PEOPLE v.

ALEMAN

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deafmutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are
going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a
qualified interpreter.

When a deaf-mute testifies in court, "the manner in which the examination of a
deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the
trial court in its discretion, and the method adopted will not be reviewed by the
appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was in
some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted."
MARCOS v. HEIRS of
NAVARRO

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she is
qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

AFP RSBS v. REPUBLIC

True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the
testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert
witnesses considering the technical nature of the procedure in
examining forged documents. More important, analysis of the questioned
signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in
crucial to the resolution of the case.
There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a
party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the
party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would support the
conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to
prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the
Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein.
The
OSG
and
the
court
a
quo
did
not
question
the
Verification/Certification of the application, and neither did they
question the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application on
behalf of the petitioner. Case records would reveal that the application was
signed and filed by Mr. Azcueta in his capacity as the Executive Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as authorized by petitioner’s Board
of Trustees. The authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application was
established by a Secretary’s Certificate attached to the said application. The
asseveration that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly authorized
representative of the petitioner is thus unfounded.

PEOPLE v. OBOGNE

In People v. Trelles, the Court held that “A mental retardate or a feebleminded
person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not
being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the
competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to”.
A mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate
what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is
admissible.
Modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to
disqualify a witness. McCormick provides that the remedy of excluding such a
witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept
and primitive. The Court follows the modern trend of evidence.

ALVAREZ v. RAMIREZ

The reasons given for the rule:
1 Identity of interest between husband and wife
2

There is a consequent danger of perjury if one testifies for or against
another

3

Policy of law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even
at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness

4

Where there is want of domestic tranqulity there is danger of punishing
one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

Exceptions in both civil and criminal cases
When relations are so strained there is no more harmony to be preserved in this case identity of interests disappear and consequent danger of
perjury is non-existent.
Citing Ordoño v. Daquigan Rule that injury (from other spouse) must amount to a physical
wrong upon the person is too narrow
Rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic
harmony is too broad
Better rule - when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation
PEOPLE v. PANSENSOY

The legitimate spouse of an accused CANNOT testify against the accused
under the marital disqualification rule EXCEPT:
(a) Where there is consent of the spouse being testified against, OR
(b) It is a civil case by one against the other, OR
(c) It is a criminal case for a crime committed by the one against the other
who is testifying, OR
(d) Procedural exception: Where the accused waives his/her right to
invoke the rule by failing to make a timely objection.
SC first said that the entire testimony of Analie may have been excluded under
the marital disqualification rule. HOWEVER, due to the failure of the defense
to timely object to said testimony, he is deemed to have waived such right.

GARCIA v. VDA de CAPARAS
Petitioners have no other evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which
proves the existence of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such
agreement exists, nor have they shown that they actually cultivated the land
even if only for one cropping. No receipt evidencing payment to the landowners
of the latter’s share, or any other documentary evidence, has been put forward.

HKO AH PAO v. TING

The claims are a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his
own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
Angel Sembranos testimony consists mainly of hearsay, which carries no
probative value. He did not have personal knowledge as to the execution of the
contract of sale between Arsenio and the Masangkay spouses nor the alleged
agreement between the former and Teng Ching Lay. He could only testify as
to what the deceased had allegedly told him. Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its evidentiary weight is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand.
Even if the alleged statement of Arsenio to Sembrano relating to the fact that his
father, Teng Ching Lay, was buying a house in Manila, can be admissible in
evidence as a declaration against his pecuniary interest under Section 38 of Rule
130, still, the veracity as to whether the deceased actually made this
statement is subject to scrutiny.
Sembranos testimony on behalf of petitioners is about an alleged declaration
against an interest of a person who is dead in an action that is in effect a claim
against his estate. Such a testimony if coming from a party would be

barred by the surviving parties rule, or the dead mans statute, in the
Rules of Court:
Section 23, Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
party. Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
And while Sembrano is not a party, he is practically a surrogate of petitioners
since he was the personal accountant of their predecessor-in-interest
and the corporate accountant of the corporation he controlled.

SANSON v. CA

The administratrix’s counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has
never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility
of the witness or subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is
here present the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship
to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the
assessment of a witness testimony but is not necessarily a negative element
which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.
Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate
transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And
Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus
disqualified to testify on the others transaction.

AIR PHILS CORP v.
PENNSWELL

Re the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on
the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonias account, she knows
the signature of the deceased.
While the testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the
quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
which reads:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of
a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. x x x,
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison
with the naked eye of the deceased’s signature appearing on each of the checksexhibits of the Montinola’s with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings
all of which checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to have
been affixed by one and the same hand.
Although it is not under the enumeration of ROC 130.24, it has been consistently
held that trade secrets are of a privileged nature. Among those not mentioned
but are considered privileged matters are: editors as to the source of published
news; voters as to whom their votes had been cast; information in tax census
returns; and bank deposits.
The determination by management however as to the confidential nature of
technologies, processes, formulae or other so-called trade secrets must have a
substantial factual basis which can pass judicial scrutiny. A naked assertion on
confidentiality would not suffice. Here, both RTC and CA ruled that the chemical
formulation of Pennswell’s products is not known to the general public. Such
factual findings are generally not reviewable by SC under Rule 45 petition.
In any case, the chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of
Pennswell’s special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the
law. Pennswell was established to engage in the business of general
manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose
of goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial
chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes,
colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others. The manufacture and
production of Pennswell’s products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of

ingredients for which it expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it
had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be wrested from respondent
on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner’s defense against a
collection for a sum of money. The value of the information to respondent is
crystal clear. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent’s
production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to
respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s
business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition
of respondent’s lubricants is opened to public scrutiny, it will result in nothing
less than the probable demise of respondent’s business. Pennswell’s proprietary
interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and
effort on is incontrovertible.
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they
derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily
ascertainable by the public.
Trade secret, defined:
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound
known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to
confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value. A trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's
business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not possess the information. Generally, a trade secret is a
process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the business,
for example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or
specialized customer list. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute
proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or
similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and
ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade
secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through a
"confidential relationship.”
SANVICENTE v. PEOPLE

CHAN v. CHAN

1.

It cannot be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with
regard to the details of the shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty.
Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business
for which petitioner retained the services of the latter. More
specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty.
Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or assistance in
relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain
something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice his
client or manage the litigation. Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon petitioner himself to
testify although he too was a signatory of Exhibit LL. Apparently, it was aware
that petitioner could well invoke his right against self-incrimination and refuse to
answer its questions. The prosecution then attempted to draw out what it could
not constitutionally extract from his lawyer. Yet, and as stated previously, said
Exhibit LL had earlier been admitted in evidence. What was objectionable was
the prosecution’s sole reliance on the document without proof of other facts to
establish its case against petitioner because of its mistaken assumption that the
same was a confession.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule is intended to encourage
the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment
and give him access to his body, enabling him to correctly diagnose the ailment
to provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in
the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and
the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at
risk.
Josielene's claim that the privilege only extends to the physician's testimonial
evidence (Rule 130, 24 (c): the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined") cannot be upheld. Disclosure of hospital
records is the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent.

Josielene claims that Johnny waived the physician-patient privilege since he
admitted in his answer to her petition before the RTC that he had been confined
in a hospital against his will. In fact, he attached to his answer a Philhealth claim
form covering the confinement. She invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Evidence that provides:
"SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence,
the remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the
whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence."

NERI v. SENATE

The Court rules however that since trial in the case had not yet begun, it cannot
be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence,
the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an
inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to
adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure
of his hospital records would again be premature.
There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications
Privilege
Executive privilege is recognized with respect to information the confidential
nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities
of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure
is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The
doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must
be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation
in
a
particular
case.

LEE v. CA

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it
essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of
course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her
behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By
order of the President", which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest
official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not
authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to
uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not
explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further
invalid on this score.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita,
who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive
agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the
three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate
Committees' investigation. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of
privilege. There, he expressly states that "this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has
advised Secretary Neri accordingly." Obviously, he is referring to the Office of
the President. That is more than enough compliance.
Section 25 of Rule 130 states:
No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
The Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and
other direct ascendants or descendants.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct"
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common
ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the
head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person
with those from whom he descends.

PEOPLE v. SORIANO

1.

As to the competency of Elven to testify, the SC ruled that such is not
affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to
testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed
by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he
chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against
Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father
of his own accord and only "to tell the truth."
2. Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading
questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly
allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like
Elven.
3. The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also
deserves scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and
flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not
have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been
compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his
sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or
any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly
pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his
father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness
for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.
4. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do
not impair the credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court
that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses. The SC has held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not
destroy the witnesses’ credibility. On the contrary, they may even be
considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the
material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies
agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and
coherent whole.
5. To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father
on a daughter, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the
complaint or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by
the quantum of proof required for conviction.
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the
complaint and duly established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the
complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved. It must be stressed that the
severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried
out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.

LEE v. CA

Section 25 of Rule 130 states:
No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants.
The Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct"
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head
of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those
from whom he descends.

PEOPLE v. INVENCION

As to the competency of Elven to testify, the SC ruled that such is not affected by
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on
"filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a
descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule

refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to
testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily
testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his
father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth."
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions
on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly allows leading
questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven.
STANLEY FURNITURE v.
GALLANO

An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless
such declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who
makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no
amount of rationalization can offset it.
The general rule is that errors of counsel bind the client. The negligence and mistakes
of counsel bind the client. A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the
client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by operation of law. The only
exception would be, where the lawyer’s gross negligence would result in the grave
injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law.
Elena’s position paper states the following:
5. Also, Stanley Fine was forced to declare them dismissed due to their failure to
report back to work for a considerable length of time and also, due to the filing of an
unmeritorious labor case against it by the two complainants. . . .. . . .
8. The main claim of the complainants is their allegation that they were dismissed.
They were NOT DISMISSED. Management was [sic] has only instructed them to
submit a written explanation for their absence before they would be allowed
back to work. . .

MERALCO v. SPS DELOY

By the two documents, MERALCO acknowledged that the owners of the subject land
were the Deloys. The first letter was written barely four (4) months after the deed of
sale was accomplished. MERALCO never disputed the declarations contained in
these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits. Pursuant to Section
26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or declarations
are admissible against MERALCO.
Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v Ducat: “Being an admission against interest, the documents
are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The
rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.”
Hence, the letter and the internal memorandum presented, offered and
properly admitted as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO itself,
constitute an admission against its own interest. MERALCO should appropriately
be bound by the contents of the documents.
Nevertheless, MERALCO insists that extrinsic evidence, such as the two documents,
even if these were their own, cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale between
CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The Court has read the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale but found nothing that
clearly stated that the subject land was included therein. What were sold,
transferred and conveyed were "its electric distribution facilities, service
drops, and customers' electric meters except those owned by the VENDOR'S
customers, x x x, and all the rights and privileges necessary for the operation
of the electric service x x x." No mention was made of any land. Rights and
privileges could only refer to franchises, permits and authorizations necessary for the
operation of the electric service. The land on which the substation was erected was
not included, otherwise, it would have been so stated in the two documents.
Otherwise, also, MERALCO would not have written Dionisio to ask permission for the
continued use of the subject land.
At any rate, it is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. It bears to emphasize that the titleholder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, the Court must
uphold the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled

to its possession.
LACBAYAN v. SAMOY

Admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable
to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by
him. (Shown by Sec. 26 of Rule 130 of ROC)
To be admissible, admission must:
1) Involve matters of fact and NOT OF LAW
2) Be categorical and definite
3) Knowingly and voluntarily made
4) Be adverse to the admitter's interest
Here, the question on the Partition Agreement indicates a QUESTION OF LAW to
determine whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties.
Further, such admission would prejudice the Respondent's interest but also his wife's
interest as a legal spouse on the properties. Respondent is not allowed to waive
such right on the wife's behalf.

TAGHOY v. TIGOL

In the present case, the parties never intended to be bound by their agreement as
revealed by the two (2) joint affidavits executed by the respondents simultaneous with
the execution of the deeds of confirmation of sale.
The joint affidavits are very solid pieces of evidence in the petitioners' favor. They
constitute admissions against interest made by the respondents under oath. An
admission against interest is the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute, based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration is true. It is fair to presume that the
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.

MATTEL v. FRANCISCO

Uy’s declaration in his comments and memorandum before the Court that he has not
filed the Declaration of Actual Use as mandated by law is a judicial admission that
he has effectively abandoned or withdrawn any right or interest in his trademark.
Pertinent laws violated:
Section 124.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides:
The applicant or the registrant shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with
evidence to that effect, as prescribed by the Regulations within three (3) years from
the filing date of the application. Otherwise, the applicant shall be refused or the
marks shall be removed from the Register by the Director.

PEOPLE v. GO, DELA ROSA,
and NICOMEDES

In a criminal case of estafa through falsification of commercial document, a letter by
the respondent to the BSO stating that he was willing to assume the (l)iability and full
payment of the accounts under examination, is an offer of compromise and thus an
implied admission of guilt under Rule 130 Sec. 27.

SAN MIGUEL CORP v.
KALALO

The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against Kalalo. “My
client…acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the payment
of the sum of P816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts.” The letter does not
contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent
acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the existence of her
liability.
That Kalalo made a compromise offer cannot be considered as an admission of
liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. CA, compromise offers must not be
considered as evidence against the offeror because: (1) the law favors the settlement
of controversies out of court and a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without
danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication
made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. (2) Offers for compromise are
irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them.
Rule 130, Section 27, states: In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission
of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases,
except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.
The Offer was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. The was clearly not
made in the context of a criminal proceeding and cannot be considered as an implied

admission of guilt. Kalalo also recanted the contents of the Offer. She explained that,
at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was
yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from
petitioner’s agents.
PEOPLE v. NAZARENO

Nazareno wrote a letter to the victim’s brother asking the latter’s forgiveness for the
killing of Romeo de Guzman. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court held that
appellant’s act of pleading for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to
an attempt to compromise, which in turn, can be received as an implied
admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Second, while on re-direct examination on the witness stand regarding the letter he
wrote to the victim’s brother, appellant admitted having killed Romeo de Guzman.
Nazareno’s testimony amounts to a judicial admission of guilt which may be given in
evidence against himself under Section 26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE v. GALVEZ

In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances for or against Galvez,
the following must always be borne in mind: that the Information charged Galvez as
the sole perpetrator of the crime of Murder; that the 3 other armed men were not
included as John Does; and that there was no allegation of conspiracy in the
Information. Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that
Galvez was the sole author of the shot that killed Enojarda. The "incriminating
circumstances" do not point to Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime. The
presence of the 3 armed men raises the probability that any one of those men inflicted
the fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses merely presumed
that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda. Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes
after Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently establish that Galvez was the one who
shot Enojarda. There is no evidence that Galvez was seen or was together with the 3
other armed men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that precludes the
Court from concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda. It cannot be said
therefore that there was positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial
evidence.
While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt, such
principle is not applicable in this case. The only basis of the RTC in concluding
that Galvez made on offer of compromise, is the Order of the RTC which reads:
Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin
appeared in Court together with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and
manifested that there is a possibility of understanding and settlement between the
parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for new assignment.
Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted
as evidence during the trial. The victim’s widow or any prosecution witness did not
testify on any offer of compromise made by Galvez.
The Court also recognized that there may be instances when an offer of compromise
will not amount to an admission of guilt. In People v. Godoy, the Court pronounced
that:
…In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against
the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases
of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the
public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal
action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt,
but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was
not in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not
shown that Galvez indeed made such an offer under the consciousness of
guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that it was given for some other
reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt or an attempt to
avoid its legal consequences. In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez
prevails over the alleged implied admission of guilt.

TAN v. RODIL
ENTERPRISES

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of
liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.

The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in TransPacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. CA, to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be
considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same
for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence
of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the
admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement is
an effective admission of a borrower’s loan balance.
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co., the Court applied
the exception to the general rule. In Varadero¸ there was neither an expressed nor
implied denial of liability, but during the course of the abortive negotiations therein,
the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no
denial of liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the amount to
be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the CA properly appreciated petitioner’s admission
as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner
did not contest the existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank
representations anent the former’s liability in the form of rentals. This expressed
admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to
Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of
petitioner’s liability on the subleased premises. The CA agreed with the MeTC. Indeed,
the existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 Oct 1999 was not denied by
petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18
and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld by this Court in the
consolidated cases.
ESTRADA v. OMB

Justice Velasco’s dissent: In Ombudsman v. Reyes, the Court remanded the case to the
Ombudsman. It stated that there was disregard of Reyes’ right to due process because
he was not furnished a copy of the counter-affidavits of Peñaloza and of Peñaloza’s
three witnesses.
Ponente: In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-affidavits
happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits, which resulted in Reyes’
dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of his Request
happened during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of
probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed,
and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of
his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial.
Furthermore, in citing the Reyes case, Justice Velasco’s dissent overlooked a vital
portion of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. This Court quoted from the Court of
Appeals’ decision: "x x x [A]dmissions made by Peñaloza in his sworn statement
are binding only on him. Res inter alios act a alteri nocere non debet. The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of
another." In OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397, the admissions of Sen.
Estrada’s co-respondents can in no way prejudice Sen. Estrada. Even granting
Justice Velasco’s argument that the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-130313 and OMB-C-C-13-039720 mentioned the testimonies of Sen. Estrada’s
correspondents like Tuason and Cunanan, their testimonies were merely corroborative
of the testimonies of complainants’ witnesses Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina
Suñas and were not mentioned in isolation from the testimonies of complainants’
witnesses.

SALAPUDDIN v. CA

Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless,
it demands more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence.
A review of the records, however, show that the only direct material evidence
against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the
confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, it isn’t
competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission
of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot
be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court:
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be

prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot
be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
“a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him…
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers”
The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule
allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the
conspiracy by evidence other than the confession. In this case, there is no
proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a
bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the
other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that
Salapuddin was involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead,
the investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s association
with these persons to conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy.
Mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not
suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy.
Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his
relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they
allegedly stayed while in Manila.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act,
without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.
There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of
conspiracy, and not simple inferences, conjectures and speculations speciously
sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence.”
PEOPLE v. BOKINGCO &
COL

In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an
unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are
essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime
itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that appellants fled
together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa's
house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault. Based on these acts
alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in
killing Pasion. At the most, Col's actuations can be equated to attempted robbery,
which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was
amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.
The fact that Bokingco told Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave
the place does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the
crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously
and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately
committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed
Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while
Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob
the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is

likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a
cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is
considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios
acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of
the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than by such act or declaration.
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that:
1. The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself;
2. The admission relates to the common object; and
3. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
LEARNING CHILD v. AAVA

Act 1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had
previously approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24
classrooms, which approval is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the Site
Development Plan with the signature of Frank Roa himself.
Supreme Court: The Deed of Restrictions does not specify the number of classrooms, it
is an ordinance that specifies the limit of 2 classrooms, so AAVA cannot be said to be
estopped because it failed to limit the number of classrooms built. Also, Frank Roa’s
signature came with a note: that the approval is subject to the Deed of Restrictions
regarding the use of the classrooms. Nowhere did he say that he sanctioned the use of
the classrooms for grade school purposes since the Site Development Plan explicitly
says The Learning Child Pre-School.
Act 2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA,
through its president Jesus M. Tañedo, authorized through a letter the construction of
a new "school building extension."
Supreme Court: We accept the explanation that AAVA was forced to allow the building
of the extension due to the trial court’s orders when it reversed itself.
~
Note that for Acts 3 and 4, AAVA is contending that it cannot be bound by ALI’s acts
because of the res alios inter acta rule. The court ruled that ALI’s acts can still bind
AVA because it is a person jointly interested with the party under the Section 29
exception to the rule. The basis for this is the “Deed Restrictions” attached with the
Deed of Restrictions which explicitly says:
"2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions
maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns, or
by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association."
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or
agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.
Act 3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional,
as allegedly proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development
Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar.
Supreme Court: we have already ruled that the reclassification didn’t nullify the Deed
of Restrictions. In the same vein, even if ALI itself requested the reclassification, its
acts cannot be said to have affected the Deed of Restrictions.
Act 4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as
shown by its letter dated July 24, 1991. It also said in the same letter that the building

of classrooms was a “worthy undertaking.”
Supreme Court: Same reasoning as #3. Also, when ALI said that the expansion was a
“worthy undertaking,” it mentioned in the same letter that the condition must be met
i.e. that AAVA board must concur with the expansion. In April 5, 1992, the AAVA board
voted that the Deed of Restrictions must be implemented. So ALI’s statement cannot
by itself be taken as an abrogation of the Deed of Restrictions because the condition
that the AAVA board must concur was not fulfilled.
DISPOSITION: Cease grade school operations by not accepting new enrollees.
However, those already enrolled in the grade school program may continue and
graduate as they are innocent by-standers to the dispute.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO

The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is
a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to
treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person.
In the Angara Diary, the options of Estrada started to dwindle when the armed forces
withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive
Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise Estrada to consider
the option of dignified exit or resignation. Estrada did not object to the suggested
option but simply said he could never leave the country. Estrada’s silence (to be
treated as his reaction) on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an
admission by him [of his intent to resign.]
: Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, says: “The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.”
The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section
29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Section 29.
Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or declaration of a
partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence
of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the
Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the
critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacanang Palace. Under our rules of
evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal
(petitioner). What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a
mere instrument.
Example of Secretary’s Angara’s acts on behalf of President Estrada: According to the
Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. This
statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him
about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask
Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch on
January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying
to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? Secretary Angara told him to
go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of
negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency.
The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the
progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.

PEOPLE v. CACHUELA

Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is also inadmissible in evidence against the
appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule.
The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused
because it is considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator
under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or

declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may
be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that:
a.

the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;

b.

the admission relates to the common object; and

c.

it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other
piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that
Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy
cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime
itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of
evidence to prove his participation in the crime.

People v. Algarme:
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz.:
1.

the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;

2.

the witness' degree of attention at that time;

3.

the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness;

4.

the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;

5.

the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,

6.

the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring
omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-of-court identification. No way exists for
the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability
of out-of-court identifications. The absence of an independent in-court identification by
Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.
Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the
persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. He did not state
when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the
persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included
in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height
and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy
before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior or
contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the
appellants.
REPUBLIC v. SB

The Marcoses admitted that they owned the $356 million funds in the Swiss banks. In
their Answer, they averred that the funds were lawfully acquired, hence unwittingly
admitting that they owned the same. Imelda also failed to deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of actionable documents attached to the petition for
forfeiture. Meanwhile, the stipulations in the Agreements undeniably indicated their
manifest intent to enter into a compromise with Republic. Corollarily, their willingness
to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of
the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would acquiesce to any
concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Under Rule 129.4, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and all proofs submitted
by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an
objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.
Under R130.29 and R130.31, the individual and separate admissions of each
respondent bind all of them. The declarations of a person are admissible
against a party whenever a privity of estate exists between the declarant and
the party, the term privity of estate generally denoting a succession in

rights. Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record
is competent. Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents Marcoses
in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested
in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent
against all.
Hence, given the manifest disproportion between the Marcoses’ lawful income of
$304,372.43 and the deposits of $356 million which they admittedly own, forfeiture
was proper.
OCA v. AMOR

Respondent’s failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded him
constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the natural order of things, a
man would resist an unfound claim or imputation against him. It is generally contrary
to human nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As
such, respondents silence may be construed as an implied admission and
acknowledgement of the veracity of the allegations against him.

OCA v. SAVADERA

Despite a directive from the Court for him to restitute the shortages and account for
the missing ORs discovered for the period over which he was accountable, he did not
bother to file a comment to dispute the same. The natural instinct of man impels him
to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is against human
nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations.
Silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of the
truth thereof.
Atty. Apusen’s continued silence is interpreted as an acknowledgment of the
truthfulness of the charges against him. His failure to remit collections upon
demand by the Court constitutes prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds to personal use. Atty. Apusen’s failure to comply with the order of
restitution constitutes gross dishonesty.

TEGIMENTA v. OCO

The LA said that the employers "did not deny the claims of complainant that she was
simply not told to work". This silence constitutes an admission that fortifies the truth
of the employees' narration. Sec. 32 Rule 130
"An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a
party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call
for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may
be given in evidence against him."
The employers' defense of her being on AWOL does not stand as there was no showing
of abandonment. Her nonappearance has already been accepted by the company as
resulting from complications in her pregnancy. Thus these absences cannot result into
the conclusion that she had abandoned her job.
For abandonment to exist, two factors must be present
A. Failure to report to work or absence without a justifiable reason
B. Clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship
With the second element as the more determinative factor being manifested by some
overt acts. Here, her acts of reporting to work after her vacation and calling up the
office to follow up her status are actions that did not constitute abandonment.
The marginal notes on the 16 to 30 Jun payroll showing she was on leave are dubious.
As the CA found, none of the payroll sheets indicated that Oco was considered as
AWOL. It becomes questionable whether Tegimenta regularly makes notations in its
payroll in considering the status of an employee. Thus the marginal notes in the
payroll sheet is not competent proof of the defense of the employee being AWOL.
Petitioners even invoked the best evidence rule, saying that the payroll sheet and not
the mere allegation of Oco is the best evidence that they did not terminate her.
It's not applicable because the subject of the inquiry is not the payroll sheet of
Tegimenta but whether or not Oco abandoned her job by being AWOL.
Prayer for reinstatement as evidence of abandonment - same as discussed by the CA,
i.e., it's not.
Last argument of petitioner is that since there are no new facts, evidence or
circumstances introduced by Oco to the appellate court, it cannot reverse its earlier
decision. SC said that every court has the inherent power to amend and control its
processes and orders, so as to make them conformable to law and justice (Sec. 5(g)

Rule 135).
VILLANUEVA v. BALAGUER
and IBC

Silence of the respondents is not an admission that can be used in evidence. Each
party must prove his own affirmative allegations and that the burden of proof lies on
the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side. In civil
cases, the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff, with respect to his complaint.
(1) IN THIS CASE: Evidence relied upon was insufficient to discharge burden of
proof:
a.

July 20, 1992 letter

b.

Newspaper articles

c.

Alleged admission by silence.

(2) One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other party.
a.

Citing Ravago Equipment Rentals, Inc. v. CA: “Man cannot make
evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that
he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it
to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated
therein]. He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge than he
can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to
answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further
circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as
an admission."

(3) Rule on admission by silence applies to
a.

Adverse statements in writing if the parties were carrying on a mutual
correspondence.

b.

However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is
relaxed on the theory is relaxed when the statement is not made orally
in one’s presence or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or
when there is no mutual correspondence between the parties.

c.

IN THIS CASE: We cannot assume an admission by silence on the part
of Balaguer by virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the
attribution to him by the newspapers that he is the source of the
articles.

Newspaper articles are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be held responsible
for the writings of third persons. Petitioner failed to prove that he was in fact truly the
source while Balaguer denied.
(1) Petitioner did not implead the editorial staff and the publisher.

(2) He should have at least presented the authors of the news articles as
witnesses to prove his case against respondents in the absence of an
express admission by the latter that the subject news articles have been
caused by them.
PEOPLE v. WAHIMAN

WON his extrajudicial confession was voluntarily rendered? Yes
Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to appellant all
throughout the proceedings and carefully explained to him the ramifications of his
admission. He informed appellant of his rights and that anything he says may be used
in evidence against him. Notwithstanding, appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial
confession.

PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ

Section 33 of Rule 130 provides that "[t]he declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein, may be given in evidence against him." People v.
Licayan instructs:
Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by Rogelio Dahilan, Jr.
as to the location of the victim’s body is hearsay. Any oral or documentary evidence
is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never presented on
the witness stand, because it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the
claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. In the instant case,
Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified that accused-appellant indeed told him where the
victim’s body can be found.

Appellant cross-examined prosecution witness Anna. Her testimony about appellant’s
confession to her is not thus hearsay.
Such confession is in fact corroborated by the evidence for the prosecution.
There being no eyewitness to the commission of the crime, the following provision of
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence applies:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained, provided the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.
PEOPLE v. SATORE

The Supreme Court acquitted Herminiano on the basis that the voluntariness of the
confession cannot be conclusively established due to the personal circumstances of
Herminiano. The Court stated that Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes
no distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial. The rationale for the
admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a confession
constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess
himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and
freely made. The term voluntary means that the accused speaks of his free will and
accord, without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the
nature and consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free from
influences affecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was made, that
it renders it admissible in evidence against him.
Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its voluntariness. The
proof of voluntariness cannot be inferred from the testimony of a witness who
allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written proof that such confession was
voluntarily made. Neither can the confessant be appraised by the court since,
precisely, it was made outside the judicial proceeding. The problem posed therefore by
an oral extrajudicial confession is not only the admissibility of the testimony asserting
or certifying that such confession was indeed made, but more significantly whether it
was made voluntarily.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. Much depends
upon the situation and surroundings of the accused. This is the position taken by the
courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating statements may be. The
intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken into account. It must be
shown that the defendant realized the import of his confession.
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19- year old farmer who did not even finish first
grade. Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain
Castanares, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and its
consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession out of
a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. The Court said that due to the
aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral
confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.
The Court added that confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be
oral or written, formal or informal in character. It may be recorded on videotape,
sound motion pictures, or tape. However, while not required to be in writing to be
admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video tape or other
means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds weight to the confession and
helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the
confession, after being reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it
read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by witnesses.

METROBANK v. CUSTODIO

No. The general evidentiary rule is that evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time. However, evidence of similar acts may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage and the like.
“The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial convenience. The
fact that a person has committed the same or similar acts at some prior time affords,
as a general rule, no logical guaranty that he committed the act in question. This is so
because, subjectively, a man's mind and even his modes of life may change; and,
objectively, the conditions under which he may find himself at a given time may
likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different way. Besides, if evidence of
similar acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to a multiplicity of
collateral issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as well as confuse the court
and prolong the trial.” [Citibank N.A., (Formerly First National City Bank) v.
Sabeniano]
Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially to actions based
on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a
person; it provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme,
design or plan, or it reveals a mistake. In this case however, Custodio’s prior
involvement in a cash shortage in the bank’s Cubao branch does not conclusively
prove that she is responsible for the loss of PhP600,000 in the Laoag City branch,
subject of the instant case. If the prior cash shortage in Cubao showed a reasonable
intent or habit on her part, then there was no reason for Metrobank to continue to
employ her, considering the degree of trust and confidence required of a bank teller.
Nevertheless, Custodio continued to serve the bank even after the case in petitioner
Metrobank’s Cubao branch. Her continued employment was an affirmation that she
was still worthy of the bank’s trust, insofar as she was allowed to continue to handle
sums of money in the Laoag City branch.

BOSTON BANK v. PERLA
and MANALO JR.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar
thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage,
pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties.
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like.
Spouses failed to allege and prove that:
1.
2.

as a matter of business, usage, habit or pattern of coduct, XEI granted to all
lot buyers the right to pay in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts, and
that
the parties intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the
two lots in question.

The 3 deeds of conditional sale held by Soller, Aguila, and Roque were adduced in
evidence by the spouses to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as
agents of OBM after it acquired the lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of
conduct. They likewise failed to prove that the RTC admitted the deeds as part of the
testimony of Manalo, Jr.
There is no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision,
including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by
them in the form of service, had executed contracts of conditional sale containing
uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to
grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the purchase price to two of
them, but granted one 180 months to do so. There is no evidence on record that XEI
granted the same right to buyers of two or more lots.
The letter agreement made no direct or implied reference to the manner and schedule
of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lots covered by the deeds of

conditional sale executed by XEI and that of the other lot buyers as basis for or mode
of determination of the schedule of the payment by the spouses.
How to prove Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct:
The offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of
uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given
manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature.
They must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute
evidence of habit.
The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must
be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct, with the key
criteria of adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response.
Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
Usage in a particular trade or market or profession must be considered.
It is also well-settled that parties who contract on a subject matter concerning which
known usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their agreement, if
nothing is said to be contrary.
PEOPLE v. MANALO

Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established methods of
identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. The first rule in
proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of photographs must be
shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a
witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way
suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. In the present case, the
police obviously suggested the identity of Pineda by showing only the photographs of
Pineda and Sison. The testimony of Ferrer fails the totality of circumstances test.

PEOPLE v. ESTIBAL

Res gestae: literally means "things done." It is provided for in Sec. 42 of Rule 130
as "Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be
received as part of the res gestae."
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either
the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that
the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
It is one of the 11 exceptions to the hearsay rule in Sec. 36 of Rule 130 which
provides that a witness can only testify as to facts which he knows of personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception.
Rationale: This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy
because they were made instinctively, "while the declarant’s mental powers for
deliberation are stilled by the shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all
his utterances at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions,
unaided by retrospective mental action." Said natural and spontaneous utterances are
perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness
stand." (People vs Moreno)
Two tests in applying the res gestae rule (People vs Salafranca):
a) the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with
the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself; and
b) the said evidence clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
3 essential requisites to admit evidence as part of res gestae:
(1) principal act (the res gestae) is a startling occurence
(2) statements made under the influence of a startling event were made before
declarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood (spontaneity of declaration)
(3) statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances

5 factors to determine spontaneity of declaration (People vs Dianos):
(1) time lapse between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the
statement,
(2) place where the statement is made
(3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given
(4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the
statement relative thereto, and
There must be no intervening circumstance between the res gestae occurrence and
the time the statement was made as could have afforded the declarant an opportunity
for deliberation or reflection (People vs Jorolan)
(5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.
Definition of spontaneous declaration: a statement or exclamation made
immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting
the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him.
IN THIS CASE:

The element of spontaneity is critical, and WAS NOT PRESENT in this case.

There was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about AAA's
declarations to the barangay tanod and to the police. Her statements were in
fact a re-telling of what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that
afternoon; this time however, her story to the tanods and the police was in
clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to
see her father finally exposed and put behind bars
o AAA first revealed the sexual abuse to her cousin, DDD, in the
afternoon of Feb. 5, 2009, the same day when the rape took place. It
was DDD who relayed to AAA's mom that AAA had a problem. The
mom then confronted her, and she was the one who lead AAA to seek
the help of the barangay tanod to arrest the dad

RTC and CA erred in holding AAA's statements as part of the res gestae of the
occurrence of rape. By the time those statements have been made, AAA had
already undergone a serious deliberation and was now led by new-found
resolve to punish her father.

PEOPLE v. LUMAHO

On Hearsay:

Definition: evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has
heard from others

Weight: no probative value

Rationale: because the testimony derives its value not from the credit of the
witness uttering the hearsay, but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information. As such, the person from whom the
witness derived the information is not in court and under oath to be examined.
It is the right of the opposing party to cross examine the other party's witness,
as it is the only means to test the latter's credibility, and is thus essential to the
administration of justice.

Hearsay rule (Rule 130, Sec. 36): witness can testify only to those facts
which she knows of her personal knowledge, that is, derived from her own
perception.
- personal knowledge is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence

Caveat: If an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove
the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted,
the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a
prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the
complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered
those words.
BBB's (cousin’s) testimony is not hearsay evidence and is thus admissible.
Ratio
Defense emphasized BBB's answer during cross examination that the first part of the
testimony was related only by CCC.
An evidence is considered hearsay if its probative value is not based on personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand.24 A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his

personal knowledge and derived from his own perception.
Upon review of the records, BBB indeed testified that the first portion of her statement
was related only by CCC. However, the defense failed to specify with particularity
which of the first portion was hearsay. Contrary to the allegation of the defense, what
is apparent is the narration of BBB that she personally heard from AAA herself, during
police investigation, that she was abused by her father. And this statement obviously
does not fall within the ambit of hearsay.
Other issues:

ESPINELI v. PEOPLE

whether or not the crime of rape was committed. YES, rape was committed
The prosecution established all the elements of qualified rape. AAA's narration was
further strengthened by Dr. Diaz's finding of a month-old laceration in AAA's hymen.
Where a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration,
there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.
whether or not the witness was not credible since her answers were elicited
from leading questions. NO, the witness was credible.
While some of AAA's responses were elicited from leading questions, these must be
accepted as credible by virtue of liberality. While liberality is more of an exception, the
court finds that it applies in this case given the circumstances of a child testifying in
open court at age 10 to narrate the she was raped by her father at age 7. AAA was
able to convey, despite her tender age, essential details to convict the accused.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states:
 Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.
– A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on
the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom
it is sought to produce.
 Such is not the case when the purpose of placing the statement on the
record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of
such statement, was made.
 Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is
the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not
apply and the statement may be shown.
Applied in this case:
 Testimony was presented not to prove the truth of such statement but
only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes
executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts.
 the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently
relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such
statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial.
Notarial (Relevant Issue)
 The written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been duly
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the
NBI.
 It may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this
instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.
 a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.
Circumstantial Evidence
Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt.”
Circumstantial evidence may be relied by the trial court
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence

PATULA v. PEOPLE

would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)there is more than one
circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii)
the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
All the circumstances must be consistent with one another and with the
hypothesis
 petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko
nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and was armed
 red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo
 Alberto was fatally shot later in the day and fled riding a red car
Thus, circumstantial evidence are sufficient to warrant a conviction of murder
The Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various
documents consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of
her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining
to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for
each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan
herself. (Exhibits B to YY)
However, these documents were prepared by people other than Go and
Guivencan and that the testimony of Guivencan (Auditor) is based on the entries
found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by
Footlucker’s corresponding to each customer and unsworn statements of
customers.
 This means that the RTC is deprived of opportunity to validate and
test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of
petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through crossexamination by petitioner.
Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, states that a witness can testify only
to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of
Court.
The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed
fact.
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as well
as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely
rejected as proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion.
Other related doctrine
The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been
given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party
who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the
same.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute. The weight of such testimony depends not
upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving
the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore,
be cross-examined.
Hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence.
To address the problem of inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the
truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga party’s right to cross-examine her
adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions
 Require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined
only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court formalizes this solution
 require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the
adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensuresthis
solution
Excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about
the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not
being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the

PEOPLE v. CABALLERO

perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court
statement depends.
Section 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
 Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments, and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
Thus, All other writings are private.
A public documentis self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.
A private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before
its acceptance as evidence in court.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in
four instances, specifically:
 (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section
21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
 (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have
not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;
 (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been
admitted; or
 (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private
individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Thus, they are required to be authenticated in the manner provided in Section20
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
 Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Applied in this case:
 The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
petitioner in various receipts, however, such was not valid as the
Prosecution admitted that the document was a mere machine copy, not the
original.
Also in the attempt to authenticate the signature of the accused, Guivencan’s
identification of petitioner’s signature on two receipts based alone on the fact that the
signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed
yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner.
Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioner’s signature on the
receipts either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had
not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the
declarant is under a consciousness of impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d)
the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.
It does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending
death when he made the statements. No questions relative to the second requisite was

propounded to Januario. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the
declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in
point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying
declaration.
Januario’s statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal
fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was
referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his coaccused.
At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the
hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His
utterance about appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the
question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the
accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by
appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
PEOPLE v. RARUGAL

ON DYING DECLARATION: The victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He
had time to reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was
appellant who had stabbed him. The SC agreed with the CA that the statement of
Florendo made to his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying
declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant
twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was
appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an expression of the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of
impending death. There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was
incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to
state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness. Lastly, the dying
declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.

BELBIS v. PEOPLE

Petitioners claim that there is discrepancy in the findings of the RTC and the CA.
According to them, the RTC never mentioned about a dying declaration which the CA
discussed in its decision. They then argue that the CA erred in ruling that the
statements made by the victim in the presence of witnesses Veronica Dacir right after
being stabbed, and SPO1 Lerma Bataller before he died, are dying declarations within
the contemplation of the law as the victim still lived for one month after the said dying
declaration was made.
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the
material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is
uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow
immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the
absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person
after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating
the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.
As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows:

(1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending
death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration
concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; and (4)
the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the
subject of inquiry.
The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8,
1998 does not prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under the
consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be
entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is
not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the
deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and
looked on death as certainly impending. As such, the CA incorrectly ruled that there
were dying declarations.
The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim to Veronica Dacir right
after he was stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a dying declaration as stated in
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae,
is that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who
made the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or
contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in
obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circumstances. In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res
gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.
It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors
are then considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of
the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that lapsed between
the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place
where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the
statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence
and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the
statement itself.
Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his assailants was made
immediately after a startling occurrence which is his being stabbed, precluding any
chance to concoct a lie as shown in the testimony of Veronica.
SABILI v. COMELEC

Whether or not common-law wife’s (Palomares) affidavit is a declaration
against her interest
A declaration against interest, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify against the interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true." A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay
rule. As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to,
testimonial evidence.
Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioner’s claim that the COMELEC had committed
grave abuse of discretion in being inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares,
particularly regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had been purchased solely
with petitioner’s money. If the COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property
in her name to be accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership thereof in favor of
petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her children’s)
property interest.
The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that
Palomares may have committed misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that
she had perjured herself as an informant on the birth certificates of her children with
respect to the supposed date and place of her marriage to petitioner. However, this
was not the reason propounded by the COMELEC when it rejected Palomares’

affidavit.
Moreover, it is notable that Palomares’ assertion in her affidavit that she and
petitioner have been living in the Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is
corroborated by other evidence, including the affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay
officials and neighbors.
LAZARO v. AGUSTIN

Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity
with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the
declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a
person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary
evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only
when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
In this case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity
with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly
executed, should be considered as an admission against interest
A reading of the sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a parcel of land
denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. On
this basis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in
the sworn statement is the same property claimed by petitioners.
STILL, even granting that the sworn statement refers to the property being disputed
in this case, it still cannot be given full faith and credence in view of the issues
raised re its genuineness and due execution
Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have
in their favor the presumption of regularity; however, this presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
 Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just
because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized
documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.
 Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to
notarized documents. While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this
presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity
of its contents.
 The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because
the regularity in the execution of the sworn statement was challenged in
the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by the
highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as
well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of
execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the
signatory, at the time the questioned document was supposedly executed. The
trial and appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to the testimonies
of these witnesses. The Court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere with
the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses, unless there
appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
 Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of
the MTCC, the RTC and the CA. Although the questioned sworn statement is a
public document having in its favor the presumption of regularity, such
presumption was adequately refuted by competent witnesses.
 The SC agreed with the RTC ruling that the testimony of notary public Atty
Respicio did not suffice to rebut the evidence of the appellees, considering that
his admission that the affidavit was already thumbmarked when presented to
him by one who claimed to be Basilisa Santos and whom, the witness said he
did not know personally. Further, what makes the documents suspect is the fact
that it was subscribed on the same date as the financial statement of Alejandra
Santos.
 In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in
ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn statement.
However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement. He simply
relied on the affirmative answers of the person appearing before him attesting
that she was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true;
and that the thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers. However,
this would not suffice. He could have further asked the person who appeared
before him to produce any identification to prove that she was indeed Basilisa
Santos, considering that the said person was not personally known to him, and

that the thumbmark appearing on the document sought to be notarized was not
affixed in his presence. But he did not. Thus, the lower courts did not commit
any error in not giving evidentiary weight to the subject sworn statement.
UNCHUAN v. LOZADA

PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS
INC v. CA

As to the validity of the donation:
When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or
enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute
and indispensable.
Here, the Deed of Donation does not appear to be duly notarized. In page three of the
deed, the stamped name of Cresencio Tomakin appears above the words Notary Public
until December 31, 1983 but below it were the typewritten words Notary Public
until December 31, 1987. A closer examination of the document further reveals that the
number 7 in 1987 and Series of 1987 were merely superimposed. This was confirmed by
petitioners nephew Richard Unchuan who testified that he saw petitioners husband
write 7 over 1983 to make it appear that the deed was notarized in 1987. Moreover, a
Certification from Clerk of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino of the Notarial Records Division
disclosed that the Deed of Donation purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No.
48, and Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and filed with said office. Pertinent
to this, the Rules require a party producing a document as genuine which has been
altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, to account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was
made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties
affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did
not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the
document shall, as in this case, not be admissible in evidence.
Remarkably, the lands described in the Deed of Donation are covered by TCT Nos.
73645 and 73646, both of which had been previously cancelled by an
Order dated April 8, 1981 in LRC Record No. 5988. We find it equally puzzling that
on August 10, 1987, or six months after Anita supposedly donated her undivided share
in the lots to petitioner, the Unchuan Development Corporation, which was
represented by petitioners husband, filed suit to compel the Lozada sisters to
surrender their titles by virtue of a sale. The sum of all the circumstances in this case
calls for no other conclusion than that the Deed of Donation allegedly in favor of
petitioner is void.
Finally, we note that petitioner faults the appellate court for not excluding the
videotaped statement of Anita as hearsay evidence. Evidence is hearsay when its
probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. There are three
reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2)
absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. It is a hornbook doctrine that
an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the witness
stand. Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear
in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our
rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party; the
videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule
130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are
admissible even if they are hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between
admissions against interest and declaration against interest. Admissions against interest
are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal
interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as
a witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence and constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness. Thus, a man’s acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made,
if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. However, as a further
qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in this case, must be authenticated
by a special testimony showing that it was a faithful reproduction. Lacking this, we are
constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped statement of Anita. Even so,
this does not detract from our conclusion concerning petitioners failure to prove, by
preponderant evidence, any right to the lands subject of this case.
Testimonies of Mr. Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. are HEARSAY.
Offers made by Marcos to purchase Philippine Free Press through Gen.
Menzi saying "Marcos cannot be denied" cannot be accepted since Menzi has
already PASSED AWAY and is no longer in a position to defend himself.
Offers of sale by Marcos through Atty Baizas and Secretary de Vega also

TANDOG v. MACAPAGAL

HERRERA v. ALBA

hearsay since both are already dead.
The three could not longer testify that they were ordered by Marcos.
Per Sec. 36 of Rule 130 of the ROC, Any evidence is HEARSAY if its probative
value is not based on personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
some other person not on the witness stand."
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a
testimony is HEARSAY if offered against a party who has no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Such evidence is excluded
precisely because it deprives the party against whom it is presented the
opportunity to be cross-examined.
With the deaths of Gen. Menzi, Baizas and De Vega, they cannot be cross
examined for statements allegedly made by them as Marcos' vehicle.
Yet, the EXCEPTION to the hearsay rule in SEC. 38 OF RULE 130 AS
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST cannot be used here.
Gen. Menzi's supposed declaration saying that he was acting for President
Marcos when he coerced Locsin, Sr. CANNOT be given evidentiary weight. The
Locsins are not DISINTERESTED WITNESSES since they are likely to gain
from the annulment of the subject contract.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge.
THUS, Locsins cannot testify respecting what President Marcos said to
Gen. Menzi, Atty Baizas and Sec. De Vega about the said acquisition.
Narration of a witness of his conversation with a dead person is
esteemed in justice the weakest.
Petitioners failed to even show if Casimiro Policarpio even "EXISTED" and if he is
their Predecessor-In-Interest.
Petitioners' testimonies cannot be considered Declarations About Pedigree.
Under Section 39 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, for Declaration
About Pedigree to be established it is necessary that:
a) actor/declarant is dead or unable to testify;
b) act/ declaration is made by a person related to the subject by birth/marriage;
c) relationship between the declarant/actor and the subject is shown by evidence
other than such declaration; and
d) Act of declaration was made prior to the controversy.
All the requisites were wanting in this case.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face:
a prima facie case,

This exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with
the putative father. In the PH, corroborative proof is required to
shift the burden to the putative father.
affirmative defences,

Two are available – 1) incapability of sexual relations because of
physical absence or impotence, 2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception
presumption of legitimacy,

A child born during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.
Legitimacy may only be impugned under the strict standards
provided by law.
physical resemblance between the putative father and child

Physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be
offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial
technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although
likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula
that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his
biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of
the trier of fact.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections are in
Sections 39 and 40 of the Rules of Court.

CRISTOBAL v. CRUZ

LBP v. ONATE

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data:
1 how the samples were collected,
2 how they were handled,
3 the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4 the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5 whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests,
6 the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal. Article 172 of the Family Code provides:
o Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of
the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the
child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late
Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable
documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she
produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901,
1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary
wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that
petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside
as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of
witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the
status as a legitimate child.
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present
any proof to refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to
Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are,
indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
LBP failed to prove that the ‘miscredited’ funds came from proceeds of the preterminated loans of corporate borrowers. LBP argument that the entries in the
passbook were made in the regular course of business and should be accepted as
prima facie evidence of facts is qualified as hearsay, and they should establish the
exceptions of the hearsay rule, which are:
1. Person who made entries is dead, outside of the country, or unable to
testify;
2. Entries were made at or near the time of the transaction to which they
refer;

3.
4.
of the entrant;
5.

Entrant was in a position to know the facts stated therein;
Entries were made in the professional capacity or in the course of duty
and,
Entries were made in the ordinary course of business or duty.

LBP has neither identified the persons who made the entries in the passbooks nor
established that they are already dead or unable to testify as required by Section 43 or
Rule 130 of the RC.

SPS QUIRINO v. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS INC.

LBP failed to prove that the amount allegedly ‘miscredited’ to Onate’s account came
from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its clients. It is worth emphasizing
that in civil cases, the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by
preponderance of evidence. Mere allegation is not sufficient.
Petitioners insist that they could not be held liable for the balance stated in Exhibit V
due to such document being hearsay as a “mere statement of account”
They argue that Cristina Llanera, the witness of PPI on the matter, was only a
warehouse assistant who was not shown to be either an accountant or
bookkeeper or a person with knowledge in accounting.
They said that the testimony was limited to stating that she had prepared the
statement of account contained therein, and that she did not affirm the
correctness or veracity of the contents of the documents.
Held:
Being a private document, Exhibit V needs authentication pursuant to the rules
ofn evidence for its admissibility
Llanera, admittedly the person who had prepared the document was competent
to testify on the due execution and authenticity
Petitioners also invoke Sec. 43, Rule 130 of the ROC but its invocation is
misplaced because the rule speaks of a situation where the person who made the
entries is dead or unable to testify which was not the situation here.
Regardless, we have to point that entries made in the course of the business
enjoy the presumption of regularity. If properly authenticated, the entries serve
as evidence of the status of the account of the petitioners.

JOSE v. MICHAELMAR

In Land Bank v. Monet’s Export and Manufacturing Corporation, the Court has
explained that such entries are accorded unusual reliability because their
regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit
of precision; and that if the entries are financial, the records are routinely
balanced and audited; hence, in actual experience, the whole of the business
world function in reliance of such kind of records.
CA reinstated the LA ruling. It held that LA correctly applied the POEA standard
employment contract which explicitly provides that the failure of a seaman to obey
the drug and alcohol policy warrants a penalty of dismissal which may be carried out
by the master even without a notice of dismissal if there is a clear and existing danger
to the safety of the vessel or the crew.
It also rebutted NLRC with respect to the unsigned report. Under legal rules of
evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of admissibility.
There are kinds of evidence known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which
need not be invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from
him because of necessity and under circumstances that safeguard the
trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are called
entries in the course of business, which are transactions made by persons in
the regular course of their duty or business.
The regularity of the procedure observed in the administration and reporting
of the tests is the very assurance of the report’s admissibility and credibility
under the laws of the evidence. There is no reason why it cannot be considered
substantial evidence, which, parenthetically, is the lowest rung in the ladder
of evidence. It is from the fact that a report or entry is a part of the regular
routine work of a business or profession that it derives its value as legal
evidence.
The tests administered to the crew were routine measures of the vessel conducted to

enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued
and released by the medical officer. The ship’s physician at Curacao under whom the
tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his name and with his
handwritten comments that the report on the respondent came out, and there is no
basis to suspect that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of his
duty. As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does
not require additional supporting evidence except if it appears that the drug test was
conducted not in accordance with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he
says, has even been suggested in this particular case.

MERALCO v. SOLE
QUISUMBING and MEWA

Citing KAR ASIA Inc., v. Corona, entries in the course of business, enjoy the
presumption of regularity. It is therefore incumbent upon the respondents to
adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of their claim. Unfortunately,
respondents’ naked assertions without proof in corroboration will not suffice
to overcome the disputable presumption.
Rule 130.45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters
of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical,
or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any
relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged
in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be
admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." The cited report is
a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an
analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no
sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its
accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this
in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was
regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally
regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy,
these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock
quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is
available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be
admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made
available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain
governmental requirements.

PNOC SHIPPING v. CA

Nonetheless, by petitioner's own allegations, its actual total net income for 1996 was
P5.1 billion. An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated that petitioner's net
operating income for the same year was about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union
relies on to support its claim. Assuming without admitting the truth thereof, the figure
is higher than the P4.171 billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net
operating income. The P5.7 billion which was the Secretary's basis for granting the
P2,200.00 is higher than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It
would be proper then to increase this Court's award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the
two years of the CBA award.
With respect to the documentary evidence, the SC ruled in favor of the petitioner
PNOC-STC.
For actual and compensatory damages, the injured party is required to prove the
actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence available.
Damages may not be awarded on the basis of on the basis of hearsay evidence. The
documents presented by private respondent were regarded as hearsay evidence. Del
Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the documents as he was not the
author of them. He can only testify as to facts of his personal knowledge. As such, the
price quotations were considered ordinary private writings which under the Revised
Rules of Court should be proferred along with the testimony of the writers thereof.
One of the exemptions to the hearsay evidence rule under Sec.37-47 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence is “commercial lists”. Under Sec. 45, a document is a
commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an

occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other
published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in
the same occupation.
However, the quotations do not fall under “other published compilation” mentioned in
the said exemption as they are not published in any list, register, periodical, or other
compilation. They are also not standard handbooks or periodicals containing data of
everyday professionals need and relied upon in the work of occupation. They are
merely letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “where general words follow an enumeration
of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
Because of the absence of competent proof of the actual damage suffered, SC modified
the CA decision and awarded the private respondent nominal damages amounting to
P2,000,000.00.
REPUBLIC v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Bane
case)

Petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without
observing the provisions of Sec 47, Rule 130. The petitioner claims that in light of the
prior consolidation of CC No. 0009 and CC No. 0130, among others, the former case
or proceeding that Sec 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.
Consolidation is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of
several causes.
There is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a
merger of causes of action, parties and evidence. At most , there was a consolidation
of trial but not actual consolidation.
Considering the fact that in the present case the party respondents to CC No. 0009
are not parties to CC 0130, the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended
an actual consolidation.
To impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation results
in an outright deprivation of the petitioners right to due process especially
where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one
of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another
jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on
evidence.
Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court
of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing.
Any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and
excluded under the hearsay rule i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered.
That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the
deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination
must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case.
However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Sec
4, Rule 23, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to
the witness stand.
Sec 47, Rule 130 lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or
deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to
testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him. The
reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial
or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.
However, before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in
evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the
party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the
realm of admissible evidence.

The deposition may not be allowed in this case because petitioner failed to impute,
much less establish, the identity of interest or privity between the then
opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents.
The petitioner asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine
the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual
notices previously sent to them.
Petitioners reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate opportunity
for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of the respondents in CC
No. 0130 the effect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they
cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be
bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent
impairment of their right of cross-examination.
After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to
move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed with the deposition
immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon
Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not
only were the respondents non-parties to CC No. 0130, they likewise have no interest
in Africas certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder.
Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a vital cog in the petitioners case
against the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the
deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became
the technical right of the petitioner to do so.
MANLICLIC and PRBLI v.
CALAUNAN (bus collision;
split civil case and criminal
case)

W/N the TSNs and other documents presented in the criminal case are
admissible in evidence. YES, the testimonies of the 3 witnesses are admissible
on the ground that PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
Petitioner’s argument: The TSNs containing the testimonies of Calaunan, Mendoza,
and Ramos should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply
with the following requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the ROC:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

The witness is dead or unable to testify;
His testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same
interests;
The former case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action
The issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case; and
The adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case

Court:
Rule: For a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible, the party
who seeks to introduce it as evidence must show the concurrence of all the requisites
set forth by the Rules to be excepted from the hearsay rule.
E: The failure of the adverse party to raise a timely objection. It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered
in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to
object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the
law.
Here, Calaunan failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites. PRBLI, not being a
party in the criminal case had no opportunity to cross-examine the 3 witnesses in said
case. However, PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in
evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered
in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case.
If PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal
case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It cannot argue that the

TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case
should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of
the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence
of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
It is also too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to
object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
Issue 2: W/N the TSNs in the criminal case are included in the terms
“testimony or deposition” under Rule 130.47. YES
Court: Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean
that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents
can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the
testimony may be entitled.
GARBO v. ANTONIO

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The fact of
forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature
and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to
have been forged.
The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the
strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned
signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former’s
authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the
benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are
other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the
condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written
is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper
used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless,
therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or
circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting,
much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities,
between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one
The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the
expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form
its own opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is
mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently
existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of
the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.
Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the manner of
examination of the specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not
point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection by an untrained observer.

DE LA LLANA v. BIONG

The courts are not bound by expert testimonies especially that the examination was
upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and they had complete control on what
documents and specimens to be examined by the NBI.
The burden of proving the proximate causation between Primero’s negligence
Pet’s whiplash injury rests on Pet. She must establish by preponderance of evidence
that Primero’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her
whiplash injury would not have occurred.

Peitioner anchors her claim mainly on 3 pieces of evidence. None of these
pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident
and the whiplash injury:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car
SC: The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the
collision. It is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be
inferred from these pictures.
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
SC: The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in
evidence. Even if SC considers the medical certificate in the disposition of this case,
the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. Evidently, it was Dr.
Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate. However,
she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm
the contents of the medical certificate. Court also pointed out that the medical
certificate did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Primero’s reckless
driving and Pet’s whiplash injury.)
(3) her testimonial evidence.
SC: Pet’s opinion that Primero’s negligence caused her whiplash injury has no
probative value. Pet was the lone physician-witness during trial. [TOPICAL]
Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness. Under the RoC,
there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert
witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence
regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in
evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he shown to possess.
Pet’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she
was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not
competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, Pet, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation
on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.

MARCOS v. HEIRS of
NAVARRO

Other: SC cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Justices have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked
to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their
corresponding legal arguments.
W/N Alvarez should be disqualified as witness and w/n Alvarez’s testimony
would be hearsay. No. RTC committed GAD in disqualifying Alvarez
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a
crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known

her perception to others. SC declared that she is qualified as a witness and cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications
specified under the Rules. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness
with the credibility and weight of her testimony.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice
or detection from an unpracticed observer. Thus, SC disagreed with the RTC that PO2
Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory
on the part of the courts. Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this
Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. However,
SC also recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents.
More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the deed of donation executed
by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. is crucial to the resolution of the case.
TABAO v. PEOPLE
(Nagtahan Bridge  Island
 Ran over twice)

HERNANDEZ v. SAN JUAN
SANTOS (Cinderella story)

The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Sec. 49, Rule 130 when it
disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo Cornelio
who testified that the petitioner’s car could not have bumped the victim because the
latter’s body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side. The petitioner argues
that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of traffic accident investigation,
and as such, his statements are "backed-up by [the] principles of applied physics,
engineering, and mathematics.”
Sec. 49, Rule 130 states that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence. The use of the word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the
testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert
witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been presented
not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the
determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt
depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law. It has
been held of expert testimonies:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts
of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within
the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning
by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom
he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which
deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily
rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances
in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion.
P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was merely
based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did
not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimony did
he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been involved in the incident.
From P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimon, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not
discount the possibility that the victim could have been thrown on the side. He
likewise admitted that the location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle
would also depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.
Opinions of Lulu's attending physicians regarding her mental state were inadmissible
in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry.
SC: Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may
give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such

occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that
her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal.
Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.
The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person's
state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to
observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.

CSC v. BELAGAN (manyak
doctor kisses school owner
while inspecting her school
grounds)

Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind
but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of
taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA
both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties
without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy. One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51
(a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged."
This provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And even
assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot
sustain respondent’s posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence
must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense
charged. Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of
assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of
embezzlement - character for honesty.
Respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What
he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation,
physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of
evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is
Magdalena’s lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the
charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given.
It refers to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. Section 11,
Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be impeached by
the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that
his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that
he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but
not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense."
Is Magdalena’s derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility? No.

First, most of the 22 cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed
in the 80’s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with the
Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of
took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was
committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of
Magdalena’s character or reputation. Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s
character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of
the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from
the commencement of the suit. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the
criminal cases specified by respondent. It is not permissible to show that a witness has
been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense,
or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility on following grounds or
theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend
to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a
crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is
legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by
evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
PEOPLE v. LEE (gun through
window while mother and
child were watching TV)

VICTIM JOSEPH is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several
criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with
frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989.
Appellant explained the information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of
the victim’s desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant
appeared and admitted his crime.
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two
blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and
drug addict. Six days before his death, on September 23, 1996, accusedappellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. As proof
of the victim’s bad reputation, appellant presented a letter handwritten by his
mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City,
and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter,
Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation because he
was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared
that eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in their
household because of his drug habit.
WON Herminia Marquez’ testimony was credible? YES.
Herminia’s testimony is positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in her
narration of the shooting incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her son’s
death. She readily gave specific details of the crime scene, e.g., the physical
arrangement of the sofa and the television set, the height of the sofa, the wall and the
window, because the crime happened right in her own living room. She explained that
she was unable to warn Joseph because she was shocked by the sight of accusedappellant aiming a gun at her son.
Accused-appellant: there are inconsistencies in the eyewitness’ testimony.
Affidavit of September 30, 1996: Herminia declared that while she and Joseph were
watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at her son. The hand and
the gun came out of a hole in the window, i.e., "butas ng bintana."
WON the bad reputation of the victim is admissible as character evidence? NO.

Accused-appellant: the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes and
he may have been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen.
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, viz:

"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:-(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of

the offense charged.

MIDWAY MARITIME v.
CASTRO (lease between
petitioner and respondent 
respondent mortgaged to
bank  unable to pay
mortgage, sold to Adoracion
 petitioners bought
building)

Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character
evidence of the accused. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers
to the character of the offended party. Character evidence, whether good or
bad, of the offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged."
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two
situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as evidence of
the state of mind of the accused.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is
irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing.
Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or
that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between
the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the
hands of accused-appellant.
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in
cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. (People v.
Soliman)
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed
through treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was
treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when accusedappellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice
in the head.
As to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, this cannot be
appreciated to increase the penalty in the absence of direct evidence showing
that accused-appellant deliberately planned and prepared the killing of the
victim.
WON there was a lease agreement between the petitioner and respondent regarding
the residential building? YES, the petitioner thus cannot claim ownership over the
building.
Such issue is a question of fact already resolved by the RTC in the affirmative.
“From June 1993 to July 25, 1995 or for a period of 26 months, the [petitioner]
has been paying rentals for the building in question and paid a rental of
[P]156,000.00 which rental was increased to P10,000.00 beginning October 1995
when the caretaker of the [respondents] Mr. Josefino Castro was ejected
therefrom and the entire building was leased to the [petitioner], represented by
Dr. Sabino Manglicmot."
Evidence: cash disbursement voucher issued by the petitioner to Mrs. Lourdes
Castro. The voucher contained the statement "payment of building rentals x x x
from June 01 to December 01, 1993" in the total amount of P36,000.00.
[TOPICAL] It is settled that "[o]nce a contact of lease is shown to exist
between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however strong,
overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or
a better right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee."
Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from
denying the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them.
Santos v. National Statistics Office - Court expounded on the rule on estoppel
against a tenant and further clarified that what a tenant is estopped from
denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of
the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have
been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply.
In this case, Adoracion’s ownership dates back to her purchase of the two parcels
of land from her father, Tomas. It was Tomas who bought the property in an
auction sale by Union Bank in 1993 and leased the same to the petitioner in the
same year. Note must be made that the petitioner’s president, Manglicmot, is the
husband of Adoracion and son-in-law of Tomas. It is not improbable that at the
time the petitioner leased the residential building from the respondents’ mother
in 1993, it was aware of the circumstances surrounding the sale of the two
parcels of land and the natureof the respondents’ claim over the residential
house. Yet, the petitioner still chose to lease the building. Consequently, the
petitioner is now estopped from denying the respondents’ title over the

ERMITANO v. PAGLAS
(respondent was leasing
from petitioner 
subsequently buys the
property)

residential building.
What Tomas bought from Union Bank in the auction sale were the two parcels of
land originally owned and mortgaged by CCC to Bancom, and which mortgage
was later assigned by Bancom to Union Bank. Contrary to the petitioner’s
assertion, the property subject of the mortgage and consequently the
auction sale pertains only to these two parcels of land and did not include
the residential house
In Castro, Jr. v. CA, the Court nullified the writ of possession issued by the trial
court insofar as it affected the residential house constructed by the
respondents on the mortgaged property as it was not owned by CCC, which
was the mortgagor.
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to possession of the property.
(Yes, during the period of redemption. After that, respondent acquired the right to
possess the property. Petitioner is entitled only to back rentals due her during the
redemption period.)
In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied
In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the
plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in
possession.
Petitioner argues: She remains the owner of the subject property. Based on her
contract of lease with respondent, respondent is not permitted to deny her title over
the said property in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court.
SC: No. The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides: "[t]he tenant is not permitted to
deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them."
What a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is
alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title has
expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim
for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what
respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she
acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between
her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court does not apply.
HOWEVER, even if respondent is not estopped from denying petitioner's claim for
rent, her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition of ownership of the
disputed property, is nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the
rentals due to petitioner.
There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's rights over the
subject property, petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor has not yet expired.
It is settled that during the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor
is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is that the
right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of
redemption has expired without the right being exercised. It is only upon the
expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of
his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes consolidated in
the purchaser.
During the period of redemption, the mortgagor, being still the owner of the foreclosed

property, remains entitled to the physical possession thereof subject to the purchaser's
right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a bond pursuant to the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The mere purchase and
certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the possession or beneficial use of
the premises.
In the instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that respondent, as
purchaser of the disputed property, filed a petition and bond. In addition, respondent
defaulted in the payment of her rents. Thus, absent respondent's filing of such petition
and bond prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, coupled with her failure
to pay her rent, she did not have the right to possess the subject property.
On the other hand, petitioner, as mortgagor and owner, was entitled not only to the
possession of the disputed house and lot but also to the rents, earnings and income
derived therefrom.
The situation became different, however, after the expiration of the redemption period.
Since there is no allegation, much less evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject
property within one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale,
respondent became the owner thereof. Consolidation of title becomes a right upon the
expiration of the redemption period. Having become the owner of the disputed
property, respondent is then entitled to its possession.

PNB v. SPS ALEJANDRO

As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered
moot when the period of redemption expired on February 23, 2001 without petitioner
having redeemed the subject property. The only remaining right that petitioner can
enforce is his right to the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to physical
possession of the subject property – that is from May 2000 until February 23, 2001.
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, as in this case, it is,
under the rules on evidence, considered as containing all the terms agreed upon.
Respondents have not presented evidence to contradict the stipulations in the
contract.
The REM, it bears to stress, having been notarized, is a public document, thus
accorded the benefit of certain presumptions. Being a public document, it enjoys the
presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be clear and convincing
evidence. Absent such evidence, as in this case, the presumption must be upheld.
Given the above perspective, the Court accords full credence to the proposition that
both parcels of land in question were simultaneously mortgaged on January 28, 1992.
Whether or not the mortgage was valid. (YES)
Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides that a mortgage contract, to be valid, must
have the following requisites: (a) that it be constituted to secure the fulfilment of a
principal obligation; (b) that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
mortgaged; and (c) that the persons constituting the mortgage have free disposal of
their property, and in the absence of free disposal, that they be legally authorized for
the purpose. The presence of the second requisite—absolute ownership—is the
contentious determinative issue.
Contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, the evidence on record reveals that, at the
time the subject mortgage was created, respondent Alejandro was the declared owner
of Lot No. 10. His ownership is reflected in TD No. 59006 issued in 1990 which was
prior to the constitution of the mortgage on Lot No. 10 in January 1992. The fact of
being in actual possession of the property is another indication of such ownership.
The records are bereft of evidence, other than respondents’ bare and self-serving
assertion, to support their contention about being mere applicants in a social housing
project at the time and that Lot No. 10 was, indeed, government property. And as may
be noted, TD No. 59006 was issued in Alejandro’s name, two (2) years prior to the
constitution of the REM.

The Contract to Sell shows that it contemplates a different object. The contract, to
stress, is one for the sale of Unit No. 10 in the Rural Bliss I Project, having an area of
36 sqm. Its Clause IV specifically refers to the unit being sold as a “dwelling unit"
(read: house). The Contract to Sell of Unit No. 10 presented by respondents has
nothing to do with this case, as it is not in any way related to the mortgage contract.
And as between the Contract to Sell and TD No. 59006, categorically stating that
respondent Alejandro is the owner of Lot No. 10 since the time of its issuance on
September 12, 1990, the latter ought to be the superior evidence as to who owns Lot
No. 10.
Not only was the tax declaration in Alejandro’s name, but also, respondents admittedly
possessed the property mortgaged, their residence being constructed on it--a prima
facie proof of ownership which respondents failed to rebut.
Whether or not the respondents were guilty of estoppel by deed. (YES)
Rule 131, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court, enunciating the principle of estoppel,
states, “Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it.”
Respondents’ act of entering into the mortgage contract with petitioner, benefiting
through the receipt of the loaned amount, defaulting in payment of the loan, letting
the property be foreclosed, failing to redeem the property within the redemption
period, and thereafter insisting that the mortgage is void, cannot be countenanced.
Respondents are estopped from contesting the validity of the mortgage, absent any
proof that PNB coerced or fraudulently induced respondents into posting Lot No. 10 as
collateral.
Even if We assume, for the sake of argument, that respondents did not intend to
deceive petitioner when they used Lot No. 10 as collateral, still respondents cannot
arbitrarily reverse their position to the damage and prejudice of the bank absent any
showing that the latter accepted the mortgage over Lot No. 10 in bad faith.
PEOPLE v. LAGAHIT (sold
sticks of the good herb; got
acquitted)

SC: Guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Lagahit is presumed innocent until proven guilty under Article III Section 14(2) of
constitution and Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which states:
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
Elements for prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs like marijuana:
1.

identities of buyer and seller, the object, and consideration

2.

delivery of the thing sold and payment for it

Elements for prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs like marijuana:
1.

accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified as a prohibited
drug

2.

possession is not authorized by law

3.

accused freely and consciously possessed the drug

Since the drug is the corpus delicti of the crime, it must be identified and the chain of
custody must be observed. Chain of custody is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, that implements the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition .
In People v. Gatlabayan citing People v. Kamad, this Court enumerated the links that
the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
Prosecution evidence failed to show the essential links in the chain of custody (even
though prosecution proved the identities of the seller and buyer). In particular,
prosecution failed to show how the 4 sticks came into the hands of PO3 Lawas Jr from
the trusted informant/poseur-buyer. (After the exchange of money and the bull cap
signal from the informant, another person approached Lagahit and they walked
towards opposite side of road. PO3 Lawas and the brgy tanods followed them until
they apprehended Lagahit and searched him which led to the recovery of 8 more
sticks, the mared 20peso bill, and cash (90pesos). Thereafter Lagahit was brought to
the brgy hall and then to the police station. All the seized items remained with PO3
Lawas until they reached the police stations where the items were marked.
There was no mention how the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes, which
were the subject of the sale transaction, came into the hands ofPO3 Lawas, Jr. from
the trusted informant. PO3 Lawas, Jr.’s testimony was lacking as to when, where and
how the said four sticks of handrolled marijuanacigarettes sold by the appellant to the
trusted informant were turned over to him by the latter. In the same manner, PO3
Lawas,Jr. failed to state that he actually seized the sold four sticks of
handrolled marijuana cigarettes. Considering that PO3 Lawas, Jr. was not the
poseur-buyer and he was not even with the poseur buyer during the sale transaction
as he was on the opposite side of the road, the turning over to him by the trusted
informant of the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes sold by the appellant
was the supposed first link in the chain of custody. Given this missing link, reasonable
doubt arises as to the first charge (selling of marijuana).
As for the possession case, prosecution satisfied the elements of the crime but they
failed to show that theapprehending team complied with the required procedure for
the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs
set forth in Section 21, ArticleII of Republic Act No. 9165:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied).
The specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid
down under the Implementing Rules and Regulations for Republic Act No. 9165,
particularly Section 21(a), Article II thereof, and it is the prosecution’s burden to
adduce evidence that these procedures have been complied with in proving

the elements of the offense.
In this case, records don't show any physical inventory or photograph of confiscated
items. Even the marking wasn't shown to have been done in his presence. While noncompliance with Section 21 may not be fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team, these conditions, however, were not
met in the present case.
RECUERDO v. PEOPLE
(dentist’s checks bounced
after buying jewelry; did not
allege good faith as defense
but instead assailed
jurisdiction)

Estafa is committed with dolo (malice) and thus malice and specific intent to defraud
are required. General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is
properly applied only to deliberate acts done on purpose and with design.
Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter of fact,
must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may be shown,
however, by the nature of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed,
the means employed and the motive of the accused. The law provides that, in estafa,
prima facie evidence of deceit is established upon proof that the drawer of the
check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
(3) days from receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of
funds.
Thus in estafa, good faith is a defense (lack of malice) but it must be proved.
Recuerdo raised the defense of good faith as a mere afterthought because she raised it
only in her Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision. In Pascual v. Ramos, the SC
held that if an issue is raised only in the MR of the appellate court's decision, it is as if
it was never raised in that court at all.
Besides, other evidence shows her lack of good faith. She intransigently refused to
make payments despite demands and only started making payments after the CA
affirmed her conviction. The deposit slips she appended in her MR did not even show
which checks they were made in payment for.
Also, even if 9 of the 17 checks were honored, and even if she paid every bit of the
amounts in the checks, her criminal liability is not extinguished.
Recuerdo cannot rely on the Ojeda case because Ojeda made prompt gradual
payments until she paid all of her debt.

RACINES v. MORALLOS
(Racines filed complaint
against respondent judge
and Sheriff Cabusao, SC
then held him in contempt)

Persons guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt.
The filing of clearly unfounded or malicious complaints seriously affects the efficiency
of the members of the judiciary in administering fair, speedy and impartial justice. The
Court, mindful of the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or
criminal cases filed by losing litigants and disgruntled lawyers against members of the
judiciary, therefore issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC.
Paragraph 1 provides that if upon informal preliminary inquiry it is found that
the complaint is unfounded, baseless and merely intended to harass
respondent, complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court. And if the complainant is a lawyer, he may be
further required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
Racines tries to escape liability by saying that Atty. Manalad did not explain the
contents of the pleadings to him, because if Atty. Manalad did, he would not have
signed the same.
The Court is not convinced. It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act and unless the requirements for proper substitution

were made, a lawyer enjoys the presumption of authority given him by his client.
Racines does not deny that the signatures in the pleadings were his. He also does not
claim that he was prevented by Atty. Manalad from reading the contents thereof. He
only said that since he fully trusted Atty. Manalad.
SPS MANUEL v. ONG (Sps
Ong were in default in a case
for accion reivindicatoria;
they aver they weren’t
served summons by the
sheriff)

The Spouses Manuel’s self-serving assertion must crumble in the face of the clear
declarations in the sheriff’s return. The acts of Sheriff Joselito Sales and the
events relating to the attempt to personally hand the summons and a copy of the
complaint to the Spouses Manuel, as detailed in the sheriff’s return, enjoy the
presumption of regularity. Moreover, Sheriff Joselito Sales must be presumed to
have taken ordinary care and diligence in carrying out his duty to make service
upon the proper person(s) and not upon an impostor.
A sheriff’s return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of
regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the
circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the
Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-serving) claim of maintaining residence
elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything irregular about the
sheriff’s return or that it was otherwise incomplete.

TARAPEN v. PEOPLE

The defense failed to specify which evidence was suppressed. It simply made a
general statement that the prosecution witnesses allegedly did not tell the
truth and thus deliberately suppressed material evidence favorable to the
petitioner.
The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is not applicable when
(1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is
merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both
parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. In the case at
bar, the prosecution witnesses who allegedly suppressed material evidence
were presented in court and were cross-examined by the defense counsel. How
then can the defense claim there was suppression?
The burden of evidence that one acted in self-defense shifted to Tarapen. Like an alibi,
self-defense is inherently weak, for it is easy to fabricate. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if
the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of
responsibility for the killing.

UNIWIDE v. TITAN-IKEDA
(Uniwide failed to pay
respondents  CIAC decided
in favor of respondents 
Uniwide assailed CIAC
decision)

As a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. As an exception, the SC however may inquire into these factual
issues since the CIAC and the Court of Appeals differed in their findings.

PEOPLE v. CASABUENA
(was caught selling shabu in
a buy-bust operation;
contested presumption of
regularity and was
successful)

The SC held that there was NO PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIE WHEN THERE IS DEVIATION FROM
REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF DUTY, IE, PROCEDURE. Citing People v Obmiranis,
the court said that when the official act in question was irregular, an adverse
presumption arises. In other words, public officers have in their favor the presumption
of regularity, only when they follow the regular procedure. In the case at bar, the cops
did not follow the regular procedure, and neither did they show cause for deviating.
The court notes that a walk-in informant is highly irregular. The fact that the cops did
not mark the sachets properly was highly irregular.

BACULI v. BELEN (contempt
cases against judge)

Baculia and Comilang should have adduced the necessary evidence to prove
bad faith. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the following
presumptions stand: (1) that official duty has been regularly performed and
(2) that a judge was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
A judge cannot be held administratively liable for every wrong decision. All that is
expected is that he follow the rules to ensure a fair hearing. Not every error is
ignorance of the law. In the case at bar, Belen followed the proper procedure in citing

SPS. CARPO v. ALI (wanted
to recover land from Ayala
on the basis of an older title;
Carpos were defeated after
failing to overturn
presumption of regularity)
PEOPLE v. GO

complaintant in contempt of court.
Under the ROC, indirect contempt proceedings may be filed either (a) motu proprios
by the court or (b) by a verified petition. The judge followed the rules in filing a
contempt proceedings motu proprio.
Baculi and Comilang were afforded the opportunity to present defense but they failed
to do so. Baculi blatantly refused to answer the charges against him. It cannot be said
that Belen did not afford Baculi the opportunity to be heard.
Though a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of
registration, it can be assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALI’s
predecessor-in-interest upon the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred
jurisdiction is deemed to have exercised all necessary powers to exercise jurisdiction
and to have exercised it effectively.
Once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system and time has passed
to render the title perfect, it cannot later on be questioned
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently proved estafa – YES, the
prosecution successfully proved that the elements of estafa were present.
TOPICAL:
1. As to the 2nd element of estafa (misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt) the evidence
establishes that the Manager’s Checks were encashed using the bank’s funds
and then deposited to Go’s accounts. These amounts were then used to fund
Go’s personal checks. The evidence strongly indicates Go converted OCBC
funds for his personal use and benefit.
2. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption
of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of
the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts. The mere presumption or misappropriation or conversion is
enough to conclude that a probable cause exists for the indictment.

ROSARIO v. SORIA (father
sold to his children some lots
without consideration 
granddaughter and her
mother and husband named
Ha, [wtf kind of name is
Ham, fucking sweet meat
with trimming of fat]
conspired to take advantage
of his frail state to execute
an SPA and resell the
property to developer
failed to overcome
presumption of regularity of
first deed of sale)
SIAIN ENTERPRISES v.
CUPERTINO (Siain had
balances with banks which
were paid via escrow and
loans from Cupertino 
Cupertino moved to
foreclose on the amount
owed  Siain contested

Whether or not respondents were guilty of falsification of commercial document – YES,
the prosecution also successfully proved that the elements of falsification of
commercial document were present
TOPICAL (presumption of forgery)
1. Whenever someone has in his possession falsified documents which he used to
his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises.
2. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be
proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. In
the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a
forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.
The first deed of sale was valid. The following are disputable presumptions: (Sec. 3
Rule 131)
a.
Private transactions have been fair and regular
b.
Ordinary course of business has been followed
c.
There was sufficient consideration for a contract
The respondents failed to trounce the presumption. Aside from the bare allegation that
there was no consideration, they failed to supply evidence to back up this claim. The
only evidence (which was relied by the CA heavily) was Lourdes' testimony, but this is
self-serving.

Applicable Rules and Laws
Rule 131.3 (r) and 131.1 (s):
Disputable presumptions.— The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
(r) That there was sufficient consideration for a contract;

foreclosure on ground it
never received P160M from
Cupaltino)

(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
Negotiable Instruments Law; Section 24 Presumption of consideration. Every
negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a
party thereto for value.
A disputable presumption that the loan was supported by consideration arose
because:
(1) Such consideration was deemed received because the agreements contained
the statements: “for value received”
(2) Cupertino was authorized to dispose of the properties in a public auction in
the event of default of payment.
(3) Chain of documents continuously affirmed the nature of their agreement: 1 st
PN – Amended 1st PN – REM – 2nd PN – Amended REM.
Bare faced denial of Siain without supporting evidence cannot overcome this
disputable presumption.

DUARTE v. DURAN (Duran
sold laptop to Duarte, gave
trial period of two days 
Duarte paid DP of 5k/15k,
reneged on paying the rest
claiming it was a loan with
Dy with laptop as collateral
coupled with option to buy)

MANUEL v. PEOPLE (39 y/o
man had a tryst with a 21 y/o
whom he called a GRO 
admitted he cheated but it’s
ok because 1st wife has been
MIA for 20 years)

(1) Siain manifested that it would provide rebuttal evidence but never did so.
(2) Such failure to provide rebuttal evidence is an implied admission of
Cupertino’s evidence that consideration was given.
(3) Even evidence exists, it is presumed to be willingly suppressed and thus
adverse.
(4) Presentation by Siain of Cash Journal Receipt Book for the year 1995 does not
help its cause because the transactions happened prior to 1995. It was also
prepared solely at the behest Siain and is therefore self-serving and tainted
with lack of credibility.
Burden of Proof: Since Siain brought the action, it has the burden of proof to
establish that it did not receive any of the proceeds. It did not do so with respect to
the P160M. They even tried to establish a pattern of violations by claiming that they
never received the P37M of the 1st PN. SC said this is idiotic because the P37M was
placed in escrow with Metrobank to pay off the DBP loan so there would never
actually be a transfer to Siain.
RE contract of sale
(1) Elements: A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon
the object of the sale, the price, and the terms of payment, regardless of form.
(2) Statute of Frauds does not apply in the present case the contract of sale had
been partially executed and possession already transferred to Duarte and the
partial payments made by her.
(3) Preponderance of evidence that there was an oral contract of sale,
a. Duran’s own affidavit,
b. Affidavit of his witness Dy
c. Receipt dated February 18, 2002
d. Demand letter dated July 29, 2002.
(4) No other evidence submitted by Duarte except for bare denials.
(5) Alleged loan was a mere afterthought since it appears that from the time she
allegedly decided not to buy the laptop up to the time the instant case was
filed against her, she did not exert any effort to recover from respondent the
payment of the alleged loan.
RE receipt
(1) NOT an actionable document
(2) However, it corroborates the testimonies of Duran and his witness Dy that
there was an oral contract of sale between the parties.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse.
This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal
prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with
the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good
faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already

established
What evidence must be adduced? A decision of a competent court declaring
the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and
(b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.

VILLANUEVA v. BALAGUER
(Villanueva was dismissed
for lack of confidence 
reports came up allegedly
defaming him 

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is
presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the
private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1.

Does the failure to respond to a letter containing statements adverse to him may
be used in evidence against him?--NO

The lack of response to the letter is not an admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130.
He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he
wishes to prove the facts and impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a
duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions in
the absence of further circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no
effect as an admission.
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if
the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if
there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed. The rule on admission
by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in one’s presence or when
one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no mutual correspondence
between the parties.
2.

Is the admission by a principal admissible against its agent? Is the admission by a
person jointly interested with a party admissible against the latter? Not in this
case.

IBC-13’s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively created an adverse interest between
them. Hence, the admission of one defendant is not admissible against his codefendant.
3.

Does the failure of an individual to disown the attribution to him by newspaper
publications, as the source of defamatory newspaper reports, when he is free and
very able to do so, constitute admission that he, indeed, was the source of the said
defamatory news reports?—NO

Admissions should be clear and unambiguous which can hardly be said of Balaguer’s
above testimony. If Balaguer intended to admit the allegation that he conducted a
press conference and caused the publication of the news articles, he could have done
so. Instead, Balaguer specifically denied these allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his

Answer.
As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state what the
defendant said are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be held responsible for
the writings of third persons. While the subject news items indicated that Balaguer
was the source of the columnists, proving that he truly made such statements is
another matter. Petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did make such statements.
ATIENZA v. BOM (wrong
kidney case)

Vda. AVENIDO v. AVENIDO
(Respondent Tecla was the
first wife of Eustaquio 
Eustaquio left and married
two other woman  Tecla
filed complaint for
declaration of nullity of
marriage between E and P)

It is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent,
for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the
court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of WON the circumstance (or
evidence) is to be considered at all. The probative value of evidence refers to the
question of WON it proves an issue.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Vda de Jacob v. CA: Marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence. Truly, the
execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.
Due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to
the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence.
Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by
the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: rationale behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio
– Always presume marriage.
The establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the
parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

BARRIDO v. NONATO
(Marriage between parties

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage,

invalidated under 36 
Nonato filed for partition 
MTCC adjudicated land in
favor of Barrido because she
had custody of children)

however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall beowned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

ESTATE of ONG v. DIAZ
(Ong sexed Jinky Diaz, who
birthed Joanne Diaz 
Treater her like his own
child until he vanished like
soap suds  Joanne sought
recognition which the CA
granted)

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the
present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to
face:
1. a prima facie case,
2. affirmative defenses,
3. presumption of legitimacy, and
4. physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As
a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of
the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of
the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about
by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of
genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through
DNA testing.