General Assembly

Libya (Ava Stills)

North Korea Nuclear Weapons
ALLOWING NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
The General Assembly and Security Council,
Fully aware of past failed resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006) and unsuccessful
sanctions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) to prevent nuclear programs in North
Korea,
Emphasizing the need for resources and low-cost occupation creation in the moribund
country North Korea,
Keeping in mind North Koreas security is threatened by many countries in the world due
to disagreements of governmental control, as well as humanitarian rights,
Guided by the knowledge that in resolution 2087 (2013) it states the determination to
take significant action, if North Korea does not comply with the resolution, has not been
acted upon,
Declaring that when handled properly and as protection, nuclear programs and weapons
are less of a threat from North Korea than they are currently viewed as,
Noting with regret the disputes with North Korea coming from others in the General
Assembly have seemingly played a role in the fight against North Korean nuclear
programs,
Having heard the concerns of other countries we propose a compromise with North
Korea that benefits both North Korea and the countries who object the authorization of
North Koreas nuclear programs,
Welcoming the concept of peace and compromise between North Korea and its allies with
the General Assembly and Security Council as stated in the following,

1. Expresses its hope of a trade of protection and acceptance of nuclear programs in

North Korea in exchange for openness of nuclear programs and viewings of production
plants for nuclear programs to the Security Council;
2. Notes need of trades and purchases, which are under many sanctions, to keep the
crumbling economy of North Korea from dissipating:

(a) With all trades searched and inventoried by the Security Council;
(b) With any trades involving materials for any nuclear programs
and/or nuclear weapons subjected to investigation and only permitted to be traded
with countries that are allowed nuclear programs;
(c) With restrictions on purchases that add to or are used in nuclear
programs;
3. Encourages the exchange of humanitarian aid to North Korean residence for the
cooperation of North Korean nuclear programs in regards to unscheduled checks of safety
and use of nuclear programs by the security council;
4. Further invites the inspection of trades being imported from and exported to
North Korea located in countries allied and associated with North Korea to ensure no
trading sanctions are being broken or the misuse of nuclear weapons is occurring;
5. Urges that if no actions for or against North Korean denuclearization occurs,
peace talks between North Korea with or without its allies and the United Nations will
occur to absolve as much nuclear conflict as is possible;
6. Further recommends the acceptance of nuclear programs in North Korea, if not
for protection then for resources;
7. Draws the attention to the reality of the threat from North Korea:
(a) With opposition or threat regarding nuclear programs against
North Korea there is no reason why North Korea should not be allowed to possess
nuclear programs for protection purposes;
(b) With the necessity of resources and occupation in North Korea,
nuclear programs would help solve various issues regarding the needs as well as
creating long range and short range protection from threats against North Korea;