Transfield (P) v. Luzon Hydro (R) | GR No.

146717 2006 | ADR |

Tinga, J p:
1. Transfield Philippines (Transfield) entered into a turn-key contract with
Luzon Hydro Corp. (LHC).Under the contract, Transfield were to
construct a hydro-electric plants in Benguet and Ilocos. Transfield was
given the sole responsibility for the design, construction,
commissioning, testing and completion of the Project.
2. The contract provides for a period for which the project is to be
completed and also allows for the extension of the period provided
that the extension is based on justifiable grounds such as fortuitous
event.
3. During the construction of the plant, Transfield requested for
extension of time citing typhoon and various disputes delaying the
construction. LHC did not give due course to the extension of the
period prayed for but referred the matter to arbitration committee.
4. Because of the delay in the construction of the plant, LHC called on
the stand-by letters of credit because of default. However, the
demand was objected by Transfield on the ground that there is still
pending arbitration on their request for extension of time.
5. The disposal of the forum-shopping charge is crucial to the parties to
this case on account of its profound effect on the final outcome of the
international arbitral proceedings which they have chosen as their
principal dispute resolution mechanism. (International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC)
6. To enjoin LHC from calling on the securities and respondent banks
from transferring or paying the securities in case LHC calls on them.
However, in view of the fact that LHC collected the proceeds, TPI, in
its appeal and petition for review asked that the same be returned
and placed in escrow pending the resolution of the disputes before
the ICC arbitral tribunal.
7. As a fundamental point, the pendency of arbitral proceedings does
not foreclose resort to the courts for provisional reliefs. The Rules of
the ICC, which governs the parties' arbitral dispute, allows the
application of a party to a judicial authority for interim or
conservatory measures.
8. Section 14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 876 (The Arbitration Law)
recognizes the rights of any party to petition the court to take
measures to safeguard and/or conserve any matter which is the
subject of the dispute in arbitration. In addition, R.A. 9285, otherwise
known as the "Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004," allows the
filing of provisional or interim measures with the regular courts

whenever the arbitral tribunal has no power to act or to act

effectively.
9. Meanwhile, the tribunal issued its Fifth Partial Award 29 on 30 March
2005. It contains, among others, a declaration that while LHC
wrongfully drew on the securities, the drawing was made in good
faith, under the mistaken assumption that the contractor, TPI, was in
default. Thus, the tribunal ruled that while the amount drawn must be
returned, TPI is not entitled to any damages or interests due to LHC's
drawing on the securities.
10. The fact that the ICC Arbitral tribunal included the proceeds of the
securities shows that it intended to make a final determination/award
as to the said issue only in the Final Award and not in the previous
partial awards. This supports LHC's position that when the Third
Partial Award was released and Civil Case No. 04-332 was filed, TPI
was not yet authorized to seek the issuance of a writ of execution
since the quantification of the amounts due to TPI had not yet been
settled by the ICC Arbitral tribunal. Notwithstanding the fact that the
amount of proceeds drawn on the securities was not disputed the
application for the enforcement of the Third Partial Award was
precipitately filed. To repeat, the declarations made in the Third Partial
Award do not constitute orders for the payment of money.

RCBC (P) v. BDO (R) [consolidated] | GR No. 196171 2014 | ADR |

Villarama, Jr., J p:
1. All three petitions emanated from arbitration proceedings commenced
by RCBC Capital pursuant to the arbitration clause under its Share
Purchase Agreement (SPA) with EPCIB involving the latter's shares in
Bankard, Inc. In the course of arbitration conducted by the Tribunal
constituted and administered by the International Chamber of
Commerce-International Commercial Arbitration (ICC-ICA), EPCIB
[Equitable PCI Bank] was merged with BDO which assumed all its
liabilities and obligations.
2. G.R. No. 196171 is a petition for review, seeking to reverse the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision which reversed and set aside the
order RTC of Makati City. The RTC confirmed the Second Partial
Award issued by the Arbitration Tribunal ordering BDO to pay
RCBC Capital proportionate share in the advance costs and dismissing
BDO's counterclaims.
3. G.R. No. 199238 is a petition for certiorari, assailing the September
13, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 120888 which denied BDO's
application for the issuance of a stay order and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO)/preliminary injunction against the RTC of
Makati City. Acting upon RCBC Capital's urgent motion, the
RTC issued on August 22, 2011 a writ of execution for the
implementation of the court's order confirming the Final
Award rendered by the Arbitration Tribunal on June 16, 2010
4. On the other hand, G.R. No. 200213, is a petition for review praying
for the reversal of the CA's Decision and Resolution. The CA
denied BDO's petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the
RTC of Makati City, the RTC denied BDO's motion for access of the
computerized accounting system of Bankard, Inc. after Chairman
Richard Ian Barker had denied BDO's request that it be given access
to the said source of facts or data used in preparing the accounting
summaries submitted in evidence before the Arbitration Tribunal.
5. In their Joint Motion and Manifestation filed in G.R. Nos. 196171 &
199238, the parties submit and pray that:
a. After negotiations, the Parties have mutually agreed that it is in their
best interest and general benefit to settle their differences with
respect to their respective causes of action, claims or counterclaims in
the RCBC Capital Petition and the BDO Petition, with a view to a
renewal of their business relations

b. Thus, the parties have reached a complete, absolute and final

settlement of their claims, demands, counterclaims and causes of
action arising, directly or indirectly, from the facts and circumstances
giving rise to, surrounding or arising from both Petitions, and have
agreed to jointly terminate and dismiss the same in accordance with
their agreement.
c. In view of the foregoing compromise between the Parties, BDO, RCBC
Capital and Go/Shareholders, with the assistance of their respective
counsels, have decided to jointly move for the termination and
dismissal of the above-captioned cases with prejudice.

Benguet Co. (P) v. DENR-MAB & JG REALTY (R) | GR No. 163101

2008 | ADR | Velasco, Jr, J p:
1. On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a RAWOP
[Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase], wherein J.G. Realty was
acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims respectively named
as Bonito I to IV, with a total area of 288.8656 hectares, situated in
Barangay Luklukam, Sitio Bagong Bayan, Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
2. Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet,
Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its
intention to develop the mining claims. However, on February 9,
1999, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a
letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was
terminating the RAWOP on the following grounds:
a. The fact that your company has failed to perform the obligations set
forth in the RAWOP, i.e., to undertake development works within 2
years from the execution of the Agreement;
b. Violation of the Contract by allowing high graders to operate on our
claim.
c. No stipulation was provided with respect to the term limit of the
RAWOP.
d. Non-payment of the royalties thereon as provided in the RAWOP.
3. On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP with the Legaspi City POA, Region
V, docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01 and entitled J.G. Realty v.
Benguet.
4. DENR-MAP POA [Panel of Arbitrators]: declared the RAWOP cancelled.
5. MAB [Mines Adjudication Board]: affirmed POA.
6. Should the controversy have first been submitted to arbitration before
the POA took cognizance of the case?
7. HELD: On correctness of appeal: Petitioner having failed to properly
appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become
final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be
denied.
8. YES, the case should have first been brought to voluntary arbitration
before the POA. Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently
provide:
i. 11.01 Arbitration - Any disputes, differences or disagreements
between BENGUET and the OWNER with reference to anything
whatsoever pertaining to this Agreement that cannot be amicably
settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind
whatsoever in any court or administrative agency but shall, upon

notice of one party to the other, be referred to a Board of

Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by
BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to
be selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.
ii. 11.02 Court Action - No action shall be instituted in court as to
any matter in dispute as hereinabove stated, except to enforce
the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators
9. A contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to voluntary
arbitration before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and
is in fact promoted by the State.
10. To reiterate, Availments of voluntary arbitration before resort is
made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a
valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties.
11. In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the
subject of voluntary arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or
quasi-judicial agencies, on motion of the defendant, the court or
quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual
provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the
court or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enforcement of said
provision.
12. In sum, on the issue of whether POA should have referred the case
to voluntary arbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction
over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the arbitration law.
13. HOWEVER, ESTOPPEL APPLIES. The Court rules that the jurisdiction of
POA and that of MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet at this
late hour. What Benguet should have done was to immediately
challenge the POA's jurisdiction by a special civil action for certiorari
when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To redo the
proceedings fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of
seven years from date of institution of the original action with the POA
would be anathema to the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.