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U.S. v Bustos
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary regarding charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of
the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary
servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were
proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution
and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him
for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it
wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced
them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made
by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the
defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in
evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition
forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in
advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence
of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this
case arose.
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900.
There were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The
Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the
tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public
opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.” It
also said “the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary
would be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in
the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of
those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any
person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine
of privilege has been the result of this. Privilged communications may
in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is
the “unfettered administration of justice.”

Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima
facie which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in
complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct
having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be
false, the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it
was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a selfseeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has
a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without
this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then
lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and
the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel
of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge
or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of
direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly
privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution.
Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of
the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends
and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office
of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they
abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize
on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them
of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a
judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue
publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the
conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

FACTS: Published under the by-line of one Marichu Villanueva and
titled “Judiciary worse than PNP,” an item in the June 17, 1993 issue
of the Manila Standard, a metropolitan daily, reported that the results
of the latest opinion polls conducted by the Ateneo Social Weather
Station, as Social Weather Stations, Inc. (or SWS) is also known,
showed the Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating that the
Philippine National Police. The item went on to state that the
President and his Cabinet had been briefed on the results of the
survey by Professors Mahar Mangahas and Felipe Miranda of the
SWS, and that Malacanang had expressed concern over the
Judiciary’s law standing. Press Secretary Jesus Sison was also
quoted as saying that this was “most puzzling,” although he could not,
recall the exact rating, noting only that the PNP had “a better image
that the judiciary.” Said report appears to have prompted Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion, presiding judge of Branch 104 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, motu proprio to initiate on the
same date of June 17, 1993 proceedingsordering the President of the
SWS to: “explain why you should not be held in contempt for
distributing to the general public without prior permission from any
court your findings that the people have more confidence with the
police than with judges thereby tending directly or indirectly to
degrade the administration of justice”. On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar
Mangahas through Atty. Antonio M. Abad, Jr. submitted his comment
and explanation that it was not true that the Social Weather Stations,
Inc. distributed to the general public the allegedsurvey. Said survey
was privately given to Pres. Ramos and the cabinet and was not
intended for publication nor for public consumption and that if ever it
reaches the media, he had not authorized anyone to do so. The
hearing was had a scheduled on June 23, 1993, after which Judge
Asuncion promulgated an Order dated July 2, 1993, finding Professor
Mangahas’ explanation satisfactory and dismissing the contempt
charge against him. After three weeks or so, or more precisely on July
26, 1993, Professor Mangahas addressed a letter to the Chief Justice
intended “as a formal complaint against Honorable Maximiano C.
Asuncion for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law,
in connection with his issuance of an Order dated 17 June 1993.

in the so-called “controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.” G. Jurado FACTS: ISSUE #1: Emiliano P. (ETPI). that said report came out at a time when there already was widespread publicity adverse to the judiciary. there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade the administration of justice. The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. what he did being. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth. HELD: No. may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech. Justice Hugo E. At the same time. “that the people have more confidence with the police than with the judges” – in light of the fact. The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27. public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm. wrote the opinion for the majority. Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for what.. their spouses and children and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong. about alleged venality and corruption in the courts. Jurado. 94374. What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled “Who will judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six justices. Gutierrez. 1992. in favor of the petitioner PLDT. . and under applicable law and principle. by hand and through the mail. anonymous communications were being extensively circulated. Although honest utterances. the complaint fails to make a prima facie showing of the charges made therein.ISSUE: Whether the Order dated 17 June 1993 is violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom from prior restraint. No. What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report about the results of the SWS poll . denying the allegations in Jurado's column. a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation (Manila Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October 1992 to March 1993). it does not follow that the lie. And he forthwith abated the proceedings upon receiving an explanation he deemed satisfactory. This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. In Re Emil P. at a minimum. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility. merely to initiate an inquiry into the source and basis of the derogatory news report. Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. The Civil Code. knowingly and deliberately published about a public official. Mr. even if inaccurate. in essence. the vote was 9 to 4.Thus.: “ARTICLE 19. No question of prior restraint or violation of the guarantee of free speech arises here. do not enjoy constitutional protection.R. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true. Inc. WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the published writings. In that decision the Court was sharply divided. constitutional or otherwise. should enjoy a like immunity. Jr. viz. and must perforce be as it is hereby. in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right. and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a HELD: the words of Judge Asuncion. Eastern Telephone Philippines. Upon the facts. of which judicial notice is taken. DISMISSED. he must have felt duty-bound to do in the circumstances.

Moreover. and asks why he is being singled out. are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty. The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice." Contempt is punishable. WON the court has the power to cite him for contempt.” The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights. Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist. to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. formally and in due course. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited. or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner. publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. Jurado has not been singled out.” Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a lawyer for his statements as ajournalist. Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw intelligence or reports he received surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding. honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute. even if committed without relation to a pending case. give everyone his due.Judges. For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges. ISSUE #2: This is not the case at all. the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity. and observe honesty and good faith. he is open to sanctions as journalist . persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. or as a member of the bar — he has been cited in these proceeding. The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt. Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity — whether a journalist.Every person must. and competence than are commonly required from private persons. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. sworn statements branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of substantiating those reports or assuming responsibility for their publication. act with justice. by becoming such. who. treated differently than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. integrity. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm. HELD: YES. Nevertheless. which requires those. Note: In this case. all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter. obstruct the administration of justice. and.” “one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law. What has happened is that there have been brought before the Court. some of his reports were completely untrue because he did not bother to make any further verification. invoking freedom of speech. The answer is that upon all that has so far been said.

v. Jurado’s actuations. In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution En Banc. rallyists and all other similar persons are enjoined from holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent to. Considering the inherent and regulatory power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of justice and the constitutional rights. By doing them. and procedure in all courts. 1987. 6. although it may aggravate liability. along with the other intellectual freedoms. he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable. At no time should ingress to and egress from the premises of the courts and the offices of the courts and the offices of the justices. especially their freedom of expression and assembly. Lawyers of parties with cases pending in courts have a duty to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice when engaged in demonstrations.. Demonstrators. et al. they must help to preserve the dignity of the courts and to insulate the courts from all forms of influence that may adversely affect judicial impartiality and violate a party's right to due process. are not absolute. Sanchez. are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. regarding the conduct of demonstrations.who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium. rallies and similar activities. The right of a citizen to use the streets for communication of views on national questions must be balanced with the need of our courts for an atmosphere that will enable them to dispense justice free from bias and unnecessary pressure. and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. in the context in which they were done. picketers. 4. any Hall of Justice. rallies and other similar gatherings in the vicinity of the grounds and adjacent areas of the Supreme Court and all other courts: 1. in addition. Members of the Bar violating this resolution may. sidewalks or pavement adjacent to. decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling. 5. 3. detriment and prejudice of the administration of justice. and court officials and employees be obstructed. Demonstrators. the Court resolves to adopt formally the following policy and procedural guidelines. Inc. directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. in front of. and complementing further the Per Curiam Resolution of the Court in the case of Nestle Philippines. rallyists and their sympathizers must keep all public thoroughfares free and unimpeded to allow the smooth flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. practice. Free speech and peaceable assembly. The courts would not exist and survive to protect the people's most revered rights if they were unable to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the institution from all forms of distracting. No provisional shelters and kitchens. pickets. Courts are the defenders of the people's rights. pickets. however. and other similar makeshift structures shall be established in said areas. degrading and prejudicial influences that threaten the fair and orderly administration of justice. picketers. and any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala. pickets' quarters. pleading. dated September 30. the outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building. Any violation of this resolution shall be treated as contempt of court. These freedoms. judges. in front of. any Hall of Justice. or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from. and any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala. Demonstrators. picketers. . or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from. 2. Augusto S. demonstrate gross irresponsibility. rallyists and their sympathizers are prohibited from camping out on the streets. They constitute contempt of court. As officers of the court. the outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building. That he is at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions. Hon. offices and chambers of the courts. Such activities unquestionably interrupt and hamper the working condition in the salas.

" filed this present petition for contempt against Atty. et al. (Confidentiality Rule in Disbarment Proceedings. In their comments. rallies. filed a disbarment case against Fortun for dishonest and deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility. suspension from the practice of law or disbarment as circumstances may warrant. complaint against him exposed this Court and its investigators to outside influence and public the allegations in the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre case. et al. Since petitioner is a public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern. Philip Sigfrid Fortun. As a general rule. the lead defense counsel of Ampatuan. however. If there is a legitimate public interest.. Quinsayas was invited to a show "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective media platforms. and all agencies of local governments in charge of issuing permits to hold demonstrations. affairs. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. the PNP. He said that the public circulation of the disbarment Held: Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule. Jr. around the vicinity of courts of justice with copies of this Resolution. Fortun Prima Jesusa Quinsayas. respondents. pickets and similar activities. et. Fortun alleged that Quinsayas. This tempted Fortun to file this present petition against him and various media men and companies. The Court recognizes that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Indeed. Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. et." where he discussed the disbarment case against Fortun. in the prominent "Maguindanao Massacre subject to the administrative sanctions of fine. The Clerk of Court is directed to forthwith cause publication of these Guidelines in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The Clerk of Court is further directed to furnish all lower courts. imprisonment. Quinsayas. including its principal points. and character. Quinsayas. The Guidelines shall take effect upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after such publication. contended that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was already the subject of widespread news and already of public knowledge. Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities conspired with Quinsayas. media is . The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the case. and because the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern. but the media men and companies are not liable thereto. the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news.cralaw Issue: Whether or not respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. including media men and broadcasting companies. among others. Exception) Facts: Petitioner Atty. Said provision of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court." Pending the disbarment case. warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court. They alleged that Fortun is "engaging in activities misleading the prosecution and the trial court. In this case. and that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings. It would have been different if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18.

The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. vindictive. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional. in the absence of clear and present danger to the state. The premature disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule. an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which Held: Yes. As to Quinsayas. freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. It is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state. Law Center and the U. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court. being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning. prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. The first. 1967.000. excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. with a fine of P20. the basic liberties of free speech and free press. The Philippine Bar Association. but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled. petitioner Gonzales. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae. whether for national or local officials. means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. instead of preserving its confidentiality. the Civil Liberties Union. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint. would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. In view thereof. GONZALES v COMELEC Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press.P. the court found Quinsayas liable for indirect contempt of court. Senator Lorenzo M. However. and elucidated that Act No. and irresponsible clients and litigants. and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. As held in Cabansag v. on the other hand.not prohibited from making a fair. ELECTIONS AND EXPRESSIONS he was subsequently elected on November 11. Petitioner Cabigao was. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine. true. he is bound by Section 18. the U. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. More precisely. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. is a private individual. G. there being the substantive evil of elections. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from any extraneous influence or interference.P. Rule 139-B both as a complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. of assembly and of association. at the time of the filing the petition. 1967. he disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court. a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It .

RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws. or unlawfulness be advocated. except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate. promulgated Resolution 2167. violence. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the prohibition. (Constitutional Law – Right to Free Press) FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places. against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly. RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. this right is not to be limited. much less denied. SANIDAD vs. no mass media columnist. commentators or announcers) of the said resolution. or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command. The Comelec. then such words are punishable. Sanidad. dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. COMELEC Facts: On 23 October 1989. ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional. due to the ban on radio. by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force. As in the case of freedom of expression. ADIONG v COMELEC The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship. republican in form. announcements or commentaries. HELD: No. tv and print political advertisements. which provides “During the plebiscite campaign period. or unlawfulness. implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. on the day before and on plebiscite day.” . a newspaper columnist of “Overview” for the “Baguio Midland Courier” assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists. violence. Pablito V. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. public or private.provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The prohibition of any speeches. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent. As the author Tañada clearly explained. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. commentator. The very idea of a government. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which is unconstitutional. the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881). Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force. announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials. and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (“a columnist. HELD: Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of speech and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent.” 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PONENTE: Reyes TOPIC: Election law. (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period. who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period”) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media. commentator. including reasonable. and the right to reply. Therefore. media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity. captive-audience doctrine . posting of campaign materials on PUV and public terminals. or should be under Comelec regulation. time and space. In fact. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b. announcer or personality. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression. but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. The concern of the Comelec cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in voting centers. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. SWS vs COMELEC Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. prior restraint of free speech. COMELEC FACTS: Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during elections for the reason that exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion. equal rates therefor. during plebiscite periods. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis. Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. valid and constitutional? Ruling: No.Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions. permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities. there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.

– During the campaign period. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6). the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. in relation to Section 7(f). Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. in public places. but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate. 13-0214. to express their preference. of Resolution No. of Resolution No. Section 7 thereof. ferries. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals. of Resolution No. in relation to Section 7(f). 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof. 9006 in connection with the May 13. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules. airports. jeepneys. docks. 9615 are constitutional. it is unlawful: xxxx (f) To post. whether motorized or not. which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda. any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity. display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common poster areas. The right to express one’s preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. taxi cabs. and the like. 7. such as bus terminals. seaports. train stations.A. which provided for the rules implementing R. No. Within the premises of public transport terminals. Thus. the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals. FACTS: On January 15. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals..DOCTRINE: The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy. which denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6). It includes not only the right to vote. 6.e. Public utility vehicles such as buses. The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. of Resolution No. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6). ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6). 9615. in relation to Section 7(f). HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615. in relation to Section 7(f). Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of REsolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech Section 7(g) items (5) and (6). through the posting of election . Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. (g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following: xxxx 5. i. in relation to Section 7(f). trains. pedicabs and tricycles. piers. 2013. 9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. pertinently provides: SEC.

It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6). Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. escape from intrusive speech. Also. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate. in relation to Section 7(f). of transportation and other public utilities. The “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided. As a result of the prohibition. as a practical matter. 9615. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. 9615 are not justified under the captive-audience doctrine. which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech. The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot. and under well-defined standards. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. . The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. is constitutionally permissible. 2. 9615. Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4. the prohibition In the instant case. but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal. 4. and The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 3. even if it restricts the right to free speech. but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression. or one that merely controls the time. As worded. and convince others to agree with them. A content-neutral regulation. provided that the following requisites concur: 1. Article IX-C of the Constitution. the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period.. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. posting an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. place or manner. is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation. Section 4. there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.campaign material in their property. of Resolution No. However. i.” inter alia. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government.e. the speech can be restricted. Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation.

the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law. i. which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. a case decided by the U. “although incidental to the provision of public transportation. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. was a necessity.e. the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals remains private. City of Shaker Heights. the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. the city government. The U. had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses. remains private. needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate.” In the same way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public. As already explained. If owners of private vehicles and other . However. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the former. Nevertheless. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause. the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.S. pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. is a part of commercial venture.. the city government in Lehman had the right. the prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals. was upheld by the U. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. but also of the equal protection clause. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause. the city government. cites Lehman v. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles.A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship. nay the duty. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. Supreme Court. In the instant case. In stark contrast. Also. It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. as pointed out earlier. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties. In Lehman. the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals. In Lehman. to refuse political advertisements on their buses. in choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its properties. in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals. or the appearance thereof. to be considered as such. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine.S. As regards ownership. the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city government. Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by the city government. which is embodied in Section 1.S. Supreme Court. Supreme Court held that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum. a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. though made available for use by the public. a policy of the city government. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. as owner of the buses. which prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses. Thus. there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties. Lehman’s case not applicable The COMELEC. impartiality.

Note: Justice Kapunan’s dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this section. the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. COMELEC 2015 FACTS: On the one hand.. Instead. Thus. Kamahalan. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life. In terms of ownership. but are also violative of the equal protection clause. and the press. for its part. as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among candidates. on the other hand. intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14. ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint RULING/RATIO: Yes. publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and features items of information including election surveys. Social Weather Stations v. are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties. e.4 which provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before the election.A. absolute.commercial establishments. SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.4 of R. as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. On a final note. there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. Nor does this section pass the O’brient test for content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials. of Resolution No.. etc. Admittedly. the prohibition of speech is direct. space.. Here. The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties. election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public. it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. Section 5. and substantial. expression. any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people. 9615 violate the free speech clause. especially section 5. there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity. in relation to Section 7(f). space and opportunity to the candidates.g. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech. 9006 (Fair Election Act). would also be seen by many people. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of R. 2001. time. and the right to reply. they are content-neutral regulations. and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment. Kamahalan Publishing Corp. Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free . Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time.A. Summary Section 7(g) items (5) and (6).

the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. These purposes would be defeated if the card were to be mutilated or destroyed. Discussion. a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government. However. he failed to show why. His conviction was upheld after the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) found the law constitutional. knowingly mutilate” a Selective Service registration certification. Therefore.enjoyment of the rights. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The Defendant. Although the initial purpose of the draft card is to notify. to be retained or tossed into the waste basket according to the convenience of the registrant? Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because it was intended to “suppress freedom of speech?” HELD: No. Third. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a law abridging the freedom of speech. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. the other considerations (for example. However. CLARK v COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NONVIOLENCE Brief Fact Summary. First. Fourth. This case creates a symbolic speech test that was used here to uphold the 1965 Amendment to the UMTSA. First. it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a draft card is constitutionally protected activity. Fourth. Third. prevention of last minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. The purpose of Congress is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional. on the balance. ISSUE: Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant because his act of burning the draft card was protected “symbolic speech” within the First Amendment? Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to notify registrants of their registration or classification. EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT AND TIME. if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Defendant knowingly burned his draft card on the front steps of the local courthouse. if it furthers a substantial or important governmental interest. a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government. H. Second. if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. O’Brien (Defendant). Synopsis of Rule of Law. was convicted for symbolically burning his draft card under a federal statute forbidding the altering of a draft card. Second. Therefore. No. the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as applied to Defendant. . FACTS: The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948. even if the alleged communicative element of Defendant’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). it serves many other purposes as well. The 1965 Amendment meets all these requirements. It cannot be accepted that there is an endless and limitless variety of conduct that constitutes “speech” whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea. No. if it furthers a substantial or important governmental interest. amended in 1965 to include the applicable provision that made it an offense to “alter. knowingly destroy. PLACE OR MANNER REGULATIONS UNITED STATES V O’BRIEN Brief Fact Summary. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. A National Park Service regulation banning camping in certain parks was held by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) not to violate the First Amendment when applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed.

however. A statute banning pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drug prices was found to be in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). would reasonably be understood by the viewer as communicative. FACT: In 1982. Discussion. No. The proper starting point for analysis in this case is the recognition that the Respondents’ speech is symbolic speech and therefore protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. Prescription drug consumers challenged a statute banning pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drug prices on behalf of the pharmacists. The lower court invalidated the law on First Amendment constitutional grounds. place or manner standards. Therefore. to conduct a wintertime demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall for the purpose of demonstrating about the plight of the homeless. ISSUE: Whether a National Park Service regulation banning camping in certain parks violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) when applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall? Held.COMMERCIAL SPEECH Virginia Pharmacy Board v. I. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Brief Fact Summary. If there is a right to advertise. Community for Creative Non-Violence (Respondent). the National Park Service regulation banning camping in certain parks does not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution when applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall. Symbolic expression of this kind may be forbidden or regulated if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated. Judgment of the lower court reversed. in context. Respondent filed this action to prevent the application of the anti-camping regulations to the proposed demonstration. They claimed that the statute was unconstitutional and that the First Amendment of the Constitution entitled the consumers to receive the drug price information. The permit authorized the erection of symbolic tent cities. fails to satisfy the time. if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech. The Park Service regulation is necessary.Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Park Service’s decision to permit non-sleeping demonstrations does not impugn the camping prohibition as a valuable. denied Respondent’s request that the demonstrators be permitted to sleep in the tents. Dissent. Facts. This case illustrates that symbolic speech can be regulated by the government as long as the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech. The regulations as applied to Respondent. A message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and that. The requirement that the regulation be content neutral is clearly met. Further the Park Service has the authority to judge how to protect the park lands. Issue. The regulation forbidding sleeping is defensible as both a time. The Park Service. but perhaps imperfect protection to the parks. Whether the prescription drug consumers have standing to challenge the law? Whether the advertisement of prescription drug prices is outside the protection of the First Amendment of the Constitution because it is commercial speech? . the Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Respondent. there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising and it may be asserted by the consumers here. place or manner restriction and as a regulation of symbolic conduct. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court should have subjected the Government’s restrictive policy to something more than minimal scrutiny.

Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. (2) Whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. When drug prices vary as much as they do. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. Therefore. the Appellee ordered electric utilities in . BATES v STATE BAR OF ARIZONA FACTS: In regulating the Arizona Bar. Where exists. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. In a democracy. (4)Whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. and helping to allocate resources in the American system of free-enterprise. Justice Blackmun argued that commercial speech does merit First Amendment protection given the important functions it serves in society. which restricted legal advertising. To be protected. This information (drug prices) is not harmful. FACTS: In December 1973.Held. the Appellee decided to continue the ban. to file suit claiming that the regulation of the Appellee was infringing on their First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights involving commercial speech. Therefore. information as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. causing the Appellee to determine whether or not to continue the ban. CENTRAL HUDSON GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP v PUNLIC SERVICE COMMISION Brief Fact Summary. ISSUE: Did the Arizona rule. the prescription drug consumers do have standing to challenge the law. as here. in fact. the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. The best means to that end is to open the channels of communication by making such information available to the consumers rather than closing the modes of communication by not prohibiting such advertising. Here the majority holds that speech is not taken out of the First Amendment’s protection merely because it is commercial in nature. would supply consumers with valuable information about the availability and cost of legal services. In the winter of 1973-74 there existed an electricity shortage in the State of New York. there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising and it may be asserted by the consumers here. Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees. Dissent. such as providing consumers with information about services and products. (1) Whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). violate the freedom of speech of Bates and his firm as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? HELD: The Court found that the rule violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. imposed a ban on all advertising that promotes the use of electricity. If both part one and part two are satisfied then (3) A court must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. If there is a right to advertise. By 1976 the electricity shortage subsided. the protection afforded by the First Amendment of the Constitution is to the communication. Synopsis of Rule of Law. (Appellant). The idea that the pharmacist wishes to communicate is merely. This case established a four-part analysis for commercial speech cases. the Public Service Commission (Appellee). Yes. it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. and. “I will sell you the X prescription at the Y price. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. No. The Court held that allowing attorneys to advertise would not harm the legal profession or the administration of justice. to its source and to its recipients both. causing the Appellant. Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. Discussion. the ban on advertising prices of prescription drugs is constitutional. the economic is subordinate to the political.” Speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it as an advertisement. The First Amendment of the Constitution does not mandate the Court’s “open door policy” toward such commercial advertising. In assessing their concept of legal services. The people will know their own best interests only if they are well informed. Accordingly the Appellee. Upon further inquiry.

ISSUE: Whether a regulation of the Appellee of the State of New York violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution because it completely bans promotional advertising by an electrical utility? HELD: Yes. agrees with the majority that even though commercial speech is involved. Another concurring judge argued that this is not a commercial speech case. This case is most significant because it clearly provides a four-part test to be used in cases involving commercial speech. But. they see no need to decide whether the four-part analysis. the Appellee’s ban is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens. used to encourage shifts of consumption of electricity from peak use times to periods of low electricity demand would be allowed because it does not increase aggregate consumption. Dissent. by the appellate level and by the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellee based this regulation on a finding that the interconnected utility system in New York State does not have sufficient fuel stocks to continue furnishing all customer demands for the 1973-74 winter. The Supreme Court’s decision fails to give due deference to the subordinate position of commercial speech. Under this four-part analysis the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) found that the advertising is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. (1) Whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. causing the Appellee to request public comment on its proposal to continue the ban on advertising. adequately protects commercial speech – as properly defined – in the face of a blanket ban of speech of the sort involved in this case. For example. In 1976. the speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. The Appellee also offered to review specific proposals by companies to determine if their advertisement meets this criterion. The Appellant challenged this order in state court.New York State to cease all advertising that promotes the use of electricity. This lead the Supreme Court to consider whether the complete suppression is more extensive than what is necessary. If both parts one and part two are satisfied then (3) A court must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. feeling that it can strike down regulations of a State through its own notions of what is the most appropriate means of regulation. providing information in its advertisement about the relative efficiency and expense of its offered service. To determine if it is protected. not by persuasion or direct regulation. In fact. the restriction by the Appellant is an unconstitutional restri ction of free speech. (2) Whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choices. Doubts whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to dampen demand for or use of the product. The Appellee’s ban is unconstitutional even though the United States Constitution (Constitution) accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. Therefore. arguing that the Appellee restrained commercial speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Discussion. There is a four-part analysis for commercial speech cases. The 1976 order from the Appellee was that information advertising. The dissenting judge feels the court has gone back to the days of Lochner. The Supreme Court found that the state interest in suppressing the use of energy is substantial. The Supreme Court also found a direct link between the state interest in conservation and the Appellee’s order as there is a connection between advertising and demand for electricity. The Supreme Court in this case determined that the Apellee has not shown that it could not protect its interest in energy conservation through a less restrictive means. Concurrence. The Appellant opposes the ban on First Amendment constitutional grounds and filed this suit after the Appellee decided to continue the ban. The Appellee’s order was upheld in the trial court. but would promote the leveling of demand throughout the day. the fuel shortage ended. Therefore since there is a less restrictive means available. The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by the regulation. The . it is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. (4)Whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

the answer will always necessarily strike down the regulation as unconstitutional. This leads to part four of the test. Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. For an int’l rule to be considered as customary law. obscenity cases. the state possess an elevated standard of interest in regulating commercial speech. However. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III Facts: Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E. as does part three determining whether the regulation furthers the interest. a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). Part two of the test. looks at whether the State’s interest is substantial and is similar to all other First Amendment analysis.1986. it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. hence. the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months. The WHO resolutions. which is to be used to determine whether or not part one of the test in this case is satisfied. int’l law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i. 21. This case builds on the definition of commercial speech provided in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. the Supreme Court will on a case-by-case basis determine if there was a less restrictive means of regulation. Art 8.Supreme Court in this case also provides a clear use of this test through its analysis. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS). Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code. e. In 2006. although signed by most of the member states. W/N the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction. where it seems most commercial speech cases will be decided. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.g. The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported. Issue: Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.O. as is with most First Amendment expression cases. If yes. were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Held: Sub-issue: Yes for ICBMS. No for WHA Resolutions. except as stated in this case and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. In part four once again. the DOH issued the assailed RIRR. That case defined commercial speech as expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. 51 (Milk Code). The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. Under 1987 Consti. it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris).e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR. the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. If a less restrictive means is available to achieve the same goal. breastfeeding up to 24 Months and . From 1982-2006.

principles and practices that influence state behavior. Antonin G. a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. Soft law is not part of int’l law. Anthony M. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Main issue: Yes. the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove. and Stephen G. These provisions are declared null and void. 4(f) ->advertising. Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks." Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing. a religious organization. promotions of formula are prohibited.absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. he also noted that there were likely no violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on the part of Pleasant Grove City. sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove. Breyer. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a "public" forum. The U. Agreeing with the Court's reasoning. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. according to the court. Justice Scalia. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens. With Justice Samuel A. the Court reasoned that since Pleasant Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments were displayed. Justice Stevens. GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE PLEASANT GROVE CITY v SUMMUM FACTS: Summum.S. The injunction. also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments. Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children uo to 24 months And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .S. He argued that displays of the Ten Commandments had been construed by the Court as "having an undeniable historical meaning" and thus did not attempt to establish a religion. Does a city's refusal to place a religious organization's monument in a public park violate that organization's First Amendment free speech rights when the park already contains a monument from a different religious group? HELD: No. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that "government speech" should be considered a rule of thumb and not a rigid category. Kennedy. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing said provisions. Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. He stated that . was also not against the public interest. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. J. Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Clarence Thomas. not a non-public forum as the district court had held. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – nonbinding norms. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. Scalia. joined by Justice Ginsburg. the monuments represented an expression of the city's viewpoints and thus government speech. joined by Justice Thomas. among other things. The U. Furthermore. and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. wrote a separate concurring opinion that largely embraced the majority's reasoning.

but warning that public monuments should not be considered government speech categorically. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. Jr. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on license plates constitute viewpoint discrimination? WALKER v TEXAS DIVISION. The Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. The TDMV had a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public. Justice Antonin Scalia. no. and Southern heritage. Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Justice Samuel A. and one faintly making up the background of the plate.." ISSUES: 1. the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV). applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on . a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War. Roberts. et al.sometimes the Court should ask "whether a government's actions burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government objective. concurring in the judgment. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY BAYAN v ERMITA FACTS: The petitioners. independence. Bayan. and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable. an observer would think that the plates were the expression of the individual drivers. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech. Moreover. Justice Stephen G. Alito. Texas’s specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that "discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the HELD: Yes. content-based restriction of speech in a nonpublic forum. and Justice Anthony M. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech that is immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality? 2. the public associates license plates with the State. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Jr. Finally. Summum. Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval. The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo. with over 350 varieties of specialty plates." The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application. Kennedy joined in the dissent. Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice.. they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. therefore. non-governmental speech. Chief Justice John G. SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS FACTS: In August 2009." Justice Souter also wrote separately. Texas rejecting the confederate flag design because it might be offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.. Because the specialty license plates are a limited public forum for private expression. wrote a dissent in which he argued that. K. not Texas.

The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes. maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally. Furthermore.” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. and of the press. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights. Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 2005. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power. 6. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. to promote the health. 5.” which is the power to prescribe regulations. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20. 12. otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Finally. Also. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14. particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. Furthermore. withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues. B. Neither the words “opinion. so its use cannot be avoided. without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. subject to the giving of advance notices. public safety. B.” “opinion. no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to . the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order. No. place and manner of the assemblies. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. good order or safety. in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions. public convenience. or of the press. is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision. the petitioners. They argue that B.P.” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution. No. 880. specifically Sections 4. III Sec. is not absolute. The words “lawful cause.” “protesting.P. HELD: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. and general welfare of the people. public morals or public health. it must be remembered that the right. of expression. 2006. together with freedom of speech. the petitions are GRANTED in part. ISSUE: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. No. 5 and 6. 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. peace. 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances. more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments. During the course of oral arguments. However. are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. and respondents. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. 880. while sacrosanct. As a content-based legislation. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. October 4.October 6. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.P. Wherefore. of expression. nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time. education. morals.

HELD: 1. Furthermore. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda. IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. ISSUES: 1. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. Meanwhile. 2. the applicant must be heard on the matter. No. is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of expression. for staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in the rally permit. Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR). It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari case. the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. However. insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance. and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. . The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects.peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Atienza did not consult with the IBP. a freedom park. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place different from that applied for. he can seek judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act. 880 is SUSTAINED IBP v ATIENZA FACTS: In June 2006. This is in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. that freedom of expression is not absolute. No. In this case. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. Subsequently. IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue without any reason therefor. and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz). 2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without consulting with the IBP. the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically. Under the Rules of Court. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his power.