Use Maximum-Credible Accident
Scenarios for Realistic and
Reliable Risk Assessment

Faisal I. Khan,
Memorial Univ.
of Newfoundland

Posing various possible incidents — rather than just
the worst-case one — illuminates those that are really
important and are most likely. Such knowledge can
enhance safety and planning for emergencies.


here have been many methodologies proposed
for the risk assessment in the chemical process
industries (CPI). Among them, the most notable
ones are quantitative risk analysis, probabilistic
safety analysis, worst-case methodology for
risk assessment and optimal risk analysis. A critical review of these methodologies is available (1). The key
points of these methods are:
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) — This method
is comprised of four steps: hazard identification, frequency estimation, consequence analysis and measure of risk.
The first step answers the question: What can go
wrong? This is the most important step because hazards
that are not identified will not be quantified, leading to
an underestimated risk (2, 3). The techniques used for
hazard identification include hazard indices, hazard and
operability (HAZOP) studies, failure mode and effect
analysis (FMEA), what-if analysis and checklists. After
the hazards are identified, the scope of a QRA is defined. The second step asks: How likely is the occurrence of each accident? Answering this question means
quantifying of the probability of each accident scenario.
The third step aims to quantify the negative impacts
of the envisaged accident scenario. The consequences


November 2001


are normally measured in terms of the number of fatalities, although they can also be determined by the
number of injuries or value of the property lost. The
last step of a QRA is to calculate the actual risk.
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) — Different techniques can be combined to carry out PSA (4, 5, 6). PSA
provides a framework for a systematic analysis of hazards and quantification of the corresponding risks. It
also establishes a basis for supporting safety-related decision-making. The methodology and the procedures
followed for the PSA of a typical chemical installation
handling a hazardous substance can be outlined in seven
major steps: (1) hazard identification; (2) accident-sequence modeling; (3) data acquisition and parameter estimation; (4) accident-sequence quantification; (5) hazardous substance-release-categories assessment; (6)
consequence assessment; and (7) integration of results.
Worst-case methodology for risk assessment — An
excellent work on hazard and risk screening based on
worst-case methodology is presented by Hirst and
Carter (7). The method does not discuss use of worstcase scenarios in detailed risk assessment, but rather
outlines the development of ready-made and easy-touse risk indices, such as the risk integral, scaled risk integral and approximate risk integral, for early planning

while foreseeing worst-case scenarios is ference in the envisaged accident scenarios. In practice. There is a wide variation in the risk-assessment studies consequence modeling. and (4) risk estimation (Figure 1). (2) hazard assessment (both qualitative and probabilistic). but in principle should be ty and is likely to be severe enough to cause significant continued to embrace the consequences of the redamage. Moreover. and these may not “For a potential release. identification process should not stop at the point A credible accident is one within the realm of possibiliwhere a release occurs. it has much detail about its mode and further escalation. the population distribution factor. it just depends upon the type/quantity of the chemical in the unit (8). Although this Accident Scenario methodology computes these indices based on the worst-case of an accident in a unit. This point also been observed that only one or two scenarios are deis cited in the magnum opus on loss prevention by Lees (11): veloped for a possible accident in a unit.cepmagazine. A small error or this aspect is usually treated as part of the hazard a bit of ignorance in these subjective judgments (in particuassessment. This would help in developing more tion and against which measure might be taken appropriate and effective strategies for crisis prevention will be missed. it Qualitative Hazard Assessment makes the computation more realistic by • optHAZOP procedure Aid to Develop • TOPHAZOP tool considering many parameters. ORA involves four steps: (1) hazard identifiProbabilistic Hazard Assessment • PROFAT tool cation and screening. on the subjective judgment of the analyst. However. little attention is paid in envisioning credible sceunit. it is necessary not reflect the true important possible incidents.Modularization of Complete Plant into Manageable Units and decision-making. (1. For the same common. escalation appears to be a rather neglected topic. Moreover. Optimal risk analysis (ORA) — This is a fairly new means for risk analysis (1. cedure is named ORA as it is 57 . Central to all of these methods is predicting accident scenarios. Significant advancement has been made in developing newer means for hazard and risk assessment. 9). then a detailed Aid to Develop risk assessment be made. and user-friendly computer-aided conducted by different groups. 10). Foremost in this is the diftools. However. the more accurate the foreness matching that applied to the identification of casting will be for this type of accident. since the • MOSEC for fire and explosions worst-case scenario remains almost constant • HAZDIG for toxic release and dispersion • DOMIFFECT for cascading effects for different units. the development of accident scenarios) can yield errothere is a danger that. lar. while another group imagines neers often describe just one type of release. such as condiAccident Scenario tional plume probability. This method does not actually Quantitative Hazard Assessment/Consequence Assessment assess the hazard/risk in a unit. features which permit escalaand associated risks. it is necessary to have some systematic procedure CEP November 2001 www. which may and significance of credibility are mostly qualitative. a set of scenarStop ios is developed and subsequently analyzed for detailed consequences. The more rethe escalation modes is treated with a thoroughalistic the accident scenario. its consequences the release modes. one group foresees a small leak from the joints and narios. This is due to only to identify a source but also to decide on the the absence of any homogeneous system for accident-scenature of the release which could occur … The nario envisaging and credibility assessment. This pro■ Figure 1.” Thus. (3) quantification of hazards or consequence analysis. unless the identification of neous results or make the study meaningless. Whilst this is a reasonable approach. based allow these consequences to escalate. and weather and directional probabilities. The identification of the modes of and management (12). It is recommended that Hazard Identification if the values of computed risk indices are • HIRA Technique above acceptance criteria. what constitutes reasonable probability lease and the failures and other events. less time-consuming to conduct an optimal risk and more-precise than alternative analyses analysis (ORA). without giving an explosive release of all vessel contents. less exRisk Estimation Steps and methods used pensive to implement. the scenarios developed by safety engiestimates risk based on that.

For these plans. An accident scenario forms a focal point of a heuristic process. Worst-case accident scenario The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) was passed in 1986. Such scenarios are generated based on the properties of chemicals handled by industry. It enables use of the wisdom of hindsight and state-of-the-art knowledge to evaluate its impact in forecasting accident situations.cepmagazine. in the wake of the tragic chemical accident in Bhopal. proximity to other industries or neighborhoods. etc. Worst-case accident scenarios indicate the geographic . 13). ponds. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommends that LEPCs either prepare themselves or request facilities to prepare emergency plans based on worst-case scenarios (8. It may contain a single event or a combination of them. present and future. it tells us what may happen so that we can devise ways and means of preventing or minimizing the possibility. etc. Accident scenario This is a description of an expected situation. etc. LEPCs must prepare comprehensive emergency plans outlining local chemical hazards and emergency response procedures. accident scenarios have been proposed as single events. In most of the past risk-assessment reports.S. Non-operational Parameters Chemical characteristics Ignition source Quantity of chemical released Atmospheric conditions Degree of confinement Site characteristics The logistics of generating an accident scenario. Also. The scenario is a reference 58 www. in-built valves and safety arrangements. A scenario is neither a specific situation nor a specific event. only that there is a reasonable probability that it could. presence of trees. rivers in the vicinity. such as site characteristics (topography. a scenario should describe the complete situation (right from release mode to the subsequent events). External factors. Creating a scenario does not mean that it will occur. physical conditions under which reactions occur or reactants/products are stored. Past case studies show that an accident occurs as a sequence or combination of events. to decide which are the most credible. but a description of a typical situation that covers a set of possible events or situations (Figure 2). further. the U. It is the basis of the risk study. and. need also be November 2001 CEP point. EPCRA established some systems to cope with chemical emergencies including Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). Release under high pressure Normal continuous release Normal instantaneous release Non-operational Parameters Chemical properties Toxicity Atmospheric conditions Quantity released Site characteristics Safe No Yes No Is the chemical flammable/reactive? Is the chemical toxic? Yes Yes Fire Fireball Flash fire Pool fire Jet fire Explosion CVCE BLEVE VCE Vented explosion Dispersion of Toxic Chemical Toxic load ■ Figure 2. as well as geometries/material strengths of vessels and conduits. India.Safety Accidental Release of Chemical Operational Data Temperature Pressure Capacity of the unit Chemical characteristics. as well as a link between the past. Accident Scenario: Sequence of events or guidelines to envisage all probable accident scenarios.) and meteorological conditions. which is not a valid way of imagining an incident.

but would cause very little damage. often. On the other hand. • In using the worst-case scenario. the central criterion is what constitutes a credible accident. one could go further and describe the cause of the leak as well. but due to proper control measures or lesser quantities of chemicals released. it is not always true that a release of toxic chemical would be the most disastrous one. Many companies are questioning the significance of the worst-case accident scenario concept and opposing the national and public data systems that include the risk management plan (RMP) on the Internet (8). Past accident analysis reveals that most of the catastrophic accidents occurred in ignorance (the accident was not foreseen) and either in areas marked yellow (not highly hazardous) or where the control arrangements were inadequate (control measures based on less credible scenarios). more accurate estimation of its probability would be done in the subsequent step of de- CEP November 2001 www. including worst-case accident scenarios. 21). 19) comprises both parameters — probable damage caused by an accident and its probability of occurrence. In the next step. 20). If the accident is found to be credible. release of a chemical from a vent or relief valve.e. because here. and has been subject to criticism.cepmagazine. This would overcome the following major limitations of the worst-case-accident-scenario approach: • In the worst-case method. this author feels that this procedure is adequate. 17. the worst-case accident scenario may not be the best approach. damage radii are calculated for each scenario. but a little crude. these scenarios are also critical for pollution prevention. they are controlled effectively. EPA and other regulatory agencies have been canvassing the worst-case scenarios for emergency planning. Maximum credibility should be set by regulatory agencies. However. probability higher than 1 × 10–6/yr) and has a propensity to cause significant damage (at least one fatality). but less-damage-causing accidents can create large financial losses and.area (the vulnerable zone) affected by the worst-possible accident at a facility in which people would be at risk of life and health. These accidents generally are controlled before they escalate by using control systems and monitoring devices — used because such piping and equipment are known to sometimes fail or malfunction. A credible accident is defined as: an accident that is within the realm of possibility (i. 18. Methodology for MCAS The first step of the MCAS methodology develops all plausible accident scenarios in the unit (Figure 3). pump or valve. only one-parameter damage potential is considered. the probability of each accident scenario is estimated. the probability of an accident is also equally important. and make them available to the public. particularly if the domino effect were considered (12. In the second step. There are two options available — one is to use Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index (for fire and explosion scenarios) and the Mond Toxic Index (for toxic and corrosive releases and dispersions) (9. The description must not reduce the freedom of finding solutions and must not restrict the means available for solution. 14. The later process of probability estimation is easy. and fire in a pump due to overheating. A detailed description of the maximum-credible-accident-scenario approach is now presented. The other is to employ the indices proposed by Khan and Abbasi (1.. A few examples are a leak from a gasket. the control measures or emergency plans are not so effective. The 1984 incident in Mexico and one in Vishakhapatnam. This concept (11. This is because few or even no accidents have been reported. and the probability of its occurrence is generally ignored. The Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990 require companies to prepare risk management programs. the author agrees with CAAA and Right to Know Act. Maximum-credible accident scenarios In using maximum-credible accident scenarios (MCAS). and toxic damage index (TDI) for flammable and toxic chemicals. A good accident scenario should describe the most prime cause of an event. These scenarios typically consider the nearinstantaneous release of the entire amount of a chemical stored at a facility and assume the failure of mitigation and safety systems. There may be types of accidents that may occur frequently. And there may be others that may cause great damage. However. Past accident analysis reveals that frequent. but would have a very low probability of occurrence. as in Bhopal. Although. depending upon the vulnerability of a site. emergency or risk-management planning is done mostly based on the release and dispersion of toxics as they cover maximum distances and may cause a large number of fatalities by a short exposure. This can be done using quantitative hazard indices. a fire and explosion damage index (FEDI). A credible accident scenario should contain two sets of information: a description of the situation and its probability of occurrence. Both would be considered accidents. leading to problems. In such situations. India (1997) are clear evidence of this (15. An example: Define a leak rate instead of an explosion 59 . The disaster at Vishakhapatnam proves that most of the risk and hazard studies are lacking in envisaging the credible accident scenarios. 15). This author feels that RMPs and other emergency plans should be based on the maximum-credible accident scenarios. There may be number of accidents that occur quite frequently. even a small leak may lead to a disastrous accident. However. respectively. This can be done using either industryspecific data (failure rates of various components used in a process unit) or the data available in the literature (frequencies of occurrence of the same event under similar conditions). as the objective is to get a rough estimate of probability. 11. therefore. can escalate to catastrophic proportions due to negligence. 16). there are less problematic areas/units that are generally ignored or not given due attention.

has a suggested value = 10–2. and toxic events. The use of more reliable methods of probability estimation (e. These costs are not justifiable at this stage 60 www. . asset density of the site. 9. if the population is localized and away from the point of accident.Safety Take One Unit Develop All Plausible Accident Scenarios Consider One Accident Scenario Flammable Toxic Is the Chemical Flammable or Toxic? Both Flammable and Toxic Calculate Factor A Calculate Factor B Calculate Factor AA Calculate Factor C Calculate Factor BB Calculate Credibility Factor L1 Calculate Credibility Factor L2 of formulating the accident scenario. If the population is uniformly distributed in the region of study (~2. accident scenarios can be divided into three main groups: fire and where i is the number of events (from i = 1 to n). For example. PDF1. the unacceptable fatality rate. and both fire and explosion.. The estimating procedures follow for each of the three incident groups.e. fault-tree analysis) not only requires large sets of data. In real life.000/yr for UFL. Fatalities: Similar to the factor for financial loss. the factor is assigned a value of 1. etc. the population distribution factor. fire. is estimated for each accident scenario: PD1 = PD1 × PDF1 No November 2001 CEP (2) (3) Bi = (AR)i × (PR)i × (PD1)i/UFR (4) B = minimum (1. to define credibility.. UFL is the unacceptable financial loss. so a loss higher than this unacceptable. but also large amounts of computational time.. Scenarios involving fires and explosions Financial loss: Factor A accounts for the damage to property or assets and may be estimated for each scenario using: Ai = (AR)i × (PR)i × (AD)i /UFL (1) Calculate Total Credibility Factor L A = minimum (1.2 is assigned. Once damage radii and probabilities are known for each damaging event.g. tailed risk assessment. three factors — A. Steps in the most-credible-accident scenarios (MCAS) method. i. According to the characteristics of the chemical. such as population density. B. ΣAi) Classify Credibility of the Scenario Is it Credible? No Yes List the Scenario Are all Units Over? Yes Short-list the Most Credible Accident Scenarios ■ Figure 3. many times the third type of accident occurs.cepmagazine. the fatality factor. the lowest value of 0. Values for this parameter has been adapted from Ref. reflects the heterogeneity of the population distribution. a loss of $1 million/100 yr may be just tolerable to an organization. We suggest a value of $10. ΣBi) (5) UFR. explosion.000-m radius). B and C — are computed using site-specific information. release and dispersion of a toxic or corrosive fluid.

BB is computed for each and the highest value is used. for fatality and ecosystem damage.) These three factors are combined together to yield L1 by: L1 = [1 – (1 – A)(1 – B)(1 – C)] (8) Scenarios involving toxic release and dispersion Unlike for fire and explosion. lake. In case of an accident scenario involving more than one chemical. dimensionless credibility factor for fire and explosion hazard. In this reference. so 0. the importance factor.000-m radius). is a measure of the spread of potential damage. Delphi was used to quantify some parameters of the AHI. dimensionless population density in the vicinity of the event (fire and explosion) up to ~2. the maximum possible damage area is estimated considering a slightly stable or stable condition. $/yr unacceptable fatality rate. BB and CC.Importance Factor 1 0. the authors use a parameter ecosystem damage-penalty for the quantification of an accident hazard index. m2/yr unacceptable financial loss.000-m radius.6 Nomenclature 0. forest.000 m2/yr. which reflects the heterogeneity of the population distribution in the region of 1. Credibility Zone Classification of credibility. This parameter was quantified based on a comprehensive Delphi (22). dimensionless population distribution factor for toxic release and dispersion. which can be estimated as: Ci = (AR)i × (PR)i × (IM)i/UDA (6) C = minimum (1. 22. AHI. dimensionless credibility factor toxic hazard. maximum of BBi) (11) Maximum Credibility Zone where i denotes the particular chemical released.4 0. from Figure 4. i.0 Uncertainty Zone 0. These are computed using the following equations: PD2 = PD2 × PDF2 PDF1 = PDF2= PR = UDA = UFL = UFR = WPF = factor for damage to property or assets asset density in the vicinity of the event. However.5 BBi = (AR)i × (PR) × (PD2) × (WPF)/UFR (10) BB = minimum (1. Importance factor. km ■ Figure 4. persons/yr weather probability factor.. ΣCi) (7) UDA. two factors are estimated here. The method of quantification is same as for PDF1.2 ■ Figure 5.2 0 0 1 5 10 50 Distance of Vulnerable Ecosystem from the Accident Site. etc. A AD AR B BB C CC IM L L1 L2 PD1 = = = = = = = = = = = = PD2 = Ecosystem damage: Factor C signifies ecosystem damage. this condition may not prevail at all times. PDF2 defines the population distribution factor. m2 factor for fatalities factor for toxic release and dispersion for fatalities factor for ecosystem damage factor for toxic release and dispersion for ecosystem damage importance factor.000-m radius. (Delphi is a technique to quantify subjective parameters through an opinion survey of a team of experts. bird sanctuary. /yr unacceptable damage area. persons/m2 population density in the vicinity of the event (toxic release) up to ~2.8 0. the unacceptable damage area. dimensionless study (an area of ~2. Generally. (9) 0. up to ~500-m radius). IM. IM is quantified using Figure 4. persons/m2 population distribution factor for fire and explosion. WPF represents the likelihood of the weather condition used in the dispersion estimation.cepmagazine. developed with the help of 61 .e. $/m2 area inside the damage radius. IM. has a suggested value of 1.0 CEP November 2001 www. respectively. dimensionless total credibility factor. dimensionless probability of occurrence of an event. is 1 if the damage radius is higher than the distance between accident and location of a sensitive ecosystem.

000-m radius) Asset density (within region of 500-m radius) Population distribution factor Weather probability factor Importance factor this factor estimates the probability of this atmospheric condition occurrence. 0.00 0. one outflow line.61 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 * Damage radius for BLEVE (boiling liquid/expanding vapor explosion).200 1.3 highly vulnerable to cause catastrophes.5 atm ble risk zone. a pressure-relief valve and other conventional safety devices. to develop hazard mitigation/minimization or disaster management strategies. † Damage radius for CVCE (confined vapor cloud explosion). Credibility factors for the scenarios in the ammonia study.00 0. 5.00 0.98 1. Region 0–0.22 0.00 0.00 1.61 .00 1.0 have been identified.cepmagazine.79 0. L1 and L2 are combined as follows: L = (L12 + L22)1/2 (15) Case study: Ammonia A vessel stores 500 metric tons of liquefied ammonia at of 15°C and 6.0E–05 1.5 onwards signifies MCAS. This is quantified using the statistical weather data of the local area.100 4.40 credible scenarios.2 signifies the zone of uncerLiquefied tainty.35 0. risk estimation.01 0.3 Once all of the credible and MCAS 1. Data setting for the ammonia study. Ammonia Quantity of the chemical involved Phase of the chemical Unit operation Operating temperature.01 0.00 Scenario 3 250* 1.5 atm. which means the developed scenarios are 0. Therefore.2–0. T Operating pressure Degree of conjunction at the site Site population density (within region of 2. (/yr) Fire and Explosion A C L1 Credibility BB CC L2 L Scenario 1 2.00 0. available time and resources. these two factors are combined to give a credibility factor L2 for toxic release and dispersion: L2 = [1– (1 – BB)(1 – CC)] (14) Scenarios involving combination of fire. and asset density around the unit is $300/m2 (Table 1).000 m away from the site.00 1. The vessel is connected with one input line.00 Scenario 2 1. and finally. The short-listed scenarios may be further processed for damage potential estimation. The quantitative value of this credibility criterion is defined considering: the objective of study. 62 B Toxic Load www. they are further studied to decide the most credible ones as per the analyst criterion.0E–05 0. Similarly.5 signifies the 0. For November 2001 CEP 0. maximum of CCi) (13) Finally. and the operational constraints.t. depending upon the analyst or team of analysts conducting the study.00 0. explosion and toxic release To estimate the credibility of accident scenarios involving both type of events. CC is computed as: CCi = (AR)i × (PR) × (IM)/UDA (12) CC =minimum (1.86 350† 1.500 5. There is bird sanctuary about 1.01 0.270 7.0E–04 1. The vessel is in one corner of a fertilizer plant where the population density is 250 persons/km2.51 0.01 950 8. then the WPF is considered to be 0. The proposed approach is now used to study the storage of liquefied ammonia.10 0. This zone signifies the tolera6.98 0.00 1. A total of five different accident scenarios are envisaged in the unit: Table 2. Parameters Value Chemical involved Delineation of MCAS The credibility ranking is shown Figure 500 m.47 0. if a slightly stable condition exists 30% of the time during a year. which means that the envisaged sceStorage narios do not pose much threat either due to 15˚C very low probability of occurrence or damage potential. Region 0. $300/m2 Region 0.41 0.0E–5 0. m Frequency of Occurrence.Safety Table 1. Accident Scenario Damage Radius. meaning they are likely 250 persons/km2 to occur and may cause enough damage. This would further short-list important accident scenarios.30. the significance of the term “most credible” varies widely.0E–06 0.

100 I Puff 3.270 C Puff 1. s Energy released by fire ball. m Duration of fireball. and the released chemical disperses into the atmosphere.15E+05 145.14E–03 210 2. kg/m3 Dia. kJ Peak overpressure developed. This causes vessel to burst as a confined vapor cloud CEP November 2001 www.7 575. Scenario 2: Due to improper maintenance or other problems.14E–02 3.15E–05 115 950 Domino checking: Location of the unit from primary event. kJ Heat intensity. which leads to a continuous release of ammonia to the atmosphere until 80% of the chemical is released.556. kPa/s Shock wave velocity.02 NA NA NA NA NA Toxic release and dispersion: Instantaneous (I)/continuous (C) Puff/plume characteristics: Concentration at center of puff/plume. The instantaneous release of high pressure causes the vessel to fail as a boiling-liquid.15E+05 310 1.6 6. m 60 m 60 m 60 m 60 m NA NA NA NA NA NA 3. Scenario 1: High pressure in the vessel causes the pressure-relief valve (at the top of the vessel) to open.Table 3. kPa Variation of overpressure in air. m2 Burning rate.0 NA NA NA 3.78E–05 375 1.30 0. kJ/m2 Domino effect due to heat load: Total heat received. kg/m3 Concentration at the edge of puff/plume.7 865. This scenario is modeled as continuous release of liquid ammonia near ground level causing subsequent evaporation and dispersion. m/s Probability of domino effect due to missile after meeting target NA 0. kJ Missile velocity. m Burning area. The leaking area is believed to be 40% of the pipeline’s cross-sectional area.5E+06 NA NA NA 0. m Steel structure. kg/s Radiation heat flux. m Fire: Radius of fireball.17 0. 2.95 NA = Not applicable. kJ Penetration ability at 50 m: Concrete structure. m/s Kinetic energy of fragment. kJ Radius of pool fire. Scenario 4: Excessively high pressure develops in the vessel beyond the design capacity of the pressure relief valve. m C Plume 3. a leak develops in the vessel’s input or output pipeline. m/s Duration of shock 63 . Scenario 3: High pressure develops in the vessel either due to overfilling or to a runaway reaction. m Brick structure. m Radius of the lethal zone (based on LD50).cepmagazine.78E–04 3. kJ Peak overpressure.15E–04 1. ms Scenario 2: Continuous Release near Ground Scenario 3: BLEVE with Dispersion BLEVE 1. 3 and 5 for ammonia study. Parameters Scenarios and Their Likely Impacts Scenario 1: Continuous Release Explosion: Total energy released. kJ/m2 Probability of domino effect due to fire Domino effect due to overpressure: Explosion energy. of puff/plume at end of lethal zone. expanding-vapor explosion (BLEVE).500 C Plume 4. Result of consequence analysis for Scenarios 1.15E–03 4.11E+07 1.15E–04 170 1.4 NA Missile Characteristics: Initial velocity of fragment. kPa Probability of domino effect due to overpressure Domino effect due to missile: Explosion energy.5 14 Scenario 5: Evaporation with Dispersion NA NA NA NA 745.

and S. F. FAISAL I. since Scenario 2 has a high frequency of occurrence. 7.. “Improved Fire and Explosion Index Hazard Classification. of Loss Prevention Proc. “Probabilistic Safety Assessment: Quantitative Process to Balance Design. Khan. 4 (1).” J. 361 (1999). of Loss Prevention in Proc. I. “Risk Assessment in the Chemical Process Industries: Advanced Techniques.500-m radius. with first-class honors. Khan holds BS and ME degrees from Aligarh Muslim Univ. Abbasi. I.. The short-listed scenarios were processed for detailed consequences and the summary of the results is presented in Table 3. 15. Khan. 18. Eng. 393 (1998). Safety Progress. “Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. A. “Loss Prevention in the CPI. The released chemical subsequently evaporates into the atmosphere and disperses. and S. Skelton. A.. and the Univ. IChemE (Environmental Protection and Safety). F. DC (1998). MUN. and S. p. causing a pool of liquid to form. November 2001 CEP dius). He also headed the Computer Aided Environmental Management unit at the Centre for Pollution Control and Energy Technology for four years.” GRS mbH. 12. 62. AIChE. I. and S. “Accident Hazard Index: A Multi-Attribute Scheme for Process Industry Hazard Rating. and he has secured II and I rank. A. 214 (1994). G. Industries. p. 13. of Newfoundland (MUN) (Faculty of Engineering & Applied Science. 5. 5 (3).” Health and Safety Executive. but does not pose much threat. “Risk Analysis of a Typical Chemical Industry Using ORA. p. Khan. Khan. Kafka. Ind. 19. 8.” Reliability Eng. Van Sciver.. 23 (1991).. p..” Discovery Publishing House. 58 (1991). still. “Models for Domino Effect Analysis in the Chemical Process Industries. and S. O. 381 (1984). 11. p.” Proc. Khan has over 70 research publications. of Roorkee in chemical engineering and computer-aided process plant design. of Loss Prevention Proc. 217 (1997). A. “Hazard Identification and Ranking (HIRA): A Multi-Attribute Technique for Hazard Identification. 4. 45 (Spring 2000). 13 (4). and S.” U. Safety Progress. 3 and 5 come in the range of maximum credible range. it does fall in maximum credibility range. Abbasi. I. A. 12. 17.. “Risk Analysis and Risk Policy in the Netherlands and EEC. et al. 20. Safety Progress. 2. 18 (1). He is the coauthor of “Risk Assessment in the Chemical Process Industries: Advanced Techniques.” Chem. “Too Close to Home: A Report on Chemical Accident Risks in the United States. Scenario 4 falls into the uncertainty range. Khan.” J. 201 (1997). B. p. Ale. conCEP sidering Scenarios 1 and 3. P. and S. 181 (1992). Abbasi. I.” Principal Division Lecture. Trans. 14 (1). Khan. Note that Scenario 3 is not only vulnerable for toxic load (over an area of ~1. Lees. Safety Progress.. 75B. “Major Accidents in the Process Industries and Analysis of Their Causes and Consequences. Abbasi.. Dev. credibility is nullified due to its very low probability. “Important Issues Using PSA Technology for Design of New Systems and Plants. Abbasi. “Studies on the Probabilities and Likely Impacts of Chains of Accidents (Domino Effect) in the Fertilizer Industry. 16 (1998). Ind. E.. “Use of Frequency-Consequence Curves to Examine the Conclusion of Published Risk Analysis and to Define Broad Criteria for Major Hazard Installations. .. It was advised that safety-related decision-making (planning for disaster management or emergency planning) should be done.. New Delhi. F. 10.. Laplante. p. M. F. p.” Proc. D.” He is a cowinner of the S.” Proc. A.” Proc. India. HM Stationary Office. “Probabilistic Safety Analysis in Chemical Installations.Safety explosion (CVCE). Scheffler. Safety Progress..” J. Canada. Carter. 14. he had served about two years at the Birla Institute of Science and Technology (BITS) in Pilani. 3. Houston. The other scenarios have adequate damage potentials and probabilities of occurrence. F.” Proc. Among MCAS. R. p. F. 17 (1). P. F. and D. 64 www. P. B. J. “Quantitative Risk Analysis in the Chemical Process Industries.” J. 26–28 (1996).. Safety Progress. 78 (2000). Abbasi. of Loss Prevention Proc. & System Safety. Hirst. 29. 17 (3). A. “A ‘Worst Case’ Methodology for Risk Assessment of Major Accident Installations. 2. but also for the shock wave developed due to the BLEVE. 6. 59 (2001).. Hagon. and S. L. in environmental systems engineering with special reference to risk assessment and environmental impact assessment.” Proc. F. A. Abbasi. 55 (1990). He has a PhD from Pondicherry Univ. KHAN is currently a visiting research professor at the Memorial Univ. New York. Ind. 11 (2). It was concluded that current safety measures were not adequate and needed review in order to reduce the risk/hazard potential to a tolerable level. 19 (1). and although it poses a considerably high damage potential. p. A. A. F. Loss Prevention Proc. 91 (1998).. Scenario 5: Ammonia is released from the joints. Kafka. pp. “Process Safety Analysis: An Introduction. Scenario 1 poses a severe threat due to a toxic load over an area of more than a 2. Germany (1993).S. p.. “The Worst Chemical Industry Accident of the 1990s — What Happened and What Might Have Been: A Quantitative Study.” Trans. I. Abbasi. p.” Gulf Publishing. The damage-causing shock wave would be operative over an area of ~250-m radius.” J. K.. Scenario 1 engulfs largest damage area. p.000-m radius.” Center for Chemical Process Safety.cepmagazine. 21. The instantaneously released chemical disperses into the atmosphere. 16. Garchirg.270-m ra- Literature Cited 1. Manufacturing and Operation for Safety of Plant Structures and Systems. Res. India. I. NF. I.. Public Interest Research Group. Khan. p. p. 9. “Techniques for Risk Analysis of Chemical Process Industries.mun. F. p. p. 22. N. E-mail: fkhan@engr. 125 (1989). Before moving to MUN. St John’s. and S. 19 (2). As per the study. 11.. respectively. London. It is evident from the table that Scenarios 1. Khan. I. A. Mitra Award of 1998.. A1B 3X5.. London (1998).. “The Tolerability of Risk Formation from Nuclear Power Stations. Washington. Discussion These five scenarios were assessed for the credibility estimations and results are presented in Table 2. p.” Butterworths. Phone: (709) 737-7652 or 8963. Fax: (709) The damage potentials of Scenarios 2 and 5 are limited to areas of ~1. 135 (1999).. I. along with four books to his credit.. Abbasi. Popazoglou. Ind. However. I. SmiRT. 121 (1998). Khan.