Liberators, Occupiers, and Rulers:

A Book Review on Galbraith's The End of Iraq

No purpose is served by a prolonged American presence anywhere in Iraq
(Galbraith, 2006, p. 224).
Such words are too strong to come from someone who has been part of the
professional staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the United States
government, and has even served as the first ambassador of the United States in
Croatia. Disappointed with the policies of the U.S. government in settling the Iraqi
situation, he resigned from his post and joined the Center for Arms Control and
Proliferation. Also the author of Unintended Consequences: How War in Iraq
Strengthened Americas Enemies (2008), Peter W. Galbraith1 provides us with a
tough-minded opinion of what should be done to settle the Iraqi situation, which has
already escalated to a civil war.
Using his own experiences and having direct exposure to negotiations and
diplomatic actions taken by the United States to settle the Iraqi situation, Galbraith
produces The End of Iraq, which highlights Americas mistakes not in invading Iraq,
but in miscalculating the effects of their actions and decisions.
The Problem of Miscalculated Occupation
Iraqs 80 years of forced unification has been plagued by a prolonged civil
war among three divisions of their society the Kurds, the Shiite majority, and the
Sunni minority. Throughout the civil war, Galbraith has seen the United States take
its place in the middle switching sides whenever and with whomever they see fit 2.
The incompetence of the American government has provided more grounds for the
division of Iraq as a country more than it has done to liberate it from the
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.
Besides the final two chapters of the book, which contain Galbraiths stand
and recommendation on how the United States government should resolve the Iraqi
situation, the other chapters simply served as premises, providing the reader with
an insight that the conditions for the civil war were already in place. The divisions in
Iraqi society were prominent: the Kurds3 believed that they had a right to an
independent state, the Shiites are religiously and politically aligned with Iran, and
the Sunni minority will not be able to accept being dominated by the Shiites,
especially having the experience of being given exclusive privileges under
Saddams government.
But what made the three-state solution more necessary is the aggravated
1

Galbraith has a bachelor of arts degree from Harvard College, a masters degree from Oxford
University, and a juris doctorate from Georgestown University (armscontrolcenter.org). He is also the
son of John Kenneth Galbraith, an American economist.
2
Galbraith mentioned that the Kurds/Shiites/Sunnis would wonder why the American government failed
to give them help in combat, or to give them aid.
3
Saddams government committed genocide against the Kurds, as part of their Arabization program.
Saddams Baath party believed that since Iraq is an Arab country, it would only be right to eliminate
non-Arabs, which made the Kurds feel excluded from the country they never really wanted to be part of
(Galbraith, 2006).

situation as a result of the invasion and intervention of the United States. Galbraith
pointed out that one of the greatest mistakes of the U.S. government in invading
Iraq is not having a coherent strategy, which led to drastic miscalculations. Even the
Reagan administration helped Saddam Hussein and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war 4,
thinking that doing so would give the United States a potential political and
economic ally in the Middle East.
Inconsistencies in U.S. policies also arose as the results of their preceding
actions turned out to be not in favour of their national interests. U.S. support for Iraq
was withdrawn5, and a shift in strategy took place when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraqs
non-compliance with Resolution 6786 gave ground for the U.S. government to
intervene, and in the end, become victors. President Bushs speech after the event
called for Saddam Hussein to step aside. The Iraqi people took this seriously, and
uprisings formed to oust the dictator, believing that they had the support of the U.S.
The U.S. government, however, never promised to aid an uprising because of
their fear of losing the balance of power, with Iraq as the leading Arab country, once
the Shiites and the Kurds gains independence. After all, only the force of Saddam
Husseins government and continuous repression of independence movements kept
that country in tact for eighty years. This is another miscalculation of the U.S.
government. With successfully ousting Saddam Hussein, the United States did not
think that all authority would go with it7.
More than the mistake of not having a contingency plan is the ignorance of
the Bush administration regarding the Iraqi societys divisions, especially the two
sects of Islam: the Shiites and the Sunnis. To distinguish these two Islamic sects is
as important as determining what form of government will be most appropriate in
Iraq. Yet, instead of establishing a post-war administration composed of Iraqi
professionals, it turned out that those who were appointed were not in the right
position to judge the situation in Iraq, more so, solve the problems it was facing in
the brink of the collapse of order.
The Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) 8, a post-war administration,
transferred power to the Iraqi Governing Council, which would produce a Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL)9. But the uncompromising differences of Iraqs divisions in
society will make a constitution look like, as Galbraith describes, the negotiation of
a peace treaty than the design of a blueprint for a common state (p. 138). The
drafted constitution has been approved through a referendum on October 2005,
4

It was also against the national interest of the United States to see Iran win the war because doing so
would result to the U.S. losing control over the oil resources they have in Iraq.
5
The U.S. government implicitly supported Iraq and Saddams government by being too tolerant,
especially when Saddam committed genocide against the Kurds. No sanctions were imposed.
6
Resolution 678 of the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force if Iraq did not pull
out of Kuwait by January 15, 1991 (Galbraith, 2006, p. 42).
7
Looting became prevalent, and this saw the destruction of Iraqs cultural heritage, notably its
museums and National Library (Galbraith, 2006).
8
CPA was led by L. Paul Bremer III. It was preceded by Garners Office for Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was dissolved after it was unable to make a concrete solution
regarding Iraqs future.
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
9
TAL will serve as their guide to elections and the formulation of a permanent constitution.

notably making Kurdistan its first federal state. The situation in Sunni-Shiite areas,
however, has yet to be resolved.
When Context Counts More Than Irreconcilability
Galbraith has a main argument in proposing the three-state solution: it is
better to split the country into three states because the divisions in their society are
irreconcilable.
Using Iraqs 80-year history of forced unification, Galbraith proves his point
by showing how impossible it is to unify the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis in one state.
Rafaat (2007) affirms Galbraiths view, by arguing that even a federal system,
power-sharing or consensus democracy is not enough to contain the dispute
among the three divisions of Iraqi society. A consensus democracy would require
the accommodation of one participant of the interests and reservations of another,
yet in the case of Iraq, Smith (as cited in Rafaat, 2007) argues that the groups
claim to be distinct from others with which it is in alliance or conflict, and it is
distinguished by unique cultural features (p. 271).
But what Galbraith missed out in discussing the three-state solution is the
consideration that there are more actors involved than perceived. Bardis (2009)
gives an insight on how geopolitics plays an important part. Three neighboring
countries are interested in Iraqs future: Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Iran has
been closely associated with the Shiite population of Iraq, and certainly, having a
separate Shiite state would work in their favor because it would widen their range of
strategic opportunities. For Turkey, an independent Kurdistan would be a danger to
their territorial security, because the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) aims to create
an independent state from different parts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Thus,
maintaining a united Iraq would work in their favor. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand,
would also prefer a united Iraq because it certainly will prevent Shiite hegemony,
which would in turn, boost Iranian influence in the Arabian Peninsula.
The actions of Iraqs neighboring countries will have great effect on the
stability and survival of Iraq, may it be unified or not. But Galbraith only suggested
how to resolve the Iraqi conflict, and forgot to consider that the conflict itself will
leave traces when Iraq becomes separated into three different states 10. In reality,
only Kurdistan is stable enough to become a country on its own 11.
Nonetheless, Galbraith fulfilled his purpose in writing The End of Iraq to
urge a course of action by which the United States can extricate itself from the
mess in Iraq, including from escalating civil war. This strategy should be based on
U.S. interests and reflect the reality that Iraq has broken up in all but name
(Galbraith, 2006, p. 12). Providing a solution for the Iraqi situation was a problem
the U.S. government could not escape, probably also because they knew it was
partly their fault that the problem has escalated to a point that it threatened the
10

The civil war, which focused on the dispute between Sunnis and Shiites, might happen again in the
future, with the Sunnis disappointment of being relegated to a lower status, relative to what they had
during Saddams government.
11
Kurdistan became Iraqs first federal state after the ratification of the constitution. It also has its own
army, the peshmerga.

existence of the country itself. Through the three-state solution, Galbraith not only
proposed a solution for what he speculates to be a more peaceful Iraq, but also an
escape for the American government to relieve themselves of their accountability to
the Iraqi people.
The United States, in the first place, had no business in Iraq. But in pursuit of
securing political and economic allies around the world, they intervened with Iraqs
problems, and consequently found themselves as occupiers rather than allies
(Mingst, 2007). In fulfilment of their national interests, the United States not only
occupied Iraq, but also aggravated the disputes already in place. Fearing that
contingency plans would cost them much, the U.S. government has found itself
unable to take risks and to make well-calculated decisions and actions in Iraq. They
gave aid to whomever they thought would be their ally and they tolerated the
injustices of Saddams government against the Kurds even when they knew they
had the power to impose sanctions. Just as Galbraith described, it was the
ignorance and arrogance of the United States that placed them in a predicament
of their own doing.
After all, the United States said that they wanted to liberate the Iraqi
people. With Galbraiths solution, the Iraqi people would be liberated from the
United States itself.

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Book information:
Title: The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created A War Without End
Author: Peter W. Galbraith
Place: New York
Publisher: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks
Publication Date: June 2007
Edition: First Simon & Schuster paperback edition
Pages: 275
Special Features: Photos courtesy of the author except for one wherein he is with
Talabani and Barzani (Kurd leaders), a map of Iraq, appendices on the Special
Provisions for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Iraq's political parties
Price: U.S. $15.00/Can $18.99
ISBN-13: 978-0-7432-9424-9
ISBN-10:
0-7432-9424-6