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Serana vs.


GR No. 162059

Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the PhilippinesCebu (UP). She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and
ending on December 31, 2000.
Petitioner received 15 million from President Estrada for the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall Annex. However such renovation failed to materialized. Hence, ombudsman filed a
charge of estafa to the sandiganbayan.
Can petitioner be charged of estafa in the Sandiganbayan? Can petitioner be
considered as public officer?
Petitioner can be charged of estafa as provided in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. The
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one
of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a)
the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in Laurel vs
Desierto, that public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law,
by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.
Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by
P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is well
established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express
mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

Remedial law; Concurrent jurisdiction. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at
the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is
likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board
of Professional Teachers.
Remedial law; Estoppel. At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the
issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in
this case, estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by
actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the
issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014 THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON.
G.R. No. 175723,

February 4, 2014



This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions 1 dated April 6,
2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December
2002 against the private respondents.In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of
the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents were constrained to
pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint denominated as one for Refund or Recovery of
Illegally and/or ErroneouslyCollected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the
CA dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local
tax case.

The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order
for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In
transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil.
1022 (1963)] that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

FALLO: petition is denied