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Immigration Aff

1AC

Court/Privacy Mechanism---1AC
The United States federal judiciary should rule that a warrant is required for
search or seizure when enforcing immigration or customs laws.
The Fourth Amendment fails to protect immigrants at the border---encounters are
simply deemed as nonsearches
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
In this battle, not unlike the war on drugs, which disproportionately targeted blacks,12 a casualty has been noncitizens Fourth
Amendment rights. In

the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Fourth Amendment

applied to immigration enforcement , even if with increased tolerance for racial profiling.13 However, as
discussed in this Article, through

a subsequent the Fourth Amendment has become moribund, barely

able to grant any privacy protections to noncitizens , particularly in the realm of


immigration enforcement series of sweeping decisions,.
One significant explanation for this Fourth Amendment exceptionalism is the Courts early treatment of
immigration as a matter of civil as opposed to criminal enforcement .14 The characterization of
immigration enforcement as administrative has colored the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. In particular, by
characterizing removal proceedings as nonpenal, the Court has, since 1984, precluded the
Fourth Amendments exclusionary remedy, except within the narrow egregious violations
exception.15 Moreover, the application of the consent doctrine in immigration enforcement under
the most coercive circumstances increasingly defies the fictional premise that reasonable people
feel free to walk away from law enforcement encounters . In immigration encounters, Fourth
Amendment doctrine assumes the reasonable person is free to refuse questions of
immigration agents at immigration checkpoints .16 That same assumption applies during
unannounced workplace raids conducted by dozens of armed immigration agents, some of whom question workers while others
guard the exits;17 or even during the execution of administrative warrants in a persons home while she is handcuffed for more than
two hours.18 The resulting picture is that when immigration agents target immigrants inside the border,
the Fourth Amendment offers little protection . Immigrants are unprotected either because
the exclusionary rule has no application in removal proceedings , or even when the
exclusionary rule applies, as in criminal proceedings, most of those encounters are deemed
nonseizures and nonsearches.
The ICE can access search warrants without probable causes
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
But what if this reasonable noncitizen learns to walk away from the immigration agent and
refuses to answer his questions? This is a likely scenario because immigrant rights groups advise their clients to maintain
a code of silence when they encounter la migra.19 Would immigrants then have a privacy expectation to
refuse questions and even to walk away from ICE? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Except
in very limited circumstances, ICE is conducting this latest wave of raids with easy access to
civil warrants in a way that expands the scope of its law enforcement power,
compelling mandatory compliance .

Today, DHSs

regulatory arm reaches into employer hiring practices,20 university requirements for
foreign students,21 the governments distribution of public benefits,22 and drivers licenses,23
among other areas. In turn, this preoccupation has caused the proliferation of databases that, in most cases, grant ICE
easy access to information about a persons immigration status as a worker,24 student, 25 or driver.26 With
easy access to such information in these databases, ICE can arm itself with civil warrants even where there is
no particularized probable cause , to conduct raids in private or quasiprivate spaces
without having to seek the information directly from immigrants themselves . These warrants name no
suspects. Rather, they are issued precisely to allow ICE to identify and arrest persons for removal or to charge them for criminal
immigration violations. Indeed, ICE agents have employed this strategy in the latest wave of workplace raids.27
Moreover, ICE

has easy access to more than 600,000 civil warrants to enforce against

persons with prior removal orders who are labeled absconders or fugitives and who appear in their outdated databases.28 While
such absconder warrants target a particular suspect, their execution is no different than the indiscriminate targeting of immigrants
that occurs in workplace raids.
For example, despite the fact that the target often no longer lives at the address that appears in the database , no oversight

occurs to protect third parties from privacy invasions. Not surprisingly then, ICE strategically enforces
these warrants in peoples homes to arrest as many persons who may be in the country without
authorization, often relying on racial profiling and intimidating tactics in the process.29
The Supreme Court should rule narrowing exemptions to the Privacy Act--dramatically reduces border surveillance
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Immigration surveillance sits at the intersection of several different doctrines that afford significant deference to government actors
in border, migration, and mobility control. Under its border enforcement jurisprudence, the

Supreme Court has


afforded federal officials considerable latitude to conduct immigration and customs
enforcement activities. This deference is strongest at the physical border itself, where the Court
has deemed routine, suspicionless searches and seizures of individuals and property for
purposes of enforcing immigration and customs laws to be per se reasonable, and therefore
exempt from the Fourth Amendments warrant and probable cause requirements,
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border .311 The Court has reached this
conclusion with little explanation, often relying on conclusory statements or invocations of history and tradition with little more.312
In some instances, the Court has explicitly invoked and tied this border exception to the federal governments power over
immigration, which it has long deemed to be plenary. In others, the Court has instead characterized border searches as falling within
the categories of exceptions from ordinary Fourth Amendment limits for administrative or special needs searches.313
In a world in which the migration border is effectively everywhere, policed by large numbers of actors other than federal
immigration officialsand in which immigration surveillance activities reach large numbers of U.S. citizens and noncitizens with
lawful immigration status the justifications for such sweeping deference become more difficult to

maintain. The categories of potential deprivations that can result from immigration surveillance
activities have multiplied drastically beyond the simple ability to enter and remain in the United States. With the
expansion of the domains of enforcement and the tools of immigration surveillance, these enforcement activities can place
restrictions on the rights to international and domestic travel, employment, education, social service benefits, and freedom from
physical restraint in both the criminal justice and immigration enforcement processes. As discussed above, the powerful tools

of immigration surveillance create significant risks of erroneous deprivations and are easily
susceptible for uses beyond those originally contemplated when implemented.
Courts have slowly begun to recognize that significant interests are at stake in
immigration surveillance activities for both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.314 However, these interests have
continued to be given insufficient weight by Congress, which has exempted records of most
noncitizens from the Privacy Act, and the executive branch, which has invoked the Acts
exemptions from its coverage for databases used for law enforcement and national security purposes. Narrowing

these exemptions in the Acts coverage would enable these interests to be given the
weight that they deserve, and ensure that any countervailing government interests are
recognized and given effect only when supported by reasoned justifications.
Surveillance is the linchpin of the overall border enforcement regime
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Far from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border
that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points , both
fixed and mobile. New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of
the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities
cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actorsboth within
and outside the United Statesto collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other
personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some
instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database
systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which integrate and coordinate otherwise
discrete surveillance regimes in both temporary configurations [and] in more stable
structuresthereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions
involved in immigration governance.248

Congress/Data Mechanism---1AC
The United States federal government should substantially monitoring, collection
of data, and tracking pertaining to persons involved in immigration.
Congressional legislation should provide a framework of transparency, oversight,
and accountability of the collection of data through implementing greater public
engagement and review of mechanisms for errors
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Finally, immigration surveillance demands greater attention to transparency, oversight, and
accountability . Whether programmatically or in the context of individual adjudications,
immigration agencies, although improving in some ways, have long suffered from major
transparency and accountability deficits.315 Those deficits are amply evident in
immigration surveillance initiatives and have been exacerbated by the blurred lines created by the
deterritorialized migration border. Ensuring greater transparency, oversight, and due process requires responses at a number of
different levels.
First, a major contributing factor to the lack of sufficient transparency, oversight, and
accountability has been the lack of sufficiently concrete or detailed legal authority to support
and guide such major and complicated initiatives. No framework statutes govern or
constrain immigration surveillance activities , which, as discussed above, also fall outside of the limited
privacy protections available under the Privacy Act. This lack of a statutory framework governing surveillance
activities that implicate privacy interests in migration, mobility, and travel data stands in marked contrast to other
areas, such as communications and financial services , in which government access, storage, and dissemination
of personal information have long been governed and constrained by framework statutes.316

coming from Congress , the executive branch, or both acting together, accountability and
oversight of immigration surveillance would be better served by a more detailed, coherent legal
framework governing immigration surveillance activities and opportunities for greater public
Whether

engagement with those rules . As the Markle Foundation has emphasized, new national security information
sharing initiatives demand privacy and security protections that address the hard questions [such as secondary use and redress] . . .
as opposed to existing policies that state that agencies must comply with the law without providing guidance on how to do so.317
These observations hold true across the full range of initiatives in which immigration surveillance activities take place and will only
become more relevant as authorities continue to incorporate, upgrade, and integrate technology-based surveillance mechanisms in
other aspects of immigration governance.
Second, individual opportunities to redress harms arising from immigration surveillance activities,
whether administrative or judicial in nature, can still play an important role not only in remedying
those individual harms, but also in creating incentives for DHS and other actors to ensure that
information maintained in their database systems is accurate and complete .318 Current redress
mechanisms, however, do not give sufficient opportunities for individuals to remedy improper deprivations. While courts have

, more robust and regularized redress mechanisms at the


administrative level would create additional incentives for the authorities involved in
immigration control to ensure the accuracy and integrity of their data .
Finally, immigration surveillance demands more attention to forms of structural oversight. Because of the necessarily
opaque manner in which database systems and automated decisionmaking mechanisms often
functionand the ways in which multiple actors are involved in their operation over extended periods of time oversight of
these systems can be particularly difficult in the context of individual cases. 319 This is undoubtedly
more true in the immigration enforcement system, which has traditionally been ill-equipped to
begun to fill this gap

supervise investigatory practices.320 Given the limitations in the ability of individual redress
mechanisms to fully ensure proper oversight of database systems, these systems raise the stakes
in making sure that structural oversight mechanisms operate effectively.321 Especially as immigration
surveillance integrates the institutions of immigration control with each other and with the institutions of other domains, the
blurred lines of accountability among different institutions make accountability difficult; the implementation of automated
immigration surveillance initiatives only blurs those lines further.322

Limiting and constraining immigration data collection is key


Anil Kalhan 2013, Associate Professor of Law at the Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School
of Law, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance,
and Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 12/14/ 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
To begin with, automated immigration policing invites reassessment of the interests at stake when
personal information is collected, maintained, processed, and disseminated for immigration
enforcement purposes and the mechanisms to protect those interests.207 As I have explored elsewhere, the
proliferation of zones in society in which immigration enforcement takes place, and where
immigration status has become visible, salient, and subject to pervasive monitoring, carries a
range of social costs.208 While it is entirely appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate
personal information for immigration enforcement purposes in some contexts and subject to certain
constraints, both individuals and society as a whole have legitimate interests in preserving zones in
society in which immigration surveillance activities do not take place, and in making sure that when
they do take place they are appropriately limited and constrained. To some extent, those interests stem from the
value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result
when immigration status is routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social
concerns that surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as
important. These social interestsfor example, preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government
poweroften have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise
from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context, the importance of
constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings
and the limited extent to which their interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal
process.211

Surveillance is the linchpin of the overall border enforcement regime


Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Far from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border
that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points , both
fixed and mobile. New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of
the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities
cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actorsboth within
and outside the United Statesto collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other
personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some
instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database
systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which integrate and coordinate otherwise
discrete surveillance regimes in both temporary configurations [and] in more stable
structuresthereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions
involved in immigration governance.248

Federalism Advantage---1AC
The federal immigration surveillance state is expanding---destroys effective
immigration federalism
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
In the avalanche of state and local immigration-related lawmaking in recent years, few
initiatives have stirred passions like those involving the police.1 Take, for example, the charged disputes
over Arizonas S.B. 1070, whose most controversial provision requires state and local police to
ascertain the immigration status of individuals they encounter and share that information with
federal authorities.2 Even by the heated standards of discourse on immigration, clashes over S.B. 1070 have been fierce.
Advocates of tougher enforcement have embraced the Arizona law and successfully urged other jurisdictions to adopt copycat laws.3
At the same time, civil rights and community-based advocates have vigorously objected that S.B.

1070 and similar laws enable racial profiling, improper arrests, and violations of due process,
and drive wedges between local police and immigrant communities.4 The Obama
Administration swiftly joined the fray by filing suit to challenge S.B. 1070 , arguing not that the law
offended equal protection, due process, or Fourth Amendment principlesas civil rights advocates urged in their own lawsuitsbut
rather that it was preempted by federal law.5 The district court enjoined four of the laws many provisions, and in

Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court largely agreed with the Obama Administrations
position, facially invalidating all but one of the disputed provisions and cautioning that the final provision remained vulnerable to
as applied challenges. While Arizona has been widely interpreted as putting the brakes on state and local immigration regulation, it
hardly brings state and local involvement in immigration law and policy to an end.7 With respect to immigration policing, in
particular, while the Court brushed back the states unilateral attempts to regulate and enforce

immigration law, it simultaneously gave a boost to state and local immigration policing under
the aegis of federal initiatives that enlist state and local cooperation .8 Running counter to a conventional
narrative of federal inaction on immigration control, the steady expansion of these federal arrangements in recent
decades has contributed to an enduring convergence of immigration control and criminal law
enforcement and the removal of unprecedented numbers of individuals .9 The long shadow cast by mass
immigration enforcement has integrated the principles, priorities, and procedures of immigration control into the day-to-day
practices of many state and local police and criminal justice institutions to a considerable extent. Those federal programs are now
undergoing a sea change with the deployment of technology. For example, even as it forcefully has urged invalidation of S.B. 1070
and similar laws, the Obama Administration has presided over the largest expansion of state and

local immigration policing in U.S. history with its implementation of the Secure Communities
program. Secure Communities integrates the criminal records databases maintained by states
and the FBI, which are routinely queried by police conducting background checks on individuals they arrest, with the
immigration databases maintained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)thereby automating DHSs ability to identify
potentially deportable noncitizens in state or local custody.11 The program has transformative aspirations: to

automatically determine the immigration status of every person nationwide who is arrested and
booked by state and local police in order to identify potential immigration law violators . Secure
Communities illustrates a broader, technology-based shift toward what I refer to as automated immigration policing. Automated
immigration policing initiatives deploy interoperable database systems and other technologies to automate and routinize the
identification and apprehension of potentially deportable noncitizens in the course of ordinary law enforcement encounters and
other moments of day-to-day life.13 While scholars and advocates have devoted critical attention to these programs, the full
significance of this shift remains underappreciated. Observers primarily have analyzed these initiatives as extensions, in degree, of
previous federal efforts to enlist state and local police assistance, emphasizing analogous questions, costs, and benefits.14 In this
Article, I take a complementary but different approach. Automated immigration policing does not simply effect

a massive increase in the number of state and local law enforcement officials involved in
immigration policing although as I discuss, it certainly does that, on an enormous scale. More fundamentally, as a leading
edge of what I conceptualize elsewhere as an emerging surveillance regime, automated immigration policing
contributes to a broader transformation in kind that renders immigration status visible,
accessible, and salient in more legal and social domains than ever before, and subject to routine
monitoring and screening by a wide range of public and private actors .15 By using technology to make

determinations of immigration status and the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration
enforcement purposes automatic, widespread, and continuous, automated immigration policing effects a basic shift in the nature of
both immigration federalism and ordinary law enforcement activities.16 As such, the implementation of these new initiatives
raises questions analogous to those arising from other forms of technology-based surveillance and dataveillance that monitor[]
people in order to regulate and govern their behavior. Accordingly, I assess automated immigration policing in the context of the
emergence of this nascent immigration surveillance state, drawing upon technology-, surveillance-, and privacy-based frameworks
to complement and refract the insights of existing analyses. In Part II, I recount the evolution of state and local

immigration policing in recent decades, from which an equilibrium has been emerging that
perhaps ironically, given Arizonas strong endorsement of federal power contemplates considerable enmeshment of
state and local police with immigration control under federal auspices, but with room for
voluntary state and local choices along the cooperationnoncooperation spectrum. In Part III, I
examine the federal governments two recent automated immigration policing initiativesSecure Communities and the National
Crime Information Centers Immigration Violators Fileand show how the architecture of

these programs disrupts

that nascent equilibrium by curtailing state and local choices concerning the nature
and extent of their participation in immigration policing. Instead, both initiatives make
immigration status determinations by law enforcement automatic, pervasive, and effectively mandatory. In the process, these
initiatives also blur the substantive lines between immigration control and other regulatory domains and the institutional lines
between federal, state, and local agencies and departments. Because they intersect with and share continuities with a broader,
longer term set of developments concerning technology, surveillance, and information sharing, in Part IV I situate and analyze
automated immigration policing within that wider context, addressing the surveillance- and privacy-related problems that these
initiatives present.18 While automated immigration policing initiatives can facilitate the efficient
identification of large numbers of potentially deportable noncitizens, they also carry several
categories of costsall of which are exacerbated by the heightened vulnerabilities of noncitizens
and the limited procedural protections afforded in immigration removal proceedings. These costs
arise from the inherent fallibilities of automation, the tendency of surveillance mechanisms to be used for
purposes beyond those for which they were initially implemented, the displacement of state and
local control over information that states and localities collect and share with federal authorities ,
and the everyday effects of these initiatives on both law enforcement agencies and the communities being
monitored. Finally, in Part V, I identify and advance principles to constrain, inform, and guide the implementation of automated
immigration policing initiatives and other programs that similarly are reshaping immigration enforcement practices with the use of
new technologies. As with other forms of technology-based surveillance, the expanded use of automated immigration policing
demands greater attention to the interests at stake when personal information is collected for immigration enforcement purposes. I
argue that the existing potential for conflicts over control of information between federal and

subfederal governments may help to protect those interests, and that the importance of those
interests demands improved transparency, oversight, and accountability in the implementation
of automated immigration policing mechanisms and other technology-based initiatives that are
contributing to the development of the immigration surveillance state.
Specifically, it destroys state flexibility in immigration law
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
Automated immigration policing has enabled massive levels of state and local involvement in
immigration enforcement that could never have been achieved under earlier programs . The NCIC
Immigration Violators File, for example, now makes over 298,900 records of potentially deportable individuals accessible to state
and local police nationwide.111 Under Secure Communities, over twenty-eight million sets of fingerprints have been transmitted to
DHS since the programs inceptionthousands of fingerprints per day, according to one official, including fingerprints of all
individuals born outside the United States or whose place of birth is unknownfrom which DHS has identified over 1.4 million
matching records in IDENT. ICE has returned or formally removed 279,482 of these individuals, with the number of removals
attributable to Secure Communities jumping from 14,364 in 2009, representing four percent of all removals, to 83,815 in 2012,
representing one-fifth of all removals.112 In light of these numbers, the Obama Administration has decreased its

reliance on task force agreements under the 287(g) program, one of the cornerstones of the previous generation
of federal immigration policing initiatives. In order to achieve these numbers, these initiatives have forcefully
challenged and eroded the equilibrium on immigration federalism that has been

emerging in recent years , illustrating the powerful ways in which the technological architecture of
federalism itself can shape and govern the institutional relationships among different levels of
government.113 While sharing with its predecessors the goal of reducing the federal governments
information deficit vis--vis states and localities in the identification of potentially deportable noncitizens,
automated immigration policing departs from those earlier initiatives by precluding states and localities from making affirmative,
calibrated, and negotiated choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to furnish. Instead, these initiatives
while nominally still tethered to voluntary forms of federalstate cooperation affect informational end runs around those choices
through the use of technology. Both programs tightly weave immigration policing mechanisms into

established, deeply ingrained systems designed to facilitate criminal investigation, prosecution,


and sentencingtransforming the process of monitoring and verifying immigration status into a routine, seamless part of
virtually all ordinary law enforcement encounters with members of the public. This approach erodes the conception
of immigration federalism that has emerged in recent years by narrowing the space for states
and localities to make affirmative choices concerning their cooperation on immigration policing
that are independent from other decisionsinitially made decades earlierto exchange identification and criminal
history records for wholly separate criminal justice purposes. With the NCIC, given the manner of its extensive use by state and local
police, the inclusion of immigration records means that individual police officers will automatically receive immigration status
information when making routine queries, even if their jurisdictions have policieswhich are likely immune from preemption
prohibiting or restricting officers from collecting that information from members of the public they encounter. Once presented with
that information, police officers may then be induced to detain or arrest suspected civil or criminal immigration law violators
without regard to their formal immigration arrest authority, which Arizona v. United States now clarifies to be highly constrained, or
the extent to which their jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with ICE.114 Secure Communities goes even further,
inducing and routinizing the assistance of state and local police en masse. Here, the informational end run proceeds in the opposite
direction from the flow of information using the NCIC. Rather than sending immigration status information to law enforcement
officials, DHS automatically extracts identification and criminal history information from state and local law enforcement agencies
when they routinely transmit that information to the FBI for purposes that are unrelated to civil immigration enforcement, but
understood as essential for criminal law enforcement.115 DHS then uses that information for immigration enforcement purposes
without regard to whether those jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with federal immigration authorities in helping
to identify potentially deportable individuals whom they encounter. While technologybeing plastic, as Lawrence Lessig has
emphasized likely could be designed to preserve the room for state and local choices that existing federal immigration policing
initiatives contemplate, these new automated immigration policing initiatives are early components in a broader federal strategy
that instead appears poised not simply to erode existing conceptions of immigration federalism even further, but to expand these
surveillance mechanisms to encompass even larger numbers of U.S. citizens.116 Federal officials have championed Secure
Communities not just as an immigration policing program, but as the first phase of the FBIs Next Generation Identification (NGI)
initiative, a biometric database system intended to upgrade and replace IAFIS, which will enable the collection, storage, processing,
and exchange of unparalleled quantities of biometric and biographic information of both U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike.117 The
scope of NGIs database system is enormous, encompassing multimodal biometric records of fingerprints, multiple photographs, iris
scans, palm prints, voice data, and potentially other biometric identifiers along with detailed biographical information, and
populated with data from a multiplicity of sourcesincluding not only law enforcement agencies, but potentially also commercial
databases, security cameras, publicly available sources, social networking platforms, private employers, and individuals. Using
powerful facial recognition and search tools, NGI not only enables more sophisticated means of immediately identifying particular
individuals, but also makes it trivially easy to locate, identify, and track individuals remotely for investigative, intelligence
gathering, or preventive purposes.118 To the extent that DHS stores the fingerprints of U.S. citizens collected under Secure
Communities, as discussed above, the implications of Secure Communities for U.S. citizens will become even more consequential
under NGI and any other programs that might involve broader sharing of those fingerprints and other biometrics along with any
personal information that may be linked to those biometric records. The comprehensive immigration reform bill

adopted by the Senate also proposes to use technology in a manner that promises to
reshape existing conceptions of immigration federalism. The bill would require employers to
verify employees identities against DHS databases using an enhanced version of E-Verify , DHSs
recently

existing online employment eligibility verification system, which incorporates a photo tool containing photos and personal
information drawn from state drivers license and identification bureaus.119 With all of these automated initiatives,

the manner in which information from different database systems and regulatory domains is
routinely aggregated and exchanged blurs the lines between immigration control and other
regulatory domains, on the one hand, and the institutional lines between federal, state, and local
institutions, on the other.120
Constraints on federal immigration surveillance solve---theyre key to effective
division of power between the states and federal government
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and

Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,


http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
To some extent, those interests stem from the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasianonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result when immigration status is
routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and information privacy
scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interestsfor example, preventing coercive or
excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power often have less to do with the
particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise
from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context,
the importance of constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular
vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings and the limited extent to which their
interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal
process. Vindicating these interests in the immigration enforcement context therefore requires context-appropriate constraints
on the collection, use, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement purposes, including limits
on secondary uses of information that were not originally contemplated. While courts may seem unlikely to readily

recognize and impose such limits, in fact the value of these kinds of limits has nevertheless long
been recognized by numerous government actorsincluding courts and even federal
immigration officials themselves.212 However, exuberance over the potential benefits of interoperable databases and
other new technologies may be clouding attention to the continued importance of these limits when implementing those systems. In
an era in which more data is almost always assumed to be better, more information sharing and interconnectivity between database
systems is also often assumed to be better as well.213 But as John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have emphasized, complete

interoperability at all times and in all places . . . can introduce new vulnerabilities and
exacerbate existing problems. Accordingly, they argue, placing constraints upon information sharing and
interoperability and retaining friction in [the] system may often be more optimal. Moreover, with advanced database systems, as
Erin Murphy suggests, to simply ignore that there is any special import to a database search misapprehends both the potential
benefits and harms of those systems and the broader implications of their use.215 Outside the immigration context,

both scholars and judges increasingly are acknowledging and engaging those implications. For
example, in United States v. Ellison, the defendant sought suppression of evidence discovered in a search that was prompted by a
police officers suspicionless NCIC query for the license plate number of the defendants vehicle.216 While the Sixth Circuit upheld
the denial of that suppression motion, Judge Karen Nelson Moore dissented, emphasizing that the nature of law enforcement
databases invited careful consideration of whether some measure of heightened suspicion or other constraint should limit police
access to information within them.217 She cautioned that while an NCIC database search may seem only minimally intrusive, the
psychological invasion from having personal information subject to search by the police, for no reason, at any time one is driving
a car is undoubtedly grave, and that the possibility of database errors might also justify suspicion or some other constraint on
permitting police to access those databases.218 The specific legal or regulatory forms that such constraints

upon immigration-related data collection, information sharing, and secondary uses might take
are varied. As a matter of policy and institutional design, more constrained information collection, usage, and dissemination
practices would better serve the full range of interests at stake in automated immigration policing. Such constraints could,
for example, enable states and localities to choose whether or not their officers receive immigration
records when making routine NCIC queries. Similarly, Secure Communities could be modified to enable states and
localities to choose whether to share fingerprint records for immigration enforcement purposes, or even to refine the flow of
fingerprint records from the FBI to DHS more generallyfor example, by only enabling DHS to access FBI information in the
context of specific, pending immigration-related decisions for which DHS needs that information. These approaches might

help preserve space for states and localities to make voluntary choices about the level of
immigration policing assistance they wish to provide, restoring some version of the equilibrium
in immigration federalism that has been emerging in recent years and better respecting local
control of law enforcement. Other kinds of constraints on the collection, use, and dissemination of information may be
warranted in these and other immigration enforcement contexts. By neglecting or minimizing the interests at stake in these
practices, however, as implementation of automated immigration policing has so far, all of these possibilities fall off the table.

Relations Advantage---1AC
US-Mexico relations low due to immigration policies
Esther Pan 6, Staff Writer for Council on Foreign Relations and Stanford University graduate,
February 21, 2006, "U.S.-Mexico Border Woes," http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-borderwoes/p9909#p8
The relationship has been in a downward spiral over the last six years , experts say. When
Fox and Bush came to power in 2000, better relations between the two countries were high on the
priority lists of both leaders. But after 9/11, the United States shifted its focus to Afghanistan, Iraq, and
the Middle East, and Mexico was pushed down the list. At the same time, a strong current of antiimmigrant feeling in America focused on Mexico , illegal immigration, and border
issues. Mexicans accounted for 91 percent of all apprehensions of illegal immigrants and 74
percent of all formal removals of immigrants in 2003 , according to the Migration Information Center.
As a result, the health of the relationship between the two countries "was ceded to the
hardliners " in the United States, Sweig says. The Mexican reformers who argued that closer ties with the United States
would be good for Mexico "now have mud on their faces," she says. As Mexico prepares for a presidential election in July, the
immigration issue will likely boost the nationalism of all the candidates and foster the strong
current of traditional anti-Americanism in Mexico , Sweig says.
Tensions over border enforcement spill over to destroy the US-Mexico
relationship broadly
Marc R. Rosenblum 12, Specialist in Immigration Policy for the Congressional Research
Service, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, 1/6/12,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180681.pdf
The United States and Mexico also cooperate extensively on border enforcement operations at the Southwest border; but with
Mexicans being the most frequent target of U.S. immigration enforcement efforts and with the United
States being the primary market for illicit drugs from Mexico as well as a source of illegal weapons flowing into Mexico, border
enforcement occasionally has been a source of bilateral tension .155 On one hand, given that Mexicans
represent a majority of all unauthorized migrants in the United States and of aliens apprehended at the border,156 and given that
drug-related violence in Mexico raises persistent concerns about spillover violence on the U.S. side of the border,157 the U.S.-

Mexican border is inevitably a major focus of U.S. enforcement. On the other hand, while Mexico does not
question U.S. authority to make and enforce its own immigration laws, Mexicans from across the political spectrum
have expressed concerns about the construction of border fencing, the effects of border
enforcement on migrant deaths , and the protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups of
migrants.158 More generally, the

use of military technology and the heavy presence of law enforcement

personnel at the U.S.-Mexican border may

work against the diplomatic and commercial goals of

a closer economic and political partnership among the United States, Mexico, and other
Latin American countries.
Mexicos key to broader Latin American relations
Pamela K. Starr 9, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of
International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of
Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35
Mexican sentiment toward the United States matters. If Mexicans mistrust the United States,
question what our country stands for, and feel treated like a second-class ally, it will be
difficult for Washington to foster a cooperative relationship that extends beyond

drugs and trade. Further, without a cooperative relationship with its nearest Latin American
neighbor it will be difficult for the United States to improve relations with the rest of
the region . And as demonstrated by the expansion of Chinese investment, Russian military sales and naval maneuvers,
Iranian diplomatic visits, and Hugo Chvez regional sway, U.S. influence in the Latin American region can no longer be taken for
granted.
Reforms on immigration rebuild relations with Mexico
Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of
International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of
Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35
The futures of Mexico and the United States are inevitably and increasingly intertwined ,
something that is reflected in the stable, cooperative and institutionalized bilateral relationship
that has developed behind the scenes over the past 25 years. Yet public perceptions of the relationship are much less
reassuring. Positive attitudes toward the United States have fallen tangibly in Mexico
during the past five years. In part, this is due to Mexican disappointment at having been shunted
from the center of the U.S. foreign policy stage during the Bush administrations first months to the margins of
Washingtons concerns in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It

is also partly due to the dashing of Mexican hopes

for a comprehensive immigration reform in the United States. Beyond the failure of the
policy initiative, Mexicans widely perceive a hostile turn in U.S. treatment of Mexican
immigrants and see that hostility extending to Mexico itself . These perceptions have been shaped by
rhetoric that sometimes turned insulting toward Mexicans and by concrete actions such as the 2006 legislation to build the border wall and
immigration raids that have split thousands of families since mid-2007. The declining esteem for the United States further reflects Mexicans deeply
rooted fears about the main features of the Bush foreign policy and especially its unilateralism. Like

many others in the United


States and abroad, Mexicans have been disheartened by a series of events including the U.S. decision to invade Iraq; its
seeming loss of a moral center evidenced by the violations of human rights committed at Abu Ghraib and Guantnamo and apparent support for a 2002
military coup against a democratically elected government in Venezuela; and its unwillingness to listen to the concerns of historic U.S. allies, especially
those located in the Western Hemisphere. In a 2008 survey, only 30 percent of Mexicans said they admired the United States, while 29 percent
expressed contempt for their northern neighbor, and fully 61 percent said they distrusted the United States (Centro de Investigacin y Docencia
Econmicas, Mxico, las Amricas y el mundo 2008). More recently, media reports painting Mexico as a country overrun by violence and comments by
former and current U.S. government officials referring to Mexico as a future failed state have rankled Mexicans and fed their sense of vulnerability to
the whims of their powerful northern neighbor.

US-Latin American relations are key to broader US legitimacy and power in


multilateral forums
Christopher Sabatini 12, adjunct professor at Columbia University in the political economy of
Latin America and the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, 6/13/12, Why the U.S. can't afford
to ignore Latin America, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-scant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/
Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other
developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential
of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea
flaunting international norms and regional stability.

But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande
goes to the heart of the U.S. changing role in the world and its strategic interests within i t.
Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations :
1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies .
Recently, countries

with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions

diametrically opposed to the U.S . when it comes to matters of global governance and
human rights. Take, for example, Russia and Chinas stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention.
Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years
ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to
refer to Brazil as a rising spoiler.

At a time of (perceived) declining U.S. influence, its important that America deepens its ties with
regional allies that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for
permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decisionmaking rather than isolate them.
If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy
agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and
human rights.
2. Latin America is becoming more international.
Its time to understand that the U.S. isnt the only country that has clout in Latin America.
For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate,
politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as theyve fought battles over small countries such as
Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China
and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region.
and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in
the region and even on the world forum.
The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that
it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and
Its also clear that countries such as Brazil

development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba.


3. There are security and strategic risks in the region.
Hugo Chavezs systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of
Chavezs senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S.
border .
FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a significant
foreign narcotics trafficker by the U.S. government.
At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are
overrunning Central America .
In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Caldern launched a controversial war on drugs that has since resulted in the loss of over
50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras
and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves

overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a
transit point for drugs heading north.
Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly
difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it wont be with or against governments as it was in
the 1980s but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states .
Latin American relations are key to sustaining green environmental cooperation
Daniel Kammen 12, serves the U. S. Secretary of State as an Energy and Climate Fellow and is
a Professor at the University of California Berkeley, 12-5-12, Building Bridges to a Sustainable
Energy Future, http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2012/12/05/building-bridges-to-asustainable-energy-future/
The Americas are undergoing a transition in the energy sector that will have global
geopolitical ramifications . At the same time as the United States is touted to become the worlds
largest oil producer by 2020, and a net exporter by 2030, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Panama show the most
promise in becoming regional hubs not only for clean energy investment , but for
sustained low-carbon economic growth
Worlds Top Energy Producer).

(see related story: U.S. to Overtake Saudi Arabia, Russia as

Although Latin America and the Caribbean lag behind the United States and Canada in terms of
implemented clean energy policy and project funding, 7 percent of the regions total installed capacity today is
renewables, and it is expected to grow faster in years to come. (See related interactive map: The
Global Electricity Mix) Faced with ever-changing economic and political realities, regional collaborations for
knowledge-creation and -sharing are crucial for fostering lasting partnerships that can
make sustainability science, well, sustainable.
International partnerships that lead to concrete action are often the clearest signs of innovation .
At the state to state level, the Energy and Climate Partnership for the Americas (ECPA) and at the person-to-person level, the
Fulbright NEXUS program provide clear evidence regional collaborations that are clearly
changing the modes of engagement within the hemisphere. One of us just returned from a partnershipbuilding ECPA sponsored trip to Nicaragua, facilitated by both the U. S. Embassy team and a local NGO, blueEnergy, which is
discussed below and here, focused on community energy.
Just two years after its launch by President Obama in 2009, ECPA has moved beyond its initial focus on

knowledge sharing around cleaner and more efficient energy, and now also supports sustainable
forest and land use initiatives as well as climate change adaptation strategies . Governments
and institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), have all worked together to support regional technical workshops, business strategies, and other initiatives for new and
cleaner ways to provide energy. ECPA has also become a vehicle for leaders in sustainability research and practice to work at the
institutional level to link industry, university, and civil-society groups in the New World.
The two-year-old Fulbright NEXUS program has already become a regional model for the support of scholars from around the
hemisphere committed to applied research and collaboration on sustainability science. At a recent meeting in Banff, Canada, the 20
NEXUS fellows focused equally on individual and group projects to assess and address environmental issues plaguing the Western
Hemisphere. Interestingly, the focus was on solutions science, not just in quantifying the extent of environmental change.
During the coming year, the Fulbright NEXUS Fellows will be working across the region on projects ranging
from forest health and productivity in Alberta, Canada, to local perceptions and strategies for climate change adaptation in the High
Andes of Peru, to

understanding the interactions between climate mitigation and adaptation

strategies for Brazils power sector .


Environmental collapse will be detrimental to the following --1. Water
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the
findings of the MA process, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdf
Many aspects of the world's hydrological (water) cycle are regulated by the natural functions of
ecosystems and associated geophysical processes (such as evaporation and the functioning of the climate system).
Human interventions in watersheds, lakes and river systems take many forms - deforestation,
farming, irrigation, river damming and extractions from subterranean aquifers. Wetlands play a
crucial role in the filtering of fresh water, including the removal of various chemicals and
potentially toxic elements (e.g. heavy metals such as cadmium and lead). Fresh water is essential for
human health . It is used for growing food, drinking, personal hygiene, washing, cooking and the dilution and recycling of wastes.
Water scarcity jeopardizes food production, human health, economic development and
geopolitical stability. Globally, the availability of water per person has declined markedly in recent decades.
One third of the world's population now lives in countries experiencing moderate to high water
stress. This fraction will continue to increase as both population size and per capita water demand
grow - reflecting the escalating use of fresh water for irrigated agriculture, livestock production, industry and the requirements of wealthier urban
residents. Over 1 billion people lack access to safe water supplies; 2.6 billion people lack adequate sanitation . This has led to widespread
microbial contamination of drinking water. Water-associated infectious diseases claim up to 3.2
million lives each year, approximately 6% of all deaths globally . The burden of disease from inadequate water,
sanitation and hygiene totals 1.7 million deaths and the loss of more than 54 million healthy life years. Investments in safe

drinking-water and improved sanitation show a close correspondence with


improvements in human health and economic productivity . Every day each person needs 20-50 litres
of water free from harmful chemical and microbial contaminants, for drinking, cooking and hygiene. The growing challenge of providing this basic
service to large segments of the human population is highlighted by one of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, MDG-7, which calls for
halving by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking-water and basic sanitation.

2. Food production
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the
findings of the MA process, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdf
Productive terrestrial and marine ecosystems, both wild and managed, are the source of our food - a
prerequisite for health and life. Global aggregate food production currently is sufficient to meet the needs of all.

However, of the present world population of 6.5 billion, over 800 million - nearly all of them in low-income countries - do not obtain
enough protein and calories for energy. Worldwide, a similar (increasing) number are now overfed. Several billion people experience
deficiences of one or more micronutrients (especially vitamin A, zinc and iodine). In poor countries, especially in rural

areas, the health of human communities often is directly dependent on locally productive
ecosystems providing sources of basic nutrition. Local food production is critical in preventing
hunger and promoting rural development in areas where the poor do not have the capacity to
purchase food from elsewhere. Wild foods are important locally in many developing countries,
often bridging the hunger gap created by stresses such as droughts and civil unrest . In richer
urban communities, human dependence on ecosystems for food is less apparent but no less
fundamental. Worldwide, undernutrition accounts for nearly 10% of the global burden of disease. Almost all of this occurs in

poor countries where food production has not kept up with population increases, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore,
undernutrition is related strongly to poverty in developing countries with high mortality rates ;
between one-sixth and one-quarter of the burden of disease is related to childhood and maternal undernutrition. In developed
countries with low mortality rates, diet-related risks (mainly overnutrition, often in combination with physical inactivity) account for
between one-tenth and one-third of the burden of disease.

The nutritional disparity between rich and

poor primarily is caused by social and economic factors as well as the uneven impacts of world
food trade. In the future, however, adverse changes in food-producing ecosystems are likely to play an
increasingly important role in nutritional disparities (medium certainty).
4. Timber, fibre and fuel
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the
findings of the MA process, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdf
Many processes and resources in nature provide power that can be harnessed by human
communities, especially wind, water and biomass combustion. Different geographical regions and countries at varying stages of
development use varied methods of generating power. This has many health impacts and the availability of
power, especially electricity, has important applications in health care. Over half of the worlds
population continues to rely upon solid fuels for cooking and heating . These fuels including
wood, crop stubble and animal dung - are a direct product of ecosystems . Indoor air pollution produced by the
combustion of biomass fuels as well as coal in poorly ventilated heating and cooking environments, causes significant mortality and
morbidity from respiratory diseases, particularly among children. In areas where the demand for wood has

surpassed local supply and people cannot afford other forms of power, there is increased
vulnerability to illness and malnutrition from consuming (unboiled) microbiologically
contaminated water and improperly cooked food, as well as from exposure to cold. Poor women and

children in rural communities often are those most affected by a scarcity of fuel wood. Many must walk long distances searching for
fuel and firewood (as well as water) and hauling it home. These time-consuming tasks reduce the time and energy available for
tending crops, cooking meals or attending school. Therefore,

provision of adequate and sustainable

energy supplies is fundamental not only to economic development, but also to

health and well-being . Outdoor air pollution is caused predominantly by the combustion of non-renewable fossil fuels
air pollution is responsible for significant
mortality every year, mostly as a result of heart and lung diseases. In addition, the accompanying
release of a major greenhouse gas (CO2) and its consequent contribution to global warming have
further, mostly adverse, impacts on human health. Air pollution due to forest fires and burning practices in
for electricity generation, transport and industry. Globally, urban

agriculture also can have serious local and regional health consequences. This was highlighted by the public health experiences in
south-east Asia in 1998, following widespread (drought-associated) forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan, Indonesia in the latter
part of 1997 and early 1998. Timber exploitation has contributed to species' loss and ecosystem

degradation in many regions of the developing world, affecting traditional livelihoods, microbial ecology
and causing other health-related risks. In particular the destruction and fragmentation of habitats,
accompanied by new patterns of human-microbe contacts, has introduced new infectious
diseases into human populations e.g. the Nipah virus in Malaysia and various viral haemorrhagic fevers in South
America. Deforestation also endangers health by intensifying the effects of natural disasters such
as floods and landslides.
5. Regulation of infectious disease
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the
findings of the MA process, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdf
Infectious diseases are caused by viruses, bacteria and other types of microbes or parasites . Only a
few infectious agents cause actual disease in plants, animals and humans; usually these are constrained geographically and
seasonally by ecosystems and ecological relationships in nature. Patterns of microbe entry into the human species
(sometimes as new mutants) are sensitive to climatic and micro-environmental conditions . These factors may
impact upon the spread of microbes between humans; their more distant dissemination; and the activity of vector organisms (e.g.
mosquitoes) involved in their transmission. Often humaninduced changes in ecosystems and in physical

environmental conditions alter these natural influences oninfectious agent range and activity .
The pattern and extent of change in incidence of a particular infectious disease depends on the
particular ecosystems affected, type of land-use change, disease-specific transmission dynamics,
sociocultural changes and the susceptibility of human populations . Infectious disease risks
are affected particularly by destruction of , or encroachment into, wildlife habitat

(particularly

through logging and road building); changes in the distribution and availability of surface waters , e.g.
through dam construction, irrigation and stream diversion; agricultural land-use changes, including proliferation of both livestock
and crops; uncontrolled urbanization or urban sprawl; resistance to pesticide chemicals used to control certain disease vectors;
climate variability and change; migration and international travel and trade; and the accidental or intentional human introduction of
pathogens. Recently, there has been an upturn in the rate of emergence or re-emergence of infectious diseases. Factors

contributing substantially to this trend include: intensified human encroachment on natural


environments; reductions in biodiversity (including natural predators of vector organisms); particular
livestock and poultry production methods; and increased long-distance trade in wild animal
species (including as food). Further contributors include: habitat alterations that lead to changes in the
number of vector breeding sites or in reservoir host distribution; niche invasions or interspecies
host transfers; human-induced genetic changes of disease vectors or pathogens (such as mosquito
resistance to pesticides or emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria); and environmental contamination by
infectious disease agents.
6. Climate regulation
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the
findings of the MA process, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdf
Regional climatic conditions are influenced by changes in ecosystems and landscapes , especially
deforestation and desertification. On a larger scale, the ongoing human induced alteration of atmospheric
composition (the greenhouse effect) also affects climatic conditions. Each of the ecosystem services described

above is

sensitive to climatic conditions and therefore will be affected by human-induced climate


change. In turn, these ecosystem changes will affect the well-being and health of
human populations . Meanwhile, climate change itself does, and will, affect human health .
Although climate change will have some beneficial effects on human health, most are expected to be negative. Direct effects,
such as increased mortality from heatwaves, are most readily predicted but indirect effects are likely
to have greater overall impact. Human health is likely to be affected indirectly by climate-induced changes in the
distribution of productive ecosystems and in the availability of food, water and energy supplies. These changes will affect the
distribution of infectious diseases, nutritional status and patterns of human settlement. Extreme weather events
(including heatwaves, floods, storms and droughts)

and sea-level rise are anticipated to increase as a

result of climate change . These events have local and sometimes regional effects: directly
through deaths and injuries and indirectly through economic disruption, infrastructure damage
and population displacement. In turn, this may lead to increased incidence of certain
communicable diseases as a result of overcrowding; lack of clean water and shelter; poor
nutritional status; and adverse impacts on mental health .

Federalism Advantage

UQ---Supreme Court
Federal supremacy over states now---Supreme Court decisions
Karthick Ramakrishnan 2014, professor of public policy and political science at the
University of California, Understanding Immigration Federalism in the United States, Center
for American Progress, March 2014, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/StateImmigration-reportv2.pdf
Two major developments in 2012 led to a steep decline in the legal and political fortunes of these restrictive issue entrepreneurs and
their plans for attrition through state enforcement. First, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down most provisions

of Arizonas S.B. 1070 in Arizona v. United States. 56 In the wake of the ruling, federal courts also
placed significant limitations on local enforcement schemes, leaving the future legal status of
much restrictive enforcement legislation in doubt.57 As a matter of legal theory, courts have been much
more likely to side with the long-standing notion of federal supremacy on immigration
enforcement than to side with the theories of Secretary Kobach and others who claim inherent authority for states to
engage in the policing of immigrants.

UQ---Surveillance Hurts Federalism


Immigration surveillance state expanding, threatens federalism
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
In the avalanche of state and local immigration-related lawmaking in recent years, few
initiatives have stirred passions like those involving the police.1 Take, for example, the charged disputes
over Arizonas S.B. 1070, whose most controversial provision requires state and local police to
ascertain the immigration status of individuals they encounter and share that information with
federal authorities.2 Even by the heated standards of discourse on immigration, clashes over S.B. 1070 have been fierce.
Advocates of tougher enforcement have embraced the Arizona law and successfully urged other jurisdictions to adopt copycat laws.3
At the same time, civil rights and community-based advocates have vigorously objected that S.B.

1070 and similar laws enable racial profiling, improper arrests, and violations of due process,
and drive wedges between local police and immigrant communities.4 The Obama
Administration swiftly joined the fray by filing suit to challenge S.B. 1070 , arguing not that the law
offended equal protection, due process, or Fourth Amendment principlesas civil rights advocates urged in their own lawsuitsbut
rather that it was preempted by federal law.5 The district court enjoined four of the laws many provisions, and in

Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court largely agreed with the Obama Administrations
position, facially invalidating all but one of the disputed provisions and cautioning that the final provision remained vulnerable to
as applied challenges. While Arizona has been widely interpreted as putting the brakes on state and local immigration regulation, it
hardly brings state and local involvement in immigration law and policy to an end.7 With respect to immigration policing, in
particular, while the Court brushed back the states unilateral attempts to regulate and enforce

immigration law, it simultaneously gave a boost to state and local immigration policing under
the aegis of federal initiatives that enlist state and local cooperation .8 Running counter to a conventional
narrative of federal inaction on immigration control, the steady expansion of these federal arrangements in recent
decades has contributed to an enduring convergence of immigration control and criminal law
enforcement and the removal of unprecedented numbers of individuals .9 The long shadow cast by mass
immigration enforcement has integrated the principles, priorities, and procedures of immigration control into the day-to-day
practices of many state and local police and criminal justice institutions to a considerable extent. Those federal programs are now
undergoing a sea change with the deployment of technology. For example, even as it forcefully has urged invalidation of S.B. 1070
and similar laws, the Obama Administration has presided over the largest expansion of state and

local immigration policing in U.S. history with its implementation of the Secure Communities
program. Secure Communities integrates the criminal records databases maintained by states
and the FBI, which are routinely queried by police conducting background checks on individuals they arrest, with the
immigration databases maintained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)thereby automating DHSs ability to identify
potentially deportable noncitizens in state or local custody.11 The program has transformative aspirations: to

automatically determine the immigration status of every person nationwide who is arrested and
booked by state and local police in order to identify potential immigration law violators . Secure
Communities illustrates a broader, technology-based shift toward what I refer to as automated immigration policing. Automated
immigration policing initiatives deploy interoperable database systems and other technologies to automate and routinize the
identification and apprehension of potentially deportable noncitizens in the course of ordinary law enforcement encounters and
other moments of day-to-day life.13 While scholars and advocates have devoted critical attention to these programs, the full
significance of this shift remains underappreciated. Observers primarily have analyzed these initiatives as extensions, in degree, of
previous federal efforts to enlist state and local police assistance, emphasizing analogous questions, costs, and benefits.14 In this
Article, I take a complementary but different approach. Automated immigration policing does not simply effect

a massive increase in the number of state and local law enforcement officials involved in
immigration policing although as I discuss, it certainly does that, on an enormous scale. More fundamentally, as a leading
edge of what I conceptualize elsewhere as an emerging surveillance regime, automated immigration policing
contributes to a broader transformation in kind that renders immigration status visible,
accessible, and salient in more legal and social domains than ever before, and subject to routine
monitoring and screening by a wide range of public and private actors .15 By using technology to make
determinations of immigration status and the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration
enforcement purposes automatic, widespread, and continuous, automated immigration policing effects a basic shift in the nature of

both immigration federalism and ordinary law enforcement activities.16 As such, the implementation of these new initiatives
raises questions analogous to those arising from other forms of technology-based surveillance and dataveillance that monitor[]
people in order to regulate and govern their behavior. Accordingly, I assess automated immigration policing in the context of the
emergence of this nascent immigration surveillance state, drawing upon technology-, surveillance-, and privacy-based frameworks
to complement and refract the insights of existing analyses. In Part II, I recount the evolution of state and local

immigration policing in recent decades, from which an equilibrium has been emerging that
perhaps ironically, given Arizonas strong endorsement of federal power contemplates considerable enmeshment of
state and local police with immigration control under federal auspices, but with room for
voluntary state and local choices along the cooperationnoncooperation spectrum. In Part III, I
examine the federal governments two recent automated immigration policing initiativesSecure Communities and the National
Crime Information Centers Immigration Violators Fileand show how the architecture of

these programs disrupts

that nascent equilibrium by curtailing state and local choices concerning the nature
and extent of their participation in immigration policing. Instead, both initiatives make
immigration status determinations by law enforcement automatic, pervasive, and effectively mandatory. In the process, these
initiatives also blur the substantive lines between immigration control and other regulatory domains and the institutional lines
between federal, state, and local agencies and departments. Because they intersect with and share continuities with a broader,
longer term set of developments concerning technology, surveillance, and information sharing, in Part IV I situate and analyze
automated immigration policing within that wider context, addressing the surveillance- and privacy-related problems that these
initiatives present.18 While automated immigration policing initiatives can facilitate the efficient
identification of large numbers of potentially deportable noncitizens, they also carry several
categories of costsall of which are exacerbated by the heightened vulnerabilities of noncitizens
and the limited procedural protections afforded in immigration removal proceedings. These costs
arise from the inherent fallibilities of automation, the tendency of surveillance mechanisms to be used for
purposes beyond those for which they were initially implemented, the displacement of state and
local control over information that states and localities collect and share with federal authorities ,
and the everyday effects of these initiatives on both law enforcement agencies and the communities being
monitored. Finally, in Part V, I identify and advance principles to constrain, inform, and guide the implementation of automated
immigration policing initiatives and other programs that similarly are reshaping immigration enforcement practices with the use of
new technologies. As with other forms of technology-based surveillance, the expanded use of automated immigration policing
demands greater attention to the interests at stake when personal information is collected for immigration enforcement purposes. I
argue that the existing potential for conflicts over control of information between federal and

subfederal governments may help to protect those interests, and that the importance of those
interests demands improved transparency, oversight, and accountability in the implementation
of automated immigration policing mechanisms and other technology-based initiatives that are
contributing to the development of the immigration surveillance state.
Destroys immigration federalism---kills state flexibility
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
Automated immigration policing has enabled massive levels of state and local involvement in
immigration enforcement that could never have been achieved under earlier programs . The NCIC
Immigration Violators File, for example, now makes over 298,900 records of potentially deportable individuals accessible to state
and local police nationwide.111 Under Secure Communities, over twenty-eight million sets of fingerprints have been transmitted to
DHS since the programs inceptionthousands of fingerprints per day, according to one official, including fingerprints of all
individuals born outside the United States or whose place of birth is unknownfrom which DHS has identified over 1.4 million
matching records in IDENT. ICE has returned or formally removed 279,482 of these individuals, with the number of removals
attributable to Secure Communities jumping from 14,364 in 2009, representing four percent of all removals, to 83,815 in 2012,
representing one-fifth of all removals.112 In light of these numbers, the Obama Administration has decreased its

reliance on task force agreements under the 287(g) program, one of the cornerstones of the previous generation
of federal immigration policing initiatives. In order to achieve these numbers, these initiatives have forcefully
challenged and eroded the equilibrium on immigration federalism that has been
emerging in recent years , illustrating the powerful ways in which the technological architecture of
federalism itself can shape and govern the institutional relationships among different levels of

government.113 While sharing with its predecessors the goal of reducing the federal governments
information deficit vis--vis states and localities in the identification of potentially deportable noncitizens,
automated immigration policing departs from those earlier initiatives by precluding states and localities from making affirmative,
calibrated, and negotiated choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to furnish. Instead, these initiatives
while nominally still tethered to voluntary forms of federalstate cooperation affect informational end runs around those choices
through the use of technology. Both programs tightly weave immigration policing mechanisms into

established, deeply ingrained systems designed to facilitate criminal investigation, prosecution,


and sentencingtransforming the process of monitoring and verifying immigration status into a routine, seamless part of
virtually all ordinary law enforcement encounters with members of the public. This approach erodes the conception
of immigration federalism that has emerged in recent years by narrowing the space for states
and localities to make affirmative choices concerning their cooperation on immigration policing
that are independent from other decisionsinitially made decades earlierto exchange identification and criminal
history records for wholly separate criminal justice purposes. With the NCIC, given the manner of its extensive use by state and local
police, the inclusion of immigration records means that individual police officers will automatically receive immigration status
information when making routine queries, even if their jurisdictions have policieswhich are likely immune from preemption
prohibiting or restricting officers from collecting that information from members of the public they encounter. Once presented with
that information, police officers may then be induced to detain or arrest suspected civil or criminal immigration law violators
without regard to their formal immigration arrest authority, which Arizona v. United States now clarifies to be highly constrained, or
the extent to which their jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with ICE.114 Secure Communities goes even further,
inducing and routinizing the assistance of state and local police en masse. Here, the informational end run proceeds in the opposite
direction from the flow of information using the NCIC. Rather than sending immigration status information to law enforcement
officials, DHS automatically extracts identification and criminal history information from state and local law enforcement agencies
when they routinely transmit that information to the FBI for purposes that are unrelated to civil immigration enforcement, but
understood as essential for criminal law enforcement.115 DHS then uses that information for immigration enforcement purposes
without regard to whether those jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with federal immigration authorities in helping
to identify potentially deportable individuals whom they encounter. While technologybeing plastic, as Lawrence Lessig has
emphasized likely could be designed to preserve the room for state and local choices that existing federal immigration policing
initiatives contemplate, these new automated immigration policing initiatives are early components in a broader federal strategy
that instead appears poised not simply to erode existing conceptions of immigration federalism even further, but to expand these
surveillance mechanisms to encompass even larger numbers of U.S. citizens.116 Federal officials have championed Secure
Communities not just as an immigration policing program, but as the first phase of the FBIs Next Generation Identification (NGI)
initiative, a biometric database system intended to upgrade and replace IAFIS, which will enable the collection, storage, processing,
and exchange of unparalleled quantities of biometric and biographic information of both U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike.117 The
scope of NGIs database system is enormous, encompassing multimodal biometric records of fingerprints, multiple photographs, iris
scans, palm prints, voice data, and potentially other biometric identifiers along with detailed biographical information, and
populated with data from a multiplicity of sourcesincluding not only law enforcement agencies, but potentially also commercial
databases, security cameras, publicly available sources, social networking platforms, private employers, and individuals. Using
powerful facial recognition and search tools, NGI not only enables more sophisticated means of immediately identifying particular
individuals, but also makes it trivially easy to locate, identify, and track individuals remotely for investigative, intelligence
gathering, or preventive purposes.118 To the extent that DHS stores the fingerprints of U.S. citizens collected under Secure
Communities, as discussed above, the implications of Secure Communities for U.S. citizens will become even more consequential
under NGI and any other programs that might involve broader sharing of those fingerprints and other biometrics along with any
personal information that may be linked to those biometric records. The comprehensive immigration reform bill

adopted by the Senate also proposes to use technology in a manner that promises to
reshape existing conceptions of immigration federalism. The bill would require employers to
verify employees identities against DHS databases using an enhanced version of E-Verify , DHSs
recently

existing online employment eligibility verification system, which incorporates a photo tool containing photos and personal
information drawn from state drivers license and identification bureaus.119 With all of these automated initiatives,

the manner in which information from different database systems and regulatory domains is
routinely aggregated and exchanged blurs the lines between immigration control and other
regulatory domains, on the one hand, and the institutional lines between federal, state, and local
institutions, on the other.120

Solvency---Brink/Fed Law Solves


Federal law determines state authority over immigration---its ambiguous now
Karthick Ramakrishnan 2014, professor of public policy and political science at the
University of California, Understanding Immigration Federalism in the United States, Center
for American Progress, March 2014, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/StateImmigration-reportv2.pdf
Since the late 1800s, the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government is vested with the
exclusive power to regulate the admission and expulsion of immigrants ; these laws are traditionally
referred to as immigration laws.14 As a corollary, the Supreme Court has consistently opined that states and
localities do not have the power to regulate immigration as such.15 Nevertheless, states and
localities have been left with some authority to enact laws that regulate the treatment of
immigrants once in the United States. These laws are often referred to as alienage laws.16 States can, for example,
require residents to be U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents in order to access certain benefits or gain certain types of public
employment.17 It is important to note, however, that while states are permitted to control some aspects of

immigrants lives, the extent to which states can regulate the treatment of noncitizens is far from
clear. That is, within the sphere of alienage law, the court is still determining the dividing line between
federal and state control. The Constitution and federal laws help determine these boundaries.

Solvency---Curtailment Solves
Constraints on federal immigration surveillance are key to effective division of
power between the states and federal government
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
To some extent, those interests stem from the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasianonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result when immigration status is
routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and information privacy
scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interestsfor example, preventing coercive or
excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power often have less to do with the
particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise
from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context,
the importance of constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular
vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings and the limited extent to which their
interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal
process. Vindicating these interests in the immigration enforcement context therefore requires context-appropriate constraints
on the collection, use, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement purposes, including limits
on secondary uses of information that were not originally contemplated. While courts may seem unlikely to readily

recognize and impose such limits, in fact the value of these kinds of limits has nevertheless long
been recognized by numerous government actorsincluding courts and even federal
immigration officials themselves.212 However, exuberance over the potential benefits of interoperable databases and
other new technologies may be clouding attention to the continued importance of these limits when implementing those systems. In
an era in which more data is almost always assumed to be better, more information sharing and interconnectivity between database
systems is also often assumed to be better as well.213 But as John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have emphasized, complete

interoperability at all times and in all places . . . can introduce new vulnerabilities and
exacerbate existing problems. Accordingly, they argue, placing constraints upon information sharing and
interoperability and retaining friction in [the] system may often be more optimal. Moreover, with advanced database systems, as
Erin Murphy suggests, to simply ignore that there is any special import to a database search misapprehends both the potential
benefits and harms of those systems and the broader implications of their use.215 Outside the immigration context,

both scholars and judges increasingly are acknowledging and engaging those implications. For
example, in United States v. Ellison, the defendant sought suppression of evidence discovered in a search that was prompted by a
police officers suspicionless NCIC query for the license plate number of the defendants vehicle.216 While the Sixth Circuit upheld
the denial of that suppression motion, Judge Karen Nelson Moore dissented, emphasizing that the nature of law enforcement
databases invited careful consideration of whether some measure of heightened suspicion or other constraint should limit police
access to information within them.217 She cautioned that while an NCIC database search may seem only minimally intrusive, the
psychological invasion from having personal information subject to search by the police, for no reason, at any time one is driving
a car is undoubtedly grave, and that the possibility of database errors might also justify suspicion or some other constraint on
permitting police to access those databases.218 The specific legal or regulatory forms that such constraints

upon immigration-related data collection, information sharing, and secondary uses might take
are varied. As a matter of policy and institutional design, more constrained information collection, usage, and dissemination
practices would better serve the full range of interests at stake in automated immigration policing. Such constraints could,
for example, enable states and localities to choose whether or not their officers receive immigration
records when making routine NCIC queries. Similarly, Secure Communities could be modified to enable states and
localities to choose whether to share fingerprint records for immigration enforcement purposes, or even to refine the flow of
fingerprint records from the FBI to DHS more generallyfor example, by only enabling DHS to access FBI information in the
context of specific, pending immigration-related decisions for which DHS needs that information. These approaches might

help preserve space for states and localities to make voluntary choices about the level of
immigration policing assistance they wish to provide, restoring some version of the equilibrium
in immigration federalism that has been emerging in recent years and better respecting local
control of law enforcement. Other kinds of constraints on the collection, use, and dissemination of information may be
warranted in these and other immigration enforcement contexts. By neglecting or minimizing the interests at stake in these
practices, however, as implementation of automated immigration policing has so far, all of these possibilities fall off the table.

Information Federalism IL
Information federalism
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
The significance of these anti-detainer policies and the extent to which they take hold in other jurisdictions remain to be seen.
However, the broader trajectory leading to their adoption suggests that as state and local

institutions including hospitals, educational institutions, and othersincreasingly collect and maintain
personal information that might be relevant to immigration enforcement , analysis of
immigration federalism may benefit from greater understanding of and attention to the
dynamics of information control. Moreover, like the fingerprints collected through Secure Communities, the
information sought by federal immigration authorities to identify potentially deportable
individuals need not even directly include immigration status itself . As databases become increasingly
interoperable and capable of aggregating information from a variety of different sources, federal officials may well regard other
forms of personal informationwhether or not personally identifiableas amply sufficient to serve their immigration enforcement
purposes.225 Accordingly, while states and localities may still find that restrictions on collection and

dissemination of immigration status information play an important and useful role, they also
will likely find those limitations insufficient to fully achieve the immigration-protective
objectives they have sought to advance with those laws. Beyond immigration, these episodes raise the question
of whether conflicts over information control might be harnessed to help protect social interests in privacy and constrain federal
surveillance activities. Scholars have critically assessed the potential for states and localities to protect privacy interests as
regulators.226 Separately, scholars have also assessed the prospects for aligning the interests of companies collecting personal
information with interests in privacy.227 Since, as discussed above, states and localities increasingly possess large

volumes of information that federal authorities seek for their own susrveillance and
enforcement purposes, the institutional role of states and localities as holders of this
information warrants critical examination as well. For example, Robert Mikos has recently argued that
under prevailing understandings of Tenth Amendment principles, federal efforts to compel
states to provide this information should be foreclosed as an impermissible form of
commandeering.228 While anti-commandeering doctrine itself has limits, as Mikos acknowledges, his analysis points
to the possibility of information federalism as a constraint on federal surveillance , whether as a matter
of constitutional doctrine, legislation, or technological design.229

Federalism Good---Privacy/Rights
State immigration law protects immigrant privacy rights and limits rights abuses
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
B. Immigration Federalism and Information Federalism One important means of fostering and facilitating
these kinds of constraintsof creating friction in [the] system in aid of the public good may be to harness the
existing potential for conflicts over information control between the federal government and
states and localities.219 While it is customary, in immigration as in other areas, to think of the federal
government as a bulwark against rights violations by states, federalism also establishes multiple centers of
power with the capacity to exert independent checks upon federal authority. Particularly in the face of broad exercises of
federal power, state and local institutions can play important roles in the protection of rights
and libertiesas focal points for the expression of political opposition to national policies, as seedbed[s] for political change at
the national level, as sources of alternative and potentially broader conceptions of federal rights, and as potentially moderating
influences on the federal actors who seek their cooperation. Immigration scholars have long discounted these

possibilities, devoting greater attention to more restrictive subfederal impulses . However, in recent
years, scholars increasingly have recognized that states and localities can and do play affirmative
and constructive roles in integrating, protecting, and otherwise affirmatively engaging their noncitizen
residents.221 Indeed, with respect to the collection, processing, storing, and dissemination of immigration status and other
personal information for immigration enforcement purposes, states and localities have long played precisely this kind of rolefor
example, by fashioning policies that constrain the collection of that information or its dissemination to federal immigration
officials.222 Automated immigration policing initiatives such as Secure Communities directly

respond to these forms of resistance by reducing the need for affirmative state and local assistance in
collecting information about potentially deportable noncitizens in their custody . However, as both
surveillance and federalism scholars might have predicted, that resistance itself has persisted in the form of efforts to limit the ability
of federal immigration officials to use that information.223 A growing number of states and localities have

adopted policies limiting their cooperation with ICE at the next stage of the enforcement
process, when ICE issues detainers to facilitate apprehension of individuals identified through
Secure Communities. For example, California recently adopted the Trust Act, which, except in cases
involving individuals charged with or convicted of serious criminal offenses, prohibits law enforcement officials
within the state from detaining individuals for immigration enforcement purposes , at ICEs request, if
those individuals are otherwise eligible for release.224 The significance of these anti-detainer
policies and the extent to which they take hold in other jurisdictions remain to be seen . However,
the broader trajectory leading to their adoption suggests that as state and local institutions
including hospitals, educational institutions, and others increasingly collect and maintain personal
information that might be relevant to immigration enforcement , analysis of immigration federalism
may benefit from greater understanding of and attention to the dynamics of information control .
Moreover, like the fingerprints collected through Secure Communities, the information sought by federal immigration authorities to
identify potentially deportable individuals need not even directly include immigration status itself. As databases become increasingly
interoperable and capable of aggregating information from a variety of different sources, federal officials may well regard other
forms of personal informationwhether or not personally identifiableas amply sufficient to serve their immigration enforcement
purposes.225 Accordingly, while states and localities may still find that restrictions on collection and dissemination of immigration
status information play an important and useful role, they also will likely find those limitations insufficient to fully achieve the
immigration-protective objectives they have sought to advance with those laws. Beyond immigration, these episodes raise the
question of whether conflicts over information control might be harnessed to help protect social

interests in privacy and constrain federal surveillance activities . Scholars have critically assessed
the potential for states and localities to protect privacy interests as regulators .226 Separately, scholars
have also assessed the prospects for aligning the interests of companies collecting personal information with interests in privacy.227
Since, as discussed above, states and localities increasingly possess large volumes of information that federal authorities seek for
their own surveillance and enforcement purposes, the institutional role of states and localities as holders of this information
warrants critical examination as well. For example, Robert Mikos has recently argued that under prevailing

understandings of Tenth

Amendment principles, federal efforts to compel states to provide this


information should be foreclosed as an impermissible form of commandeering .228 While anticommandeering doctrine itself has limits, as Mikos acknowledges, his analysis points to the possibility of
information federalism as a constraint on federal surveillance , whether as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
legislation, or technological design.

Econ Advantage

Immigration Good for Mexican Econ


Open borders helps the Mexican economy
Nonie Darwish 2013, IS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION GOOD FOR MEXICO?, Frontpage
Magazine, 6/18/2013, http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/193700/illegal-immigration-goodmexico-nonie-darwish
Even if we ignore the fact that the US cannot absorb and assimilate all the people who want to come to America, we cannot ignore
the question of whether we are doing Mexico a favor with our open borders . No doubt, life as an illegal

alien in the US is much better than being unemployed and poor in Mexico or any other third
world country. At face value illegal immigration seems to be good for Mexico, which benefits
tremendously from the pouring of US dollars into its economy, supporting families and relatives
of immigrants in America. That is why the Mexican government is not complaining and is happy
to maintain the status quo on its borders. The government of Mexico acts like it is a right for its
citizens to cross the borders into the US to find work . Not a bad deal for any government that does not want to be
accountable to its own citizens to improve their lives, the economy and human rights conditions. The message of the Mexican
government to its citizens is: You want a job, human rights and medical care, then go to the US if you cant afford it here.

Unemployment rates low in Mexico because of illegal immigration


Michael Carr 2014, editor of the Market Technicians Association monthly newsletter and is on
the board of directors of the MTA Educational Foundation, Illegal Immigration Helps Mexico
Maintain Low Unemployment, Newsmax Finance, 06/ 22/ 2014,
http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/MichaelCarr/Illegal-Immigration-MexicoUnemployment/2014/08/22/id/590252/
Unemployment in Mexico was just 4.9 percent in June, the latest available data. That figure could
be significantly higher if the United States enforced its immigration laws . There are an estimated 11.7
million illegal immigrants in the United States with about 52 percent of that number believed to come from Mexico. An unusually
high percentage of the illegal immigrant population is of working age. The Migration Policy Institute estimates that 80 percent of
immigrants were between the ages 18 of 64 while 60 percent of the native-born population is in that age group. Full

deportation, a policy that is impossible, could return 4.9 million working-age adults to Mexico. In June,
there were 2.5 million unemployed in Mexico and just fewer than 50 million jobs. Full deportation could increase
Mexicos unemployment rate to 13 percent. The disproportionate number of working age illegal
immigrants in the United States indicates these individuals left their home country in pursuit of
employment. While the decrease in unemployment is most likely welcome news to Mexican politicians, the country could suffer
in the long term as the economy is robbed of the future output of millions of workers who left. Illegal immigration is a multi-faceted
problem. Mexicos economy looks stronger than it is in the short term as unemployment remains low

because millions of workers are, in effect, exported.

Immigration Good for US Econ


Immigration helps the US economy by increasing productivity
Gordon H. Hansen 2007, Pacific Economic Cooperation Chair in International Economic
Relations and director of the Schools Center on Emerging and Pacific Economies, The
Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration, The Bernard and Irene Schwartz Series on American
Competitiveness, April 2007, CSR No. 26 pg. 19-20
Immigration generates extra income for the U.S. economy, even as it pushes down wages for
some workers. By increasing the supply of labor, immigration raises the productivity of resources
that are complementary to labor. More workers allow U.S. capital, land, and natural resources to
be exploited more efficiently. Increasing the supply of labor to perishable fruits and vegetables, for instance, means that
each acre of land under cultivation generates more output. Similarly, an expansion in the number of manufacturing workers allows
the existing industrial base to produce more goods. The gain in productivity yields extra income for U.S.

businesses, which is termed the immigration surplus. The annual immigration surplus in the United States
appears to be small, equal to about 0.2 percent of GDP in 2004.33

NAFTA Bad for Mexican Econ


NAFTA and other trade agreements have not helped the Mexican economy, it has
actually made it worse.
Justin Akers Chacn 2010, professor of U.S. History and Chicano Studies in San Diego,
California, The U.S.-Mexico border: Free trade without free people, International Socialist
Review, http://isreview.org/issue/73/us-mexico-border
The potential population displacement resulting from NAFTA was supposed to be offset by new job
creation. However, this failed to materialize for the majority of Mexicans.41 Aside from NAFTA, Mexico has
also signed forty-four separate free-trade and bilateral agreements and twenty-seven
investment protection agreements with other nations, making it the most open economy in
Latin America.42 Economic displacement has resulted from the massive influx of capital and cheap goods from foreign
sources, primarily from U.S.-based enterprise, inducing a radical restructuring of Mexicos economy. Mexico is now identified
by the World Bank as having the largest diaspora of economic emigrants in the world.43 Large-scale
displacement and out-migration, primarily to the United States, is countered by intensified border
enforcement efforts and an immigration and visa system that has not been updated to account for the
realities of globalization. As the economic forces of displacement have been more powerful than
the political actions taken to stop unauthorized immigration, instead of curtailing cross-border
movement, the border zone and enforcement efforts into the interior have only made it more deadly.

Surveillance Bad for US Econ


Immigration deportation costs and the shutdown of immigrant businesses ripple
the economy
Shannon K. ONeil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS
INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD,"
Rounding up all of the estimated eleven million undocumented individuals while appealing to the law
and order folksis extremely costly . A report by the Center for American Progress
conservatively estimates that the costs to find and deport these people would top US $57 billion a
year for five years approximately the entire budget of the Department of
Homeland Security , or roughly US$23,000 per deportee. 30 This doesnt consider the
disruptions to the workplace: factories, restaurants, hotels, construction sites, laundromats,
farms, and ranches could all shut down, rippling through the economy .

US Econ Key to Mexican Econ


US economy is K2 Mexico's economic stability
Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of
International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of
Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35
Mexicos relies on the U.S. market to absorb over 80 percent of its exports ,
accounting for 25 percent of its gross national product; its industrial sector is tightly integrated
with U.S. manufacturing; it earns $11 billion a year from U.S. tourists traveling in Mexico; it depends on over
$20 billion in annual remittances sent by its citizens living and working in the
United States ; and it relies on the U.S. financial system as its main source of international credit. This reality quickly
transmitted the impact of the U.S. economic crisis into Mexico. Growth in January 2009
plummeted as Mexican consumers copied the anxiety driven austerity of their U.S. counterparts;
after months of layoffs in the manufacturing sector, unemployment registered its highest rate on
record in February; and fears about Mexicos ability to meet its foreign obligations produced a nearly 30 percent drop in the
value of the peso. The economy is predicted to contract by 3.5-4.5 percent in 2009 before returning to anemic growth in 2010, but
these numbers have been adjusted downward with disturbing regularity during late 2008 and early 2009. While most

economists conclude that Mexico is not on the brink of a balance of payments crisis or a default
on its foreign debt (public or private), there is a full recognition that this optimistic scenario
depends heavily on the U.S. economy finding its footing by late 2009 or early 2010 at the latest.

Productivity IL
When there is productivity in the US, it creates productivity in Mexico
Gordon H. Hansen 2007, Pacific Economic Cooperation Chair in International Economic
Relations and director of the Schools Center on Emerging and Pacific Economies, The
Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration, The Bernard and Irene Schwartz Series on American
Competitiveness, April 2007, CSR No. 26 pg. 15
Illegal immigration also brings low-skilled workers to the United States when the productivity
gains of doing so appear to be highest. During the past twenty years, Mexico has experienced several
severe economic contractions, with emigration from the country spiking in the aftermath of each downturn. In terms of
the economic benefits, this is exactly when one would want workers to movewhen their labor
productivity in the United States is highest relative to their labor productivity at home . Long queues
for U.S. green cards mean there is little way for legal permanent immigration to respond to such changes in international economic
conditions.

Relations Advantage

Immigration/Plan Key
Tensions over border enforcement spill over to destroy the US-Mexico
relationship broadly
Marc R. Rosenblum 12, Specialist in Immigration Policy for the Congressional Research
Service, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, 1/6/12,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180681.pdf
The United States and Mexico also cooperate extensively on border enforcement operations at the Southwest border; but with
Mexicans being the most frequent target of U.S. immigration enforcement efforts and with the United
States being the primary market for illicit drugs from Mexico as well as a source of illegal weapons flowing into Mexico, border
enforcement occasionally has been a source of bilateral tension .155 On one hand, given that Mexicans
represent a majority of all unauthorized migrants in the United States and of aliens apprehended at the border,156 and given that
drug-related violence in Mexico raises persistent concerns about spillover violence on the U.S. side of the border,157 the U.S.-

Mexican border is inevitably a major focus of U.S. enforcement. On the other hand, while Mexico does not
question U.S. authority to make and enforce its own immigration laws, Mexicans from across the political spectrum
have expressed concerns about the construction of border fencing, the effects of border
enforcement on migrant deaths , and the protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups of
migrants.158 More generally, the

use of military technology and the heavy presence of law enforcement

personnel at the U.S.-Mexican border may

work against the diplomatic and commercial goals of

a closer economic and political partnership among the United States, Mexico, and other
Latin American countries.
Immigration key to US/ Mexico relations
Enrique Pea Nieto 2015, President of Mexico, Why the U.S.-Mexico Relationship Matters,
Politico, 1/ 06/ 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/us-mexicorelationship-enrique-pea-nieto-113980.html#.VaqtpCpViko
The United States and Mexico have recognized that the challenges and opportunities we face on
immigration should be addressed from a broad regional perspective and based upon the
principle of shared responsibility. Consequently, we are committed to working with our
neighbors in Central America to foster development and prosperity in that region.
Over 34 million people of Mexican origin live in the U.S., 22.9 million of whom were born here. Mexican-Americans are
socially and economically active members of their communities, and they maintain a strong
binational identity. These communities are pillars of the relationship between our
countries and will help us build a more prosperous shared future . My government
applauds President Obamas recently announced Immigration Accountability Executive Action,
which acknowledges the positive economic and social impact of Mexican immigrants to their
communities in the U.S. Furthermore, these measures will allow immigrants to increase their
contributions to American society and live without fear of being separated from their families .
My administration will continue to work with the U.S. government by providing services and
consular assistance in order to improve the well-being of the Mexican community in this
country. In order to raise living standards in Mexicowhich will discourage undocumented immigrationmy government has
embarked upon a transformational path. We have sought to enhance my countrys competitiveness, strengthen the rights of the
Mexican people and consolidate our democracy.

US-Mexico relations low due to immigration policies


Esther Pan 6, Staff Writer for Council on Foreign Relations and Stanford University graduate,
February 21, 2006, "U.S.-Mexico Border Woes," http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-borderwoes/p9909#p8

The relationship has been in a downward spiral over the last six years , experts say. When
Fox and Bush came to power in 2000, better relations between the two countries were high on the
priority lists of both leaders. But after 9/11, the United States shifted its focus to Afghanistan, Iraq, and
the Middle East, and Mexico was pushed down the list. At the same time, a strong current of antiimmigrant feeling in America focused on Mexico , illegal immigration, and border
issues. Mexicans accounted for 91 percent of all apprehensions of illegal immigrants and 74
percent of all formal removals of immigrants in 2003 , according to the Migration Information Center.
As a result, the health of the relationship between the two countries "was ceded to the
hardliners " in the United States, Sweig says. The Mexican reformers who argued that closer ties with the United States
would be good for Mexico "now have mud on their faces," she says. As Mexico prepares for a presidential election in July, the
immigration issue will likely boost the nationalism of all the candidates and foster the strong
current of traditional anti-Americanism in Mexico , Sweig says.

Action Solves
Latin America wants broader legalization for immigration--- relieves social ills
Esther Pan 06, Staff Writer for Council on Foreign Relations and Stanford University graduate,
February 21, 2006, "U.S.-Mexico Border Woes," http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-borderwoes/p9909#p8
U.S. immigration policy is viewed negatively in Latin America, Sweig says. "The wall [proposed in the
current legislation] is a symbol of the souring of U.S.-Latin American relations over the last few
years," Sweig says. Eleven Latin American foreign ministers met in Cartagena, Colombia, February 13 to discuss ways to protest
U.S. plans to build the border wall and lobby Congress to defeat HR 4437. Latin American countries, most of which have
significant populations of nationals working in the United States, are arguing for guest-worker programs and the
legalization of undocumented migrants to the United States.
But Latin American countries also have a massive stake in keeping immigration to the United States open. Allowing citizens
to emigrate to the United States gives Latin American societies a release valve for their
own social ills : high unemployment, barely functional governments, and massive income
inequality. "Overwhelmingly, the case in Latin America is that the lack of a social contract makes societies dysfunctional and
ineffective," Sweig says. "There are huge problems of governance and development because of a lack of
investment by the elites in their own economies. People are driven away. " Sweig discusses these issues in
her forthcoming book, Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century.

Mexico is pushing for legislation in the border--- immigration is an eminent


concern for its government
Clare Ribando Seelke 14, Specialist in Latin American Affairs in the Congressional Research
Service, 12-16-2014, "Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations,"
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf
Since the mid-2000s, successive Mexican governments have supported efforts to enact comprehensive
immigration reform in the United States, while being careful not to appear to be infringing upon
U.S. congressional authority to make and enforce immigration laws. The Mexican government has pledged
to enforce legal emigration, increase security along its northern and southern borders, and
create opportunities for workers in Mexico so that fewer individuals will emigrate . Mexico has
aggressively combated transmigration by unauthorized migrants crossing Mexico bound for the United States and
worked with U.S. law enforcement to combat alien smuggling and human trafficking. Due to a number of factors,
illegal emigration from Mexico is estimated to be at a 40-year low.87 Still, corruption remains endemic within Mexicos National
Migration Institute (the entity within the Interior Ministry that enforces immigration laws).88 Mexicos southern border also
continues to be porous and insecure.
President Pea Nieto, like former President Caldern, has not promised Mexicans that he can affect immigration reform efforts in
the U.S. Congress or influence the Obama Administration. Both leaders saw how former President Vicente Foxs failure to secure a
bilateral immigration accord with the United States in 2001 proved to be a major blow to his Administration. Nevertheless, Pea

Nieto has pledged his full support for efforts to enact comprehensive immigration reform, and is
likely to continue Mexicos efforts to improve border security and enforce its migration
policies to combat illegal transmigration from Central America. On November 20, 2014, the Mexican Foreign
Ministry issued a statement welcoming President Obamas executive action on immigration;89 some 3 million of the estimated 5.2
million unauthorized immigrants who could qualify for the programs Obama announced are Mexican.90

Nevertheless, several migration-related issues have concerned the Mexican


government . Mexico has protested the alleged excessive use of force by U.S. agents on the
border; defended the rights of Mexican migrants in the United States, regardless of their status;
and challenged certain state laws against illegal immigration . Record numbers of removals
(deportations) under the Obama Administration, as well as certain removal procedures, such as the treatment of unaccompanied
Mexican minors and removals that release migrants into violent border regions at night, have been issues of concern .91
Recent increases in Mexicans from some regions seeking asylum in the United States due to threats of violence in their communities
and a rise in Central American migrants in transit through Mexico has been a concern of both governments. Emigrants from Mexico

and Central America have increasingly become victims of kidnapping and abuses by organized crime, sometimes in collusion with
corrupt Mexican officials.

Mexico Key to LA Relations


Mexicos key to broader Latin American relations
Pamela K. Starr 9, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of
International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of
Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35
Mexican sentiment toward the United States matters. If Mexicans mistrust the United States,
question what our country stands for, and feel treated like a second-class ally, it will be
difficult for Washington to foster a cooperative relationship that extends beyond
drugs and trade. Further, without a cooperative relationship with its nearest Latin American
neighbor it will be difficult for the United States to improve relations with the rest of
the region . And as demonstrated by the expansion of Chinese investment, Russian military sales and naval maneuvers,
Iranian diplomatic visits, and Hugo Chvez regional sway, U.S. influence in the Latin American region can no longer be taken for
granted.

LA Relations Impact---Multilat
US-Latin American relations are key to broader US legitimacy and power in
multilateral forums
Christopher Sabatini 12, adjunct professor at Columbia University in the political economy of
Latin America and the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, 6/13/12, Why the U.S. can't afford
to ignore Latin America, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-scant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/
Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other
developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential
of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea
flaunting international norms and regional stability.

But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande
goes to the heart of the U.S. changing role in the world and its strategic interests within i t.
Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations :
1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies .
Recently, countries

with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions

diametrically opposed to the U.S . when it comes to matters of global governance and
human rights. Take, for example, Russia and Chinas stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention.
Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years
ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to
refer to Brazil as a rising spoiler.
At a time of (perceived) declining

U.S. influence, its important that America deepens its ties with
regional allies that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for
permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decisionmaking rather than isolate them.
If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy
agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and
human rights.
2. Latin America is becoming more international.
Its time to understand that the U.S. isnt the only country that has clout in Latin America.
For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate,
politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as theyve fought battles over small countries such as
Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China
and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region.
and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in
the region and even on the world forum.
The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that
it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and
Its also clear that countries such as Brazil

development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba.


3. There are security and strategic risks in the region.
Hugo Chavezs systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of
Chavezs senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S.
border .

FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a significant
foreign narcotics trafficker by the U.S. government.
At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are
overrunning Central America .
In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Caldern launched a controversial war on drugs that has since resulted in the loss of over
50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras
and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves

overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a
transit point for drugs heading north.
Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly
difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it wont be with or against governments as it was in
the 1980s but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states .

LA Relations Impact---Enviro
Latin American relations are key to sustaining green environmental cooperation
Daniel Kammen 12, serves the U. S. Secretary of State as an Energy and Climate Fellow and is
a Professor at the University of California Berkeley, 12-5-12, Building Bridges to a Sustainable
Energy Future, http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2012/12/05/building-bridges-to-asustainable-energy-future/
The Americas are undergoing a transition in the energy sector that will have global
geopolitical ramifications . At the same time as the United States is touted to become the worlds
largest oil producer by 2020, and a net exporter by 2030, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Panama show the most
promise in becoming regional hubs not only for clean energy investment , but for
sustained low-carbon economic growth

(see related story: U.S. to Overtake Saudi Arabia, Russia as

Worlds Top Energy Producer).

Although Latin America and the Caribbean lag behind the United States and Canada in terms of
implemented clean energy policy and project funding, 7 percent of the regions total installed capacity today is
renewables, and it is expected to grow faster in years to come. (See related interactive map: The
Global Electricity Mix) Faced with ever-changing economic and political realities, regional collaborations for
knowledge-creation and -sharing are crucial for fostering lasting partnerships that can
make sustainability science, well, sustainable.
International partnerships that lead to concrete action are often the clearest signs of innovation .
At the state to state level, the Energy and Climate Partnership for the Americas (ECPA) and at the person-to-person level, the
Fulbright NEXUS program provide clear evidence regional collaborations that are clearly
changing the modes of engagement within the hemisphere. One of us just returned from a partnershipbuilding ECPA sponsored trip to Nicaragua, facilitated by both the U. S. Embassy team and a local NGO, blueEnergy, which is
discussed below and here, focused on community energy.
Just two years after its launch by President Obama in 2009, ECPA has moved beyond its initial focus on

knowledge sharing around cleaner and more efficient energy, and now also supports sustainable
forest and land use initiatives as well as climate change adaptation strategies . Governments
and institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), have all worked together to support regional technical workshops, business strategies, and other initiatives for new and
cleaner ways to provide energy. ECPA has also become a vehicle for leaders in sustainability research and practice to work at the
institutional level to link industry, university, and civil-society groups in the New World.
The two-year-old Fulbright NEXUS program has already become a regional model for the support of scholars from around the
hemisphere committed to applied research and collaboration on sustainability science. At a recent meeting in Banff, Canada, the 20
NEXUS fellows focused equally on individual and group projects to assess and address environmental issues plaguing the Western
Hemisphere. Interestingly, the focus was on solutions science, not just in quantifying the extent of environmental change.
During the coming year, the Fulbright NEXUS Fellows will be working across the region on projects ranging
from forest health and productivity in Alberta, Canada, to local perceptions and strategies for climate change adaptation in the High
Andes of Peru, to

understanding the interactions between climate mitigation and adaptation

strategies for Brazils power sector .

Immigration Advantage

Immigrant Deaths
Increased Border Security hugely increases deaths of immigrants
Robin Emmott 07, Journalist, Correspondent and Editor for Reuters, 7/12/2007, More
migrants die as U.S. tightens border security, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/12/usmexico-usa-deaths-idUSN1231212420070712
Tougher security along the U.S.-Mexico border is forcing migrants to take more dangerous,
remote routes to cross into the United States and pushing up the number of deaths in the desert.
This year could see a record of well over 500 such deaths. At least 275 Mexican bodies have been
found in the first six months, according to a Mexican Congressional report backed by U.S. and
Mexican border groups and academics. They say at least 4,500 Mexicans have died trying to
cross since the United States drastically increased border controls in late 1994 to stem illegal
immigration. Following the failure of President George W. Bush's immigration reform proposals
in Congress last month, U.S. policy is centered on tighter border security rather than giving
immigrants more options to find jobs legally. But some border experts say enforcement does
not stop those trying to get into the United States and only makes it more
dangerous , greatly raising the fees charged by people smugglers. As security increases, so will
the number of deaths, they say. "Has enhanced border security increased the number of migrant
deaths? Unquestionably," said Wayne Cornelius, an immigration expert at the University of
California San Diego. "There is no other way to explain the sharp increase in fatalities." The
Border Patrol recovered some 116 bodies in the Arizona desert between last October 1 and the
end of June, and it only records deaths on the U.S. side of the frontier. It blames ruthless
smugglers for taking migrants through dangerous terrain and sometimes abandoning them
there. "The number of migrant deaths is increasing because smugglers are taking them to lesspatrolled, more dangerous areas," Border Patrol spokesman Ramon Rivera said. He said agents
rescued 1,450 people in the desert in the same period. Unknown numbers of migrants from
Central America and other countries also die each year. The U.S. government has raised its
Border Patrol deployment to around 13,500 agents today from fewer than 4,000 in 1993 and
plans to add a further 9,600 agents by 2012. It deployed 6,000 National Guard troops to the
border last year for a two-year period until more agents are hired. Washington aims to have
"operational control" of the border by 2013 by building a 700-mile (1,120-km) wall along parts
of the frontier and creating a "virtual fence" in desert areas with drones, sensors, cameras,
satellite technology and vehicle barriers.
Robust statistics prove our argument
Ray Walser 11, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation, 6/22/11, The Human Tragedy of Illegal
Immigration: Greater Efforts Needed to Combat Smuggling and Violence,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/the-human-tragedy-of-illegalimmigration-greater-efforts-needed-to-combat-smuggling-and-violence
While apprehensions of illegal immigrants along the U.S. southern border declined by more
than 50 percent between 2004 and 2009, deaths have increased by nearly 28 percent in the
same time.[6] In 2009 alone, U.S. Customs and Border Protection found 417 bodies along the
U.S. border with Mexico.[7] In 2009, along the deadliest areas of the border, such as Arizonas
Sonoran Desert, the risk of death for illegal border-crossers was one and a half times greater
than it had been in 2004, and a staggering 17 times greater than it had been in 1998.[8]
According to various estimates, between 80 percent and 95 percent of illegal immigrants employ
smugglers to assist in crossing the southern border.[9] While smugglers often ease the means of
travel, there are also significant risks in employing these networks. Chief among the concerns is
that smugglers have been known to leave behind people who fail to keep up with the group due

to exhaustion, injury, dehydration, or age.[10] Furthermore, immigrants seeking to cross the


southern border illegally increasingly do so in desert regions where the extreme heat can lead to
over-exhaustion and death. A study by the American Civil Liberties Union and Mexicos
National Human Rights Commission estimates that 30 percent of the 390 people whose bodies
were recovered in 2008 died due to exposure to extreme heat.[11] Those left behind often lack
food and water, and face little chance of survival. Illegal immigrants may also be packed into
trucks, hidden under seats, or smuggled in trunks to avoid detection. There they risk death and
injury from suffocation or overturned vehicles.
Increasing deaths among immigrants crossing the border
Fernanda Santos 13, Phoenix bureau chief for The New York Times, 5/20/13, Arizona Desert
Swallows Migrants on Riskier Paths, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/us/immigrantdeath-rate-rises-on-illegal-crossings.html?_r=0
Less people are coming across, said Bruce Anderson, the chief forensic anthropologist at the
medical examiners office, but a greater fraction of them are dying. There were 463 deaths in
the past fiscal year, which ended Sept. 30 the equivalent of about five migrants dying every
four days, according to an analysis by the Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights
group. In the time federal statistics have been compiled, only 2005 had more deaths, and in that
year, there were more than three times as many apprehensions. As security at the border has
tightened, pushing migrants to seek more remote and dangerous routes, the largest number of
the deaths last year occurred along the punishing stretch of desert that spans the southernmost
tip of the Border Patrols Tucson sector, the busiest along the border. The only riskier stretch is
the Rio Grande Valley sector in Texas, where, from Oct. 1 to April 30, law enforcement officers
or ranchers found the bodies of 77 immigrants, or more than half the number of bodies
recovered there in all of the past fiscal year: 150. In that sector, the most deaths have occurred in
Brooks County, small and struggling at 944 square miles, where the average household income
is $25,000. The number of migrant remains recovered is on pace to double that of last year, a
record for the county, at 129, said a county judge, Raul Ramirez. Most of the dead are believed to
be from Central America, Judge Ramirez said.

Dangerous/Different Routes
Border Security Doesnt Stop Immigration- Instead Forces Immigrants to risk lives
on unsafe parts of border
Calynn Dowler 13, BA in Political Science, A in Migration Studies from the University of
Sussex, 5/24/13, DIVIDING THE SKY: THE FORTIFICATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO
BORDER, http://themigrationist.net/2013/05/24/dividing-the-sky-the-fortification-of-the-us-mexico-border/
In 1993, the Clinton administration took the first steps toward fortifying the border, largely in
an effort to quell Republican criticisms of the administrations lax approach to immigration.
Subsequent administrations have continued these policies, allocating unprecedented funding to
an impressive display of force along the southern border: steel fences, high-intensity lighting,
remote-controlled, 24-hour-a-day video surveillance systems, helicopters, and unmanned
surveillance drones (Cornelius 2005: 779). In the early days of border fortification, strategists
determined not to distribute resources uniformly along the border. Instead, they focused
attention on high-risk sections of the border, where 70-80% of crossings were made. The logic
was that if authorities could secure these areas geography would do the rest to discourage
would-be migrants from leaving their homes (Cornelius 2005: 779). Policymakers assumed that
the natural borders of the U.S. soaring mountains, swift rivers, and wide deserts would deter
crossings. They believed that migrants would not risk their lives crossing such brutal terrain.
Twenty years later, it is clear that they were wrong. The flow of migrants has continued, and
there is no evidence that the expansion of border enforcement has effectively deterred irregular
migration from Mexico to the U.S. (Cornelius 2005: 776). However, there is ample evidence
from recent research that border fortification policies have contributed to the bottling up of
unauthorized migrants in the U.S. (Cornelius 2005: 782). Unwilling to risk traveling home,
undocumented migrants have ended up staying in the U.S. longer, and more migrants have
settled permanently. This has resulted in a paradox policymakers seem hesitant to discuss: an
explosion in the numbers of unauthorized migrants living in the U.S. at a time when this country
spends more on border security than ever before (Cornelius 2005: 777). In fact, Washington
now pours more money into immigration control than all other federal criminal lawenforcement agencies combined, its total spending estimated at over $18 billion a year.
Causes diversion to more dangerous crossings
Alex Pea 12, freelance foreign correspondent currently covering Ciudad Juarez, Mexico,
9/20/12, Migrants face higher risks illegally crossing the border,
http://nbclatino.com/2012/09/20/migrants-face-higher-risks-illegally-crossing-the-border/
Migrants face higher risks of death in the desert than in previous years, the report stated.
Also, certain deportation practices put migrants at risk. For example, migrants can be deported
at night and/or to cities hundreds of miles from where they were detained. These same cities are
also some of the border regions most dangerous. Through initiatives referred to as prevention
through deterrence, border enforcement operations have been directed at moving migrants
towards more remote and inhospitable areas of the border. According to Mexicos Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, around 370 to 800 migrants are dying every year in U.S. territory while trying to
cross the border. The U.S. government estimates the number to be closer to 300 400. The
majority of these deaths result from dehydration, hypothermia in the desert, or drowning in the
Rio Grande canals. In Arizona, despite a decrease in flows since 2007 and an increase in Border
Patrol and National Guard presence, the Tucson-based Coalicion de Derechos Humanos,
(Coalition of Human Rights) found 2010 to have been one of the deadliest years for migrants,
with 253 bodies found in the Arizona desert. Their data showed that while migrant deaths in
Arizona dropped in 2011, the number of remains found per 100,000 apprehensions actually

increased. In Mexico, as many as 20,000 migrants, mostly from Central America, are kidnapped
some tortured, raped or even murder by organized crime each year on their way through
Mexico and to the north, according to Mexicos independent National Human Rights
Commission.

K Advantage

General Inequality
The border represents inequality between Mexico and the US
Calynn Dowler 13, BA in Political Science, A in Migration Studies from the University of
Sussex, 5/24/13, DIVIDING THE SKY: THE FORTIFICATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO
BORDER, http://themigrationist.net/2013/05/24/dividing-the-sky-the-fortification-of-the-us-mexico-border/
International borders often overlap with the fault lines of global inequality. The divisions and
differences between the U.S. and Mexico do not begin and end in the borderlands, but the
border is where they come into sharp focus. As Alvarez (1995) has pointed out, borders
graphically illustrate the conflicts and contradictions of a hierarchically organized world.
Therefore, the management of the U.S.-Mexico border holds a meaning that extends far beyond
the two countries, representing a larger struggle on the part of countries in the North to deter,
detect, detain, and deport migrants from the global South. As Stephen Castles notes: The
perceived migration crisis is really a crisis in North-South relations, caused by uneven
development and gross inequality. Migration control is essentially about regulating North-South
relations. The U.S.-Mexico border clearly illustrates a crisis in North-South relations. The
border acts as a dividing line between the wealth of the worlds largest economy and the poverty
of the third-world nations that lie south of it. Thus far, policymakers have largely refused to
address the patterns of economic inequality that spur migration to the United States in the first
place, opting instead for a heavily fortified border. However, U.S. officials have historically shied
away from robust internal controls in the labor market, which has lead some migration scholars
(e.g. Castles, Cornelius) to claim that the government has in fact intentionally allowed low-skill
labor into the country through illegitimate channels in order to create an undocumented and
thus more readily exploitable working class, all while maintaining their legitimacy with the
electorate through a display of force at the border.
The border further enforces unequal power relations and creates exclusion
between immigrants and citizens
Justin Akers Chacn 2010, professor of U.S. History and Chicano Studies in San Diego,
California, The U.S.-Mexico border: Free trade without free people, International Socialist
Review, http://isreview.org/issue/73/us-mexico-border
AS U.S. astronaut Jos Hernndez gazed back at his home planet during a six-million-mile mission to the
International Space Station in 2009, this space traveler, who is also a son of Mexican immigrants, observed
something peculiar. What surprised me is when I saw the world as one. There were no borders.
You couldnt distinguish between the United States and Mexico, he was quoted as saying .1 Like
millions of others whose lives have been affected by migration, barriers, and restrictions, Hernndezs insight speaks volumes about
the role of borders in the daily lives of those for whom they exist. His epiphany also sheds light on a reality that

need not require a celestial journey to comprehend: the U.S.-Mexico border exists more
as a social constructor of identities and less as a physical barrier that delineates and
defines distinct and exclusive landscapes. Since its inception as a boundary imposed by a war of expansion the U.S.Mexico border has functioned in a dualistic manner. It has served both as a gateway to economic opportunity
and as a barrier that creates and maintains unequal power relations. This paradoxthe border
as both conduit and obstacleis most apparent when analyzing the movement of peoples and
capital. For American capitalists , investors, tourists, and retirees, the border provides
access . For Mexicans moving north , the majority of whom cross to seek economic
opportunity in low-wage industries , the border imposes exclusion . This border duality defines the
social identities of both peoples in relationship to each othera status that manifests most starkly once one crosses into the others

The matrix of disequilibrium produced by the U.S.-Mexico border offers portable


sovereignty to the American and the stigma of illegality to the Mexican when each crosses the
border. Upon entry into each country, this imposed identity defines social relations . Contrary to
the gravitational force of economic globalization, which ignores boundaries and obliterates
barriers, the border wall socially and politically disaggregates and segregates all those who pass
through it. It is the existence of the border wall more as a signifier of status than as a barrier that
sustains each population in its own form of isolation on the opposite side . While the compelling forces of
country.

regional integration yearn to make two parts whole, the border forces them apart. While the border stands defiant, the world around
it rapidly changes.

Border surveillance constructs a system of exclusion and a worthy/unworthy


dichotomy for the undesirables
James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan,
"From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance,"
Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-andsociety/article/view/3481/3435
Under such conditions migrants encounter a highly stratified mobility regime (Shamir 2005) where
all travellers are identified, sorted, and classified as desirable or undesirable, safe or risky, and,
thus, admissible or inadmissible. Consequently, access to the territories and societies of rich nations
has emerged as a significant determinant of life -chances and a primary axis of global inequality (Bauman
1998).1 For tourists, professionals and other affluent transients, borders are generally experienced as conduits
or zones of transit where surveillance is thin, momentary and superficial (Torpey 2007). For undocumented
workers, sanspapiers and other undesirables , borders are sites of intensive scrutiny, closure and
trauma where surveillance is thick (Torpey 2007) and functions as a banopticon (Bigo 2002) oriented
towards exclusion rather than correction or discipline. Through regimes of surveillance and classification,
states do not merely control movements but also enact rituals of purification and prophylaxis
(Douglas 1966; cf. Salter 2007) that construct and codify moral distinctions between those
worthy and unworthy of membership. Here those marked as undeserving and undesirable are constituted as anticitizens whose presence is deemed hazardous and whose sociopolitical existence is rendered invisible and unauthorized (Inda
2006). Thus, more than just administrative techniques, border patrols, workplace raids, and related forms of surveillance

provide normative performances that call into existence the very categories and
divisions

(legal/illegal, alien/citizen)

they purport to represent and enforce .

Panopticon
Liberties are constrained inside Border Patrol facilities
Roger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, BORDERWORLD: HOW
THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-securityborders
Sharon Ansick, a tactical logistics officer who went to high school with my sister, gave me the
grand tour of the Del Rio facility. Video cameras were everywhere, 150 in all. Doors and
windows were secured, and passage in and out of facilities, as well as from one area to another
within a compound or building, was tightly controlled. Ansick explained that this was called
passive security. Everyone who entered this facility, whether they knew it or not, had entered a
panopticon. Their every move was registered, recorded, observed, and controlled. No one could
leave without permission. Border runners would be met with road spikes that jut up from the
pavement at the push of a distress button. Few would ever realize the degree to which their
liberty had been constrained. All incoming and outgoing license plates are photographed, and all
drivers too. All recently issued passports, green cards and day-entry cards contain radiofrequency ID chips that broadcast the identify of a traveler at the primary checkpoint, and the
Del Rio port is the first to deploy a special RFID lane to speed processing. When I was there,
traffic was light and lines were short, but there was a sense of high alertness throughout the
facility. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents armed with M-4 rifles loitered near the
secondary station. Supervisory agents, in a glass-encased control room overlooking the traffic
lanes, kept watch over the whole proceeding, monitored the video feeds, and maintained radio
contact with personnel all over the port. The port's noncommercial trafficabout two million
vehicular travelers and 50,000 pedestrians annuallyis not routinely scanned. Instead, CBP
officers interview drivers in a primary lane and use special angled mirrors to inspect the
underside of all vehicles, and if a dog sniffs something suspicious or something about the car
seems unusual, or if the driver seems nervous or simply came from an area of interest, the
officer will call for a secondary inspection. At that point, density meters, mirrors, x-ray scanners
and the whole repertoire of what CBP terms non-intrusive inspection techniques come into play.
Nowadays few cars are dismantled or drilled without evidence derived from one of these
methods. One recent seizure came about because an officer manning the primary lane noticed
that a vehicle, driven by a lone male, was uncommonly clean. A trip to the VACIS x-ray scanner
settled the matter. After some probing and chipping, agents discovered several pounds of heroin
and methamphetamine.

Race
Race plays a role in the immigration laws are carried out.
Doris Marie Provine 2015, Professor Emrita, School of Social Transformation, Arizona State
University, Institutional Racism in Enforcing Immigration Law, Norteamrica, 11/11/ 2013,
Year 8 Special Issue 2013 pg. 32
Over time, the role of race and racism in immigration law has changed. Laws that explicitly target particular groups
for inclusion or exclusion can no longer be justified on eugenic grounds (Gomez, 2007). Yet
immigration laws and policies that leave room for race to play a significant role in enforcement
are not only tolerated, but often embraced by immigration restrictionists (Sinema, 2012). They typically
feature a large measure of discretion for the front-line officials who determine when surveillance occurs and what cases get priority.
Safeguards to prevent abuses are generally lacking. The enduring relationship between race and immigration

law can be traced to popular fears and anxieties about racial others and the fragility of national
allegiances, which depend on a sense of fellow feeling among members (Omi and Winant, 1994;
Bosniak, 2006; Kanstroom, 2007). As Benedict Anderson suggests, one's membership in a national body is in
reality an imagined community of people who believe that they belong together . This abstract
sense of membership leaves a lot of room for the exclusion of people who seem different , and
perhaps not suitable for assimilation (Anderson, 1983; Kanstroom, 2007; Zolberg, 2006). It is thus not surprising that
much of the pressure for exclusion comes from citizens themselves, not from the top, where
commercial interests and international diplomacy may dictate a more cosmopolitan approach . In
Europe, for example, populist parties have made sharp restrictions on immigration a central plank in their platforms. The
question is not so much why race matters to citizens who feel threatened by rapid demographic
change, but rather how the law adapts to racial anxieties. In a time when race-neutral rules have found favor,
how does racial disadvantage persist? This essay offers a two-part explanation, based on the U.S. experience. Latinos in the
United States, particularly immigrants of Mexican and Central American origin,
have been disproportionately targeted for deportation ( Provine and Doty, 2011). The pattern
is evident in popular stereotypes about immigrants, in the spending and construction that are
taking place on the southern border with Mexico, and in the racial/ethnic patterns associated
with deportation. This essay first details the role that race plays in federal immigration-enforcement operations, and then
turns to the local level, where, under a federal policy of devolution, local law enforcement agencies are
being asked to assist in enforcing federal immigration law. Arizona's participation is highlighted here because
the state stands out for the enthusiasm with which it has embraced deportation as the solution to unauthorized residence and for its
effort to supplement federal enforcement with its own laws and policies. The mix of

policy

that I describe here

federal , state, and local law and

institutionalizes racism by facilitating ethno-racial profiling,

hyper-surveillance, abusive stops, problematic searches, and unwarranted


detention of suspected unauthorized immigrants. The targets of these actions are
disproportionately Latinos because U.S. Americans, including members of the law enforcement
community, have been conditioned to see the problem of unauthorized entry and residence in
racial terms, as a Mexican and Central American phenomenon (Chavez, 2008; Ngai, 2004). Ironically, those
who demand more enforcement invariably ignore these problems in order to focus on the illegality of the immigrant's actions in
remaining without authorization. The much more significant story in a nation that honors the rule of law is the failure of government
to adhere to its own high standards.

The Federal Government paints Immigrants to be Mexican or Central American.


Doris Marie Provine 2015, Professor Emrita, School of Social Transformation, Arizona State
University, Institutional Racism in Enforcing Immigration Law, Norteamrica, 11/11/ 2013,
Year 8 Special Issue 2013 pg. 32
In one sense, it is not surprising that the spotlight has focused on Mexicans and persons from
further south who have illegally crossed the southern border. This border was for a long time relatively open,

Past
porosity and the historic relationship between the two nations have set the stage for continued
illegal immigration from Mexico because would-be migrants rely upon their connections with
already-resident family and friends as a form of social capital (Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2002). The
in deference to border communities and U.S. employers desiring temporary Mexican labor (Kang, 2010; Ngai, 2004).

problem of illegal entry or re-entry is exacerbated by the difficulty of gaining work or visitation visas in Mexico and by the extremely
lengthy wait requirements for legal immigration from Mexico. The upshot is that Mexicans constitute slightly over

half of the unauthorized population within U.S. territory, giving law enforcement some reason to
focus on people who appear to them to be from Mexico or Central America . To the extent that this logic
informs enforcement, however, the federal government, through the weight of its authority, paints the
face of illegal immigration as Mexican or Central American. Lost in the translation of policy into
practice is the reality that persons without legal status can be found in all colors and among all
classes and every nationality.
Racism is the foundation for immigration laws.
Harvard Law Review 2015, Policing Immigrant Communities, Harvard Law Review, 4/10/
15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771
Certain features of the immigration-enforcement regime have remained static over the last two centuries; others have changed
dramatically. The forces driving the immigration regime , for instance, have not changed: regulation

has
always been driven in part by an image of immigrant criminality, an image which itself has been
driven by racism. The tools to implement those forces, though, have changed. The modern criminal justice system and
immigration enforcement regime have fused together, and today it is possible to say that immigration enforcement is the work of
police generally. This is due not only to an explosion of criminal laws governing migration, but also to the extent to which

federal, state, and local police enforce both these criminal laws and the civil provisions of the
immigration law. This section describes these changes from two perspectives: the laws that are enforced and the actors who
enforce them.

Idk what to tag this, or if it is even useful


Harvard Law Review 2015, Policing Immigrant Communities, Harvard Law Review, 4/10/
15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771
As the authority to deport expands, the power to stop deportation contracts . Congresss initial removal regime
afforded courts broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation. By 1990, Congress had
eliminated that discretion. And in 1996 Congress eliminated the Attorney Generals power to prevent deportation. The
consequences of criminal conviction, then, are not only severe but also inevitable. The Supreme Court
has now said that criminal defense attorneys are constitutionally incompetent if they do not advise their clients of these
consequences. In addition to adding civil-immigration consequences to otherwise criminal behavior, Congress has

labeled
immigration violations as criminal. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) criminalized certain
violations of immigration law, and the scope of criminal immigration law has continued to expand. In 2005, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and the Department of Justice piloted Operation Streamline, a zero-tolerance program that files criminal charges
against people arrested by CBP officials. Men,

women, and children are automatically charged with

illegal entry, a misdemeanor punishable by six months in federal prison. Others are
charged with illegal reentry, a felony offense that could, if the reentrant has a criminal record,
result in twenty years in prison. It is hard to overstate the significance of these legislative changes to immigration
enforcement for criminal justice enforcement, prosecution, adjudication, and incarceration. Immigration crimes like
illegal entry and reentry did not exist before the 1980s, but since 2004 they have topped the list of federal
prosecutions. Since 2009, they have constituted more than half of the entire federal criminal
docket. In some parts of the country the numbers are more dramatic: eighty-eight percent of all federal prosecutions in the
Southern District of Texas are for illegal entry or reentry into the United States. A surge in immigration policing has
stretched courts thin and changed the face of American prisons.

Solvency/Mechanisms

Specific Policy Recommendations


The Supreme Court should rule narrowing exemptions to the Privacy Act--reduces amount of surveillance in border
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Immigration surveillance sits at the intersection of several different doctrines that afford significant deference to government actors
in border, migration, and mobility control. Under its border enforcement jurisprudence, the

Supreme Court has


afforded federal officials considerable latitude to conduct immigration and customs
enforcement activities. This deference is strongest at the physical border itself, where the Court
has deemed routine, suspicionless searches and seizures of individuals and property for
purposes of enforcing immigration and customs laws to be per se reasonable, and therefore
exempt from the Fourth Amendments warrant and probable cause requirements,
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border .311 The Court has reached this
conclusion with little explanation, often relying on conclusory statements or invocations of history and tradition with little more.312
In some instances, the Court has explicitly invoked and tied this border exception to the federal governments power over
immigration, which it has long deemed to be plenary. In others, the Court has instead characterized border searches as falling within
the categories of exceptions from ordinary Fourth Amendment limits for administrative or special needs searches.313
In a world in which the migration border is effectively everywhere, policed by large numbers of actors other than federal
immigration officialsand in which immigration surveillance activities reach large numbers of U.S. citizens and noncitizens with
lawful immigration status the justifications for such sweeping deference become more difficult to

maintain. The categories of potential deprivations that can result from immigration surveillance
activities have multiplied drastically beyond the simple ability to enter and remain in the United States. With the
expansion of the domains of enforcement and the tools of immigration surveillance, these enforcement activities can place
restrictions on the rights to international and domestic travel, employment, education, social service benefits, and freedom from
physical restraint in both the criminal justice and immigration enforcement processes. As discussed above, the powerful tools

of immigration surveillance create significant risks of erroneous deprivations and are easily
susceptible for uses beyond those originally contemplated when implemented.
Courts have slowly begun to recognize that significant interests are at stake in
immigration surveillance activities for both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.314 However, these interests have
continued to be given insufficient weight by Congress, which has exempted records of most
noncitizens from the Privacy Act, and the executive branch, which has invoked the Acts
exemptions from its coverage for databases used for law enforcement and national security purposes. Narrowing
these exemptions in the Acts coverage would enable these interests to be given the
weight that they deserve, and ensure that any countervailing government interests are
recognized and given effect only when supported by reasoned justifications.
Congress should pass a legislation that provides a framework of transparency,
oversight, and accountability of the collection of data through implementing
greater public engagement and review of mechanisms for errors
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Finally, immigration surveillance demands greater attention to transparency, oversight, and
accountability . Whether programmatically or in the context of individual adjudications,
immigration agencies, although improving in some ways, have long suffered from major

transparency and accountability deficits.315 Those deficits are amply evident in


immigration surveillance initiatives and have been exacerbated by the blurred lines created by the
deterritorialized migration border. Ensuring greater transparency, oversight, and due process requires responses at a number of
different levels.
First, a major contributing factor to the lack of sufficient transparency, oversight, and
accountability has been the lack of sufficiently concrete or detailed legal authority to support
and guide such major and complicated initiatives. No framework statutes govern or
constrain immigration surveillance activities , which, as discussed above, also fall outside of the limited
privacy protections available under the Privacy Act. This lack of a statutory framework governing surveillance
activities that implicate privacy interests in migration, mobility, and travel data stands in marked contrast to other
areas, such as communications and financial services , in which government access, storage, and dissemination
of personal information have long been governed and constrained by framework statutes.316

coming from Congress , the executive branch, or both acting together, accountability and
oversight of immigration surveillance would be better served by a more detailed, coherent legal
framework governing immigration surveillance activities and opportunities for greater public
Whether

engagement with those rules . As the Markle Foundation has emphasized, new national security information
sharing initiatives demand privacy and security protections that address the hard questions [such as secondary use and redress] . . .
as opposed to existing policies that state that agencies must comply with the law without providing guidance on how to do so.317
These observations hold true across the full range of initiatives in which immigration surveillance activities take place and will only
become more relevant as authorities continue to incorporate, upgrade, and integrate technology-based surveillance mechanisms in
other aspects of immigration governance.
Second, individual opportunities to redress harms arising from immigration surveillance activities,
whether administrative or judicial in nature, can still play an important role not only in remedying
those individual harms, but also in creating incentives for DHS and other actors to ensure that
information maintained in their database systems is accurate and complete .318 Current redress
mechanisms, however, do not give sufficient opportunities for individuals to remedy improper deprivations. While courts have

, more robust and regularized redress mechanisms at the


administrative level would create additional incentives for the authorities involved in
immigration control to ensure the accuracy and integrity of their data .
Finally, immigration surveillance demands more attention to forms of structural oversight. Because of the necessarily
opaque manner in which database systems and automated decisionmaking mechanisms often
functionand the ways in which multiple actors are involved in their operation over extended periods of time oversight of
these systems can be particularly difficult in the context of individual cases. 319 This is undoubtedly
more true in the immigration enforcement system, which has traditionally been ill-equipped to
supervise investigatory practices.320 Given the limitations in the ability of individual redress
mechanisms to fully ensure proper oversight of database systems, these systems raise the stakes
in making sure that structural oversight mechanisms operate effectively.321 Especially as immigration
begun to fill this gap

surveillance integrates the institutions of immigration control with each other and with the institutions of other domains, the
blurred lines of accountability among different institutions make accountability difficult; the implementation of automated
immigration surveillance initiatives only blurs those lines further.322

The USFG should set up the United States Border Enforcement and Immigration
Review Commission
BNHR 8, Border Network for Human Rights, human rights advocacy and immigration reform
organizations located at the U.S./Mexico Border, November 2008, "U.S.-Mexico Border Policy
Report," https://law.utexas.edu/humanrights/borderwall/communities/municipalities-USMexico-Border-Policy-Report.pdf
1. Create a United States Border Enforcement and Immigration Review Commission (the
Commission). The Commission should be an independent agency legislatively established
to oversee the implementation of all federal border and immigration policies ,
projects, programs, and activities, both those of DHSCustoms and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)and

those of other relevant


agencies. It should be vested with legal authority to provide recommendations regarding federal
immigration andsecurity policy, enforcement, and complaint procedures, and it should also be
able to hold federal immigration agencies accountable . Its broad purposes should be to promote best
practices at the border, to enhance internal capacities in border agencies, and to strengthen relations between the community and
government agencies.
The Commission should be composed of a diverse group of people who understand the complexities of the border, and most of them
should be border residents.
It must have three powers: (1) investigatory power, (2) auditing power, and (3) legal power,

including the power to subpoena.


The independent commission also needs to be able to formulate and fund an effective outreach strategy to border communities. The
Commission should report annually to Congress.

Immigration Surveillance Increasing


Surveillance technologies have substantially increased funding and use of
immigration control
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
In this Article, I examine a set of important but underappreciated consequences of this entrenchment of mass immigration
enforcement, tracing and analyzing the evolution of immigration governance into an enduring regime of immigration surveillance.4
By any measure, enforcement levels have soared in recent years . Federal expenditures on border and

immigration control have grown fifteen-fold since 1986 and now substantially exceed
expenditures on all other federal law enforcement programs combined .5 These activities
have been supplemented by a dizzying array of initiatives, often administered by state, local, and private actors, that
indirectly enforce immigration law by regulating access to rights, benefits, and services including
employment, social services, drivers licenses, transportation services, and educationbased on citizenship or immigration status.6
Increasingly, immigration control objectives also are pursued using criminal prosecutions .7

These initiatives have yielded a staggering, widely noted increase in the number of noncitizens
formally removed from the United States.8 Much less widely noted, however, has been the full
significance of that growthincluding an attendant sea change in the underlying nature of immigration regulation itself,
hastened by the implementation of transformative new surveillance and dataveillance
technologies . Like many other areas of contemporary governance, immigration control has rapidly become
an information-centered and technology-driven enterprise. At virtually every stage of the process of migrating
or traveling to, from, and within the United States, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens are now subject to
collection and analysis of extensive quantities of personal information for immigration control
and other purposes. This information is aggregated and stored by government agencies for long retention
periods in networks of interoperable databases and shared among a variety of public and private
actors, both inside and outside the United States, with little transparency, oversight, or
accountability .9
Border Patrol organizations have massively multiplied
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Historically, territorial borders and their functional equivalents have been the focal points of immigration control, and as
immigration enforcement activities have expanded in recent decades, the federal government has
continued to invest heavily in border control and other measures to control entry into the United States. Among
these measures, the most visible initiative involves the quasi-militarized fortification of the U.S.Mexico land border.29 CBPs Border Patrol, which totaled a few thousand agents in the early
1990s, has doubled since 2004 to over 21,000 agents, with the vast majority posted along the southwestern
border.30 In addition, congressional mandates have prompted the construction of over 650 miles of
fencing and other physical barriers.31 Current immigration reform proposals would go dramatically further, doubling
both the number of Border Patrol agents and the extent of fencing and physical barriers.32

Immigration surveillance expands from the boundaries of the traditional


framework
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74

Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?

article=3646&context=mlr
However, legal scholars have given virtually no attention to the revolution taking place in the
techniques and technologies of immigration enforcement themselves their swift proliferation, enormous
scale, likely entrenchment, and broader meanings. In this Article, I theorize and assess these shifts, situating and analyzing them
within a broader, longer term set of developments concerning technology and surveillance in contemporary governance.16

Immigration control has not simply evolved into a system to effectuate the removal of
noncitizens on a massive scale, although it manifestly has done that. More fundamentally, the evolution of this
system has reshaped the meanings and functions of immigration governance itself,
transforming a regime of immigration control , operating primarily upon noncitizens at
the border, into part of a more expansive regime of migration and mobility surveillance,
operating without geographic bounds upon citizens and noncitizens alike.17 Traditional
immigration law frameworks offer neither the vocabulary to fully engage with this
transformation nor the mechanisms to constrain these surveillance activities across the many domains
in which they occur. Accordingly, I advance a framework to understand and respond to these developments rooted in scholarship on
surveillance and privacy, bridging a larger divide identified by Vicki Squire between scholarship on the law and politics of control
and scholarship on the law and politics of migration or movement.18

Congress has reinforced efforts to monitor noncitizen immigrants


Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
This expansion of direct post-entry enforcement consists of several component mechanisms. First, noncitizens have been
subject to more extensive, ongoing monitoring and registration requirements while in the United
States. While noncitizens have long been required, as a formal matter, to register and be
fingerprinted upon arrival, to carry proof of registration at all times within the United States,
and to notify immigration officials promptly of changes of address, these provisions went
largely unenforced for decades .66 Even today, these registration requirements largely remain a legal fiction.67
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the government did step up both its
formal and informal efforts to monitor certain categories of noncitizens within the United
States.68 For example, beginning soon after the attacks, the FBI initiated a program of voluntary interviews for thousands of Arab
and Muslim men with nonimmigrant visas.69 In early 2002, the Justice Department announced plans to

aggressively enforce the change of address provision, warning of severe adverse


consequences for noncompliance. 70 Later in 2002, the Attorney General initiated the National Security EntryExit Registration System (NSEERS), which imposed registration requirements on nonimmigrant men who were at least sixteen
years old and current or former nationals of twenty-five countries, all but one predominantly Arab or Muslim.71 Congress and
DHS also tightened oversight of international students and schools where they are enrolled to
ensure compliance with the terms of student visas.72
Federal officials encourage immigration monitors at the state and local level
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Third, federal officials have enlisted hundreds of thousands of state and local law enforcement and
corrections officials in immigration policing.77 These initiatives, whose particular manifestations have
evolved swiftly, seek to identify potentially deportable noncitizens by screening individuals when
they are arrested, convicted, and incarcerated to determine their citizenship and immigration
status and potential deportability. In addition to these federal initiatives, some states and localities
unilaterally have sought to become directly involved in immigration policing . For example, several

states and localitiesmost prominently Arizona, with its controversial and widely-noted Senate Bill 1070have authorized or
required law enforcement to inquire about the immigration status of individuals they encounter and in some instances to convey
that information to federal immigration officials.78 While the Supreme Court left open the possibility of as-applied
challenges to Section 2 when it reviewed SB 1070, it declined to facially invalidate the provision, and it has

previously
signaled its willingness to tolerate an active role for state and local police in direct immigration
enforcement.79
Immigrants are surveiled at departure for any time violations and drug trafficking
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Finally, DHS has implemented mechanisms to monitor and control departures from the United
States. In a series of laws dating back to 1996, Congress has mandated the establishment of a
comprehensive, automated system to monitor and collect records of the departure of every
noncitizen lawfully admitted to the United States.103 This system seeks to match departure records with
arrival records to confirm whether noncitizens admitted under temporary, nonimmigrant admission
categories have departed the United States when required and to identify individuals who have
overstayed. As with screening and registration upon initial entry, a complete exit control system necessarily
involves monitoring and verifying citizenship and immigration status for all individuals
traveling from the United States. Increasingly, exit controls have been justified with reference to national security and
criminal law enforcement.104 At some locations along the U.S.-Mexico border, departing individuals are
subject to additional screening under initiatives that target drug trafficking. 105 Other mechanisms
restrict the ability of noncitizens to travel outside the United States altogether.106
While implementation of this system has proven challenging, the federal government has continued to make considerable
investments in its development and automation. Under the system in place for many years, nonimmigrants would fill out an I-94
arrival/departure form when seeking admission at the border. Upon admission, border inspectors would stamp and retain this form,
returning to individuals a departure receipt to be submitted to transportation carriers upon departure and then forwarded to
immigration officials.107 This process has recently been automated for individuals arriving by air and sea, and immigration officials
have piloted automated systems to track exits by verifying and collecting biometric identification information from these
travelers.108 Immigration reform proposals in Congress would go further by requiring air and sea

carriers to collect exit data from passengers before departing the United States .109

Surveillance Key to Border Control


**Also in Random DA Links**
Surveillance and interoperable databases are key to extensive border control
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Far from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border
that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points , both
fixed and mobile. New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of
the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities
cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actorsboth within
and outside the United Statesto collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other
personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some
instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database
systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which integrate and coordinate otherwise
discrete surveillance regimes in both temporary configurations [and] in more stable
structuresthereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions
involved in immigration governance.248

Privacy/Probable Cause
The ICE can access search warrants without probable causes
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
But what if this reasonable noncitizen learns to walk away from the immigration agent and
refuses to answer his questions? This is a likely scenario because immigrant rights groups advise their clients to maintain
a code of silence when they encounter la migra.19 Would immigrants then have a privacy expectation to
refuse questions and even to walk away from ICE? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Except
in very limited circumstances, ICE is conducting this latest wave of raids with easy access to
civil warrants in a way that expands the scope of its law enforcement power,
compelling mandatory compliance .
regulatory arm reaches into employer hiring practices,20 university requirements for
foreign students,21 the governments distribution of public benefits,22 and drivers licenses,23
among other areas. In turn, this preoccupation has caused the proliferation of databases that, in most cases, grant ICE
easy access to information about a persons immigration status as a worker,24 student, 25 or driver.26 With
easy access to such information in these databases, ICE can arm itself with civil warrants even where there is
no particularized probable cause , to conduct raids in private or quasiprivate spaces
without having to seek the information directly from immigrants themselves . These warrants name no
Today, DHSs

suspects. Rather, they are issued precisely to allow ICE to identify and arrest persons for removal or to charge them for criminal
immigration violations. Indeed, ICE agents have employed this strategy in the latest wave of workplace raids.27
Moreover, ICE

has easy access to more than 600,000 civil warrants to enforce against

persons with prior removal orders who are labeled absconders or fugitives and who appear in their outdated databases.28 While
such absconder warrants target a particular suspect, their execution is no different than the indiscriminate targeting of immigrants
that occurs in workplace raids.
For example, despite the fact that the target often no longer lives at the address that appears in the database , no oversight

occurs to protect third parties from privacy invasions. Not surprisingly then, ICE strategically enforces
these warrants in peoples homes to arrest as many persons who may be in the country without
authorization, often relying on racial profiling and intimidating tactics in the process.29
The Fourth Amendment fails to protect immigrants at the border---encounters are
simply deemed as nonsearches
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
In this battle, not unlike the war on drugs, which disproportionately targeted blacks,12 a casualty has been noncitizens Fourth
Amendment rights. In

the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Fourth Amendment

applied to immigration enforcement , even if with increased tolerance for racial profiling.13 However, as
discussed in this Article, through

a subsequent the Fourth Amendment has become moribund, barely

able to grant any privacy protections to noncitizens , particularly in the realm of


immigration enforcement series of sweeping decisions,.
One significant explanation for this Fourth Amendment exceptionalism is the Courts early treatment of
immigration as a matter of civil as opposed to criminal enforcement .14 The characterization of
immigration enforcement as administrative has colored the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. In particular, by
characterizing removal proceedings as nonpenal, the Court has, since 1984, precluded the
Fourth Amendments exclusionary remedy, except within the narrow egregious violations
exception.15 Moreover, the application of the consent doctrine in immigration enforcement under

the most coercive circumstances increasingly defies the fictional premise that reasonable people
feel free to walk away from law enforcement encounters . In immigration encounters, Fourth
Amendment doctrine assumes the reasonable person is free to refuse questions of
immigration agents at immigration checkpoints .16 That same assumption applies during
unannounced workplace raids conducted by dozens of armed immigration agents, some of whom question workers while others
guard the exits;17 or even during the execution of administrative warrants in a persons home while she is handcuffed for more than
two hours.18 The resulting picture is that when immigration agents target immigrants inside the border,
the Fourth Amendment offers little protection . Immigrants are unprotected either because
the exclusionary rule has no application in removal proceedings , or even when the
exclusionary rule applies, as in criminal proceedings, most of those encounters are deemed
nonseizures and nonsearches.
Probable reason becomes manipulated for immigrants--- privacy is eliminated
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
These civil immigration warrants are neither very different from nor less offensive to liberty
values than the general warrants that originally inspired the Fourth Amendment. The infamous
general search warrants in early U.S. history were issued by executives and legislators, without judicial
intervention, with neither a probable cause requirement or oath, nor a description of the particular places to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.34 Today, immigration laws and codes authorize the compelled
collection of information on ever-expanding databases over which persons retain no
expectation of privacy and that become the basis for the issuance of warrants . Moreover, the
Camara35 legacy of balancing government regulatory powers against individual liberty interests 36 has
validated the use of indiscriminate warrants to conduct immigration raids for decades .37 The
principle mischief of the Fourth Amendment balancing doctrine is that it has redefined the probable
cause requirement as one of a flexible inquiry of reasonableness , rather than
requiring probable cause to fulfill the prerequisite of reasonableness .38 Judicial preapproval becomes a
mere procedural formality when warrants do not require particularized suspicion based on probable cause.
In the immigration context particularly, the Fourth Amendment scale has tilted heavily in

favor of the state.


The trend toward eliminating noncitizens expectations of privacy in the spaces they occupy
inside the border cannot be detached from the ongoing war against undocumented
migration. Local governments interests in protecting the economy or the federal governments interest in controlling
immigration or national security weigh heavily against the privacy interests of undocumented immigrants to hide their illegality.

Increasingly, local and federal laws have sought to make the mere presence of undocumented
immigrants in U.S. spaces illegal, rendering them neither deserving nor reasonably expectant of
privacys protection.39 Like cars40 or certain heavily regulated businesses,41 immigrants have become so regulated that
any Katz42 expectation of privacy to occupy spaces in silence without detection becomes unreasonable

Immigration Raids
Raids are often issued on flawed information--- it wrongly devastates families
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
Immigration raid abuses include the issuance of civil warrants that are not substantiated on
particularized probable cause . Instead, the warrants are often issued based on flawed
information contained in databases whose information was never intended to have a law enforcement purpose.56
These abuses also include the dragnet-like and intimidating execution of warrants in peoples
homes and in the workplace with devastating effects on families and communities .57 Still more
abuses include the racially charged nature that has always characterized immigration law
enforcement.58 Yet, courts have mostly turned a blind eye to these abuses by pretending that removal is not punishment,
ignoring the fact that raids carry criminal consequences for many, or, worse yet, allowing the illegality of
those arrested to justify law enforcements wrongdoing.

Workplace raids increasing now--- authorities appeal to theft crimes and terror
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
Immigration worksite raids have occurred for decades .73 In the past, complaints by government, employers,
and civil rights groups of economic disruption and violations of civil liberties had convinced immigration officials to shift their
efforts to immigration enforcement near the border and at checkpoints.74 Recently, however, the landscape for worksite
immigration enforcement has changed. In 2006, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff made worksite enforcement

a priority, announcing in April 2006 a nationwide immigration enforcement strategy that would aggressively target employers
who knowingly or recklessly hire undocumented workers.75
ICEs new worksite enforcement strategy, begun in eleven major U.S. cities, adopts a comprehensive approach focusing on how
undocumented workers enter the country and obtain identity documents, as well as targeting employers who knowingly hire such
workers.76 As a result of this strategy, the number of persons arrested in the workplace for being unable to

prove legal immigration status jumped nearly tenfold since 2002 to 4,385 in fiscal year
2006.77 In addition, an increasing number of persons arrested during workplace raids are
criminally prosecuted and face felony criminal charges with a real threat of jail time for violating
immigration or other U.S. laws principally related to identity theft. In 2006, for example, that number was
716 of the total arrests (sixteen percent), up from only twenty-five in 2002 (five percent).78 In fact, ICE today is
effectively, even if deceivingly,79 appealing to identity theft concerns , as well as to the
image of foreigners as potential terrorists. This appeal increases the level of tolerance
for civil rights erosions , especially of privacy interests. Consider, for example, Chertoffs remarks in
defense of worksite raids:
[Document fraud] is a serious problem not only with respect to illegal immigration, but with respect to national security. And thats
precisely the point made by the 9/11 Commission a couple of years ago, because illegal documents are not only used by illegal
migrants, but they are used by terrorists who want to get on airplanes, or criminals who want to prey on our citizens. And so, as part
of this overall strategy of worksite enforcement, weve gotten very focused on the question of those who exploit illegal documents
and identity theft in order to pursue illegal acts. So yesterdays enforcement action [in the Swift Co. raids] demonstrates another step
in this work site enforcement strategy. A tough stance against worksites that employ illegal aliens and against individuals and
organizations that commit or facilitate identity theft or fraud.80
These workplace immigration raids are representative of Fourth Amendment exceptionalism for
immigrant workers in the United States. It is not that the Fourth Amendment has no application in this context, but rather that
privacy expectations about immigration status in the workplace have been eroded . Such erosion
occurs through statutes authorizing the creation of databases from which ICE has easy access to obtain civil warrants to conduct
raids without particularized suspicion. Unions representing some of the workers arrested during the Swift & Co. raids have filed
complaints alleging, inter alia, Fourth Amendment violations when ICE arrested a large group of workers without a warrant and
without reasonable suspicion.81 The likely success of the litigation, however, is quite narrow even for workers who may have a

remedy in criminal proceedings. Fourth

Amendment violations will be difficult to establish under current


Fourth Amendment doctrine. The threshold for a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy in a workers immigration status
is likely quite high in light of the heavily regulated nature of workplace immigration enforcement that allows unregulated databases,
compels employer collaboration, and sanctions general warrants.

Warrants are often incorrect--- faulty recordkeeping and address changes aren't
reported
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
The apprehension teams arresting priority absconders comprised both immigration and FBI agents,192 though ICE alone has
conducted the most recent raids. The apprehension teams procured warrants to execute the raids based

on information compiled on each absconder from their immigration records . At least some of the
information gathered from the arrests was then entered into a criminal database.193
Unfortunately, much of the information that forms the basis for these

fugitive warrants is
unreliable . Immigration agencies have been notorious for atrocious record-keeping
and faulty databases, including errors in removal order files.194
Several other factors also result in incorrect records. First, many of the removal orders date back years,195
which increases the probability that persons other than the person subject to the removal order
live at the address when the warrant is finally executed. Second, DHS relies on the addresses
provided by noncomplying immigrants, who often move to avoid immigration authorities. Third, address
changes reported to immigration agencies often are not recorded in the databases .196 In
addition, many persons in the databases are not even aware of their removal orders because notice was
sent to the incorrect address or because DHS never gave the immigrant notice of her removal order.197 As a result, the
administrative warrants are often issued on the basis of incorrect information about the persons
place of residence,198 or against people who do not know they have a removal order at all.

Post-Immigration Surveillance
The government surveils noncitizens post-immigration and deports them
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
In recent decades, however, the regulation of immigration after noncitizens have entered the United
States has increased dramatically. In part, post-entry enforcement serves as an extension of
regulation of the territorial border, intended to apprehend noncitizens who are unlawfully
present. Under what Daniel Kanstroom terms an extended border control model of enforcement, officials
seek to deport not only unlawful entrants but also the many individuals estimated in recent years to
comprise between forty and fifty percent of all unauthorized migrants who lawfully enter as temporary
nonimmigrants and then overstay or otherwise violate their terms of admission .57 But Congress
also has fashioned a second model of deportation by expanding the bases upon which individuals who
are lawfully present may be delegalized and deported for post-entry conduct .58 The
post- entry social control has been particularly
severe for individuals with post- entry criminal convictions .59 Until the 1980s, only a limited number of
trend toward this model of what Kanstroom calls

serious crimes rendered noncitizens deportable, and in most instances, those individuals could seek discretionary relief from
deportation. Since 1988, however, Congress has steadily (and at times retroactively) expanded the list

of

criminal deportability grounds to include a broad range of comparatively minor crimes, including a variety of
misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies, and has sharply narrowed eligibility for discretionary relief.60
The consequences have been transformative, as federal officials now place unprecedented

emphasis on direct
post-entry enforcement within the United States. Over half of all individuals removed in recent years have been
deported from inside the United States.61 Since 1999, deportation of individuals with criminal convictions has been the
governments highest stated interior enforcement priority, and the number of individuals removed on criminal grounds has
increased accordingly.62 Of

the 391,000 individuals removed in 2011, almost half had a prior

conviction , compared to three percent in 1986.63 Moreover, as the U.S. economy has slumped since 2008 and
the number of unauthorized migrants has droppedand as southwestern border enforcement strategies have increasingly
emphasized criminal prosecution rather than immediate expulsionthe number of informal, voluntary returns without formal
removal orders, which typically occur at or near the territorial border, has plummeted.64 As a result of these shifts, lawfully
present noncitizens have become immigration enforcement targets to a greater extent than ever
before, and the number of formal removals arising from interior enforcement activities now significantly dwarfs the number of
informal returns arising from apprehensions at or near the territorial border.65

Ankle Braces/Tracking
Ankle bracelets used to track immigrants subjects them to scrutiny.
Maria Sacchetti 2013, has a masters in Latin American studies and covers immigration for
Merto Desk, Program to track immigrants grows, drawing scrutiny, Boston Globe, 03/17/
2013,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/03/16/monitor/A6e2Hxv3hRAOJufFLqT7QN/stor
y.html#
Behind a smoky-glass door, a private company called BI Incorporated monitors immigrants facing deportation
with office visits, surprise home inspections, and even GPS devices attached to their ankles,
making sure they show up for immigration court or their final departure. The program has
boomed in recent years as deportations soared, and the White House has proposed expanding
such monitoring because it is less expensive and more humane than immigration detention . But
advocates for immigrants, who have clamored for alternatives to jail, now say the program has morphed into a
profit-driven enterprise that subjects thousands of immigrants to scrutiny usually
reserved for serious criminals . I dont know why they put it on me. Ive done everything
theyve asked, said Norma Urbina, a petite 40-year-old seamstress from Honduras who has worn a
GPS ankle monitor for more than a year, though she has no criminal record. I have four
children. Where am I going to go? Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Homeland Security agency in charge
of deportations, said the program seeks to compel immigrants to obey court and deportation orders; a decade ago, the vast majority
did not. BI said in a recent report that 96 percent of participants attended their final court hearings and 77 percent showed up for
deportation. An ICE spokesman said federal immigration agents oversee the program and make key

decisions, such as whether an immigrant should be supervised by BI or wear an ankle monitor .


All decisions regarding the level of supervision required for individuals in removal proceedings are made on a case by case basis, in
order to ensure that ICE maintains sufficient resources to detain serious criminal offenders and other individuals who pose a serious
or significant threat to public safety, said ICE spokesman Ross Feinstein. BI, which stands for Behavioral Interventions, says its
program costs less than $8 a day compared with $119 a day to keep an immigrant in jail. In 2009, ICE awarded BI a five-

year contract worth $372.8 million.


Ankle monitoring is cruel and unusual punishment and has negative effects.
Maria Sacchetti 2013, has a masters in Latin American studies and covers immigration for
Merto Desk, Program to track immigrants grows, drawing scrutiny, Boston Globe, 03/17/
2013,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/03/16/monitor/A6e2Hxv3hRAOJufFLqT7QN/stor
y.html#
In the last year, federal judges ordered fewer than 1 percent of convicted criminals released on
supervision to wear the monitors, according to the courts . In Massachusetts, fewer than 3 percent of criminals
on probation, including sex offenders by law, and 5 percent of parolees, wear the monitors. Its not appropriate to have
intensive supervision and especially GPS devices for people who pose very little flight risk, said
Megan Bremer, a lawyer with Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service in Baltimore. There are other ways. Bremer and
others said immigration officials could get results with phone calls, some home visits, and helping immigrants plan to leave the
United States. Others also favor referring immigrants to legal aid, transportation, and other services that help them comply with the

the monitoring traumatizes immigrants and their children .


Immigrants hide the blinking ankle monitors under their clothes. Winter boots cannot fit over
the bulky devices, so some slog through the snow in wet sneakers. At night, they sleep plugged
law. Advocates for immigrants say

into the wall to charge the devices. Some become withdrawn, even suicidal . Ralph
Isenberg, a Texas real estate developer turned immigration activist, has financed multiple lawsuits against
ICE for attaching the monitors to immigrants, calling the practice cruel and unusual
punishment . He said he is trying to get ICE to remove a GPS device from a

disabled woman in Oregon. These monitors are the most demeaning, shameful things
that I think Ive ever experienced, Isenberg said. These things are not being put on hardened
criminals. Theyre being put on housewives.

Restrict Data Collection


Immigration data collect should be limited and constrained.
Anil Kalhan 2013, Associate Professor of Law at the Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School
of Law, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance,
and Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 12/14/ 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
To begin with, automated immigration policing invites reassessment of the interests at stake when
personal information is collected, maintained, processed, and disseminated for immigration
enforcement purposes and the mechanisms to protect those interests.207 As I have explored elsewhere, the
proliferation of zones in society in which immigration enforcement takes place, and where
immigration status has become visible, salient, and subject to pervasive monitoring, carries a
range of social costs.208 While it is entirely appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate
personal information for immigration enforcement purposes in some contexts and subject to certain
constraints, both individuals and society as a whole have legitimate interests in preserving zones in
society in which immigration surveillance activities do not take place, and in making sure that when
they do take place they are appropriately limited and constrained. To some extent, those interests stem from the
value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result
when immigration status is routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social
concerns that surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as
important. These social interestsfor example, preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government
poweroften have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise
from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context, the importance of
constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings
and the limited extent to which their interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal
process.211

Border Drones
The DHS has plans to expand its use of drones over the US-Mexico border
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Despite implementation challenges, Congress and DHS have placed new surveillance technologies at the
heart of border control strategies.162 Physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border have been
supplemented with advanced lighting, motion sensors, remote cameras, and mobile surveillance
systems, and DHS has deployed a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor coastal areas and land borders.163 To date, these
drones primarily have been used to locate illegal border crossers and individuals suspected of
drug trafficking in remote areas using ultra high-resolution cameras, thermal detection sensors,
and other surveillance technologies.164 However, drones also have been used to patrol and
monitor activities within Mexico itself .165 In addition, government documents indicate that DHSs drones
are capable of intercepting wireless communications and may eventually incorporate facial recognition
technology linked to the agencys identification databases.166 According to one official, CBPs drones can
scan large swaths of land from 20,000 feet up in the air while still being able to zoom in so close that footprints can be seen on the
ground.167 The DHS

has plans both to expand its fleet of drones and to increase their

surveillance capabilities , and immigration reform proposals in Congress would significantly build upon these recent
expansions.168

Domestic use of drones causes radical operational change in border surveillance


Roger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, BORDERWORLD: HOW
THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-securityborders
At that point, though, technology would continue to play a ma
jor role. Indeed, it would
most likely be every bit as transformative for border operations as air power was in military
affairs. Borkowski singled out the domestic use of unmanned aerial systems as having the most
potential for radical operational change. SBInet might have failed, but the idea behind it was
sound: watching as much of the border as possible, all the time. A drone has a different, but
complementary, mission: targeted surveillance. "A UAV can get somewhere fast, and can stay
there," he saidfar longer than a conventional aircraft"but it looks through a soda straw.
Different purpose. Different mission." Leaning forward on his desk, Borkowski was quick to
credit his fellow assistant commissioner Michael Kostelnik, the retired Air Force general who
runs OAM, for pushing the deployment of drones along the border and elsewhere. OAM has
been operating Predators in domestic airspace for six years now and is using them in many
situations that have little or nothing to do with border security, notably in disaster-recovery
missions after hurricanes, fires and floods, but also in what Kostelnik (at a border summit I later
attended in El Paso) called "pop up" missions responding to contingent homeland-security
situations. For routine border missions, OAM operates its unmanned aircraft with a certificate
of authorization from the FAA that permits it to fly them over the entire southwestern border, as
well as the Gulf Coast as far east as New Orleans and the northern border from Spokane,
Washington, to the western end of the Great Lakes. The agency also has transit certificates that
allow it to fly drones across the country from one area of operations to another. The FAA will not
yet permit OAM drones to fly over large metropolitan areas on a routine basis, but Kostelnik
said his agency can now secure an emergency authorization and within a day put a Predator
drone in the sky anywhere in the country.

Employment
Immigrants' data are collected by employers to verify them with the DHS
database--- failure to identify leads to de-authorization to work
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Employment Eligibility Verification. The process by which employers verify whether their new hires are
eligible to work in the United States is undergoing a significant transformation with the
implementation of USCISs E-Verify system . Under this pilot program, which was first authorized and initiated
during the 1990s, employers collect personal information from the identification and work
authorization documents that employees already must present under the existing, paper-based verification process and
submit that information through the online E-Verify system. The system then attempts to match
the individuals data with records contained in databases maintained by DHS, the State
Department, and the Social Security Administration (SSA) in order to determine whether the individual
is authorized to work in the United States . If the system finds a match, then the employer is informed that
the individual is authorized to work. If there is no match, or there are discrepancies between the information submitted and
the database records, the system will issue a tentative non-confirmation and direct the employer to
refer the employee to either DHS or SSA to resolve the issue. If the issue is not resolved within eight days,
the employer will be informed that the individual is not authorized to work.200
While formally still a pilot program that remains voluntary for most employers, E-Verify has grown extensively in the past ten years
due to a series of federal, state, and local mandates. In 2008, the Bush Administration mandated the systems use by federal
contractors and subcontractors, and the Obama Administration has maintained the requirement .201 In
addition, while some states have sought to limit the systems use by employers within their jurisdictions, a growing number of states
and localities have mandated its use by various categories of employers.202 Leading reform proposals would

dramatically extend the reach of this system not only by requiring all employers to use
E-Verify but also by enhancing the system to incorporate biometric identification
mechanisms and, potentially, by making the employment verification system interoperable with other database systems.203
The No-Match laws force employers to fire more immigrants
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
Additionally, the SSA has been sending so-called No-Match letters, about 130,000 every
year ,103 which provide employers with a list of employees whose names or SSNs on their Wage and
Tax Statement (Form W-2) do not match SSA records.104 The SSAs stated purpose for this letter is to
correct errors in its database, not to provide employers grounds for firing an employee or
reporting him to immigration authorities .105 However, some employers fire employees or
report them to ICE out of fear that not doing so could make them liable for knowingly hiring
undocumented workers or subject to IRS fines. 106
In reality, employers face neither IRS107 nor IRCA liability when they receive SSA No-Match letters.108 However, in June 2006,

ICE issued proposed rules regarding an employers legal obligations upon receiving a No-Match
letter.109 The rule would allow ICE to use an employers failure to act after receipt of these
letters as evidence that the employer had constructive knowledge of an employees work
ineligibility.110 Under the proposed rules, an employer must fire a worker with a No-Match SSA letter if
within ninety days that worker has failed to rectify the mistake.111 Failure to do so could lead to stiff civil

sanctions, $10,000 per violation, or prosecution .112 On August 10, 2007, Secretary Chertoff and
Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez in a joint press conference presented a new immigration enforcement plan that includes
the new SSA No-Match rule, which took effect in September 2007.113 This

move is very likely to provoke

employers to fire even more , or report immediately to ICE, employees identified in SSA No-Match letters.114

Description of Tech
Immigration control serves as the leading edge for biometric surveillance
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Infused with this national security significanceand substantial resources, as a resultimmigration authorities have implemented a
complex and far-reaching set of identification systems.118 Officials now collect large quantities of personal

information about both noncitizens and U.S. citizens in a variety of different contexts. In line with the September
11 Commissions recommendationsbut building upon nascent initiatives already under way before the 2001 terrorist attacks

these systems collect not only biographic data but also biometric identifiers, which are unique
markers that identify or verify the identity of people using intrinsic physical or behavioral
characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, iris scans,
DNA, palm prints, hand vein scans, or voice prints.119 Based on the supposition that automated biometric
processes enable efficient and highly accurate identification of individuals, t heir use has exploded since 2001, with
immigration control serving as a leading edge of this trend .120
Immigration authorities store this biographic and biometric information in a growing system of
interoperable databases. At the core of this database network is DHSs Automated Biometric Identification
System (IDENT), which INS originally developed to help the Border Patrol identify and track
individuals unlawfully crossing the U.S.Mexico border. Today, IDENT is used for a much broader variety of
immigration and security-related functions and constitutes the main DHS-wide biographic and biometric information system.121
Growing at a rate of ten million new entries per year, IDENT holds records on over 160 million subjects who

have had any contact with DHS, other agencies, and even other governments including visa applicants
at U.S. embassies and consulates, noncitizens traveling to and from the United States, noncitizens applying for immigration benefits
(including asylum), unauthorized migrants apprehended at the border or at sea, suspected immigration law violators encountered or
arrested within the United States, and even U.S. citizens enrolled in DHSs registered traveler programs or who have adopted
children from abroad. Given its data collection and retention practices, IDENT also contains fingerprint records for

many naturalized U.S. citizens who were fingerprinted before naturalizing and lawfully present
noncitizens.122 At the same time, IDENT does not include records of noncitizens who have never had any contact with DHS,
such as those who entered the United States without inspection.123

Border control aggregates data from different sources in order to assess the risk of
an individual
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Other systems aggregate and analyze information from a multiplicity of sources to furnish
automated, probabilistic risk assessments to officials in real time, with the goal of identifying
unknown individuals whose names might not be listed in immigration, criminal records, or
antiterrorism databases, but whose information matches previously identified profiles and who
therefore are deemed to warrant closer scrutiny. For example, CBPs Automated Targeting
System (ATS), a decision support tool originally developed by the U.S. Customs Service to
screen cargo for illegal drugs and other contraband, aggregates detailed information about all
travelers entering and leaving the United States and assesses the risks presented by each of them
in order to identify and prioritize individuals deemed to warrant greater attention by CBP
border inspectors.137 The ATS analyzes information collected from a wide variety of different
sources, including information collected from transportation carriers about travelers and
information contained in a broad array of other government databases.138 For domestic flights,

the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) operated by the


Transportation Security Administration (TSA) performs a similar role.139
The government even surveils the transportation and mobility of immigrants
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
The proliferation of settings in which immigration enforcement activities take place also has given rise to
extensive government monitoring and control over travel and mobility of both noncitizens and
U.S. citizens. In the wake of the 2001 attacks, travel itself has been deemed a source of potential danger to
public safety: in the words of the September 11 Commission, Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon
against terrorists as targeting their money.144 Accordingly, the Commission recommended that border
screening systems be integrated into a broader network of screening systems covering
transportation and other sensitive facilities.145 Government authorities have invested heavily to
develop and upgrade systems that collect, analyze, store, and disseminate detailed information
about individuals mobility and travel plansboth internationally and domestically, and including both noncitizens
and U.S. citizens.146 These travel and mobility tracking systems have been developed within a broader context in which the
governments capacity to undertake day-to-day location tracking, using GPS systems, cellular telephone location data, automated
license plate readers, and other mechanisms, has also been significantly enhanced.147 In combination with

authorization mechanisms that restrict travel for certain individuals, these systems have enabled
a comprehensive regime that accumulates and stores detailed, permanent records about
individual travel histories and patterns, and enables much individual travel, both international and
domestic, only to take place upon receipt of affirmative, advance government permission.148
Several information systems enable this regime of mass surveillance and control of travel and mobility. As discussed below,

CBP

collects several categories of personal and travel information from transportation carriers ,
computerized reservation systems, other government agencies, and directly from individual travelers using a variety of mechanisms
beginning before individuals commence their travel and extending through completion of the inspection process at the port of
entry. This information is stored within a series of database systems but even when it does not store
information in its own systems on travel and mobility, DHS has required transportation carriers to provide real time access to obtain
this information directly from their reservation and departure control systems.149 In addition, the new e-passports have the
technical capacity to include an archive of the holders travel history, although to date this feature has not been activated for U.S.
passports.

Surveillance technology constantly advancing


Roger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, BORDERWORLD: HOW
THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-securityborders
Smugglers are often stupid, and sometimes they are greedy. They are just as frequently
ingenious, however.The Rio Grande Valley sector employs dozens of Remote Video Surveillance
Systems, most of which are on fixed towers. Each RVSS is made up of four cameras, two of
which are infrared for night duty. The agents who are assigned to camera duty in the control
room zoom and pan the cameras as needed. At night they can manipulate the contrast of the
infrared video, shifting from "black hot" to "white hot," rewinding and forwarding through the
digital file as needed to identify what is often merely a fleeting glimpse of an unidentified
animal, possibly human. Sources of thermal energy abound. Rocks, concrete blocks and even the
plants radiate heat, but warm-blooded animals stand out most vividly, and they move. A seismic
sensor buried alongside an active trail detects foot traffic and transmits its radio signal to the
command center. Such unmanned ground sensors have been used for decades, but engineers
continue to reduce their size and increase their sensitivity. Border Patrol agents have placed
some 11,000 sensors along the U.S. border, and they move them constantly in an effort to keep

up with the ever-shifting traffic patterns along the infinitely forking paths that radiate outward
from the line.

Other Stuff

Tourism
Border security kills tourism from Mexico to the US
Edward Alden 12, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2012,
Immigration and Border Control, Cato Journal,
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/1/cj32n1-8.pdf
Third, increased border control efforts have not just discouraged illegal border crossers, but
legal travelers as well. Tourism, business travel, crossings at the land borders, and other legal
entries into the United States have all been flat or falling over the past decade. Skilled
immigrants have been discouraged and sought out more hospitable countries. The economic
costs of these declines have never been measured in any comprehensive way, but they are
certainly large. The questions for Congress and the Obama administration in the near future
ought to be these: What are the goals of border control? How much is enough? How much can
we afford? How can the economic costs of tighter border enforcement best be mitigated? How
can better legal immigration and temporary work programs help to reduce further the illegal
migration problem? Unfortunately, in the current political environment such questions are not
being asked. Instead, Congress and the administration continue to be focused on the elusive goal
of creating a perfectly secure border through enforcement measures alone.

Border Budget
The massive increase of surveillance doubles the border budget
Roger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, BORDERWORLD: HOW
THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-securityborders
My initial question was relatively simple: How does the border work? What devices and systems
have we invented to secure a 1,954-mile international boundaryof river valleys and canyons,
mountains, deserts and vibrant communities straddling both sides of the linethat people have
crossed more or less freely for hundreds of years? What I discovered, over weeks and months of
reporting, is that no real agreement exists among policymakers about how to define the border
itself. Is it an obstruction or a conduit? A military domain or a civil and commercial one? Is it
meant to join communities or keep them apart? I searched in vain among the pronouncements
of our political leaders for clarification of such questions. What was once little more than a line
on a map has become a theater of operations. Despite this ambiguityor perhaps as a result of it
the federal government has since 2003 doubled the flow of funds to Customs and Border
Protection, the division of the Department of Homeland Security with primary responsibility for
policing the border. CBP, which encompasses the Border Patrol, has in turn deployed
increasingly advanced means not only to scrutinize, search out, and seize an immense stream of
drugs and bodies (to use CBP parlance), but also to channel a concomitant river of data
electronic manifests, lists of travelers' names, dates of entry, and untold terabytes of video
footageall of which must be analyzed, quantified, indexed, and stored. Technologies of
surveillance and control all aim to achieve a perspectival advantage over some adversary, but the
vast quantities of data produced by these devices threaten to overload the system, thus defeating
the original goal. Fusing those rivers of data into a comprehensive and intuitively manageable
real-time graphical interface, for instance, had been one of the foremost aims of the Secure
Border Initiative Network, or SBInet, the federal government's doomed mega-contract with
Boeing to build a "virtual fence" along the nation's borders. In January 2011, after five years of
effort and more than $1 billion had yielded a mere 53 miles of partially operative tactical
infrastructure in southern Arizona, the Department of Homeland Security canceled SBInet. It
was not yet clear what would take its place. Despite the failure of SBInet, the border is
increasingly defined not by geography or war or acts of Congress, but innovation. Border-control
assetsfrom radar blimps to Predator drones to virtual fences and other military-grade
surveillance machinesare evolving rapidly, if imperfectly, and with them so is the border itself.
What was once little more than a line on a map has become a theater of operations.

Random Offcase Answers

AT: Topicality
Interpretation: Surveillance is systematic monitoring to sort populations
John Gilliom 13, Professor of Political Science and Associate Dean in the College of Arts and
Sciences at Ohio University, "SuperVision: An Introduction to the Surveillance Society," P. 2
the systematic monitoring , gathering, and analysis of information in order to make
decisions, minimize risk, sort populations , and exercise power
Automatic immigration policing is surveillance
Anil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdf
Secure Communities illustrates a broader, technology-based shift toward what I refer to as automated immigration policing.

Automated immigration policing initiatives deploy interoperable database systems and other
technologies to automate and routinize the identification and apprehension of
potentially deportable noncitizens in the course of ordinary law enforcement encounters and other moments of day-today life.13 While scholars and advocates have devoted critical attention to these programs, the full significance of this shift remains
underappreciated. Observers primarily have analyzed these initiatives as extensions, in degree, of previous federal efforts to enlist
state and local police assistance, emphasizing analogous questions, costs, and benefits.14 In this Article, I take a complementary but
different approach. Automated immigration policing does not simply effect a massive increase in the number of state and local law
enforcement officials involved in immigration policing although as I discuss, it certainly does that, on an enormous scale. More
fundamentally, as

a leading edge of what I conceptualize elsewhere as an emerging surveillance regime ,


automated immigration policing contributes to a broader transformation in kind that renders
immigration status visible, accessible, and salient in more legal and social domains than ever
before, and subject to routine monitoring and screening by a wide range of public and
private actors.15 By using technology to make determinations of immigration status and the
collection, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement
purposes automatic, widespread, and continuous, automated immigration policing effects a basic shift in the
nature of both immigration federalism and ordinary law enforcement activities.16 As such, the implementation of these new
initiatives raises questions analogous to those arising from other forms of technology-based surveillance and
dataveillance that monitor[] people in order to regulate and govern their behavior .

AT: Immigrants Dangerous DA


Turn: Immigrants commit less crimes than their US-born counterparts--- make
cities safer
Shannon K. ONeil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS
INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD,"
Also, in contrast to the conventional wisdom , the evidence suggests that those newly arrived are the least
likely to commit crimes , meaning immigrants may in fact make U.S. cities safer . As noted
by New York Times columnist David Brooks (and backed up with research by Harvard professor Robert Sampson, among others),
as

[U.S.] immigration has surged, violent crime has fallen 57 percent . 71 These and other
studies find that immigrants commit fewer crimes than American-born whites or African
Americans, and not by small margins. First-generation Hispanic immigrants are 45 percent
less likely than third-generation and above native-born Americans to commit violent
crimes; second-generation Hispanic immigrants are 22 percent less likely to run afoul of the law .
72 Incarceration rates for young immigrant men are also lower : in 2000, they were five times
less likely to be behind bars than their U.S.-born counterparts. 73

AT: Terror DA---No Threat


Terrorist threats on border minimal
Tom Barry 11, senior policy analyst and director of CIP's TransBorder Project, specializes in
immigration policy, homeland security, border security, and the outsourcing of national
security, co-founded the International Relations Center (IRC), and joined CIP in 2007, 6/1/11,
Policy on the Edge: Failures of Border Security and New Directions for Border Control,
http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/failures-of-border-security-and-new-directions-forborder-control
Despite the border security buildups and a hundred billion dollars spent along the southwestern
border, no terrorists or terrorist weapons have been seized. DHS does point out, however, that every year it
regularly apprehends illegal border crossers from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. Those apprehended are mostly
from Cuba, with single digit numbers from Iran, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. Border security hawks
point to these arrests of citizens from special interest countries as evidence that the broken border keeps Americans vulnerable
and that the border should be completely sealed.6 Ten years after the federal government undertook a new commitment to
homeland security and border security, the nation deserves to know what the tens of millions of dollars spent on securing the
southwestern border have accomplished. Before more tax dollars are dedicated to border security, we need

new policy frameworks for immigration and illegal drugs that disaggregate these issues from
homeland and national security. This report looks at the evolution of border security policy and
the persisting failures. Starting with a brief review of border and immigration policies prior to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, the report then moves to the 21st century and the launch of the border security bandwagon of budget increases and

security rhetoric has not


been accompanied by more narrowly and strategically focused border operations . Instead, illegal
alarmism spurred by the new security framework for border control operations. The new

immigrants and illegal drugs are the continuing target of the border security buildup. Policy on the Edge concludes with eight
recommendations for a more effective, more sharply focused and less expensive U.S. border policy.

AT: Terror DA---Border Control Fails


Border Control does not work--- records prove
Shannon K. ONeil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS
INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD,"
Ignoring the multiple and wide-ranging factors behind rising Mexican immigration, the United
States fixated on the border. Throughout the 1990s, operations Hold the Line (El Paso, Texas), Gatekeeper
(San Diego, California), Safeguard (Nogales, Arizona), and Rio Grande (southeast Texas) poured billions of dollars into
fences, lights, surveillance cameras, and manpower to stop these sojourners . After September 11, 2001,
the federal government struggled to expand these local lockdowns along the entire border. The new U.S. Department of Homeland
Security whisked the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) away from the Justice Department and rechristened it the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). This functioned alongside an ever-growing Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The 2006 Secure Fence Act promised literally to steel the

line for some 700 border miles, while the Secure Border Initiative pledged sophisticated
technology to defend the other roughly 1300 miles. The same year, Operation Jumpstart sent six thousand
National Guard members to the southwest. Over the next four years, U.S. Border Patrol agents more than
doubled to twenty thousand, and the annual budget rose to over US$3 billion .8 By 2010, the
federal government even deployed Predator dronesthe type used in Iraq and Afghanistanto patrol the
southern frontier. What have been the results of all these actions? Apprehensions along the southern border rose
in absolute termsto a high of 1.6 million in 2000.9 Government officials heralded the success,
but interviews showed that, at this peak, four out of every five migrants still made it across pretty
good odds.10 Those that got caught the first time usually just tried again. Starting in 2005, the
number stopped at the border began to fall. By 2010, apprehensions were less than half the 2000 peak, matching
numbers last seen in the early 1970s.11 Again the Border Patrol touted the achievement, citing the deterrent effect. Yet the
decline seems to match just as directly to the shifts in the U.S. and Mexican economies and
societies. Surveys of crossers suggest that those who try to get across generally do, even with the
surge in manpower, technology, and steel.12 David Aguilar, former head of the Border Patrol, admitted that the fence
only slows illegal immigrants by three or four minutes.13 Interviews show that aspiring crosserswell aware of
the increased dangersrarely change their minds. Even those who knew someone who died crossing were not deterred.14

AT: Terror DA---Border Surveillance Fails


Surveillance systems are flawed and inefficient---4 reasons
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
At the same time, automation and semi-automation present significant risks and concerns of their
own. Studies indicate that decisionmaking when using computerized systems can be distorted by
automation complacency and automation bias , two related phenomena in which individuals
place too much trust in the proper functioning of automated systems even when they suspect
error or malfunction. When these phenomena are at work, individuals may regard these systems as
resistant to error, fail to sufficiently monitor their operation, or overtrust the answers, recommendations, and cues they
provide.263 These risks may be exacerbated with large, complex networks of interoperable
information systems like those used for immigration surveillance, since their proper utilization
and maintenance present distinct challenges. As Erin Murphy describes, government databases are the ultimate
collaborative projects, often involving multiple systems and distributed collection, maintenance, access, analysis, and exchange of
information among many different actors over extended periods of time.264
In this context, inadequacies in the quality, accuracy, and relevance of information contained in the database systems used for
immigration surveillance raise several distinct types of concerns. First, large database systems invariably contain

inaccurate, outdated, or irrelevant records, particularly as they grow larger and contain greater
quantities of information. Fair information principles emphasize that personal data in government databases should be
accurate, complete, and current.265 For decades, however, immigration authorities have been criticized for
maintaining unreliable and inaccurate records and inadequately managing their information
systems.266 While some improvements have been made, these concerns have persisted .
For example, E-Verify regularly issues tentative non-confirmation notices for a significant number of individuals, including both
noncitizens and U.S. citizens, who in fact are lawfully eligible to work.267 Similarly, a GAO analysis of Secure Communities found
that ICE had no record of the criminal arrest charges for more than half of all individuals removed under the program during 2011
and the first half of 2012; other evidence indicates that a significant number of individuals are detained and placed into removal
proceedings as a result of the program who ultimately prove not to be deportable.268 More recently,

over one million

immigrant families have experienced difficulties applying for health care coverage and insurance
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act due to problems with verification of their immigration or
citizenship status.269
Second, when database systems are made interoperable and accessible to large numbers of
actors, erroneous information can propagate widely and quickly and can become even more
difficult to correct.270 Outside of immigration agencies, other databases that are relied upon for immigration surveillance
purposes suffer from similar data quality problems. For example, despite some recent improvements, criminal
history records databases often remain inaccurate, inconsistent across states, and incomplete .271
Improper deprivations of liberty based on inaccurate information in these database
records remain common.272 Observers also have documented large numbers of concededly innocent individuals whose
names have been added to watchlists generated by the TSDB, such as the No Fly List and Selectee List, and inadequate mechanisms
exist to remove names of innocent individuals from those lists.273

Third, contrary to the connotations suggested by the term database, the use of these systems
does not simply involve the retrieval and reliance of factual information, whether accurate or
otherwise. To the contrary, as discussed above, much of the information generated by these systems and relied upon by

enforcement actors necessarily incorporates analysis, risk assessment, and the exercise of subjective and evaluative human
judgments at some stage. Those judgments may have been made directly, such as when individuals are identified for inclusion in the
No Fly List, Selectee List, or other watchlists, or indirectly, as with the automated risk assessments made by systems like the ATS
and CAPPS, whose evaluations and predictions are generated using algorithms that invariably embed human judgments,
assumptions, fallibilities, and potential biases.274 However, in either case, the nature of the data generated and

distributed by government database systemscoupled with the opaque nature of the criteria for

inclusioncan mask the subjective and evaluative judgments that underlie that
information, making it seem more objectively factual to enforcement actors relying upon it than may be warranted.275
Finally, the biometric identification technologies upon which immigration surveillance relies are
not foolproof. For example, although automated fingerprint identification systems can be
extremely accurate in determining identity, they nevertheless can yield inaccurate results, owing
to technological limitations, the quality of fingerprint recording processes, and even the
particular demographic groups in which the subjects are members.276 Advanced multimodal biometric
identification systems that are currently under development have limitations and fallibilities of their own.277

Deprivations from fallible surveillance systems are rarely remedied


Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
The nature of immigration surveillance, however, limits the space for these human and
institutional layers to function carefully and effectively and given the enormous scale of immigration
surveillance activities, even small error rates can result in very large numbers of individuals facing
improper deprivations that are often left unremedied . While intended to eliminate
improper discrimination, immigration surveillance mechanisms sometimes merely shift the
point at which such discrimination takes place. With E-Verify, for example, employers often decline to hire
individuals who receive tentative non-confirmations without properly notifying them depriving these workers of employment
without any opportunity to resolve errors in database records.281 Similarly, even as Secure Communities seeks to preclude
police from any direct immigration policing role after individuals have been arrested, it empowers

police to arrest
individuals for the very purpose of booking them and having their immigration status
screenedwithout regard to whether that arrest leads to any criminal prosecution. Evidence to date
suggests that in some jurisdictions, this is precisely what has happened.282 With both of these systems, evidence suggests that

these types of errors and deprivations fall disproportionately upon particular


communities .283
Moreover, agencies

involved in immigration surveillance are typically subject to limited

oversight and deferential (if any) review . Accordingly, those agencies have few incentives to
ensure that the records contained in their database systems are accurate, complete, and current .
In addition, many of these systems are not governed or meaningfully constrained by any
framework statutes . While the Privacy Act of 1974 requires agencies to ensure that government records of
personal information are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete, the statute only applies to systems of records about
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents .284 Moreover, even for records on those categories of
individuals, the statute permits agencies to exempt records concerning law enforcement or national security from its coverage.285

While some individuals have filed lawsuits challenging their improper inclusion in these
database systems, the lack of transparency concerning the criteria and operations of these
systems makes those legal challenges difficult .286 While more accurate database systems would better serve
these agencies own interests, the incentives for immigration control, law enforcement, and national security agencies to devote the
resources necessary to ensure the accuracy and integrity of these databases on their own, without external oversight, are limited.287
In short, the combination of database errors, automation-related biases, complex but time-pressured decisionmaking, massive
volumes of identification and screening activities, fragmented responsibilities among different authorities, and laws and agency
incentives that are misaligned with the goal of ensuring data accuracy and integrity can easily result in large numbers of improper
denials of immigration-related authorizations in a variety of different contexts. In many instances, these deprivations fall

disproportionately on particular groups.288 Especially given the lack of transparency and oversight
mechanisms in these systems, the limited procedural protections and access to counsel afforded
to noncitizens at all stages of the migration process, and the limited protections for U.S. citizens
who are outside the United States or seeking to enter, the consequences of these fallibilities can
be significant and difficult to remedy .

AT: Courts CP
Cant solve--- Court rulings on immigration is ambiguous--- side bias for
immigration surveillance
Shannon K. ONeil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS
INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD,"
In June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Arizona provisions that made it a state
crime for immigrants not to carry papers at all times and for illegal immigrants to work, as well
as the provision allowing state police to arrest suspected illegal immigrants without a warrant.
But it upheld what many see as the most controversial part of the law requiring law
enforcement officers to check the status of anyone they stop or detain if they suspect
them of being in the United States illegally. 18

AT: Privacy/Neolib K
Link Turn: Border surveillance is rooted from neoliberal restructuring--Surveillance is used to promote the state's economic freedom and social control--Aff solves the link
James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan,
"From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance,"
Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-andsociety/article/view/3481/3435
While an exhaustive discussion is beyond this papers scope, it is essential to note that globalization involves more than
transnational mobilities, flows, and exchanges; it is equally defined by practices of gatekeeping, immobilization and exclusion. For
many individuals, rather than flexible citizenship (Ong 1999), the most striking trend of the last century has

been the growth and increasingly preemptive, punitive, and technologically sophisticated nature
of border control and surveillance. Such dynamics have resulted from neoliberal
restructuring and the replacement of managed capitalism with programs of
socioeconomic deregulation and market rationality. Unable to provide safety, security, and certainty through
redistributive and market interventions, states increasingly face anxious publics and patterns of social polarization and antagonism.
In response, governmental

agents have escalated the policing of boundaries, mobility, and

placement of people (Trouillet 2001) to preemptively identify and neutralize risks and
undesirable elements. According to Garland (2001, 100), this trend has inverted the post-war political
principles of economic control and social liberation into economic freedom and
social control .
Perm do plan with privacy perceived as a collective right
James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan,
"From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance,"
Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-andsociety/article/view/3481/3435
Additionally, the groups agenda incompletely expresses the needs of migrants. Commenting on attempts to reduce
questions of surveillance to matters of privacy and non-interference , many scholars argue
that an uncritical deference to liberal individualism ignores the importance of
substantive citizenship and active, public commitments to justice, egalitarianism,
and respect . As observed in John Gillioms (2001) study of welfare mothers, privacy advocates attempts to
establish an autonomous, inaccessible protected [and] non-public zone around the individual
(120) risk endorsing an uncaring world of neglect in which the most needy... are cut off from
the support ...of a broader community (123). For the subjects of this studypoor migrants whose very existence is
unauthorizedcommitments to privacy and personal protections have little relevance to their experiences of marginalization and
17
do little to bring about manifest improvements in their life chances. According to Williams (2007, 31), more than protection from
government encroachments, immigrants need a language with which to make a case for their entitlement to...public life. In this
context, to comprehensively address injustice the frameworks of privacy, personal freedom, and
other abstract legal principles must be dovetailed into a broader social approach
grounded in positive freedoms and collective recognition and obligations (Lyon 2001;
Regan 1995). Absent such connections, merely upholding the freedom to be left alone risks further
entrenching contemporary patterns of social atomization. As the following indicates faith-based movements
articulate a broader, more collective approach as they present spiritually grounded forms of cosmopolitanism rooted in human
security and dignity.

Alt doesn't solve. A narrow mindset of surveillance fails to challenge


authoritarianism
James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan,
"From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance,"
Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-andsociety/article/view/3481/3435
By detailing and analyzing the use of often sophisticated observational practices by border
activists, this article has highlighted interventions and actors left unexplored in extant work on
surveillance, borders, and mobility. While the administration of territorial borders remains a
significant instantiation of state authority central to the exercise and accumulation of political
and symbolic power, treating the state as the exclusive agent of border surveillance or
assuming that surveillance is inherently repressive endorses a narrow and
undersocialized view of observational techniques and practices. Noting there is more to
surveillance than initially meets the eye, this paper has advanced a broader definition,
recognizing that observing, locating, and classifying may be conducted in the interest of
protecting rights, redressing injustices, enabling democratic participation, buttressing moral
criticism, and advocating for alternative practices. Further, this paper calls attention to the need
to study surveillance as a dynamic and interactive process in which the boundaries between
watcher and watched are often indeterminate and where, despite inequalities of power,
subordinates are able to contest and challenge gatekeepers, order enforcers, and other formal
authorities. Acknowledging this duality allows the researcher to venture beyond the empirically
obvious, challenge excessively authoritarian accounts , and, most importantly, advance a
publicly engaged brand of scholarship that explores surveillances empowering potential.

Visas CP Answers

Solvency Deficits
Cant pass---The USFG and labor unions are against employment programs
Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 An
Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/noteprospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-braceroprogram-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/
These measures have drawn much criticism from the Mexican government and public, straining U.S.-Mexican relations. 217 Furthermore, the passage
of these acts reflects Congress's and the U.S. public's perception that immigration from Mexico is a threat to the national interest of the United
States.218 It

may be difficult to persuade voters and their representatives that a bilateral


immigration agreement would prove beneficial. 219 Many in Mexico believe that "the existence
of a powerful U.S. Congress and demands imposed on the U.S. executive by domestic interests
still present the largest obstacles to bilateral cooperation. "220 The U.S. president is particularly
constrained on immigration issues by labor interests. Labor interests today, including agricultural workers, continue to
influence immigration policy-making. As discussed above, a new bilateral guest worker program may enjoy the support of the UFW, a largely Chicano
farmworkers' union. 221
Nonetheless, other

labor interests are likely to object to an employment immigration

program with Mexico. It will be difficult to convince them that more guest workers would not
threaten domestic laborers' wages and working conditions . Although unemployment
in the general economy is very low,222 agricultural unemployment rates are nearly twice as
high. 223 In 1998, 8.3% of hired farmworkers were unemployed. 224 In 1999, that rate increased slightly to 8.9%.225 These are major obstacles to
any legalized foreign worker programs.

Bracero Bad
The Bracero program attracted illegal immigrants, encouraged inadequate wages,
and led to abused human rights
Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 An
Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/noteprospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-braceroprogram-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/
Even if circumstances today resemble the circumstances that existed when these bilateral
agreements were created and a new bilateral agreement on Mexican immigration can be reached, virtually all commentators
agree that any new guest worker program requires substantial improvements over the
Bracero model . 139 Although the 1951 agreement provided more protections for the bracero and
domestic workers, the U.S. government did not enforce them adequately .l40 As one commentator put it,
"'United States employers benefitted [sic] from a risk-free pool of menial labor.... And they determined all the working conditions, hours, wages, and
living accommodations. ", 141 Particularly during the period of direct recruitment, but even after 1951, braceros

received

insufficient food and substandard housing , and suffered inadequate wages, unsafe
working conditions, and unemployment during the contract periods. 142 Many even deserted their
employers. 143

The U. S. government also ignored the provisions of the agreements intended to protect the
domestic labor market. 144 Although, under Public Law 78, the secretary of labor was to certify that the importation of foreign labor would
not adversely affect wages and working conditions for domestic workers,145 in areas where braceros were concentrated,
agricultural wages remained the same or fell . 146 Studies showed that growers
deliberately used the Bracero Program to lower farm wages, and research linked the growers'
inability to hire willing domestic laborers to the low wages that resulted from the importation of foreign workers. 147
In addition to the negative effects on domestic laborers and braceros, the Bracero Program also attracted illegal
immigrants to the United States . 148 The program also increased permanent immigration
to the United States. 149 As many have observed, "there is nothing more permanent than temporary workers."150 If foreign workers are
easily available, employers come to depend on them. 151 Human rights abuses and general immigration
considerations led to the eventual demise of the Bracero Program as the labor shortage subsided
at the end of the Korean War and, as Table 3 indicates, unemployment in the United States was again on the rise in the agricultural sector.

Current guest worker programs are the equivalent to legalized slavery--employers file lawsuits against reforms
SPLC 13, Southern Poverty Law Center, February 13, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs
in the United States, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/close-to-slaveryguestworker-programs-in-the-united-states
In the debate over comprehensive immigration reform, various policymakers and business
groups have suggested that Congress create a new or expanded guestworker program to ensure a
steady supply of foreign workers for industries that rely on an abundance of cheap labor.
Congress should look before it leaps. The current H-2 program, which provides temporary
farmworkers and non-farm laborers for a variety of U.S. industries, is rife with labor and human
rights violations committed by employers who prey on a highly vulnerable workforce . It
harms the interests of U.S. workers, as well, by undercutting wages and working conditions for
those who labor at the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. This program should not be expanded or used as a
model for immigration reform.

Under the current H-2 program overseen by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), employers brought about 106,000 guestworkers
into this country in 2011 approximately 55,000 for agricultural work and another 51,000 for jobs in forestry, seafood processing,
landscaping, construction and other non-agricultural industries.

But far from being treated like guests, these workers are systematically exploited and abused.
Unlike U.S. citizens, guestworkers do not enjoy the most fundamental protection of a
competitive labor market the ability to change jobs if they are mistreated. Instead, they are bound to the employers who import
them. If guestworkers complain about abuses, they face deportation, blacklisting or other retaliation.

Bound to a single employer and without access to legal resources, guestworkers are routinely:
Cheated out of wages; Forced to mortgage their futures to obtain low-wage, temporary jobs; Held virtually captive by employers or
labor brokers who seize their documents; Subjected to human trafficking and debt servitude; Forced to live in squalid conditions;
Denied medical benefits for on-the-job injuries.
Former House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel put it this way: This guestworker programs the closest thing
Ive ever seen to slavery.1
Congressman Rangels conclusion is not mere hyperbole nor the first time such a comparison has been made. Former

DOL official Lee


G. Williams described the old bracero program an earlier version of the guestworker
program that brought thousands of Mexican nationals to work in the United States during and
after World War II as a system of legalized slavery .2 On paper, the bracero program had many significant
written legal protections, providing workers with what historian Cindy Hahamovitch, an expert on guestworker programs, has called the most
comprehensive farm labor contract in the history of American agriculture.3 Nevertheless, the bracero workers were systematically lied to, cheated and
shamefully neglected.4

In practice, there is little difference between the bracero program of yesterday and
todays H-2 guestworker program . Federal law and DOL regulations provide a few
protections to H-2 guestworkers, but they exist mainly on paper. Government enforcement of guestworker rights is
historically very weak. Private attorneys typically wont take up their cause. And non-agricultural workers in the program are not eligible for federally
funded legal services.
The H-2 guestworker system also can be viewed as a modern-day system of indentured servitude. But unlike European indentured servants of old,

They
are, in effect, the disposable workers of the U.S. economy.
U.S. workers suffer as a result of these flaws in the guestworker system. As long as employers in
low-wage industries can rely on an endless stream of vulnerable guestworkers who lack basic
labor protections, they will have little incentive to hire U.S. workers or make jobs more
appealing to domestic workers by improving wages and working conditions. Not surprisingly, many H-2
todays guestworkers have no prospect of becoming U.S. citizens. When their temporary work visas expire, they must leave the United States.

employers discriminate against U.S. workers, preferring to hire guestworkers, even though they are required to certify that no domestic workers are
available to fill their jobs. In addition, it is well-documented that wages for U.S. workers are depressed in industries that rely heavily on guestworkers.

This report is based on interviews with thousands of guestworkers, a review of the research on guestworker programs, scores of legal
cases and the experiences of legal experts from around the country. The abuses described here are too common to blame on a few
bad apple employers. They are the foreseeable outcomes of a system that treats foreign workers as commodities to be imported as
needed without affording them adequate legal safeguards, the protections of the free market, or the opportunity to become full
members of society.
When the Southern Poverty Law Center published the first version of this report in 2007, we recommended reform or repeal of the H-2 program.

Unfortunately, even after the enactment of modest reforms in recent years, guestworker
programs today are still inherently abusive and unfair to both U.S. and foreign workers.
In the past several years, the DOL has proposed two sets of regulations to better protect non-agricultural
H-2 workers one related to wage rate guarantees and one more comprehensive set of regulations. These regulations also would better protect
the jobs and wages of U.S. workers. Unfortunately for workers, neither set of regulations has gone into effect;
employers have filed multiple lawsuits challenging them , and Congress has effectively
blocked implementation of the new wage regulations. For workers, then, the abuses continue unabated.

Link to Border DA
Illegal immigration still occurs with guest worker programs
Philip Martin 2000, professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of
California, Davis, April 2000, Guestworker Programs for the 21st Century,
http://cis.org/GuestWorkerProgramReform
The United States has had two agricultural guest worker or Bracero programs with Mexico, and one program, H-2 and
H-2A, that permits U.S. farmers to recruit foreign farmworkers in any country, although most come from the Caribbean and Mexico. None of
these programs fulfilled their stated purpose: to add workers temporarily to the U.S. work force
without adding permanent residents to the population, and to do so in a manner that does not
adversely affect U.S. workers. Instead, the Bracero programs laid the groundwork for one of the world's great mass migrations that
from Mexico to the United States and the H-2A program has been wracked by costly disputes.

The first Bracero program was an exception to U.S. immigration law . The 1917 Immigration Act prohibited the

entry of immigrants who were "induced ...to migrate to this country by offers or promises of employment," imposed a head tax, and excluded
immigrants over 16 who could not read in any language. However, with "Food to Win the War" as a motto, farmers and railroads persuaded the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) to suspend until 1921 the head tax and the literacy test for Mexican workers coming to the United States with contracts for
up to 12 months. Many

of these first Braceros did not return as scheduled there was no Border
Patrol to regulate crossings until 1924 and some U.S. employers did not pay Braceros the
wages promised.
The second Bracero program was a series of agreements between Mexico and the United States under which some 4.6 million Mexicans were admitted
to work on U.S. farms between 1942 and 1964. It

is often argued that a legal guest worker program reduces illegal


entries, but 4.9 million Mexicans were apprehended during the Bracero years (both Bracero
entries and apprehensions double count individuals admitted or caught several times). The Bracero program was small during World War II
admissions peaked at 62,000 in 1944 and rose to 445,000 in 1956, primarily to harvest cotton and other commodities in surplus.
The Mexican and U.S. governments recognized that the

Bracero program also facilitated illegal immigration .


Mexico pressed the United States to adopt employer sanctions to discourage illegal emigration ,

and the 1951 Bracero program was approved for only six months in order to put pressure on Congress to approve sanctions. The "Texas Proviso" in the
1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, however, specifically exempted the knowing employment of unauthorized workers.

The H-2 program operated alongside the Bracero program, allowing farmers along the eastern seaboard to import Jamaican and
other workers to hand cut sugar cane in Florida and pick apples in the Northeast. Like the Bracero program, farm employers who
wanted to employ H-2 workers had to convince the U.S. Department of Labor that U.S. workers were unavailable at government-set
wages and to provide the foreign workers with free housing and contracts that spelled out their rights and responsibilities.
The U.S. experience with foreign farm workers leads to three major lessons:

There is nothing more permanent than temporary workers. After farm employers and foreign
workers become dependent on each other, the farmers do not think about alternatives to
Bracero or H-2 workers, and the migrants need U.S. earnings to maintain their families.

Link to Politics DA
CP links--- Despite some Republican support, immigration reform will always be
contentious
Mark Z. Barabak 14, reporter for the LA Times and former reporter from the White House
during the Clinton Administration, 11-21-2014, Immigration debate explodes despite voter
desire for change, http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-ff-immigrationpolitics-reaction-20141121-story.html#page=1
Far from settling matters, President Obamas unilateral action on immigration all but ensures at least
two more years of fierce and angry debate over one of the most contentious and
polarizing issues facing the country.
It is a debate that presents opportunity and political risk to both parties, but especially
Republicans , who are deeply divided among themselves and badly need to mend relations with a Latino and Asian
American population growing bigger and more politically powerful each day.

And, with the loudest, most strident voices likely to dominate the discussion, it

is a debate that will continue to mask a broad

consensus among Americans, who want compromise and a fix to a decades-old problem fashioned by Congress and the president
working in tandem rather than more of the partisan brick-throwing that has escalated over the past several days.

Exit polls this month found that nearly six in 10 voters supported legislation that would go further than Obamas plan by
establishing a path to citizenship for the roughly 11 million people in the country illegally a striking ratio for a largely white, GOPleaning electorate that swept Republicans to power across the country on Nov. 4.
Even here in Arizona, a state known for taking one of the hardest lines on illegal immigration, there is a strong desire to see the
political skirmishing end.
People want a solution, said Chuck Coughlin, a GOP strategist who has advised two of the states top Republicans, Sen. John
McCain and Gov. Jan Brewer, who have sometimes worked at cross-purposes on the issue. Theyre tired of the partisan stalemate
and the finger-pointing by both sides.

Immigration is a uniquely difficult and emotional issue, freighted with the weight of family ties
and two broad, sometimes conflicting impulses. The United States, as the president suggested in his speech Thursday night,
is both a land of laws and a nation of immigrants; squaring that circle and finding agreement somewhere in the middle has exceeded both the
imagination and capacity of elected leaders for a generation.

Obama was never going to placate all sides by going it alone, a move he says was forced upon
him by hostile, intransigent Republicans in Congress. What he has done, though, has heightened tensions in the
short term and cast the conflict forward into the race to succeed him, placing every White House hopeful on the spot for the next two years.

About half of the undocumented aliens are here temporarily to earn some money to return to their homeland with. POTUS has not
offered a path to citizenship with his executive order. He said that only Congress can authorize that.
Because Obamas actions are not binding on his successor the

next president is going to have to decide whether to


continue these policies after 2017, said Matt Barreto, a University of Washington political scientist who conducts extensive polling
among Latinos nationwide. Whether its Hillary Clinton or Chris Christie or Marco Rubio, theyre all going to have to take a position, because its a
policy that the next president, through his or her executive power, will be overseeing.

The danger Democrats face is alienating the white working-class voters who have never much
cared for the president and who could view the influx of newly hirable immigrants as unwelcome
job competition.
CP links--- Republicans resistant to reform
Caren Bohan 13, president of the White House Correspondents Association, 5-6-2013,
Lawmakers struggle over guest workers in immigration bill,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/us-usa-immigration-congressidUSBRE9420W920130506
As the Senate gets ready to debate the details of a broad U.S. immigration bill, a group of House
of Representatives lawmakers is still struggling to write its own legislation , hung up in part over guest worker
programs sought by businesses.

Programs allowing employers in high-tech, agriculture, construction and other industries to hire foreign workers were also a
stumbling block for senators who introduced a separate immigration bill last month.
In the end, the four Republicans and four Democrats in the Senate "Gang of Eight" group incorporated into its bill a deal reached
between the AFL-CIO labor organization and the Chamber of Commerce, the huge U.S. business lobby.

Immigration reform is Democratic President Barack Obama's top domestic priority. Although

the Senate is controlled by


Democrats, the bill will need some Republican support to meet the minimum 60-vote threshold
for passage.
Still, passage of the bill in the Republican-led House is seen as the biggest challenge .
Although many Republicans view immigration reform as a way to help repair their party's weak standing with Hispanic
voters, many others are resistant to comprehensive reform that includes a path to citizenship. Conservative
critics of that provision view it as a form of amnesty.

Border DA Answers

No UQ
Surveillance systems are flawed and inefficient --- 4 reasons
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
At the same time, automation and semi-automation present significant risks and concerns of their own .
Studies indicate that decisionmaking when using computerized systems can be distorted by
automation complacency and automation bias , two related phenomena in which individuals
place too much trust in the proper functioning of automated systems even when they suspect
error or malfunction. When these phenomena are at work, individuals may regard these systems as resistant
to error, fail to sufficiently monitor their operation, or overtrust the answers, recommendations, and cues they provide.263 These risks
may be exacerbated with large, complex networks of interoperable information systems like
those used for immigration surveillance, since their proper utilization and maintenance present
distinct challenges. As Erin Murphy describes, government databases are the ultimate collaborative projects, often involving multiple
systems and distributed collection, maintenance, access, analysis, and exchange of information among many different actors over extended periods of
time.264
In this context, inadequacies in the quality, accuracy, and relevance of information contained in the database systems used for immigration surveillance
raise several distinct types of concerns. First,

large database systems invariably contain inaccurate, outdated,


or irrelevant records, particularly as they grow larger and contain greater quantities of
information. Fair information principles emphasize that personal data in government databases should be accurate, complete, and current.265
For decades, however, immigration authorities have been criticized for maintaining unreliable and
inaccurate records and inadequately managing their information systems .266 While some improvements
have been made, these concerns have persisted .
For example, E-Verify regularly issues tentative non-confirmation notices for a significant number of individuals, including both noncitizens and U.S.
citizens, who in fact are lawfully eligible to work.267 Similarly, a GAO analysis of Secure Communities found that ICE had no record of the criminal
arrest charges for more than half of all individuals removed under the program during 2011 and the first half of 2012; other evidence indicates that a
significant number of individuals are detained and placed into removal proceedings as a result of the program who ultimately prove not to be

over one million immigrant families have experienced difficulties


applying for health care coverage and insurance subsidies under the Affordable Care Act due to problems with
verification of their immigration or citizenship status.269
Second, when database systems are made interoperable and accessible to large numbers of
actors, erroneous information can propagate widely and quickly and can become even more
difficult to correct.270 Outside of immigration agencies, other databases that are relied upon for immigration surveillance purposes suffer
from similar data quality problems. For example, despite some recent improvements, criminal history records
databases often remain inaccurate, inconsistent across states, and incomplete .271 Improper
deportable.268 More recently,

deprivations of liberty based on inaccurate information in these database records remain


common.272 Observers also have documented large numbers of concededly innocent individuals whose names have been added to watchlists
generated by the TSDB, such as the No Fly List and Selectee List, and inadequate mechanisms exist to remove names of innocent individuals from
those lists.273

Third, contrary to the connotations suggested by the term database, the use of these systems
does not simply involve the retrieval and reliance of factual information, whether accurate or
otherwise. To the contrary, as discussed above, much of the information generated by these systems and relied upon by enforcement actors

necessarily incorporates analysis, risk assessment, and the exercise of subjective and evaluative human judgments at some stage. Those judgments may
have been made directly, such as when individuals are identified for inclusion in the No Fly List, Selectee List, or other watchlists, or indirectly, as with
the automated risk assessments made by systems like the ATS and CAPPS, whose evaluations and predictions are generated using algorithms that
invariably embed human judgments, assumptions, fallibilities, and potential biases.274 However, in either case, the

nature of the data


generated and distributed by government database systemscoupled with the opaque nature of
the criteria for inclusioncan mask the subjective and evaluative judgments that
underlie that information, making it seem more objectively factual to enforcement actors relying upon it than may be warranted.275

Finally, the biometric identification technologies upon which immigration surveillance relies are
not foolproof. For example, although automated fingerprint identification systems can be extremely
accurate in determining identity, they nevertheless can yield inaccurate results, owing to
technological limitations, the quality of fingerprint recording processes, and even the particular
demographic groups in which the subjects are members.276 Advanced multimodal biometric identification systems
that are currently under development have limitations and fallibilities of their own.277

Estimates on border control success is based on flawed metrics


Suzy Khimm 13, reporter for Washington Post, 1-30-2015, Is our border security working? Its
far from clear, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/30/is-ourborder-security-working-its-far-from-clear/
We've enacted almost all of the border security that the Bush administration had wanted in
2007, dramatically ramping up personnel, detention facilities, border infrastructure, and
technology.
Legislators now want to ramp up these efforts even further as part of comprehensive immigration reform. But is our border
really more secure because of these additional measures? It's a question that's actually quite
difficult to answer , as the American Immigration Lawyers Association lays out in a new report.
The Obama administration has touted success by pointing to the numbers of apprehensions
along the southwest border dropping to the lowest level in 40 years in 2010. Violent crime in border cities has also
dropped steadily in recent years.

The problem is, the decline in the sheer number of apprehensions doesn't
necessarily mean that border security is more effective . Experts point out that illegal
immigration as a whole has plummeted since 2007 in significant part because of our economic
downturn. Border arrests in 2012, in fact, are up to 356,873 from 327,577 in 2011, the AP reported this week, which could
suggest that the number of apprehensions has been contingent at least in part on the economy.
Despite our limited ability to measure success, however, lawmakers have continued to

ask for more and more


resources. Immigration advocates and experts believe that better metrics are necessary to
evaluate whether these additional resources are actually helping. "Missing from these
proposals is a proven way to measure when the border is reasonably secure ," AILA writes in its new

report, arguing that policymakers "need to identify clearer goals for border security and ways to measure success rather than simply
increasing resources."

No Link
*SPICY* The border is not an ideal terrorist breach and terrorists always enter
legally anyways
Daniel Griswold 04, director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4-1-2004,
Securing Our Borders Under a Temporary Guest Worker Program,
http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/securing-our-borders-undertemporary-guest-worker-program-0
Long-time opponents of immigration seized on September 11 to argue against legalization of
Mexican migration, and in favor of drastic cuts in existing levels of legal immigration. But any connection between the
September 11 attacks and illegal immigration from Mexico is non-existent . None of the 19
hijackers entered the country illegally or as immigrants. They all arrived in the United States
with valid temporary nonimmigrant tourist or student visas. None of them arrived via
Mexico. None of them were Mexican. Sealing the Mexican border with a three-tiered, 2,000-mile replica of
the Berlin Wall patrolled by a division of U.S. troops would not have kept a single one of those
terrorists out of the United States.
The problem is not too many immigrants. Immigrants who come to the United States to work
and eventually settle are but a small subset of the tens of millions of foreign-born people who
enter the United States every year. In fact, on a typical day, more than 1 million people enter the United States legally by land, air,
and sea through more than 300 ports of entry. In a typical year, more than 30 million individual foreign nationals
enter the United States as tourists, business travelers, students, diplomats, and other temporary,
nonimmigrant visa holders.[1] Of those, perhaps 1.3 million will eventually settle here as
permanent immigrant residents. In other words, less than 5 percent of the foreigners who enter the United States each year intend to
immigrate in any sense of the word. The rest plan to stay here only a short time.

Yet up until September 11, 2001, the overriding focus of our border security policy was to keep people out
who might stay beyond their visa or enter illegally in search of employment . If you recall, some of the

September 11 hijackers were granted a visa without even being interviewed by our consulate personnel. Why? Because they were deemed to be low risk
for staying in the United States to seek employment.
Our focus, one might say our obsession, with keeping

Mexicans from crossing our Southwester border illegally


has not served our national security interests. It has diverted resources and attention

away from efforts to identify and keep out people who truly intend to do us harm .
The Southwest border is not a frontline on the war on terrorism . First, Mexicans themselves are not a national
security threat. No Mexican national to my knowledge has been connected with Al Qaeda or any other
international terrorist network. Mexicans almost universally come here to work. Second, international terrorists have
not viewed the Southwestern border as a preferred means of entry. The Canadian border is
more attractive . Its twice as long, with far fewer border patrol personnel per mile . Middle Eastern
that it was at a
port of entry at the Washington state/British Columbia border in 1999 that U.S agents
apprehended Ahmed Ressam, one of the so-called millennium bombers.
Why would potential terrorists incur the risks of sneaking across our Southwest border when
other doors are more attractive? A special investigation by the Associated Press last November found that not a single terrorist
nationals tend to stand out more in Mexican society than in Canadian society or at a typical international airport. R ecall

suspect had been arrested trying to enter the United States across the Mexican border since the September 11 terrorist attacks. As border patrol agent
Matt Roggow told the AP, The

people who are coming across [the Mexican] border are people who can
only pay $1,500 to a smuggler. A terrorist can pay $30,000 or $40,000 and go to the
northern border where we dont have the resources to stop them .[2]
While we were guarding the back door in 2001 to make sure no Mexican immigrants entered our
country illegally, we were neglecting the far larger barn door of temporary non-immigrant visas
through which all the September 11 hijackers entered.

ISIS Terrorist claims are not supported


KVIA 15, 4-15-2015, "U.S. Rep. O'Rourke refutes latest ISIS in Mexico rumors, shows decadeslong rumors of terrorists in Mexico," http://www.kvia.com/news/us-rep-orourke-refutes-latestisis-in-mexico-rumors-shows-decadeslong-rumors-of-terrorists-in-mexico/32382904
Is Isis in Jurez?
Some have shared stories on social media suggesting that is the case. Others have contacted my office to see if it's true.
Today I reached out to the Mexican government, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Northern Command.

None of them have found any evidence, credible or otherwise, that Isis is in Jurez .
Stories like these are good at scaring people and getting attention for those who spread them.
But they are terrible for the country's image of the border, for El Paso's ability to recruit talent,
and for our region's opportunity to capitalize on the benefits of being the largest bi-national community in the world.
Stories like these have come up before. The 1981 story about Libyan hit squads in Jurez . The fears
that Al-Qaeda was going to invade after 9/11. The claims about Isis crossing the border last year.
As a member of the House Homeland Security committee in the 113th Congress, I asked the director of the FBI, the director of the National

They
answered that there was not, nor had there ever been, any terrorist, terrorist plot, or terrorist
organization that was able to exploit our border with Mexico.
Counterterrorism Center and the Secretary of Homeland Security if there was currently any terrorist threat on the Southern border.

Beyond hurting our image nationally, these kinds of false stories could lead us to take our eye off real threats to the homeland. While
we should always remain vigilant at our borders -- and we currently spend $18 billion a year to do so -- the greatest proven
homeland threats have been at our airports and with homegrown terrorists radicalized over the internet. Not in El Paso, the
country's safest city 4 years in a row.

No evidence of terrorists in the border--- air travel more likely


Dan Friedman 14, reporter for the Washington bureau of the NY Daily News, 9-10-2014, ISIS
terrorists won't sneak into U.S. across loose Mexico border: Homeland Security officials,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/isis-terrorists-won-sneak-u-s-loose-mexico-border-homelandsecurity-officials-article-1.1935224

Despite some Twitter chatter, there is no evidence ISIS terrorists are trying to slip into the
United States from Mexico, Department of Homeland Security officials told Congress Wednesday.
Administration officials said they are more concerned about jihadists entering the U.S. legally
on commercial airline flights.
Administration higher-ups testifying at a House hearing Wednesday threw cold water on scary border scenarios cited by
conservatives such as Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas.
"We

don't have any credible information, that we are aware of, of known or suspected terrorists
coming across the border," Jennifer Lasley, a senior official in the Department of Homeland Security's intelligence and analysis office,
told the House Homeland Security border security subcommittee.

Across the Capitol another top DHS official acknowledged that the agency has tracked online talk by ISIS backers about infiltrating
the U.S. via the border.
"There have been Twitter, social media exchanges among (ISIS) adherents across the globe speaking about that as a possibility,"
Francis Taylor, DHS undersecretary for intelligence, told Sen. John McCain (R.-Ariz.) after he pressed him on the issue during a
Senate committee hearing.
"Any infiltration across our border would be a threat," Taylor agreed, but said he is "satisfied we

have the intelligence and capability on the border that would prevent that activity .

Lawmakers from border states, including Cruz and McCain, have said the threat from ISIS requires beefing up border security.
Texas Gov. Rick Perry has said ISIS terrorists may already have crossed into the U.S.

Administration officials at the House hearing, which focused on ISIS fighters who hold western passports, said it is far more
likely an extremist sympathetic to the group will try to enter the country by air.
The terrorist claims are all hype--- conservatives have been using them as
campaign fodder
Zeke J. Miller 14, political reporter for TIME an graduate of Yale University, 10-7-2014, GOP
Ad Claims ISIS Plot to Attack U.S. Via Arizonas Backyard, http://time.com/3478254/isisnrcc-border-plot-gop-2014/
The National Republican Congressional Committee ad opens with grainy footage of black flags
and fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) holding rifles on military vehicles. Evil

forces around the world want to harm Americans every day, an

ominous voiceover states. Their entry into our


country? Through Arizonas backyard. The spot goes on to recount how Rep. Ann Kirkpatrick (D-AZ), locked in a
close re-election fight with Arizona House Speaker Andy Tobin, has voted against border security legislation, suggesting that she
leaves Arizona vulnerable.
The claim is clear: The same terrorists targeted by U.S. bombers for destruction in Syria and Iraq are coming to the U.S. to attack the
homeland through the Mexican border. Yet federal law enforcement officials have repeatedly stated that

there is no active plot against the U.S. from ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, and no
intelligence to suggest incursions on the Southern border .
To make the claim, the ad relies on a Sept. 10 writeup of a congressional hearing by the
conservative Washington Free Beacon in which a Department of Homeland Security official was understood
as telling lawmakers that ISIS supporters are known to be plotting ways to infiltrate the United States through the border.
But a review of the testimony by DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Francis Taylor tells another story. Instead, he
said, there have been Twitter, social media exchanges among [ISIS] adherents across the globe speaking
about that as a possibility. But

that is a far cry from a direct threat, and light years away from a direct
plot against the homeland.
Other national security officials have since offered more detail refuting the claim. We see no specific intelligence
or evidence to suggest at present that [ISIS] is attempting to infiltrate this country though
our southern border, Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson told the House Homeland
Security Committee a week after Taylors testimony . Matt Olsen, the outgoing director of the National
Counterterrorism Center told lawmakers at the same hearing, There have been a very small number of sympathizers with [ISIS]
who have posted messages on social media about this, but weve seen nothing to indicate that there is any sort of operational effort
or plot to infiltrate or move operatives from [ISIS] into the United States through the southern border.
When asked about the sourcing for the ads claim, a spokesman for the NRCC did not back down. ISIS presents an imminent and
dangerous threat to the United States, says Daniel Scarpinato, a NRCC spokesperson. Anyone who doesnt believe that having a
porous border made of chicken wire is leaving our country at risk, should go explain that to people in Arizona who actually have to
live with this problem and are upset that politicians like Ann Kirkpatrick are ignoring it.

By juicing the threat of ISIS, Republicans are hoping to take advantage of global volatility and
the understandable fear surrounding it for their own electoral purposes. ISIS has been used as
campaign fodder since at least the summer , as the terrorist group took control of major
cities in Iraq and started beheading Westerners.

No Impact
Terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons is incredibly implausible--- too many steps
that need to be perfect
Steve Chapman 12, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, 5-17-2012, The
Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism, http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/theimplausibility-of-nuclear-terrorism
Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the
terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but atomic bombs
capable of killing hundreds of thousands.
The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies
aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war.
Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet . Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia.
Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a
matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass . Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear
Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable."
But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida

and its ideological

kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.


Given their inability to do something simplesay, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck
bombit's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious . Far
from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, " the
likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly
small."
The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a
bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads . If that
were easy, one would have already gone missing.
Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been)
quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb,

they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent
unauthorized use.
As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally for reasons even the Iranians can grasp.
Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some
government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to
spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces."

Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and
power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment
plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a
prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test
it.
Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.
Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time - but seeking their help would confront
the plotters with possible exposure or extortion . This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding
the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.
Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it
said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different

challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only
one thing has to go wrong.

Immigration Neg

Topicality

States
Immigration is handled at local and state level not entirely by the federal
government
Harvard Law Review 2015, Policing Immigrant Communities, Harvard Law Review, 4/10/
15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771
Enforcement by Federal Delegation. Immigration enforcement is the prerogative of the federal government, but Congress has
defined circumstances under which the federal government may delegate immigrationenforcement authority to state and local police. The biggest federal delegation program, the
287(g) program, allows the Attorney General to grant immigration enforcement authority to state
and local police departments that sign Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These MOUs allow state and local police to enforce civil
immigration laws so long as they participate in ICE training, agree to ICE supervision, and abide
by certain ICE rules.
States have their own laws for immigration independent of the federal
government.
Harvard Law Review 2015, Policing Immigrant Communities, Harvard Law Review, 4/10/
15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771
(b) Enforcement by State Authority. States and cities often enforce federal immigration laws and their
own immigration policies without federal authority. States, at times joined by the federal government, claim
an inherent authority to enforce federal criminal laws. The purported authority stems from the Tenth
Amendment: one sovereign has the authority to assist another sovereign in arrests and, since
states retain their sovereignty under the Constitution, they have the power to arrest for
violations of federal criminal law. Additionally, states often enact laws that target immigrants and
allow officers to regulate immigration. For instance, many states have human smuggling laws that prohibit
transporting consenting unauthorized immigrants into the state. Others restrict undocumented-immigrant employment. Arizona,
for instance, amended its identity theft laws to criminalize the use of false information to get a job, whether the identity belonged to
a real or fictitious person. And some states and cities target the jobs that immigrants can get. Together,

inherent arrest authority and independent state laws mean police target and detain suspected
immigrants and their communities without the authorization or oversight of the federal
government.

Federalism Answers

Immigration Federalism Bad


Curtailing the States power to make immigration laws good
Stella Burch Elias 2013, Associate Professor of law, University of Iowa, The New Immigration
Federalism, Ohio State Law Journal, 12/06/2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/6-Elias.pdf
The Supreme Courts recent immigration preemption doctrine effectively precludes states
passing their own anti-unauthorized-immigrant immigration laws. Although some state
legislators may fear that this curtailment of their lawmaking powers will herald a permissive era
of amnesty and laissez-faire acceptance of undocumented immigrants , all available
evidence suggests that the opposite is true . Under the Obama Administration, federal
immigration authorities have carried out record numbers of deportations, with over 400,000
immigrants removed from the United States in 2009 and 2010, and with the Department of
Homeland Security set to deport two million immigrants by 2014approximately the same
number of immigrants who were deported in the 105 years from 1892 to 1997.109 Despite this
extraordinary record of immigration enforcement activity, since President Obama took office,
according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, a record number of immigrationrelated laws were passed by state governments, including thirty-seven pertaining to state
participation in immigration enforcement.110 State engagement with the enforcement of
federal immigration laws excluding individuals from entry to the United States is not a new
phenomenon,111 but state involvement grew exponentially in the early years of the twenty-first
century.112 This growth involved a plethora of state laws authorizing direct enforcement of
federal immigration laws, whether under so-called 287(g) agreements with ICE delegating
authority to do so,113 or under independent state initiatives such as Arizonas S.B. 1070.114 At
the same time a wide range of exclusionary alienage laws pertaining to the treatment of
immigrants were introduced, limiting immigrants access to housing, employment, or language,
and effectively serving an indirect enforcement function.115
Solvency deficit--- States strongly support anti-immigrant laws
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
Since the events of 9/11, anti-immigrant groups like the Federation of American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the U.S. EnglishOnly, Inc. have been supporting or promoting local efforts to pass anti-immigrant ordinances or include them as propositions in key
local elections.256 In 2006 alone, at

least seventy-eight state immigration related bills were

approved in thirty-three states .257 These ordinances range from denying the undocumented
basic worker protections to restricting their access to higher education and other
state benefits , such as denying them drivers licenses, barring them from congregating as day
laborers, and prohibiting them from speaking Spanish.258 The ordinances also include housing
and employer restrictions, such as the 2006 Hazleton, Pennsylvania anti-immigrant ordinances that sought to bar the
undocumented from taking jobs, renting apartments, or engaging in other commercial transactions. These housing and
employer ordinances would have required employers, landlords, and businesses to monitor the
immigration status of workers and tenants. They also sought to impose both civil and criminal
penalties on employers, landlords, or businesses that violated the restrictions.
Local communities plan to add more officers in immigration raids
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf

One thing is certain: like federal enforcement, local

immigration enforcement will be characterized as


regulatory in nature, particularly when the consequences continue to be nonpenal . In Hazleton,
undocumented tenants and workers will be forced out of workplaces and homes, and possibly reported to
immigration agencies , but not prosecuted per se. Nevertheless, these consequences are all extremely
harsh, and criminal prosecution, as in the federal immigration enforcement context for such crimes as identity theft and
fraud, remains a strong possibility.
An interesting parallel exists between these new anti-immigrant ordinances and attempts by local police to regulate disorder among
the homeless and poor. For many generations, local police enforced laws criminalizing public order offenses,

such as vagrancy, loitering, and public drunkenness, until the courts stepped in to declare them
unconstitutional under doctrines such as the prohibition against status crimes .300 These legal
challenges, however, encouraged the proliferation of order-maintenance policies that replaced
criminal with administrative enforcement, namely through property regulation tools like zoning
laws.301 Here again, the relaxed criminal safeguards in the context of administrative law enforcement has made it possible for
these measures to survive judicial scrutiny at a significant cost of rights.302 Local anti-immigrant ordinances, such
as those in Hazleton, if successful, have the potential to exponentially multiply the
number of law enforcement officers involved in immigration raids , and are likely to suffer
from similar costs of rights, including to the Fourth Amendment.

Despite public backlash states strongly support restrictive immigration laws


Shannon K. ONeil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS
INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD,"
States took up the callmost vocally in Arizona. Facing a tough reelection fight in 2010, Governor Jan
Brewer did not hesitate as she signed the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act, or Arizona SB 1070. The law required police officers to check peoples
immigration status if there was a reasonable suspicion that they might be here
illegally, and made it a crime not to have official identification on hand . In defending the bill, Brewer
assured constituents that it would protect U.S. citizens against a relentless and daily barrage of narco-terrorist drug and human
smugglers. 16

Public outrage immediately spilled forth . Rallies around the country denounced the bill,
with protesters carrying signs saying Stop the hate and What does illegal look like? Opponents warned that now WWH

Yet counter rallies also occurred , with placards declaring


Arizona got it right and Adis illegals. Opinion polls revealed strong backing for the law, and
similar initiatives began to work their way through other state legislatures across
the country, passing in Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, and South Carolina . 17
walking while Hispanicwould be a crime.

State Flexibility Now


Immigration federalism curtails the states ability to make immigration laws
Stella Burch Elias 2013, Associate Professor of law, University of Iowa, The New Immigration
Federalism, Ohio State Law Journal, 12/06/2013,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/6-Elias.pdf
State and local alienage laws designed to welcome, integrate, and include immigrants play an increasingly
important, but hitherto underexplored role in U.S. immigration law and policy. While some states
have developed exclusionary statutes and regulations pertaining to immigrants, especially
undocumented immigrants, other states and localitiesincluding individual localities within immigrant-exclusionary
stateshave promulgated laws designed to foster the inclusion and integration of all immigrants
into their local communities.194 It is not possible to discuss in this Article all of the myriad inclusionary measures
adopted in different locales throughout the United States. This Part therefore focuses on two examples of local and state
immigrant- inclusionary provisions that have proliferated since the mid-1990s: (1) so-called sanctuary laws,
designating areas (usually cities) as sanctuaries from immigration enforcement and providing all
residents, regardless of immigration status, with equal access to local governmental services ; and
(2) in-state tuition initiatives and other measures designed to provide immigrant youth with
equal access to higher education. This Part argues that while the new immigration federalism curtails
states and localities ability to engage in immigrant- exclusionary lawmaking, it simultaneously
creates opportunities for states and localities to promulgate laws designed to foster immigrant
inclusion.

Econ Answers

Immigration Bad for Mexican Econ


Immigration steals innovation and economic benefits from Mexico
Shannon K. ONeil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS
INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD,"
Mexican immigrants time in the United States has helped to debunk the facile stereotypes of the PRI days, including views of
Mexicos northern neighbor. Nearly

six in ten Mexicans see life as better in the United States ;


for those with friends and relatives up north the number is even higher . Today over half of Mexicans have
a favorable opinion of the United States, near Spain and Britain.83
Yet Mexicos widespread and long-standing migration to the United States has had its drawbacks as well. Over

six hundred
thousand (or about a sixth) of all Mexican college degree recipients and roughly half of all PhD
holders reside in the United States.84 Here, U.S. gains are Mexicos losses , as these
professionals make their careers, start their businesses, and contribute to communities far away
from their native land. Economists call this phenomenon brain drain an exodus of talent
from the very countries that need it most.
Remittances too are not an unqualified benefit. The money sent back to families divides small towns between
the haves and the have-nots. The influx of dollars to migrants hometowns can drive up local
prices , making it harder for those that remain to make ends meet. This pushes even more to
migrate, perpetuating a cycle that ensures survival, but not development .
Open borders hurts Mexican Economy
Nonie Darwish 2013, IS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION GOOD FOR MEXICO?, Frontpage
Magazine, 6/18/2013, http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/193700/illegal-immigration-goodmexico-nonie-darwish
If the huge number of illegal immigrants from Mexico was good for Mexico as a nation, then
how come its economic, political and security conditions have not improved over the years, but
instead have steadily deteriorated? The steady absorption of the bottom of Mexican society by the US has deprived
Mexico of its motivation to improve its economy and to become a government that serves the welfare and living conditions of its
poor and unemployed. Why should Mexico work hard on improving conditions for the poor and unemployed if America is doing the
job for them? It is not easy for any nation to be located on the border with a giant economic super

power like the United States. This situation tempts smaller nations to exist like small fish living
off the crumbs and leftovers of a giant whale . The situation in both Mexico and the US is
unnatural and self-defeating, leaving Mexico stagnant and unmotivated to improve and meet the
needs of its citizens. Groups in America who claim moral superiority for being on the side of open borders and absorbing all
illegal aliens because they have big hearts are in fact absolving the Mexican government of its duty toward its citizens and economy
and are contributing to the internal problems of Mexico and the United States. In the long run, we are not doing

Mexico a favor with our open borders, but we are crippling them and robbing them of
the healthy functioning of their nation . The US should immediately end the
politicization of the immigration issue not only for the sake of America, but also for the sake of
Mexico. We need a sane immigration policy that respects US sovereignty and that helps Mexico
become more responsible as an independent nation to end its sluggish economy and political
corruption. The sovereignty of both the US and Mexico has been compromised under the status quo, which is unsustainable.
Either we control the US border or say goodbye to both US and Mexican sovereignty as two
separate nations.

Immigration prevents Mexico from improving its economy


Bill Ong Hing 2011, Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco, Mexico's Economy Is
the Problem That Anti-Immigrant Laws Won't Solve, Huffington Post Politics, 05/ 25/ 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-hing/mexicos-economy-is-the-pr_b_829377.html
Everyone agrees that we need immigration reform. For years, Congress has attempted to strike a principled balance between greater
enforcement and a fair way to adjust the status for the 10 to 12 million undocumented immigrants in the country. However, even
immigrant rights advocates must acknowledge that legalization will not solve undocumented migration

permanently. An expansion of visas will certainly help, but if the package does not include at
least the first steps toward helping Mexico improve its economy and infrastructure,
undocumented Mexican migration will continue, and the tension over undocumented migration
will resurface down the road. To truly understand undocumented migration, we have to do what Americans have thus far
been unwilling to do: Look beyond the simple explanation that migrants cross the border in search of work. We
have to ask why they cannot find what they want in Mexico. In 1994, we were told that NAFTA would solve the
undocumented problem because new jobs would be created in Mexico. But NAFTA ultimately contributed to huge
job losses in Mexico. Mexican corn farmers could not compete with heavily-subsidized U.S. corn
farmers, and now Mexico imports most of its corn from the U.S. Because of globalization,
100,000 jobs in Mexico's domestic manufacturing sector were lost from 1993 to 2003 . Where do
those unemployed workers look for work? El Norte. An economic turnaround in Mexico is central to solving the undocumented
migration challenge in the United States. Conservatives should understand that. And liberals should recognize that

reducing undocumented migration is in Mexico's interest as well; the persistent loss of ablebodied workers needed to build its infrastructure and economy only hurts Mexico . All of us
understand that economic investment in Mexico will not and, probably, should not be done without close monitoring.

Relations Answers

Relations High
US/ Mexico relations high now --- NAFTA proves
Enrique Pea Nieto 2015, President of Mexico, Why the U.S.-Mexico Relationship Matters,
Politico, 1/ 06/ 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/us-mexicorelationship-enrique-pea-nieto-113980.html#.VaqtpCpViko
Our countries have an intense economic relationship that is spread over a myriad of areas . Since
the beginning of my administration, I have worked with President Barack Obama to create bilateral mechanisms that harness the
full potential of our relationship. We are already seeing concrete results from the High Level Economic

Dialogue (HLED), the Mexico-U.S. Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation and
Research (FOBESII), the Mexico-U.S. Entrepreneurship and Innovation Council (MUSEIC) and the
21st Century Border Action Plan of 2014. We are steadfast in our belief that the continuous
promotion of bilateral trade is a win-win situation for both our countries . Mexico is the third
largest trading partner of the U.S., just behind China and Canada. Total bilateral trade between us
amounted to more than $500 billion during 2013. Our exports to the U.S. have increased
significantly since NAFTA entered into force, with roughly 80 percent of them coming to this country. Meanwhile,
U.S. exports to Mexico in 2013 were $226 billion, up 443 percent since 1993. In fact, Mexico buys more U.S.
goods than all of the BRICS combinedand nearly as much as the entire
European Union . Moreover, 5.9 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Mexico. Even Mexican
exports benefit the American economy: 40 percent of the value of Mexican exports to the U.S.
contains American inputs. By 2020, Mexico will have the capacity to build one in every four vehicles in North America, up
from one in six in 2012. Additionally, Mexico has begun to invest in high technology exports; we have become the leading exporter of
flat screen televisions in the world, the fourth largest computer exporter and a growing pioneer in the aerospace industry. We are
interlinked.

The Mexican population's approval rate of the US is at its highest since '09
Juliana Menasce Horowitz 13, Senior Researcher at Pew Global Attitudes Project, 5/1/2013,
"How Mexicans See America," http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/01/how-mexicans-seeamerica/
When U.S. President Barack Obama travels to Mexico this week, he will encounter a Mexican public that has
far more positive attitudes about the United States than at any time in the last several
years.
Americas image south of the border fell sharply in 2010, when Arizona passed a show me your
papers law aimed at identifying, prosecuting and deporting immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally. B ut Mexican views
have rebounded since then, and U.S. favorability ratings are now at their highest point since
2009 . The prospects for U.S. immigration reform may be, at least in part, the source of renewed Mexican approval of their
neighbor to the north.
A new Pew Research Center poll found that

66 percent of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the

U.S. , up 10 percentage points from a year ago and up 22 points from May 2010 , immediately
last time Americas image was as strong among
Mexicans was in 2009, when 69 percent said they had a favorable opinion .
following the enactment of Arizonas immigration law. The

Drug War Alt Cause


Alt cause drug wars--- plan cant solve--- fuels bad relations and
misunderstandings between the two governments
David Shirk 13, Associate Professor at University of San Diego and Director of the Justice in
Mexico Project, 5-4-13, U.S.-Mexico Relations Complicated, Conditioned By Drug War,
http://www.npr.org/2013/05/04/181053775/u-s-mexico-relations-complicated-conditionedby-drug-war
SCOTT SIMON, HOST:
In many ways, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is c omplicated and conditioned
by the long and the bloody war on drugs . It's difficult to say exactly how many people have been killed in
that war, but Mexican media have estimated that around 70,000 people have died since 2006;
many thousands more have been disappeared. The United States has been closely involved,
providing money, technology and intelligence to the Mexican government .
But Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has begun to back away from the U.S . And
this week, his administration said they would limit its contacts with American agencies .
David Shirk is an associate professor at the University of San Diego. He studies the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and joins us in our
studios. Thanks so much for being with us.
DAVID SHIRK: Thank you for having me.
SIMON: How closely has the United States been involved?
SHIRK: In the last 12 years, and especially the last six years, have really been a high-water mark

in

U.S.-Mexico collaboration, particularly on security issues. Levels of trust are so high that we have had the
opportunity to fly drones in Mexico, we have agents operating in direct collaboration with their Mexican counterparts, we've seen
record levels of extradition. So, the collaboration is at a much higher level of intensity than we've ever seen before - or has been, at
least over the last six years or so.
SIMON: And has U.S. involvement been helpful?
SHIRK: That's a great question. I think it has been, depending on what you consider to be success. We

have not seen

violence go down . We have not necessarily seen the flow of drugs diminish. We have not
seen necessarily an overall reduction in corruption in Mexico . But you can look at tactical successes. The
dismantling of major organized crime groups, the target of specific organized crime figures has been accomplished over the last
several years, thanks to this very high level of collaboration.
SIMON: So, why would President Enrique Pena Nieto be eager to reduce that cooperation ?
SHIRK: Well, I'm not sure that the idea is necessarily to reduce collaboration so much as to reshape the dynamics of collaboration. I
think that's probably how the Pena Nieto administration would portray this. For one thing, the Pena Nieto

administration is trying to move away from the security policies that were employed by
the Calderon administration. So, these efforts to go after high-level targets and to dismantle
drug-trafficking organizations is diminishing as a priority of the Mexican government . And what
they have emphasized instead is promoting citizen security.
I think that the Pena Nieto administration thinks that you had a real problem with the lack of coordination under the Calderon
administration. And their idea, in the Pena Nieto government, is to try to tighten up and centralized

the mechanisms of coordination and cooperation with the United States. And I think that's a deliberate
attempt to vet and control whatever types of cooperation we're going to see between the U.S. and Mexican government.
SIMON: Well, that raises an issue that I think you've even touched on in some of your writings. Has this been, in many ways, a drug
war that's been an American war conducted over the border?
SHIRK: I think that there are a lot of people who would agree with that idea. And in some ways, you can see that the drug war,

as it's played out over the last 34 years, in particular as a U.S. proxy war . That said, over the last
six years, working with Mexico, U.S. officials have consistently tried to let Mexico set the agenda. U.S. officials that I spoke to,
repeatedly - and Mexican officials - repeatedly expressed the understanding that Mexico and the United States were working
together because they had a shared responsibility to deal with the problem of drug trafficking and organized crime. But I think U.S.
officials are really waiting to see whether they will be able to cooperate with the Pena Nieto administration and in what areas.
Because there is some sense that the trust and collaboration that was built up over the last six

years is at least on hold, if not in recession .

SIMON: It seems to me - I've spoken with

Mexicans, who, to deal in shorthand, are sick of the drug

wars and sick of the cartels and blame them for thousands of deaths, and yet at the same
time, in some ways, they blame Americans for being the market for those drugs.
SHIRK: Yeah, I think that's true. I mean, first of all, I think many Mexicans are tired of having their country
portrayed as a lawless, violent and corrupt place. That said, I also think that, for many Mexicans, this
incredible fight that they've made over the last six years to try to take on organized crime has
not yielded major gains in stopping the flow of drugs in even necessarily breaking down some of the major
cartels that operate in Mexico. So, there is a sense that they've made all of this effort and it's primarily to
prevent U.S. drug consumers in engaging in an illicit market activity. I think some Mexicans may simply
say this is not worth the effort. This is not our fight. Let's let the drug traffickers get back to business as usual and we can get on with
our lives.

Other/Random

AT: Cartels Impact


Mexico is resilient--- drug cartels can't make a failed state
Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of
International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of
Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35
This suggests that violence and insecurity on the Mexican side of the U.S. southern border will persist
in the years ahead and occasionally spill over into American territory. That does not mean,
however, that Mexico is likely to become a failed state as many have recently argued. The Mexican
state is relatively strong , albeit with important pockets of profound institutional weakness.
The reach of the federal governmentfrom tax collection to poverty programsis felt throughout the country. Unlike the
Taliban, the Mexican cartels have no interest in overthrowing the Mexican state but
instead, like any businessmen, simply want to reduce state intervention in their economic
enterprise. And unlike Pakistan, Mexico lacks the sharp regional, ethnic, and religious
divides that feed the formation of anti-state political actors. This balance of power obviously has not
prevented the crime syndicates from controlling a large number of municipalities; corrupting politicians and law enforcement
officials; killing policemen, state prosecutors, and federal police officials; and sowing fear and insecurity in several key border towns.
Nor does it preclude the possibility of occasional unpleasant surprises, like the assassination of high ranking government officials.
it limits the likely reach of their influence and thereby suggests that while the
violence will persist in the years ahead, the cartels are not well positioned to threaten the
stability and survival of the Mexican state.
But

Offcase

DA Link---Surveillance K2 Border Control


Surveillance and interoperable databases are key to extensive border control
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Far from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border
that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points , both
fixed and mobile. New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of
the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities
cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actorsboth within
and outside the United Statesto collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other
personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some
instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database
systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which integrate and coordinate otherwise
discrete surveillance regimes in both temporary configurations [and] in more stable
structuresthereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions
involved in immigration governance.248

Disease DA
Immigration control conducts medical examinations for immigrants and prevents
the introduction of diseases into the U.S.
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Public Health Surveillance. Public health officials have also implemented systems to conduct disease
surveillance on noncitizens who have entered the United States. Individuals long have been inadmissible on certain
public health-related grounds, and Congress has required individuals seeking admission to undergo medical examinations in their
countries of origin before being issued immigrant visas or being admitted as refugees. Individuals seeking to enter as
nonimmigrants can be required to undergo medical examinations upon arrival at ports of
entry.211 To implement these inadmissibility provisions and the statutory obligation to prevent
communicable diseases from being introduced and transmitted within the United States,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has established the Electronic Disease
Notification system, which collects and stores health information on these individuals and transmits that health information
to state and local public health authorities and refugee resettlement authorities when noncitizens with certain specified health
conditions enter their jurisdictions.212

The US-Mexico border is a gateway for contagious diseases--- curtailing


surveillance sends
Michelle Weinberg 03, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, January 2003, "The
U.S.-Mexico Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project: Establishing Binational Border
Surveillance," http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/9/1/02-0047_article#comment
The 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border is one of the worlds busiest international boundaries . An estimated
320 million people cross the northbound border legally every year (1). The U.S.-Mexico border is a unique region
where the geopolitical boundary does not inhibit social and economic interactions nor the transmission of
infectious diseases among residents on each side of the border. Some border cities (such as El Paso and
Ciudad Juarez) are separated by a short distance and serve as one large metropolitan area for the local community (Figure 1).

From an epidemiologic perspective, the border population must be considered as one, rather
than different populations on two sides of a border; pathogens do not recognize the geopolitical
boundaries established by human beings. The border region has a population of approximately 11 million people (2),
many of whom cross the border daily to work, shop, attend school, seek medical care, or visit family and friends (3,4). The
border population also includes persons who pass transiently through the region and others who
come the area to work in maquilas, the border factories. The region has experienced tremendous population
growth. During 19931997, the U.S. border population grew by 1.8% annually, more than double the national U.S. average of 0.8%,
while the Mexican border population has grown by 4.3% per year, almost three times the national Mexican annual growth rate of
1.6% (2,5). Population growth has been spurred by increased economic opportunities after the North American Free Trade
Agreement was implemented in 1994. Currently, an estimated 3,300 maquilas, employing >1 million workers, are located along the
border (6,7). The proliferation of border factories has generated a wave of internal migration of persons from other regions of
Mexico and Central America toward the border (8).
From Mexicos perspective, the border encompasses some of the countrys most economically prosperous states. In contrast, the U.S.
border region is among the poorest areas in the United States, with >30% of families living at or below the poverty level (8). Along

the Texas border, an estimated 350,000 or more people live in 1,450 unincorporated areas
known as colonias, which lack adequate sanitation infrastructure (8).
The large population movement, limited public health infrastructure, and poor environmental
conditions contribute to increased incidence of certain infectious diseases (811) Analysis of data
from the U.S. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System for 1990 through 1998 showed increased risks for
certain foodborne, waterborne, and vaccine-preventable diseases in U.S. counties within 100
kilometers of the border, compared with nonborder states. These data show a two- to fourfold
greater incidence of hepatitis A, measles, rubella, shigellosis, and rabies and an eightfold greater

incidence of brucellosis in border counties than in nonborder states (11). Studies have identified
the importance of cross-border movement in the transmission of various diseases, including
hepatitis A (12,13), tuberculosis (1418), shigellosis (19), syphilis (20), Mycobacterium bovis
infection (21), and brucellosis (22,23).
Despite the high prevalence of infectious diseases and increasing movement of people across the
borders, no surveillance system had been established to assess the border population as a
geographic unit. Gaining an accurate picture of public health needs was limited by the following factors. First, the
surveillance case definitions used for public health reporting in Mexico and the United States
are different. Also, laboratory confirmation is often unavailable in the Mexican border states,
and therefore reported cases of infectious diseases are defined primarily by clinical findings. In
contrast, for the many notifiable diseases in the United States, laboratory confirmation is required, and U.S. surveillance is heavily
based on laboratory reporting. This system likely underestimates the true incidence rates. In the past,

the two countries have exchanged limited border surveillance data. However, these differences
diminish the usefulness of national surveillance data for developing a comprehensive, regional
understanding of infectious disease epidemiology in the border areas . A consistent binational perspective
is essential to effectively control and prevent the transmission of infectious diseases that move easily through the geopolitical
boundary.
The Border Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) project was designed to bridge this surveillance gap by forming partnerships
among institutions in both countries serving the region and bringing together each countrys complementary experiences in
syndromic and laboratory-based surveillance. This report describes the establishment of a binational surveillance system for
hepatitis and febrile exanthems along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Illegal Immigration DA
Border Security Reduces illegal immigration
Manuela Angelucci 11, Ph. D development economist, 7/29/11, U.S. Border Enforcement and
the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mangeluc/EDCCenforcement.pdf
This paper contributes to the existing literature on Mexican illegal migration to the United
States and its border enforcement by estimating the effect of enforcement on the net flow of
undocumented migrants. Border enforcement increases migration costs, reducing the inflow of
illegal migrants and increasing their human capital. The marginal effect of enforcement is a
positive function of enforcement for the inflow but a constant or decreasing one for the outflow.
Thus, as enforcement increases in the time period considered, it becomes more effective at
reducing the net flow of illegal migrants. This evidence of high and rising migration costs that
select a better pool of illegal migrants provides a rationale for Chiquiar and Hansons findings
that Mexican migrants who live in the United States in the 1990s and 2000s are not negatively
self-selected: as the costs get higher, low human capital individuals are prevented from
migrating.

Visas CP
Visa programs like the CP solve and provide remittances
Melissa MacNeil 8, Discussion of the Validity of a Guest Worker Program in the United States,
Discussion of the Validity of a Guest Worker Program in the United States,
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc86950/m2/1/high_res_d/macneil-melissa.pdf
Migration flows follow certain patterns, and governments develop policy responses based on the type and
duration of migratory flows. The aim of most new immigration policy implemented in Western countries is to curb illegal migration.
Several authors have outlined plans that would curb illegal migration and are pertinent to the
discussion of a guest worker program because most involve provisions that could be
remedied by such a program . Martin and Straubhaar argue that to slow migration, governments on both sides
of the issue must maximize the migration experience by ensuring payoffs with the three Rs, which are
recruitment of workers, remittances to family members in emigration areas, and a return to the country of origin
when the migrant has earned his targeted amount (Martin & Straubhaar, 2002). These three factors ensure that the migrant maximizes savings
potential, and rather than settle in the immigration area they return to their country of origin with more social capital and thus power within the
community. As remittances

are an important component of ensuring that the rotation model of


migration functions effectively, the benefits of remittances must be maximized. Currently, emigrant communities are not benefiting
up to their potential from the remittances sent by migrant workers because there is not enough competition from money transfer agencies, which keeps
the costs of transfer low. Countries with high rates of emigration have not effectively implemented programs to encourage small investments of
remittance money, and the governments themselves do not effectively appropriate remittance revenue into long-term investments (Martin &
Straubhaar, 2002).

Trade CP---1NC
The United States federal government should decrease restrictions on trade
between the United States and Mexico
Releasing protectionist policies boosts the Mexican economy--- motivates
Mexicans to stay
Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of
International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of
Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35
Evidence of dysfunction in the U.S. immigration system is so bountiful and varied that
policymakers and advocates from all points of view agree that the current system is broken .
An effective, multifaceted reform of immigration law is obviously the ideal longterm response
despite the disagreements over detailed provisions and sequencing that produced a stalemate in
2007. Despite President Obamas promise to take up the issue before the end of 2009, however,
it remains unclear that a broad legislative effort on immigration will rise to the top of
Washingtons agenda in 2009 or even 2010, given competing priorities in domestic policy, such
as health care, and the need to address the economic crisis. But that does not mean
nothing can be done .
If the United States is serious about reducing migration from Mexico, it should help Mexico
create the 500,000 new jobs needed each year to employ new entrants into the Mexican
job market. This effort should target the above mentioned aid programs to the regions in
Mexico that have only recently begun to send migrants to the United States. Since the culture of
migration is apt to be less well-developed in these new sending regions, job creation can be
a more powerful motivation to stay home than in regions where migration has already
become a way of life. This effort could also include expanded loan guarantees provided by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The most important U.S. policy tool for helping to
create jobs in the Mexican economy, however, is not aid but fairer trade . Although reducing
existing protection in the midst of an economic crisis is evidently not feasible, new
protectionist impulses must be averted . Keeping the U.S. economy open to competitive
Mexican exports and reducing subsidies on U.S. exports to Mexico, meanwhile, are essential
medium-term policy reforms. And while trade alone is not a development or an anti-poverty
program, it is hard to imagine how a country such as Mexico, where trade accounts for 30
percent of national production, can prosper in an increasingly protectionist environment. The
United States must internalize the reality that if Mexico cannot export its goods to its main
trading partner, it is destined to continue exporting labor instead .

Trade CP---Solves Immigration


Trade and economic relations stop negative immigration and foster effective ties
between the US and Mexico
Oscar Montealegre 13, M.A. in International Relations at University of Westminster and
contributing writer at Diplomatic Courier, 1/25/13, " U.S.-Mexico Relations: Love Thy
Neighbor," http://www.diplomaticourier.com/u-s-mexico-relations-love-thy-neighbor/
It is not common knowledge that Mexico is the United States third largest trading partner , behind
Canada and China. Every

day, at least a billion dollars of goods flows across the border . Yet,
Mexico is frequently negatively caricaturized, primarily with images of migrants illegally
crossing the border into the U.S. and stealing U.S. jobs. Instead of viewing Mexico as a valuable
partner that can benefit the U.S. in many facets, it is perceived as a liability, a region that cultivates corruption and
violence and is the root of the current U.S. immigration problem that has spurred controversial rogue measures like Arizonas SB
1070.
In matters of foreign policy, Mexico is an afterthought our attention and resources are diverted to the Middle

With the U.S.


economy performing at a snail-like pace, an emphasis on exports has re-emerged, but the bulk
of the exporting narrative revolves around Asia. This is unfortunate, because our neighbor to the
south has quietly positioned itself to be the next jewel in the emerging markets
East or to grand strategies based on pivoting our geopolitical and economical capacity towards Asia.

portfolio .
For example, Market Watch (a Wall Street Journal subsidiary) recently published a bullish article on Mexico with the following
headline: Mexico: Investors New China. The Economist published an opinion piece titled The Global Mexican: Mexico is open for
business, highlighting Mexican companies that are investing locally and in the U.S. and arguing that Mexico is fertile ground for
more investment, especially in the manufacturing sector. And according to The Financial Times, BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China) are no longer the flavor of the month; Mexico is now taking over that distinction.
In essence, immigration and the drug trade will no longer anchor the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico; instead, economics,
finance, trade, and commerce will dictate the terms between the neighboring countries.
However, in order to move forward, undoubtedly the elephant in the room must be addressed promptly. Immigration
although the topic is polarizing, it is imperative that President Obama tackles this issue
steadfastly and in the most bi-partisan manner possible . It can be seen as one-sided that the onus is on the U.S.,
while Mexico gets carte blanche in its contradictory policy with their border patrol methods towards Central American migrants
entering through Guatemala. True, but when you are worlds super power, not all is fair in love and war.

Fortifying borders, beefing up security, creating walls that divide the two countries that mimic
uncomfortable parallels between Israel and Palestine should not be the main focus. With the
world becoming more flat, the emphasis in tackling the immigration quagmire should
be trade and commerce . Engagement, interaction, and the exchange of ideas should be the picture we want to paint.
We should not foster the argument that an open border policy and a global business paradigm
will compromise American jobs and bite into our distinctive American competitiveness .
The reason Mexicans cross the border illegally into the U.S. is because of one desire:
opportunity . If Mexico develops a lasting robust economy, Mexicans will no longer desire
to come to the U.S. in such droves . According to Nelson Balido, President of the Border Trade Alliance, this
already occurring: Mexicos economy has, for the most part, weathered the worst of the economic downturn, meaning that more
young Mexicans can reasonably seek and find work in their patria rather than heading north.
A strong American economy is extremely favorable for Mexico. Turn the tables a bit, and ponder what it
means for the U.S. when a Mexican economy is robust and stable more

export possibilities for the U.S.; more

investment from the U.S. to Mexico, and vice versa, creating a win-win situation .
Less need for Mexicans to leave their homeland and look for jobs in the U.S.
Sounds familiar? The characteristics of many vibrant emerging markets such as China, Indonesia, Brazil, and India, are occurring
right next door. Why go East when we can venture South? Or perhaps, approach both simultaneously. According to a Nomura Equity
Research report, Mexico in the next decade will surpass Brazil in being Latin Americas largest

economy. When comparing Mexico on a GDP per capita basis, Mexico happens to be less developed than Argentina, Chile, and
Brazil. This might sound negative, but in actuality it should be music to investors ears: more catching up for Mexico, meaning more
investment and business activity.
Moreover, Mexicos economy is highly interconnected with the U.S. economy. Currently, Mexico

sends almost 80 percent of its exports to the U.S., and roughly 50 percent of its imports are from
the U.S. Manufacturing costs in Mexico are once again competitive compared to China . Ten years
ago, Chinas labor costs were four times cheaper than Mexico, but with labor wages in China inflating, Mexico now has a
comparative advantage because its proximity to the U.S . Shipping cargo across the
Pacific can be more expensive and arduous, versus trucking cargo from northern Mexico and
delivering to Wisconsin in a matter of days.
However if the U.S. administration continues to close the borders, the exchange of commerce
between Mexico and the U.S. will suffer due to setbacks of just getting goods to cross
the border . Luckily, NAFTA is already in place, but both parties (and Canada) can do more to cut red tape and streamline the
movement of trade and commerce.

States CP
Banning state immigration laws relieves the economy
Shannon K. ONeil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS
INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD,"
Local laws too have had deleterious effects . Early in 2011, Georgia passed a strict new
immigration law to relieve it of the burdens of illegal aliens. As the start date approached,
immigrant farm workers fled Georgia s famous peach orchards and Vidalia onion fields. Searching
for a solution, the governor asked farm owners to hire parolees. 34 The experiment ended
almost as soon as it started, as nearly all quit within the first day, claiming the work
was too hard . One participant observed, Those guys out here werent out there thirty minutes and they got the bucket and
farmers were
desperate for help; there were eleven thousand vacant field-hand positions, and the
just threw them in the air . . . They just left, took off across the field walking. By mid-June, Georgia

economy had already lost hundreds of millions of dollars . 35


Samuel Addy
estimates the combined effects of lost sales and income taxes (somewhere between US$80 million and
US$350 million) and the fall in aggregate demand from lost consumers (eighty-five thousand unauthorized
immigrants, roughly 5 percent of the states workforce) from Alabamas restrictive immigration laws could
shrink the states annual GDP by up to US $11 billion (6 percent). 36 Studies by the Center for
American Progress and the University of Arizona have found that deporting unauthorized
immigrant workers would have a similar effect in California and Arizona respectively. 37
More comprehensive studies reaffirm this anecdotal evidence. A study by University of Alabama researcher

A different study by the Americas Society / Council of the Americas suggests that restrictive laws hurt rather than help local
employment in the long run. 38

Privacy K Links
The problems of immigration surveillance revolve around the right of privacy and
individual interests
Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York
City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, Immigration Surveillance, 74
Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3646&context=mlr
Immigration surveillance demands reassessment of the interests at stake when personal
information and travel history are collected, maintained, analyzed, and disseminated for
purposes related to immigration control and the mechanisms to protect those
interests .304 The proliferation of zones where immigration control activities take placeand where detailed information on
individuals and their migration and mobility histories is collected and subsequently aggregated, stored, and disseminatedcarries a
range of social costs.305 While it is entirely appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information for immigration
control purposes in some contexts and subject to certain constraints, both

individuals and society as a whole


have legitimate interests in preserving zones in which these immigration surveillance activities
do not take place and in making sure that when they do take place those activities are appropriately limited and constrained.
To some extent, those interests are individual interests, stemming from the value of
preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual
harms that can result when individuals migration and mobility are routinely tracked and
detailed information is maintained.306 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and
information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interestsfor example,
preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power often
have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise
from the means of surveillance and information management.307 In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness
to give greater weight to these kinds of interests than they have traditionally received.308

Their Aldana evidence recut says privacy rights for immigrants should be
recognized
Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rightsremedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf
Finally, privacy rights for immigrants should be recognized , despite their constructed
illegality, because there are compelling policy reasons for protecting privacy in certain
spaces .331 In the workplace, for example, immigration raids have devastated employers, the wellbeing of small towns, and the
economic well-being of the entire nation.332 The reality is that immigrant workers dominate certain industries, including
agriculture and meatpacking plants like that of Swift & Co. Ridding the country of twelve million undocumented workers through
raids is not only unrealistic but incredibly disruptive.

Border DA

1NC Shell
Border Patrol is effective in keeping illegal immigrants out
Lynnette Curtis 10, 9-5-10, "Border Patrol finds success in curbing illegal immigration, targets
Las Vegas," http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/border-patrol-finds-success-curbing-illegalimmigration-targets-las-vegas
For some Border Patrol agents, boredom has replaced illegal immigration as Public Enemy No. 1 . That is a good
thing, said Chris Van Wagenen, a supervisory agent, as he steered his SUV past cotton fields near the Colorado River in late August.
"It's been a very hard battle to get where we are," he said. " We've

gone from getting killed to having things handled ."


Yuma sector's border with Mexico has transformed from one of the busiest,
most dangerous hot spots for illegal crossings to practically sleepy.
The U.S. Border Patrol now considers the sector, which includes 126 miles of U.S.-Mexico
border, to be under "operational control," and it is a model for other sectors that line the border .
In the last several years, the

This unprecedented level of control has allowed Yuma to branch out and focus more of its efforts on areas within its sector but
farther from the border, including a city 300 miles away that officials say has become a hub for human and drug smuggling from
Mexico.

U.S. Border Patrol agents recently descended upon that city -- Las Vegas -- where they raided several bus stations,
arrested 31 suspected illegal immigrants and angered some in the Hispanic community.
Curtailing border control allows criminals to enter the U.S.
Albaro Tutasig 14, Worker's Institute Research Fellow at Cornell University, 9-8-2014, "
IMMIGRATION: A NATIONAL SECUIRTY THREAT?,"
http://cuslar.org/2014/09/08/immigration-a-national-secuirty-threat/
The argument that undocumented immigration is a threat to the security of the United States is
also supported by the criminal activities that accompany the increasing number of people
immigrating to the United Statesin particular the rising numbers of individuals crossing the U.S.-Mexican border. According to a
Congressional Research Service report released in August 2012, revealed that over a 33-month period,
about 159,000 undocumented immigrants were arrested by local authorities , but released shortly after. The
report also showed that nearly one-sixth of previous detainees were arrested for crimes, mostly drunkdriving offenses, drug-crimes and felonies. In 2012, Republican Rep. Lamar Smith of Texas, then chairman of the House
judiciary committee, criticized of what detractors have called a catch and release immigration policy: Rather than protect the
American people he was elected to serve, President Obama has imposed a policy that allows
thousands of illegal immigrants to be released into our communities . ICE claimed the policy was aimed at
focusing limited resources on apprehending dangerous criminals.

ISIS terrorists reside in Ciudad Juarez


Lauren Carroll 14, PolitiFact staff writer and major in Political Science from Duke University,
9-17-2014, "Is ISIS in Mexico and planning to cross the border?,"
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/sep/17/trent-franks/isis-mexicoand-planning-cross-border/
With the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria growing in the Middle East, nearly half of Americans think the country is less
safe than it was before Sept. 11, 2001, according to a recent poll.
Some Republicans have expressed concern that the southern border is so porous, members of the extremist group
could slip into the United States from Mexico. And a few have said such a plot is already in the
works -- but federal agencies dont agree.
Rep. Trent Franks, a Republican from Arizona, said his state faces an imminent threat in a recent phone conference
with conservative nonprofit Staying True to Americas National Destiny. BuzzFeed picked up Franks comment, and it made its way around the
Internet.

"It is true, that we know that ISIS is present in Ciudad Juarez or they were within the last few
weeks," Franks said. "So theres no question that they have designs on trying to come into

Arizona. The comment that Ive made is that if unaccompanied minors can cross the border then
certainly trained terrorists probably can, too. It is something that is real."
Several other politicians have made similar claims, including Texas Gov. Rick Perry, Rep. Lou
Barletta, R-Pa., and Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla. And the claims are spreading around conservative online media, like the Daily
Caller, Breitbart News and pundit Sean Hannity at Fox News.

Drug cartels export terrorists across the border


Judicial Watch 2015, non-partisan educational foundation promoting transparency,
accountability and integrity in government, politics and the law, 4-14-2015, "ISIS Camp a Few
Miles from Texas, Mexican Authorities Confirm,"
http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2015/04/isis-camp-a-few-miles-from-texas-mexicanauthorities-confirm/
ISIS is operating a camp just a few miles from El Paso, Texas , according to Judicial Watch sources that
include a Mexican Army field grade officer and a Mexican Federal Police Inspector.
The exact location where the terrorist group has established its base is around eight miles from the U.S.
border in an area known as Anapra situated just west of Ciudad Jurez in the Mexican state of
Chihuahua. Another ISIS cell to the west of Ciudad Jurez, in Puerto Palomas, targets the New Mexico towns of
Columbus and Deming for easy access to the United States , the same knowledgeable sources confirm.
During the course of a joint operation last week, Mexican Army and federal law enforcement officials discovered
documents in Arabic and Urdu, as well as plans of Fort Bliss the sprawling military
installation that houses the US Armys 1st Armored Division. Muslim prayer rugs were
recovered with the documents during the operation.
Law enforcement and intelligence sources report the area around Anapra is dominated by the Vicente Carrillo
Fuentes Cartel (Jurez Cartel), La Lnea (the enforcement arm of the cartel) and the Barrio Azteca (a gang originally formed in the jails of El
Paso). Cartel control of the Anapra area make it an extremely dangerous and hostile operating environment for Mexican Army and Federal Police
operations.
According to these same sources, coyotes

engaged in human smuggling and working for Jurez Cartel


help move ISIS terrorists through the desert and across the border between Santa Teresa and
Sunland Park, New Mexico. To the east of El Paso and Ciudad Jurez, cartel-backed coyotes
are also smuggling ISIS terrorists through the porous border between Acala and Fort Hancock,
Texas. These specific areas were targeted for exploitation by ISIS because of their understaffed municipal and county police forces, and the relative
safe-havens the areas provide for the unchecked large-scale drug smuggling that was already ongoing.
Mexican intelligence sources report that ISIS

intends to exploit the railways and airport facilities in the vicinity


of Santa Teresa, NM (a US port-of-entry). The sources also say that ISIS has spotters located
in the East Potrillo Mountains of New Mexico (largely managed by the Bureau of Land
Management) to assist with terrorist border crossing operations. ISIS is conducting reconnaissance of regional
universities; the White Sands Missile Range; government facilities in Alamogordo, NM; Ft. Bliss; and the electrical power facilities near Anapra and
Chaparral, NM.

Nuclear terror is feasible and likely high motivation


Matthew Bunn 15, Professor of Practice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, Reducing the
risks of nuclear theft and terrorism, from Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and
Policy ed. Joseph F. Pilat and Nathan E. Busch, 5/15/15, pp. 419-420
But we now live in an age that includes a few groups intent on inflicting large-scale destruction to
achieve more global objectives. In the 1990s, the japanese terror cult Anni Shinrikyo first sought to buy
nuclear weapons in Russia, then to make them themselves, before turning to biological weapons and the nerve
gas they ultimatelv used in the Tokyo subways. Starting also in the 19905, al Qaeda repeatedly sought nuclear
materials and the expertise needed to make them into a nuclear bomb. Ultimately, al Qaeda put together a focused program
reporting directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri (now head of the group), which progressed as far as carrying out crude but sensible
conventional explosive tests for the nuclear program in the desert of Afghanistan. The killing of Osama bin Laden and the many

other blows against al Qaeda have surely reduced the risk that al Qaeda could put together and carry through a nuclear bomb
project. But by how much? The core organization of al Qaeda has proved resilient in the past.There is every

reason to believe Al-Zawahiri remains eager to inflict destruction on a nuclear scale .


Indeed, despite

the large number of al Qaeda leaders who have been killed or captured, nearly all of

the key players in al Qaedas nuclear program remain alive and at large - including
Abdel Aziz al-Masri, an Egyptian explosives expert who was al Qaedas nuclear CEO." No one knows what
capabilities a secret cell of al Qaeda may have managed to retain or build. And regional affiliates and other groups in the
broader violent Islamic extremist movement particularly some of the deadly Pakistani terrorist groups may someday
develop the capability and intent to follow a similar path. North Caucasus terrorist groups sought
radiological weapons and threatened to sabotage nuclear reactors.There is signicant, though less
conclusive, evidence that they sought nuclear weapons as well particularly confirmation
from senior Russian officials that two teams were caught carrying out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear weapon
storage sites, whose very locations are a state secret. More fundamentally, with at least two, and probably
three, groups having gone down this path in the past twenty-five years, there is no reason to expect
they will be the last . The danger of nuclear terrorism will remain as long as nuclear
weapons, the materials needed to make them, and terrorist groups bent on large-scale destruction co-exist.

Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are key


Nathan Myhrvold '13, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton,

and
founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of
Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research
Paper Series No.2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/StrategicTerrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf
Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology
now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented
fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means
that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their
own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless
groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small
numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small
group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of
people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilizationperhaps
even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what
was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling
to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and
inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities
from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic

terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense


agencies, and the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented .
History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a
direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by
repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.

Add-Ons
The US-Mexico border is a gateway for contagious diseases--- curtailing
surveillance allows for disease breakout in the U.S.
Michelle Weinberg 03, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, January 2003, "The
U.S.-Mexico Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project: Establishing Binational Border
Surveillance," http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/9/1/02-0047_article#comment
The 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border is one of the worlds busiest international boundaries . An estimated
320 million people cross the northbound border legally every year (1). The U.S.-Mexico border is a unique region where
the geopolitical boundary does not inhibit social and economic interactions nor the transmission of infectious
diseases among residents on each side of the border. Some border cities (such as El Paso and Ciudad Juarez) are
separated by a short distance and serve as one large metropolitan area for the local community (Figure 1). From an epidemiologic
perspective, the border population must be considered as one, rather than different populations
on two sides of a border; pathogens do not recognize the geopolitical boundaries established by
human beings. The border region has a population of approximately 11 million people (2), many of whom cross the border daily to work, shop,
attend school, seek medical care, or visit family and friends (3,4). The border population also includes persons who pass
transiently through the region and others who come the area to work in maquilas, the border
factories. The region has experienced tremendous population growth. During 19931997, the U.S. border population grew by 1.8% annually, more
than double the national U.S. average of 0.8%, while the Mexican border population has grown by 4.3% per year, almost three times the national
Mexican annual growth rate of 1.6% (2,5). Population growth has been spurred by increased economic opportunities after the North American Free
Trade Agreement was implemented in 1994. Currently, an estimated 3,300 maquilas, employing >1 million workers, are located along the border (6,7).
The proliferation of border factories has generated a wave of internal migration of persons from other regions of Mexico and Central America toward
the border (8).
From Mexicos perspective, the border encompasses some of the countrys most economically prosperous states. In contrast, the U.S. border region is
among the poorest areas in the United States, with >30% of families living at or below the poverty level (8). Along

the Texas border, an


estimated 350,000 or more people live in 1,450 unincorporated areas known as colonias, which
lack adequate sanitation infrastructure (8).
The large population movement, limited public health infrastructure, and poor environmental
conditions contribute to increased incidence of certain infectious diseases (811) Analysis of data from
the U.S. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System for 1990 through 1998 showed increased risks for certain
foodborne, waterborne, and vaccine-preventable diseases in U.S. counties within 100 kilometers
of the border, compared with nonborder states. These data show a two- to fourfold greater
incidence of hepatitis A, measles, rubella, shigellosis, and rabies and an eightfold greater
incidence of brucellosis in border counties than in nonborder states (11). Studies have identified
the importance of cross-border movement in the transmission of various diseases, including
hepatitis A (12,13), tuberculosis (1418), shigellosis (19), syphilis (20), Mycobacterium bovis
infection (21), and brucellosis (22,23).
Despite the high prevalence of infectious diseases and increasing movement of people across the
borders, no surveillance system had been established to assess the border population as a
geographic unit. Gaining an accurate picture of public health needs was limited by the following factors. First, the surveillance
case definitions used for public health reporting in Mexico and the United States are different.
Also, laboratory confirmation is often unavailable in the Mexican border states, and therefore
reported cases of infectious diseases are defined primarily by clinical findings. In contrast, for the many
notifiable diseases in the United States, laboratory confirmation is required, and U.S. surveillance is heavily based on laboratory reporting. This
system likely underestimates the true incidence rates. In the past, the two countries have
exchanged limited border surveillance data. However, these differences diminish the usefulness
of national surveillance data for developing a comprehensive, regional understanding of
infectious disease epidemiology in the border areas. A consistent binational perspective is essential to effectively control
and prevent the transmission of infectious diseases that move easily through the geopolitical boundary.

The Border Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) project was designed to bridge this surveillance gap by forming partnerships
among institutions in both countries serving the region and bringing together each countrys complementary experiences in
syndromic and laboratory-based surveillance. This report describes the establishment of a binational surveillance system for
hepatitis and febrile exanthems along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Tuberculosis can breakout between the borders and develop resistant forms
Betsy McKay 13, Atlanta Bureau Chief for The Wall Street Journal, 3-8-2013, "Risk of Deadly
TB Exposure Grows Along U.S.-Mexico Border,"
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323293704578336283658347240
To be sure, the actual number of cases in the U.S. and Mexico is still small and the rates of
multidrug-resistant TBor MDRare nowhere near as severe as India , China, or Eastern Europe, where
drug-resistant TB is at epidemic proportions. In 2011, the most recent year available, Mexico had 467 MDR-TB cases, the World
Health Organization estimates, while the U.S. had 124, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Almost half of
the U.S. cases came from California and Texas. Health officials say it is crucial to jump on prevention now,

because the disease is transmitted airborne and can spread quickly.


"We're all connected by the air we breathe," said Thomas Frieden, director of the CDC, and a TB expert who
successfully battled a major outbreak of multidrug-resistant TB in New York City in the 1990s, then spearheaded India's TB-fighting
program for the World Health Organization.

Gonzalo Garcia has struggled with drug-resistant tuberculosis while living in Tijuana. He doesn't
know when he contracted the disease.
In its drug-resistant forms, TB can still be fatal, and the treatment may be painful, requiring up
to two years or more of medication and potentially months of isolation. Costs are steep too;
according to a recent CDC study, treatment on average in the U.S. was about $140,000 and ran
as high as $700,000.
For health officials, the challenge of trying to control an airborne disease along an area as large as the
U.S.-Mexico border is enormous. More than 150 million people cross the border each year. Many,
like Mr. Garcia, go back and forth to work, or to play, with visas that allow short trips in the border region. Two CDC quarantine
stations sit along the border to deal with health concerns. "T B is the most common disease we get called about ,"
said Steve Waterman, chief of the CDC's U. S-Mexico unit in the agency's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine.
The U.S.-Mexico border is "not like the Berlin Wall," said David Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute at
the University of San Diego. "It's one region." That means people live on one side of the border and run a business on the other,
and shoppers from both countries frequent the same malls, he said.

In the Mexican state of Baja California, officials are treating three cases of XDR-TB, a rare but
severe form of the disease in which a patient's TB is resistant both to the two most potent drugs
for treatment as well as some drugs used to treat drug-resistant TB , said Dr. Laniado-Laborin. Six new
cases of this type were reported in the entire U.S. in 2011.

North of the border, in San Diego, the overall TB rate is around twice the U.S. national average.
Los Angeles is grappling with its worst TB outbreak in a decade, and police have been reminded
to use face masks when encountering those who are sick. "You can learn from San Diego how things could play
out in the heartland of America," says Richard Kiy, chief executive of International Community Foundation, a public foundation that
supports treatment of drug-resistant TB patients at Dr. Laniado-Laborin's clinic and elsewhere in Baja California.
Officials say that when drug-resistant cases show up in the U.S., there is often a Mexico connection. Of San Diego's 14 multidrugresistant TB cases between 2007 and 2011, half were either from Mexico or had a Mexico link based on the particular strain of the
disease, said Kathleen Moser of the county's Health & Human Services Agency, which sees many patients who live and work on both
sides of the border.
Part of the problem, of course, is that Mexico's rate of TB infection is much higherin some cases 10 times

higher. The resistant strains begin to breed, experts say, when doctors there give patients similar
drug regimens over and over. Other times, patients who aren't supervised closely abandon
treatment before they are cured.

UQ
Border security is effective--- 84% of illegal crossings are prevented
Brad Plumer 13, Senior Editor at Vox and former reporter for the Washington Post, 6-21-2013,
Border security is the key to immigration reform. So how do we measure it?,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/21/border-security-is-the-keyto-immigration-reform-so-how-do-we-define-it/
1) At the moment, the U.S. government considers border security in the Southwest about 84 percent
"effective."
It was only last year that the nine Border Patrol sectors along the Southwest border finally standardized their metrics for how
effectively they were securing the border. The results are laid out in a 2012 report from the Government Accountability Office:
Each sector measures three things: "Apprehensions"

are the portion of border-crossers who are caught and


detained. "Turn backs" are people who had either climbed a fence or crossed the border but
were sent back to Mexico. "Got aways" are, well, border-crossers who made it through without getting
caught.
These numbers are thought to be reasonably accurate , says Rebecca Tallent, the director of immigration policy for
the Bipartisan Policy Center. The Border Patrol will use cameras and other evidence to get a rough count
for "turn backs" and "got aways." Workers at the Yuma sector, for instance, will comb the desert every morning and count footprints
in the sand to see who slipped through in the night. That said, they're still rough estimates. It's very possible that other border-crossers are slipping by
undetected.

In 2011, the GAO reports, border security along the Southwest was thought to be about 84 percent effective. That is, 16 percent of
attempts to cross the border were successful which amounted to about 85,000 people getting through. Another 61.3 percent
resulted in apprehensions. And 22.7 percent of attempts were turned back.
Now, effectiveness varied by sector the

Yuma sector, which is very well-staffed , had an effectiveness

rate of 93.7 percent . By contrast, border security in the Rio Grande Valley sector was just
70.8 percent effective. Here's a map of the sectors, via the BPC's Matt Graham:

Link
Terrorists will exploit open entrances in the border.
Todd Steinmetz 11, Homeland Security Analyst at EWA/IIT, Fall 2011, Mitigating the
Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Criminal Organizations,
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=jss
History demonstrates that terrorists search for security gaps and invent creative ways to exploit
them. In fact , terrorists rely on security weaknesses to operate effectively . International
terrorist groups know that criminal organizations in Central and South America maintain well-established networks that enable
them to smuggle large quantities of narcotics and people across America's southern border. Terrorists could use these

illicit criminal networks to smuggle weapons, chemicals, biological contaminants, and/or


explosives into the United States. As Zapata County, Texas Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez observed:
"If smugglers can bring in tons of marijuana and cocaine at one time and can smuggle twenty
thirty persons at one time, one can just imagine how easy it would be to bring in two to
three terrorists or their weapons of mass destruction chances of apprehension are very slim."31
Terrorists also know that large segments of both the northern and southern border remain relatively unsecured. It is a known
fact that several radical international Islamic groups maintain significant operations in Central
and South America and engage in money laundering, drug trafficking, arms dealing, and other
legitimate and illegitimate means to funnel millions of dollars every year into the hands of
transnational terrorists.32
Drug cartels in the border practice terrorist tactics--- decapitations and skinning
Carrie F. Cordero 13, Director of National Security Studies in the Georgetown University Law
Center, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: A Key Homeland Security Challenge for the Next Four
Years, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2211&context=facpub
The homeland security community has been forced to steadily increase its engagement on the
issue of how the U.S. legal and policy framework should address the Mexico Situation . The traditional
view has been to treat the Mexican drug cartels4 like criminal organizationsthat is, primarily as a law enforcement issue. But, in recent years,
the drug cartels have stretched beyond the Italian mafia model; their activities increasingly are
more similar to those of international terrorist organizations and insurgencies as defined
by the laws of war. According to Steven C. McCraw, Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety and a former FBI Agent, the
Mexican Situation is both a public safety and national security issue :5
[The cartels] use military and terrorist tactics and weaponry . . . They employ horrific tactics to
intimidate their adversaries and the public such as decapitations, acid baths, skinning
people alive, torture and Improvised Explosive Devices

and they have expanded their criminal

operations to profit from kidnappings, robberies, human trafficking, extortions, and theft . . . . We continu[e] [to] see multi-ton drug loads seized
throughout Texas.6

In line with McCraws description, events

of recent years have made clear that the citizens of Mexico live
in terror. Murder, torture, kidnappings, and extortion are the daily goings-on in Mexico at the
direction of the cartels.7 The average Mexican citizen, law enforcement official, or local public official, may no longer have a
choice whether or not to cooperate with the cartels. When the choice is to cooperate, or face death of oneself or
ones family, there really is no choice .8
The frightening security situation is not limited to the Mexican side of the border. Americans
are at risk , too. Sigifredo Gonzalez, the Zapata County, Texas Sheriff, described in May 2011 how families on the United
States side of the border have bullet holes in their homes and periodically need to hide or
evacuate to avoid cross-border gunfire.9 U.S. citizens have been killed, including some on official duty (e.g., the February 2011
killing of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agent Jaime Zapata by Los Zetas), and others innocently visiting Mexico (e.g., Agustin
Roberto Bobby Salcedo).10

Once terrorist groups obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan, bombs can be sent to
the US through smuggling tunnels
Eben Blake 15, intern covering general affairs at IBTimes in New York City and currently
pursuing a degree in English and History at Brown University, 6-3-2015, Islamic State Nuclear
Weapons: ISIS Claims It Can Smuggle Devices Through Nigeria, Mexico To The United States,
http://www.ibtimes.com/islamic-state-nuclear-weapons-isis-claims-it-can-smuggle-devicesthrough-nigeria-1950280
The Islamic State group claims it could purchase a nuclear device from Pakistan and transport it
to the United States through drug-smuggling channels . The group, also known as ISIS and
ISIL, would transfer the nuclear weapon from Pakistan to Nigeria or Mexico, where it could be
brought to South America and then up to the U.S., according to an op-ed allegedly written by kidnapped
British photojournalist John Cantlie and published in Dabiq, the group's propaganda magazine.
The op-ed said that Boko Haram, the Nigerian jihadist group that announced its formal allegiance to ISIS in March, would make
their efforts to transport a weapon to the U.S. much easier, reported Nigerian newspaper Premium Times. ISIS claims the Nigerian
army is in a "virtual state of collapse" because of its war against Boko Haram.
While U.S. officials have dismissed the ability of the group to acquire or transport a nuclear weapon, Indian

Minister of State Defense


Rao Inderjit Singh said at the Shangri-La regional security conference in Singapore last weekend that "[w]ith the rise of ISIL in
West Asia, one is afraid to an extent that perhaps they might get access to a nuclear arsenal
from states like Pakistan ," Bloomberg reported.
Cantlie describes how ISIL would hypothetically call on supporters in Pakistan to "purchase a nuclear device
through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region ," after which it would be "transported
overland until it makes it to Libya" when "the mujahedeen move it south to Nigeria." It would then be moved to South America in the same method that
"drug shipments bound for Europe pass through West Africa," according to Premium Times. After

transporting the device through


the " porous borders of South America " to Mexico, it would be "just a quick hop through a
smuggling tunnel" to bring the nuclear bomb into America.
Since his abduction in 2012, Cantlie has appeared in multiple ISIS propaganda videos, including the series "Lend Me Your Ears."

Visas CP

1NC
CP Text: The USFG should create a program, reminiscent of the Bracero Program,
giving immigrants temporary visas to come work in the US as agricultural laborers
with visa portability. Monetary sanctions will be utilized to assure cooperation.
That solves the cse
Alex Nowrasteh 13, Immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institutes Center for Global
Liberty and Prosperity, 3-5-2013, Guest Workers Key to Reform,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/guest-workers-key-reform
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO reached a tentative agreement to support
increasing lawful migration through a guest-worker program for lower-skilled
migrants . The details are obscure, but this agreement is an essential first step for successful immigration
reform a step so far ignored by the Obama administration .
Without a guest-worker program, quite simply, immigration reform will fail .
Overwhelmingly, immigrants come to the United States because they want jobs, and American
businesses have jobs to give. Legalizing the unauthorized migrants already here is a sound policy, but without a legal
channel for workers to come, others will continue to enter the country illegally .
Policymakers seem to forget that there is recent evidence to this effect. Ronald Reagan instituted an amnesty in 1986, but
unauthorized immigration continued unabated. Increased border and immigration enforcement
and it did increase couldnt stem the tide.
It is foolish to expect legalization and enforcement alone to stop unauthorized
immigration . The demand is too strong on both sides of the labor equation. We need reforms that adapt to that reality.
Why is President Obama ignoring a guest-worker visa program? Because unions one of the presidents most valued constituencies
have historically opposed guest workers.
A 2007 immigration reform effort largely failed because of union efforts to kill it. Late in the game, Senate Democrats amended the
bill to end its guest-worker program after five years. The amendment passed 49-48 with then-Sen. Obama, ominously, voting in
favor. As a result, Republicans and business interests that supported increased lawful immigration withdrew their support, and the
reform effort collapsed.
At the time, the leaders of the AFL-CIO, the Teamsters, and other unions all wrote letters opposing the guest-worker program. James P. Hoffa of
the Teamsters opposed

a guest-worker program because it would [force] workers to toil in a truly


temporary status with a high risk of exploitation and abuse by those seeking cheap labor .
But the employer abuse issue is a straw man. There is a rather simple remedy: visa portability, which would allow guest workers to easily
switch jobs. The ability to quit a job without the legal risk of deportation would give guest workers
the ability to effectively enforce their own labor standards: They could depart an abusive
employer without fear of deportation.
Instead of more migrant freedom, labor leaders are supporting more regulations for guest-worker visas . The
Obama-endorsed blueprint wants reform to protect workers by ensuring labor protections. But those so-called protections have already made current
lower-skilled guest-worker visas too costly for American employers a by-product unions favor.

To their credit, unions support legalization of current unauthorized immigrants and family reunification. But from the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882 through the race-based quotas of the 1920s to today, unions have supported every migrant-worker restriction.
Csar Chvezs United Farm Workers (UFW) lobbied hard to end the Bracero Program, a 1940s guest-worker program created to
address an agricultural labor shortage created by World War II. UFW members beat up unauthorized migrants, formed a wet line
(their words) on the border to stop migrants, and reported unauthorized immigrants to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

If there is a model for a successful guest-worker program, however, the Bracero Program is
it . Under Bracero, immigrants could work temporarily, but they had to leave the United States
every season. American farms got the labor they demanded, immigrant workers
made money, and agricultural production increased .
The program was so successful that it was extended until 1964. It combined enforcement that funneled migrants into a legal system
with an unlimited temporary migration system. Often, Border Patrol agents enrolled unauthorized immigrants they arrested in the
Bracero Program and let them return to work this time lawfully.

Mexican workers thinking of entering the United States illegally overwhelmingly chose the legal Bracero option instead. Throughout

the
1950s, unauthorized immigration declined by 95 percent. If a Bracero-type guest-worker visa
existed today, one that allowed migrants to switch jobs and work in nonagricultural areas,
unauthorized immigration would dramatically decrease .

Internal NB: Mexican Economy


The past Bracero program alleviated the Mexican economy
Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 An
Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/noteprospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-braceroprogram-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/
Despite these concerns, the Mexican government recognized the advantages of the program . 76 They had been
assured that it would be a government-to-government program in which Mexico would have a strong
voice. 77 By working on American farms, the braceros would acquire technical skills that could
benefit Mexican agriculture . 78 The braceros would also have the opportunity to earn substantial
money for themselves, their families , and their country, thus alleviating rural
poverty and providing a safety valve to deal with a politically explosive underemployed
population. 79 Finally, it was a chance for Mexico to contribute significantly to the war effort, and refusing the American request risked
"antagoniz[ing] the consumer of a potentially large amount of Mexican raw materials during the war. "80 Mexico decided that overall the positive
effects of the program outweighed the negative. 81

More Solvency Mechanisms


The guest-worker program establishes a bilateral relationship that improves the
US overall relations with Mexico
Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 An
Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/noteprospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-braceroprogram-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/
Last year Mexican Labor Minister Jose Antonio Gonzalez Fernandez expressed his government's
intention to ask the United States to join Mexico in examining the possibility of a worker
exchange program when the NAFTA labor side-accord comes up for review in the future. 4 Such a bilateral effort, the Bracero
Program was executed in the 1940s and 1950s.5 Under this program Mexican agricultural workers were legally
permitted to temporarily enter the United States to work . The Bracero Program remains the only example of a bilateral
immigration program between the United States and Mexico. 6 Since then, the U.S. government has made little effort even to discuss a new bilateral
program for Mexican immigration to the United States. 7
This Note will examine the bilateral nature of the Bracero Program, and the various factors that made the program possible from 1942 until 1964. That
is, what brought about the air of cooperation, what drove it away, and what was accomplished in the interim. Ultimately, this examination will
demonstrate that the

economic and political conditions that exist today are similar to those that

existed when the Bracero Program was established , providing hope that a new bilateral
labor agreement between Mexico and the United States may be forthcoming .
A bilateral immigration program could provide significant advantages over unilateral
immigration policy. First, the two countries could more effectively achieve their migration
goals through a cooperative effort since the policies of either nation can influence migration
patterns. 8 Additionally, cooperation and compromise in the area of immigration can improve
overall relations between Mexico and the United States so that cooperation will
continue in other fields, such as trade. 9 However, differences in the sociopolitical atmosphere of the two countries and
weaknesses in the Bracero Program itself indicate that a new agreement would not and should not follow the Bracero model. Nonetheless, the failures
in cooperation and the weaknesses of the earlier program can provide some of the best insight on how any future bilateral immigration program should
be structured.

Different card: Current immigration enforcement fails


Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 An
Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/noteprospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-braceroprogram-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/
Finally, the perception that Mexican labor migration to the United States was not amenable to
control through unilateral efforts by either government, the perception that led to the creation of the Bracero Program, has
been reaffirmed since the termination of the program . I83 Unilateral steps taken by the United
States, for example, to stem the tide of illegal immigration have proven ineffective . 184 In fact,
the United States experienced a significant increase in the pace of Mexican immigration in the 1970s and 1980s.185 In the 1990s,
approximately 200,000 Mexican immigrants (legal and illegal) came to the
United States each year ,186 and one to two million additional Mexicans (legal and illegal)
worked at least seasonally in the United States each year. 187
The U.S. response to the massive flow of unauthorized migration has focused on apprehending those attempting
illegal entry. 188 Yet, instead of deterring attempted illegal entries, the U.S. strategy has only
caused migrants to pay professional smugglers higher fees and to attempt crossing the

border several times before successfully entering. 189 There has, in turn, been a significant increase in the number of
migrants who have died while attempting to gain unauthorized entry.19O The U.S. strategy has also created an unintended incentive for unauthorized
migrants to remain in the United States once they have entered since re-entry is ever more difficult. 191

Cooperation with Mexico has advantages that improve the chances of having greater success in
achieving the migration goals of both countries. 192 Although in the long run, both governments expect NAFTA to create
jobs in Mexico for people who might otherwise immigrate to the United States,193 reduced migration is an unrealistic expectation in the near- to
medium-term future. 194 Conditions in both countries will continue to influence immigration decisions. 195 Conditions

pulling
Mexicans to the United States include the demand for immigrant labor by U.S. employers,
opportunities and higher wages, and family connections in this country . 196 Conditions pushing Mexicans to
leave Mexico include demographic population growth, urban and rural insecurity, economic restructuring disruptions, and severe degradation of the
environment in Mexico. 197

A2: Solvency Deficits


Migration goals between both governments mean that the program will pass
Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 An
Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/noteprospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-braceroprogram-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/
Any plan for a bilateral legalized worker program would have to address the human rights and illegal
and permanent immigration problems of the Bracero Program. It would also have to overcome
the fears of domestic labor and persuade American workers that such a program would not
adversely affect the domestic job market. Additionally, it would have to overcome the extreme anti-immigrant attitude that has
dominated U.S. public opinion in recent years. Nonetheless, it appears that conditions are quite favorable
for a new immigration agreement with Mexico in light of the atmosphere of cooperation that exists, the
confidence that the United States is enjoying with a booming economy, and the existence of
common migration goals between the two countries.
Monetary sanctions and legalization protects the laborers and the bilateral
agreement
Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 An
Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/noteprospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-braceroprogram-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/
Many in Mexico have suggested that a new bilateral guest worker program, "operat[ing] within currently existing
migratory labor markets," could satisfy the migration goals of both Mexico and the United States by
replacing "highly exploited undocumented migrants" with regulated guest workers . 226 Legalizing
migrant laborers on a bilateral basis allows both governments to ensure adequate safeguards for labor . With
such protections, Mexican workers would have an incentive to remain within the program, the Mexican government would have
assurances that their citizens' human rights would not be violated , and U.S. labor would be more likely
to support the use of foreign labor. 227 U.S. growers should support the program, even with safeguards for the laborers, because
it would help satisfy their need for a "just-in-time labor force."228 For both countries, such a program would also promote the
return of Mexican immigrants to Mexico, minimizing "brain drain"229 so that Mexico can
benefit from the migrants' new skills and conform to the seasonal fluctuations of the U. S. growers' demand for labor. 230
Of course, both countries must insist that enforcement of the safeguards be taken seriously to avoid
a repetition of the worst aspects of the Bracero Program. Any bilateral migration agreement should contain
mechanisms that provide serious incentives for enforcement of workers' rights under the agreement. 231
For example, commentators have argued that automatic monetary sanctions for breaches of rules in
international agreements can significantly strengthen the rights and obligations created by the
agreement. 232 Including this type of sanctions provision in any new bilateral migration program would penalize the United States if it were to
ignore its obligations under the agreement as it did under the Bracero Program. Thus, the experience with the Bracero Program,
while teaching us what mistakes to avoid, demonstrates that there are good prospects for a new
bilateral program today.

CP Shields Link to Politics


Republicans pushing for guest worker programs
Yal Ossowski 15, national investigative reporter for Watchdog, April 2, 2015, Conservatives
push guest worker program to halt illegal immigration, http://watchdog.org/209762/guestworker-program/
An easy way to fix the convoluted immigration system in the United States entails making it
easier for foreigners to be hired, without a lot of red tape in their way.
Even the 8.1 million illegal immigrants now in the workforce.
That, at least, was

the consensus of the five witnesses convened to present at the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs last week.
I worry about a government that would criminalize the rational activity of someone selling their labor to improve their condition,
and another who buys labor in order to make a profit which is what our current immigration law does, said Daniel Garza,
executive director of the LIBRE Initiative, a free market organization representing Latinos. I fear a growing government that
hinders economic growth, that restricts opportunities.
He was joined by experts from Pew Research Center, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Enterprise Institute and the
Migration Policy Institute, who were all united behind the idea of expanding the existing guest worker program as a means to trigger
economic growth and fix the nations immigration problems.

The committee hearing chaired by Sen. Ron Johnson, a Republican from Wisconsin , was
called Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and
Addressing Future Flows. It focused more on reforming the visa programs than border controls, demonstrating a shift in the
conservative examination of immigration.

The meeting was marked by a united front by the conservative-leaning panel of witnesses, coming from industry, academia and
activism.
Asked what was needed for Congress to solve the illegal immigration crisis, Randel Johnson, a vice president of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, pulled no punches. Its a combination of an expanded temporary worker programs and a sensible pathway to
legalization, he testified.
He emphasized that it

must be easier for companies to hire immigrants to provide for the best educated
and skilled employees to compete in the global marketplace.
The U.S. has the largest guest worker program in the world, made up of the H-2A and H-2B visas, which allow employers to
temporarily hire foreign workers.
But even with the largest guest worker program in the world, the U.S. also has the distinction of having the largest illegal immigrant
population in the world, according to the Migration Policy Institute, which makes for an interesting paradox.
Thats made worse by the fact there has been no significant immigration reform since at least 1996, when stricter policies were
enacted and helped bulk up immigration enforcement instead of solving the problem of the growing population of undocumented
immigrants.
Immigration enforcement has cost the U.S. government over $208 billion since 2001, Marc Rosenblum, deputy director of the
Migration Policy Institute, said at the committee hearing. It spends more on immigration enforcement than any other federal
criminal law enforcement activities combined.
Senator Johnson, the committee chairman, generally agreed with the witnesses, but he remained skeptical about whether accepting
larger numbers of immigrants and legalizing those already in the country would hurt the native workforce.
There is a dispute as to whether undocumented workers have or havent depressed wages, said Johnson, citing a case from a
California energy company looking to hire technicians from outside the United States.
His question was immediately addressed and downplayed.
The bulk of studies unquestionably find that there is almost no effect, said Madeline Zavodny, economics professor at Agnes Scott College and an
adjunct scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute. There

is no zero-sum number of jobs. When

immigrants come, jobs also get created.


She was unequivocal in her support for expanding a guest worker program to help not just immigrants but also native workers
themselves.
To protect native workers from unfair competition, we need to allow guest workers to move to employers who want to hire them
and want to offer higher wages to have them, said Madeline Zavodny, economics professor at Agnes Scott College and an adjunct
scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.

This positive take on immigration reform is rising not just among conservative economists and
activists but also among the potential top GOP candidates for president, including Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky,
Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Scott Walker of Wisconsin.
Republicans pushing for non-border immigration reform
Paul Dupont 15, reporter for American Principles Project, 1-2-2015, Republican-Led
Immigration Proposals Taking Shape For New Year,

https://americanprinciplesproject.org/blog/republican-led-immigration-proposals-takingshape-for-new-year/
However, as I have argued in the past, bolstering border security and enforcement in other areas will not fix
Americas immigration system on its own. There is also a need to improve U.S. guest worker
programs in order to address the increasing demand for foreign workers to fill high- and low-skill positions for
which American workers cannot be found. Fortunately, some in Congress also seem keen to tackle this issue:

Republicans are preparing legislation to address additional aspects of the


immigration system. Rep. Ral Labrador (R., Idaho), a onetime immigration attorney, plans two
bills, an aide said.
One would create a temporary worker program that would allow as many as 350,000
foreigners to enter the country each year for construction, restaurant and other low-skilled jobs.
Other

These workers would have most of the labor rights afforded in a broad immigration bill that passed the Senate last year, such as the right to change
jobs.
Meanwhile, Sen.

Orrin Hatch (R., Utah) plans to introduce legislation making more visas available

for

high-tech workers, a spokesman said.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.) is working on a bill revamping the agricultural visa program, based on
provisions in last years Senate bill. Her staff is in talks on the measure with Republicans including Sen. Marco Rubio of
Florida, who helped work out a compromise on this issue in 2013.
Of course, many details remain to be settled before any of these proposals can be fully evaluated. However, given the need for major reforms in these
areas, news

of such developments may give proponents of a truly conservative immigration policy


reason to feel cautiously optimistic.

CP Shields Link to Border DA


Legalization of workers reveals terrorists from the migrating population
Daniel Griswold 04, director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4-1-2004,
Securing Our Borders Under a Temporary Guest Worker Program,
http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/securing-our-borders-undertemporary-guest-worker-program-0
Indeed, legalizing and regularizing the movement of workers across the U.S.-Mexican border could
enhance our national security by bringing much of the underground labor market into the
open, encouraging newly documented workers to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials,
and freeing resources for border security and the war on terrorism.
Real immigration reform would drain a large part of the underground swamp that facilitates
illegal immigration. It would reduce the demand for fraudulent documents, which in turn would
reduce the supply available for terrorists trying to operate surreptitiously inside the United
States. It would eliminate most of the human smuggling operations overnight . The vast majority of Mexican
workers who enter the United States have no criminal record or intentions. They would obviously prefer to enter the country in a safe, orderly, legal
process through an official port of entry, rather than put their lives in the hands of unscrupulous smugglers. By

entering legally through


a temporary worker program, they could travel freely across the border for multiple visits home
rather than incurring the risk and expense of re-crossing the border illegally. As a consequence,
legalization would drain the underground channels through which terrorists might try to
enter the country.
Just as importantly, legalization would encourage millions of currently undocumented workers to make
themselves known to authorities by registering with the government, reducing cover for
terrorists who manage to enter the country and overstay their visas. Workers with legal documents
would be more inclined to cooperate with law enforcement and provide evidence if they do not
fear deportation. Furthermore, we would free up enforcement and border-control resources to focus
on protecting the American homeland from terrorist attack. Our Department of Homeland Security should
concentrate its limited resources and personnel on tracking and hunting down terrorists instead of raiding chicken processing plants and busting
janitors at discount stores.