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On October 5, 1937 (Bryson, 1975), President Roosevelt presented the quarantine

speech as a response to the Empire of Japan’s attack on China to conquer it (Jacobs, 1962). The
Empire of Japan had violated the Briand-Kellogg Pact that made war illegal (Briand-Kellogg Pact,
1928) and the Nine Power Treaty that guaranteed the sovereignty of national affairs and
territory of China (Nine Power Treaty, 1922). For Roosevelt, this was an indication that the
Empire of Japan was a threat to the United States too (Roosevelt, 1937). For this reason,
Roosevelt presented the quarantine speech to communicate to the American people “the
realities of the international crisis” (Jacobs, 1962, 484).
The quarantine speech drew immediate questions as too its exact meaning (Haight,
1971). At the center of the controversy was what President Roosevelt meant by “quarantine,”
and more specifically, what President Roosevelt meant when he said, “It seems to be
unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of
physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the
patients in order to protect the health and community against the spread of the disease.”
While Roosevelt stated that “quarantine” does not mean “sanctions” (Borg, 424), a
popular interpretation is that the speech indicated a sharp change from isolationist policy and
anticipated the use of economic sanctions (Bryson, 1975) because the Empire of Japan was a
threat. However, other scholars see the speech as an indication that Roosevelt was pursuing a
variety of options to avoid catastrophe, rather than, viewing it as indicating an abandonment of
isolationism (Borg, 1957). Perhaps more perplexing, there is debate as to why Roosevelt later
rejected positions in the speech for which there are not agreements (Bryson, 1975).

Because the controversy centers on isolationist policy, analysts of the speech miss that
the speech indicates Roosevelt anticipated the use of “sanctions,” a quarantine, against threats
posed by the Empire of Japan and that he did not reject the positions he took in the speech.
First, Roosevelt’s rhetoric constructed threats that the Empire of Japan posed and a
determination to defeat them. Second, Roosevelt’s rhetoric built group rights for the United
States and Americans that were used to defeat the threats.
In this paper I will argue, the Manzanar internment camp for Japanese in the United
States during World War II testifies, the quarantine speech is an indication Roosevelt
anticipated the use of “sanctions,” a quarantine, against the threats posed by the Empire of
Japan and he did not reject the positions he took in the quarantine speech. This is because,
first, Manzanar was a quarantine that witnesses sanctions to defeat the threats posed by the
Empire of Japan constructed in the quarantine speech. And second, Manzanar beholds the
group rights built in the quarantine speech. Therefore, I will analyze the quarantine speech in
relation to Manzanar so that the quarantine speech has its proper place in history.
To make my argument, first, I will analyze the quarantine speech to present Roosevelt’s
had a determination to defeat threats posed by the Empire of Japan. Second, I will use Jack
Donnelly’s liberal human rights theory and Kenneth Burke as a guide to explore rights for the
United States. This leads to asking, why should rhetorical scholars care? The answer guides the
remainder of the paper. Third, I will use Walter Fisher as a guide to expand the threats that the
Empire of Japan posed and the determination to defeat them. I will then use Fisher and Burke
to explain why and how a rhetorical analysis can be done to find Roosevelt’s interpretation of

what he wanted to defeat because it was constructed in the quarantine speech. Fourth, I will
explain how and why Roosevelt could defeat what he wanted with the group rights his rhetoric
built for the United States and Americans. I will then explain how a rhetorical analysis can be
done to find the group rights built. Fifth, I will provide a description of the Manzanar
internment camp for Japanese in the United States during World War II. Sixth, I will apply the
findings from the analysis of the quarantine speech for Roosevelt’s interpretation of what he
wanted to defeat, and the findings from the analysis of the group rights built to swear, the
Manzanar internment camp for Japanese in the United States during World War II testifies, the
quarantine speech is an indication Roosevelt anticipated the use of sanctions against the
threats posed by the Empire of Japan and he did not reject the positions he took in the
quarantine speech.
The construction of threats the Empire of Japan posed and the determination to defeat them:
President Roosevelt communicated “the hopes for [humankind] for a continuing era of
international peace were raised to great heights when more than sixty nations solemnly
pledged themselves not to resort to arms in furtherance of their national aims and policies.”
Although the United States was loyal to the pledge and “tranquilly and peacefully [carried] on
the ethics and arts of civilization,” Roosevelt was “compelled to contrast [the peace in the
United States] with very different scenes being enacted in other parts of the world.” In these
scenes, other peoples and nations, particularly, the Empire of Japan, violated treaties “through
unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory”
for the purpose of “greed and power for supremacy.” Because there could not be peace “either

within nations or between nations” except under right ways of behaving “adhered to by all”
peoples and nations, the foundations of a peaceful civilization, “the landmarks and traditions
which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order, and justice
[were] being wiped away.” In other words, the Empire of Japan’s wrong behavior of violating
the sovereignty of national affairs and territory created a scene were the foundations of peace:
law, order, and justice, were threatened in the world.
Even though the Empire of Japan behaved wrong “in other parts of the world,” their
wrong behaviors were cause of “grave concern and anxiety” for the United States. This was
because “there is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically
and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation to completely isolate itself from
economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals
appear to be spreading and not declining.” Further, this was because the “lawlessness” was an
“epidemic,” a “contagion,” that “[spread]” to “engulf states and peoples remote from the
original scene of hostilities.” In other words, the Empire of Japan’s attitudes and wrong
behavior of violating the sovereignty of national affairs and territory, created a scene that
included the United States, and threatened United States’ foundations of peace because their
attitudes and wrong behaviors spread like a disease and would spread to the United States.
Roosevelt wanted “no one [to] imagine that America will escape” the “state of international
anarchy and instability.” Therefore, the “hopes for peace” gave way to a “haunting fear” of the
Empire of Japan’s lawlessness that spread.

It is important to point out that because verbal action creates a dialectic, people do not
just exist in some state of existence (Burke, 33). In other words, the Empire of Japan did not just
“exist” in a state of wrong behaviors; they also existed in a state of right behaviors. The
importance of this will become clear later in the paper.
Roosevelt stated it was his “determination to pursue a policy of peace.”Because “there
can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and
moral standards adhered to by all,” “those who cherish their freedom and recognize and
respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace,” must work “for the
triumph of law and moral principals.”Further, this policy would “[respect] the rights and
liberties of other” while putting an end to acts of international aggression.” We can conclude,
this means, Roosevelt’s policy was to defeat the spread of the Empire of Japan’s attitudes and
wrong ways of behaving-the right attitudes and ways of behaving according to the Empire of
Japan-, and defeat them from spreading, while respecting the sovereignty of national affairs
and territory of other nations. If this “lawlessness” was defeated, a new scene of peace and
stability and confidence could prevail for the world. Roosevelt thought they could be defeated
by right ways of behaving adhered to by all. Further, Roosevelt thought “lawlessness” could be
defeated with a “quarantine.”
Exploring “Rights” for the United States:
According to Roosevelt, the United States must be “aroused to the cardinal necessity of
honoring sanctity of treaties” while defeating the wrong ways of behaving because the
sovereignty of national affairs and territory is a right. In the modern era, most rights work has

focused on liberal human rights theory (Donnelly). Although the sovereignty of national affairs
and territory was not provided as a right for the United States because it is a human right for
individuals to prevent state abuses, Jack Donnelly’s liberal human rights theory can be used as a
guide to explore the United States’ right to the sovereignty of national affairs and territory.
According to Roosevelt, the United States is a member of a modern global society
because the United States is intertwined morally and technically with other nations. Because of
this, the United States has performances, and other nations have performances, that uphold
values, to govern the relationship between, and help to form, nations belonging to an organized
global society and an organized global society. Some of these performances, such as the
sovereignty of national affairs and territory, are rights codified by the laws of an organized
global society. However, there are other performances that are rights because they are agency.
If there were not other performances that are rights because they are agency, the relationship
between the United States and other nations would “exist,” and some values would “not
exist.”Agency for what though?
Based on an analysis of what Roosevelt thought the Empire of Japan’s attitudes and
states of mind were directed toward when they violated the sovereignty of national affairs and
territory, we can conclude United States’ rights are based on conceptions of the values of
peace, law, order, and justice, for the purpose of world economy, world security, and world
humanity. Rights then, are: United States’ agency to uphold peace, law, order, and justice for
world economy, world security, world humanity. These rights are performances that govern
the relationship between, and help to form, nations belonging to an organized global society,

and an organized global society, to uphold peace, law, order, and justice. This means the rights
change the scene and the people. For the scene to change, the attitudes and states of mind
toward something important to uphold something else need to change. For the people to
change, the scene needs to change (Burke). This means, United States’ rights are agency to
advance attitudes and states of mind toward world economy, world security, and world
humanity to uphold peace, law, order, and/or justice, within the constraint of respecting the
sovereignty of national affairs and territory of other nations. These agencies define right ways
of behaving for the United States and the audience to uphold peace, law, order, and/or justice
(Donnelly). The rights ways of behaving are rights if they function as the right does.
This petitions two important questions? First, what are the right ways of behaving that
advance attitudes and states of mind toward world economy, world security, and world
humanity to uphold peace, law, order, and/or justice, within the constraint of respecting the
sovereignty of national affairs and territory for nations belonging to the organized global
society? These right ways of behaving would be rights. Second, so far it seems that political
scholars might have an interest because these right ways of behaving could be Roosevelt’s
policy, and rights scholars might have an interest because these right ways of behaving explore
the beginning of a theory of United States rights. However, why should rhetorical scholars
care?
The answer guides the remainder of the paper. It is for this reason, next we will explore
rhetoric in relation to what Roosevelt wanted to defeat. Then, how Roosevelt could defeat
wanted he wanted to with group rights brought into being rhetorically. And following that, all

of that in relation to Manzanar. To foreshadow, rhetorical scholars should care because these
agencies were brought into being rhetorically in the quarantine speech to create group rights
that could defeat what Roosevelt wanted to with right ways of behaving adhered to by all, and
a “quarantine.”
Rhetoric and Roosevelt’s policy of what he wanted to defeat:
Rhetoric creates a value-orientated image of the world that reflects “how one ought to
behave” (Fisher). In other words, Rhetoric creates a scene as symbolizing a value for the
audience and this reflects right ways of behaving for the rhetor and audience. What does this
mean though? While Fisher did not provide details, this means that rhetoric creates a scene as
symbolizing a value by connecting the scene’s purpose, a measure of the scene’s qualities, or
the scene’s qualities in relation to something else, to something important for the audience.
Therefore, the right ways of behaving created for the rhetor and audience are to uphold the
scene and the scene symbolizing a value.
The Empire of Japan wanted to uphold the scene they created and the scene
symbolizing a value. By examining Roosevelt’s rhetoric, we can get Roosevelt’s interpretation
as to why the scene the Empire of Japan created connected to something important for the
Empire of Japan’s audience. With this, we can get Roosevelt’s interpretation of the right ways
of behaving for the Empire of Japan’s audience to uphold the scene and the scene symbolizing a
value. This is what spread that Roosevelt wanted to defeat, and defeat from spreading. We can
conclude then, Roosevelt’s policy was to defeat the Empire of Japan’s scene, the scene

symbolizing a value, and the right ways of behaving to uphold the scene and the scene
symbolizing a value that spread, and from spreading.
So how did Roosevelt’s Rhetoric connect the purpose of the scene the Empire of Japan
created, the measure of the qualities, or its qualities in relation to something else, to something
important for the Empire of Japan’s audience? In other words, how does Rhetoric create a
scene as symbolizing a value? Because the scene symbolizing a value would be motivation for
the audience if the scene symbolizing a value creates right ways of behaving for the audience
that are acted on, this means rhetoric creates a scene as symbolizing a value based on how
rhetoric creates motivation for the audience. So how did Roosevelt’s rhetoric create a scene as
symbolizing a value based on how rhetoric creates motivation for an audience?
Burke asks, “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are
doing it?” (xv). He answers, “Any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of
answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who
did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose)” (xv). I ask, according to this logic,
“What is involved when we say what the audience will do and why they will do it?” I answer,
according to Fisher’s logic (the narrative paradigm), “Any complete statement about the
audience’s motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what did the rhetor
say was done (act), when or where did the rhetor say it was done (scene), who did the rhetor
say did it (agent), how he the rhetor say they did it (agency), and why did the rhetor say they
did it (purpose)” (xv). Therefore, how does how the rhetor used scene, act, agency, agent, and
purpose create a scene as symbolizing a value to be motivation for the audience?

According to Burke and Fisher, it depends on if the scene symbolizing a value created by
rhetoric corresponds with the image already held by the audience (Fisher 131). If the scene
symbolizing a value corresponds with the image already held by the audience, it will be
accepted. Because the scene the Empire of Japan created spread, the scene created
symbolizing a value was accepted. This means the accepted scene symbolizing a value created
right ways of behaving for the Empire of Japan’s audience. According to Roosevelt, the right
ways of behaving were being accepted because the scene was spreading. Basically then, an
audience is motivated by a scene symbolizing a value being a sign of consubstantiality
So, how does rhetoric create a scene symbolizing a value being a sign of
consubstantiality? Like all questions that ask how rhetoric does something, it depends on what
rhetoric is. Rhetoric could be, the process of drawing a conclusion about an audience’s
standards of good and bad, right and wrong, and true and false, to implement the standards
into discourse to reduce the audience’s uncertainty because their standards produce, or are a
set of conditions for, the audience to think and act in a certain way. Does this mean an
audience’s uncertainty is reduced through what is established to be an example (standard) of a
good and bad, right and wrong, true and false scene, act, agency, purpose, and agent because
these established examples produce, or are a set of conditions, for scene a symbolizing a value
being a sign of consubstantiality?
Yes, the established examples of a good and bad, right and wrong, true and false scene,
act, agent, agency, and purpose produce, or are a set of conditions for, a scene symbolizing a
value to be a sign of consubstantiality. This is because the established examples of scene, act,

agent, agency, and purpose construct a scene symbolizing a value because they are the purpose
of the scene and the qualities of the scene. Essentially then, these established conditions
produce, or are a set of conditions for, an audience’s motivation. Therefore, by examining
Roosevelt’s rhetoric for his interpretation of the Empire of Japan’s scene, act, agent, agency and
purpose, we can get Roosevelt’s interpretation as to how the Empire of Japan’s scene, act,
agent, agency, and purpose were signs of consubstantiality for the Empire of Japan’s audience.
With this, we can find Roosevelt’s interpretation as to why the scene the Empire of Japan
created had a purpose, had a measure of its qualities, or its qualities in relation to something
else, connected to something important for the Empire of Japan’s audience. With this, we can
get Roosevelt’s interpretation of the right ways of behaving for the Empire of Japan’s audience
to uphold the scene and what the scene is connected to. This “lawlessness” is what Roosevelt
wanted to defeat that spread, and defeat from spreading.
A rhetorical analysis can be used to figure out Roosevelt’s policy of what he wanted to
defeat. For example, in paragraph eight of the quarantine speech, that the Empire of Japan is a
good and right agent to have attitudes toward global society that are enacted through
murderous anarchy for a borderless global scene for the selfish desire for the ability to produce
an effect is connected to the Empire of Japan’s ability to create the conditions necessary for the
Empire of Japan’s global dominance. This creates right ways of behaving for the rhetor and
audience to uphold the scene and the scene symbolizing a value. The right ways of behaving
uphold, and are, global borderlessness in nations and between nations and the Empire of
Japan’s ability to create the conditions necessary for the Empire of Japan’s global dominance.
These are what Roosevelt wanted to defeat that spread, and from spreading.

Rhetoric and United States’ “Rights” in relation to what Roosevelt wanted to defeat:
Roosevelt wanted to defeat the scene, the scene symbolizing a value, and the right ways
of behaving to uphold the scene and what it is connected to created by the Empire of Japan
that spread, and from spreading, so that a new scene prevailed. He thought this could happen
with right ways of behaving adhered to by all because this upholds the foundations of peace:
law, order, justice. Further, he thought this could happen with a “quarantine” that defeated the
wrong ways of behaving. What are the right ways of behaving adhered to by all? How could
Roosevelt bring right ways of behaving adhered by all into being? How does bringing them into
being, and the right ways of behaving adhered to by all, defeat what Roosevelt wanted to? How
is this related to a “quarantine?”
Roosevelt brought right ways of behaving adhered to by all into being with narrative.
Specifically, the signs of consubstantiality for scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose for the
United States’ audience connected a scene’s purpose, a measure of the scene’s qualities, or the
scene’s qualities in relation to something else to peaceful, lawful, and/or justified right ways of
behaving adhered to by all being important for the United States’ audience. Based on analysis,
this is because if there were peaceful, lawful, orderly, and/or justified right ways of behaving
adhered to by all, the United States would have the ability for agency to act out their purpose:
to uphold the foundations of peace for world economy, world security, and world humanity.
This created right ways of behaving for the rhetor and the United States’ audience to
advance attitudes and states of mind toward world economy, world security, and world
humanity, to uphold the scene and the scene symbolizing a value. This is because the agency

for the scene and the scene symbolizing a value for the United States’ audience were attitudes
and states of mind toward peace, law, order, justice, world economy, world security, and world
humanity. In other words, these attitudes and states of mind put into action and produced the
effect that the right ways of behaving adhered to by all were important to the audience.
Therefore, advancing these attitudes and states of mind promotes the interests of peaceful,
lawful, and/or justified right ways of behaving adhered to by all being important.
We can conclude these agencies would be rights. These agencies would be rights
because they function like the conclusion of what rights for the United States would be: they
are agencies to advance attitudes and states of mind toward world economy, world security,
and world humanity to uphold (peace) peaceful, (law) lawful, (order) orderly, and/or (justice)
justified right ways of behaving adhered to by all. How does bringing these agencies into being
in the quarantine speech defeat what Roosevelt wanted to? The explanation for this answer lies
in the question: can we find these agencies in Rhetorical Communication?
Although these rights would not be a human right for individuals to prevent state
abuses, Donnelly’s liberal human rights theory leads to if we can find rights brought into being
by rhetorical communication and why these agencies created rhetorically could defeat what
Roosevelt wanted to. While rhetoric creates a scene to symbolize a value to create right ways
of behaving because of signs of consubstantiality, according to liberal human rights theory,
liberal human rights are not brought into being based on signs on consubstantiality. This is
because liberal human rights create and are “a field of rule-governed interactions centered on,
and under the control of, the [individual] right-holder” (Donnelly, 8). In other words, liberal

human rights do not say how the audience “ought to behave” based on the audience’s
standards of right and wrong, true and false, and good and bad, instead, rights say how the
audience “has to behave,” based on, and under the control of, the person claiming the right
standards of good and bad, right and wrong, and true and false. Therefore, if rhetoric is the
process of drawing a conclusion about an audience’s standards of a good and bad, right and
wrong, and true and false scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose to implement the standards
into discourse to reduce the audience’s uncertainty because these standards produce, or are a
set of conditions for, the audience to think and act in a certain way because they create a scene
symbolizing a value that is consubstantial with the audience, liberal human rights are not
created rhetorically.
However, rhetoric creates rights. Rhetoric creates rights because rhetorical
communication creates group rights. Rhetorical communication creates group rights because
the rights say how the rhetor and audience has to behave based on the collective audience’s
standards of right and wrong, true and false, good and bad scene, act, agent, agency, and
purpose. So why would bringing the agencies for the United States and Americans into being
rhetorically defeat what Roosevelt wanted to because they are group rights?
Roosevelt thought the United States and Americans would not escape the scene, the
scene symbolizing a value, and the right ways of behaving to uphold the scene and what the
scene is connected created by the Empire of Japan. Group rights for the United States and
Americans would provide the ability to defeat what could infect Americans because even when

group membership of the United States is a part of the reason for a right, the individual
Americans still needs protection from the group (Donnelly). Here is why.
According to Burke, a scene reflects because it deflects because people have to select a
reality (Burke). The reason for the group rights created for the “United States” and “Americans”
based on their signs of consubstantiality for scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose, was to
uphold a scene and a scene symbolizing a value based on the “United States” and “Americans”
“selected” signs of consubstantiality. This created a shared understanding that the “United
States” and “Americans” were a “collective” with moral purposes based on the “selected” signs
of the “United States” and “Americans” because they had a capacity for agency (Stanford online Philosophy Encyclopedia). Further, these signs reflected the “United States” and
“Americans” position in relation to “the Empire of Japan’s audience” (Burke). This means the
agencies were to uphold the “United States” and “Americans” “selected” position in relation to
the “the Empire of Japan’s audience.”
The “group” of the “United States” and “Americans” holds a group right because none
of them can hold the right alone (Stanford on-line philosophy encyclopedia). Why none of them
can hold the right alone is left open to interpretation. Referring back to Donnelly, a right
regulates relations between, and helps to constitute, “citizens” and a “state.” Arguably then, a
group could hold a right because none of them can constitute “citizens” and a “state” on their
own. Because Japanese in the United States were thought to be a part of the Empire of Japan’s
audience, the agencies became a way to regulate relations between, and helped to constitute,
“citizens” and “the United States” because they upheld the “United States” and “Americans”

position in relation to “the Empire of Japan’s audience” based on selected signs of
consubstantiality of the “United States” and “Americans.” This created a field of rule-governed
interactions for “citizens,” “the United States,” and “the Empire of Japan’s audience,” centered
on, and under the control of, the “citizens’” and “the United States’” standards of a good and
bad, right and wrong, and true and false act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose. In other
words, bringing rights into being rhetorically could defeat what Roosevelt wanted to because
bringing group rights into being defined how “the United States,” “citizens,” and “the Empire of
Japan’s audience,” would be constituted and regulated so that “the United States” and
“citizens” maintained their position in relation to “the Empire of Japan’s audience,” based on
the selected reality of the “United States” and “citizens.”
And why would these agencies be able to defeat what Roosevelt wanted to? Simply,
because they uphold a scene, a scene as symbolizing a value, and right ways of behaving to
uphold the scene and what the scene is connected to based on the United States. In other
words, it is a war between scenes, scenes symbolizing a value, and right ways of behaving to
uphold the scene and what the scene is connected to. And how are these “rights” related to a
“quarantine?” Manzanar will answer that question.
So the analysis will be: How the signs of consubstantiality for the act, agent, purpose,
scene, and agency of the United States connected a scene’s purpose, a measure of the scene’s
qualities, or the scene’s qualities to peaceful, lawful, and/or justified rights ways of behaving
adhered to by all being important for the audience. And what right ways of behaving for the
rhetor and audience this created that advanced attitudes and states of mind toward world

economy, world security, and world humanity, to uphold the scene and what the scene was
connected to.
Description of Manzanar
“It seems to be unfourtunetly true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.
When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and
joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health and community
against the spread of the disease.”
Accompaning the December 7, 1941 Declaration of War was Presidential Proclamation
2525. This said that people of the Empire of Japan who are not naturalized and will be in the
United States are “alien enemies” that can be detained if they pose a threat (Parks, 2004, ?).
Ten weeks later, on February 19, 1942, Executive Order 9066 gave the military the authority to
define areas where any or all persons could be removed as a “possible protection against
espionage and against sabotage” (Parks ?). Although the order was silent on which group or
race should be excluded, or which geographic locations should become exclusion zones (Fiset,
1999, 566), Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt recommended that for security reasons people of Japanese
ancestory were removed from the west coast (2ndary 577 6). Worried about invasion and
convinced that Japanese might be loyal to Japan, President Roosevelt insisted the decision was
a matter of ‘military necessity” (Ewers, 2008) because it was impossible to distinguish who
might be loyal to the Empire of Japan (Winks, 1994).
A wide strip along the entire Pacific Coast of Washington, Oregon, California, and
including Arizona Military Areas off limits to enemy aliens were defined as removal zones

(Parks, 2004, 577). Here, ninety percent of the Japanese population in the country, two-thirds
of whom were US citizens by birth, lived (Winks, 1994). People of Japanese decent were
advised to leave voluntarily. On March 11, 1942 the Wartime Civilian Control Administration
was created to overlook the evacuation. By this time, “enemy aliens” had become “the
evacuated people” (Parks, 2004, 578).Congress passed Public Law 503 on March 19, 1942,
making violating the restrictions a criminal offense (Parks, 2004, 577). Congressman John
Rankin said, “I’m for caching every Jap in America and Alaska and Hawaii and putting them in
concentration camps….Damn them! Let’s get rid of them now!” (Japanese American National
Museum). Later in March, President Roosevelt created the War Relocation Authority to
supervise the evacuation. Ten camps, called “relocation centers,” were planned, built, and
settled from May to October 1942 (Parks, 2004).
Without any charges being pressed or a trial (Harth, 1993), the government gave only
days for Japanese to decide what to do with their houses, farms, businesses, and belongings
(source). William Hohri remembers, “We had about one week to dispose of what we owned
except what we could pack and carry for our departure by bus” (source). People who got sent
there remember white people going and buying their belongings for a bargain when they left,
or having to give away their belongings for free (Ewers, 2008). Most, lost their house,
businesses, and belongings.
Each family was assigned an identification number and then loaded into cars, buses,
trucks, and trains. They did not know where they were going or for how long (R 10?). In total,
120,000 people of Japanese Ancestroy were forced to internment camps (Ewers, 2008). People

who were not Japanese, yet married one, went too by choice so that they could stay together
(Japanese American National Museum). It was the largest forced population transfer in United
States history (Twair & Twair, 2008).
The Manzanar Relocation center was the first of the ten “relocation centers” and
originally served as an “assembly center,” a place where federal authorities sent Japanese prior
to settlement at a permanent “relocation center” (History and Culture of Manzanar, 2006).
Manzanar was an old apple orchard with a still plentiful supply of water provided by a creek
bordering the site, George Creek, named after a Paiute chief (Hayashi, 2003, 63). Many people
were permanently settled at Manzanar. At the peak of its population in late 1942 there were
around 10,000 people there. Half the people permanently settled in Manzanar were under the
age of 21, about one-quarter were children and infants, and many were elderly (Renteln, 1995,
620). 88% were from Los Angeles County and 72% were from Los Angeles (Kurashige, 2001).
WRA writers were the prime source of government descriptions of the internment
camps during their operation (Parks, 2004, 579). Even though they said the purpose was not for
confinement, it was to provide communities where evacuees might live and contribute, through
their work to their own support pending their gradual reabsorption into private and normal
American life and to serve as wartime homes for those evacuess who might be unable or unfit
to relocate in ordinary American communities (2ndary 580 6), this is not the case.
Manzanar was both isolated and arid (Hayashi, 2003, 8). It is located on a windswept
square mile plot at the foot of the Sierra Nevada, 200 miles north of Los Angeles (Song &
Wittenburg, 2004). The land had to be leased from the Los Angeles department of water and

power (Cook, 2008). It the summer the temperatures reached 110 degrees farenheight and
there were duststorms (R 10?). One internee wrote of the duststorms, “Anything--death,
mutilation, suffocation, drowning-would be better than to feel the sting of dust in the throat,
the eyes, the nose, the lungs for days at a time” (Shivani, 2008). In the winter it got to below
freezing (R 10?) and there were blinding snowstorms (Hayashi, 2003). Still, the 500 acre
compound was surrounded by a barbed wire fence, eight guard towers manned by soldiers
with machine guns and huge searchlights for the miles of arid desert (Cook, 2008). The guards
were instructed to shoot at inmates who would not halt on command, even children (Harth,
1993).
There were 504 barracks organized into 36 blocks. The living quarters were unsanitary
(Fiset, 1999). Any combination of eight individuals was allotted a 20 by 25 foot room (r 10?). An
oil stove, a single hanging lightbulb, cots, blankets, and mattresses filled with straw were the
only furnishings provided. There was privacy only by stringing sheets between bunks (Song &
Wittenburg, 2004). Government documents even said that “physical standards of life in the
relocation centers have never been much above the bare substience level,” and represented
“real depriation for the majority of residents…” (2ndary 580 6).
Men and women shared toilets and showers and a laundry room. For Rosie Kakuuchi,
and most of the other internees “…one of the hardest things to endure were the communal
latrines, with no partitions; and showers with no stalls” (r 10?) The mess halls were staffed by
inexperienced workers with little knowledge of sanitation and proper-food handling methods
(Fiset, 1999). In the summer heat and windstorms and the winter freeze and snowstorms

people had to wait in long lines outside to get their food (Japanese American National
Museum).
There was a Government policy of enforced assimilation (Colborn-Roxworthy, 2007). By
criminalizing Japanese culture, the US government argued that performing Japanese culture
was an indication of a Japanese heart, so therefore, a duty to enact disloyalty against America
(211-212). The ancestoral culture got criminalized to the extent that people anticipating FBI
raids destroyed objects connected to the Japanese cultural repertoire (209).
Most internees worked in the camp. Professionals were paid $19 a month, skilled
workers received $16 and nonskilled $12. They dug irrigation canals and ditches, made clothes
and furniture, make camoflague rubber and netting for military (r 10?). The internees were
mess hall workers, doctors, nurses, police officers, firefighters, and teachers. The quarantined
were forced to raise their own vegetables and livestock (Twair & Twair, 2008). Internees
established churches, temples, and boys and girls clubs (R 10). There was a hospital complex,
town hall, outdoor theatre, baseball field, orphanage, auditorium for its high school (McStotts,
2007).
Recreational activities and aesthetic wonders threatened to overshadow and otherwise
distort the injustice taking place at Manzanar (Colborn-Roxworthy, 2007, 192). The internees
developed sports, dance, music, and other recreational activities; they built gardens and ponds
(r 10). There were performance festivals were outsiders could judge the performances of
internees (Colborn-Roxworthy, 2007). These helped to appease the Manzanar’s ambivalence
with a “visual rhetoric of good cheer” (202) Manzanar had an ambivalent status as non-“nazi-

style” internment camp with ball playing instead of “torture” (194). One internee wrote in a
letter to a co-worker, “I like to tell you about this camp. Nice place to live. It better than
Hollywood. Snow on mountains. Fresh air…Every day is 80 to 85…” (193)
Beginning in the Fall of 1942, for certain reasons, internees could leave, such as to do
seasonal agricultural work. In 1943 there was a Loyalty questioner that asked if the internees
would serve combat and swear allegiance to the United States. Internees who answered yes
became eligible for indefinite leave. Internees who answered no got sent to segregation center
(r 10?) at Tule Lake that was in violation of the Geneva Convention (Harth, 1993). The
quarantined that answered no, did so, as a protest because of the economic devastation
(Source). By 1943 only 3.9 thousand internees had left voluntarily (Harth, 1993). Many
internees stayed until the end of the war because they had nowhere to go (Ewers, 2008) since
they had lost their homes and businesses. Upon release they were given $25 and a one way
ticket to where they came from (Twair & Twair, 2008).
Manzanar was an economic, cultural, artistic, relationship, and mobility sanction
because Japanese quarantined lost the management of the production, distribution, and
consumption of goods and services, culture, expression, association, and mobility for the
United States to enforce the law. Even though Supreme Court cases Korematsu v US 1944 and
Hirabayashi v US 1943 upheld the “military necessity” motivation for the President and
Congress (Parks, 2004, 585), and the ACLU said it could not challenge the governments right to
remove citizens from military areas ( 2ndary 623 Q9), Manzanar was one of the most
repressive actions ever taken by the United States government (Renteln, 1995). It was

horrendous, one of the most egregious in history, in a way that violates the constitution (Ewers,
2008).
Manzanar was built on wartime hysteria. Manzanar was built on unwarranted suspicion.
Manzanar was built on a lack of political leadership (Iwamura, 2007, 2ndary to Regan).
Manzanar was built on racism (Hays, 2003). Manzanar was built on the group rights built in the
quarantine speech.
Application of what Roosevelt wanted to defeat and the group rights built to Manzanar:
Roosevelt anticipated the use of sanctions to defeat the threats that spread, and from
spreading, posed by the Empire of Japan in the quarantine speech. This is because the threats
posed by the Empire of Japan are evidenced in Manzanar, which was an economic, cultural,
artistic, relationship, and mobility sanction. Manzanar bears witness to “right ways of behaving
adhered to by all” brought into being and a quarantine to defeat the threats that spread, and
from spreading.
Based on the analysis, essentially, when a scene symbolizes a value based on signs of
consubstantiality of the scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose, the scene can always be
connected to the agent’s ability for agency to act out their purpose. In the analysis of
Roosevelt’s interpretation of what he wanted to defeat, the agent is the Empire of Japan and
therefore, Roosevelt’s interpretation of the right ways of behaving support, and are, the Empire
of Japan’s ability for agency to act out their purpose. In other words, the “wrong” ways of
behaving that spread support, and are, loyalty to the Empire of Japan.

For example, in paragraph five, right behavior supports, and is, the Empire of Japan’s
ability to attain an end where they are the highest in rank in the power to influence courses of
action to guide global decisions because their attitudes toward other nation’s, including the
United States’, courses of action, were violently acted out. In paragraph seven, Roosevelt’s
interpretation is that what spread is right behavior that supplies what is needed so that the
Empire of Japan can cause an effect globally in intangible ways by wiping away the foundations
of a peacefully diverse global society with attitudes toward nations internal affairs and territory.
And in paragraph nineteen, right behavior supports, and is, the Empire of Japan’s production of
what will be used as an unprovoked attack to maintain the greatest ability to exert influence in
relation to other nation’s.
Manzanar was the use of sanctions to defeat the spread of loyalty to the Empire of
Japan. This loyalty was seen as “lawlessness.” When this spreads, those that can be infected
with the “disease” should be approvingly quarantined. Manzanar witnesses this.
Roosevelt did not reject the positions he took in the quarantine speech. This is because
Manzanar beholds the group rights built in the quarantine speech. Manzanar beholds a field of
governed interactions based on the “United States” and “Americans” signs of consubstantiality
to constitute “citizens” and a “state.” Manzanar beholds the upholding of the “United States”
and “Americans” position in relation to “the Empire of Japan’s audience” based on the
“selected” signs of consubstantiality for the “United States” and “Americans.”
For example, quarantining Japanese in the United States, without a trial, within days,
was built by the United States right to advance attitudes toward the United States being

undisturbed by other nations to uphold peace of mind in the United States because the United
States has the ability to set a course of action to guide decisions toward peace because there
are peaceful right ways of behaving adhered to by all. Quarantining Japanese in the United
States, without a trial, within days, was built by the United States advancing attitudes toward
the United States being undisturbed by other nations. This is because the interpretation was
that Japanese in the United States needed to be quarantined, without a trial, within days,
because they would be loyal to the Empire of Japan and engage in espionage and sabotage. If
they engaged in espionage and sabotage they would disturb the United States war efforts. This
upheld peace of mind in the United States because the United States has the ability to set a
course of action to guide decisions toward peace because there are peaceful right ways of
behaving adhered to by all. This is because quarantining Japanese without a trial, within days,
was interpreted as ensuring there would be peaceful right ways of behaving adhered to by all,
as opposed to the unpeaceful behavior of engaging in espionage and sabotage. This helped to
ensure peace of mind in the United States because the United States had the ability to set a
course of action to guide decisions toward peace. In other words, this helped to ensure peace
of mind in the United States because the United States would have the ability to set a course of
action for the war to guide decisions toward peace because Japanese in the United States
would not be able to disturb the course of action set for peace with espionage and sabotage.
Critical Insights w/conclusion
I am waiting to do this last, until I have completed all the drafts, because I am not sure at this
point, what will change, with feedback.

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Missing:
7 Secondaries ---hopefully some become primaries---they are mainly government documents
R10
6 more