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Eurika Jessa Castillon, 1-E

Sec. of DND vs Raymond Manalo
On 14 February 2006, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted
by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. While the case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect
on October 24, 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On 26
December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The Court of Appeals also ordered the DND secretary and AFP chief to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment
of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of
Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed
an appeal with the Supreme Court.
1. Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for Amparo
2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary to invoke the right to
1. Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of
evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the
torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of
the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves,
and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks
they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against
them comes as no surprise.
2. A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations
of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from
fear.” Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Third, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights
to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo
any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
the amparo context, it is more correct to
the “freedom from threat.” Deprivation of

Rule, “freedom from fear” is the right and
security is the actionable wrong. Thus, in
say that the “right to security” is actually
liberty is not necessary before the right to

In other words. . the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to may be invoked – While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9. there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.