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September Term, 2014:
Nos: 1553 and 2099
September Term, 2015:
AARON J. WALKER, ESQ., ET AL.
APPELLEE WALKER’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S OPPOSITION TO
APPELLEE WALKER’S MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION TO EXCEED PAGE
LIMITATION AND OSTRONIC’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
NOW COMES Appellee Aaron J. Walker, Esq., and files this Reply to “Appellant's
Response in Oppostion [sic] to Appellee Aaron Walker's (1) Motion to Dismiss and (2)
Motion to Exceed the Page Limit” (hereinafter the “Opposition”) and states the
The Appellant accuses Mr. Walker1 of not wishing to confront the merits of
the appeal (Opposition ¶1), but in fact the Appellant doesn’t want to deal with the merits
of Mr. Walker’s Motion to Dismiss. Nowhere in his seven-page Opposition does the
Appellant deny the major thrust of Mr. Walker’s motion—that the Appellant has serially
misrepresented the facts, misrepresented the content of testimony, and misrepresented the
For instance, Mr. Walker stated that the Appellant misstated the truth in
relation to Judge McGann’s ruling of July 1, 2014, describing it as a granting a motion to
dismiss when, in fact, Judge McGann granted a motion for summary judgment. Mr.
Mr. Walker refers to himself in the third person for stylistic purposes and to depersonalize this case.
Walker also stated that the Appellant falsely claimed that he was not told he could testify
until “the day of trial, minutes before evidence was to begin,” Appellant’s Brief 24, when,
in fact, the record and the record extract showed that the Appellant was told he could
testify the day before the presentation of evidence. This fact undermines one of the
Appellant’s major legal claims: that he was unfairly surprised when he won his motion to
testify. To name only a few of the countless falsehoods identified in the Motion to
Dismiss alone, he also falsely accused his own wife of being crazy (Motion to Dismiss
¶15), made claims about the Appellees’ state of mind unsupported by evidence (id. at
¶22) and claimed that the Appellees admitted to a desire to injure the Appellant when
they did not (id. at ¶42).
Instead of addressing these points, the Appellant feigns confusion and
complains that Mr. Walker filed his Motion to Dismiss in anticipation of this Court
granting Ostronic’s motion to withdraw, as though this is not perfectly ordinary conduct.
Likewise, he complains that Mr. Walker filed a Motion to Dismiss exceeding the page
limit while simultaneously seeking a waiver of that limit, as though this is also unusual.
Indeed, Mr. Walker has done precisely this in prior litigation involving the Appellant (he
has sued Mr. Walker many times). Likewise, he complains that Mr. Walker uses roman
numerals for page numbers for matters placed before his Appellees’ Brief, even though
this is a common practice that the Appellant has himself engaged in.
Then, the remainder of the motion is an ad hominem attack on Mr. Walker
as a person and as an attorney in an attempt to argue he can’t represent himself. The
Appellant complains that Mr. Walker is not licensed to practice law in Maryland,
Opposition ¶7, but neither is the Appellant. The Appellant has repeatedly expressed in
other courts the belief that somehow because Mr. Walker is an attorney in two other
jurisdictions (Virginia and the District of Columbia), that he cannot represent himself in
Maryland. There is no such rule, and the Appellant has been told repeatedly by other
courts that this is not the rule.
However, he uses this knowingly faulty legal premise to launch into his ad
hominem attacks on Mr. Walker, falsely claiming Mr. Walker is “a disgraced attorney
from Virginia who is unemployed and unemployable” (Opposition ¶15), when, in fact,
Mr. Walker has never been disciplined by any state bar or committed any crime worse
than a traffic infraction and is self-employed like many lawyers. He goes on to tell a
fantasy story about Mr. Walker’s termination that was rejected in this very case (where he
writes as though he personally witnessed events which he did not), attempts to falsely
smear Mr. Walker as a religious bigot, falsely claims that Mr. Walker has lost every filing
against him, and so on. Further, one wonders, if Mr. Walker is as incompetent as the
Appellant claims, why is the Appellant unable to counter any of his arguments on their
merits? Why does he want this Court to look away and ignore what Mr. Walker wrote in
his Motion to Dismiss and his brief?
The Appellant also adds additional arguments in his “Appellant’s Response
to Appellees’ (1) Motion to Dismiss, (2) Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Appellee
Walker, and (3) Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Appellee Brief [sic]”
which he claims was served on August 14, 2015, but didn’t arrive at any Appellee’s
mailbox until some ten days later. Specifically, he conspiratorially claims that “[t]his is an
obvious ploy to get around the 35-page limit for the appellee brief” (id. at 8), when, in
truth, Mr. Ostronic could always file separate briefs for each Appellee. Further, the
Appellant darkly claims that part of the plan was to “place impertinent information into
Appellee Walker’s brief” (id.). That brief has already been filed, and this Court can judge
for itself the accuracy of the Appellant’s prediction. In truth, the only person inserting
impertinent information into legal filings is the Appellant with irrelevant ad hominem
attacks. In doing so, he has inserted improper, immaterial, impertinent, and
irrelevantly scandalous matter into his Opposition and Mr. Walker asks that it be
stricken. The Appellant also claims that Mr. Ostronic is using the motion to withdraw as
a justification for seeking extra time, but on the face of his filings he is only seeking that
extension of time in order to give this Court a chance to address his latest motion to
Mr. Walker notes that Mr. Ostronic filed that motion to dismiss on Mr. Walker’s behalf.
That was in error. This is not to say Mr. Walker opposes any part of Mr. Ostronic’s
The reality is that, unlike the Appellant, Mr. Walker is a law school
graduate (Yale Law School), having achieved this despite his hidden disabilities and the
discrimination they inspire. Further, Mr. Walker has been required to convince two
jurisdictions that he had the competence, character and fitness to practice in the legal
profession and remains in good standing in both. In other words, Mr. Walker is licensed
to represent other people and does represent other people in two jurisdictions, but
somehow the Appellant thinks that Mr. Walker shouldn’t be allowed to represent himself
in Maryland. Further, contrary to the Appellant’s suggestion, Mr. Walker has little doubt
that he could be admitted to practice in Maryland if he ever so desired, but, in all
frankness, his practice is focused in Virginia. This is in sharp contrast to the Appellant,
who never attended law school and is unable to become a lawyer because of his extensive
The right to represent oneself has constitutional significance. For instance,
in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a state
may not “hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even
when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” Mr. Walker has equally been
haled before Maryland’s courts and now has been haled before this Court. He insists that
he wants to conduct his own defense of this appeal. Absent extraordinary circumstances,
the right of self-representation should not be denied, and no such circumstances exist in
In an Opposition complaining that the Appellees are focused on
technicalities, the Appellant has refused to even address the very substantive point that he
has repeatedly misstated the truth about the facts shown in this case, about the
proceedings below, and even about the legislative history in this state. In all bluntness,
the Appellant seems to think a “statement of facts” is a chance to let his imagination run
wild and his creative juices flow, rather than an opportunity to present a concise and
motion to dismiss—Mr. Walker incorporated those arguments by reference, after all—but
Mr. Walker always intended to write separately to correct the legion of misstatements of
the truth in the Appellant’s Brief.
relevant description of the proven facts and the proceedings below. The Appellant’s
continual misstatements of the truth—as well as every point raised by Mr. Ostronic in his
motion to dismiss—justifies dismissal of the instant appeal.
Accordingly, the Appellant has not offered this Court any reason why Mr.
Walker’s Motion to Dismiss should not be granted and the suit should not be dismissed,
and Mr. Walker asks that it be dismissed immediately, for the reasons stated in his Motion
to Dismiss as well as for the reasons stated in Mr. Ostronic’s motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, Appellee Aaron J. Walker, Esq. should be allowed to represent himself,
should be granted leave to file a Motion to Dismiss in excess of the page limitation,
should be granted his Motion to Dismiss, and given all other relief that is appropriate.
Wednesday, August 26, 2015
Aaron J. Walker, Esq. (Va Bar# 48882)
P.O. Box 3075
Manassas, Virginia 20108
Phone: (703) [redacted] (no fax)
I, Aaron Walker, solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury that the contents of
the foregoing paper are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
STATEMENT ON FONT
This document was typed in Times New Roman, 13-point font.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on Wednesday, August 26, 2015, I served copies of the Motion for Leave,
Motion to Dismiss and Appellee’s Brief on Brett Kimberlin at [redacted], Bethesda,
Maryland 20817, via U. S. Mail, on the following co-Appellees via email: William Hoge,
Robert Stacy McCain and Ali Akbar with their consent.