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NUISANCE CANDIDATE (SEC.

69)
GROUNDS:

If the COC has been filed to put the


election process in mockery or
disrepute; or
To cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the
names of the reg. candidates; or
by circumstances or acts w/c
clearly
demonstrate
that
the
candidate has NO bona fide
intention to run for the office for
w/c his COC has been filed

[NOTE: A political party may nominate


and/or support candidates NOT belonging
to it.]

the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul


Lee
as
the
winning
gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly,
at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995,
Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new
petition for the annulment of the said
proclamation. he took his oath of
allegiance
as
a
citizen
of
the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed
with
the
Special
Committee
on
Naturalization in September 1994 had
been granted.
COMELEC First Div.: Proclaim Frivaldo as
winner

FRIVALDO v COMELEC
FACTS:
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably
obtained the highest number of votes in
three successive elections but who was
twice declared by this Court to be
disqualified to hold such office due to his
alien citizenship, and who now claims to
have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer
in the canvass, but who claims that the
votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be
considered void; that the electorate
should be deemed to have intentionally
thrown
away
their
ballots;
and
that legally, he
secured
the
most
number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar
G. Deri, who obviously was not voted
directly to the position of governor, but
who according to prevailing jurisprudence
should take over the said post inasmuch
as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a
"permanent vacancy in the contested
office has occurred"?
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but
promulgated according to the petition
"only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en
banc directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down


new
doctrines
on
repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies
existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections,
and upholds the superiority of substantial
justice over pure legalisms.
ISSUE: Was the repatriation of Frivaldo
valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably
cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify
him to be proclaimed and to hold the
Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?
HELD:
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship,
Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected
governor by the electorate of Sorsogon,
with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988
elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in
1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.
Twice, he was judicially declared a nonFilipino and thus twice disqualified from
holding and discharging his popular
mandate. Now, he comes to us a third
time, with a fresh vote from the people of
Sorsogon and a favorable decision from
the Commission on Elections to boot.
Moreover, he now boasts of having
successfully passed through the third and
last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by
repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no
less than the Solicitor General himself,
who was the prime opposing counsel in
the previous cases he lost, this time, as
counsel
for
co-respondent
Comelec,

arguing the validity of his cause (in


addition to his able private counsel Sixto
S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath
of allegiance under the provisions of
said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30,
1995 is not disputed.
CONTENTION OF LEE: P.D. No. 725 had
"been effectively repealed," asserting that
"then President Corazon Aquino exercising
legislative powers under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances
as the same poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the
present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion, should
best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution,
adding that in her memorandum dated
March 27,1987 to the members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization
constituted for purposes of Presidential
Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed
them "to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings
within
your
functional
area
of
responsibility as defined under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended."23
SC: It is obvious that no express repeal
was made because then President Aquino
in her memorandum based on the copy
furnished us by Lee did not categorically
and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was
being repealed or was being rendered
without any legal effect. In fact, she did
not even mention it specifically by its
number or text. On the other hand, it is a
basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals
by
implication are
not
favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two
laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
ANOTHER CONTENTION: Lee further
contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of
June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship
qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date
of his election, if not when the certificate
of candidacy is filed.

Citing our decision in G.R. 104654


(Republic v De la Rosa) 30 which held
that "both the Local Government Code and
the
Constitution
require
that
only
Philippine citizens can run and be elected
to Public office" Obviously, however, this
was a mere obiter as the only issue in said
case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization
was valid or not and NOT the effective
date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the
issue ofwhen an aspirant for public
office should be a citizen was NOT
resolved at all by the Court. Which
question we shall now directly rule
on.
QUALFICATION
OF
AN
ELECTIVE
LOCAL OFFICIAL. Under Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code, "(a)n elective
local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x
where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the
position of governor x x x must be at
least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day."
NOTE: From the above, it will be noted
that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must
consist of at least one year's residency
immediately
preceding the
day
of
election) and age (at least twenty three
years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none
other than to ensure that no alien,

i.e., no person owing allegiance to


another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship
on June 30, 1995 the very day 32 the term
of office of governor (and other elective
officials) began he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning
to
our
law
on
qualifications
consistent with the purpose for
which such law was enacted.
MOST
DIFFICULT
OBJECTION:
the
citizenship
qualification
should
be
possessed at the time the candidate (or
for that matter the elected official)
registered as a voter. After all, Section
39, apart from requiring the official
to be a citizen, also specifies as
another item of qualification, that he
be a "registered voter." And, under the
law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of
the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter-much
less a validly registered one if he
was not a citizen at the time of such
registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in
discerning the purpose of the requirement.
If
the
law
intended
the citizenship qualification
to
be
possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a
registered voter, then it would not
have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification.
The
law
abhors
a
redundancy. It therefore stands to
reason
that
the
law
intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification
distinct from being a VOTER, even if
being a voter presumes being a
citizen first. It also stands to reason that
the voter requirement was included as
another
qualification
(aside
from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for
nationality but to require that the official be

registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR


TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law
states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where
he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government
Code requires an elective official to be a
registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually. Hence, registration not
the actual voting is the core of this
"qualification." In other words, the
law's
purpose
in
this
second
requirement is to ensure that the
prospective
official
is
actually
registered in the area he seeks to
govern and not anywhere else.
REPATRIATION
OF
FRIVALDO
RETROACTED TO THE DATE OF THE
FILING OF HIS APP. It is true that under
the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." But there are
settled exceptions40 to this general
rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or
when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: A reading of P.D.
725 immediately shows that it creates a
new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our
laws.
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to
cure
the
defect
in
the
existing
naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63
wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death
of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty
of
undergoing
the
rigid
procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725
benefit Frivaldo considering that said law
was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo
lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on
January 20, 1983, and applied for
repatriation even later, on August 17,
1994?

While it is true that the law was already in


effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not
only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be
given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the
date of his application therefor,
August 17, 1994. The reason for this
is simply that if, as in this case, it was the
intent of the legislative authority that the
law should apply to past events i.e.,
situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into
being in order to benefit the greatest
number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise
the
constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and
such legislative intention is to be
given
the
fullest
effect
and
expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such
law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should
be made to take effect as of date of his
application.
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in
the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no
showing that damage or prejudice to
anyone, or anything unjust or injurious
would result from giving retroactivity to his
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any
vested
right
or
breach
of
some
constitutional guaranty.
RULING: FRIVALDO DECLARED GOV OF
SORSOGON

MERCADO v MANZANO (see notes)


VILLABER v COMELEC, CAGAS

FACTS:
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent
Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for
a congressional seat in the First District of
Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001
elections. Villaber filed his certificate of
candidacy for Congressman on February
19, 2001,[1] while Cagas filed his on
February 28, 2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor,
Commission On Elections (COMELEC),
Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition [3] to
disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters
certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in
the said consolidated petition that on
March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for
violation of BP 22 and was sentenced to
suffer one (1) year imprisonment.
Cagas
further
alleged
that
this
crime involves moral turpitude; hence,
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code, he is disqualified to run for any
public office.
CA: Affirmed
Petitioner alleged: BP 22 does NOT involve
MORAL TURPITUDE
COMELEC: Villaber disqualified
ISSUE: W/N BP22 cases involve moral
turpitude
HELD:
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we
have consistently adopted the definition in
Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs.
Commission on Elections[15] that not

every criminal act involves moral turpitude,


and that as to what crime involves moral
turpitude is for the Supreme Court to
determine.
In the final analysis,
whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances
surrounding
the
violation of the statute.
The elements of the offense under the
above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or
issues any check to apply to account
or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time
of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in,
or credit with, the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and
3.
The
check
is
subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it
would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
SC: The presence of the 2nd element
manifests moral turpitude
We should add that the crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorneys oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
under both of which she was bound to obey
the laws of the land. Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might
not (as in the instant case, violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise
of
the
profession
of
a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character
of a person convicted of such offense.
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED

LONZANIDA v COMELEC, MULI

FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly
elected and served two consecutive terms
as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed
winner. He assumed office and discharged
the duties thereof. His proclamation in
1995 was however contested by his
then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an
election protest before the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, which in a
decision dated January 9, 1997
declared a FAILURE OF ELECTION.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the
Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is
hereby declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On
November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved
the election protest filed by Alvez and after
a revision and re-appreciation of the
contested ballots declared Alvez the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by
plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling
1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for
Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the
COMELEC issued a writ of execution
ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post,
which obeyed, and Alvez assumed office
for the remainder of the term.
ON THE THIRD TIME. In the May 11, 1998
elections
Lonzanida
again
filed
his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of San
Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent
Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to
disqualify Lonzanida from running for
mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections
on the ground that he had served
three consecutive terms in the same
post. On May 13,
1998,
petitioner
Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
COMELEC: issued the questioned resolution
granting the petition for disqualification
upon a finding that Lonzanida had served
three consecutive terms as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore
disqualified to run for the same post for the
fourth time.

The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas


assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was
later unseated before the expiration of the
term, should be counted as service for one
full term in computing the three term limit
under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. The finding of the
COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the
COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated
August 11, 1998.
ARGUMENT OF LONZANIDA: His assumption
in office in 1995 CANNOT be counted as
service of a term
OSG: The public respondent contends that
petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights
and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998
which should be counted as service of one
full term, albeit he was later unseated,
because he served as mayor for the
greater part of the term.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Lonzanidas
assumption of office as mayor of San
Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March
1998 may be considered as service of one
full term for the purpose of applying the
three-term
limit
for
elective
local
government officials.
HELD:
Petition has merit.
Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law shall be three
years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was
elected.
RATIONALE. The said disqualification was
primarily
intended
to
forestall
the
accumulation of massive political power by
an elective local government official in a

given locality in order to perpetuate his


tenure in office. The delegates also
considered the need to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates
who will run for office, and to infuse new
blood in the political arena by disqualifying
officials from running for the same office
after a term of nine years. The mayor was
compared by some delegates to the
President of the Republic as he is a
powerful chief executive of his political
territory and is most likely to form a
political dynasty.[1] The drafters however,
recognized and took note of the fact that
some local government officials run for
office before they reach forty years of age;
thus to perpetually bar them from running
for the same office after serving nine
consecutive years may deprive the people
of qualified candidates to choose from. As
finally voted upon, it was agreed that an
elective local government official should be
barred from running for the same post after
three consecutive terms. After a hiatus
of at least one term, he may again run
for the same office.
2 CONDITIONS: This Court held that two
conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same
local government post and 2) that he
has FULLY served three consecutive
terms.
Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: The two requisites
for the application of the three term rule
are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to
the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. After a
re-appreciation and revision of the
contested ballots the COMELEC itself
declared by final judgment that petitioner
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral

elections and his previous proclamation as


winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held
by this court that a proclamation
subsequently
declared
void
is
no
proclamation
at
all[5] and
while
a
proclaimed candidate may assume office
on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election
protest.[6] Petitioner Lonzanida did not
serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption
was later overturned by the COMELEC
when it decided with finality that Lonzanida
lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
INVOLUNTARY SEVERANCE. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by
the
COMELEC
to
that
effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term.
RULING: PETITION GRANTED.

proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres


(Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested
Torres
election
and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest, paving
the way for his assumption of office
starting May 9, 2006 until the end of
the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007,
or for a period of a little over one year
and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections
where Abundo and Torres again opposed
each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty
seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the formers
disqualification to run, the corresponding
petition,
predicated
on
the
threeconsecutive term limit rule.
RTC: Abundo ineligible to serve as Mayor.
Abundo appealed to COMELEC
COMELEC: Ruled against Abundo
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC committed GAD
when it declared Abundo had served 3
consec term despite the fact that he had
only served the remaining 1 yr and 1
month of the 2nd term as a result of an
election protest
HELD:
Petition meritorious.

ABUNDO v COMELEC
FACTS:
4 successive regular elections, namely, the
2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and
local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and
2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the
2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially

The consecutiveness of what otherwise


would
have
been
Abundos
three
successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 20042007 term when he was initially
deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an
office
to
which
he,
after
due
proceedings, was eventually declared
to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for
an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory

provisions, the following requisites must


concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
(2) that he has
consecutive terms.

fully

served

three

Par. 2 on Voluntary renunciation: This


qualification was made as a deterrent
against an elective local official
intending to skirt/avoid the threeterm limit rule by merely resigning
before his or her third term ends. This
is a voluntary interruption as distinguished
from involuntary interruption which may
be brought about by certain events or
causes.
INVOLUNTARY INTERRUPTION; CAUSES:
Involuntary interruption is claimed to
result from any of these events or causes:
succession or assumption of office by
operation
of
law,
preventive
suspension,
declaration
of
the
defeated candidate as the winner in
an election contest, declaration of the
proclaimed candidate as the losing
party
in
an
election
contest,
proclamation of a non-candidate as
the winner in a recall election,
removal of the official by operation of
law, and other analogous causes.
RULES:
1. ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE BY OPERATION
OF LAW/SUCCESSION. This contemplates a
situation wherein an elective local
official fills by succession a higher
local government post permanently
left vacant due to any of the
following contingencies, i.e., when
the supposed incumbent refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify (due to
election offense/s), dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated
to discharge the functions of his
office.

The Court emphasized that succession in


local government office is by operation of
law and as such, it is an involuntary
severance from office. Since the law no
less allowed Montebon to vacate his post
as councilor in order to assume office as
vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher
office cannot, without more, be deemed as
a voluntary renunciation of his position as
councilor.
2. RECALL. The prohibited election refers
to the next regular election for the
same office following the end of the
third consecutive term and, hence,
any subsequent election, like recall
election, is no longer covered.
One who has served for three consecutive
terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term,
but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the
officials service. For, he had become in
the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd
term up to the recall election, a private
citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. CONVERSION OF A MUNICIPALITY INTO
A CITY. does not constitute an
interruption of the incumbent officials
continuity of service.
4. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising
the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period.
The best indicator of the suspended
officials continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement
and the lack of the authority to
appoint one since no vacancy exists.
5. ELECTION PROTESTS. When a candidate
is proclaimed as winner for an elective
position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would
otherwise be the unexpired portion of his
term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The

break or interruption need not be for a full


term of three years or for the major part of
the 3-year term; an interruption for any
length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the
continuity of service (Socrates, citing
Lonzanida).
TERM fixed and definite perod of time
which the law describes that an officer
may hold office; time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as a
matter of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.
RULING: ABUNDO DECLARED TO HOLD
OFFICE; IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED AS
MAYOR

COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993


resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En
Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a
reconsideration of the resolution.
ISSUE: W/N respondent who, at the time of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy
(and to date), is said to be facing
a criminal charge before a foreign court
and evading a warrant for his arrest comes
within the term "fugitive from justice"
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local
Government
Code
and,
therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and
thereby ineligible from holding on to, an
elective local office
HELD:
Based on the Oversight Committee:

MARQUEZ v COMELEC, RODRIGUEZ


FACTS:
It is averred that at the time private
respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of
candidacy, a criminal charge against
him for ten (10) counts of insurance
fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial
District, County of Los Angeles, State
of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by
said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has
yet to be served on private respondent on
account of his alleged "flight" from that
country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a
petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of
respondent's certificate of candidacy, on
the
ground
of
the
candidate's
disqualification under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code, was filed by
petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May
1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Private
respondent
was
proclaimed
Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner Marquez instituted
quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28)
against private respondent before the

THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule


or not she can run. She is not a fugitive
from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this
point and I have held that for a long time
ago. So can. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody
who is convicted by final judgment. Okay,.
Fugitive means somebody who is
convicted by final judgment. Insert that
on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that
approved? No objection, approved
THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive
from justice. He has been convicted by
final judgment, meaning that if he is simply
in jail and because he put up, post bail, but
the case is still being reviewed, that is not
yet conviction by final judgment.
The Oversight Committee finally came out
with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991.
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or
non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has
been convicted by final judgment.
PERSONAL VIEW OF THE COURT. The Court
believes and thus holds, albeit with some

personal
reservations
of
the ponente (expressed
during
the
Court's en banc deliberations), that Article
73
of
the
Rules
and
Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991, to the extent that it confines the
term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to
a person (the fugitive) "who has been
convicted by final judgment." is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
RULING: REMANDED TO THE COMELEC TO
PROCEED

DE LA CRUZ v COMELEC, PACETE


FACTS:
Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner) assails
COMELEC Resolution No. 88441 considering
as stray the votes cast in favor of certain
candidates who were either disqualified or
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied
due course but whose names still appeared
in the official ballots or certified lists of
candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.

among voters due to the similarity of his


surname with petitioners surname.
ALLEGATIONS OF LACK OF BONA FIDE
INTENTION: n contrast, Aurelio is an
unknown in the political scene with no prior
political experience as an elective official
and no political party membership. Being a
retiree and having no known business,
Aurelio has no sufficient source of income
but since the 2007 elections petitioners
opponents have been prodding him to run
for the same position as petitioner in order
to sow confusion and thwart the will of the
voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited
Aurelios miserable showing in the previous
local elections when he ran and garnered
only 126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB
member (May 2007) and barangay captain
of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November
2007), respectively.
COMELEC: nuisance candidate and thus
cancelled his COC
Despite being declared as a nuisance
candidate, his name wasnt deleted in the
Certified List of Candidates and Official
Sample Ballot for the Automated elections
EX PARTE OMNINIBUS MOTION: delete the
name from the Official List of Candidates
COMELEC: Delete the name

In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections,


petitioner ran for and was elected member
of
the
Sangguniang
Bayan(SB)
of
Bugasong, Antique. On November 28,
2009, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy3 for the position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique under the ticket of the National
Peoples Coalition (NPC). Subsequently,
Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a
certificate of candidacy4 for the same
position.
Petitioner filed a petition5to declare Aurelio
a nuisance candidate on the ground that
he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
vice-mayoralty position to put the election
process in mockery and to cause confusion

On May 10, 2010, the first automated


national and local elections proceeded as
scheduled. Aurelios name remained in the
official ballots.
Petitioner insisted that the votes cast in
favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor.
However, the MBOC refused,
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private
respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was
proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the
MBOC of Bugasong
PROTEST W/ RTC. (1) the tallying in her
favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2)
the annulment of respondent Pacetes
proclamation as Vice-Mayor of Bugasong;
and (3) her proclamation as winning

candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of


Bugasong.

disqualification by conviction in a final


judgment.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Considering that


private respondent won by a margin of only
thirty-nine (39) votes over petitioners
6,389 votes, petitioner contends that she
would have clearly won the elections for
Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC
properly tallied or added the votes cast for
Aurelio to her votes

Obviously, the disqualification of a


candidate is not only by conviction in a
final judgment; the law lists other
grounds
for
disqualification.
It
escapes us why the Comelec insists
that Section 211(24) of the OEC is
strictly for those convicted by a final
judgment. Such an interpretation is
clearly inconsistent with the other
provisions of the election code.

COMELECS ARGUMENT: While the votes for


the
nuisance
candidate
were
not
considered stray but counted in favor of
the bona fide candidate, this is no longer
the rule for automated elections. COMELEC
cites the following factors which changed
the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in
automated elections now contain the full
names of the official candidates so that
when a voter shaded an oval, it was
presumed that he carefully read the name
adjacent to it and voted for that candidate,
regardless of whether said candidate was
later declared disqualified or nuisance;

ANOTHER
CONTENTION:
Private
respondent thus suggests that regardless
of the ground for disqualification, the
votes cast for the disqualified candidate
should result in considering the votes cast
for him as stray as explicitly mandated by
Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of
the OEC.
We disagree.

24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate


who has been disqualified by final
judgment shall be considered as stray and
shall not be counted but it shall not
invalidate the ballot.

It bears to stress that Sections 211


(24)
and
72
applies
to
all
disqualification cases and not to
petitions to cancel or deny due
course to a certificate of candidacy
such
as
Sections
69
(nuisance
candidates)
and
78
(material
representation shown to be false).
Notably, such facts indicating that a
certificate of candidacy has been filed "to
put the election process in mockery or
disrepute are not among those grounds
enumerated in Section 68 (giving money
or material consideration to influence or
corrupt
voters
or
public
officials
performing electoral functions, election
campaign overspending and soliciting,
receiving
or
making
prohibited
contributions) of the OEC or Section
4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).

When read together, these provisions are


understood to mean that any vote cast in
favor of a candidate, whose disqualification
has already been declared final regardless
of the ground therefor, shall be considered
stray. The Comelec misconstrued this
provision
by
limiting
it
only
to

DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF SEC. 68, 69


AND 78. At this point, we must stress that
a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a "Section
68" petition. They are different remedies,
based on different grounds, and resulting
in different eventualities.

ISSUE: W/N COMELCE committed GAD


HELD:
Petition is meritorious
In this case, Resolution No. 8844 issued by
COMELEC clearly contravened existing law
and jurisprudence on the legal effect of
declaration of a candidate as a nuisance
candidate, especially in the case of
nuisance candidates who have the same
surnames as those of bona fide candidates.

ACTION

GROUN
DS

EFFECTS

SUB

PETITION
FOR
DISQUAL.
(SEC. 68)
can
be
premised on
Section
12
or 68 of the
OEC,
or
Section
40
of the LGC.
person who
is
disqualified
under
Section 68 is
merely
prohibited to
continue as
a candidate,
Can
be
validly
substituted

PETITION TO DENY (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could


DUE COURSE/CANCEL not have been intended for Edwin
Bautista. We further noted that the
COC (SEC.78)
voters had constructive as well as actual
can only be grounded knowledge of the action of the COMELEC
on a statement of a delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for
mayor.
material
representation in the
said certificate that is In the more recent case of Martinez III v.
false.
House
of
Representatives
Electoral
Tribunal,28 this Court likewise applied the
not treated as a rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not
candidate at all, as if to consider the votes cast for a
he/she never filed a nuisance candidate stray but to count
CoC
them in favor of the bona fide
candidate notwithstanding that the
decision to declare him as such was
issued only after the elections.

Cannot be validly sub


bec. he/she is NEVER
considered
as
a
candidate
The foregoing rule regarding the votes
cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
such under a final judgment was applied
by
this
Court
in
Bautista
v.
COMELEC26 where the name of the
nuisance
candidate
Edwin
Bautista
(having the same surname with the bona
fide candidate) still appeared on the
ballots on election day because while
the COMELEC rendered its decision to
cancel Edwin Bautistas COC on April
30, 1998, it denied his motion for
reconsideration only on May 13, 1998
or three days after the election. We
said that the votes for candidates for
mayor separately tallied on orders of
the COMELEC Chairman was for the
purpose of later counting the votes
and hence are not really stray votes.
These separate tallies actually made the
will of the electorate determinable despite
the apparent confusion caused by a
potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring
Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was
not yet final on electionday, this Court
also
considered
those
factual
circumstances showing that the votes
mistakenly deemed as "stray votes"
refer to only the legitimate candidate

As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of


proceedings against a nuisance candidate
on election day inevitably exposes the
bona fide candidate to the confusion over
the similarity of names that affects the
voters will and frustrates the same. It
may be that the factual scenario in
Bautista is not exactly the same as in this
case, mainly because the Comelec
resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was issued before and
not after the elections, with the electorate
having been informed thereof through
newspaper releases and other forms of
notification on the day of election.
Undeniably, however, the adverse effect
on the voters will was similarly present in
this case, if not worse, considering the
substantial number of ballots with only
"MARTINEZ"
IN THE CASE AT BAR: Here, Aurelio was
declared a nuisance candidate long before
the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis
of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for
him should not have been considered
stray but counted in favor of petitioner.
COMELECs changing of the rule on votes
cast for nuisance candidates resulted in
the invalidation of significant number of
votes and the loss of petitioner to private
respondent by a slim margin. We observed
in Martinez:
RATIONALE. primordial objective of
election laws is to give effect to, rather

than frustrate, the will of the voter. The


inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the
electoral exercise into an uneven playing
field where the bona fide candidate is
faced with the prospect of having a
significant number of votes cast for him
invalidated as stray votes by the mere
presence of another candidate with a
similar surname.

period of sentence and perpetual absolute


disqualification.

The possibility of confusion in names of


candidates if the names of nuisance
candidates remained on the ballots on
election day, cannot be discounted or
eliminated, even under the automated
voting system especially considering that
voters who mistakenly shaded the oval
beside the name of the nuisance
candidate instead of the bona fide
candidate they intended to vote for could
no longer ask for replacement ballots to
correct the same.

On October 25, 2007, however, former


President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former
President Arroyo) extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada.

RULING: 532 VOTES CAST IN FAVOR OF


NUISANCE CANDIDATE BE COUNTED IN
FAVOR OF CASIMIRA DELA CRUZ AND NOT
STRAY VOTES; DECLARED AS VICE MAYOR
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v COMELEC,
ESTRADA
FACTS:
On
September
12,
2007,
the
Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada, a former President of the Republic
of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder
in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al."
he penalty imposable for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is
Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being
no
aggravating
or
mitigating
circumstances,
however,
the
lesser
penalty shall be applied in accordance
with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the accused Former President
Joseph
Ejercito
Estrada
is
hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the

The period within which accused Former


President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention shall be credited to him in
full as long as he agrees voluntarily in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

COC FOR PRES. On November 30, 2009,


former President Estrada filed COC for
Pres.3 Petitions for disqualifications were
also filed but dismissed.
COMELEC:
(i)
the
Constitutional
proscription on reelection applies to a
sitting president; and (ii) the pardon
granted to former President Estrada by
former President Arroyo restored the
formers right to vote and be voted for a
public office. The subsequent motions for
reconsideration thereto were denied by
the COMELEC En banc. Erap lost
COC FOR MAYOR. On October 2, 2012,
former President Estrada once more
ventured into the political arena, and filed
a Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time
vying for a local elective post, that ofthe
Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the
petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President
Estrada before the COMELEC. The petition
was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC).
Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the
theory that "[Former President Estrada] is
Disqualified to Run for Public Office
because of his Conviction for Plunder by
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26558 entitled People of the Philippines
vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Sentencing
Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetuawith
Perpetual
Absolute
Disqualification."11 She relied on Section
40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in

relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus


Election Code (OEC)

The pardoning power of the President


cannot be limited by legislative action.

ISSUE: whether or not the COMELEC


committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in ruling that former President Estrada is
qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by former President Arroyo

ELEMENTS OF A VALID PARDON. It is


apparent from the foregoing constitutional
provisions that the only instances in which
the President may not extend pardon
remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction; and (3)
cases involving violations of election
laws, rules and regulations in which
there
was
no
favorable
recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued
that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President.

HELD:
Petition lacks merit.
CONTENTION:
he
"acceptance,"
she
claims, is an indication of the conditional
natureof the pardon, with the condition
being embodied in the third Whereas
Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office." She explains that the
aforementioned commitment was what
impelled former President Arroyo to
pardon former President Estrada, without
it, the clemency would not have been
extended.
Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on
the ostensible requirements provided
under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon
shall not work the restoration of the right
to hold publicoffice, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
IT WAS AN ABSOLUTE PARDON. He
was granted a pardon that fully
restored allhis civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office,
the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms
to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code.

DOCTRINE OF NON-DIMINUTION/NONIMPAIRMENT. Thru enactment of laws


was
strongly
adhered
to
by
an
overwhelming majority of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution when they flatly
rejected a proposal to carve out an
exception from the pardoning power of the
President in the form of "offenses
involving graft and corruption" that would
be enumerated and defined by Congress
through the enactment of a law. hi1 Aside
from the fact that it is a derogation of the
power of the President to grant executive
clemency, it is also defective in that it
singles out just one kind of crime. There
are far more serious crimes which are not
included.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the
thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way,
serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive
power and prerogative of the President to
pardon persons convicted of violating
penal statutes. A rigid and inflexible
reading of the above provisions of
law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is
unwarranted, especially so if it will
defeat or unduly restrict the power of
the President to grant executive
clemency.
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE. It is this
Courts firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which
declares that former President Estrada "is

hereby restored to his civil and


political rights" substantially complies
with
the
requirement
of
express
restoration.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe
that, if the President wishes to include in
the pardon the restoration of the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, or the
remission of the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification,he or
she should do so expressly.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: The first sentence
refers to the executive clemency extended
to former President Estrada who was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
plunder and imposed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The latter is the
principal penalty pardoned which relieved
him of imprisonment. The sentence that
followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights,"
expressly remitted the accessory penalties
that attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable
from the textof the pardon that the
accessory
penalties
of
civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification
were
expressly
remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED.

MAQUILING v COMELEC
FACTS: <supra>
ISSUE: The third question is whether or not
the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this
case
An ineligible candidate who receives the
highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he
could not even have been a candidate in
the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening

circumstances, his ineligibility might not


have been passed upon prior to election
date.
The
ballot
cannot
override
the
constitutional and statutory requirements
for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed
by persons desiring to serve as elective
public officials, those qualifications must
be met before one even becomes a
candidate.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling
then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of
votes
from
among
the
qualified
candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of
Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC that a void COC cannot
produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes
cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in
determining
the
winner
of
an
election.
NO NEED TO APPLY THE RULE IN LABO
v COMELEC. That when the voters are
well aware within the realm of notoriety of
a candidates disqualification and still cast
their votes in favor said candidate, then
the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter
that further complicated the rules
affecting qualified candidates who placed
second to ineligible ones.
NOTE: Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidates
disqualification
is
NOT
necessary before a qualified candidate
who placed second to a disqualified one
can be proclaimed as the winner. The
second-placer in the vote count is

actually the first-placer among the


QUALIFIED candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has
already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of
the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.
EFFECT
OF
DISQUALIFYNG
CIRCUMSTANCE.
The
disqualifying
circumstance
surrounding
Arnados
candidacy involves his citizenship. It
does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in
the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has
already been elected, from holding the
office.
DUAL CITIZEN DUAL ALLEGIANCE. As
earlier discussed, Arnado was both a
Filipino and an American citizen when he
filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a
dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code. COC IS VOID AB
INITIO
RULING: MAUQILING
ELECTED MAYOR

ROMMEL
ARNADO
FLORANTE CAPITAN

DECLARED

DULY-

COMELEC,

FACTS:
etitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
after he was naturalized as citizen of the
United
States
of
America
(USA).
Subsequently, and in preparation for his
plans to run for public office in the
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act No. 92255 (RA 9225)
before the Consul General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on


even date, an Order of Approval of
Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition
was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009,
Arnado
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, however, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC
on the ground, among others, that Arnado
remained a US citizen because he
continued to use his US passport for entry
to and exit from the Philippines after
executing
aforesaid
Affidavit
of
Renunciation.
Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes
for
the
mayoralty
post
of
Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the
winning candidate.
COMELEC: Nullified proclamation; Rule on
succession applies
In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling
(Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate
who garnered the second highest number
of votes, intervened in the case. He
argued that the Comelec First Division
erred in applying the rule on succession.
COMELEC en banc: n. It held that Arnado's
use of his US passport did not operate to
revert his status to dual citizenship. The
Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's
explanation that he continued to use his
US passport because he did not yet know
that he had been issued a Philippine
passport at the time of the relevant
foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further
noted that, after receiving his Philippine
passport, Arnado used the same for his
subsequent trips.
While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the
period for the filing of CoCs for local
elective officials for the May 13, 2013
elections officially began. On October 1,
2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for the same
position. Respondent Capitan also filed his
CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.

On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its


Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it
annulled and set aside the Comelec En
Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution,
disqualified Arnado from running for
elective position, and declared Maquiling
as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010
elections. In so ruling, the majority of the
Members of the Court opined that in his
subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado
effectively disavowed or recalled his April
3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013
Decision sets the stage for the present
controversy.
Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming
Rommel
C.
Arnado's
"Affidavit
of
Renunciation Dated April3, 2009.
The following day or on May 10, 2013,
Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the
mayoralty post, filed a Petition9 seeking to
disqualify him from running for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his
CoC based on the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling. The resolution of said
petition was, however, overtaken by the
May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado
garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the
total votes cast) while Capitan
obtained 1,707 (16% of the total
votes cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. He argued that
with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this
Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that
Arnado is disqualified from running for any
local elective office. Hence, Arnado's
proclamation is void and without any legal
effect.
COMELEC: ARNADO DISQUALIFED , it
ratiocinated that at the time he filed his
CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed
to comply with the requirement of RA
9225 of making a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.
COMELEC EN BANC: Affirmed

ISSUE: Whether x x x the comelec


committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioner who has fully
complied with the requirements of ra 9225
before the filing of his coc on october 1,
2012
HELD:
Petition is devoid of merit.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA
9225
at
the time he filed his CoC for the May
13,
2013
elections;
subsequent
compliance
does not suffice.
Under
Section
4(d)
of
the
Local
Government Code, a person with "dual
citizenship" is disqualified from running for
any elective local position. In Mercado v.
anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase
"dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must
be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.''45Subsequent,
Congress
enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization abroad to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil
and political rights upon compliance with
the requirements of the law. They may
now run for public office in the Philippines
provided that they: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and, (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath46
prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
It is worth noting that the reason for
Arnado's disqualification to run for public
office during the 2010 elections being a
candidate without total and undivided
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines - still subsisted when he filed
his CoC for the 2013 elections on October
1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely
adhered to the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling lest it would be committing

grave abuse of discretion had it departed


therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that
Arnado should be given the opportunity to
correct the deficiency in his qualification
because
at
the
time
this
Court
promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on
April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC
for local elective office had already
lapsed.
It was settled in that case that the use of a
foreign passport amounts to repudiation or
recantation of the oath of renunciation.
Yet, despite the issue being novel and of
first impression, plus the fact that Arnado
could not have divined the possible
adverse consequences of using his US
passport, the Court in Maquiling did not
act with leniency or benevolence towards
Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that
matters dealing with qualifications for
public elective office must be strictly
complied with
STARE DECISIS. Maquiling, therefore, is
binding on and applicable to this case
following the salutary doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere, which
means to adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established.
HE COULD HAVE REMEDIED SUCH
PROBLEM. In short, the argument that
Arnado should be given the opportunity to
correct the deficiency in his CoC
since Maquiling was promulgated after the
lapse of the period for filing a CoC for the
2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit.
Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling
in Maquiling, Arnado should be made to
face the consequences of his inaction
since he could have remedied it at the
time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012
or even before that. There is no law
prohibiting him from executing an
Affidavit
of
Renunciation
every
election period if only to avert
possible
questions
about
his
qualifications.
The alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any

probative
weight.-the
original
certified true copy thereof was
presented.

or
not

Landslide election victory cannot


override eligibility requirements.
NOT A MAGIC FORMULA. In Velasco v
COMELEC, this Court pronounced that
election victory cannot be used as a
magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise,
certain provisions of laws pertaining
to elections will become toothless.
One of which is Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which specifies
the basic positive qualifications of local
government officials.
RULING: ARNADO DISQUALIFIED; CAPITAN
DULY-ELECTED MAYOR
CABALLERO v COMELEC, NANUD
Petitioner3 and
private
respondent
Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. 4 were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of
the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of
Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Private respondent filed a Petition 5 to deny
due course to or cancellation of
petitioner's
certificate
of
candidacy
alleging that the latter made a false
representation when he declared in his
COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor
of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a
Canadian citizen and a nonresident
thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of
his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before the Philippine
Consul General in Toronto, Canada on
September 13, 2012 and became a
dual Filipino and Canadian citizen
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No.
9225,
otherwise
known
as
the Citizenship
Retention
and
Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter,
he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section

5(2) of RA No. 9225.6 He claimed that he


did not lose his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a
Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan
temporarily to pursue a brighter future for
him and his family; and that he went back
to Uyugan during his vacation while
working in Nigeria, California, and finally in
Canada.
COMELEC: Petitioner made a material
misrep. when he declared that he is a
resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan,
Batanes within one year prior to the
election. He failed to comply with the
other requirements provided under RA No.
9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e.,
persons who renounced their foreign
citizenship must still comply with the one
year residency requirement provided for
under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a
Canadian
citizen
resulted
in
the
abandonment of his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned
his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon
him to prove that he was able to
reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him
to be eligible to run for elective office in
said locality which he failed to do.
Elections were subsequently held on May
13, 2013 and the election returns showed
that
petitioner
won
over
private
respondent.8 Private respondent filed an
Urgent Ex-parte Motion
to
Defer
Proclamation. Petitioner was proclaimed
Mayor.
COMELEC CHAIR BRILLANTRES ISSUED
WRIT OF EXECUTION. Private respondent
took his Oath of Office
ISSUE: whether petitioner had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one
(1) year before the elections held on May
13, 2013 as he represented in his COC
HELD:
Petition not meritorious.
CONTENTION: Petitioner next claims that
he did not abandon his Philippine domicile.

He argues that he was born and baptized


in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had
worked therein for a couple of years, and
had paid his community tax certificate;
and, that he was a registered voter and
had exercised his right of suffrage and
even built his house therein.
RA
No.
9225
treats
citizenship
independently of residence.23 This is only
logical and consistent with the general
intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino
may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establish
residence
either
in
the
Philippines or in the foreign country of
which he is also a citizen. 24 However,
when a natural-born Filipino with
dual citizenship seeks for an elective
public
office,
residency
in
the
Philippines becomes material.
(2) Those seeking elective public office in
the
Philippines
shall
meet
the
qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
Clearly, the Local Government Code
requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks
to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the election
day. Respondent filed the petition for
cancellation of petitioner's COC on the
ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation when he declared
therein that he is a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes for at least one year immediately
preceeding the day of elections.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled that
naturalization in a foreign country may
result in an abandonment of domicile in
the Philippines. This holds true in
petitioner's case as permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the
acquisition
of
Canadian
citizenship.29 Hence,
petitioner
had

effectively abandoned his domicile in


the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His
frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during
his vacation from work in Canada cannot
be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
What is the effect of petitioner's retention
of his Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v COMELEC, [Petitioner's]
reacquisition
of
his
Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 had no automatic impact or
effect on his residence/domicile. He
could still retain his domicile in the USA,
and he did not necessarily regain his
domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must
still prove that after becoming a Philippine
citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from
the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed
to present competent evidence to prove
that he was able to reestablish his
residence in Uyugan within a period of one
year immediately preceding the May 13,
2013 elections. It found that it was only
after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by
virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13,
2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim
that he re-established his domicile in
Uyugan,
Batanes,
if
such
was
accompanied
by
physical
presence
thereat, coupled with an actual intent to
reestablish his domicile there. However,
the period from September 13, 2012 to
May 12, 2013 was even less than the one
year residency required by law.
CANCELLATION DUE TO MATERIAL MISREP.

FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and
Estela D.
Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 National and
Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo
(Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify
Lonzanida and to deny due course or to
cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy
on the ground that Lonzanida was elected,
and had served, as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms
immediately prior to the term for the May
2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a
false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida
certified under oath that he was eligible
for the office he sought election. Section
8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 43(b) of the Local Government
Code both prohibit a local elective official
from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive terms for the same
position.
COMELEC: Cancelled Lonzanidas COC;
Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and
were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting
Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge of Olongapo. On the same date,
Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for
an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he
was legally required to assume the Office
of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas
disqualification.
DILG
stated
that
Lonzanida
was
disqualified to hold office by reason of his
criminal
conviction,
and
as
a
consequence, his office was deemed
permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea
should assume the Office of the Mayor in
an acting capacity

RULING: PETITION DISMISSED


ARATEA v COMELEC, ANTIPOLO

COMELEC en banc: disqualifying Lonzanida


from running for Mayor in the May 2010

elections. The COMELEC En Bancs


resolution was based on two grounds: first,
Lonzanida had been elected and had
served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption;
and second,
Lonzanida
had
been
convicted by final judgment of 10 counts
of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each
count of falsification to imprisonment of 4
years and 1 day of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prisin
mayor as maximum.
HELD:
Antipolo, the alleged "second placer,"
should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was
void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was
never a candidate at all. All votes for
Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus,
Antipolo, the only qualified candidate,
actually garnered the highest number of
votes for the position of Mayor.
A petition for disqualification under
Section 68 clearly refers to "the
commission of prohibited acts and
possession of a permanent resident status
in a foreign country." All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to
election offenses under the Omnibus
Election Code, not to violations of
other penal laws. There is absolutely
nothing in the language of Section 68 that
would justify including violation of the
three-term limit rule, or conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification
under the Revised Penal Code, as one of
the grounds or offenses covered under
Section 68.
NOTE: ALWAYS correlate Sec. 78 w/
Sec. 74 if ground for disqual. is
eligibility.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final
judgment, with the penalty of prisin
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually
from holding any public office, or
from being elected to any public
office. This perpetual disqualification
took effect upon the finality of the
judgment
of
conviction,
before

Lonzanida filed
candidacy.

his

certificate

of

The penalty of prisin mayor automatically


carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the
Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or
to be elected to such office. The duration
of temporary absolute disqualification is
the same as that of the principal penalty
of prisin mayor.
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED
JALOSJOS v COMELEC
FACTS:
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates
for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos
was running for his third term. Cardino
filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos.
Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a
false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was
eligible for the Office of Mayor.
ALLEGATION: Jalosjos had already been
convicted by final judgment for robbery
and sentenced to prisin mayor by the
Regional Trial Court. Cardino asserted that
Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence.
Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated
that he had already been granted
probation. Cardino countered that the RTC
revoked Jalosjos probation in an Order
dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted
Cardino and stated that the RTC
issued an Order dated 5 February
2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly
complied with the order of probation.
Jalosjos further stated that during the
2004 elections the COMELEC denied a

petition for disqualification filed


against him on the same grounds.
COMELEC: Cancelled JalosjosCOC. Jalosjos
is ousted from office
HELD:
The perpetual special disqualification
against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material
fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy was void from
the start since he was not eligible to
run for any public office at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Jalosjos was never a candidate at any
time, and all votes for Jalosjos were
stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the
highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.
A false statement in a certificate of
candidacy that a candidate is eligible to
run for public office is a false material
representation which is a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the same
Code.
A sentence of prisin mayor by final
judgment is a ground for disqualification
under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code and under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It is also a
material fact involving the eligibility of a
candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person
can file a petition under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code or under either
Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Perpetual special disqualification "deprives
the convict of the right to vote or to be
elected
to
or
hold
public
office
perpetually."
Perpetual special disqualification is a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of

the Omnibus Election Code because this


accessory penalty is an ineligibility,
which means that the convict is not
eligible to run for public office,
contrary to the statement that Section 74
requires him to state under oath. As used
in Section 74, the word "eligible" means
having the right to run for elective public
office, that is, having all the qualifications
and none of the ineligibilities to run for
public office.
NOTE: Material misrep could mean
qualification or eligibility. One who suffers
from perpetual special disqualification is
ineligible to run for public office. If a
person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath that "he is
eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then
he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. As this Court
explained in Fermin:
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy. A void certificate
of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility
that existed at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy can never give
rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid
votes.21 Jalosjos
certificate
of
candidacy was cancelled because he was
ineligible from the start to run for Mayor.
Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on
such ground means he was never a valid
candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio. Jalosjos ineligibility existed on the
day he filed his certificate of candidacy,
and the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it.
Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was
only one qualified candidate for Mayor in
the May 2010 elections Cardino who
received the highest number of votes.
If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who
filed
such
void
certificate
of
candidacy was never a candidate in
the elections at any time. All votes

for such non-candidate are stray


votes and should not be counted.
stray votes.
RULING: PROCLAIM CARDINO AS MAYOR
QUINTO v COMELEC
FACTS:
This controversy actually stems from the
law authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES). On
December 22, 1997, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTORAL
EXERCISES,
PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,
[4]
the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection
with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution
No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of
Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or
controlled
corporations,
shall
be
considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or
position shall not be considered resigned
upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion
HELD:

CONTENTION: In considering persons


holding appointive positions as ipso
facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned
all
other
civil
servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first
class.
it is necessary that the four (4) requisites
of valid classification be complied with,
namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial
distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of
the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members
of the class.
The Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged
provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote
ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on
the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency,
integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public.
If we accept these as the underlying
objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision
cannot
be
constitutionally
rescued
on
the
ground
of
valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the
requisite that the classification must be
germane to the purposes of the law.
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought
to be prevented by the measure remain.

Under the present state of our law, the


Vice-President, in the example, running
this time, let us say, for President, retains
his position during the entire election
period and can still use the resources of
his office to support his campaign.
RULING: PETITION GRANTED
QUINTO v COMELEC
HELD:
NOT
VIOLATIVE
PROTECTION

OF

EQUAL

i.
Farias, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al. is Controlling
In Farias, the constitutionality of Section
14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, was assailed on the ground,
among others, that it unduly discriminates
against appointive officials. As Section 14
repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemedresigned provision in respect of elected
officials) of the Omnibus Election Code,
elected
officials
are
no
longer
considered ipso facto resigned from their
respective offices upon their filing of
certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since
Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation
on appointive officials continues to be
operative they are deemed resigned when
they file their certificates of candidacy.

political activity). These are interests that


are important enough to outweigh the
non-fundamental right of appointive
officials and employees to seek elective
office.
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED
READ:
MENDOZA v COMELEC
SOCRATES v COMELEC

CAMPAIGN, ELECTION
(ART. X, OEC)

PROPAGANDA

The
term
election
campaign
or
partisan poll activity refers to an act
designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate/s to a public
office.It includes:
(a) forming orgs or groups of persons
(b) holding political caucuses, mtgs,
rallies or other similar assemblies,
(c) making speeches, announcements,
or
commentaries,
or
holding
interviews, and
(d) publishing or distributing campaign
lit.or matls,
(e) directly or indirectly, soliciting
votes, pledges or support for or
against any candidate.

To start with, the equal protection clause


does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction.[34] What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. [35] The
test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness.

NOTE: It does NOT include public


expression of opinions or discussions of
probable issues or on attributes or
criticisms or probable candidates proposed
to be nominated. The filing of a COC is
a partisan poll act.as the candidate
thereby
offers
himself
to
the
electorate for an elective post.

Prescinding from these premises, it is


crystal
clear
that
the
provisions
challenged in the case at bar, are not
violative of the equal protection clause.
The
deemed-resigned
provisions
substantially serve governmental interests
(i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the
government and the people rather than to
party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of
political justice as to policy; (iii) avoidance
of the danger of a powerful political
machine;
and
(iv)
ensuring
that
employees achieve advancement on their
merits and that they be free from both
coercion and the prospect of favor from

PROHIBITED ACTS
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, w/n
a voter or a candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan poll activity
except during election period (Sec.
80)
[Accdg to RA 7166, Sec. 5 thereof provides
that campaign periods are thereby fixed
as follows:
(a) For Pres, VP and Senators, 90 days
before the day of the election; and

(b) For Mems of the HOR and elective


provincial, city and municipal
officials, 45 days before the day of
the election
However, COMELEC may exclude the day
before and the day of the election itself,
Maundy Thurs and Good Fri.]
(2) It shall be unlawful for any foreigner,
whether juridical or natural person, to aid
any candidate or poll party, directly or
indirectly, or take part in or influence in
any manner in election, or to contribute or
make any exp.in connection w/ any
election campaign or partisan poll act.
(Sec. 81)
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person
during the campaign period to remove,
destroy, obliterate, or in any manner
deface or tamper with, or prevent the
distribution of lawful election propaganda.
(Sec. 83)
(4) It shall be unlawful for any candidate,
poll party, org., or any person to give or
accept, free of charge, directly or
indirectly, transpo, food or drinks or things
of value during the 5 hours before and
after a public mtg., on the day preceding
the election, and on the day of the
election; or to give or contribute, directly
or indirectly, money or things of value for
such purpose.

LAWFUL ELECTION PROPAGANDA


Election propaganda whether on T.V,
radio, newspaper or any other medium is
allowed for all reg. poll parties, national,
regional,
sectoral
parties
or
org.participating under the party list
elections and for all bona fide candidates
seeking national and local elective posts.

3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters,


whether framed or posted, with an area
not exceeding two (2) feet by three (3)
feet, except that, at the site and on the
occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in
announcing the holding of said meeting or
rally, streamers not exceeding three (3)
feet by eight (8) feet in size, shall be
allowed: Provided, That said streamers
may be displayed five (5) days before the
date of the meeting or rally and shall be
removed within twenty-four (24) hours
after said meeting or rally;
3.4. Paid advertisements in print or
broadcast media: Provided, That the
advertisements
shall
follow
the
requirements set forth in Section 4 of this
Act; and
3.5. All other forms of election propaganda
not prohibited by the Omnibus Election
Code or this Act. (RA 9006)
REQT FOR PUBLISHED OR PRINTED
ELECTION PROPAGANDA
4.1.
Any
newspaper,
newsletter,
newsweekly,
gazette
or
magazine
advertising, posters, pamphlets, comic
books,
circulars,
handbills,
bumper
stickers,
streamers,
sample
list of
candidates or any published or printed
political matter and any broadcast of
election propaganda by television or
radio for or against a candidate or
group of candidates to any public
office shall bear and be identified by
the reasonably legible or audible
words "political advertisement paid
for," followed by the true and correct
name and address of the candidate or
party for whose benefit the election
propaganda was printed or aired.

Lawful election propaganda shall include:


3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals,
stickers or other written or printed
materials the size of which does not
exceed eight and one half inches in width
and fourteen inches in length;

4.2. If the broadcast is given free of


charge by the radio or television station, it
shall be identified by the words "airtime
for this broadcast was provided free of
charge by" followed by the true and
correct name and address of the
broadcast entity.

3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging


voters to vote for or against any particular
political party or candidate for public
office;

4.3.
Print,
broadcast
or
outdoor
advertisements donated to the candidate
or political party shall not be printed,
published, broadcast, or exhibited without

the written acceptance by the said


candidate or political party. Such written
acceptance shall be attached to the
advertising
contract
and
shall
be
submitted to the COMELEC as provided in
Subsection 6.3. hereof.
ELECTION SURVEYS
- refer to the measurement of opinions
and perceptions of the voters as regards a
candidate's
popularity,
qualifications,
platforms or a matter of public discussion
in relation to the election, including voters'
preference for candidates or publicly
discussed issues during the campaign
period.
1. During the election period, any person,
natural as well as juridical, candidate or
organization who publishes a survey must
likewise publish the following information:
(a) The name of the person, candidate,
party or organization who commissioned
or paid for the survey;
(b) The name of the person, polling firm or
survey organization who conducted the
survey;
(c) The period during which the survey
was conducted, the methodology used,
including the number of individual
respondents and the areas from which
they were selected, and the specific
questions asked;
(d) The margin o error of the survey;
(e) For each question for which the margin
of error is greater than that reported
under paragraph (d), the margin of error
for that question; and
(f) A mailing address and telephone
number, indicating it as an address or
telephone number at which the sponsor
can be contacted to obtain a written
report regarding the survey in accordance
with Subsection 5.3.
2. The survey together with raw data
gathered to support its conclusions shall
be available for inspection, copying and
verification by the COMELEC or by a
registered political party or a bona fide

candidate or by any COMELEC-accredited


citizen's arm. A reasonable fee sufficient
to cover the costs of inspection, copying
and verification may be charged.
3. Surveys affecting national candidates
shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting
local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
4. Exit polls may only be taken subject to
the following requirements:
(a) Pollsters shall not conduct their
surveys within fifty (50) meters from the
polling place, whether said survey is taken
in a home, dwelling place and other
places;
(b) Pollsters shall wear distinctive clothing;
(c) Pollsters shall inform the voters that
they may refuse to answer; and
(d) The result of the exit polls may be
announced after the closing of the polls on
election day, and must clearly identify the
total number of respondents, and the
places where they were taken. Said
announcement shall state that the same is
unofficial and does not represent a trend.
[EXIT POLLS a species of election
survey conducted by a qualified indivl or
a group of indivls for the purpose f
determining the result of an election by
confidentially asking randomly selected
voters for the names of candidates they
have voted for immediately after they
have cast their ballots.]
EQUAL ACCESS TO MEDIA TIME, AND
SPACE. All registered parties and bona
fide candidates shall have equal access to
media time and space. The following
guidelines may be amplified on by the
COMELEC.
1. Print advertisements shall not exceed
one-fourth (1/4) page, in broad sheet and
one-half (1/2) page in tabloids thrice a
week per newspaper, magazine or other
publications, during the campaign period.
2. Each bona fide candidate or registered
political party for a nationally elective

office shall be entitled to not more than


one hundred twenty (120) minutes of
television advertisement and one hundred
eighty
(180)
minutes
of
radio
advertisement whether by purchase or
donation.
3. Each bona fide candidate or registered
political party for a locally elective office
shall be entitled to not more than sixty
(60) minutes of television advertisement
and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall
require any broadcast station or entity to
submit to the COMELEC a copy of its
broadcast
logs
and
certificates
of
performance
for
the
review
and
verification of the frequency, date, time
and duration of advertisements broadcast
for any candidate or political party.
4. All mass media entities shall furnish the
COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for
advertising, promoting or opposing any
political party or the candidacy of any
person for public office within five (5) days
after its signing. In every case, it shall be
signed by the donor, the candidate
concerned or by the duly authorized
representative of the political party.
5. No franchise or permit to operate a
radio or television stations shall be
granted or issued, suspended or cancelled
during the election period.
In all instances, the COMELEC shall
supervise the use and employment of
press, radio and television facilities insofar
or
the
placement
of
political
advertisements is concerned to ensure
that
candidates
are
given
equal
opportunities under equal circumstances
to make known their qualifications and
their stand on public issues within the
limits set forth in the Omnibus Election
Code and Republic Act No. 7166 on
election spending.
6. The COMELEC shall ensure that radio or
television or cable television broadcasting
entities shall not allow the scheduling of

any program or permit any sponsor to


manifestly favor or oppose any candidate
or political party by unduly or repeatedly
referring to or including said candidate
and/or political party in such program
respecting, however, in all instances the
right of said broadcast entities to air
accounts of significant news or news
worthy events and views on matters of
public interest.
7. All members of media, television, radio
or print, shall scrupulously report and
interpret the news, taking care not to
suppress essential facts nor to distort the
truth by omission or improper emphasis.
They shall recognize the duty to air the
other side and the duty to correct
substantive errors promptly.
8.
Any
mass
media
columnist,
commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air
correspondent or personality who is a
candidate for any elective public office or
is a campaign volunteer for or employed
or retained in any capacity by any
candidate or political party shall be
deemed resigned, if so required by their
employer, or shall take a leave of absence
from his/her work as such during the
campaign
period: Provided, That
any
media practitioner who is an official of a
political party or a member of the
campaign staff of a candidate or political
party shall not use his/her time or space to
favor any candidate or political party.
9.
No
movie,
cinematograph
or
documentary portraying the life or
biography of a candidate shall be publicly
exhibited in a theater, television station or
any public forum during the campaign
period.
10.
No
movie,
cinematograph
or
documentary portrayed by an actor or
media personality who is himself a
candidate shall be publicly exhibited in a
theater, television station or any public
forum during the campaign period.
AFFIRMATIVE
COMELEC

ACTION

BY

THE

(1) Pursuant to Secs. 90 and 92 of the OEC


(BP 881), the COMELEC shall procure
the PRINT SPACE upon PAYMT of JC
from at least 3 newspapers of general
circulation wherein candidates for
national office ca announce their
candidacies. Such space shall be allocated
free of charge equally and impartially among all the
candidates for national office on three (3) different
calendar days: the first day within the first week of
the campaign period; the second day within the
fifth week of the campaign period; and the third day
within the tenth week of the campaign period.

(2) The COMELEC shall also procure free

airtime from at least three (3) national


television networks and three(3) national radio
networks, which shall also be allocated free of
charge equally and impartially among all
candidates for national office. Such free time
shall be allocated on three (3) different
calendar days; the first day within the first
week of the campaign period; the second day
within the fifth week of the campaign period;
and the third day within the tenth weeks of the
campaign period.
(3) The COMELEC may require national
television and radio networks to sponsor at
least three (3) national debates among
presidential candidates and at least one (1)
national debate among vice presidential
candidates. The debates among presidential
candidates shall be scheduled on three (3)
different calendar days; the first debate shall
be scheduled within the first and second week
of the campaign period; the second debate
within the fifth and sixth week of the campaign
period; and the third debate shall be
scheduled within the tenth and eleventh week
of the campaign period.
(4) The sponsoring television or radio network

may sell air-time for commercials and


advertisements to interested advertisers and
sponsors. The COMELEC shall promulgate
rules and regulations for the holding of such
debates.
REGULATION
OF
ELECTION
PROPAGANDA THRU MASS MEDIA (SEC.
86)
(a) The Commission shall promulgate rules and
regulations regarding the sale of air time for
partisan political purposes during the campaign
period to insure the equal time as to duration and
quality in available to all candidates for the same

office or political parties at the same rates or given


free of charge
(b) All contracts for advertising in any newspaper,
magazine, periodical or any form of publication
promoting or opposing the candidacy of any
person for public office shall, before its
implementation, be registered by said newspaper,
magazine, periodical or publication with the
Commission. In every case, it shall be signed by
the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized
representative of the political party.
(c) No franchise or permit to operate a radio or
television station shall be granted or issued,
suspended or cancelled during the election period.
(d) Any radio or t.v station, owned or controlled by
the govt, shall give free of charge equal time and
prominence to an acrredtied poll aprty or its
candidates if it gives free of charge air time to an
accredited poll party. Or its candidates for poll
purposes.
(e) In all instances, the COMELEC shall supervise
the use and employment of press, radio and t.v
facilities so as to give candidates equal opp.under
equal circumstances to make known their qual.
RALLIES, MTGS., AND OTHER POLL ACTS
(See Secs. 87 and 89)
COMELEC SPACE, POSTER AREA, TIME AND
INFO BULLETIN
(1) The COMELEC shall procure shall in at

least one (1) newspaper of general circulation


and air time in at least one (1) major
broadcasting station or entity in every
province or city:
(a) Provided, however, That in the
absence
of
said
newspaper,
publication shall be done in any other
magazine or periodical in said
province or city, which shall be known
as "COMELEC Space":
(b) That in the absence of said broadcasting
station or entity, broadcasting shall be
done in any radio or television station in
said province or city, which shall be known
as "COMELEC Time". Said time shall be
allocated to the COMELEC free of charge,
while said space shall be allocated to the
COMELEC upon payment of just
compensation.

(c) The COMELEC time and space shall be


utilized exclusively by the COMELEC for
public information dissemination on
election-related concerns.
(d) The use of COMELEC Space is
PERSONAL to the candidate. (Sec.8, RA
9006)
2. The Commission shall designate common poster
areas in the strategic public places such as
markets, barangay centers and the like wherein
candidates can post, display, or exhibit election
propaganda to announce or further their candidacy.
(a) Whenever feasible common billboards
may be installed by the Commission
and/or non-partisan private or civic
organizations which the Commission may
authorize whenever available, after due
notice and hearing, in strategic places
where it may be readily seen or read, with
the heaviest pedestrian and/or vehicular
traffic in the city or municipality.
(b) The space in such common poster areas
or billboards shall be allocated free of
charge, if feasible, equitably and
impartially among the candidates in the
province, city or municipality. (Sec. 10 RA
6646)
3. The Commission shall cause the printing,

and supervise the dissemination of bulletins to


be known as "Comelec Bulletin" which shall

be of such size as to adequately contain the


picture, bio-data and program of government
of every candidate.
(a) Said bulletin shall be disseminated to the
voters or displayed in such places as to give due
prominence thereto.
(b) Any candidate may reprint at his expense, any
"Comelec Bulletin" upon prior authority of the
Commission: Provided, That the printing of the
names of the different candidates with their biodata must be in alphabetical order irrespective of
party affiliation.

MASS MEDIA AD.FOR CANDIDATES


RA 9006 repealed Sec. 11(b) of RA 6646.
The ban on mass media advertising for a
candidates was meant to prevent welldfunded candidates from unfairly dominating
the use of mas media thru paid ads at the
expense of candidates from less affluent
strata of society.
RATIONALE: Place them on equal footing
insofar as media advertising is concerned and
make electoral campaigns less expensive
thus minimizing the need to amass funds thru
illegal or questionale means to recoup
exp.and prep for the next electoral campaigns,