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Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Where the law makes
no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Issue: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to tape it
without the consent of all those involved?
What was construed:
The word “any” in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be unlawful for ANY person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcia’s office.
Ramirez taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and
humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape
recording.
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act,
because it was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the
law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the
instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed because
the instrument used was not mentioned in the law).
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any
person to secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.
“The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication.”
The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought
from all parties in the conversation. “This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties,” Sen. Tanada said during
the deliberations.
“The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.”
Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.
Abello Vs. CIR
Abello v. CIRG.R. No. 120721February 23, 2005
Topics: gift not defined in the Tax Code – Civil Code definition on donation applies;
election contributions are subject togift tax – they are not exempt even if such transfers
are with intentions, motives or purpose
Facts:

Article 18 of the Civil Code.31 to the campaignfunds of Senator Edgardo Angara.Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential element of a donation. petitioners arguethat it is important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a political contribution is a gift. Held: Yes. Petitionersattempt to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between donative intent and the purpose of political contributions. an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another. They claim that the purpose of electoral contributions is brought on by the desire of the giver toinfluence the result of an election by supporting candidates who would influence the shaping of government policies thatwould promote the general welfare and economic well-being of the electorate.645. states: “In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws. However. donative intent is presumed present whenone gives a part of ones patrimony to another without consideration. There was intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi was present since each of thepetitioners gave their contributions without any consideration. Senator Angara’s patrimony correspondinglyincreased by P3. . donative intent is not negated when theperson donating has other intentions.66 for their contributions. then runningfor the Senate. All three elements of a donation are present.” Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor. Thepatrimony of the four petitioners were reduced by P882.” Thus.032. The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. Petitioners each gave P882. but such ruling was overturned by the CA. Abello. Concepcion. who are partners in the Angara. their deficiency shall be supplied by theprovisions of this Code. (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi . Issue: Whether or not electoral contributions are subject to donor’s tax.661. they are. donativeintent is not present. This being the case. Second.661. reference may be made to the definition of a donation in the Civil Code. there was no donative intent. contributed P882. petitioners. including the giver himself.31 each.31 each to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara. Article 725 of saidCode defines donation as: “. who accepts it.Petitioner’s claim that since the purpose of electoral contributions is to influence the results of the elections. Petitioners’ argument is not tenable. Regala andCruz (ACCRA) law firm. The claim for exemption was denied by the Commissioner. and. The CTA ruled in favor of thepetitioners. It cannot be perceived except by thematerial and tangible acts which manifest its presence. This Court is notconvinced that since the purpose of the contribution was to help elect a candidate. without any material consideration. thereby leaving no room for construction. BIR assessed each of the petitioners P263. Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation. Petitioners questioned theassessment to the BIR.530.661. claiming that political or electoral contributions are not considered gifts under the NIRC so theyare not liable for donor’s tax.The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. (b) the increase in the patrimonyof the donee. .Petitioners’ contribution of money without any material consideration evinces animus donandi . motives or purposes which do not contradict donative intent. First of all. . thus this petition for review.24. donative intent is a creature of the mind.During the 1987 national elections.Section 91 of the NIRC is clear and unambiguous.

he may evenbe called to enact laws that are contrary to the interests of his benefactors. Petitioners questioned theassessment to the BIR. Senator Angara was under no obligation to benefit thepetitioners. Regala andCruz (ACCRA) law firm. an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another.032. Issue: Whether or not electoral contributions are subject to donor’s tax. Thepatrimony of the four petitioners were reduced by P . contributed P882. Article 18 of the Civil Code. who are partners in the Angara. as a public servant.” Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor. BIR assessed each of the petitioners P263. In fact. who accepts it. motives or purpose Facts: During the 1987 national elections.31 to the campaignfunds of Senator Edgardo Angara. The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. Abello. Petitioners’ attempt is strained. 2005Topics: gift not defined in the Tax Code – Civil Code definition on donation applies. The claim for exemption was denied by the Commissioner.661.R. Petitioners each gave P 882. 120721February 23. The fact that petitioners will somehow in the future benefitfrom the election of the candidate to whom they contribute.ThisCourt reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the presence of other intentions. (b) the increase in the patrimonyof the donee.66 for their contributions. without any material consideration.31 each to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara. claiming that political or electoral contributions are not considered gifts under the NIRC so theyare not liable for donor’s tax. states: “In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws. Article 725 of saidCode defines donation as: “. However. and. Concepcion. reference may be made to the definition of a donation in the Civil Code. election contributions are subject togift tax – they are not exempt even if such transfers are with intentions.” Thus. for the benefit of the greater good Abello v. No. CIRG.The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. their deficiency shall be supplied by theprovisions of this Code. petitioners.661. . in no way amounts to a valuable material consideration so asto remove political contributions from the purview of a donation. All three elements of a donation are present. . motives or purposes which do notcontradict donative intent. The CTA ruled in favor of thepetitioners. thus this petition for review. they are. then runningfor the Senate. The proper performance of his duties as a legislator is his obligation as an elected public servant of theFilipino people and not a consideration for the political contributions he received. (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi . Held: Yes. but such ruling was overturned by the CA.

First of all.882.24. Subsequently. donative intent is not negated when theperson donating has other intentions. motives or purposes which do not contradict donative intent. motives or purposes which do notcontradict donative intent.Petitioners’ contribution of money without any material consideration evinces animus donandi .Section 91 of the NIRC is clear and unambiguous.Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential element of a donation. donative intent is a creature of the mind. Second. This being the case. TOMAS AND SOLICITOR-GENERAL MARCH 28. In fact. Tomas). Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation. Petitioners’ argument is not tenable. August 11.530. Senator Angara’s patrimony correspondinglyincreased by P3. in no way amounts to a valuable material consideration so asto remove political contributions from the purview of a donation. for the benefit of the greater good CORPUZ VS. Senator Angara was under no obligation to benefit thepetitioners.Petitioner’s claim that since the purpose of electoral contributions is to influence the results of the elections. 2010 Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. in Pasig City. No.645. Petitionersattempt to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between donative intent and the purpose of political contributions. there was no donative intent. ThisCourt reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the presence of other intentions. 186571. donative intent is presumed present whenone gives a part of ones patrimony to another without consideration. thereby leaving no room for construction. 2013 ~ VBDIAZ GERBERT R. as a public servant. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. CORPUZ vs. a Filipina. The fact that petitioners will somehow in the future benefitfrom the election of the candidate to whom they contribute.661. he may evenbe called to enact laws that are contrary to the interests of his benefactors.R. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G. It cannot be perceived except by thematerial and tangible acts which manifest its presence. They claim that the purpose of electoral contributions is brought on by the desire of the giver toinfluence the result of an election by supporting candidates who would influence the shaping of government policies thatwould promote the general welfare and economic well-being of the electorate. petitioner went back . the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. After the wedding. including the giver himself. petitioners arguethat it is important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a political contribution is a gift. donativeintent is not present. There was intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi was present since each of thepetitioners gave their contributions without any consideration. Petitioners’ attempt is strained.31 each. STO. The proper performance of his duties as a legislator is his obligation as an elected public servant of theFilipino people and not a consideration for the political contributions he received. This Court is notconvinced that since the purpose of the contribution was to help elect a candidate.

The foreign divorce decree itself. This Section states: SEC. The Superior Court of Justice. January 8. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. when he came back he was shocked to discover that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and intent behind the enactment. 4.with the complementary statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed by Corpuz before the RTC. 2006. Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce. the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person. the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing. the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. and as such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. Series of 1982. In either case. Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. Ruling: No. Ontario. petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. pursuant to NSO Circular No. an official of the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable. for his love to his fiancée. Thus. Thus. Even though. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. Accordingly. The RTC denied his petition. 48.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country. the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. pursuant to Section 48. Two years later. Despite the registration of the divorce decree. the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of . The divorce decree took effect a month later. hence this recourse by the petitioner. However.to Canada due to work commitments. the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens. the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert. the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. Windsor. however. after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence. we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our jurisdiction. the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to marry. having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing. the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petitions for its recognition.

The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree. every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made. either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. . Section 24. simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence. as discussed above. In a divorce situation. more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations. Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. as a rule. these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. want of notice to a party. or clear mistake of law or fact. This same effect. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines. In fact.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence.jurisdiction. want of notice to the party. In Gerbert’s case. To our mind. “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides. given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien. direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. fraud. as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity. collusion. once recognized. that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines. at this point. or clear mistake of law or fact. The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Needless to state. recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce. fraud. as provided in Section 48. Justice Herrera explained that. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action. purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority. This Section requires proof. as the foreign judgment. we can. A remand. unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. we have declared. collusion. no less. Under this situation. at the same time. provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.