Moya v Del Fierro

Moya filed a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of CA declaring respondent
Agripino Ga. Del Fierro as the candidate elect for the office of mayor of Paracale, Cam
Norte with a majority vote of three votes over Moya. Moya contended that the CA erred
in admitting and counting ballots marked “R. del Fierro”, “Rufino del Fierro”, “P. del
Fierro” and ballots inadvertently or contrary to the controlling decisions of in favor of the
Whether or not the technical rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the
voter discoverable from the ballot itself.
No, technical rules should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter if that
intention is discoverable from the ballot itself. The SC dismissed the petition because in
result even if the ballots contested are counted in favor of Moya, del Fierro still wins by
one vote. The SC avers that in republicanism, the enfranchised citizen, as a particle of
popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority, he has a
voice in his representative type of government. It is the solemn duty of the judiciary to
when called upon to act in justifiable cases to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate
it. The ballots should be read and appreciated, it not outmost, with reasonable liberality

Mercado vs. Manzano

Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc. The motion remained pending until after the election. 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. 7160 Sec. The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R. While dual citizenship is involuntary.A. the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. 40 of the Local Government Code. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Held: No. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation. a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. loyalty to two or more states. by some positive act. Issue: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local position. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. The former arises when. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes. Article IV Sec. effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states. 7854 Sec.Facts: Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11.A. as far as the laws of this country are concerned. 40 (d) and R. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen." The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship. persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country. private respondent has. Dual allegiance on the other hand. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. .

A. the basis of the COMELEC resolution. and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R. The resolution provides that. No. shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. “Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.Quinto vs.” RA 9369 provides that . COMELEC Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. 9369.

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only. the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. however. and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. yet equally compelling. there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny. No. perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional Held: No To start with. REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s ." In the instant case. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations. interest of deferring to the sovereign will. In other words. In contrast. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term. including active members of the armed forces. (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law. shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided. the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. the Legislature.“For this purpose. Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first. also thought it wise to balance this with the competing. Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R. That. An election is the embodiment of the popular will. is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions. That any person holding a public appointive office or position. third and fourth requisites of reasonableness.A. efficiency. the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration. unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided. IN VIEW WHEREOF. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. and discipline of the public service. because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one. proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law. It. complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. finally.

there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. or those in the civil or military service. 9369. does not amount to the issuance of an appointment. shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. Held: No. 1995. DISMISS the Petition. (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 1994 of the Commission on Elections. including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations. Tapispisan v Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioner Tapispisan. Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule. Petitioner contended that the designation was made in violation of appointments and promotion during election period. to any election other than a partisan one. CSC argued that only appointments/promotions and not designation can be the subject of a protest. Designation. provincial or national official or employee. Rumbaoa as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)Head Teacher of P. ============== Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal. 1995 up to June 7. Transfer is defined as "a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank. level or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an . which declared as a prohibited act the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period from January 8. and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369. For this reason. but is a mere imposition of additional duties. and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. a public school teacher and has been occupying the position of Teacher III filed a petition for review on certiorari to reverse the decision of CA affirming the resolutions of Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissing the petitioner’s protest against the designation of respondent Aida M. Villanueva Elementary School and respondent Myrna M. under the present state of law. 2731 dated December 5. 8678. and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School. being temporary in nature. city.December 1. 2009 Decision. Issue: Whether or not the designation of Rumbaoa and Teves violates Resolution No.

" The designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves did not involve a movement from one position to another. respondents Rumbaoa and Teves retained their incumbent positions at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School. . Neither did it involve the issuance of any appointment to the said positions in their favor. As such. their designation could not be considered as a "transfer" within the meaning of a prohibited act during the election period. In fact.appointment.