite several
conferences and efforts of the designated conciliatormediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, finding the instant labor
dispute impressed with national interest, assumed
jurisdiction over the same.
October 7, 1996, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
issued the first assailed order, increasing the Company's
offer of P135 per day wage to P140 per (day) and also . the
new Collective Bargaining Agreement which the parties will
sign pursuant to this Order shall retroact to January 1, 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the SOLE committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in decreeing
that the CBA to be signed by the parties
shall retroact to
Jan. 1, 1996.
Held:
It must be emphasized that respondent Secretary assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute because it is impressed with
national interest. As noted by the Secretary, "the petitioner
corporation was then supplying the sulfate requirements of
MWSS as well as the sulfuric acid of NAPOCOR, and
consequently, the continuation of the strike would seriously
affect the water supply of Metro Manila and the power supply
of the Luzon Grid." Such authority of the Secretary to assume
jurisdiction carries with it the power to determine the
retroactivity of the parties' CBA.
It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the
Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all
questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is
plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to
effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary
dispute.
SAN JOSE vs. NLRC and OCEAN TERMINAL SERVICES,
INC.
G.R. No. 121227 August 17, 1998
Facts:

L A 'S
D EC IS IO N

N LR C
R E V ER S ED

Complainant, in his position paper states that he was hired


sometime in July 1980 as a stevedore continuously until he
was advised in April 1991 to retire from service considering
that he already reached 65 years old; that accordingly, he did
apply for retirement and was paid P3,156.39 for retirement
pay.

The Labor Arbiter decided the case solely on the merits of


the complaint. Nowhere in the Decision is made mention of
or reference to the issue of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to
hear the case.
Held:
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and Voluntary Arbitrator or
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is clearly defined and
specifically delineated under Articles 217, 261 and 262 of the
Labor Code. The cited provisions of law cannot be read in
isolation or separately. They must be read as a whole and
each Article of the Code reconciled one with the other. An
analysis of the provisions of Articles 217, 261, and 262
indicates, that:
1. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases
enumerated in Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly
include money claims in one form or another.
2. The cases where the Labor Arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction are enumerated in Article 217, and that
of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators in
Article 261.
3. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is
qualified by an exception as indicated in the introductory
sentence of Article 217 (a), to wit:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters . . .
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this
Code the Labor Arbiter shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide . . . the following cases involving all
workers. . . .
The phrase "Except as otherwise provided under this Code"
refers to the following exceptions:
A. Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company
procedure/policies shall be disposed of by
the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to
the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitrator as may be provided in said
agreement.
B. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor
disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon
agreement of the parties, shall also hear
and decide all other labor disputes
including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.
Parenthetically, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217
(c), for money claims is limited only to those arising
from statutes or contracts other than a Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators will have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over money claims "arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and, those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies", under Article 261.
4. The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators is provided for in Arts. 261 and 262 of
the Labor Code as indicated above.
1. A close reading of Article 261 indicates that the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators is limited only to:
. . . unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the
G O ES T O S C - Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
PE T IT IO N FO R
arising from the interpretation or
C ERT IO R A R I
W /O FIL IN G A N enforcement of company personnel policies
M R FIR S T
. . . Accordingly, violations of a collective
bargaining agreement, except those which
are gross in character, shall no longer be
treated as unfair labor practice and shall be
resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. . . . .

Exodus International Construction Corp., et al. vs.


Guillermo Biscocho, et al.
G.R. No. 166109
February 23, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Exodus International Construction Corporation
(Exodus) is a duly licensed labor contractor for the painting of
residential houses, condominium units and commercial buildings.
February 1, 1999, Exodus obtained from Dutch Boy Philippines, Inc.
(Dutch Boy) a contract for the painting of the Imperial Sky Garden
located at Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila. On July 28, 1999, Dutch
Boy awarded another contract to Exodus for the painting of Pacific
Plaza Towers in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
In the furtherance of its business, Exodus hired
respondents (Guillermo Biscocho, Fernando Pereda, Ferdinand
Mariano, Gregorio S. Bellita, Miguel B. Bobillo) as painters on
different dates.
November 27, 2000, Guillermo, Fernando, Ferdinand, and
Miguel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13 th month pay and nightshift differential pay.

CA
NLRC
LA
affirmed
affirmed no illegal
NLRC's
LA's
dismissal
decision reinstated
pay full
backwages, MR also
w/o
inclusive of
denied
backwages ,
all benefits
premium pay
the
for holiday,
respondent
rest days
s should
and
have
nightshift
received
differential;
had they
allowed
not been
claims for
dismissed.
holiday pay,
MR denied
service
incentive
leave pay
and 13th
month pay.

2. Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,


however, can exercise jurisdiction over any and all disputes
between an employer and a union and/or individual worker
as provided for in Article 262.
Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor
disputes. The voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators, upon
agreement of the parties, shall also hear
and decide all other labor disputes
including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.
It must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators under Article 262
must be voluntarily conferred upon by both labor and
management. The labor disputes referred to in the same
Article 262 can include all those disputes mentioned in
Article 217 over which the Labor Arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction.
As shown in the above contextual and wholistic analysis of
Articles 217, 261, and 262 of the Labor Code, the National
Labor Relations Commission correctly ruled that the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioner's
money-claim-underpayment of retirement benefits, as the
controversy between the parties involved an issue "arising
from the interpretation or implementation" of a provision of
the collective bargaining agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator
or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the controversy under Article 261 of the
Labor Code, and not the Labor Arbiter.
To recapitulate; the Court hereby rules
1. That the National Labor Relations Commission correctly
ruled that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case,
because the case involved an issue "arising from the
interpretation or implementation" of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement;
2. That the appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission was filed within the reglementary period and
that the appeal bond was filed; and
3. That we adopt the computation formula for the retirement
benefits by the Labor Arbiter, and the basis thereof, The
respondent must therefore pay the petitioner the additional
amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Three
and Seventy Centavos P25,443.70) Pesos.

Issues:
Whether or not CA erred and committed grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
ordering
the
reinstatement of respondents to their former
positions which were no longer existing because
its findings of facts are premised on
misappreciation of facts.
Held:
Petitioners are misguided. They forgot that there are two types of
employees in the construction industry. The first is referred to as
project employees or those employed in connection with a
particular construction project or phase thereof and such
employment is coterminous with each project or phase of the
project to which they are assigned. The second is known as nonproject employees or those employed without reference to any
particular construction project or phase of a project.
The second category is where respondents are classified. As such
they are regular employees of petitioners. It is clear from the
records of the case that when one project is completed,
respondents were automatically transferred to the next project
awarded to petitioners. There was no employment agreement
given to respondents which clearly spelled out the duration of their
employment, the specific work to be performed and that such is
made clear to them at the time of hiring. It is now too late for
petitioners to claim that respondents are project employees whose
employment is coterminous with each project or phase of the
project to which they are assigned.
Nonetheless, assuming that respondents were initially hired as
project employees, petitioners must be reminded of our ruling in
Maraguinot, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission that [a]
project employee x x x may acquire the status of a regular
employee when the following [factors] concur:
1.
There is a continuous rehiring of project employees
even after cessation of a project; and
2.
The tasks performed by the alleged project
employee are vital, necessary and indespensable to
the usual business or trade of the employer.
In this case, the evidence on record shows that respondents were
employed and assigned continuously to the various projects of
petitioners. As painters, they performed activities which were
necessary and desirable in the usual business of petitioners, who
are engaged in subcontracting jobs for painting of residential units,
condominium and commercial buildings. As regular employees,
respondents are entitled to be reinstated without loss of seniority
rights.
In cases where there is no evidence of dismissal, the
remedy is reinstatement but without backwages. In this case,
both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC made a finding that there was
no dismissal much less an illegal one. It is settled that factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded respect
and finality so long as these are supported by substantial
evidence.