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People v.

667 SCRA 790, March 12, 2012

FACTS: Roger Posada (Roger) and Emily Posada (Emily) were convicted by the
Regional Trial Court for selling twelve (12) pieces of transparent sealed plastic
sachet, containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu in violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Roger was also convicted by the same RTCfor
possession of one piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue of a crystalline
substance (allegedlyshabu), a piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small scissors,
and fifteen (15) pieces of used lighter all of which are intended to be used for
smoking or introducing dangerous drugs into the body of a person, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accusedappellants filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC
ISSUE: WON prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of the
seized illegal items


YES. The accused-appellants' failure to show evidence that the police

officers did not comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 gives us no other recourse
but to respect the findings of trial court and of the CA. Furthermore, the CA is
correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the police officers as regards the
timely submission of the subject illegal drugs since they are presumed to have
regularly performed their duties, unless there is evidence suggesting ill-motive on
the part of the police officers. In this case, the accused-appellants failed to
contradict the presumption. What goes against the accused-appellants is the fact
that they have not offered any evidence of ill-motive against the police officers.
Emily even admitted that she did not know PO1 Area, the poseur-buyer.

617 scra 366, February 22, 2010

FACTS: WILSON SUAN y JOLONGON was convicted by RTC for violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 which was affirmed by the CA. Appellant seeks a
final recourse before SC via appeal.

ISSUE: WON The admissibility of Dangerous Drug as evidence should be equated with its
probative value in proving the corpus delicti.

HELD:: No. While the drug may be admitted in evidence it does not necessarily follow
that the same should be given evidentiary weight. the prosecution miserably failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly recovered from the appellant. Records
show that while the police officers were able to prove the factuality of the buy-bust
operation, the prosecution dismally failed to prove the identity of the substance taken
from appellant. , there is a break in the chain of custody of the seized substance. The
standard operating procedure on the seizure and custody of the drug as mandated in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations was not
complied with. As we observed, the chain of custody of the drug from the time the same
was turned over to the Team Leader, as testified by PO2 Labasano or the Records
Custodian as related by PO1 Gondol, to the time of submission to the crime laboratory was
not clearly shown. There is no indication whether the Team Leader and the Records
Custodian were one and the same person. Neither was there reference to the person who
submitted it to the crime laboratory. The prosecution needs to establish that the Team
Leader or Records Custodian indeed submitted such particular drug to the crime
laboratory for examination. The failure on the part of the Team Leader or Records
Custodian as the case may be, to testify on what he did with the drug while he was in
possession resulted in a break in the chain of custody of the drug. There is obviously a
missing link from the point when the drug was in his hands to the point when the same
was submitted for examination. The failure to establish the evidences chain of custody is
fatal to the prosecutions case. Under no circumstance the court can consider or even
safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug was properly preserved

by the apprehending officers. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited

drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. Jurisprudence abounds
with cases where deviation from the standard procedure in an anti-narcotics operation
produces doubts as to the identity and origin of the drug which inevitably results to the
acquittal of the accused.

630 SCRA 42, September 7, 2010
The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla), who was ambushed in broad daylight while
driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed assigned
at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened. As a purported
eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused. All the
accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint
examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights
during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible
eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and
participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed
the crime.
Whether Extrajudicial Confession of Joel de Jesus is not valid

NO, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation was
not valid.
The Court upholds the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation. But while we strike down the extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of
constitutionally enshrined rights and declare it inadmissible in evidence, appellants are not entitled to an

acquittal because their conviction was not based on the evidence obtained during such custodial
investigation. Even without the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel de Jesus who was the first to
have been arrested, the trial courts judgment is affirmed, as the testimonial and documentary evidence on
record have established the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
After a thorough and careful review, the Court hold that there exists sufficient evidence on record to
sustain appellants conviction even without the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel de Jesus.

577 SCRA 309, January 30, 2009
Petitioner operated a hardware store in a building along Bonifacio St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, which stood in a commercial lot owned by Maria Mendoza, from whom the petitioner
rented the same. In 1982, petitioner allowed respondents to manage the store. In 1984, Mendoza
put the Bonifacio property for sale. Having no funds, Petitioner allegedly entered into a verbal
agreement with respondents stipulating that the latter shall buy the property in behalf of the
petitioner and the consideration for the lot shall be paid from the accumulated earnings of the
store. On September 20, 1984, respondents returned the management of the store to the petitioner
with an inventory showing a difference of P116,946.15. The petitioner then demanded from the
respondents the reconveyance title of the property but the latter refused. The petitioner filed a
case before the RTC which rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner, which was later
on reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Whether the existence of a trust agreement between her and respondent spouses Ramos
was clearly established and admissible as evidence.
On this score, the court subscribe to the ruling of the RTC that said spouses were deemed
to have waived their objection to the parol evidence as they failed to timely object when
petitioner testified on the said verbal agreement.
A careful perusal of the records of the case reveals that respondent spouses Ramos did indeed fail
to interpose their objections regarding the admissibility of the afore-mentioned testimonies when
the same were offered to prove the alleged verbal trust agreement between them and petitioner.
Consequently, these testimonies were rendered admissible in evidence. Nevertheless, while
admissibility of evidence is an affair of logic and law, determined as it is by its relevance and
competence, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, still depends on judicial

evaluation. Thus, despite the admissibility of the said testimonies, the Court holds that the same
carried little weight in proving the alleged verbal trust agreement between petitioner and
respondent spouses.

Malayan Insurance Co v Alberto

(664 SCRA 791) February 1, 2012
Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Alberto and Reyes,
the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of Cargo Truck that was involved
in an accident requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured.
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police
investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in
evidence, especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its
presentation in evidence. Respondents counter that since the police report was
never confirmed by the investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part
of the evidence on record

Whether the evidence presented by Malayan Insurance are sufficient to claim for
the amount of damages

Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to
the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the
public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her
stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person
personally or through official information.

Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to

the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in
court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved.
Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared
the report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However, what is not clear
is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in
his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police reports presentation in
evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so. As a result, the
police report is still admissible in evidence.

People vs Mangune
685 SCRA 578, November 14, 2012

AAA accused her father, Mangune, whom she identified in open court, of raping her
on May 7, 2003.
Mangune denied raping his daughter

The RTC found AAAs testimony sufficient to be able to stand on its ground and
convict Mangune. Moreover, the RTC said, Mangunes "barefaced denial could not
prevail over the positive, spontaneous, straightforward and detailed testimony of
AAA." The RTC explained that it gave AAAs testimony "full faith and credence" as
there was no showing that she was actuated by improper motive against her father.

Whether full weight and credence should be given to the prosecution's witness.

It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Denial cannot prevail over
the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between
the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the
appellant, the former deserves more credence

616 scra 652, March 26, 2010
A confidential informant reported De Guzmans drug pushing activities to Alcala.
Pangasinans Chief of Police immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. At the
police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust operation were turned over
to the police investigator, SPO3 Eduardo Yadao. SPO3 Yadao entered the incident in the police
blotter. He then placed his initials on the packets of suspected shabu, which were later submitted
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta City. Confirmatory tests
revealed that the substance in the packets that appellant handed to SPO1 Llanillo was indeed
shabu. The trial court found De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Whether or not the illicit drug is admissible as evidence.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.
The prosecution successfully established the first and third elements of the crime.
However, there is a problem in the prosecutions effort to establish the integrity of the corpus

delicti. The Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines set
under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled the
evidence that a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court and that
seized from the accused are one and the same.
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the
seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to
engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused.
Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the prosecutions whole case still falls. The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense. WHEREFORE, , appellant RONALDO DE
GUZMAN y DANZIL is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

People v. Cabiguez
631 scra 652, September 29, 2010

FACTS: On evening of 2001, AAA was raped and her house was robbed by two men
who were later on indentified as Cabiguez and as Grondiano. Doctors had taken
spermatozoa on the vaginal part of AAA. The Trial Court convicted Cabiguez on the
crime of rape although his DNA profile did not match since the specimen submitted
to them were mere vaginal discharges from AAA. And Both Cabiguez and Grondiano
on the crime of robbery.The case was elevated to CA. The defense argued that the
prosecution failed to establish conspiracy since BBB did not actually see that
Cabigquez was on the balcony while the robbery was being committed. The CA
found BBBs testimony candid and not prompted by ill-motive. As to BBBs failure to
promptly implicate Grondiano and Cabigquez for the crimes, the appellate court
ruled that this cannot be taken against her in the light of serious threats made by
said accused on their family. The alleged contradictions in the testimonies of AAA
and BBB were likewise not fatal to the case of the prosecution as they bear no
materiality to the commission of the crime. The CA also noted that the accused
were able to consummate their criminal acts without any physical resistance from
the victims who could not even cry loudly because they were ordered at gunpoint
not to make any noise. It rejected the defense of alibi put up by Cabigquez in view
of his admission that he stayed at a house within the vicinity of AAAs store.

ISSUE: WON Cabiguez should be acquitted since the DNA profile did not match.
WON There was a conspiracy on the crime of robbery.
HELD: No. A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the totality of the evidence
presented before the court points to no other possible conclusion, i.e., appellant
raped the private offended party. A positive DNA match may strengthen the
evidence for the prosecution, but an inconclusive DNA test result may not be
sufficient to exculpate the accused, particularly when there is sufficient evidence

proving his guilt. Notably, neither a positive DNA match of the semen nor the
presence of spermatozoa is essential in finding that rape was committed. The
important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.
On the Second issue, the SC held that the CA correctly ruled that conspiracy was
sufficiently proven by circumstantial evidence on record We also find that the trial
court correctly appreciated conspiracy against Cabigquez with respect to the crime
of robbery. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of
previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown
through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred upon the acts of the accused themselves when
such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of

Bontilao v. Gerona
630 SCRA 561, September 15, 2010

Facts: Dr. Carlos Gerona conducted an open surgery to treat the fractured right arm
of petitioners son Allen. Petitioners were informed that their son died because of
asphyxia due to congestion and edema of the epiglottis at the operating room.
Petitioner filed an administrative and criminal case againt Dr. Gerona and Dr.
alleging medical negligence and incompetence. The documentary
evidence and testimonies of several witnesses presented in the criminal
proceedings were offered and admitted in evidence at the RTC. RTC decided in
favor of the petitioners. It held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable
in establishing respondent's liability. According to the RTC, asphyxia or cardiac
arrest does not normally occur in an operation on a fractured bone in the absence of
negligence in the administration of anesthesia and the use of an endotracheal
tube. Also, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia were all under
the exclusive control of respondent and Dr. Jabagat, and neither Allen nor his
mother could be said to be guilty of contributory negligence. Thus, the trial court
held that respondent and Dr. Jabagat were solidarity liable for they failed to prove
that they were not negligent. Respondent appealed the decision. The CA set aside
and reversed RTCs decision and held that that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply for it must be satisfactorily shown that (1) the accident is of
a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2)
the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory conduct; and (3) the instrumentality












The CA held that while it may be true that an Open Reduction and Internal Fixation
or ORIF could not possibly lead to a patient's death unless somebody was negligent,
still what was involved in this case was a surgical procedure with all risks attendant,
including death. As explained by the expert testimony, unexplained death and maloccurrence is a possibility in surgical procedures especially those involving the
administration of general anesthesia. It had also been established in both the
criminal and administrative cases against respondent that Allen's death was the
result of the anesthesiologist's negligence and not his

Issue: was there a substantial evidence to prove the negligence of the respondent

Held: No. the CA correctly found that petitioners failed to present substantial
evidence of any specific act of negligence on respondent's part or of the
surrounding facts and circumstances which would lead to the reasonable inference
that the untoward consequence was caused by respondent's negligence. In fact,
under the established facts, respondent appears to have observed the proper
amount of care required under the circumstances. Having seen that Dr. Jabagat
failed in the intubation, respondent inquired from the latter, who was the expert on
the matter of administering anesthesia, whether the surgery should be postponed
considering the failure to intubate.

People v. De Mesa
624 scra 248, July 6, 2010

FACTS: De Mesa and Gonzales were both arrested in a buy bust operation at KFC
for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. RTC found the accused guilty of the said
crime. De Mesa appealed to the CA and raised the contention that he prosecution
failed to indubitably establish that the shabu presented in court as evidence was the
very same white crystalline substance allegedly sold by and seized from them. They
allege that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the requirements of the law
on the proper handling and custody of dangerous drugs in the course of the alleged
buy-bust operation. They claim that no photographs of the seized items were taken
and no inventory report was made by the apprehending officers. They also claim
that the police officers testimonies failed to establish when and where the seized
items were marked. The CA rejected the argument and rules that In a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that
the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was

presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. The
presence of these elements is sufficient to support the trial courts finding of
appellants guilt. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated
drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the
marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused.The presentation in court of the corpus delicti the body or
substance of the crime establishes the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. Thus the case is brought before the SC.

Issue: WON failure to strictly abide by the requirements of the law as regards the
proper handling and custody of dangerous drugs seized in the course of an alleged
buy-bust operation is fatal to the prosecution of the crime.

HELD: No, The SC ruled in negative. non-compliance of IRR of R.A. No.

9165 Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or
make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Contrary to appellants assertion, the prosecution presented an unbroken
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs seized from appellants at the time of
the buy-bust operation until the items seized were examined at the PNP
Crime Laboratory, all of which took place in only a matter of hours.

Bontilao v. Gerona
630 SCRA 561, September 15, 2010

Facts: SUPRA

Issue: WON the failure to intubate before the surgery is the proximate cause of the
death of allen.
HELD: No, Petitioners failed to present substantial proof that intubation was an
indispensable prerequisite for the operation and that it would be grave error for any
surgeon to continue with the operation under such circumstances. In fact, the
testimony of the expert witness presented by the prosecution in the criminal
proceedings and admitted into evidence at the RTC, was even to the effect that the

anesthesia could be administered by alternative means such as a mask and that the
operation could proceed even without intubation.

Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat

577 SCRA 6, January 27, 2009
The subject matter of this case is a parcel of agricultural land located in La
Trinidad, Benguet which was previously described as Lot No. 4 in a Survey Plan
prepared for Agustin Ulep by Private Land Surveyor Mariano Singson (Singson)
which was approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1964. Prior to such approval, Agustin
Ulep and Cristobal Ducat (Ducat) executed an agreement whereby Ducat is to
perform necessary procedures for the registration and acquisition of the title of the
lands. Before accomplishing this task, Agustin died. His son Cecilio took over as
administrator of the properties. Ducat continued working to acquire titles for the
lands of Agustin Ulep. Then the land in dispute was referred to as Lot No. 22 in an
Amended Survey Plan prepared for Ducat et al. by the same Singson. Such was
approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1982. In 1984, Ducat registered Lot No.4 under
his and his wifes (Flora Kiong) name and subsequently declared the property in his

name for taxation purposes. In 1994, the heirs of Bernardo Ulep (heirs) filed a
complaint for reconveyance of the land with damages. The heirs alleged that Ducat
fraudulently maneuvered the improper amendment of the survey plan to alter the
description of the land.
MTC dismissed the complaint of the heirs for failure to prove their cause of
action by competent and preponderant evidence. The heirs appealed in the RTC
which decided in favor of Spouses Ducat. Their subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied too, on the ground that it was filed beyond the
reglementary period. Then they filed a Motion to Resolve for Reconsideration on the
Merits with the RTC which reversed the MTC judgment and ordered the spouses
Ducat to reconvey the property to the heirs and pay for damages and attorneys
fees. Spouses Ducat filed a petition for review with the CA which ruled that the heirs
failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish that the spouses wrongfully
acquired title over the land. The heirs moved for reconsideration but the CA denied
such. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether Exhibit 15 serves as documentary evidence that Bernardo Ulep
has transferred his right over the disputed lot to Cristobal Ducat?
Yes. Exhibit 15 serves as documentary evidence that Bernardo Ulep has
transferred his right over the disputed lot to Cristobal Ducat.
The MTC is correct in holding that the more important document which
proved respondents' ownership of the subject property is Exhibit 15, the Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property, subscribed and sworn to before the Deputy Provincial and
Municipal Assessor.
Exhibit 15 is a very solid piece of evidence in favor of respondents. It
constitutes an admission against interest made by Bernardo Ulep, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, the Court elucidated
x x x Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The
rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to
presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if
it does not.
Bernardo Ulep's admission against his own interest is binding on his heirs,
herein petitioners. It is now beyond cavil that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest
recognized respondents as the legal owner of the lot in dispute.
In sum, the admission against the interest of Bernardo Ulep goes against the
theory of petitioners, and the evidence they presented is sorely insufficient to
overcome said admission. Thus, there is no proof that the titling of the subject
property was fraudulently obtained by respondents in their names.

SMC v. Kalalo
672 scra 401, June 13, 2012

FACTS: Kalalo was a dealer of beer products of SMC. She had a credit overdraft
arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior to the delivery of beer products,
she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner: a blank check and a check
to be filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of the goods
delivered. At the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the
actual amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer

bottles and cases from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded
in determining the actual amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on
the blank check, and respondent would fund her account accordingly. Respondents
business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by SMC increased
from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it
became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus, she
requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply.
Respondents business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by
SMC increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of
deliveries, it became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the
transactions. Thus, she requested regular statements of account from petitioner,
but it failed to comply. SMC sent her a demand letter for the value of the seven
dishonored checks.
SMC filed before the MeTC a Complaint against respondent for violating the
Bouncing Checks Law. The MeTC acquitted Kalalo and it found that the total amount
owed to SMC was only 71, 009 pesos. SMC appealed only the civil aspect of the
MeTCs Decision to the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the larger
amount of 921,215. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the
RTC found no reversible error in the MeTCs Decision, dismissed the appeal of
petitioner. Dissatisfied with the RTCs Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42
Petition for Review, which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court. SMC
thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court.

Issue: WON Compromise Agreement made before the institution of Criminal

Proceeding is considered as an admission of liability.

Held: The SC ruled in negative. The fact that respondent made a compromise
offer to petitioner SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In civil
cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise
dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint
against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer
of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and,
therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt.
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. v. CIR
614 SCRA 526, March 9, 2010
Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of
manufacturing and exporting of electric machinery, equipment systems,
accessories, parts, components, materials and goods of all kinds, including those

relating to office automation and information technology and all types of computer
hardware and software, such as but not limited to HDD-CD-ROM and personal
computer printed circuit board. It is registered with the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA) as an Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise in the Laguna
Technopark, Inc.
In its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997, filed on April 14,
1997 and July 21, 1997 respectively, Toshiba declared input VAT payments on its
domestic purchases of taxable goods and services in the aggregate sum
of P3,875,139.65 with no zero-rated sales. Toshiba subsequently submitted to the
BIR its amended VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997, reporting the
same amount of input VAT payments but, this time, with zero-rated sales totaling
On March 30, 1999, Toshiba filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF One-Stop
Shop) two separate applications for tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT
payments for the first half of 1997 in the total amount of P3,685,446.73. The next
day, Toshiba likewise filed with the CTA a Petition for Review to toll the running of
the two-year prescriptive period under Section 230 of the Tax Code of 1977, as
amended which contained a prayer for the granting of a tax refund/tax credit
certificate in the amount of P3,875,139.65 representing unutilized input taxes paid
on its purchase of taxable goods and services for the period January 1 to June 30,
1997. Such was opposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) in his
Upon CTAs advice, Toshiba and the CIR filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Issues, wherein the opposing parties agreed and admitted, among others, that
2. [Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in
accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended and
7. [Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales.
During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented documentary evidence in support
of its claim for tax credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any evidence at
all. With both parties waiving the right to submit their respective memoranda, the
CTA rendered its Decision on October 16, 2000 favoring Toshiba. The CTA, though,
reduced the amount to be credited or refunded to Toshiba to P1,385,292.02. Both
Toshiba and the CIR sought reconsideration of the foregoing CTA Decision. The CTA
issued a Resolution dated January 17, 2001 denying both Motions for
Reconsideration of Toshiba and the CIR. Unsatisfied, the CIR filed a Petition for
Review with the Court of Appeals which was granted; reversing and setting aside
the Decision dated October 16, 2000 and the Resolution dated January 17, 2001 of
the CTA. Toshiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision,
based on (c) the conclusion of the CTA that the export sales of Toshiba were zerorated was supported by substantial evidence, other than the admission of the CIR in
the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, among other arguments, which was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated February 19, 2003. Hence, Toshiba filed the instant
Petition for Review.

Issue: Is the CIRs admission made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial of the parties
considered as a judicial admission?
Yes. The CIRs admission made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial of the
parties is considered as a judicial admission.
The arguments of the CIR that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latters export sales
were VAT-exempt transactions are inconsistent with the explicit admissions of the
CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba was a
registered VAT entity and that it was subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its export
sales. The Joint Stipulation was executed and submitted by Toshiba and the CIR
upon being advised to do so by the CTA. The approval of the Joint Stipulation by the
CTA marked the culmination of the pre-trial process in CTA Case No. 5762. The
admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission
especially when the opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed
with further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in
the course of the proceedings does not require proof.
In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted by the CIR and
Toshiba in their CTA-approved Joint Stipulation are that Toshiba is a duly registered
value-added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as
amended[,] that is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export
sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as
amended. The CIR was bound by these admissions, which he could not eventually
contradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA Decision dated October 16,
2000, by arguing that Toshiba was actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export sales
were VAT-exempt transactions. Obviously, Toshiba could not have been subject to
VAT and exempt from VAT at the same time. Similarly, the export sales of Toshiba
could not have been subject to zero percent (0%) VAT and exempt from VAT as

People v. Bodoso
623 SCRA 580, July 5, 2010
These cases are about two counts (July 14, 1999 and September 1999) of
rape committed by Ricardo Bodoso against his daughter AAA which is 14 years old
when the incidents took place. During arraignment, the accused entered a plea of
Not Guilty to both charges. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated,
among others, that 2. The private complainant in this case is a minor, being 14
years old on the date of the incidents The prosecution presented as witnesses,
private complainant AAA and Dr. Arsenia Maosca-Moran which stated that the
lacerations found in the hymen of the complainant were caused by sexual
intercourse and that because there was no congestion, the incident could have
happened a long time ago before the examination of the patient. On the other hand,
the accused declined to present any evidence. Hence, the cases were submitted for
The RTC of Tabaco City found the accused guilty as charged. The cases were
then brought to the SC for automatic review. The SC remanded the cases to the trial
court for proper disposition, particularly to ascertain the voluntariness of the
accused on his waiver of his right to present evidence, his understanding of its
consequences, and the conduct of further proceedings. The RTC allowed the
accused to present evidence; accused set up denial and alibi. After resting its case,
the defense moved and was granted leave to submit a memorandum. Upon
submission of such, the case was submitted for decision. The RTC finally convicted
the accused of 2 counts of rape defined under Art. 266-A and penalized under Art.
266-B of the RPC. The accused appealed to the CA which was dismissed by the
latter. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Is the assertion of the accused that the minority of AAA was not established
because the prosecution failed to present her birth certificate in evidence?
No. The assertion of the accused that the minority of AAA was not established
because the prosecution failed to present her birth certificate in evidence deserves
scant consideration.
The Informations specifically alleged that AAA was a minor, i.e., barely 14
years old on July 14, 1999and September 1999, when she was raped by her own
father. The accused himself, with the assistance of counsel, categorically admitted
during pre-trial that AAA was his daughter and that she was only 14 years old on
July 14, 1999 and in September 1999. These stipulations are binding on this Court
because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Court. The stipulation of facts signed by the parties, that
is, the accused, his counsel and the prosecutor, in a criminal case is recognized as a
declaration constituting judicial admission and is binding upon the parties. The
stipulated facts stated in the pre-trial order amount to an admission by the accused

and a waiver of his right to present evidence to the contrary. Although the right to
present evidence is guaranteed by the Constitution, such right may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Thus, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts
admitted during a pre-trial hearing applies.

In this regard, the Court is also guided by the ground rules laid down in the
case of People v. Pruna, in appreciating the age, either as an element of the crime
or as a qualifying circumstance. Thus:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the