You are on page 1of 17

OSMEA

220
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

vs.
SCRA

ORBOS
703

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which
implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."
FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as
amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase
of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue
to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil
companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil
products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further,
the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing
power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the
special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the
petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956,
as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special
fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general
fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that
these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to
the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring
the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of
the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D.
1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the
Fund.

CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague


G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to

P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that
the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication


Board 215 SCRA 86 (1992)
Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
215 SCRA 86 (1992)
Facts:
On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao
Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU
embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty
members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members and
employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In
turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will
be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.

When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap"
for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the
segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage
on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is
not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.
Issue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public use by
presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the
purpose for which they are reserved?
Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question of when
and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue
of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating
that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in
carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and academic faculty"
overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.

Araneta v Gatmaitan
Facts:
The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66
and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of
people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in
danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators
filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
Issue:
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative
powers unduly delegated to the Pres.
Held:
VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or
fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to
provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and
leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an
anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were
in consonance and strict conformity with law.
Distinction bet:
Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law shall be
Execution of Law authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in
pursuance of law.

Edu vs Ericta
Posted by kaye lee on 2:56 PM
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation of power; police power]
FACTS:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as
Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for
being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in
the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an
undue exercise of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.
RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public
safety and order.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing
upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity
of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary
to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order,
which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the

completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands
of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no
doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime
consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation
Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules
and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No.
2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA


Posted by kaye lee on 5:21 PM
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate
legislation]
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits
and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of nondelegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as

hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot
be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law
may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject
is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Gerochi vs. DOE


Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind

Facts: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power


Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose
a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose
of funding NAPOCORs projects, was enacted and took effect in
2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating
that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard
and be represented.
Issue: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax.
Held: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an
exaction in the exercise of the States police power. That public
welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA,
which enumerates the policies of the State regarding
electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the
universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment
and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is
imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the countrys electric
power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an
exaction primarily in pursuit of the States police objectives
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does
not make the imposition a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement of police
power. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax

emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot


fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and wellbeing of the people.
People of the Philippines vs Vera
Posted by kaye lee on 1:31 PM
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a
motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He
then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also
denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for
new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of
the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular
Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI
Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming
that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No.
4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This
Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of
the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied

in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the
salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial
fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers
would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The
Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show
that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate
the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No.
4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.
Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC


Posted on September 10, 2012

G.R. No. 177597


July 16, 2008
Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October
29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the
First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City

because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of
votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative
in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of
Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU
must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create
LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power

to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in the
LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1
representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1
Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the
Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives,
and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers
through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative
bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of
Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242
SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body
which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through
the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress
but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.

The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely
in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because
Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional
assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for
Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected
in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, is void.

Gonzales vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967
Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and
PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and
3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that
each province shall have at least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the
general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act
fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the
people, and appropriates funds for said election.
Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said
law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this
provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election.
The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action
taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by
the Court.
Velasco vs COMELEC
This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the resolutions denying the
COC Velasco had filed for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Sasmuan,
Pampanga. The distinctions between inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC
denial/cancellation proceedings, refute and belie Velasco's position that the
COMELEC improperly ruled on his right to vote when it cancelled his COC.
ISSUE: Is decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding operate as a bar to any
future action challenging ones right to be registered as a voter?
HELD: Inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary
proceedings. A decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a

bar to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning his
right to be registered as a voter. A ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a
specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC
itself does not rule on the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC
denial/cancellation proceeding the final and executory ruling by a court, as
mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding.

GALLEGO VS VERRA
G.R.No.L48641November24,1941
FACTS:
ThisisapetitionforcertioraritoreviewthedecisionoftheCAaffirmingthedecisionofthe
CFILeyte,whichdeclaredillegalthepetitioner'selectiontotheofficeofmunicipalmayorof
Abuyog,LeyteintheelectionofDecember1940,onthegroundthathedidnotmeetthe
residencequalification.
GallegoisanativeofAbuyog.Afterhisstudies,hewasemployedasaschoolteacherin
Catarman,Samar,aswellasinsomemunicipalitiesinLeyte.In1937,heranasmunicipalmayor
inAbuyogbutlost.InJune1938,heworkedinMalaybalay,BukidnoninaplantationofBureau
ofForestrytomakeupforthefinancialdrawbackcausedbyhislossinthepreviouselection,and
stayedthereuntilheresignedinSeptember1940.
GallegoregisteredhimselfasanelectorinBukidnonandvotedintheelectionforassemblymen
heldinDecember1938,andinJanuary1940.Heobtainedandpaidforhisresidencecertificateit
wasstatedthathehadresidedinthesaidmunicipalityforoneandahalfyears.
Undertheforegoingfacts,theCAdeclaredthatGallegolosthisdomicileinAbuyogatthetime
hewaselectedmayor.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotGallegolosthisdomicileoforigininAbuyog,Leyteandacquiredanew
domicileinMalaybalay,Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO.Inthedefinitionof"residence"intheelectionlaw,itstatesthatinordertoacquirea
domicilebychoice,theremustconcur:(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality;(2)
anintentiontoremainthere;and(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile.
Thepurposetoremaininthedomicileshouldbeforanindefiniteperiodoftime.Thecourt
believedthatGallegohadnointentiontostayinMalaybalayindefinitelybecause:(1)Whenhe
wasemployedasateacherinSamar,healwaysreturnedinAbuyogandevenresignedwhenhe

ranforofficein1937;(2)Hisdeparturewasonlyforthepurposeofmakingupforthefinancial
drawbackcausedbyhislossintheelection;(3)Hedidnottakehiswifeandchildrento
Malaybalaywithhim;(4)HeboughtapieceoflandinAbuyoganddidnotavailofthelandin
theplantationofferedtohimbythegovernment;and(5)Hevisitedhisfamilythricedespitethe
greatdistancebetweenLeyteandBukidnon.
TheCourtsaidthatthemanifestintentofthelawinfixingaresidencequalificationisto
"excludeastranger,oranewcomer,unacquaintedwiththeconditionsandneedsofacommunity
andnotidentifiedwiththelatterfromanelectiveofficetoservethatcommunity."
Moreover,thepetitionerwasanativethere,hadrunforthesameofficebefore,andwasnow
electedwithamajorityof800votesina3rdclassmunicipality.

Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections


June 23, 2011
No comments

20

Facebook20

Twitter

Pinterest0

LinkedIn0

Email0

ADVERTISEMENTS

558 SCRA 700 Political Law Municipal Corporation Creation of LGUs by Autonomous
Regions (ARMM) Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised
of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration
from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with
Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because
her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that
under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically
gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly
LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government

units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM
cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in
order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the
other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities
and provinces.

You might also like