You are on page 1of 74

If one subscribes, as I do, to a polydoxic, tehomic panentheism, what does that say and not say?

Without discussing that stance, in particular, let's explore some norms for the interface of
theology and metaphysics, in general, first.
Our interpretations of reality's regularities will influence our theopoetics.
As metaphysical realists, we affirm reality's givenness, kataphatically, aspiring to descriptive
accuracy via affirmations. As metaphysical fallibilists, we acknowledge these constructions,
apophatically, negating the ever-cascading, yet ever-collapsing, root metaphors, which interpret
those descriptions, which model but do not explain reality's rules or regularities.
As fallibilists, we recognize that our epistemic states, variously interpreting a given reality as
determinable or indeterminable, converge on reality's ontic states, which may be variously
determined or indetermined, but we do so in an inescapably anthropometric way. This presents a
challenge as we hope to avoid anthropomorphic projections of our epistemic states onto reality's
ontic states.I would argue that, whether in science, philosophy, metaphysics or theology, in
every great school or tradition, there have been saving remnants offering prophetic criticisms,
urging an ongoing dialectic of kataphasis and apophasis, whether, for example, 1) Popper via
falsification or alternating conjecture and criticism; 2) Godel via incompleteness theorems; 3)
Scotus via the formal distinction; 4) Peirce via a modal ontology that prescinds from necessity
to probability; 5) emergentisms, which modestly avoid supervenience; 6) Hawking, who has
lately gathered the godelian implications for physics; 7) apophatic cohorts of every great
religious tradition and so on.
If human epistemology remains ineluctably anthropometric and human axiology remains
properly anthropocentric (although more suitably attenuated, nowadays, by a hierachy of
intrinsic values, which extends moral considerability throughout reality's pan-, physio-, bio-,
phyto-, zoo- and anthropo-semiotic spheres), then our participatory imaginations,
understandably, will remain challenged by the constant intrusion of an anthropomorphic
This challenge, then, presents in our tendencies to rush to closure, to prove too much, to say
way more than we can possibly know, to tell untellable stories. Paradoxically, the taming or
domestication of this regnant anthropomorphism will require the unleashing and uncaging of its
anthroposemiotic imaginaries that they may wander free and wonder much in the pansemiotic
Concretely, then, what might a more thoroughly pansemiotic imaginary look like?
In my experience, it will look 1) less hierarchical and more egalitarian; 2) less reliant on the
privileged and institutional and more attendant to the marginal and noninstitutional; 3) less
pervasively de/constructive and more ubiquitously reconstructive; 4) less preoccupied with
evidential theodicies and more satisfied by logical defenses; 5) more focused on belonging and
desiring, orthocommunally and orthopathically, while less focused on behaving and believing,
orthopraxically and orthodoxically; 6) less focused on philosophical theology, metaphysically,
while more focused on theologies of nature, liturgically; 7) granting hermeneutical primacy to

the pneumatocentric and agapic, polydoxically, recognizing the plurality of sophiological
trajectories even given a singular soteriological account of human authenticity and conversions;
and so on.
There's a tension between the goals of deemphasizing theodicies and emphasizing defenses,
while, at the same time, focusing less on philosophical theology and more on theologies of
nature. After all, philosophical theologies articulate logical defenses, while theologies of nature
celebrate evidential resonances, which precisely reinforce the plausibility of those defenses. I
will try to explicate and resolve this tension more concretely, below.
In taking account of godel-like constraints on physical theories, Hawking suggested that, when
confronted with a choice between consistency and completeness, the good money is on
consistency. Similarly, the more sage atheological critics have retreated in recent years, many
indeed surrendering, conceding that logical defenses of God, properly nuanced, will inevitably
succeed; they have drawn back from their ramparts, where they've attacked the conceptual
consistency, logically, whether of classic, open, process or other interpretations, and now lob the
weaker philosophic ordnance of evidential implausibility. It is in this latter sense, then, that I
suggest we accept our theo-logic victory, whether we're flying the battle flag of Augustine,
Plantinga or Griffin, aware that neither the noncognitivists nor ignostics nor atheologians have
ever demonstrated any unreasonableness of faith, logically. Philosophical theology has, as ever
and always, done its job of (re)establishing the life of faith as a forced, vital and live option that
can be eminently reasonable, logically, and supremely actionable, existentially.
It in the above sense, then, that I suggest that philosophical theology, beginning from reason,
has done its job. In a real sense, its task is done; its work is finished. When I recommend
emphasizing defenses, then, that's only in the sense of engaging the noncognitivists, ignostics
and atheologians on that ground, logically, while not being drawn into epistemic battle,
evidentially. There's an old pedagogical saying --- we don't teach pigs to fly because, for
starters, they cannot fly and, besides, it annoys the pig. So, when I suggest we focus more on
theologies of nature but less on theodicies, there's no contradiction, because I'm all for
evidential reverie, liturgically, just not evidential repartee, metaphysically. The reason is that
plausibility and implausibility are way too weakly probabilistic, trafficking in a dyadic cycling
of only abductive hypothesizing and deductive clarifying unable to avail themselves of any
robustly inductive testing, which is necessary to complete the epistemically virtuous cycling of
triadic inferences. More succinctly, any final adjudication of competing logical conceptions and
interpretations regarding primal and/or ultimate realities, even of their initial, boundary and
limit conditions, can not, in principle, be delivered in terms metaphysical necessity, i.e. in terms
of explanatory adequacy regarding reality's rules, axioms and regularities. Instead, science,
probabilistically, models such rules but does not explain them.
This is not only true for any cosmogony that extends, interpretively, for our cosmological
descriptions. It applies across our emergentist heuristic. It's the case for any quantum
interpretation that extends from the descriptions of quantum mechanics. So, too, regarding the
biopoietic origins of life, those descriptions remain open to a/biogenic interpretations. Our
neuroscientific descriptions extend, interpretively, to a plurality of philosophies of mind.

Descriptions of symbolic human consciouness extend, interpretively, to any number of
anthroposemiotic accounts.
Whether quantum, cosmic, biopoietic, zoopoietic (sentient) or anthropopoietic (sapient) origins,
our emergentist heuristic, eschewing invocations of supervenience, which remain question
begging for strong, trivial for weak, emergences, provides only conceptual placeholders,
epistemic bookmarks, where explanatory adequacy eludes us. These bookmarks remain on the
blank pages of our probabilistic, scientific, descriptive modeling narratives. They won't be filled
in by plausibilistic, metaphysical, interpretive explanatory metanarratives. This is to recognize
that epistemic states of in/determinable realities might be ontologically suggestive of various
putative ontic states of in/determined realities, but they should not, a priori, be considered
More concretely, coming full circle back to out theopoetics and theologies of nature, what I am
suggesting is that we engage them widely and wildly with an aim to celebrate the metaphorical
imagery of our descriptive sciences and interpretive metaphysics, fired by our pneumatological
imaginations, all to enhance our devotions, liturgies and psalmody, but letting such cascading
metaphors collapse prior to any temptation to employ them logocentrically in any evidential
theology or apologetic. In a peircean normativity, aesthetics precedes ethics which precedes
logic. The highest and best use of our theopoetic adventures is thus an affective attunement to
oneself, to others, to God, to the cosmos, via the cult-ivation of an evaluative dis-position and
not, rather, the articulation of descriptive or interpretive pro-positions, which cannot aspire to
robustly probabilistic argumentation.
Philosophical theology has done, already, what it can to make the life of faith logically
consistent, externally congruent, internally coherent, existentially actionable and a host of other
virtuous epistemic criteria. Such reason takes us only so far, where forced, vital and live options
beckon a leap of faith. Suitably chastized by the epistemic inadequacies of plausibilities and
implausibilities, evidentially, we'd do very well not to overinvest, theopoetically, in one 1)
quantum interpretation or another (Bohm vs Copenhagen vs ...); 2) cosmogony or the next
(cyclical, oscillating, singularity, un/bounded, in/finite, ...); 3) biopoietic or another (abiogenesis
or vitalism or ...); 4) philosophy of mind or another (physicalist or csc as primitive or ...); 5)
anthropopoietic or another (anthropic principle or irreducible complexity or ...). A robust
panentheism needn't place God along reality's seams, evidentially, when it has already affirmed
that S/he's been dyed into its fabric, theo-logically.
I am sympathetic to anti-theodicies but wonder, sometimes, if they are but the obverse side of an
evidential coin that has no evidential purchase, anyway, whether heads or tails, in the same way
that nominalism and essentialism moreso represent the same wrong question than they do any
coherent answers. If our logical defenses have already secured for us an opening for faith, our
evidential theodicies only concede more epistemic force and normative significance to
atheological implausibilities than they actually warrant. Let us celebrate our metanarrative
consistencies without lamenting their ineluctable incompleteness, for that, pragmatically, is
where the good money has always been wager, the best life has always been lived.
This is to suggest, also, that our anxiety to overcome every form of insidious -ism cannot finally
determine our choice of quantum interpretation, our cosmogony, our biopoietics, our philosophy

incompatible god-conceptions. goodness and unity in a way that. The phenomenological taxonomy of our epistemic states. present. Keller. Clayton. kataphatically enriched." whose emphases have been. then. which includes the use of incoherent. ententional regularities (pansemiotic). logically. agapic) with that divine logic you described. evidentially. logically. proving too much. saying way more than we can possibly know. in a word. . which participate in an eternal fugue of peircean 1ns. cosmically. though. each with its own inviolable logic of in/determinables and/or in/determined realities. even as those analogies inevitably collapse into the luminous darkness of faith. those who've most consistently grappled with the putative divine attributes are the cyber-interlocutors of Tripp Fuller's "Homebrewed Christianity. Cobb. muted. now. while ineluctably unobtrustive. on conceptual clarity and consistency: Bracken. Yong and their ilk. rushing to metaphysical closure. greater affective attunement. eternalizing every trace of emergent truth. Oord. each field a dynamic. in/determined. beauty. will be utterly efficacious. not for primal realities and especially not for ultimate realities. The triadic (trinitarian) kenotic field (erotic. wherein we participate. it's not because we have the wrong answers. which include the teleomatic. I intuit a vague panentheistic reality.of mind or our anthropic principles. evidentially. does not gift us an infallible metaphysical map of reality's ontic states. Which aspects of reality are eventually found in/determinable. where a creatio ex profundis brings coeternal kenotic and tehomic fields into relationship. the tehomic logic accounts for emergent teloi. we witness these kenotic influences in various degrees. brute or question begging. Tehomic emergence. variously constrained (exactly how & to what degree remaining a mystery) by the tehomic logic. devotionally and liturgically. In my view. probabilistic or necessary. more consoling evaluative dispositions. not for proximate realities. telling untellable stories. but whose celebrations have engaged every cascading metaphor ceremoniously. the teleonomic purposive realities (biosemiotic sentience) and teleodynamic purposeful realities (sapience). Where these tehomic and kenotic fields overlap a creatio ex nihilo presents as a cosmic reality. co-participates in the cosmic field. but only because we've asked the wrong questions. would account for free (enough) will and anthroposemiotic value-realizations. relational reality of ever-emergent novelties. philic. Proleptically. open. Caputo. apophatically tempered. 2ns and 3ns. whose appeals have been. Most concretely. will always make for richer psalmody. eschatologically. inconsistent. If theodicy problems.

This pattern predominates in nature. generally eschews a-pathetic indifference or co-dependent.sufficient for human value-realizations even as we aspire to and strive for ever more successful descriptions. in moments of apophatic negation. above. the kenotic initiative. Regarding regularities and invocation of Peirce: Successful references. high and low. high amplitude pathetic interference yield. THAT this is so is a vague creedal stance. the cosmic emergent. a polydoxic. in human relationships. where they interpenetrate. are sym-pathetic. more the predominant pattern. inviting. My stance is. tehomic. without violating tehomic or agapic logics. such as throughout evolution. metaphysically. philosophy or theology. God does do. which affirms both a creatio ex profundis. Well. The interventions. good soteriologically harvested. that's hard to set forth in a Reader's Digest condensed version. God. beauty. high amplitude interventions and. goodness. such as in kenotic dynamics. we thus prescind from these specific descriptions back to our vague . of interactivity such that 1) low frequency. reveal both. invariably. pan-semio-entheism. low amplitude influence. the agapic Spirit. more succinctly. as well as the cosmic field. We thus describe. low amplitude a-pathetic indifference and 2) high frquency. whether in science. coaxing. to 3) low frequency. such as in codependency. em-pathetic. HOW & WHY otherwise properly invites both metaphysical and theological skepticism. provisionally. can do to eliminate or alleviate it.not only necessary. and in divine interactivity.Suffering can be transformed. unity and freedom. What’s coaxed forward is human authenticity (Lonergan’s conversions). Then. ontologically "suggested" by our various axiological realizations. that which has been. Reality. agapically. luring. and ex nihilo. seducing but never coercing the emergence and eternalization of truth. frequencies and amplitudes. pathetic interference. the influences. but is otherwise part of a tehomic logic. What the kenotic field. remain --. but --. Indifference and interference present on the axis of codependency. Patterns that we encounter in both tehomic and kenotic fields. 4) high frequency. but I hope you intuit the resonances. Influence and intervention present on a continuum of the axis of co-creativity. instead. in moments of poetic kataphasis.

knowing in this moment of unknowing. the so-called hard problem. nevertheless presents as eminently and infinitely and richly intelligible. where our modal ontology prescinds from the possible. then. sentient origins (consciouness) or sapient origins (symbolic language). where explanatory adequacy eludes us. whereby our epistemic in/determinacies aren't a priori interpreted. as necessarily due to either indetermined or determined realities (or various degrees or blends thereof). how much more in theology?" below is redacted correspondence of my friend across the big pond. actual and "probable. as conceptual and axiological placeholders.' We might say. Quantum mechanics invites a plurality of interpretations. symmetry and asymmetry. thus a plurality of interpretations is invited. random and systematic.Our kataphatic descriptions serve. saying in this moment of unsaying. marking those epistemic states that confront us at given ontological junctures. ontologically. actual and "necessay" to the possible. Cosmological data invite a plurality of cosmogonies. that this option has momentous existential significance. A reality that remains utterly incomprehensible. A/biogenesis posits a plurality of interpretations of how the robustly biosemiotic emerged from the merely physiosemiotic. chance and necessity. order and chaos. I would interpret both Pascal's Wager and Wm. . Lambrusco Whatever Pascal really intended. finally. that nothing has been. if there." What's going on here is a holding of tension or a certain ontological agnosticism regarding reality's regularities. as fecund heuristic devices. then. our descriptive modeling attempts and phenomenological taxonomies must not be mistaken for explanations. For example. if there. James also described this 'option' as 'vital. cosmic origins." This was philosophically intuited in Scotus' formal distinction and in Peirce's thirdness. how much more problematic are the origins of sapience and anthroposemiotic symbolic language? Thus the epistemic humility of Scotus' formal distinction and Peirce's modal phenomenology instructs us in science and. between patterns and paradox. poetically. how much more in metaphysics and. This is to recognize that an in/determinate epistemic state might suggest an in/determined ontic state but not in a decisive metaphysical fashion. ontologically "decided. apophatically. between stochasticity and nomicity. Neuroscience invites a number of philosophies of mind. biogenic origins.references. kataphatically. If the origins of sentience remain problematic. we best draw a distinction between speculative and practical reason. whether quantum origins. James' 'forced option' as forms of practical reason.

which options are truly live. For me. Put more simply. Those probabilities remain metaphysically vague. implicitly presupposed in the question 'why not rather nothing?' is the principle of sufficient reason [PSR]. who knows?) Our ability to navigate reality successfully evolved in a milieu of sufficient probabilities. vital and live option do we choose? We turn to practical reason and an existential disjunction. They have epistemic significance as regularities. think laws (nomicity. alone. universal and eternal. We do not know whether it successfully refers because we cannot a priori know whether reality as a whole begs an explanation. At this point. they don't enjoy falsifiability. to live AS IF this or that. There are indeed competing metaphysical interpretations that refer to ultimate reality. So. our wager. doesn't tell us whether they also have ontological significance as 'regulators.James also described it as a 'live' option. it must at least be equiprobable vis a vis competing interpretations. we are obliged to use the light of reason to delimit. we still don't a priori know whether they're emergent. For an option to be 'live. ------------------------------------------------We do not know whether the concept 'nothing' successfully refers to reality. unsure whether it's a snake or a rope --that we jump over it. we do not know whether those putative probabilities. Which forced.' then. leaving us with several 'live' options. We've nothing to lose by leaping over it if it's a rope.when we encounter a coiled object on the floor of a dimly lit cave. Pascal's Wager. Whatever other epistemic virtues they might enjoy. probabilistically. it's called). but only because we have dutifully exhausted its resources. which are often called 'necessities. actualities and probabilities. we 'leave' our spculative reason behind. aren't empirical or robustly probable but merely plausible. this is where speculative reason comes in. In that sense. could not reasonably argue against one's use of speculative reason per se. (Fallacy of Composition may or may not apply. in my view. whether temporally or atemporally? Also.' If they are regulators. our practical decision. in a modal ontology of possibilities. much to gain if it's a snake! If there's an illuminating epistemic fire burning in that cave. local and ephemeral versus primitive. . but that. This equiprobability or equiplausibility principle suggests --.' successfully refer to reality either. moreso has 'performative' but less so informative significance. interpretations of ultimate reality can compete. for that's the safer course.

they sound blasphemous to me in their arrogant presumption to comprehend the divine will. our cosmic experiences putatively derive from a co-eternal interactivity between a tehomic realm (chaos. If God is. THAT. all wholesome trivialities. formless void. Still. the concept ---'nothing' --. perhaps suggesting the implausibility of those implicit metaphysical presuppositions that make the question prima facie reasonable. freedom = love). From a common sense perspective. explaining either God's nonintervention or interactivity. rational sphere where this matter cannot be adjudicated to the evidential and press weaker claims.are wrong. In other words. Whitehead. at the same time. for the most part.a creatio ex profundis. HOW and why or why not warrants a certain agnosticism regarding specifics. generally and vaguely. the when. to weaker claims by advancing evidential arguments suggesting various degrees of implausibility. one best simply affirm. having said nothing new --. every beginning of a smile. etc) and agapic realm (truth. those --. they often seem to me to trivialize the enormity of human suffering. 3) modal necessity or 4) reality as a whole begging an explanation. necessity & nothing. .Without 1) the PSR. Also. Theodicies that respond to evidential arguments can become even more problematic.some may find of interest: Others and my own reading of Genesis takes its references to the deep. ------------------------------------------------The defenses argued against the logical problem. one would have to move from the logical. in part. Most fall back. 2) eternal laws. the abyss or the tehom as implying --. utterly incomprehensible. eternalizing every trace of human goodness. makes God way too inscrutable --. All that aside. goodness. immensity of human pain and horror of both personal and natural evil. but --. following both inscrutable divine and natural logics. a theological skepticism.who argue that the remedy. both constrained by their eternal logics. As such. where. beauty. Griffin) but "powerful enough" to coax Her eschatological (fullness) realities forth. challenge the 3 N's that ground the PSR: nomicity. not as classically conceived.not a creatio ex nihilo. Whether one confronts the evidential problem of evil or its corollary problem of good. For starters. succeed because the claims are too strong. that type of rhetoric is less interesting to me because it's just not robustly probabilistic. unity. while miracles can happen or good can come from evil. implausibility succeeds to a degree in persuasion. for example. God not omnipotent in the classical sense (think Hartshorne. intelligible enough for humans to discern His nature. Philosophically. then. anyway.makes no reference? To make this an atheistic argument rather than what I suppose is just a metaphysical agnosticism. it doesn't follow that She's not.

------------------------------------------------The question relies on indispensable methodological stipulations to various epistemic and metaphysical presuppositions. necessarily. In addition to a modal ontology of possibilities..seem to last longer before collapsing. if we're going to advance our probes of reality. essentialistic approaches like substance or being. We can still ask which root metaphor one presupposes for one's metaphysic? If one sticks with a static notion like substance or [i]being[/i]. :up: Besides. metaphors that are dynamic and relational --. For example. for their part. I also stipulate to methodological naturalism. excluded middle. Moving past nomicity. Just because abandoning PSR and/or naturalism might thwart my future probes of reality doesn't.. that doesn't mean they have to be considered metaphysical necessities. Beyond the principles of identity. but I have no idea if it will really hold universally.. make them eternal metaphysical verities? Our root metaphors..There's more nuance than would be charitable to share in a single post. Instead. so don't feel strongly about 'nothing' one way or the other. I remain open to ontological surprises. but don't commit to a philosophical naturalism. necessity and common sense notions of causation .. I haven't [i]a priori[/i] and cursorily dismissed the concept's meaningfulness on literal grounds precisely because I suspect some Thomist will come along and nuance it in some essentialistic. . but any interested might investigate a TEHOMIC panentheism. I'd rather hop around on the surface of common sense than head down some ontological rabbit hole. wherein God neither makes rocks so big He cannot pick them up nor human wills whose freedom Godde can take away. nowadays. I don't have an ideological dog in that hunt.. I stipulate to the PSR as I continue my probes. then. event or experience --. the only way I could ever make sense of the question was to rephrase it [i]why is there not rather something else?[/i]. necessary. Many. just because most of the metaphysical presuppositions listed above might be indispensable methodological stipulations. noncontradiction and sufficient reason . substance ontology that I don't want to have to inhabit in order to defend my own arguments. actualities and probabilities . are even more pliable. don't employ process. By not conflating my methodological stipulations with their implicit metaphysical stances.

What gets set aside is material causation. Let's see what happens to our modal ontology and its grammar when we tinker with our definitions. not imagining that [i]nothing[/i] cannot successfully refer just because my methodological stipulations suggest that's the case. What often happens. . 2) Even after opting for a root metaphor--. does not drive us. 3) The former employs a modal ontology of possibility. actuality and probability. for example. being vs becoming. PEM and PNC hold. whether from physical or metaphysical premises. which has an implicit grammar. to ontological conclusions. 4) Still. then.let's stay with being --.[/b] e. which is to really ask. the grammar of that modal ontology. alone. but can be found already buried in our definitions. is that our ontological conclusions are not flowing from our modal logic or metaphysical premises.g. including not only efficient but minimalist conceptions of formal and final.I have often wondered what [i]nothing[/i] might refer to in a question like [i]why is there not rather no-thing. For b) [b]actualities[/b]. revealing our univocal. 1) A lot of metaphysics turns on one's chosen [b]root metaphor. b) [b]equivocally[/b] or c) [b]analogically[/b] of being as one moves from a descriptive physics to a normative metaphysics.. algorithmically. Our methodological stipulations to certain metaphysical presuppositions may be ontologically suggestive but we're proving too much to claim they're necessarily decisive? ------------------------------------------------Heading down the rabbit hole. I'm willing to leave that open. equivocal or analogical predications. For a) [b]possibilities[/b]. only PEM holds.. only PNC holds. alone. of being and nonbeing. For c) [b]probabilities[/b]. then . We must first define our root metaphor. in this case being. substance vs process. why is there not rather no process or no becoming[/i]? At stake are notions of causation. Noncontradiction [PNC] and excluded middle [PEM] variously hold or fold in these categories.we must determine whether another is speaking a) [b] univocally[/b].

remaining virtual. 2) mere probabilities (uniformities.From a vague phenomenological perspective. to concepts like absolute nonbeing. both because they're more controversial and. let's remain agnostic regarding the nature of the possibilities (non/instantiated) and probabilities (nomicity/stochasticity) in play and tinker only with a definition or interpretation. Popper. This avoids many of the problems with spatial singularities. Interesting solution. They will thus match those tastes that would best go with the metaphysical selections that one has already made off the above-listed Chinese Menu of epistemic and ontic entrees. so good. less interesting. let's look at an example of how we can reimagine and redefine concepts and what practical implications might flow therefrom. So far. regularities) can be conceived in terms of a) [b]nomicity[/b] (deterministic). a [i]temporal[/i] point. To conserve energy. Here. Because the taking of the square root of negative one produces a complex number. But what type of quantum effect or event? Particles arise in vacuums by borrowing surrounding energy. [i]no-thing[/i] might refer . it will physically manifest as asymmetric temporality (the proverbial arrow of time). but 'as if' actual). let's employ. That cookie and its tailored message have already been baked to order. to me. b) [b]noninstantiated[/b] (pure) or c) [b]virtual[/b] (neither. instead. metaphysically mapping as a higher dimension. tendencies. such a spontaneous particle and anti-particle annihilate each other within a quantum time limit. Peirce. cf. 5) Any given belief that a given concept may or may not successfully refer to reality is a trope contained in a philosophical fortune cookie. Let's avoid the equivocal and analogical predications that lead. It allows for quantum effects on a cosmic scale. due to an infinestimally small cosmos. Also. such as classical theory and relativity breaking down as we approach T=0. Scotus). Instead of imagining the origin of our space-time-mass-energy plenum in terms of a spatial singularity. To make these distinctions more concrete. which brackets metaphysics: 1) mere possibilities can be conceived in terms of the clearly a)[b]instantiated[/b] (actual). b) [b]stochasticity[/b] (indeterministic) or c) [b]propensity[/b] (neither. but virtual. via their implict metaphysical presuppositions. while net energy remains the same.

which seems to have arrowheads on both ends. energy disperses. the random and systematic. and far too few pure states. and asymmetrically (arrow of time). contingency and necessity. we can model a cosmic origin that's conceivably consistent with both classical and quantum theory. order and chaos. which. then. while there would be no problematic T=0 and our conceptualizations of efficient causation would need tweaking. the T at singularity would be symmetric. spatio-temporally. What if black holes could evaporate by allowing the emission of quantum radiation? If. boundary and final conditions? We see the 'Arrow of Time' operating for thermodynamic. comes from increasing correlations. which model equilibrations of entangled states. epistemology modeling ontology. which have an ontologically penetrating arrowhead on one end and an epistemologically stabilizing fletching of feathers on the other? It seems that the Arrow. however small (which I like to conceive as chaos).to an absence of spatiotemporal observables. when a spontaneous particle pair arises. unbounded universe could exhibit an eternal flux between pattern and paradox. in classical theory. symmetry and asymmetry. should one escape the black hole. and our other experiences of reality. they will both become [b]real[/b]. while the other gets trapped. black holes allow no thermal energy escape. Time's arrow. A finite. remains asymmetric because there are way too many mixed states. What would be the relationship between the Quantum Arrow of time. then. It clearly doesn't refer to the presupposed energetic milieu. objects equilibrate. for all practical purposes. unless a putative nonspatial. the latter shrinking the black hole. exhibiting an advance toward equilibrium. Now. the former carrying mass-energy away. Metaphysically. limit. by using the square root of negative one. of course. seems absurd. atemporality . What could this mean regarding our conventional understandings of the relationships between initial. It requires some nonuniformity. cosmological and epistemological realities. while reversible in theory. But not between being and nothing. informationally. which are 'ordered' and not ravaged by entropy. Conceptually. States collide.

Finally. I have never gone through the Principia with Russell & Whitehead.would refer to [b]nothing[/b]. however it's conceived. paves the way to the next best round of inductive testing. when the Higgs boson news broke. as an interpretive stance. But the practical upshot of incompleteness is not that we necessarily could not taste and see the truth of our axioms. whether it spoke to my questions regarding the putative asymmetries near any singularity.. in whose metaphysic? A given metaphysic. It can demonstrate the reasonableness of our questions regarding many realities but. Why was the initial state far from equilibrium? Does the concept [i]intial[/i] successfully refer? ------------------------------------------------In my view . coupled with deductive clarifying. Why is there not rather nothing? or Why is there not rather something else? or It's not HOW things are but THAT things are which is the mystical? or It's neither how things are nor that things are but that THESE THINGS are which is the mystical? Which of these questions make sense. only that we could not prove them in a closed. those regarding penultimate realities remain indispensable heuristic devices. While metaphysical speculations regarding putative ultimate realities remain especially problematic. We do face Godelian-like constraints in formally formulating a Theory of Everything [TOE]. [b][i]something else[/i][/b]. energetically. This is what happens when folks argue whether this universe as a whole begs explanations not provided by its parts. provides a normative heuristic. meaning analogical inference to the best explanation. Abductive-transductive inference. in order to satisfy myself regarding the axioms that ground 2+2=4. formal symbol system. and one would need to go at least halfway. But that would still be only in the sense of being. I precisely wondered. which could variously foster or hinder human value-realizations but doesn't add new information to our systems. In abduction or retroduction. We cannot [i]a priori[/i] say whether the axioms of some future TOE . leaves those regarding first and last things begging.. new questions beg if one posits the singularity this way. we can look at various effects as might be proper to no known causes and reason analogically how the unknown cause is like or not like those that are known. properly received.

we shouldn't rush to closure regarding either metaphysics or epistemic probes. We should aspire to proceed fallibly but inexorably. . posed as an interrogatory. over against either a god of the gaps mysterianism or a scientistic. primal or ultimate. neuroscience birth philosophies of mind and cosmology birth cosmogonies. rests on a conceptual confusion between chance and coincidence. Unless and until we learn a lot more about the initial conditions of the universe. We will evaluate it. We aspire beyond descriptive accuracy to explanatory adequacy. Once again. we don't know what should be reasonably "expected" regarding our existence. over against either Russell or those who invoke the principle. Until we negotiate those interpretations. in advances in quantum computing. I say let a thousand quantum interpretations bloom for our quantum mechanics. pragmatically. too. So. My concern is with how much normative impetus (especially for others' behavior) some aspire to exert vis a vis our consensus regarding rules of evidence and burdens of proof. We should cave neither to mysterianism nor naive realism. controversial or seemingly trivial. energy production or who knows what. . whether proximate. logical positivism. What does another want to demand of me based on their interpretation of reality. The anthropic principle. the latter evaluated by pragmatic metrics. how could we presume to adjudicate primal much less ultimate realities? We always hope the merely plausibilist can become robustly probable for any given reality. based on what epistemic warrants or normative justifications? That's a political reality. If we dispatch metaphysics.will be interesting. then cash out their values. I don't have a quarrel with competing plausible interpretations of any reality. Thank the founders for nonestablishment and free exercise and pity those who don't enjoy same! ------------------------------------------------ My juxtaposition of those various takes on the mystical. I'm metaphysically agnostic regarding that. based on the values which we'll be able to cash out or not. if any. Let QM birth quantum interpretations. only means I'm agnostic regarding same. we'll abandon highly theoretic sciences. as it stands. or pluck their friits.

good heuristic devices can pave the way to the next best scientific tests.g. they likely enjoy a greater degree of explanatory adequacy . we distinguish the two in temporal terms. with heuristic concepts. while quantum mechanics. Those concepts which have thus been negotiated and out of which a great deal of pragmatic value has been cashed out. So.g. however. the concept of probability has no validity vis a vis a coincidence and statistical science thus pertains to chance and not coincidence. philosophy of mind and cosmogony are interpretive. Coincidence is something that pertains to the present or past.. quantum interpretations. we can look at the concepts they employ. are explanatory attempts not empirical measurements. I suppose that if we knew enough about the universe's initial conditions we could imaginatively (conceivably) walk ourselves back to T=0 and invoke chance.not due to a lack of epistemic virtue. Probability deals with the epistemically-unavailable.even of a multiverse --. to which we must at least methodologically stipulate.) The problem results. are [i]theoretic[/i].due to the nature of the realities under consideration. from a need to clarify the conceptual confusion between coincidence and chance. in part. If we consider it a posteriori. Such interpretations are much more heavily laden with heuristic concepts (e. We must evaluate these interpretations using a host of criteria for epistemic virtue. . like first principles. (The weak version is trivial. states or types of same). Those that are nonnegotiable. Those that remain still in negotiation are [i]heuristic[/i].. religions). Beyond these penultimate realities. chance is in play. with dogmatic concepts. less . Our interpretations are normative.A problem arises in any invocation of a strong anthropic principle.might otherwise be considered likely). even less. This precedes any inductive testing. It's not to be expected that such interpretive stances would enjoy the same degree of explanatory adequacy as scientific theories or meta-theories --. Those not negotiated are [i]dogmatic[/i].. not descriptive. but --. So. For starters. If they are heavily laden with theoretic concepts. but we don't thus have such an informed grasp of what should or should not be expected of this reality. ultimate realities. neuroscience and cosmology are descriptive. If we are considering an event a priori. At the frontiers of those disciplines.. So. ------------------------------------------------Knowledge typically advances by formulating interpretive heuristics using abductive hypothesizing and deductive clarifying. interpretations abound regarding reality's first and last things. over the course of a lifetime --. we have coincidence (something which. are [i]semiotic[/i]. metaphysics) and dogmatic concepts (e. Chance has meaning only when information is lacking. is an empirical notion subject to empirical methods and is assigned to arguments with premises and conclusions (and not rather to events. concepts that will have been negotiated in various communities of earnest inquiry.

we would recognize as each other. As empirical selves. metaphysically. The divine fractured "S"elf expressed in our individual "s"elves are individual peepholes on reality. It's descriptive not pejorative. seen by individual streams of consciousness. I also reject any [i]a priori[/i] epistemic surrenders or rushes to closure that declare some type of. As with other traditions. even in the afterlife.Overlapping magisteria. What we experience as individual empirical selves might be considered "fractures" of the Divine Self. Aurobindo and certain Buddhists do not deny what they refer to as the "empirical self." which is very much consistent with the conventional distinctions we draw between individuals. She said that I properly interpreted her outlook. who remain recognizable as a dynamic process. These fractures have no static essence per se. What they seem to most fear is self-annihilation or self-dissolution or loss of self or loss of the individual or loss of personal identity or loss of selfsignificance. for example. empirically. complementing and supplementing the singular. which is related to and confluent with other everchanging processes. This divine fractured self perdures eternally. ontological occulting. We can still even affirm a continuity of identity of each individual. on this side (even notwithstanding reincarnations and so on). This conception of a person thus presents moreso as an active moving target. so to speak. as perduring individuals. FWIW: Many have been threatened by some buddhist-like conceptions of self and with other no-self teachings. we are still called forth in solidarity with and compassion for one another. in principle. We can affirm an eternal Immutable Self as well as individual streams of consciousness or karmic bundles. So. which is in constant change and flux. mostly used in philosophy of mind. Mysterianism is a philosophic stance. I think it was Chesterton who suggested that we don't know enough about reality to say that it's unknowable. which. but do present. as the individuals we knew. Buddhism's not monolithic but has different schools. While rejecting scientism. The no self conception is thus moreso an adjectival description and not an ontological denial of the self. experienced as distinct karmic bundles. movements and energies. both temporally and eternally. We still recognize moral obligations and practical responsibilities toward one another. all seeing Self . Below is a position statement I constructed with a Buddhist practitioner from an extensive dialogue.

that it's epistemically impactful but not ontologically decisive. in large measure. speculatively. only provisionally and locally. is not especially problematical. . stochasticity or brute existence. This particular conception by Aurobindo would not be wholly inconsistent with a Christian panentheism. The move from the given to the normative. theoretically. Theoretically. Such wholeness and fracture both perdure eternally in dialogue. for argument's discrete psychic perspectives. which merely asks one to stipulate to telos for argument's sake before deciding on essentially pragmatic grounds? This is to say that the Humean critique could apply moreso to one's theory of knowledge but needn't presuppose one's theory of truth. One can agree that Pascal's Wager operates in a system where the axioms refer to telic ultimate realities but would be meaningless in a nontelic system. we [i]a priori[/i] conclude for or against telos. so we all fall back to weaker evidential arguments. then reason our way to a normative conclusion. on one hand. we tend to share evaluative dispositions and normative propositions toward many descriptive realities. is to an ought. doesn't Pascal's Wager refer. But we are proving too much and rushing to closure if. the love of the divine. for all [i]practical[/i] purposes. enriching the Immutable One's experience of Self precisely via this fracture into mutable souls. we thus have competing tautologies that differentiate axiomatically. hence a deontological vagueness. to one's choice between one axiomatic system and another? Couldn't Pascal be acknowledging an ontological undecidability. which needn't hold absolutely or universally. the mutable and Immutable mutually enriching each experience. The Oneness of the Immutable Self could correspond to what we experience as a univocity of being (Scotus) and divine energies (Eastern Orthodox. -----------------------------------------------We can stipulate to a theory of truth. itself. or normatively. ------------------------------------------------Because humans. The same is true for Hume's problem of induction. meta-systemically. for all moral and practical purposes. nomicity or sufficient reason. are similarly situated. for the most part. or purposelessness. We can thus couple any given shared prescriptive premise to a given descriptive premise. The love with which we all Love is. hesychasm). Practical upshots of the Humean critique would certainly include epistemic humility. They can't be adjudicated in terms of logical validity. However. descriptive to the prescriptive. Who is One. which cannot be adjudicated in a robustly probabilistic way. because we are situated in and evolved in relationship to a spatiotemporal sphere of regularities. immutable self. only advanced by plausibilistic appeals. on the other.

and not unreasonably. ------------------------------------------------- .When we suggest one cannot reason from an is to an ought. beauty and goodness are grounded in putative transcendent imperatives of Truth. It only means we cannot prove that we have. One may live with the epistemic uncertainty and ontological vagueness implicit in both Hume's critique and godelian incompleteness but still opt. which guide practical reason. we recognize that our descriptive. existentially and practically. however. It invites one. suggesting that they are not otherwise [i]axiologically integral. we encounter godelian-like constraints. Folks might reasonably disagree. But the structure of the Wager survives. uncertainty. evaluative and normative probes of reality are [i]methodologically autonomous[/i]. He cannot [i]a priori[/i] maintain that one cannot reason from an is to an ought. We are confronted with a choice between consistency and completeness. hence deontological. in my view. based on generic equiprobability principles. sufficient. however. Those ultimate grounds operate axiomatically. to live as if our existential orientations to truth. We are not. Hume's critique. however. alone. then. that invites critique. unable to prove those axioms within the very systems they axiomatize. Beauty and Goodness. each asking distinctly different questions. for every human value-realization. regarding the ultimate grounds of our descriptions (truth or Truth). has an epistemic force similar to godelian constraints. only that one cannot know whether one has necessarily done so.[/i] each necessary but none. evaluative dispositions and normative propositions in one's premises and then reason one's way to prescriptive conclusions. We are not saying that one cannot couple descriptive (pre)suppositions. evaluations (beauty or Beauty) and norms (goodness or Goodness). This doesn't mean that we cannot formulate a system that is both complete and consistent. Pascal's Wager invokes such ontological. As for Pascal's specific gains and losses vis a vis what's at stake. existentially. The good money's ordinarily opting for incompleteness. so. Or not. to live as if our shared evaluative dispositions and normative propositions are indeed grounded more deeply than our evolutionary inheritance.

How could a Being related to beings. but --teleodynamically. The classical approach addresses infinite regress and sufficient reason but introduces causal disjunctions. morphodynamically. not robustly explanatory. Any literal predications must be expressed as negations. novel dissipative structures and boundary conditions arise.not just thermodynamically and morphodynamically. dissipative structures arise. Teleodynamic realities interact semiotically with novel boundary conditions provided by signs and. The teleodynamic refers to downward causations. ------------------------------------------------The notion of divine simplicity was introduced as a strategy to preserve utter transcendence. affirmative predicates of God are analogical. could well have been entirely physical. Without knowing the initial thermodynamic conditions. which can interact --. internally. with life. This is the narrative called emergence. though. externally. The emergence of consciousness. It's a descriptive heuristic. symbols. alone. cause anything? The answer relies on an atemporal conception of cause. Emergence isn't inconsistent with telos or Telos. Since the environs that we inhabit presents moreso as a dynamical. not univocally predicated between God and creatures. From the interaction of morphodynamic structures. and congruent. but the former distinction remains trivial. it would make more sense to employ affirmative analogues from some other ontology using some other root metaphor. the latter. One takeaway is that semiotic science employs a minimalist telos. the classical theist approach remains a question begging tautology grounded in an essentialistic substance ontology employing [i]being[/i] as its root metaphor. in my view. with novel boundary conditions formed. it's not possible to place odds. only analogically. question begging. too. far from equilibrium. People distinguish between weak and strong emergence. At best. .In a thermodynamic environment. but doesn't suggest whether or not its downward causations would violate physical causal closure. Questions would still beg but the approach would be more coherent. for humans. Of course. processive and relational reality. which may or may not refer. so.

will discourse primarily with a terminology that employs concepts that have been negotiated in a community of inquiry that --. Not all scientific theories can demonstrate all of these criteria. by its discourse.pragmatically cashes out the modeling power of those concepts. it doesn't make God more intelligible because that type of metaphysic isn't an adequate heuristic for reality as most experience it. Arguably. I only use the Razor to decide between systems that have already achieved explanatory adequacy. epistemically. and I'll stipulate it can be done. The whole notion of irreducible or specified complexity lacks probabilistic significance from the get-go. hypothetical fecundity. popperian falsifiability and other normative criteria of good scientific research programs. analytically. evidential measurability. internal coherence.not only empirically measures and inductively tests. but --. further. The theory of evolution is clearly a scientific interpretation while both intelligent design and philosophical naturalism are metaphysical interpretations. but they can be distinguished from metaphysical heuristics using most of these degrees. Whether a given interpretation is more closely related to the robustly. provide the same degree of modeling power? Theoretic interpretations differentiate from metaphysical heuristics --. within an ontology. abductive facility and interpretive consonance. but scientific theories. meta-theoretic. coherently. existential actionability. probabilistic probes of descriptive sciences or the weakly plausibilistic hermeneutics of normative philosophies can be determined. metaphysically.Even if one can situate divine simplicity. interdisciplinary consilience. Scientific and metaphysical interpretations might share such epistemic virtues as logical consistency. pragmatic utility. phenomenal predictability. not in kind. ------------------------------------------------Not all interpretive explanatory accounts. .not by strict demarcation criteria. This enhanced modeling power thus further differentiates theoretic from metaphysical interpretations in terms of conceptual warrant. however. aside from interpreting it in terms of not unnecessarily multiplying ontologies. but --. in my view. so to speak. it can refer to going with that inference that one has abductively formulated with the greatest facility (facile or simple as in "ease" not vs complex).

------------------------------------------------That's why we distinguish between descriptive sciences. however. So. If we consider it a posteriori.might otherwise be considered likely). The theory's not inconsistent with either creation accounts. chance is in play.------------------------------------------------The theory of evolution involves several core hypotheses in relationship to a host of auxilliary hypotheses in an expansive web of coherence. which employ a [i]methodological[/i] naturalism. the concept of probability has no validity vis a vis a coincidence and statistical science thus pertains to chance and not coincidence. judicially. Chance has meaning only when information is lacking. When it does get litigated by the few. much less the universe's initial conditions. I suppose that if we knew enough about the emergence of life or of consciousness. then we could imaginatively (conceivably) walk ourselves back to life's beginnings. we distinguish the two in temporal terms. It doesn't rise and fall on anomalies or with every unexplained phenomenon. Probability deals with the epistemically-unavailable. As long as no one confuses what belongs in science books and what belongs in philosophy books. Coincidence is something that pertains to the present or past. over the course of a lifetime --. in part. Its predictions are legion and impactful across the entire spectrum of pure and applied sciences. we have coincidence (something which. but we don't thus have such an informed grasp of what should or should not be expected of these realities. If we are considering an event a priori. including modern medicine and agriculture. This isn't terribly controversial in most circles. the courts manage to sort through the distinctions I've set forth and make the right call. So. and interpretive metaphysics. from a need to clarify the conceptual confusion between coincidence and chance. The problem results. classical theisms and panentheisms or with philosophical naturalism and materialist monism. there's no rub for me. .even of a multiverse --. the dawn of consciousness or even T=0 and thereby invoke chance. is an empirical notion subject to empirical methods and is assigned to arguments with premises and conclusions (and not rather to events. not all which employ a [i]philosophical[/i] naturalism. states or types of same).

scientism and ID theory both need to be chased back across the quadrangle to the philosophy department. These are analogous to Aristotelian versions. My sneaking suspicion is that consciousness is emergent not primitive. Instead. in far from equilibrium environments. Allowing a design inference into descriptive or theoretic sciences is not the proper antidote to [i]scientism[/i]. epiphenomenalist. I embrace an emergentist stance. The emergentist heuristic essentially refers to [i]something more (or else) coming from nothing but[/i]. for all [i]practical[/i] purposes. Essentially. These dynamical constraints. serves as the paragon of interpretive heuristics vis a vis complexity. It precisely has room for formal and final causations. but remain metaphysically agnostic regarding the origins of the universe. nonreductive physicalist or even dualist stance. I find that the affirmation of teleodynamics makes reality much more intelligible as a heuristic device even though. morphodynamic and teleodynamic layers of complexity. some add consciousness along side space. as we traverse thermodynamic. myself. whether from an eliminativist. the emergentist paradigm. homeodynamic.Philosophically. that a nonreductive physicalism fits reality best. especially from the perspective of semiotic science. but doesn't [i]a priori[/i] suggest whether it would necessarily violate physical causal closure or not. ------------------------------------------------Questions beg. Check out the thinking of Alicia Juarrero. For example. . The emergentist paradigm can be variously interpreted. obviously. life and consciousness. But. it doesn't gift us with a great deal of explanatory adequacy. It takes note of [i]downward[/i] causation in nature. mass and energy as a primitive. new constraints emerge. time. exert various downward causations. but doesn't necessarily require one set of primitives vs another. boundary conditions. I remain agnostic and none of this matters to me. in my view. what can be considered only a minimalist telos. ------------------------------------------------Dynamical whole-part constraints.

whether or not reality's initial. necessary. We can't [i]a priori[/i] say. Any. As a heuristic device. boundary or limit conditions derive from clear necessities or mere regularities. can be tested pragmatically. though. which we refer to as common sense. ------------------------------------------------Sciences describe. Philosophies norm. the tacit dimensions and boundary constraints. Cultures evaluate. as do those fast & frugal heuristics gifted by evolution. Not answers. A good heuristic. Certain amplifications of epistemic risks can augment human valuerealizations. Metaphysics provide interpretive heuristics. Life's higher goods. a minimalist telos. and no one has [i]a posteriori[/i] demonstrated. or even vague probabilities. Others emergent. Of course. in a robustly participatory manner (beyond any mere cognitive map-making). it provides conceptual placeholders and frames up our questions. when well formulated. as propensities. Some laws may be eternal.Explanatory adequacy eludes. By acknowledging the intelligibility of these causations. who wave these questions away as nonsensical or who claim they require one type of answer or anther. are [i]givens[/i] and in no need of an apologetic or justification to be realized. beyond the formal causes. with good questions. Some regularities may result from nomicity. metaphysically. others from stochasticity. We bracket them. ephemeral. existentially. without adding new information to our systems. They gift us. are proving too much. . Metaphysics & religions interpret. but doesn't pretend to explanatory adequacy. a more robust telos emerges with human consciousness. We interpret reality. which may or may not be true. Their sheer multiplicity reveals their still-innegotiation status. This is to recognize that regularities may have ontic significance in addition to epistemic. we better justify invoking them analogically for heavier metaphysical lifting in this or that philosophy. which are intrinsically rewarding. ------------------------------------------------It's claims are modest because that's all that's epistemically warranted.

that a useful belief has a greater chance of also being true. Given any relevant epistemic indeterminacy and ontological vagueness. ------------------------------------------------- Actually. many different (reasonable) interpretations compete. We don't know the numbers. Scientific theories don't rise and fall based solely on explanatory gaps. we haven't been able to demonstrate that they're ontologically decisive. Any who suggest that epistemology. thus and such is the case.. my pragmatic criteria apply only to a theory of knowledge. Instead. Scientific theories remain rather domain specific and cannot (yet) be facilely cobbled together into a Theory of Everything. successfully models ontology. They suffer explanatory gaps. While it would be silly to deny that such presuppositions are ontologically suggestive. using probabilities for all [i]practical[/i] purposes. how shall we interpret this reality (including proximate. Metaphysically. are certainly not being unreasonable.. penultimate or ultimate realities)? Existentially. so can't calculate the odds. scientifically. that any given dissipative structure might arise far from thermodynamic equilibrium. in varying degrees (as it seems you are suggesting?). What's that? Describe it. It suggests. we will [i]live as if[/i] . in many instances. which function as indispensable methodological stipulations. So. we bracket the nature of regularities. when you suggest [i]If we know the numbers we can work out the probability[/i]. In other words. hence is weakly truth-indicative. ------------------------------------------------Our discourse implicitly relies on various metaphysical presuppositions. it does not equate truth with utility. which makes them autonomous. What's that to us? Evaluate it. they gain theoretic . morally & practically. No. in varying degrees of plausibility. not a theory of truth. rather.The normative mediates between the descriptive and interpretive to realize the evaluative. it seems you have begun to grasp what I mean. at the same time. Our methods differ in the questions they ask. What's the best way to acquire or avoid that? Norm it.

metaphysical rationalism. then. The theory of evolution brackets metaphysics. for example. materialist and all manner of other interpretive metaphysics. hence introduce interpretive heuristics. as have presented in the forms of radical empiricism. As the symbolic species. philosophically. Humans employ abduction. any specific ontology. neutral. for example. weakly scientific. who confuse methodological stipulations with metaphysical commitments and conflate descriptive models and interpretive metaphors. theological ignosticism and scientism. than religious fundamentalisms. There's even less justification for characterizing ID theory as remotely scientific rather than robustly metaphysical. There's no justification. even in birds. metaphysical interpretations employ root metaphors. for characterizing the theory of evolution as predominantly metaphysical. from other animals. isn't terribly interesting to me. as have presented via fideism. both . is no argument against its proper use. but. what we experience as [i]inference to the best explanation[/i]. logical positivism. ------------------------------------------------The abuse of something.resilience from making innumerable unfalsified predictions and gifting us with countless practical applications. ------------------------------------------------I wholeheartedly resonate with your common sense and intuition regarding human consciousness and intentionality. generally. Interestingly. This issue makes for a great foil regarding methodological demarcation criteria. semiotically. relational. specifically. are no more defensible. The theory of evolution employs no root metaphor and neither presupposes nor excludes. Descriptive and theoretic sciences employ a methodological not a metaphysical naturalism. immersed in category errors. however. monist. the Design Inference. which makes it consistent with substance. in this case a scientific theory. dualist. we see hard-wired forms of abduction. implicitly or explicitly. Enlightenment fundamentalisms. idealist. unlike. ------------------------------------------------While scientific theories do go beyond mere descriptions to introduce a modicum of explanatory adequacy. arational gnosticism and dogmatism. The culture wars are being waged between ideologues who employ bad epistemologies. humans interpret reality in a qualitatively different way. process.

aren't tossed aside due to explanatory gaps or experimental anomalies. boundary or limit conditions that. but speak of modern synthes[i]es[/i] in biology. They aren't fatal to the syntheses. considering it an anachronism. is how much of our interpretation of reality takes place algorithmically. elude our physical measurement systems. The only takeaway from PFT for me was the recognition of just how great a role our unconscious can play in problem-solving. So. including the author of the most widely used text in cell biology. they don't ambition the degree of explanatory power you seem to require of them. They. knowing it's also being formed and reformed by robustly intentional stances and pervasively conscious processes but in varying degrees from one person to the next. most of the biologists I know. disciplines and asceticisms in all of our Great Traditions. though. ------------------------------------------------For starters. Isolated. again. is how to optimize this mix. At issue. apparently confused with metaphysical interpretations. as you continue to insist. do not even employ the descriptor neo-darwinian. It's one thing to recognize this degree of human algorithmic and quasi-algorithmic interpretation (and most people likely grossly underestimate it). or due to technical . which wholesale ignores the web of coherence provided by the [b]uncountable[/b] examples of practical applications of our modern biological syntheses. As you observe.instinctually and inferentially. in principle (ontologically). acknowledging the diversity of mutually critical approaches. as individual persons. scientific theories. robustly conscious intentionality. What [i]scientific[/i] theory do you have in mind? It may turn out that our methodological naturalism may ultimately fail us precisely because reality's implicately ordered by initial. Finally. both algorithmically and nonalgorithmically. that's ludicrous. inferential and instinctual. instead. quite another to deny a meaningful role for truly nonalgorithmic. Which brings up my second point --. in both hard. Most of all. for us as a species. quasi-algorithmically or nonalgorithmically. your confirmation bias is betrayed by your inventory of problematics. mindfulness and wakefulness. Precisely because scientific theories are vague interpretive heuristics. There are age-old practices. your overemphases on explanatory gaps to discredit the modern biological syntheses don't strike at the theories' modeling power resiliency. auxilliary hypotheses that get disconfirmed get replaced. There's likely a normal range of percentages for each. At issue for each of us. faculties. enhance our modeling power of reality. however. as interpretive heuristic devices. harnessing both our conscious and unconscious. which are ordered to such an optimal awareness. Furthermore. especially those that are broadly interdisciplinary. [i]relying[/i] on certain rules without [i]explaining[/i] them. theories don't get tossed aside until there are better ones to take their place.and soft-wiring.that your understanding of what scientific theories entail is idiosyncratic.

9:00 PM: We've located an impasse. then. are many biosemiotic features. just because we persist in a line of inquiry. you attack your own caricature of evolutionary principles. micro vs macro. . where I not only object to its premises but don't even agree with its definitions. My attitude likely overlaps greatly with yours. phylogenetically. including certain sign interpretations. even abductive processes or logical structures. to shut down inquiry. 2015 . you rather idiosyncratically set the evidential and explanatory bars inordinately higher than science's conventional standards and relatively modest epistemic aims. whether science. doesn't mean anyone's thereby [i]a priori[/i] committed to naturalist metaphysics. or a theory. that stipulates to naturalist presuppositions. the applications of which are so abundantly accessible that any dispassionate inquirer can readily tally them without my assistance. ------------------------------------------------My own interpretive stance has been influenced by both Eastern & Western traditions. Resultingly. What we witness. the principles of which don't lend themselves to ontological distinctions. So. only icons and indices. might be more broadly conceived as [i]interpretation[/i]. It would be pointless to argue evidentially for and against a stance. particularly? ------------------------------------------------I already located our impasses 1) at the level of methodological categories. or entropic erasures.methodological constraints (epistemologically). What would make no sense at all would be to [i]a priori[/i] concede such epistemic defeat. animals can't interpret symbols. generally. methodologically. -------------------------------------Didn't we just agree on the distiction between the abuse and use of something. Science brackets metaphysical stances. While this mimics human abductive inference. how one conceives scientific theories versus metaphysical interpretations and 2) how theories function. Regarding the latter. What we have in common. ------------------------------------------------LambruscoE wrote on Dec 8.

My only interest in this thread concerns demarcation criteria vis a vis science and metaphysics. it involves deterministic processes. Quite the contrary. ------------------------------------------------This math is [i]deeply[/i] flawed. Those criteria have convinced courts of competent jurisdiction ever since [i]Scopes[/i]. there's an [b]orthograde[/b] (against entropy) [i]ratchet[/i] dynamic. Even nonliving morphodynamics involve deterministic processes. it seems there wouldn't be a single philosophy of intention either. The odds that a specific protein won't likely win the lottery pale in comparison to the odds that [i]some[/i] protein might. is a necessary condition in setting forth a theory or metaphysic. beyond description. which have various auxilliary hypotheses coming and going in competition across a broad interdisciplinary spectrum. And those boundaries are well established in academia and commercial enterprises. against any life-form. Besides. likely because it wouldn't have survived. That particular study by Axe wasn't published in a mainstream peer reviewed journal. . As far as life's origins. I already set forth the criteria that distinguish scientific theories from metaphysical interpretations. but since there are several materialist versions of philosophy of mind. rather. establishing odds against any specific life-form isn't informative or interesting. these overemphases on gaps are also fallacious arguments from ignorance. Besides. We need to know the odds. No. ------------------------------------------------Not sure exactly how materialists might self-describe re: your other descriptions. Thus. I may be setting the probative bar too low but I don't aspire to convince everyone else. ------------------------------------------------Engaging in interpretation. Selection is not random. contrary to this example. ancestral reconstructions have indeed been used to change enzyme/binding specificity. but not a sufficient condition to make an interpretation metaphysical. dramatically increasing various probabilities. Infinity inschminity. I refer to the criterion that scientific theories are inadequate if they suffer explanatory gaps. They recognize explanatory gaps! This is especially the case for overarching theories.

org/faqs/comdesc/ The pseudo-scientific number games being played by some all commit the same errors. They also include pragmatic interpretations regarding how [i]they can be [b]used[/b][/i]. Theories are variously formal due to the nature of the realities they interpret. often crosses.talkorigins. possibly. but it would be the most [i]useful fiction[/i] ever enjoyed! ------------------------------------------------That sounds right. like classes of models. They can also employ semantical interpretations. ------------------------------------------------Scientific research into the origins of the universe. Theoretic cosmology does become . while the latter installs nontheisms and/or nihilisms at the perimeters. [i]could be wrong[/i]. abiogenesis and materialism. like axiomatic propositions. Indeed. As science moves from the theoretic to the meta-theoretic.stanford. it has been so widely corroborated across so many diverse [i]lines of evidence[/i] over a century and a half that it enjoys the normative impetus of a [i]fact[/i] --.You're trafficking in either-or and all or nothing conceptions for realities that present in degrees. Some of those lines of evidence are summarized here: http://www. Theories can present syntactical interpretations. 1) confusing coincidence and chance and 2) arbitrarily setting bayesian priors in the place of unknown initial and boundary conditions: http://infidels. the quintessential example for how theoretic interpretation works can be seen precisely in the topic under consideration --.not something I find terribly interesting in a philosophy forum. That's one conclusion that follows in any move from a methodological to a philosophical naturalism.because those are the only methodological paradigms practicable. The former keeps gods out of the gaps. And you're dealing with an idiosyncratic conception of As for common descent. biopoietic and evolutionary paradigms --. it [i]does[/i] approach. but --.[b]population genetics[/b]: http://plato.html Evolutionary theory. life and consciousness employ physicalist. the threshold of metaphysical interpretation. even if implausibly.neither because science [i]a priori[/i] commits to nor [i]a posteriori[/i] has demonstrated the explanatory adequacy of physicalism.

that the uneveness you refer to suggests that. even when coupled with a physicalist metaphysic. attitudes don't reflect those norms? Obviously. Similarly. though. participate in spiritual practices and are open to more than physical descriptions of reality? I doubt seriously many nonscientists give much thought at all to philosophy of science? Best I can tell. I gather. physicalist conceptions of consciousness or even of the soul threaten neither human freedom nor human value-realizations. While fewer people participate in organized religion. ------------------------------------------------I'm treating this normatively. a clear supermajority. At the same time. If those who take a . though.interpretive cosmogony. As for Dawkins. Metaphysically. there [i]should[/i] be an uneveness as each particular interpretive approach to each particular problem in any given domain will vary in its degrees of being scientific and/or metaphysical. Quantum theory does become quantum interpretation. anthropologically and/or cosmologically. too. free exercise and nonestablishment works well here in the USA. Overlapping magisteria slice in both epistemic directions. Any interpretive paradigms that rely only on abductive hypothesizing and deductive clarifying without the benefit of inductive testing compete plausibilistically (evidentially) and logically (consistency & validity) but not in a robustly probabilistic way. yes. in a pluralistic world. as far as norming anyone's approach to ultimate realities. too. they'll be doing away with our highly speculative sciences. Those who would annihilate metaphysics should take heed that. as methodological advances change the horizons of the un/knowable. he attacks caricatures. a great many scientists seem philosophically illiterate? I have no real grasp of such sociologic metrics. And it's a dynamical situation. worldwide. no too few worship same. Scientific theory and metaphysics belong to the same interpretive continuum. Theories in neuroscience & cognitive science do become philosophies of mind. remains a solid philosophical step removed from eliminativist and reductionist accounts. He's no Camus or Nietzsche. we know enough from both science and our own phenomenal experience to do anthropology without becoming overwrought about competing metaphysical interpretations. So. too. so used a lot of question marks ??? ------------------------------------------------In my view. physicalist conceptions of cosmogony don't obviate theological approaches. notwithstanding the norms I discussed above. but a very substantial minority are only methodological naturalists. That goes for materialism. sociologically. there's some hygienic value there. in the same instance. Now. This is to suggest that methodological naturalism. So. that varies from one sociodemographic cohort to the next? I think a clear majority of scientists are philosophical naturalists.

that's fine. going beyond metaphysics. the former characterizing reality's first and last things or [i]ultimate realities[/i]. Religions generally address both [i]creedal[/i] and [i]moral[/i] realities. common sense and common sensibilities. Edit to add url's: Those interested might check out 1) metanexus. While creedal realities tend to rely on alleged special revelations. will and shall be 3) ctns. Hitchens and Harris. including philosophy but bracketing metaphysics. --------------------------------------That's right. Such an evaluative disposition toward ultimate realities. Faith. While I think any anthropology worth its while would have to affirm our radical human finitude. my theological anthropology doesn't do [i]the Fall[/i]. moral realities are transparent to human reason. per my stance. is transmitted by and celebrated within interpretive communities.much less to successful descriptions of --. as if all may. the cosmos. But I would maintain that the anthropology we can derive from science. if that nuance or conception is worth anything to you. remains pervasively enchanted. This is to recognize that people can live both a good and a moral life without religion. Dennett. takes one [i]beyond[/i] but not [i]without[/i] reason. who engage facile caricatures. In other words. properly approached. quit emulating those caricatures! The world. that and the other thing or [i]proximate[/i] realities.more enchanted stance toward reality seem to be having a rough go of things in the public marketplace of ideas. If we have an impasse. ------------------------------------------------I'll leave you with this teaser.ultimate reality and generally entail an existential disjunction or a [i]living as if[/i] ultimate reality is friendly. the latter pertaining to this. is both necessary and sufficient to establish human freedom and human value-realizations. . which can also inform one's affective attunement to others. I just wanted to more precisely locate it as well as to clarify both what I was saying and not saying. just not for all the reasons many seem to ------------------------------------------------I agree that religions. I suggest they focus more on getting their own rampantly fundamentalistic houses in order and less on Dawkins. even oneself. phenomenal experience. 2) counterbalance. Creedal beliefs aspire much more to successful references to --. can augment both human freedom and human value-realizations.

whether prescriptively or proscriptively). normatively. interprets the diverse creedal stances of the Great Traditions. Even among the best equiplausible interpretations we will find agnostic. they can be celebrated as both private and communal [i]reverie[/i]. So. to realize our human authenticity. it would recognize [i]downward causations. we inescapably fall back on logical consistency and evidential plausibility and our interpretations compete. Religious beliefs regarding creedal realities thus enjoy free exercise but are curtailed by nonestablishment. in other words. should not serve as a public [i]referee[/i] (of others' behaviors) and cannot justify coercive strategies. A [i]polydoxic[/i] perspective. evidentially. gifted by modern interreligious dialogue and comparative theology. however. When it comes to proximate realities. right belonging (orthocommunal) and right desiring (orthopathic) tend to enjoy a formative primacy over right behaving (orthopraxic). One doesn't need to be on any particular creedal path to realize such values. when we talk about the rules of evidence in the context of failing or succeeding.In such communities. some clearly better than others. we always inquire further: failing to do what? Burdens of proof are normative rules which ask: [i]What do you want to do with that evidence?[/i]. as well as indigenous religions. When it comes to human references to ultimate realities. both practical and moral. asceticisms and practices to foster our intellectual. Those regarding moral and practical realities. ------------------------------------------------- . It helps us discern the best disciplines. It serves as a vague heuristic device and provides some conceptual placeholders.ultimate realities. When synthesized with an emergentist stance. ------------------------------------------------Biosemiotics describe how living things interpret signs. theistic. much less right believing (orthodoxic). affective. Robustly probabilistic reasoning guides us morally and practically. nontheistic and atheistic accounts.not conflicting descriptions of --. For example. which is why essentially religious moral claims do fail. moral and social growth and development. Interpreted as evaluative dispositions toward ultimate realities. precisely where questions continue to beg. Biosemiotics combined with emergentism remains metaphysically agnostic and is not robustly explanatory. our interpretations incorporate evidential probability. but it doesn't [i]explain[/i] them metaphysically. as complementary references to --. they may or may not violate physical causal closure. require higher burdens of proof (because they aspire to coerce others' behaviors. none which deserve stigmatizing.[/i] which can be characterized as analogous to Aristotelian formal and final causations.

We'll continue to probe the origins of the quantum. philosophically. Those who draw inspiration from Robert Rosen's work may also find the following authors stimulating: James Coffman.semiotics. ------------------------------------------------Is your stance epistemological. Arguably. in part. some [i]complexity[/i] thought speculates about a putatative [i]physiosemiotics[/i]. scientism says the question's not even meaningful or is a pseudo-question. ontological or both? Are there specific philosophies of mind you [I]a priori[/i] reject? or not? or even accept? I ask in the interest of seeing how your stance toward the mind might interface with your metaphysical framing of life's origins? ------------------------------------------------It's not sentimentalism to recognize the difference between fully determined mechanisms and partially determined organisms. Alicia Juarrero. A pansemiotic stance would be consistent with a [i]teleonomic[/i] account ([i]purposive[/i] integration or adaptation not [i]purposeful[/i] intention) of at least some of the universe's regularities. as a methodological naturalism. Joyus Crynoid. determinate. this could mirror the fabric of the cosmos. See Crynoid's [i]The Scientific Misconception of Life[/i] http://hubpages. in principle. at least in part. of the universe. I would agree. you are protesting metaphysical ignosticism regarding these questions. zoo. would remain metaphysically [i] [b]a[/b]gnostic[/i] regarding the putative nomicity of regularities. science leaves the question to be framed by philosophy. of life and of consciousness. which implicates a [b]pansemiotic[/b] perspective. which can make for bad . indeterminate. Terrence Deacon. If I've interpreted you correctly. In the first instance. scientifically. That's one reason we refer to methodological naturalism and not methodological [i]physicalism[/i]. would prevent complete reducibility. Some scientists don't get this distinction. and the questions they raise are legitimate. because organisms are. In the latter.Beyond biosemiotics. which includes phyto-. that such a stance is philosophically indefensible. Pervasive indeterminacy. in part. While science. Donald Mikulecky and Evan Thompson. wholeheartedly. but they are insufficient precisely because organisms are. that's quite different from the metaphysical [i][b]i[/b]gnosticism[/i] urged by the [i]scientistic[/i] cohort. Mechanistic accounts of organisms are necessary.and anthropo. Jesper Hoffmeyer. Complexity approaches will continue to frame these explanatory gaps.

Consider Coffman's abstract, below, of
[i]On the Meaning of Chance in Biology[/i], Biosemiotics, December 2014, Volume
7, Issue 3, pp 377-388
Chance has somewhat different meanings in different contexts, and can be taken to be
either ontological (as in quantum indeterminacy) or epistemological (as in stochastic
uncertainty). Here I argue that, whether or not it stems from physical indeterminacy,
chance is a fundamental biological reality that is meaningless outside the context of
knowledge. To say that something happened by chance means that it did not happen by
design. This of course is a cornerstone of Darwin’s theory of evolution: random
undirected variation is the creative wellspring upon which natural selection acts to
sculpt the functional form (and hence apparent design) of organisms. In his
essay Chance & Necessity, Jacques Monod argued that an intellectually honest
commitment to objectivity requires that we accord chance a central role in an otherwise
mechanistic biology, and suggested that doing so may well place the origin of life
outside the realm of scientific tractability. While that may be true, ongoing research on
the origin of life problem suggests that a biogenesis may have been possible, and
perhaps even probable, under the conditions that existed on primordial earth. Following
others, I argue that the world should be viewed as causally open, i.e. primordially
indeterminate or vague. Accordingly, chance ought to be the default scientific
explanation for origination, a universal ‘null hypothesis’ to be assumed until disproven.
In this framework, creation of anything new manifests freedom (allowing for chance),
and causation manifests constraint, the developmental emergence of which establishes
the space of possibilities that may by chance be realized.[/quote]
------------------------------------------------Metaphysics and science remain in a dynamical dialog. The sciences rely, implicitly, on
formal categories and relational structures, which a metaphysic explicitly unifies,
introducing abstract concepts to refer to such unifications. Those categories and
structures include modalities, entities, essences, properties, causalities, primitives (like
space, time, mass & energy), mereologies and such.
The most highly speculative theoretical sciences shade into metaphysics on a continuum
that reflects the different degrees in employment of abstract concepts in any given
interpretive discourse.
Science not only describes but interprets. Those interpretations are explanatory. Those
explanations are theories. Those theories are scientific.
Very highly speculative theories introduce novel unifying abstract concepts. The fewer
of these employed, the more scientific. The more of these employed, the more
metaphysical. Some interpretations are indeed more scientific. Abiogenesis employs
fewer abstract concepts than ID, so is more scientific. At the same time, any biopoietic

interpretation that ignores complexity theory and mereological relationships would be
bad science.
So, these specific demarcation criteria (number of conceptual placeholders) do
distinguish between biopoietic and ID accounts. There are other criteria we've also
discussed that further distinguish between a scientific and metaphysical interpretation.
But, even if one stipulated for argument's sake that the design inference is sufficiently
scientific, it employs a woefully inadequate analysis of relevant im/probabilities, which
makes it, at best, bad science.
------------------------------------------------I share your critique of scientism.
I affirm the need for an [i]expanded[/i] evolutionary synthesis, generally, supplemented
by holistic and emergentist perspectives, also, specifically, framed by a semiotic
interpretation. (I say expanded and supplemented but never conceived it
mechanistically, myself.)
This synthesis would remain agnostic regarding both the universe's primitives (space,
time, mass, energy plus ???) and the nature of its regularities (nomicity vs stochasticity).
This is to suggest, perhaps, that, ontologically, I reject no serious metaphysic, [i]in
principle[/i]. Epistemologically, I take a fallibilist stance, where I recognize the reality
of any given epistemic uncertainty, [i]provisionally[/i], but don't suggest it will
necessarily remain, [i]in principle[/i].
Concretely, for example, I wouldn't [i]a priori[/i] rule out panpsychism or even
consciousness as a primitive. My sneaking suspicions, however, are that consciousness
is an emergent reality, consistent with a nonreductive physicalist stance. Since I don't
have to choose, I don't.
I appreciate that a mechanistic account is not sufficient to describe human moral
A semiotic emergentist evolutionary synthesis, in my view, is sufficient, whatever the
natures of our universe's primitives and regularities. Our phenomenal experience,
common sense, common sensibilities and good old fashioned [i]reductio ad
absurdum[/i] reveal what we need to know about our free will and how to be moral.
---------------------------------------------Just to clarify, do you accept the distinction between the neo-darwinian synthesis [i]per
se[/i] and its [i]materialist conception[/i]?
In other words, it's one thing to suggest that the evolutionary synthesis is clearly wrong
but quite another to recognize that it's merely inadequate to this or that task? And,
further, that methodological naturalism, itself, doesn't require a mechanistic paradigm?

------------------------------------------------LambruscoE wrote on Dec 16, 2015 - 11:25 PM:
BTW, I fat-thumbed that [i]0 of 1 persons found this post helpful[/i].

------------------------------------------------Have you come across the neologism - [i]ententional[/i]?
Terry Deacon coined it as a reference to a broad range of phenomena that exhibit
[i]aboutness[/i]. It would include end states, goals, functions, purposes, life, teleology,
intentionality and so on.
Also, are you familiar with the distinctions that ethologists and others have drawn
between teleomatic, teleonomic, teleodynamic and teleologic?
The above distinctions are controversial and their definitions vary. Below are my own
idiosyncratic parsings.
The [b]teleomatic [/b] refers to mechanistic phenomena governed by physical laws. The
ententional [i]aboutness[/i] of teleomatic realities vis a vis end states might include the
2nd law of thermodynamics or, perhaps, a principle like entropy maximization.
The [b]teleonomic[/b] refers to organismic phenomena governed by programs
(computational & algorithmic). The ententional [i]aboutness[/i] of teleonomic realities
might include [i]intentional aboutness[/i], adaptations, functions, abductive [i]instinct[/i]
and [i]purpos[b]ive[/b][/i] behaviors with determinable end states.
The [b]teleodynamic[/b] refers to organsmic phenomena partially determined by
programs but otherwise responding to the environment with an open-ended processing
of sensation, perception, emotion & motivation that's nonalgorithmic,
noncomputational.The ententional [i]aboutness[/i] of teleodynamic realities might
include robust intentionality, symbolic language, abductive [i]inference[/i], triadic
inference (abduction, induction & deduction) and [i]purpose[b]ful[/b][/i] behaviors.
The [b]teleological[/b] for me refers to any putative [i]primal telos[/i], which would
account for reality's [i]regularities[/i], sorting probabilities in terms of necessity,
nomicity, determinacy, stochasticity, indeterminacy and so on, clarifying the
relationships between chance & necessity, the random & systematic, chaos & order,
paradox & pattern, the asymmetric & symmetric and so on.
Any explanation of the origin of life must go beyond the teleomatic to the teleonomic as
organisms go beyond the mechanistic. Any explanation of the human mind must go

whichever root metaphor one employs for one's metaphysic. which results from the failure to distinguish. Feser basically unpacks the same ideas and provides concrete examples that are much more generally accessible (which takes a lot more words but can often be worth it!). Check out Peirce's [i]Neglected Argument for the Reality of God[/i]. wherein he refers to God as the [b]Ens Necessarium[/b]. Yes. from the given to the normative.beyond the teleonomic to the teleodynamic as the mind goes beyond mere programmatic. They tend to reason from is to ought. methodologically. He further identified the [i]genetic[/i] (Dawkins) and [i]memetic[/i] (Dennett) fallacies. teleonomic and teleodynamic realities. a great deal of human solidarity and compassion. it's not unlike the move from a methodological to a philosophical naturalism. transkin even. ------------------------------------------------I just read that Feser blog response to Coyne that you referenced above. between animal and human sign interpretation. instead. who experience. Such stipulations may be ontologically [i]suggestive[/i] but they certainly are not [i]decisive[/i]. addendum: Peirce's argument reminds me of the metaphysical move some make when extrapolating the Principle of Sufficient Reason beyond a methodological stipulation to an ontotheological conclusion. which treat genes and memes as [i]replica[b]tors[/b][/i]. which are grounded in our collectively being similarly situated as radically social beings. however. Most moral approaches seem to converge. The shared prescriptive premises. Clarifying those misunderstandings may not do much. intentions and circumstances. the former merely iconic and indexical. as well as teleomatic. by coupling shared prescriptive premises to shared descriptive premises and then reasoning to a normative conclusion. Same line of thought. mere [i]replicas[/i]. Not to say we're not variously tribalistic. to cure anyone's anxiety regarding the grounding of moral realities. he was saying the same thing I was trying to say (with my dense prose. neologisms and abstract categories). But. are wholly consistent with a teleology conceived as [i]primal[/i] telos. that works well. for the . Both merely ententional and clearly intentional phenomena. Hence. when they are. computational algorithms. After all. in their analyses of acts. all the usual questions come to bear: [i]fallacy of composition[/i] apply or not? [i]brute[/i] fact or not? ------------------------------------------------Terry Deacon identified the [i]computational[/i] fallacy. You refer to [i]logos[/i]. which contributes to tensions and tears at the fabric of solidarity. They're also consistent with an [i]emergent[/i] telos. semiotically. derive from shared evaluative dispositions. Basically. empathetically. the latter also symbolic. sometimes referred to as self-evident. from the descriptive to the prescriptive.

vis a vis scientific inquiry. that religious stances cannot. which is understandable and could have been hygienic even --. true and false. much less our evaluative dispositions and meta-philosophical suppositions. similarly. primal and emergent telos). a properly fallibilist theory of knowledge should inject enough epistemic humility into our moral reasoning. There are varieties of rationalism. beauty. which can help us better frame up our questions regarding the origins of the quantum. which we know as the epistemic vices of radical empiricism and logical positivism. Hartshorne spoke of a . Even with a foundational theory of truth. anyway. regarding which authority or foundation grounds our stances regarding good and evil. life and consciousness. teleodynamic. It is one thing to take the stance of philosophical naturalism. robbed the epistemic frontiers of our most highly speculative theoretic sciences of the more robust explanatory heuristics provided by the concepts of formal and final causations (suitably parsed as ententional. which also manifests as scientism. however. shouldn't any de-ontology be at least as modest as its ontology is tentative? ------------------------------------------------You have precisely located where the religious impulse often derails. 4) speculative and apophatic produces [i]encratism[/i]. 2) speculative and kataphatic produces [i]rationalism[/i]. that believers must somehow be cognitively impaired and are necessarily unreasonable. unity and freedom needn't be grounded in transcendental imperatives in order to work. The matrix I employ uses an axis of speculative to affective and another of kataphatic to apophatic. teleomatic. The religious-like impulse to banish [i]telos[/i] from methodological naturalism. logically valid and evidentially plausible vis a vis primal and/or ultimate realities.had it not gone too far --. intentional. These epistemic vices apply to one's meta-philosophical outlook every bit as much as they describe one's [i]mythos[/i] vis a vis putative ultimate realities. wherein the speculative impulse avoids self-critique and/or apophatic criticism. 3) affective and apophatic produces [i]quietism[/i]. An overemphasis on the 1) affective and kataphatic produces [i]pietism[/i] and [i]fideism[/i]. unfortunately. all of which are philosophically indefensible. authoritative appeals and transcendental theories of truth don't agree. As it is. our existential orientations to what we call truth. goodness.most part. the universe. which further leads to theological ignosticism. which can certainly be internally coherent. those who rely on foundational epistemologies. teleonomic. be epistemically warranted and normatively justified. process approach would enhance our modeling power of reality as compared to the more essentialist. substance metaphors. right and wrong. After all. It's quite another to suggest. ------------------------------------------------I suspect that a dynamical.

------------------------------------------------LambruscoE wrote on Dec 18. All that said. over. in order to see the truth of those axioms. our models for reality. We don't [i]a priori[/i] know when we are epistemically thwarted by some temporary methodological constraints or permanently so due to some. ontological occulting.determined. would take one [i]beyond[/i] our positivist and philosophic horizons of human concern but not [i]without[/i] them. the theoretic takeaway is not that a successful TOE couldn't be formulated. our equations for the fire breathed within. . only emergently asymmetric? Hawking conceived of just such a model? Or any given probability. we might devise successful references to unknown causes even while successful descriptions evade us.other explanations.[i]nonstrict identity[/i]. Few of us have to travel halfway through the [i]Principia[/i] with Russell & Whitehead. ------------------------------------------------If we model the universe with a temporal rather than spatial singularity. ------------------------------------------------Religion. for that matter. un/determinable. Thus we distinguish between in/determinate. in/determinable.not only with determinism. but conceives it as more of a dynamical reality (as well as every[i]thing[/i] else). which resonates. This is all just to suggest an optimistic stance for our methodological naturalism since. which don't deny our experiences of an [i]empirical[/i] or [i]practical[/i] self. just like any other interpretive metanarrative. as GK Chesterton suggested. ------------------------------------------------I precisely meant to imply that probability's not necessarily incompatible --.and under.10:18 PM: There's a plurality of models. with some Buddhist conceptions of the [i]no self[/i]. we mustn't confuse our maps for terrain. time could be fundamentally symmetric. seems to me. While Hawking notes there are Godel-like constraints on any putative Theory of Everything [TOE]. [i]we don't yet know enough about reality to say that it's unknowable. One practical upshot might be that we could [i]see[/i] the truth of such axioms or find them more versus less interesting. When we encounter effects as would be proper to no known causes. This is to suggest that it can be pulled off with one's epistemic virtue intact.[/i]. whether implicit or explicit. where they eventually prove the axioms of 2+2=4. properly conceived. but --. 2015 . only that its axioms couldn't be proved in a closed formal symbol system. in principle.

last century. the latter corresponding. as a [i]provisional[/i] closure. There's nothing. For example. logical validity and some degree of plausibility of a materialist monism. but those epistemological whack-a-moles --logical positivism. the former modeling boundary conditions per Hawkings' [i]history of time[/i]. 2015 . as epistemic collateral damage. one is also overtaken by the urge to annihilate metaphysics. telos and action under uncertainty. much less evaluate the myriad answers.keep popping up in different ways? ------------------------------------------------LambruscoE wrote on Dec 19. though! This isn't to deny that other interlocutors might not over-reach metaphysically.6:25 PM: . I took it to mean there might be competing ways to model the nature of space-time. radical empiricism and theological ignosticism --. But I can better see. unnecessarily so. For my part. however. as you say. imputes neither intrinsic meaning nor objective existence to same. then highly speculative theoretic sciences. in principle. when one adopts a materialist stance. I never gathered that was done over against the notion of space-time. Such [i]hege[/i]monistic urges were philosophically purged. to our conventional notions. the possibility for category errors in drawing such facile comparisons. I'm quite willing to concede the internal coherence. imaginary numbers. square root of negative one). when modeling the universe as finite but unbounded. I'm still trying to learn the right questions. teleonomic paradigms and decision theory norms will suffer. that stands in the way of materialists reciprocating such concessions to competing stances? If. while other models might describe it differently? Thus I've come across such distinctions as the [i]spatialization[/i] of time versus the [i]temporalization of[/i] space.------------------------------------------------When distinctions are drawn between spatial and temporal singularities in speculative cosmology. especially by approaching it from the perspective that. ------------------------------------------------QM doesn't seem weird to me. we'd employ one set of mathematical axioms for time (e.g. perhaps. The competing interpretations can get rather interesting. now.

methodologically. this is not at all to suggest that conceptions like intentionality. analogically or equivocally between our physical and metaphysical models. . computational. purpose. ------------------------------------------------I most resonate with those who represented semiotic stances. the former would be predicated only analogically between our physical and metaphysical models. temporality and various causes would. Teleodynamic properties are end-directed (purposeful) and higher order. More concretely. or vice versa. This. which is to recognize that they include [i]inferential[/i] abduction (as well as. explained per [i]mechanistic[/i] physical laws. necessarily.g. leads to different inferences re: design. for argument's sake. if they were taken to be physically emergent. necessarily. applies to any Design Inference and what might be the precise nature of a design. exhibiting downward causations that wouldn't. Human brains also exhibit teleodynamic features. maximizing entropy). One practical upshot would seem to be that. which are noncomputational. whether as primal and/or emergent. too. How one conceives telos. brains certainly exhibit teleomatic features. violate physical causal closure but which derive from boundary constraints. of course. final cause or designer. if the telic conception represents an emergent rather than fundamental reference to nature. The most salient distinction between animal and human biosemiotics presents when humans interpret symbols. it would mean that those metaphysical references refer only analogically. determinable). To the extent that certain of our physical conceptions represent emergent descriptions of nature. of which animals are capable. re: time. Rather. Teleomatic properties are [i]about[/i] end states (e.See #247 re: the putative relationship between temporality and intentionality. we might make a successful reference to such a putative reality but remain a step or more removed from a successful description of that reality. metaphysically. while the latter might be predicated univocally. explained in terms of [i]organismic[/i] programs (algorithmic. our claims would be weaker (hence. triadically. that conceptions of past and future were only [i]emergent[/i] references to nature. In any event. beyond the interpretation of icons and indexes. Within an emergentist paradigm. while others represent fundamental descriptions. couldn't they still successfully model our spatio-temporal reality? We must disambiguate each conception and define whether it's being predicated univocally. and teleonomic features. for example. not successfully refer. ------------------------------------------------Even if one stipulated. more defensible?). So. Teleonomic properties are about end goals (purposive) and would include [i]instinctual[/i] abduction. analogous to Aristotelian formal causes.

the evolutionary role of consciousness has [b]not[/b] been explained yet. The same is true for the distinction between [i]ententional[/i] and [i]intentional[/i].teleomatic. even though purposive. Many draw a distinction between physicalism and naturalism. though. The acquisition of language. adaptations. One might question. or intractably perdure. as ontological density increases and complexities transist from the mechanistic to the organismic. indeed. scienti[b]s[/b]tic? Scienti[b]f[/b]ic refers to a methodology. So.are. requires teleodynamic brain activity. Human realities require both these mechanistic and organismic accounts. rather.induction and deduction). Throwing oneself in front of that London bus. determinable. intentionality and such. reducing to new physical accounts. then. which would be agnostic to philosophy of mind. maybe beyond that even. Directly. however. . Still. refer to teleomatic and teleonomic brain activities. The Libet experiments. Folks may grossly underestimate how much human brain activity exhibits teleonomicity. functions. teleonomic and teleodynamic --. which are necessary but not sufficient to account for our experience of purposeful. jumping out of the way of that London bus. nonreductively. which may have co-evolved with the brain and which is largely social. All of these properties exhibit final causation. Misspelling? You meant. placeholders for rather intractable explanatory gaps. a neologism introduced by Terry Deacon as discussed on the [i]abiogenesis[/i] thread. At least until we reconcile the quantum and gravity. noncomputational brain activities. whether we have introduced distinctions that make a difference. purposes. ---------------------------------------That might roughly describe [i]one[/i] interpretation of the data for [i]some[/i] brain activities. recognizes the unpredictable novelty that presents as dissipative structures interact. is integral to higher order cognition. goals. computational. but the case hasn't been made that it's an exhaustive description of [i]all[/i] brain activities. Not all levels of complexity can be described by mechanistic accounts due to emergent whole-part constraints. life. their activities can be described via programs that are clearly algorithmic. we don't know how those gaps might close. just of different types. not an ideology. too.[/i] An emergentist stance. teleology. so. Ententionality refers to a broad range of phenomena that exhibit [i]aboutness[/i] and includes end states. not inconsistent with a physicalist interpretation. Scientists generally employ a methodological [i]naturalism. in my view. Those heuristic conceptions --.

Deacon also coined the term teleodynamic. I'd rather watch football than construct a sylly syllogism to prove I'm not a brain in a vat or alienprogrammed robot with an umwelt. utilizing the 2nd Law. I refer. broadly categorized in terms of truth. goodness. ------------------------------------------------I first encountered such distinctions in biology. to [i]this. but teleodynamic properties as purpose[b]ful[/b]. unity and freedom. evolving in relationship. both prudential and moral. beauty. fuzzy-type . the logical structures of common sense remain indispensable. but presents in degrees. while formalizing our models and arguments gifts us enormous heuristic utility. For morphodynamics. while partly determined and uniquely bounded. for its part. The fast and frugal heuristics of common sense gift us a great deal of modeling power. either-or. We model thermodynamic processes. but I have parsed it to draw a distinction between it and Ernst Mayr's ethological conception of teleonomic. specifically located in how we model the rules that operate at each discrete level of complexity. The human will is undeniably plenty [i]free-enough[/i] to enjoy manifold and multiform value-realizations. Freedom. We model teleonomic properties with reference to programs. then realized. later. We refer to teleonomic properties as purpos[b]ive[/b]. here. broadly conceived to model physicochemical. but approach them the same way I do [i]solipsism[/i]. as I like to say. Here emerge human realities. which include horizons for the emergence of quantum. we're essentially talking S ----&#62. they were philosophically freighted. homeodynamics.That which lacks existential actionability. exhibit robustly autopoietic. we use physics. which. which per his usage seemed to include teleonomic properties. intentional behaviors. The differences between these concepts are nomological. behavioristically. electro-mechanical apparatus via human programming. R or stimulus ----&#62. I don't ordinarily bother refuting facile philosophical tautologies and reductionistic accounts by employing formal arguments or even im/plausibilist appeals. in my view. To oversimplify. that and the other thing[/i] or [i]proximate[/i] realities. pragmatic utility or robust normativity. inferential abduction (including what some call retroduction as well as transduction or analogical reasoning). living and conscious realities. whether developed by phylogenetic (via selection) or ontogenetic (via experience or social interaction) activities or even a quasi-autonomous. although the algorithms can get increasingly complex. is not an all or nothing. for the most part. to instinctual abduction. response. cosmic. teleomatic end-states. When it comes to various [i]first and last things[/i] or [i]ultimate[/i] realities. reality. gets tossed into the philosophic wastebin via good old fashioned [i]reductio ad absurdum[/i].

logic. The questions that beg remain [i]nothing but [b]what[/b]?[/i] and [i][b]what[/b] else?[/i] . and ontogenetically. but. I don't [i]a priori[/i] rule out consciousness being a primitive. the teleonomic operates in social organisms both phylogenetically. and cumulative case-like. then dutifully disambiguated vis a vis various levels of complexity or ontological densities). We don't know enough about reality's initial. much less successfully. Well. ultimate or horizon realities. Disambiguation searches out our predications as we engage one model vis a vis another to discern whether they're employed univocally. syllogistic logic remains an enormously powerful tool. equivocally or analogically. which involve nonsymbolic biosemiosis. etc! So.. starting with a false premise. to infer probabilistically what should or should not be expected. which is why the greatest logicians can end up further from the truth in a nanosecond than the local village idiot could ever aspire to travel in a lifetime. I think the epistemic virtue of an emergentist stance precisely resides in its avoidance of either an epistemic or ontic rush to closure via its bracketing of metaphysics. Intentionality and temporality remain indispensable conceptions. via selected adaptations. I've a friend who refers to emergence as [i] something more from nothing but [/i]. Many times. less like algebra. one's conclusions might not be explicitly obvious in one's premises but are otherwise implicitly embedded in one's very definitions. Formal. emergently. to an erroneous conclusion. informal reasoning. necessarily. The epistemic virtue that's required when considering primal. along with final causation (but finality first [i]vaguely[/i] conceived. much more realized by avoiding any [b]rush to closure[/b] when otherwise giving free reign to abductive inference. which is more like set theory. This is to say that I employ an emergentist + semiotic + methodological naturalist paradigm rather minimalistically. I do rule out the [i]consciousness [b]explained[/b][/i] absurd. the former rather trivial.. at one level of complexity or the next. I like to say [i]something more from something else[/i]. play. the latter begging questions. include concepts like supervenience. or distinctions like weak or strong emergence. Strong anthropic principles rely on a conceptual confusion between coincidence and chance. in my view. This is precisely why I harp on definitions so much. For example. is much less realized by syllogistic approaches. very efficiently. materio-energetic realities. anymore than I rule out physicalist or naturalist conceptions. one can proceed free of fallacy. boundary and limit conditions. via experience & social interaction. the cards I will not. along side space-time. .

we go beyond mere description. well executes one's implicit sneaking suspicions even a tad unawares. when I describe a system as teleomatic. biopoietic and anthroposemiotic horizons of emergence). in principle. cosmic. rather than offering proofs for what anyone (wrongfully) imagines that they do. perhaps in response to some equiprobable existential disjunction ( In the shadows. They have more value. unpack as follows: Science models the states of any given system probabilistically. perhaps in response to some Jamesian forced. that the methodological differences between these models might implicate ontological differences? Yes. perhaps. Some deterministic chaotic systems (deterministic in principle. Interpretation existentially engages reality. So. I shall jump over it and leave it alone!). then.Indeed. for me. however. unpredictable in practice --. there's no reason. as conceptual placeholders regarding what we [i]don't know[/i]. always with [i]performative[/i] significance. (This applies to quantum. in no way. And. not a robustly theoretic explanatory attempt. teleonomic or teleodynamic. teleonomic or teleodynamic provide a weak heuristic. I leave the ontic states of those systems open to interpretation. Is it reasonable to the local weather-girl) might be observationally indistinguishable from some stochastic systems. . probabilistically. ontic or even [i]epi-ontic[/i] (as our measurements even interfere). acknowledging (urging even) distinctions between various modeling attempts. amounts to a life lived. provide explanatory adequacy. still competently. why deterministic realities cannot emerge from indeterministic realities or vice versa or why [i]stochastic nomicity[/i] couldn't model some ontic states. but those differences remain [i]suggestive[/i] not [i]decisive[/i] and. ------------------------------------------------- The emergentist concepts of teleomatic. evaluation and normativity whenever we [i]interpret[/i] reality. I refer to epistemic states. is that a snake or rope? Uncertain. perhaps in response to what Walker Percy distinguished as [i]news[/i] versus information. hopefully well. We may describe various levels of complexity using different probabilistic models. These distinctions. Any given state might be epistemic. describing epistemic states per degrees of in/determinability and/or un/predictability. whether one ever articulates one's common sense and common sensibilities explicitly or. Philosophy. vital and live option.

but where they otherwise effectively prescind from a category of [i]necessity[/i] to that of [i]probability[/i]. Probability is thus taken seriously. too! Various emergentist conceptions seem to square with differences in our probabilistic modeling attempts of various states of systems at various levels of complexity.if the origins of quantum. epistemic states and probabilities for any given system wouldn't necessarily provide information regarding the ontic states of those systems per degrees of in/determinism. biopoietics invite origin of life hypotheses.not only how. I don't feel I'm being unreasonable. while noncontradiction continues to hold. absolutely so. both which remind me of a modal ontology wherein the categories of possibilities and actualities are employed. N'est pas? . for example. because science.g. -----------------------------------------------My approach to emergence has nothing to do with indeterminism. questions beg and it remains to be seen --. above. excluded middle folds. but --.Therefore. You describe. an indispensable methodological stipulation. but precisely leave the ontic states to be interpreted by philosophy. ontologically. I offer the following clarification. biopoietic and anthroposemiotic realities will ever obtain a consensus ontological interpretation. To enlarge that distinction. cosmic. for example. Note: Perhaps check out what the medieval. not an necessary. metaphysical ontology. cosmology yields various cosmogonies (e. as it doesn't go [i]ontic[/i]. Scotus. much along the lines of what I've suggested above. This is to suggest that. So. There are different theories of probability. which means that. and consciousness invites philosophies of mind. ------------------------------------------------I don't offer this over against what you've said. especially as I gathered elsewhere your distinction between the methodological and ontological. [i]beyond a doubt[/i]. in my view. Others. including such putative categories. eternal vs emergent temporality). and hopefully. called the [i]formal distinction[/i] or what CS Peirce called [i]thirdness[/i]. the relationship between the epistemic and ontic states of systems can often remain open to interpretation. Certain states might therefore reasonably be interpreted as [i]adequately[/i] in/determined. is a necessary but insufficient condition for rationality. when interpreting the human will as [i]free enough[/i]! Thus quantum mechanics invites various interpretations. to eventually be described & measured empirically and tested inductively by science. as an ontic indeterminism. perhaps.

to highly speculative theoretic sciences. ontologically. Whether any given equiprobable interpretation of a putative ontic state can be normatively justified as rational and existentially actionable is a separate consideration for any given abduction. we cannot know. We can't [i]a priori[/i] say that this consequent must necessarily be caused by a physical antecedent. proper to no known causes. nevertheless. [i]a prori[/i]. metaphysically. Epistemology relies on implicit metaphysical [i]presuppositions[/i].When we encounter effects as would be proper to no known causes. and transductively. ontologically. which is to say. Similarly. which innoculates metaphysical realisms against [b]naivete. only as a clarification. ------------------------------------------------A [i]provisional[/i] ontology. in my view. mereologically. The Postmodern Critique. to the best explanation. commit the fallacy of composition. we abductively refer to their putative causes. Thus. abduction aspires. . whether any given equiplausible interpretation. physically. Again. but it did introduce a novel thought. not over against. They only mean that we would otherwise be epistemically unfortunate if they are not. the universe as a whole could be an empirical effect. like the rules of one's neighborhood fantasy football club. can be normatively justified as rational and existentially actionable is a separate consideration for any given abduction. Neither the principle of sufficient reason nor methodological naturalism (nor an empirical physicalism) mean that reality writ large must be wholly comprehensible in order to be partly intelligible or must be thoroughgoingly naturalistic or physicalistic. [i]self-criticism[/i]. which inferences from part to whole. employing analogical conceptions. retroductively. metaphysically. Neither a metaphysical nor theological ignosticism are philosophically defensible because that type of positivism would do violence. or universally. because I note you critiqued positivism in passing. but we cannot [i]a priori[/i] know whether they successfully refer only locally. also. fundamentally or emergently. reasoning backwards from consequents to antecedents. didn't drastically modify the Enlightenment. For example.[/b] ------------------Probabilities and plausibilities reflect epistemic not ontic states. inferentially. Very weak.

itself. primal and proximate --. biogenesis and philosophy of mind as well as probability theory. process. intelligibility. fallibilist theory of knowledge. Universally. In the context of equiprobability and equiplausibility there's no reason to misintepret those as anything but epistemic descriptions. or even pragmatism. [i]fallibilistic[/i]. provisional. properly considered. on the other. ontic and epi-ontic distinctions? I was conflating nothing. which employs conceptions like nonstrict identity. that both epistemic state in/determinability and ontic state in/determinism represent polar realities that present in degrees without threatening the axioms of one's implicit. wouldn't. then. The [i]essence[/i] of metaphysical realities --. which is distinct from a theory of [i]knowledge[/i]. on one hand. That's a theory of [i]truth[/i]. hold. itself. because both physical and metaphysical claims are. only a recognition that intelligibility could be thwarted for all [i]practical[/i] purposes and that we may have no way of [i]a priori[/i] or even [i]a posteriori[/i] knowing it. like substance. experience. Fallibilism would.---------------------------------------------There is neither an [i]a priori[/i] nor [i]in principle[/i] assumption of unintelligibility. a continuum of ontic states representing degrees of causation along an axis of in/determinism. however. necessarily. ------------------------------------------------It's also speculatively provisional. Rational discourse can rely on a correspondent theory of truth even while only holding to a coherentist. should that happen. . wouldn't be inconsistent with a continuum of epistemic states representing degrees of intelligence along an axis of in/determinability. etc Dynamical accounts of regularities in a process metaphysic. metaphysical presuppositions. This is to recognize. I recognize both epistemic and ontic states. precisely regarding epistemic.or the prevaling epistemic and ontic states of the environs wherein one evolved? ------------------------------------Do you not accept that there are a plurality of interpretations for quantum mechanics.ultimate. cosmogenesis. Metaphysical claims employ root metaphors. again.

idealisms and pragmatisms. You keep referring to your axioms and I could tell you were immersed in some tautology. Abductive inference is precisely what you were praising in armchair thinkers. Biopoietics admit origins of life interpretations. You're disingenuously suggesting a conflation. Inference is optimally triadic. logical positivism. It doesn't establish the boundaries of rational discourse. epistemologically. I've got news for you. there was no reason to interpret my reference to equiprobability or equiplausibility as ontic rather than epistemic. precisely due to overlapping magisteria. same. Not just scientific interpretative or theoretic discourse is rational. nonrational or irrational by someone who idiosyncratically narrows his definition of rationality. Conventional philosophy considers all of this rational discourse. not eternal verities? And that Popperian falsification can't be. Not all rational discourse is descriptive. Cosmology admits cosmogonies. Some folks provisionally close on various monisms. theological ignosticism. which is fine. well. Neuroscience admits philosophies of mind. Empirical falsifiability sets the contours for neither rational discourse nor metaphysical hypotheses. falsified! And is an overly narrow and idiosyncratic view of empirical methodology and philosophy of science? My point regarding abduction is that you cannot vote it out of one type of discourse or domain without crippling its pragmatic utility in another. all of them rationally. ontologically and/or realisms. Your demarcation criteria continue to be either arbitrary or derived from idiosyncratic definitions. however. Emergentist thought. Such interpretive discourse has heuristic value helping us frame up our questions prior to articulating falsifiable hypotheses. pluralisms. Quantum mechanics admits quantum interpretations. Philosophical theology. You do realize that metaphysics traffic in hypotheticals. which leads to a rather naive realism rather than a fallibilist epistemology. same. dualisms.------------------------------------------------You conflate a theory of knowledge with a theory of truth. both in practice and in principle. I was talking about normative justifications and existential actionability . The point was that abductive hypothesizing about ultimate realities can only be considered either arational. which keeps implicitly driving your conclusions per the very epistemic vices you have explicitly disclaimed: radical empiricism. Abductive hypothesizing and deductive clarifying can spin their epistemic wheels without inductive testing ever hitting the ontological road. Again.

which is indeed incoherent. except for actualities. Charles Peirce drew inspiration from same and elaborated [i]thirdness[/i]. one fine day. It will turn a naive into a critical realism and infallibilistic metaphysical presuppositions into provisional methodological stipulations that needn't present absolutely or universally. is to drop your foundational epistemology for a nonfoundational brand. try Peirce's semiotic. Even the medieval Franciscan. If anyone hasn't gathered yet. so I could jump over it vs pick it up? I have no problem with your holding fast to noncontradiction. Without using excluded middle. semiotic. ontic or epi-ontic. You want to interpret probability. Or. Emergentism takes many forms. It will open one's paradigm beyond the syntactical. but noncontradiction holds. where excluded middle folds. some which presumptively smuggle in rather reductive presuppositions. indexical and iconic to the robustly pragmatic and semantic. The proper response.when dealing with uncertainty. In effect. which deserved a response. which waits patiently to be discovered by an epistemic uncertainty that will inevitably lose its un-ness. all or nothing. Scotus. Epistemic. You mistake the Postmodern [i]Critique[/i]. for its perversion into a [i]system[/i]. such as: Is that a rope or snake? and not: Is that virtual reality superpositioned as a rope and a snake? You know. ------------------------------------------------Yes. Your problem is that you overuse excluded middle. probabilities will get translated into discourse that employs [i]in principle[/i] a lot less and [i]for all [b]practical[/b] purposes[/i] a lot more. either-or. I only employ metaphysical presuppositions as provisional methodological stipulations. in/determinability and/or in/determinism? Can't say [i]a priori[/i]! Check out Peirce's pragmatic. so introduced his formal distinction. fallibilism. knew better than this. I had grasped that and wanted to take the opportunity to reinforce how I employ it. you end up with a de facto modal ontology of actual and necessary. or at least embrace a much more critical realism. presupposing only an ontic determinism. I embrace a fallibilist . in my view.

He just wrongly imagines that all competing interpretations are irrational. consciousness and anthroposemiotic origins. best I could gather.metaphysical realism while being ontologically agnostic. if I am interpreting that situation correctly. pattern and paradox. Reality could dance to a cosmic fugue of chance and necessity. when otherwise stranded together in a cable of intertwined inferences. in my view. via an axiological epistemology.. the epistemic indeterminability of reality's various layers of complexity remains intractable. as well as reality taken. relying on informal. biopoietic. Even if reality presents as: . just like his philosophy of science. just like his philosophy of mind. Such indeterminabilities remain consistent with varying degrees of either determinism or indeterminism or both. Most human valuerealizations. predicating same in a deist. I think that cable metaphor originated with Peirce. with his own PSR reification by [i]a priori[/i] commiting to an ontological physicalism. cosmic. which may be our most ubiquitous epistemic vice. as a whole.$% thus. the random and systematic. ------------------------------------------------Most who reify PSR. can be adequately explicated by an ontologically vague modal phenomenology. however. Specific ontic indeterminisms could well include quantum. symmetry and asymmetry. alone. quite candidly. one has to quit beating one's head against the wall just because it feels good when one stops. which is too strong a position to defend. In short. It's not incoherent per se. mereologically. pantheist or classical theist sense. Thanks SO much for saying THAT. can gain epistemic resilience and gift us with fairly good modeling power. order and chaos. the primitives of which remain undefined. A great deal of critical thinking goes into informal reasoning. physically predicated. while presupposing complete causal closure. sometimes. because. He deftly avoids that route. cumulative caselike reasoning. Arguments which. may be rather weak. then reason syllogistically to Necessary Being. well . awaiting a unifying root metaphor. I think our common sense and common sensibilities remain our greatest epistemic resources but derail us if we rush to closure. believes in a Necessary Being.. !#=. Here's my parsing: Presently.

while: 13) specific indeterminisms may lack explanation. which. nontemporally or even atemporally. If such a system. then . nomological descriptions. 10) when taken as a whole and lacking explanation. 5) each such ontic state naturally explicable in terms of antecedents and consequents per 6) axiomatic. when measuring most discrete states.. It doesn't [i]a priori[/i] follow that: 9) this system's nomicity and series of ontic states. while: 16) taken as a whole. conceivably. Neither would it [i]a priori[/i] follow that. whether 3) temporally. wouldn't necessarily be either explicable or inexplicable.1) a dynamical system. whether of 4) a materio-energetic or some other conserving nature. although otherwise still 8) [i]generally[/i] causal . may even variously specify 7) degrees of ontic in/determinism for each state. 17) still.. will necessarily either 11) [i]require[/i] an explanation or 12) present as an inexplicable [i]brute[/i] fact. should it turn out to be explicable. 14) the system could not otherwise present as [i]generally[/i] causal. 2) in a series of ontic states. hence 15) largely intelligible.

These types of references have long been made in theological philosophy and more recently in highly speculative theoretic cosmology. but still partly [i]intelligible. In other words. 21) [i]not. Neither does it even exhaustively describe all types of final causation.18) it would be subject to Godel-like constraints. so. to be sure.[/i] per a possibly succesful [i]reference[/i] to a putative system. remains an indispensable concept. while we couldn't describe its [i]nature[/i]. entropy maximization might be a necessary cause in any comprehensive scientific description but it's certainly not sufficient.[/i] which could mean that our search for a Theory of Everything will entertain us until it all ends in ecological whimpers. which is to recognize that we could well 20) see the truth of the system's axioms. we could appreciate some of its [i]character[/i]. Would you accept the following nuance? While controversial. atemporal causation. I would agree that it's [i]incomprehensible[/i]. however? One system's ententional (aboutness) [i]ends[/i] can serve as another system's intentional means. the dissimilarities between atemporal and temporal causes would certainly outnumber any similarities. 19) the incompleteness of which may turn out to be more or less interesting. It requires analogical reasoning. in my view. whether inprinciple or for all practical purposes. solar eruptions or eschatological glories. we could speak rationally of its [i]properties. ------------------------------------------------- . even while otherwise unable to successfully [i]describe[/i] its [i]identity[/i]. Still. in terms of not offering a complete understanding.[/i] metaphysically. -----------------------------------------------At best. Hence the appeal to semiotic accounts. perhaps. even if otherwise unable to formally prove them or. nuclear bangs.

humans). If the normative necessarily mediates between the descriptive and interpretive.) I'll tie this together (re-ligate) religiously. might represent the evaluative aspect of teleomatic realities. we're talking about right behaving ([i]orthopraxic[/i]) mediating between right believing ([i]orthodoxic[/i]) and right belonging ([i]orthocommunal[/i]) to realize right desiring ([i]orthopathic[/i]. then. existentially. the telic nature of nature's laws (still 3ns. makes any claims on us. axiologically [i]integral[/i]. [i]eschatological glories[/i]. While we properly describe reality teleologically. normative philosophies. what in the world. especially with its [i]pragmatic turn[/i].] The reason I bring this up is because I find this conversation stimulating. in [i]telos[/i]. maximum entropy production or the 2nd law. but I wanted to point out that I used the phrase. zoo. whether practical or moral. . precisely to express the hope I nurture for peaceful endtimes (as contrasted with dreadful scenarios)! ------------------------------------------------I employ an axiological epistemology. it follows that we'd next interrogate its [i]normativity[/i] that we may respond to that practical or moral reality. however.and anthropo. we might question whether such [i]aboutness[/i]. have undeniable normative impetus. [Note to Peirceans: This decodes into 3ns mediates between 2ns and interpretations to effect 1ns. While. specifically? Even if entropic realities. which include phyto. interpretive worldviews and evaluative cultures might each be methodologically [i]autonomous.Excuse the digression.[/i] insofar as they ask distinctly different questions of reality.semiotics (plants. via a suitable [i]interpretation[/i]. generally. After all. they remain. inasmuch as each is necessary but not sufficient for every human value-realization. especially regarding humanity's evaluations. which represent laws (3ns). affective dispositions and emotional connections. for example. what could be their axiological significance? There are those who suggest that. beyond biosemiotics. What about the converse? When we [i]describe[/i] a reality and reference its telic nature.. one formulation of which suggests that the [i]normative[/i] mediates between the [i]descriptive[/i] and the [i]interpretive[/i] to realize the [i]evaluative[/i]. animals. teleonomic and teleodynamic properties. we ground all normativity. recognizing teleomatic. It affirms the irreducibly triadic nature of meaning-making and pragmatics. Essentially. descriptive sciences. whether merely purposive or clearly purposeful.

orthopraxically. when I set forth a paradigm with a putative atemporal series of causes. to be sure. but don't you refer to what we'd both agree is quite possibly an [i]emergent[/i] not fundamental reality? At any rate. our cosmos presents as [i]pansemiotic[/i]. as well as our own. even if weakly analogical. orthopathically. phytosemiotically. evaluatively. zoosemiotically. different conceptions of putative primal realities could still lead both of us. :) Also. for example. ------------------------------------------------LambruscoE wrote on Dec 24. to all of nature? This would be consistent with an enlightened self interest. I still found it useful to use terms like antecedent and consequent. But. We've already set forth a compelling descriptive narrative? Perhaps we can broaden our orthocommunal sensibilities to include pansemiotic realities. ------------------------------------------------I do admit that. this week. cultivate a compassion not only for every sapient or sentient reality but for every semiotic reality? Cultivating a more robustly orthopathic stance. grow in intimacy and solidarity with nature. we'll build a better normative consensus. many who do atemporal metaphysics find a conception of [i]absolute time[/i]. neither unreasonably. 2015 . The take-away that I'm driving toward is this: Humankind has long conceded moral significance to human realities. which would include teleomatic systems (like the weather. for their own sake. also. If we can get the evaluative right. might we not better accord some intrinsic value.for the Peirceans) suggests a physio-semiotics. I wouldn't accord axiological primacy to a normative primitive. to competing interpretations. we could reconnect with nature. to be an almost indispensable conception. climate. some significance to animalkind. The greater the number of bifurcations that form a dissipative . anthroposemiotically. for example.Thus. evaluative disposition or emotional connectivity to all of nature comports with a secular religious naturalism as well as with those great traditions which celebrate. much less physiosemiotic realities. Even as I commend valuing the teleomatic.5:44 AM: You say [i]privileged[/i]. which weren't considered semiotic or telic. Even within our temporal reality. subscribing to an aesthetic teleology. I would still relatively value semiotic realities in terms of their ontological density. and [i]nos environs writ large[/i]). eternally. our fates inextricably intertwined. less significance to the plant kingdom. their God finding our Earth a fitting dwelling. Beyond any normative impetus for our pervasively telic reality grounded only in its extrinsic values. I still side with those who find atemporal causation [i]somewhat[/i] intelligible but certainly consider your stance eminently reasonable. affective attunement. what it's worth to us.

particularly. purposeful. then. Then we evaluate it. evolved in relationship to feeding behaviors. acting on our descriptions. not constrained by physicalist descriptions. we observe how bird plumages correlate with food sources. and the 2nd law. the greater the number of permutations that threaten its existence. enjoy moral [i]significance[/i] not moral [i]agency.[/i] and to be mindful of. Lacking moral agency. then. anthroposemiotic reality over a syntactical. which takes into account the ontologically relevant (layer of complexity) telic dimension. Then we norm it. normatively per our sense of goodness. The evaluative pursuit of a given coloration becomes aesthetically rewarding. I say [i]us[/i] because we're radically social animals. asking [i]What's that?[/i]. First. we describe reality. I had given some further thought to this before seeing your response and crafted the following note to self: Emergence interprets reality vaguely. in and of itself. I would thus value a semantical. [i]morally. existentially. . We interrogate reality descriptively per our sense of truth. wherein teleomatic realities. experienced as an end.[/i] which is clearly intentional. hermeneutical cycle. [i]practically. end-state. symbol using. Would it apply to a universe as a whole or not? To a universe with a singularity or not? To a universe with a boundary or no boundary? To a universe as an open or closed system? With reference to planck time or not? imaginary time or not? real time or not? Not that the answers to those questions really matter one way or the other to my [i]aesthetic teleology[/i]. Specifying thermodynamics as fundamental laws of physics. here. re-emerged in relationship to breeding behaviors. generally. One adaptive attractant. evaluations and norms.structure. the fundamental vs emergent distinction. meaning making.[/i] only something to value. as an epistemic means to our existential imperatives which has transmuted to a rewarding end. ------------------------------------------------I do recognize the question begging nature of the aesthetic turn. the more complex. the latter enjoyable in moderation. holds or not. asking [i]What's the best way to acquire or avoid it?[/i] We only ever inquire about a norm after an evaluation. in and of itself. hasn't been answered to my satisfaction. they give us nothing as agents to emulate. Reductively. So. the more fragile. We finally interpret the reality. the more beautiful. the former without limitation. [i]axiologically. the more fragile. relates any two levels of complexity as either the [i]something else[/i] or the [i]nothing but[/i] out of which it emerged.[/i] As we draw a distinction between higher and lesser goods. Norming doesn't enjoy primacy over valuing in our epistemic. We experience this hermeneutical cycling as intrinsically rewarding. which are merely ententional. we might observe that the higher goods precisely refer to our anthroposemiotic probes of reality. asking [i]What's that to us?[/i]. although certainly also a means to feeding and reproduction. interpretively per our sense of unity. Whether thermodynamics. physiosemiotic reality. indexical. doesn't address their origin. evaluatively per our sense of beauty.

beauty. rather. or robustly teleodynamic. that self-actualization ensues. Abraham Maslow. of course. evaluate. In my view. which lead to human authenticity. Religiously. We describe. participatory imaginations. in need of no justification or apologetic. beauty. evaluatively. abductively inferring that there might be Truth. we ask whether there might be more to this or that reality than my feelings presently suggest. that we begin already inside interpretive communities with evaluative sensibilities. we ask whether other conceptions of ultimate realities might not speak to our ultimate concerns. He recognized. Bernard Lonergan and Viktor Frankl all came around to recognizing that the pursuit of self-actualization frustrates its own ends. social and religious turns of epistemic humility refer to what Lonergan called secular conversions. then reason our way to shared normative conclusions (both practical and moral). we ask whether there might be other interpretations of this reality than those gifted by my own interpretive community. ends unto themselves. as a by-product of self-transcence. do we ever launch our descriptive probes. Morally. similarly. transcendentally. Because the symbolic species distinguishes itself as a meaning maker. That abductive inference remains question begging. normative and interpretive probes of reality become their own rewards. cycling truth. as in [i]Homo aestheticus[/i]. even. self-transcendence. Socially. valued per a [i]just-because-ishness[/i]. goodness and unity get experienced as higher goods. which have only ever established that teleodynamic. whether merely teleonomic. Beauty. norm and interpret realities.Our interpretive semiotics reward us. normative approaches and descriptive. I addressed the relationship between life's higher and lesser goods. as our descriptive. Any notion of self must begin anthropologically in that social reality. truth. Goodness and Unity. goodness and unity hermeneutically. we ask whether there are goods at stake beyond my horizon of concerns. We needn't appeal to some transcendental ground to make our deontological moves from the given to the normative. what I call an aesthetic teleology needn't be conceived in terms of transcendental imperatives but cannot be denied as existential orientations. evaluative. normatively. Rather. that authenticity was a by-product of self-transcendence. This is all to recognize that we are radically social animals. evaluatively. Any aesthetic telos. affective. Only out of such shared interpretations and evaluations and norms. between existential and transcendental imperatives. as in a bird's plumage. remains otherwise emergent. moral. fosters human authenticity. Affectively. intrinsically rewarding. Hence. though not unreasonable. we avoid a rush to closure by asking if there might be more to this reality than I have described. The [i]out of what[/i] . teleonomic and teleomatic realities emerged. we couple our shared prescriptive premises (as would derive from our shared evaluative sensibilities) to our shared descriptive premises (as would be derived from our sciences and semiotics). Intellectually. that sustained authenticity could only be realized via [i]being in love[/i]. ------------------------------------------------In my last response I drew a distinction between the assignment of moral [i]significance[/i] versus the ascribing of moral [i]agency[/i]. Those intellectual.

essentialist conceptions of self. as methodological approaches. though. but does invite provisional closures. we best conceive it as dynamical and per a nonstrict identity. Hence. regarding the similarity. This wouldn't [i]a priori[/i] mean there couldn't also be equivocally and/or analogically predicated features. yet. I agree. I referred to how we [i]experienced[/i] these so-called transcendentals. to formal causations. Essentially. relying only on our shared vague conceptions of many of their characteristics. aesthetics and ethics. It doesn't lead. . Ever heard of Peirce's [i]haecceity[/i]? It might be of interest. however otherwise transcendent. must share some type of unitary nature. in some way. various realities. That would make for an interesting success. I described an axiological epistemology within the framework of the normative sciences of logics. in my view. However one pictures reality. I had already suggested a pragmatic paradigm. such as might apply to interpenetrating fields or matrices. beyond being partly determined. partly determined. ------------------------------------------------You refer. to apodictic certainties. too. I'll say this much. This stance remains consistent with evolutionary epistemology and naturalist accounts. must require some univocal predications between them. I'm not sure what you mean above. individuality. Erratum: not Peirce but Scotus ------------------------------------------------Questions beg for now and other reasonable pictures compete. sameness. it might be rooted in divergent anthropological stances or CSP's [i]logic follows ethics and both follow aesthetics[/i]. beauty and goodness. which remain agnostic to the metaphysical natures of truth. beyond static. I wonder at the nature of such a picture's axioms and what we'd think and how we'd feel about them! No. partly bounded. whichever root metaphors one employs. The self is also autopoietic and free.question remains open. how the self is partly bounded.

The former refers. ------------------------------------------------I think it's Loyal Rue who offers the distinction between telic realities that implicate only [i]because of[/i] and not.That's not one of humankind's prevailing evaluative dispositions. as they only ever have. the formulation of the argument. rather. ubiquitous. say way more than can . which I generalize to any metaphysical (being) argumentations regarding ultimate realities (God). I don't see why that wouldn't include the [i]a priori thermodynamicization[/i] of reality. ----------------------------------------------CSP emphasized two distinctions in God-talk that obtain in any metaphysical discourse regarding ultimate realities --. I do recall this much. [i]because of [/i] explications. [i]so that[/i] explanations. which could become a red herring. to the abduction. waste-products and end-products.that between 1) existence and reality and 2) argument and argumentation. yet formulated an argument for the [i]reality of God[/i]. indigenous religions and secular humanisms. The latter refers to what I would describe as a nonvirtuous cycle of abductive hypothesizing and deductive clarifying without the benefit of inductive testing. so. He wrote that it [i]would be fetichism to say that God “exists”[/i]. but in the substance of the relevant peircean critiques. they can't jot or tittle ever become prescriptive [i]so that[/i] norms. This speaks to the distinctions between teleomatic and teleonomic. Thermodynamics will only ever yield. not for fear of their consequences to oneself but because they offend charity toward others. he certainly would abide same as a fallibilist metaphysic or provisional closure. The philosophic take-aways aren't found in the various definitions of fetish. including all of the great traditions. I believe this may be contained in his Neglected Argument for the Reality of God. From our regnant. I doubt it'll ever gather significant shared normative impetus. just for instance. Perhaps you could better urge this metanarrative thru song or myth? CSP considered argumentation regarding ultimate realities a fetish. which suggest that we often run into extraordinary error in rendering our vague vernacular conceptions precise and that we often [i]prove too much[/i]. Justice Belcher discussed the forms of that methodological fetish which confuses natural science and mathematics. The communities of inquiry. ententional and intentional realities. oh. ineradicable. between such as by-products. Not to worry. Proselytizing and theodicizing best yield to evangelizing (modeling not tutoring values). basically. CSP drew a distinction between an argument and argumentation. He specifically avoided the concept [i]being[/i] in reference to God. pretty much unanimously draw distinctions. humanist perspective.

here using thought to include. including many of the scientific men of my generation who are accustomed to think the belief is entirely unfounded. must have had to do with such matters. still the vernacular words alone. the question being whether I believe in the reality of God. I answer.” on the contrary. whether in the form of self-evident [i]a priori[/i] principles or in that of infallible perceptual apprehension. A proper formulation of an [i]argument[/i] establishes the rational acceptability of a belief. in that sense. answer the principal purposes. and willing (as long as forcible means are not used). substitute “God. 1906.actually be known and tell untellable stories.” Of course. CP 6. but I myself always use exist in its strict philosophical sense of “react with the other like things in the environment. as a high ecclesiastic. who..[/i] similarly. This is emphatically the case with the very vague word “God. Yes. therefore. but the real thing's characters will remain absolutely untouched. imagining they have [i]a priori[/i] demonstrated metaphysical necessities. is used in ordinary parlance in its correct philosophical sense. I shall. occurring early in the twelfth century. if you please. for all their vagueness. points out: "This attitude is inimical to philosophies in which intuitive cognition is fetish. then. many [i]prove too much[/i].” is the earliest. Still. The reason they fall into this extraordinary error . and of many of them it is true that. or ever will have thought them to be. in one way. Metaphysical arguments have established many rationally acceptable beliefs regarding ultimate realities. I define the real as that which holds its characters on such a tenure that it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may have thought them to be. let the logician do his best to substitute precise equivalents in their places. So. since those attributes are at least as vague. imported it into philosophy.” This is perhaps overscrupulosity.” which is not made less vague by saying that it imports “infinity. apriorism [b]confusing natural science and mathematics. it would be fetichism to say that God “exists. in the latter part of the thirteenth century began to use it freely. It is curious that its legal meaning. But it did not become at all common until Duns Scotus. yet they are invariably vague.” for “Supreme Being” in the question. whereas an [i]argumentation[/i] aspires to compel belief in the truth of its conclusions. in which we speak of “real estate.” The word “reality. opining. in his introduction to [i]Philosophical Writings of Peirce. By the queer yet understandable twists of philosophic history such view-points have in their different ways purported to be scientific. but no metaphysical argumentations have compelled beliefs in their conclusions regarding same.” etc. Albertus Magnus.[/b] (emphasis mine) [quote=Peirce from Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God (c. I further opine that pretty nearly everybody more or less believes this. when saying precisely what the order in the universe consists in.494-521)] No words are so well understood as vernacular words. imagining. I will also take the liberty of substituting “reality” for “existence. for example. Justice Belcher. Of any kind of figment. this is not true.

our instinctive beliefs involving such concepts are far more trustworthy than the best established results of science. [b]For instance. not even those of mathematics. societies. Alas. Entropic processes would represent naught but boundary constraints to our robustly telic human value-pursuits. well. for starters. layers of complexity and orders of emergence under consideration. I would subscribe to a realist. relational metaphysic of experience in a [i]turn to community[/i] that employs an equiprobability principle. semiotic. inevitably change it. So. norm. waste-products and endproducts only analogically. love. and. By-products might include human happiness and hope. Waste-products might include .[/b][/quote] ------------------------------------------------Of course. all as communities of value-realizers. the metrics are fuzzy. nothing. moral achievement. vital and live option one encounters. even biological sciences. especially if all things can work together for the good! ------------------------------------------------- . even if it cannot be quite refuted. conversionfostering. while it may disappoint some that I employed by-products. using a manufacturing metaphor more amenable to a reductionistic thermodynamic paradigm. variously describe. Men who are given to defining too much inevitably run themselves into confusion in dealing with the vague concepts of common sense. then. interpret and transcend realities they encounter. but less so for the physical sciences. evaluate. variously over. Sustained human authenticity would comprise our end-product. is absolutely precise. which would correspond to how well individuals. No concept. relationship-enhancing. he will quickly find he outruns all logical warrant.and under-determined. Nevertheless. social. The metrics. such remaining the case in our social sciences. Every concept that is vague is liable to be self-contradictory in those respects in which it is vague. Could any laboratory experiments render that proposition more certain than instinct or common sense leaves it? It is ridiculous to broach such a question. But when anybody undertakes to say precisely what that order consists in. per those sociologic metrics.about their own belief is that they precide (or render precise) the conception. and such precise conception is easily shown not to be warranted. which prescribes the most life-giving. social responsibility and ideological polydoxy. in doing so. cultures and communities of inquiry. we all think that there is an element of order in the universe. affective attunement. would guage humankind's collective intellectual growth. and some of the most important for everyday use are extremely vague. triadic. if these be precisely understood. don't doubt that there are metrics but only recognize that they are categorically apt to the relevant ontological densities. existentionally actionable response optimal in relationship to every given forced.

rain does not fall for a purpose. they would have no existence otherwise. as well as my appropriation of Deacon's teleodynamics for anthroposemiotic realities (purposeful). [/b] It is. of necessity. It just does fall.[/quote] These peircean distinctions by Short remain consistent with Mayr's teleomatic (mechanistic) and teleonomic (organismic & purposive) distinctions. ‘Final causation without efficient causation is helpless’. [b]For the final state of maximum entropy is not one that the Greeks would have recognized as a form of order. about anisotropic processes generally: their particulars are mechanical. are due to selection (from among alternatives due largely to chance). But. ‘Efficient causation without final causation .. your argument's conclusions are embedded in your overly broad conception of final causation. in Darwin’s phrase. Peirce continued. These are the ones that. The selection can be made consciously and deliberately. includes [b]pseudo-teloi.[/quote] It's. at least. thermodynamics.You've advanced a tautology. ‘teleological is too strong a word’ – was better. ‘and chaos is not even as much as chaos. naturally. It is quite otherwise with organic features. Such has been our theme. that Peirce erred in 1902 by defining final causation too worse than helpless. he said.. it is mere chaos’. again. . which may or may not be true but which adds no new information to ANY of our systems. or. in Peirce’s but not in Aristotle’s sense of that term. then. in Peirce’s account but not Aristotle’s. nevertheless. Your circular reasoning doesn't present explicitly in your premises. is a type for which selection is made. However. instead. as conforming to the laws of mechanics but bereft of a patterned result. in particular. Peirce wrote. it is blank nothing’. as by a human agent. [quote=Short expanded in his notes]In the 1902 writings on which we have drawn. Let us therefore call ‘teleological’ those anisotropic processes only that result in forms of order.. Nor would we. though for the wrong reason. this conception of final cause includes but is broader than our ordinary idea of purpose. surely.. there can be efficient without final causation. but no whit the less on that account are their modes of action polar contraries’. in general. e. controversial to interpret peircean conceptions of final causality as inclusive of entropy maximazation.[/b] [quote=Tom Short points out] I think. That is in line with the Greek conception of chaos or Boltzmann’s of entropy. to make crops grow. today. by no agent at all. without final causation. As Peirce suggested. Instead. ‘Final causality cannot be imagined without efficient causality. which per my own tautology. be tempted to describe it in teleological language. His caution of 1898.. As Aristotle noted. A final cause. when he introduced the term ‘finious’ – ‘if’. Peirce added. And not all tautologies are equally taut. a modern representation of that chaos from which they saw order as emerging..g.

And therefore we cannot identify it with selection for a type of result. is not teleological. Your epistemic promissory notes for reconciling QM and gravity. T. I don't buy your facile psychologizing regarding supposed implicit evaluative dispositions. the relation of mechanistic law to events. I'm extremely curious how you imagine it enjoys a shred of normative impetus or modicum of evaluative appeal. generalizing thermodynamics . I'm engaging your thought only as an interesting foil but otherwise dismiss it out of hand. L. . via 1) reductio ad absurdum. Peirce's Theory of Signs. On Peirce’s own grounds. 2) inordinate vulnerability to both pragmatic and moral parody and 3) failure to gain traction across diverse communities of earnest inquiry and valuerealization. as far as your advancing a descriptive I'm not suggesting your logic's inconsistent or that my interpretation's the only reasonable stance. Erickson. ------------------------------------------------I have no problem with the argumentation [i]per se[/i]. seems to me. No. You leapt across planck's moat to inhabit a metaphysical castle few others find philosophically inhabitable.[quote=Short further explicates]But a law’s governance of events does not conform to Peirce’s own description of final causality: it does not consist in a process exhibiting variability of means. Short (2007) http://www. Even sustained authenticity refers to anthropological realities interpreted in a naturalist frame. singularities (or not). Human authenticity refers to developmental trajectories such as those described by Piaget. then. I'm just pointing out the location of our impasse. informally. [/quote] cf. explaining vaccuum fluctuations.cambridge. while indeed ‘ideal’. boundaries (or none). that you both more broadly construe telos and intentionality or purposefulness than I. etc appear to me to have philosophic junk bond status as far as cashing out any peircean pragmatic value. Your conversation with @MU takes place on a different plane for. ------------------------------------------------We may be a lot closer than I have gathered. ------------------------------------------------Induction? In whose lifetime? You are precisely engaging in a nonvirtuous cycle of abductive hypothesizing and deductive clarifying with no practical prospect of the inductive rubber hitting the epistemic road. open or closed systems. Kohlberg and others.

fee. conversely. even though there is a difference in the degree of finality. But even so. and final causation. I'd presuppose that every event and process involve an element of objective chance. however. and thus the degree of finality is very low. all processes are teleological. the dyadic account loses a degree of rationality. 2ns can be prescinded from 3ns. ------------------------------------------------Why must we conceive these as mutually exclusive? I agree that we must strike a balance between overly optimistic and overly pessimistic anthropologies. Mechanical processes are teleological processes with a negligible degree of finality. To wit: [quote=Menno Hulswit]Granted. but efficient causality can indeed be prescinded from final causality. the fact remains that in some way. or even vague probabilities. As for re-establishing norms. efficient causation. whether or not reality's initial. Final causation in mechanical processes may be viewed as a degenerate kind of final causation. Not entirely over against Short. maintaining an irreducible triadicity. won't that require a novel aesthetic appeal? ------------------------------------------------Although 3ns cannot be prescinded from 2ns. which implicates regularities and laws. maybe just nuancing our differences.What's the difference your distinctions make? Practically. Why wouldn't the same apply to any putative end state? .br/hulswit/p-telhul. Hence.unicamp. I continue to distinguish [i]teloi[/i] by degrees. Instead. and no one has [i]a posteriori[/i] demonstrated. what would humankind do differently? Morally. explaining only the [i]post hoc[/i] but not the [i]propter hoc[/i]. boundary or limit conditions derive from clear necessities or mere regularities. for example? Perhaps you could expand on concrete norms or point me to other resources.htm[/quote] We can't [i]a priori[/i] say. there can be no prescission of final from efficient causality. So.digitalpeirce. such as [i]completely mechanistic and ideal[/i] versus [i]fully teleological and real[/i]. I wouldn't want to [i]a priori[/i] surrender rationality by drawing a flat out distinction. http://www. In so doing. what ought humankind do differently? You touched upon this regarding energy conservation earlier I believe. between one system process and another. in “mechanical processes” the degree of deviation from the deterministic laws is minimal. however.

we would be proving too much and rushing to closure if. exhibit only a [i]degenerate[/i] kind of final causation. [/b] And that's exactly what we discover in our communities of inquiry and valuerealization: They ignore the 2nd Law. ephemeral. describing epistemic states per [i]degrees[/i] of in/determinability and/or un/predictability. necessary. STILL: Mechanical processes and thermodynamics.[/b] What about entropy as the notion of a multiplication of [i]microstates[/i]? . tendencies. while logically consistent. pragmatically. Any given state might be epistemic. After all. epistemic states and probabilities for any given system wouldn't necessarily provide information regarding the ontic states of those systems per degrees of in/determinism. on one hand. Popper. theoretically. but virtual. could only ascribe a commensurately minimal. Some laws may be eternal. on the other. regularities) can be conceived in terms of a) [b]nomicity[/b] (deterministic). others from stochasticity. Therefore. So. ontic or even [i]epi-ontic[/i] (as our measurements even interfere). And certainly wouldn't substitute its ententionality for their own intentionality! [b]Negligible teloi can only birth negligent metanarratives. b) [b]stochasticity[/b] (indeterministic) or c) [b]propensity[/b] (neither. Scotus). in principle. that any deontological ascription of evaluative significance and normative impetus to such a degenerate. unpredictable in practice) might be observationally indistinguishable from some stochastic systems. the relationship between the epistemic and ontic states of systems can often remain open to interpretation. metaphysically. perhaps. except for its practical constraints. wherein the degree of deviation from the deterministic laws is [i]minimal. This is to recognize that regularities may have ontic significance in addition to epistemic. nomicity or sufficient reason. While the practical upshots of the Humean critique would certainly include epistemic humility. as propensities. And. mere probabilities (uniformities.Science thus models the states of any given system probabilistically. We bracket them. [b]negligible degree of evaluative significance and normative impetus. absolutely. why deterministic realities cannot emerge from indeterministic realities or vice versa or why [i]stochastic nomicity[/i] couldn't model some ontic states. minimal. It would seem. Others emergent. or purposelessness. Others. in principle. which brackets metaphysics. Certain states might therefore reasonably be interpreted as [i]adequately[/i] in/determined. All that considered. some deterministic chaotic systems (deterministic in principle. From a vague phenomenological perspective. Peirce. stochasticity or brute existence.[/i] and where the [i]degree of finality is so very low[/i] as to be teleologically [b]negligible[/b]. there's no reason. negligible degree of [i]telos[/i]. we [i]a priori[/i] conclude for or against telos. cf. Some regularities may result from nomicity. therefore.

It's a [i]substrate[/i] of intentionality. rather exhaustive. precisely employ the conceptual placeholders at explanatory gaps. too. I view [i]entropy as information[/i] as a mere analogue to its physical conception. epistemically. as it seems you have imputed. its triads all the way down? No. Otherwise. consciousness and anthroposemiotic origins. biopoietic. while strong emergence remains question begging. I don't combine my emergentist stance with a given metaphysic. Semiotics does no such thing. If you want to employ a root metaphor employing entropic processes or information. of consciousness. philosophies of mind or human language origins. are not grounded in a transcendent metanarrative (not that I don't own such an abduction). which reveals very little regarding the [i]content[/i] of same. posts. semiotic accounts are both necessary and sufficient to foster every human value-realization and to realize those values in abundance. I only subscribe to a vague phenomenological perspective using peircean categories. So. Weak emergence is trivial. Instead of turtles. however. teleonomic and teleodynamic processes. cosmic. is an epistemic logic not an onto-logic. especially given the background context of my other. that's fine. novel boundary constraints. cosmogonies. if he arguably has one. which may or may not be true but it's way too strong a position to demonstrate. Laws can evolve. a/biogenesis. Any quibbles. But I know you don't pretend that it has eliminated the explanatory gaps that would resolve quantum interpretations.I've seen that. though. properly considered. such as regarding the origins of life. ------------------------------------------------To be clear. I remain metaphysically agnostic regarding quantum. implicate novelty. Onto-semiologists boil existence down to a root metaphor of information. You are not being serious when you facilely caricature my stance. Emergence does. such as between teleomatic. I subscribe to the view that naturalist. of human symbolic language. Your caricature relies on a failure to disambiguate telos. Neither do I [i]a priori[/i] assign in/determinist properties to probabilities or in/determinabilities. employing a broad conception which I reject. The distinctions that some of us draw. but am not at all immersed in any thoroughgoing peircean metaphysic. . semiotics.

exactly why would it follow that the robust telos would necessarily be more temporally fundamental than the weak? I assign an axiological primacy to human values. is to say nothing terribly informative (pun) ontologically. The boundary constraints that inform thermodynamics birth new boundary constraints in morphodynamics which birth novel boundary constraints in organisms which birth novel boundaries. to pragmatic interests.Telos itself can evolve. to meet the burdens of proof required for coercive normativity. however. We see this all the time. that. No. as epistemic and practical methodologies. ethics and morality.[/i] we next draw upon his distinction between the normative sciences as [i]theoretic[/i] and those logical. which best coheres with my sneaking suspicions. probabilities. aesthetics and/or ethics[/i]. evidentially. beauty and goodness when doing science. such argumentations are too weak. All in keeping with the peircean notion that [i]Logic follows Ethics and both follow Aesthetics. genotypically and phenotypically. not even [i]ipso facto[/i] via an auxiliary consequence of some other argument. as metaphysical and theoretic presuppositions. differentials in degrees of in/determinability. for all practical purposes. apart from any precise theories of [i]truth. well. methodological stipulations. it still would not follow that I have anywhere suggested that human intentionality is fundamental rather than emergent. No. purposeful telos might be more robustly teleological than a purposive telonomic process. lacking a more universally compelling nature. An axiological anthropocentrism doesn't implicate an anthropic cosmological principle. in my view. we can discuss and even robustly describe theories of [i]knowledge. they can't coerce a logical . Just because I maintain that an emergent. In our metaphysical. epistemic states. It does comport with the emergence of human semiosis which is. ethical and aesthetical activities out of which we cash [i]pragmatic[/i] value. It describes. It is to recognize. It's a category error to confuse that with any putative temporal primacy exhibited by some degenerate 3ns. I have no earthly idea what emerged from what or how. Now. to suggest that a robustly purposeful telos remains distinct from its purposive teleonomic. This is not to suggest that making our accounts of primal and/or ultimate realities more precise via argumentation cannot variously dispose us. not even implicitly. to ultimate realities. we need refer only to our shared [i]vague[/i] conceptions of truth. Further. evaluatively. organismic substrate which emerged from a teleomatic mechanistic process. but brackets them and any degrees of in/determinism. But even if I stipulate to a physicalist stance. all the way up our phylogenetic lineage. inescapably human. In other words. beauty and goodness[/i]. rather. which is more indeterminable than a weak teleomaticity. It doesn't describe ontic state properties or natures.

it's nowhere near decisive. as far as precise conceptions go.generally don't employ robust descriptions of the natures of truth. all hierarchically nested in a recursively constrained triadic dynamic. The pragmatic turn and semiotics. with an [i]explanatory account[/i] of natural information systems. our phenomenological taxonomy recognizes distinctions between. where. which norm what we can do with any given level of evidence. respectively. While these vague conceptions remain in negotiation within and between most communities of inquiry. noncontradiction holds but excluded middle holds. This phenomenological taxonomy represents a [i]logical[/i] accounting of a vague modal ontology. Whether one's stance stops at biosemiotics or extends to pansemiotics. It doesn't meet such burdens of proof. Beliefs --. noncontradiction folds but excluded middle holds. it shouldn't. vague conceptions regarding many of the putative properties. It won't. as Terry Deacon's thought reveals. to ultimate realities.[/i] which provides a phenomenological taxonomy. I say causationS only because. they overlap enough (in how they characterize truth.ethically and morally ---because. and 3ns. [quote=As Deacon recognizes] . between purposive and purposeful processes.and anthropo. beauty and goodness. most axiological discourse employs shared vague conceptions of the [i]characteristics[/i] of truth. including bio. coupled with science. while our [i]logical[/i] accounting may be [i]onto-logically[/i] suggestive. This relates to the telic distinctions between teleomatic. that particular distinction. they can't coerce an ethical consensus in the sense that moral formulations and legal codifications would in any manner reflect a deontological response to their ontological implications. the various reductions in [i]shannon[/i] (signal). for example. which. seem to be indispensable heuristics for navigating the proximate realities of [i]nos environs[/i]. between ententionality and intentionality. though. evidentially.consensus in the sense that competing accounts would necessarily be considered unreasonable. [i]boltzman[/i] (thermodynamic) and [i]darwinian[/i] (genotypicphenotypic variety) entropies. affectively. in peircean 1ns. John Deely or Stanley Salthe. teleonomic and teleodynamic process. correspond to syntactic delimitations. characteristics or [i]predicables[/i] of truth. enjoy a coercive normative impetus --. So. 2ns. however. gifts heuristic value for theoretic frontiers and has the ability to variously attune us. which would describe informational causations. whether Tom Short.semiotics.upon which a wo/man is prepared to act --. how easy it is to become seduced by what we might call the [i]fallacy of [b]misplaced aboutness[/b] . Beliefs employ. instead. beauty and goodness but doesn't otherwise rely on shared robust descriptions of their precise [i]natures[/i]. beauty and goodness) to provide great heuristic value. we mustn't confuse a semiotic [i]heuristic. they can't evoke an aesthetical consensus in the sense that competing accounts would suffer a diminished evaluative appeal.. both hold. semantic references and pragmatic interests. beauty and goodness.. However. for example. all [i]distinctly different forms of [b]aboutness[/b][/i]. This is to recognize that.

I did read a LOT of Stanley Salthe but it was kinda [i]deja vu[/i].g.[/quote] Humanism. such efforts including our education. rather. It made me suspect that you and I might be overstating our differences. and so on. Humanism [i]is[/i] pragmatism.norms our efforts to subdue our animality out of which our [i]sapience[/i] extends.:nod: Actually. where his metaphysic could be abstracted away or bracketed without affecting the integrality of his system. in a quantum bit. This is implicit in eliminativist alternatives to Cartesian dualism and it is ubiquitous in computational conceptions of evolution. mind. He discussed the teleomatic and teleonomic but departed from same in saying the 2nd Law was the ultimate final cause. boltzmann. darwin entropic triadic. which. properly considered --. it's [i]finious[/i]. but --. cultures and traditions. Capurro counters Floridi maintaining that all values are [i]human[/i] values. where the world's coextensive with the domain of information.[/i]. consistent with pragmatism. Humanism. much of it seemed reasonable enough.not only takes account of our anthroposemiotic differentiations from other biosemiotic and pansemiotic realities. a DNA molecule. e.[/quote] This reminds me of Rafael Capurro's critique of Luciano Floridi's [i]demiurgic information ecology[/i]. As I read. a computer algorithm. thus conceived. it is not reducible to any specific physical distinction. What the present analysis purports to demonstrate is that the representational relationship cannot be vested in any object or structure or sign vehicle. a word-object correlation. an eminently defensible anthropo[i]centric[/i] view. I resonated with much of the biology and darwinian critique and wondered if he would abide the shannon. It is an analogue to the Whiteheadian fallacy of misplaced concreteness and involves the tendency to identify the content or ground of an intentional relationship with some one or more of the substrates of the process. in my view. Most of his biology and much of his social critique seemed philosophically portable to metaphysical places other than a pansemiotic stance. [quote=John Deely]What distinguishes the human being from the other animals is that only human animals come to realize that there are signs distinct from and superordinate to every particular thing that serves to constitute an individual in its distinctness from its surroundings. which remain at the center of any claims to moral significance as long as we avoid the [i]fallacy of misplaced aboutness[/i]. attends to peircean thirdness to realize authentically human values. a neural circuit. affirming a secular humanism. ------------------------------------------------I take. language and social processes. perceiving that which humans attend to and attending to that which . nor is it fully constituted by a correspondence relationship.

and ubiquitously shared evaluative dis-positions and normative pro-positions of humankind's diverse communities of value-realizers. almost axiomatically so. cultural and traditional realities (habits. relevance and interests. While both are [i]rule-governed[/i]. I'm sympathetic to a pansemiotic and physiosemiotic view. even overcoming Heidegger's critiques) and presents as a nonfoundational. Journal of Biosemiotics. goodness. 2005. Biosemiotics as applied objective ethics and esthetics rather than semeiotic. The fourth pitfall is that we are driven to believe our metaphysical convictions as a doctrine. The proclamation of unnecessarily strong statements is strategically unwise if weaker claims are sufficient for making biosemiotics. vital and live options.neither ahistorically nor uncritically ---from humanism's classicist.[quote=Ahti-Veikko Pietarinenn]Normativity has to do with rule-governed.Limitations on applying Peircean semeiotic. meaning-constitutive practices and activities. Pragmatic humanisms turn attentively to the accumulated wisdom of educational. axiologically secured by the time-honored. hence.we avoid any facile conflation regarding ententional and intentional teloi. one of the “most purely theoretical of purely theoretical sciences”Why is the Normativity of Logic Based on Rules? [/quote]In the . but properly nuanced by an emergentist stance that remains ontologically vague and tentative. only the latter are [i]meaning-constitutive[/i]. long-established. beauty. beyond any sheer quantity of information or rule-governance. unity and freedom. enlightenment and existential expressions (yes. is another pitfall that should be avoided (if biosemiotics is going to be a science). which lead us to forced. An authentically pragmatic humanism retrieves wisdom --. that makes them incapable of explaining (or even describing) anything. phenomenological taxonomy with only a vague modal ontology and shared vague conceptions of human values such as truth. deontologically modest. 269-308 [/quote]Per the [i]fallacy of misplaced aboutness[/i]. I say ironic because this is over against any indefensible anthropo[i]morphic[/i] pansemiotic. because logic as a normative science is. 3ns). The third pitfall is that we may be drifted to pronounce unnecessarily strong metaphysical statements (as in [b]physiosemiotics[/b]). Intentionality relates to significance. Volume 1. Number 1.interests humans. It requires only our semiotic. fallibilist. tendencies. which onto-extrapolates human intentionality to other forms of [i]aboutness[/i]. ------------------------------------------------[quote=Tommi Vehkavaara]Thus. This humanism remains unapologetically and thoroughgoingly anthropocentric. renaissance. not as the hypotheses or ends but as the principles or starting points. according to Peirce. including our existential concerns. As such they are often either simply false or even if true. postmodern humanism. pp. It doesn't require a systematic architectonic or metaphysic. the excess vagueness of the adopted metaphysical concepts and doctrines. so weekly justified (if justified at all) that others do not have much reasons to become convinced of their truth.

we properly redescribe pleasure and pain. his theory is exactly contrary to hedonism. or an accompaniment of the achievement of quietus... not the feeling that accompanies reaching this state. not ontological commitments. requiring various sacrifices. It provides those implicit. a symptom.continental view. a state in which the struggle between the ego and the non-ego is minimal) but this state not be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. aesthetics and spiritual intuitions. . If brains are amazing. The feeling of pleasure is the icing on the cake — it is an indicator that one has reached a state of quietus. all within our pragmatic interests. in principle. epistemology remains inherently [i]anthropocentric[/i]. Atkins]As Peirce notes.<-----. phenomenologically.ego into a state of quietus in thought. or agreement. that we have every reason to believe are novel. the person would still be in a pleasurable state. The science of logic strives to bring the ego and the non. . one value vs another. ontologically. In the analytic view. .In the normative sciences. on aesthetics. which locates normativity in the feeling of pleasure. due to our radical finitude. semiotic realism can adopt both stances. indeed. ontological specificity remains unnecessary.e. Those presuppositions require only provisional closures or methodological stipulations. In contrast. one could reach a state of quietus (i. On the Peircean account. A pragmatic. even if he does not feel the pleasure. the feeling is only an epiphenomenon. they won't collapse into hedonism if.. No doubt about it: Our symbolic minds allow us to access mental experiences. This is determined by the very nature of judgments and the mutual interdetermination of the ego and the non-ego.[quote=Ursula Goodenough and Terrence Deacon]We have our virtues neither by nor contrary to our natures. Aesthetics recognizes the state of quietus to be what is admirable in itself. Peirce’s conception of normativity is grounded in the struggle for a state of pleasure. the human brain is flat-out astonishing. which.. the pleasure itself is the state in which quietus is reached. The science of ethics strives to bring the ego and the non-ego into a state of quietus in conduct. one individual vs another vs even the common good.But we suggest that it is also of utmost importance that we not lose track of our mental evolutionary antecedents. while ethics and logic depend. can compete. like mathematics. We are fitted by our natures to receive them.This is the agreement of the faculties of understanding and imagination in reaching determinate concepts by which to subsume (and hence understand) nature. unique to the human. and conflict.LambruscoE snipped here ------>Is not pleasure by definition a feeling?In reply. However. consequent on reaching a state of quietus. However.[quote=Richard K..The normative sciences bridge phaneroscopy and metaphysics by bringing the struggle between the ego and the non-ego into an aesthetic state of quietus. indispensable metaphysical presuppositions (modal ontological logic) required for an axiological epistemology. It is this state that grounds normativity. [i]The Pleasures of Goodness: Peircean Aesthetics in Light of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment[/i][/quote]The intentional teloi of human experience are grounded in our relationships to value-rich ecological objects or [i]affordances[/i] and are attenuated by intensely pro-social feelings. A taxonomy of vague phenomenological conceptions suffices. Conceivably. the feeling is.

38(4): 801-819 [/quote][quote=Joshua Johnson]Consider it this way: Shannon entropy is often used to measure the amount of information in an object. independently of the effort. Very random strings may have more Shannon entropy than very structured strings.199). .” “that question obviously depends upon the question what it would be that. we would say that it is an impoverished perspective. and it is this awareness of what it feels like to be moral -. Peirce admits that “the moralist … merely tells us that we have a power of self-control. Any substance. --indeed. that no narrow or selfish aim can ever prove satisfactory …. even though long random strings could have more information than very short well structured strings. Peirce states that since “ethics asks to what end all effort shall be directed. they may not be very relevant or interesting.J. Normativity.this moral experience -. in so far as affordances are not dependent upon the observer. It begins with a new definition of what value and meaning are. Physics may be value-free. any layout has some affordance for benefit or injury to someone.. In fact.. Any perspective on the human condition that brushes this fact aside is an incomplete perspective.” The puzzling aspect of Peirce's treatment of aesthetics is that esthetics is taken to deal with both the normative habits of feeling and the Summum Bonum itself. any surface. Without a capacity to decide the relevance or structure of various interpretations.. then. and for any more definite information.<-----LambruscoE snipped here ------>J. we should like to experience”. Between the normative habits of feeling and the normative ultimate ideal there is an immediate and essential [/quote] [quote=Marco Stango]Aesthetics. He distinguishes them from the phenomenal theory of gestalt psychology. he has to refer us to the esthetician whose business it is to say what is the state of things . The perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a value-free physical object to which meaning is somehow added in a way that no one has been able to agree upon. deals with habits of feeling evaluated under the category of nobility (cf. we are uniquely aware of what it feels like to be pro-social. that is the essential question of aesthetics (CP 2. Gibson theorizes affordances as ecological features which enable or constrain an animal by virtue of their invariances. but ecology is not. it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object. but are invariant features of the environment:“The [b]theory of [i]affordances[/i][/b] is a radical departure from existing theories of value and meaning.” (Gibson)[i]Full Spectrum Aesthetics: Process Ontology. as I conceive the matter. since it is difficult to predict the appearance of new bit of information in a random string. the sheer number of interpretations tells us very little about the significance of the object at hand. Given that we have evolved from an intensely social lineage.that undergirds and motivates the actions of a moral person. on the one hand.? From Biology to Consciousness to Morality by Ursula Goodenough and Terrence Deacon. On the other hand.. by calculating the degree of randomness contained within any given string of information. Zygon D 03. and Speculations on the Category Theoretical Approach[/i]http://joshuaj.. Parker 2003) or absolute “admirability. But.

panentheism. The first quotation shows that esthetics aims to fix the good habits of feeling. 3) intraobjectively. aesthetic teleology. tehomic. donald gelpi. through expressivism or emotionalism in art. determinable.Regarding our vague conception of [i]goodness[/i]. In other words. Esthetic insight grasps affectively and simultaneously reality's goodness and truth. In other words. through mimesis and imitationalism in art. [/quote]Aesthetically. expressivism and instrumentalism. it engages that appreciative insight into the identity of the good and the true which humans call the beautiful. 2) intersubjectively. shannon entropy. ursula goodenough. through virtue epistemology. . aretaic (virtue) teleological and (consequentialistic). we distinguish imitation or mimesis. through formalism or essentialism in art.Agency and Normativity: A Study in thePhilosophy of Peirce and Dewey [/quote][quote=Donald Gelpi]Esthetics measures other goods against supreme excellence and formulates a normative account of the kinds of habits one needs to cultivate in order to appreciate supreme goodness and beauty. tehom. boltzman entropy. through a semiotic. through contractarian ethics. teleonomic. we approach ethical value realizations 1) intrasubjectively. Esthetics puts order into the human heart and psyche by teaching it to appreciate those realities and values that make life ultimately worth living. Logic teaches one to think clearly about reality so that one can make realistic choices that lead one to the appreciation and enjoyment of ultimate beauty. teleodynamic. teleomatic.Esthetics also gives an ultimate orientation to the other two normative sciences of ethics and of logic.Regarding our vague conception of [i]beauty[/i]. jack caputo. terry deacon. Ethically. chaos. pansemioentheism. ontic state. 3) intraobjectively. indetermined. we approach aesthetical value realizations 1) intrasubjectively. epistemic state. and 4) interobjectively. Peirce found that the ultimate normative ideal of human life. 2) intersubjectively. goodness. amos yong. is “the development of concrete reasonableness” in the world. and truth. in Peirce's understanding of normative thinking both ethics and logic serve the ultimately beautiful as their end. while the second quotations makes clear that its object is extended to the definition of the nature of the Summum Bonum. darwinian entropy. 3) intraobjectively. david ray griffin. determined. indeterminable. epi-ontic state.Regarding our vague conception of [i]truth[/i].which is most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason” (EP 2: 253). through teleological or consequentialistic ethics. As we know from the previous chapter. An esthetic perception of supreme goodness engages the heart rather than the head. and 4) interobjectively. its Summum Bonum. and 4) interobjectively. thomas oord. 2) intersubjectively. through correspondence. we distinguish the deontological. community of inquiry. through deontological ethics. catherine keller. we approach noetical value realizations 1) intrasubjectively. axiological epistemology. through art as instrumentalism. through aretaic or virtue ethics. through coherence. Ethics studies the kinds of habits of choice one must cultivate in order to live for the ultimately beautiful. john cobb.

philip clayton. theology of nature. anti-theodicy. principle of maximum entropy.tripp fuller. john haught. theodicy. john deely . phytosemiotic. philosophical theology. physiosemiotic. zoosemiotic. biosemiotic. pansemiotic. charles sanders peirce. joseph bracken. john sobert sylvest. anthroposemiotic. homebrewed christianity.