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FACTS: Macke and Chandler are
partners doing business under the firm
name of Macke, Chandler & Company.
Macke, on the order of one Ricardo
Flores, who represented himself to be
agent of the defendant, shipped goods
to the defendants at the Washington
Caf. Flores acknowledged its receipt
and made various payments thereon.
On demand for payment of balance,
Flores informed him that he did not
have the necessary funds on hand,
and that he would have to wait the
return of his principal, the defendant,
who was at that time visiting in the
provinces. Flores acknowledged the
bill for the goods furnished and the
balance still due them.
Macke claims that when the goods
were ordered they were ordered on
the credit of the defendant and that
they were shipped by the plaintiffs
after inquiry which satisfied him as to
the credit of the defendant and as to
the authority of Flores to act as his
agent. That when he went to the Cafe
for the purpose of collecting his bill he
found Flores apparently in charge of
the business and claiming to be the
business manager of the defendant. A
complaint was filed for sum of money.
A written contract was introduced in
evidence, from which it appears that
Galmes, the former owner of the Cafe,
sub rented the building to the
defendant obligating himself not to
sub rent the building or the business
without the consent of Galmes. The
contract was signed and attached was
an inventory signed by the defendant
followed by the name Flores, with the
words "managing agent" following his
ISSUE: Whether Flores was managing
the business as agent or sub lessee.
RULING: Flores was the agent of the
Camps in the management of the bar
and of the Washington Cafe with
authority to bind Camps, his principal,
for the payment of the goods.
The contract sufficiently establishes
the fact that the Camps was the owner

of business, and the title of "managing

agent" of Flores which appears on that
contract and the fact that, at the time
the purchases in question were made,
Flores was apparently in charge of the
usually entrusted to managing agent,
proves he was there as authorized
agent of Camps.
That Flores, as managing agent of the
Washington Cafe, had authority to buy
such reasonable quantities of supplies
necessary in carrying on the business
may fairly be presumed from the
nature of the business, especially in
view of the fact that his principal
appears to have left him in charge
during more or less prolonged periods
of absence. Flores was acting within
the scope of his authority in ordering
these goods are binding on his
One who clothes another apparent
authority as his agent, and holds him
out to the public as such, cannot be
permitted to deny the authority of
such person to act as his agent, to the
prejudice of innocent third parties
dealing with such person in good faith
and in the following presumptions or
deductions, which the law expressly
directs to be made from particular
facts, are deemed conclusive.

FACTS: Dominga Conde and her coheirs sold with right of repurchase a
parcel of land to spouses Casimira and
Pio Altera. The Pacto de Retro Sale
provided that, if the land is not
repurchased a new agreement shall be
made between the parties and title
and ownership of the land shall be
vested to the Alteras. The lot was then
adjudicated to the Alteras and an OCT
was issued in their name subject to
the right of redemption by Dominga,
within ten (10) years after returning
the purchase price and the amount of
taxes paid by the spouses. Later,
Paciente Cordero, son-in-law of the
Alteras, signed a memorandum of
repurchase. However, neither of the
signatory to the deed. Then, Pio Altera
sold the disputed lot to the spouses
Ramon and Catalina Conde.
Contending that she had validly
repurchased the lot, Dominga filed a
Complaint against Paciente Cordero
and his wife, Spouses Ramon and
Catalina Conde, and Casimira Pasagui
for quieting of title to real property
Dominga's evidence is that Paciente
Cordero signed the Memorandum of
Repurchase in representation his inlaws, and that Cordero received the
repurchase price. Private respondents,
on the other hand, claims that
Paciente Cordero signed the document
of repurchase merely to show that he
had no objection to the repurchase;
and that he did not receive the
inasmuch as he had no authority from
his parents-in-law who were the
After trial, the lower Court rendered its
Decision dismissing the Complaint. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld
the findings of the Court and held that,
Dominga had failed to validly exercise
her right of repurchase in view of the
Repurchase was signed by Paciente

Cordero and not by Pio Altera, the

vendee-a-retro, and that there is
nothing in said document to show that
Cordero was specifically authorized to
act for and on behalf of the vendee a
retro, Pio Altera.
ISSUE: Whether Paciente Cordero has
authority to act for and on behalf of
Pio Altera.
RULING: Neither of the vendees-aretro signed the "Memorandum of
Repurchase", and that there was no
formal authorization from the vendees
for Paciente Cordero to act for and on
their behalf.
However, possession of the disputed
lot had been with Dominga from the
repurchase was executed up to the
time she instituted the action. If
Dominga had done nothing to
formalize her repurchase, neither have
the vendees-a-retro done anything to
clear their title of the encumbrance
therein regarding Dominga's right to
repurchase. No new agreement was
entered into by the parties as
stipulated in the deed of pacto de
retro, if the vendors a retro failed to
exercise their right of redemption after
ten years. If Dominga exerted no effort
to procure the signature of Pio Altera
after he had recovered from his illness,
neither did the Alteras repudiate the
deed that their son-in-law had signed.
Thus, an implied agency must be held
to have been created from their
silence or lack of action, or their
failure to repudiate the agency.
Paciente Conde must be held bound
Memorandum of Repurchase that he
had signed wherein he acknowledged
the receipt the repurchase price and
assumed the obligation to maintain
possession should they be disturbed
by other persons.

opinion that the authority expressed in

the letter is a sufficient compliance
with both requirements.

FACTS: Gregorio Jimenez owned 3
Pangasinan. While he was staying at
Vigan, his property in Alaminos was
confided by him to the care of his
elder sister Nicolasa Jimenez. He wrote
a letter to his sister wherein he
informed her that he was pressed for
money and requested her to sell one
of his parcels of land and send him the
money in order that he might pay his
description of the land to be sold other
than the words "one of my parcels of
land" Acting upon this letter Nicolasa
approached the Pedro Rabot, and the
latter agreed to buy the parcel of land
for P500, P250 were paid at once.
Nicolasa admits having received this
payment but there is no evidence that
she sent any of it to her brother.
Later, Gregorio demanded that his
sister should surrender this piece of
land to him which she refused. As a
result Gregorio, instituted an action for
the recovery their land. This action
was decided favorably to the plaintiffs.
Meanwhile, Nicolasa Jimenez executed
and delivered to Rabot a deed
conveying to him the parcel of land
controversy. He acquired possession
under the deed from Nicolasa during
the pendency of the litigation. It
appears that he was at the time
cognizant of that circumstance.
conferred on Nicolasa by the letter
was sufficient to enable her to bind
her brother.
RULING: Article 1713, NCC, requires
that the authority to alienate land
shall be contained in an express
mandate; while subsection 5 of section
335 of the Code of Civil Procedure
says that the authority of the agent
must be in writing and subscribed by
the party to be charged. We are of the

The purpose in giving a power of

attorney is to substitute the mind and
hand of the agent for the mind and
hand of the principal; and if the
character and extent of the power is
so far defined as to leave no doubt as
to the limits within which the agent is
authorized to act, and he acts within
those limits, the principal cannot
question the validity of his act.
The general rule applicable is that
definite to identify the land either from
the recitals of the contract or deed or
from external facts referred to in the
document, thereby enabling one to
determine the identity of the land and
if the description is uncertain on its
face or is shown to be applicable with
equal plausibility to more than one
tract, it is insufficient. The deed which
Nicolasa executed contains a proper
description of the property which she
purported to convey.
In the present case the agent was
given the power to sell either of the
parcels of land belonging to the
plaintiff. We can see no reason why
the performance of an act within the
scope of this authority should not bind
the plaintiff to the same extent as if he
had given the agent authority to sell
"any or all" and she had conveyed
only one.

FACTS: Diego Lian was the owner of
a certain parcel of land. He executed a
power of attorney in favour of Marcos
P. Puno which conferred upon him the
power ... that ... he may administer ...
purchase, sell, collect and pay ... in
any proceeding or business concerning
the good administration and
advancement of my said interests."
Later, Puno sold and delivered said
parcel of land. A complaint was filed
by Lian where he alleges that the
said document did not confer upon
Puno the power to sell the land and
prayed that the sale be set aside; that
the land be returned to him, together
with damages. In defense, they
admitted the sale of the land by Puno
to the other defendants and alleged
that the same was a valid sale and
prayed to be relieved from the liability
under the complaint. After trial, the
lower court ruled in favour of Lian it
held that the document Exhibit A did
not give Puno authority to sell the land
and that the sale was illegal and void.
ISSUE: Whether Puno was not
authorized to sell the land in question
and that the sale executed is null and
RULING: Contracts of agency as well
as general powers of attorney must be
interpreted in accordance with the
language used by the parties. The real
intention of the parties is primarily to
be determined from the language
used. The intention is to be gathered
from the whole instrument. In case of
doubt resort must be had to the
situation, surroundings and relations
of the parties. Whenever it is possible,
effect is to be given to every word and
clause used by the parties. It is to be
presumed that the parties said what
they intended to say and that they
used each word or clause with some
purpose and that purpose is, if

possible, to be ascertained and

enforced. The intention of the parties
must be sustained rather than
defeated. If the contract be open to
two constructions, one of which would
uphold while the other would
overthrow it, the former is to be
chosen. So, if by one construction the
contract would be illegal, and by
another equally permissible
construction it would be lawful, the
latter must be adopted. The acts of
the parties in carrying out the contract
will be presumed to be done in good
faith. The acts of the parties will be
presumed to have been done in
conformity with and not contrary to
the intent of the contract. The
meaning of general words must be
construed with reference to the
specific object to be accomplished and
limited by the recitals made in
reference to such object.
The words "administer, purchase, sell,"
etc., seem to be used coordinately.
Each has equal force with the other.
There seems to be no good reason for
saying that Puno had authority to
administer and not to sell when "to
sell" was as advantageous to the
plaintiff in the administration of his
affairs as "to administer." To hold that
the power was "to administer" only
when the power "to sell" was equally
conferred would be to give to special
words of the contract a special and
limited meaning to the exclusion of
other general words of equal import.
There was no proof that Puno acted in
bad faith or fraudulently in selling the
land. It will be presumed that he acted
in good faith and in accordance with
his power as he understood it. That his
interpretation of his power, as
gathered from the contract, is tenable
cannot, we believe, be successfully


FACTS: Po Ejap was the owner of a
parcel of land. Po Tecsi executed a
general power of attorney in favor of
his brother Po Ejap, empowering and
authorizing him "To buy, sell or barter,
assign or admit in acquittance, or in
any other manner to acquire or convey
all sorts of property, real and personal,
businesses and industries, credits,
rights and action belonging to me, for
whatever prices and under the
conditions which he may stipulate,
paying and receiving payment in cash
or in installments, and to execute the
formalities provided by the law." Then,
Po Ejap, sold the said land to his
brother Po Tecsi. Thereafter, Po Ejap,
as attorney-in-fact of Po Tecsi, sold the
land in favor of Katigbak. After said
sale, Po Tecsi leased the property sold,
from Po Ejap, who administered it in
the name of Katigbak, leaving unpaid
the rents accrued until his death After

his death, Po Sun Suy (Po Tecsis son)

and Po Ching leased said land. Later,
Po Sun Suy (Po Ejaps son) was
appointed administrator of the estate
of his father Po Tecsi, and filed with
the court an inventory of said estate
including the land in question. And
then later, Katigbak sold the same
property to Po Sun Boo. As Po Tecsi
and Po Sun Suy, had not paid, the rent
due from his father's death until Jose
M. Katigbak transferred the ownership
thereof to Po Sun Bo an action for the
recovery of rent was filed.

ISSUE: Whether Po Ejap was not

authorized under the power executed
by Po Tecsi in his favor to sell said
land, for the reason that said power
had been executed before Po Ejap sold
said land to his brother Po Tecsi.
RULING: The power is general and
authorizes Gabino Po Ejap to sell any
(pertenezcan) to the principal. The use
of the subjunctive "pertenezcan"
(might belong) and not the indicative
"pertenecen" (belong), means that Po
Tecsi meant not only the property he
had at the time of the execution of the
power, but