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-1The inferential step in the Sorites paradox

:
Logical or Human?
M.R.Pinheiro
I.R., Mathematics
PO BOX 12396, A'Beckett st, Melbourne, VIC, AU, 3000
mrpprofessional@yahoo.com

Abstract: In this paper, we produce an ERRATA to our previously publi
shed paper with Semiotica, A Solution to the Sorites (2006). We al
so address, finally, some of the major objective queries generated by o
ur Solution presentation to the general public, namely: *Have we sta
ted that Logic does apply to the Sorites or not? *Have we finall
y solved the puzzle that has been astonishing humanity for mill
ennia now with no doubts? * Is the Solution something logicall
y useful or not?

As a plus, we offer a well-posedness theory for philosophical pr
oblems of any sort, with full justification.

Key-words: Sorites, paradox, solution, errata, logic, human, well-pos
edness, Logic, Language, discourse, dictionary, linguists, problem.

1.Introduction

The Sorites Paradox is presented in several ways in the literature available nowada
ys. In our last paper with Semiotica, [1], we chose to misrepresent it mathematicall
y first, in order to generate doubts in the good researcher's mind as well as to make i
t simple for the audience of just Mathematics-literate people, once we do embrace Ca
sti's concept (Note 1), on popularizing Science as much as possible in order to allow th
e intuitionist reader to have their insights into the problem and enjoy it as much as w
e do. In that sense, anything is useful: from jokes to real-life examples. Later on, ho
wever, in the own paper, we explain the confusion, or believe to have done it anyway,
and finally tell the mathematical truth behind all.

The underlying reasoning for those who studied Science is obvious: by raising philoso
phers, we create a World where there is less inequality because the way people creat
e consciousness is via understanding feelings and different views of the World. But it
is not that simple for a person who is still an outsider. How to motivate them into
Science? How to pass the message onwards? Why is it good to study, what is the ga
in? Why is it not enough just to get the Diploma, the degree, why can't one just chea
t on exams and forget about learning, why are principles important and morally relev
ant? Why can't one just think of own happiness and exclude everyone else from the s
cope of those who deserve human rights, or rights in general? X holds rights, everyo
ne else does not, X may easily think. And if they do not think the way X does, then X
always wins...(Devil's rules). Why does X need to change at all? These are some go
od reasons for stimulating the general public to come to Science and Logic. What is
the Bible about and the laws about, if not Logic? What does Logic, or Mathe
I. M. R. Pinheiro 1
matics, bring to the World that is really meaningful and highly relevant, plus
useful? We believe the answer is: Perfection, God's image, or the closest we can
get to it. If and only if there is full understanding - by everyone else - that this is the
way it should be, and that beauty and perfection are worth respecting, the Worl
d can play God's rules. This is a way of showing that talking is useful, that it is wort
h it exchanging ideas, rather than imposing them upon others. That is the result of a
nalyzing and going at least one step higher in the Taxonomy of Bloom [3]. The best
part of it is that with more people involved, more original insights might be triggered.
Philosophy and Logic are the most basic requirements for a life to be seen a
s human. Therefore, a solution to such an old problem might be reached by someon
e who was a total outsider of Philosophy before that particular time when they came
to understand the problem well, in very simple terms, once the paradigms are just n
ot there, or the habit. Why making scientific thoughts, related to some very very pop
ular reasoning sciences, so exclusive for the few who acquire specific degrees? It mig
ht be true we are publishing in a media that is very restricted in terms of audience. B
ut that does not prevent an outsider from accessing it by chance! The main thing the
n is the broadening of the set of possibilities.

In this sense, we understand, given the insistence of the logicians involved ( Note 2), t
hat writing in wrong Mathematics (apparently - Note 3) is worth it. It is not a Mathem
atics paper, at last, so that it might be shocking for mathematicians, but if the logicia
ns feel the need of seeing things the way they cannot formally be, once Language i
s far beyond any logical control, so, there we go, trying to do the impossible for t
hem all to be happy, once we also need to publish. We just took it for granted: that it
was a needed description, or trial of such. So this paragraph is just to convince those
who were mathematicians, or had a strong basis in Mathematics, such as Dr Greg Re
stall, from Melbourne University at the moment, who immediately felt repulsion for i
t, that that was a fulfillment of someone else's request, whose knowledge and presen
t status in Science we must strongly respect.

Basically, Language is a human factor, and we believe that at least this point got f
ully explained to the reader in our last paper. A very reduced scope of Language see
ms to bear more effective communication in any language, the bit which gets clas
sified as technical translation, when translators are the people to assess it. Howev
er, once we are also experts in Translation (Note 4), we can testify that, even in techni
cal translations, there is not a single truth, or a definite truth. Simple evidence, for th
e general public, is that it is impossible to use a translation software and get it all acc
urate, or totally acceptable by both ends of the line (target and source). Even with th
e silliest sort of translation piece, which exceeds one word. Therefore, there is absolu
tely no way that a single sentence could be totally logically translated, once it is form
ed by all human nuances such as emotion, expression, etc. Soritical steps are total
ly inside of the solely human scope of the Language, once they depend upon
observation. It is also very illustrative for us, mathematicians, to notice how philoso
phers seem to grasp so little of the classical laws of Logic, still getting it all wrong. If
normal mental processes were ever machine orientated, or machine translatable, wh
y would we ever need a human being? One must understand that there are a few wo
rds with absolute meaning, and Friege, or Russell [4], could not be that unskilled not
to choose those: `Not the case', `Belongs to the class', etc. Their words are quit
e absolute, so that there is no doubt there. Notice the cleverness of the ancient peopl
e and how less-clever society has become with time, by here. The father of Medicine,
many centuries ago, for instance, Hippocrates, was able to tell a disease by the secre
tions and excretions of a human body only (see, for instance, [5]), no other instrum
ents being ever applied. He was also able to prescribe medicines which could be mad
I. M. R. Pinheiro 2
e at home. What have we progressed (progressed?) to? X-rays that go from doctor t
o doctor during ten years and whilst the patient (victim) is being prescribed `Aspiri
n’, over and over, a tumor develops (Note 5)? In Logic, unfortunately, we have progres
sed also from Friege and Russell, with a highly useful tool to develop any strictly logi
cal/mathematical problem, or to write it, to confusing non-classical systems, with no
application at all. Basically, the first idea was not that bad: someone comes up and s
ays `let's pervert one of the rules of the classical logical system and imagine what co
uld happen’ (Note 6)...this is OK, it is playing a bit to see what comes up. Really…no h
arm. But then a second comes, and does the same procedure, names it differently, a
nd a third...and they call it Non-Classical Logic, and everyone thinks it is really impor
tant, or should be. At the end of the day, however, the novelty is gone, once the proc
ess applied was always the same. So, unless there is some use for that specific new l
ogic created, using the same `new procedure' devised by the one who should be the
genius involved, the precursor; it is obviously nonsensical to allow people to publish t
heir `new systems'. Scientific journals always state they will only publish ORIGINAL
works that have got IMPACT. This is obviously a further confirmation of our previous
assertion, that Science has `regressed', not `progressed', in the last few years, unfo
rtunately. Friege and Russell have solved problems: practical problems. Let's be since
re, why would any person invest their money, or assets, in something useless? For p
eople's vanity? To increase the number of useless, or meaningless, human beings? To
make it look as if they are useful?

It is definitely not the case that it must not have an application; We do believe on the
veracity of stating that Non-Classical Logic might be useful. We just do not believ
e on the veracity of the assertion that Non-Classical Logic, as it stands, IS USEFUL fo
r human beings. Even if considered as a human reasoning extensor, it is not doing a
good job if one is remaining only in the lowest level of Bloom's taxonomy all the tim
e, just on the understanding level, once learning how a new non-classical system is b
orn and making a new one, in what regards Priest's book [7], is pretty much just un
derstanding that, and proving you have done it.

Some are quite happy to state that Fuzzy Logic was applied, at least in the Fuzzy con
trollers, or even Paraconsistency. We disagree. It was not the logic that was ever app
lied. It was part of the underlying reasoning of the logic, or a single aspect of it. Ther
efore, the new logic, itself, is not useful at all, so far. The useful factor was the engin
eer who, probably bored with Zadeh's extensive talk [8], had the insight that that pa
rticular part of Zadeh's ideas development could, indeed, lead him to develop a bette
r machine reasoning/application. Interesting enough, as mentioned in [9], only the t
ranslation from natural language into machine language was what was useful to the
engineer, that is, the same issue addressed by our solution for the Sorites `parado
x’!!!

The greatest part of our findings is that one of the top World problems is not commu
nication between human beings, but between human beings and machines, that is:
most of the problems in Science nowadays, in what regards possible application
s, are related to how machines and human beings interact or should interac
t.

Why? Because there is no more artificial creation than a computer!!! Who could
think of a so limited human being as to do whatever we tell them to, or even an a
nimal? A machine is basically an employee that never gets paid, has got no ne
eds, asks for nothing, never interacts with humans in an unexpected way, is always t
here for humans, irrespective of what they do to it, and is fully replaceable by anothe
I. M. R. Pinheiro 3
r one, which is able to do precisely the same things, the same way the previous mac
hine used to. A stranger can blow up one's home-computer and, next day, the victim
can get another one, which is precisely like the previous one, delivered to their house
immediately!!! (It is an actual truth that, with cloning, they also try to get human bei
ngs to be like that, unfortunately: we can imagine the day in which an Afghanistan h
usband will burn his wife in full, grab a piece of remaining flesh, go to the cloning de
partment, and demand another one. We do not even know why people think cloning
could, possibly, be a good thing to the World... There are several human beings with
problems just because the husband, for instance, in a couple, has got a computer, an
d will prefer sex with it than with his wife!!!) Either it is the case that this is a true w
onder or the most demoniac device ever invented on Earth for people who cannot act
ually relate to others, or respect the most basic equality laws of this World regarding
human interaction: one speaks for an amount X of time, the other listens for an amo
unt X of time; one makes an aggression, one expects to get it back; one makes a vio
lence, one expects to get it back; one demands love in X amount, one must then pro
vide love in X amount; action and reaction, one of the most basic principles in Physi
cs, as well as in God's rules.

Always alluring to remember that Mathematics and Physics were both born in P
hilosophy, but the machine was not. Mathematics and Physics must be, therefor
e, God's creations, once Jesus was a philosopher, named The Son of God (at lea
st Him). This way, Mathematics and Physics should be perfect and good to hu
man race, in every possible sense. Machines, however, are created by those who
are too lazy to accept the most basic laws of God and, therefore, can only be harmfu
l, if not very well policed, watched over, in all their applications. Whilst philosophers
must think a long time and take very careful, and World-improving decisions, if ever
doing what they should, machines act the other way around: they are clearly oppos
ite and distinct forces, so that if one falls to the side of God's rules, the other must
lie on the side of the Devil's rules…and there is no other way to see it. If Jesus was
God, then machines are not. If Jesus is denied, we are left with no Philosophy, jus
t orders being obeyed. In this case, we are pretty much the same as the comput
ers, so that `computers should be human beings' is the only possible inference. That
all because in the Old Testament there is authority which is never given up, totally he
ld by God, the almighty, who would punish anyone who disrespected Him, in any of H
is orders, with horrible things and plagues...Once we really do not think it is plausible
that a human being, who is able to make independent decisions, is equal, or might e
ver equate a machine, Jesus is the actual God, and Mathematics plays God's rules, w
hich match, therefore, adoration for perfection, perfection emanated from God: perfe
ction in human constructions, human actions, human performances...perfection per
se!

Interesting how things converge to an universal understanding… Some sciences are t
here to make people think on things that they usually would not, that is, to shift para
digms, that is, to create and raise revolution, change...that is the actual aim of Phil
osophy, or should, obviously, be. Confusion happens when someone tries to make w
hat is useful to trigger reasoning in others look like Computer Science: an actual a
pplication of highest order reasoning, never the reasoning itself (therefore, an appli
cation of a logical system, never the system itself, in full. Basically, Gödel’s golden rul
e must be true here as well, as much for Mathematics as for Logic, incompleteness –
see [13], for instance).

Nobody can say they are philosophers if they are working on the scope of Co
mputer Science, which is pretty much the scope of [7]. However, in our yet to be p
I. M. R. Pinheiro 4
ublished paper, we also came up with a solution to increase governmental belief in th
e sort of scope of [7], that is, to make it also relevant to humanity: the paper is men
tioned in our references list as [10].

In any hypothesis, we need now producing an ERRATA to our previously published p
aper containing the actual solution to the Sorites `paradox’ in order to explain it all
(not to be taken to be lazy mathematicians, and to be fully understood). We must sta
te that we never expected mathematicians to react so strongly about it, once it was
a philosophical paper...

With this further `excuse-me for our why', there we go: The ERRATA follows this.

Soon after the Errata, we address the issue of what we actually stated, in clear Englis
h and philosophical terms only, not mathematical, or technical
lingo anymore, so that everyone understands it, or is able to assess it. That is our thi
rd section in this paper. Following the third section, it comes the addressing/defense
of the statement `Yes, we hold a definite solution for the `paradox’, or the what sho
uld not be called a paradox' and finally, but not least important, comes the addressin
g of our own issue criticizing our own work: what is this piece of logical reasoning, fo
r the solution, good for?

2. ERRATA FOR THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED AT SEMIOTICA IN 200
6:

a) Page 308(2=20); l:21: There should be a footnote, or remark, included in the te
xt, referring to the x-tilde and the next members of C. We must state that: `One mu
st consider that any color classification is always vague. If one may take the idea of a
precise color, which could be mechanically defined in terms of brightness and etc, the
n x-tilde would be that color and the symbol should be `belong'. However, because w
e speak about Philosophical Logic and, therefore, about reality of human reasoning,
x-tilde must be regarded as the symbol of a set, a subset of C, which will then includ
e all similarities to that specific color regarding the eyes of the people involved in tha
t particular evaluation. It is acceptable that we refer, then, to the union of subsets as
a `plus', once it is supposed to be an element only, but, due to the nature of our spe
ech, is going to be a set encompassing all similarities (eye), attached to the particula
r group of observers that the word said/judgment stated represents. The color is just
one and, in that sense, the object has got a particular color x. However, speech and l
anguage complicate it all because they assign a single name to a particular range of
possibilities. In this sense, x is both an element and a set, only depending on what w
e refer to: the actual color, which is unique, or the speech, which fails to translate th
at idea perfectly well. On the trial of being too simple for the reader, we use both sen
ses, so that we had to choose a single symbol, and we chose to use a shocking one t
o make it clear, once our background is Mathematics, that there was a possible confli
ct there to be observed. Rigorously, were it a paper in Mathematics, there would be t
wo descriptions, as we later on mention. One would be for the speech function, with
subsets, and another would be for the actual ontology of the object, which would be
elements. One must notice, however, that this is what precisely gets developed in the
paper, so that it is explained up to this detail later. In any hypothesis, the idea was m
aking it popular: as simple as we could.' We beg the reader to understand us.
b) Page 316(10=20); l:11: end of number 3-item): it is missing an inverted co
mma over the f and stating `meaningful to the solver but not to the listener".

I. M. R. Pinheiro 5
c) Page 316(10=20); l:29=30: wrong reference position. Priest should have been
mentioned soon after non-heap.
d) Page 322(16=20); l:26: typo, it should be `but is coincidental' instead of `but i
t..'
e) Conclusion 324(18=20); l:22: adding a last paragraph: `Our statements are th
at there is a solution for each different logic ( Note 8 ) involved in the `Sorites
paradox' problem: Discourse (Discourse Logic, Philosophy of Language), Human R
easoning (Philosophy of Science), Machine Reasoning (Computer Science), Huma
n senses system (Medicine). In what regards a single person's speech (Discours
e), the solution is found by translating that speech into logical entries the wa
y we propose, and entering that into a machine, so that the issues of the problem ar
e fully addressed. Therefore, from an individual's perspective, from our example, c
olor-blind or not, there is always a very well defined solution. From a mathematical p
oint of view, we have to choose to be with the machines (Computer Science). In
this case, the machine needs to be fed by a reasonable observer, someone with no pr
oblems in the eyes, or with unusual reasoning, or with reasoning which matches the
average person in what regards observational qualities as well as definitions of color
s. The machine points out the range of variations it allows and the person feeding th
e machine will choose which element is, in our chosen example, of color X, or not. W
hen the person gets confused, the machine chooses to state `it is not' of color X, as
we propose. This way, the problem also holds a machine solution with no vag
ueness. From a human perspective (Human Reasoning), there is no problem. Pure
ly Human reasoning is of no use to machine lingo or logic (when regarded as comput
ational logic, not its complementary set in relation to the Philosophy behind it), or Ma
thematics. What counts is what can be proved, stated logically, suitable for inference
s. If purely human reasoning could be mechanized, ever, then human and machines
would be equal, at least in expression and actions/reactions, and, as stated here, an
d proved with evidence, there is no way they are going to be, unless the human is `
made' a machine by disease or fault. A machine will never be human. A normal
human being, with no impairments or faults, will never be a machine either.
The speech has to be attached to a single speaker/evaluator/judge ( Human Senses
System ), so that, in what regards speech, the problem was solved by us as well. W
e actually believe this is the proposed problem. The problem is like a philosophical m
atter, in which each listener will have their own point of view and they are all allowed
by the system. Why? Because language is philosophical and personal, irrespecti
ve of our trial of precise definitions, and despite of all its rules. Remember here that
society also has got countably many rules and those rules cannot, ever, express the
behavior of everyone in society, or justify them. One must understand that almost all
accounts mentioned in [11] fall into the same mistaken category: they all seem to t
hink that language is computational, or the same as Mathematics, and, therefo
re, it is all precise and very computer-friendly. We actually think, to the best of the W
orld, that schools should really worry about teaching people how to be purely human
sometimes, as weird as it may sound. It seems that even in the highest level of B
loom's taxonomy in place in the World research, people are looking for `how to m
ake all which is human become machine-friendly’ as if this were always possibl
e. That is a bit scary...if the human factor looses importance at that level, why not kil
l everyone or just make masses be totally uniform in their expression/thought/life lik
e Hitler wished for, and so many other dictators/brain-washers? In this sense, Philos
ophy has been going through an involution, in terms of its human character, in s
uch a way that people nowadays considered `great philosophers', occupying position
s of philosophers, are actually the opposite that one of our most remarkable philosop
hers told us to do: (Descartes) Cogito Ergo Sum. Basically, thinking above the machi
ne level (and, in that sense, Bloom's taxonomy could not help us better) is human an
I. M. R. Pinheiro 6
d, therefore, should be the aim of Philosophy as much as teaching/learning. If the So
rites paradox is misinterpreted, however, it looks like someone tries to make a mathe
matical induction and change discourse into Mathematics, what is certainly impossibl
e. This way, there cannot ever be any paradox on the scope of both human senses a
nd human reasoning, once the inferential step is mathematical, machine friendly, not
natural for a purely Human Reasoning, so that it would never show up from a person
who was never presented the pre-manufactured problem. The premise `adding one
grain does not make any difference, therefore I can do it an infinite number of times,
and it will not' simply cannot, ever, appear in a mind that has not learned mathemati
cal reasoning, so that it is not purely human, it is machine orientated and dictated, w
hat is worse. From what regards Discourse and Machine Reasoning, or their interfac
e, which, ultimately, seems to be the problem, it suffices inventing an obvious transla
tion, or one that may be accepted. We do believe we have created such. There is not
a single universal way of going about language interpretation. Were there such a wa
y, translators of technical words would never differ in their translations from one lang
uage into another, if having the same document, plus the same language pair, to deal
with. Were there such an universal approach as well, documents would always use th
e same lingo (most objective scope of language, intended to be written in top objecti
ve lingo), but that is always false, the number of universal glossaries, or dictionaries,
available being totally irrelevant for the actual conclusion (false).
f) Page 324(18=20); l:30: adding, at the end of the acknowledgments section `Als
o, not less importantly, actually even more relevantly, the author would like to thank
Dr Carnielly, from Unicamp, for his advice on what journal would be the most adequa
te one for the article'.

3. WHAT WAS STATED IN LOGICAL/PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS ON
OUR PREVIOUS PAPER:

We have actually written:

A) Logic does apply to the reduced scope of human act
ions where the Sorites problem lies.
We have also stated that

B) What looks like an implication might as well not be
one!
More clearly, what looks like a mathematical implication is not one of that sort ( Note 1
2 ) .

It is interesting to understand that people usually like one discipline from school bett
er than the other, or are limited to a single profession. We don't. We were lucky enou
gh to love Language, Mathematics, Philosophy, Logic, with the same passion as we lo
ve Arts in general, or people. This way, we get to understand things in full, as the gre
atest modern thinkers state: holistic education, integration of disciplines, mult
i-valued degrees - why graduating only in Mathematics, if one can do one more, tw
o more, three more, four more majors??? Make people know more, and understand t
otally different ways of viewing the World, and they are going to bring us break-throu
I. M. R. Pinheiro 7
gh in every area… Make people limited to a single area, and they are going to create
problems, publish, but the problems were never really problems to start with (well-p
osedness theory never applied, the problem was not a scientific problem ever, or coul
d be)…However, they are going to remain unsolved for millennia...how many useless
thinkers do we want? As simple as it may seem, words in English bear far more
meanings than the words in Mathematics (and that is the difference betwee
n Language which is not philosophical, Philosophy of Language, which is par
t of Logic, and Computer Language), derived from Logic, Russell and Friege. Impl
ication in English might not be as simple as an `If ...then'. But it is true that an `If...
then', in Mathematics, is definitely the one stated by Russell and Friege, and totall
y well translated into symbols that are, at the end of the day, for the happiness and
pleasure of computer scientists, machine-friendly! This is basically, if you can tell, t
he same reasoning used to go from human logic to machine logic. Can go one way, b
ut not backwards. Basically, the word `then' might bear other meanings, and the spe
cific meaning in use might not be translated, with 100% accuracy, into the machine-f
riendly-entry, the logical implication.

When someone states `then', they usually mean many more things, called enthym
emes, usually omitted from the Discourse-Language, once they assume the rece
ptor takes them for granted as well. Machines, however, are as dumb as one ca
n tell, and will always take it literally, with the only set of existing allowed translati
ons have been fed by the person programming/building them. If they are going to do
so, you'd better feed them accurately and, sometimes - most of the time - you are n
ot going to be able to feed human sentences precisely into a machine because they i
nvolve emotions, hidden sentences/propositions, etc. Each English word actually c
orresponds to a set of possible meanings, and whoever works with translations k
nows that, sometimes, it is impossible to find the right meaning in any dictionary, an
d we have to make it up by using many more words, in order to produce an almost e
quivalence in the so-called target-language, that is, we are actually trying to state th
at the translation of human reasoning into the language discourse works similar to th
e translation from one language into another (easy to understand, cultural difference
s represent communication patterns and that has to do with usual thinking of a popul
ation), just worse (far much worse). As a practical example, consider the word `C
OMER' in Portuguese. If it were ever machine-friendly, it would give us a precise
meaning as soon as we hit enter in our computers, or dictionaries. What happens, ho
wever, is that literal translation, according to usual dictionaries, leads us to `
EAT'. A sentence such as`EU A COMI' goes like `I ATE HER'. Cannibalism!! Bra
zilians are cannibals... (Apparently, this could be the same mistaken conclus
ion going on with enlarging the scope of the enthymemes in the Sorites): Ob
viously acceptable logical conclusions (inferences, implications). However, if lang
uage were ever as objective as machines, or Logic, all the time, Brazilians woul
d be taken to be cannibals, and that inference would be accurate as to logical deducti
on from given premises. This is a horrible mistake, and might lead people to never vi
sit Brazil fearing being eaten (especially if they have not heard of Brazil before and m
ight believe films a lot...). It happens that the most accurate translation of `EU A CO
MI' is `I had a one-off sex with her', most of the time, in most contexts it appears.
What is the problem here? The problem is the allowance, or God's gift to Human L
anguage: the chance of extrapolating in human discourse. Notice that, even in this s
uggested translation, we are careful enough to remind the reader that it is actually p
ossible, as well, that there is cannibalism in Brazil somehow, such as the recent news
on a guy who actually `ate another'. This way, without knowing all details involved, a
problem cannot, ever, be well stated regarding human observation/feelings/situation
s, in its purely human scope, unless plenty of words are used, and that is why philos
I. M. R. Pinheiro 8
ophical papers tend to be so boring: it is all about making what is said totally, and un
iquely, understood by every audience.

How many words are necessary to express a single idea? You tell us!!! For us, this so
lution was so clear-cut that we just stated two sentences at the beginning and thoug
ht we were over with it. But the problem, as someone already stated is obviously `th
e others'...Anyway, `EU A COMI' is just three words formed by one very standardly k
nown entry from the dictionary (COMI), which contains no double meaning (not in th
e dictionary, or not yet, also nice to remember that it does get updated, but always l
ater than what was created in speech), and two other ones, with a single meaning, b
ut both being attached either to the speaker or to the object being referred to ( EU A
), the first entry having being expanded by speakers of the Country to mean far muc
h more (also interesting to notice that this unusual application of the word is not nat
ural, it does demand work over the basic levels of Bloom’s taxonomy, it is something
a machine would only be able to do by mistake). Basically, were we to consider logic
al entries, `Eu' could easily be part of the mathematical logic and be machine-friendl
y nowadays (because it may also change with time) but `A' and `COMI' could never,
ever, be expressed in a unique way because they will always depend on what comes
next, or before them, in the text, that is, we are in the same situation we were befor
e with the name of God and the color red (please refer to [1] and our other preprints
at www.geocities.com/mrpprofessional for this matter). Ramy (UQ, 2000) actually po
ints out that problem very well, we just do not hold a reference for his present work
yet. We speak about things the words refer to. Basically, the obvious conclusion is th
at, so far, only the words which have a single meaning in every language dictionary,
considering all languages in the World, could possibly be used for Mathematics/Logic
(in the computer sense). Easy to see that adjectives (soritical expressions), or noun
s, which have functional value as adjectives, or may have (heaps/non-heaps), have n
o way of being included in the same case as `Eu'. They hold not only several words i
n the dictionary to explain their meaning in every possible language, but they also ho
ld more than one application (Red zone, Red car, Heaps of money, Heap of grass, wor
ked heaps).

Notice then here, once more, the ability to create new applications for an old word th
at society has got, and the absence of precision in a single word, as to fully address,
or point, with no confusion, to a single object. Therefore, there are at least two move
s which make it impossible for a human being to be equated to a machine, remembe
ring it is always the same problem, being able to program the machine so that label
s, or signs, refer uniquely to what is intended: one is that of the person creating the
word originally (a person who, like us (in what regards the solution to the Sorites), h
as everything uniquely pointed out in their minds. They call it W, and it is something
nobody has noticed before, in any possible sense. It all works if the universe is forme
d by that sole person, once they do all to the top understanding they have of their o
wn systems (and remember that if Mathematics is one of the smallest scopes of hum
an life, and, in it, incompleteness is verified, it is obviously impossible to fully describ
e human systems). So, it is not that it is perfectly, and uniquely, singled out by the p
erson, it is just that the own person is unable to cope with all their own information
when seeing that particular problem: it is only outside of the system that one m
ay evaluate it. Once the person communicates (hell is the others), there is the obse
rver, outsider, of their systems. By the time that happens, not only there is more tha
n one set of systems involved, but there is the `external eye’ over the own person. It
is obviously the case that only a second party would ever be able to describe the syst
ems of someone, if ever possible, but then they would not be able to describe their o
wn systems with perfection. Taking into consideration that the first person fails in jud
I. M. R. Pinheiro 9
ging their own systems, considering that they were able to judge someone else’s wit
h perfection would lead us to think that a couple of people could describe their syste
ms in full. But then, we are tired of knowing that if we add a single other person, the
y will find mistakes, or missing elements, so that it never stops, and there is no hum
an being (another justification for the need of the existence of God) who would be ab
le to have their systems fully described by any amount of others, unless they are faul
ty human beings (retards, etc), if ever possible in that case as well.

The whole point of this paragraph is then stating that we have named `implication’
(here, in this paper) what would be a mathematical, or logical (machine-friendly), `o
bject’.

However, if we prove that the Sorites language never contained such a thing, we will
also have proven that it cannot, ever, be perfectly addressed inside of logical systems
(which include mathematical systems). That will then mean that there could never be
any confusion between the language of the Sorites and Mathematics, or logical syste
ms.

We have also stated:

C) The beauty of the Sorites lies in paying forced atten
tion to, via a shocking example, the fact that there ar
e actually at least three different human categories to
be dealt with/possibly translated into logical (in the s
ense of reasoning, of any possible origin which is inclu
ded in Philosophy, that is, reasoning with clear founda
tion, which might, or not, be passive of translation int
o purely logical systems, or computer-friendly lingo) s
ystems/ involved in any sort of combination encompa
ssing human discourse/writing, human thinking/elab
oration, and mathematical lingo, or trials of expressin
g that in mathematical lingo.
On the top of the previous assertion, we also state that

D) Human thinking/elaboration is never fully logical (i
n the computers sense)
or, otherwise, computers and humans would be pretty much the same. We do not ne
ed to go practical to prove that, but there is a practical `proof' ( Note 10 ): Turing c
ontest ( mentioned in [2]). Coming into scientific terms, however, the proof is q
uite evident and trivial. See:

D1) Only a reduced scope of human interactions/speech may be transl
ated into logical lingo, even exclusively philosophical (not computational);

D2) Only a reduced scope, again, of the philosophical lingo may be tra

I. M. R. Pinheiro 10
nslated into computers lingo;

D3) Only a reduced scope of the computers lingo involves Mathematic
s, which is the Classical Logic one;

D4) By a simple set of inclusions, which can never be contained or equal t
o, only strictly contained, we easily see that it is simply impossible to sta
te that human expressions would ever be fully mathematical;

D5) For the Sorites to be totally mathematical, all its writing, and solution, sh
ould belong to the most reduced scope of Classical Logic. However, it is easy t
o see it has to involve human reasoning above the three first levels in
Bloom's taxonomy, so that it cannot, ever, be fully contained in the Classica
l Logic set (it is also true that human reasoning matches its language, and the
re is no chance more complicated levels of human assessment, for instance in
volving senses, pure reasoning, abstraction, would ever be passive of descript
ion via same symbolic logic used for lowest levels, with perfection, and becaus
e perfection is the aim of Science, there is no point in even thinking of doing t
hat. If reduction is proven to be inadequate, it should simply be forgotten fore
ver, otherwise there is no progress). This is actually the so-pointed-out proble
m of higher-order vagueness. Higher-order vagueness, that they refer to, is si
mply our large scope of observation, sentiment, feeling, perception, etc, invol
ved in the judgment of the speech function Fx(A,O), as to it being equal to 0
(false), or 1 (true), that is, as to it determining an inclusion of the object of si
ght `O’ in the class of the attribute `A’, or not. This is simply stating that the
`solution’ to the problem lies in the complementary set of what progresses fro
m D1 to D2 in the above inclusions. Notice that mathematical reasoning is in t
hose levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy, but the solution to the problem in Mathemat
ics will always lie in the Classical Logic scope. However, the mathematical pro
blem is also there, in its formulation, with no enthymemes, or hidden things.
Rather the opposite, well-posedness theory, for Mathematics, demands absolu
tely any literate reader to be able to identify all premises involved and a clear
question, as well as the type of answer demanded. Notice that the same appli
es to computer friendly problems: both the problem and its solution will alway
s belong to the reduced world of the computers in full, otherwise made impos
sible to be dealt with by the computer. Minimum requisite, then, is writing the
Sorites problem, in full, inside of the world one wishes it to be addressed. If o
ne tries to reduce it to smallest set of discourse, Classical Logic, and that is n
ot possible, that can only mean the problem does not belong to Classical Logi
c; it is simply not boxed there. Therefore, we go one step larger. When going f
or the computer logic, if, once more, we prove the language demanded for th
e description of the problem is not entirely contained in the computer world, t
hen it does not belong there and, therefore, cannot be solved there either, no
matter what. No confusion must be made between levels of sets, once the lar
gest will always encompass the expressions of the smallest (just to reassure t
he reader on the answer being yes, or no, not posing a problem for the subtr
action of the problem from the Classical Logic set).

So far, we believe to have proved, with clear evidence, that the Sorites paradox ca
nnot be totally formulated, well posed, or solved, in the scope of the Classic
al Logic, which is the only one affected, or touched, by Mathematics. Therefore, the
problem cannot be addressed, either, inside of Mathematics, ever. Mathemati
cs lingo, or Classical Logic lingo, is simply wrongly applied, if ever applied to the stat
I. M. R. Pinheiro 11
ement, or solution, to the problem. With this, we now need to prove that the proble
m belongs, or can only belong, to the complementary set of all possible logical sets,
of logical accounts, that scape purely machine reasoning, only well addressed by Pur
e Philosophy of Language, if totally contained in Philosophy, that is, it is all reasoning
with clear foundation, but not machine-friendly. This obviously has to do with the the
ory of well-posedeness problems, besides being blatantly obvious. Nobody can teach
a subject and give students a problem that cannot be fully addressed inside of their s
ubject, or by one of its pre-requisites, that is, the problem is not well-made unless it
is all described in terms of the subject area it belongs to. On the other hand, the pro
blem cannot, ever, be well-addressed, unless it speaks the same language in which it
was proposed: Basic principles.

To resume, the if…then, used in the problem, posed as Sorites, must not be mathe
matical, or logical. The reason is because it is involving senses (human senses), as w
ell as judgment of highly personal order (what cannot, ever, happen in Science, per s
e).

Were it ever encompassing things which do point to single objects (a number on the
board is called `five’, but one first draws the number to then state `five’: if ever star
ting from the statement, `five’ –per se, there is no way the mathematician could dea
l with that. It is always necessary to single out the object first for a mathematician, o
r logician, to be able to develop their reasoning), any mathematician, or logician, no
matter of what sort, would be a qualified candidate to solve the problem well. Becaus
e once the problem is written in their terms, and only once so is done, they are top q
ualified to address it. If such task is proven impossible, they must be forgotten with t
heir theories.

Interesting enough, infinity does the trick only at boundaries which are of, at most, ir
rational order. However, one never knows, precisely, what the irrational is, unless it is
repetitive in what comes after the decimal point. Otherwise, it is chaotic, or imprecis
e, with the mathematician fully aware it is something they can only deal up to an ord
er of mistake, or precision, that is, they actually are not dealing with the whole entit
y, they are dealing with the part they are able to limit by force, only.

And that regards numbers, figures, which are very solid entities, with totally precise
definition in the dictionary. So, to start with, there is no doubt about the mathematic
al concept, the definition. Therefore, these are all sorts of objects a pure mathematici
an can deal with (the own concept does not bear confusion, is not passive of updatin
g, in its initial definition).

This certainly excludes all elements from the Sorites, once colors cannot be made uni
que by simply drawing. Basically, any drawing may lead different mathematicians to
see different things and, therefore, due to the uniformity principle of the language of
Science, it cannot belong to Mathematics. Mathematical symbols do not demand judg
ment: they are absolute in their interpretation. And this is the only reason why Math
ematics is the only possible universal language: once the symbols are learned, once t
hey all hold unique application, or definition scope, nobody will ever be mistaken whe
n seeing them. However, nobody can teach all color nuances, for instance, in a repeti
tive manner, like Mathematics, without forcing others to their own point of view, whic
h is certainly going to conflict with the point of view of someone else in another class
room, even neighbor to theirs. For that reason, colors, per se, do not belong to Scien
ce. Therefore, their ontology cannot be spoken about in the scope of Science. Mathe
maticians do solve problems involving the word `color’ sometimes. But what matters
I. M. R. Pinheiro 12
is the `name’ only, not the nuance. If a single word is out, as said before, it cannot b
elong to Science at all.

Question then comes: where does it belong to?

Obviously, the adjectives, in general, belong to human discourse and human mind, o
nly. With this, they may be object of logical reasoning, but cannot, ever, be the end o
f the problem (to tell what red is for everyone in the World, for instance). What may
belong to Science is a decision theory, at most, once that is purely technical. That is j
ust trivial. Decision theory could belong to Computer Science, of course. And that we
shall discuss below.

Computer Science works with logical systems. The main characteristic of any system
is the predictability of the response. If a response cannot be predicted, there is no po
ssible logical system which can deal with it.

Another point to be observed, regarding Computer Science, is that it is a mistaken la
bel for what is not, by any means, a Science. Computer Science is simply a tool, a to
ol for any scientist. Basically, what computers can do, at most, is reproducing the rea
soning of the programmer. It is even possible to create a machine who has autonom
y, but that autonomy is always going to be bounded by the own logical system of the
programmer, and it will suffice someone else, who has got an action which is not in t
he system of the programmer, to make the computer crash, or being unable to respo
nd. It is also possible to prepare a computer to perform a single, or even a number o
f, action(s), at a time, given response to unexpected action is demanded. However, t
hat set of possible actions must also be programmed, so that it is all boxed in the ow
n logic allowed by the system of the programmer. Basically, Computer Science is not
a Science at all, it is a tool to translate someone’s mind, and never in full, once the o
wn mind of a person cannot be fully known by the own person, or even by someone
else (a normal person, of course, excluding limitations by disease, for instance, whic
h may (only) make the previous assertion false).

This way, whatever may be written in a computer system, may always be written in l
anguage first, that is, without any symbols which are not usually contained in a lexic
on.

Therefore, it could never make sense to think of the logical system first, or of its sym
bols. What must be thought first is the description of that system in the language.

With this, it is possible that something lies outside of Mathematics and inside of Com
puter logical systems, but such can only be proven if the expression of the reasoning
demanded lies entirely in the logical systems world, what means prediction, and gen
eralization, of some sort.

It is obviously impossible that a problem like the Sorites would fit in a computer logic
al system entirely, once the question may always contain one more element (betwee
n any two real numbers there is always another one, well pointed out by Fuzzy Logic:
between any two members of the soritical sequence, there is always another one, wh
ich could easily be inserted). The response to it (judgment) could only be contained i
n it after a decision theory is applied, once it demands translation from the mental/or
al human processes into Classical Logic.

However, the problem which remains is obvious: precisely the translation between mi
I. M. R. Pinheiro 13
nd/expression of it and Classical Logic, so that all we need is creating that interface b
etween humans and machines (how to interpret, or receive, the language statement
from the listener).

Any decision theory could belong to the scope of computer systems. But such can onl
y occur if that decision theory is well generalized. However, with the Sorites, any gen
eralization leads to the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness, as pointed out by al
most everyone in the literature. This is to clearly prove it is impossible to generalize,
departing from inputs of listeners. Such is obvious, because you may have a normal
person, a group of people, even, who sees something and always says the same, let’
s say: yes or no. However, all of a sudden, there is a non-officially classified schizoi
d, or retard, for instance, in the audience. They then have absolutely unpredictable o
ral behavior. Once the problem is about what is orally expressed, and they may easil
y simply destroy the computer, utter something like `uh’, and leave, for instance, the
re is no way their particular answer could be accounted for, in all its possibilities.

It is clearly the case that human speech/reaction escapes, by large, any chance of a
computer system containing them in full.

If it is such, it is certainly the case that it will all get truncated at the exposed argum
entation from D1, as named earlier on in this paper.

Therefore, the problem can only lie on the purest language scope, without any Logic
to it.

This is the same scope linguists work with: the chaos of human expression.

And they are the only people who worry about settling definitions that were, otherwis
e, impossible to be common to everyone in the World.

Basically, every linguist deals with the problem of forcing a match between human ex
pression and human understanding, that is, of making communication possible and d
ecisions possible, in a formal way, when there is generalized chaos.

From another point of view, the ontology singled out by the Sorites is of human natu
re because it gets extended to the human being questioned (their eyes, their ears, et
c) and, therefore, way out of what a mathematician (purely, if that was ever possibl
e), or a logician, could cope with (just like the description of one’s own systems). Th
at is basically stating that if something cannot be fully reduced (or locked in) to the l
anguage of those supposed to deal with it, those supposed to deal with it are not qua
lified candidates (or their theories, no matter how innovative).

One could then come up with intervals and the human apparent ability to deal with a
ny of its members (intervals of numbers). However, one must remember that the nat
ure of the ontology/predicate involved is never questioned, it is fully understood by
mathematicians and logicians: the figures. What is questioned is the excess of them,
so that a human being is not able to cope with all of them, pointing at them individua
lly, at the same time (remember that if no human being is able to deal with that, and
yet it exists, and it is an object of reference, no computer would be able to do it eithe
r, no matter which computer: a human being will program it! By the time the human
being is able to program a computer to do such, the human being has imagined, in t
heir own heads, how a machine system would be able to do it, what means that at le
ast human reasoning is able to deal with it). However, one must remember that it suf
I. M. R. Pinheiro 14
fices choosing a stopping point and one is back to the same situation as the one with
interval boundaries, with no confusion. The nature of the objects under observation i
n between (quantity) is the same as the boundaries. However, the `red’, in the middl
e of a soritical sequence, is not of the same nature of that at the end. For Mathemati
cs, or logical systems, to be used, it is necessary that generalization takes place, wh
at includes same ontological nature (only numbers, for instance). However, with the
Sorites, both object ontology and predicate are involved, it is what could easily be se
en as a `complex entity’. It is, indeed, possible to program a computer to deal with a
number of them, but, as said before, once a new one may be generated, at any tim
e, by simply intercalating two members with the average of brightness of the color, f
or instance, the computer cannot, ever, deal with that. Once more, those programmi
ng the eyes of a computer hold limitations in their own sight (as well as imaginatio
n)…

Remember then the piece of wood which is not measured by a rule, with perfection, with a human being bei
ng unable to tell whether the piece is precisely at 0.9, or 0.99 instead, of the ruler. This is a case in
which only engineers could solve the problem, so that things work for a house, for in
stance, but it obviously escapes the scope of Mathematics and the problem cannot, e
ver, be addressed by a mathematician. It is addressed by a more human sort of `Sci
ence’ (once more, it is not a Science, once in Science things will never fail, it is all tot
ally logically boxed), in which mistakes are allowed (several buildings fell over people
soon after finished, for instance. There is always risk, indeterminacy, vagueness of re
sults, as to them being precise or not, and that happens with any sort of situation wh
ich escapes human abilities).

E) Machines are not able to decide on their own and n
ever will be.
Why? Because it is always necessary to have a human being programming it fir
st, even if this machine is supposed to program others, so that the initial machine
will always be built from what makes logical sense for the person building i
t. Nobody would be able to include all their judgements inside of a machine’s head b
ecause they do not even know those judgements until there is an actual real-life situ
ation. Due to abstraction, easy to see that new problems may always be built by joini
ng two other ones – any couple of them - so that there is an infinite number of variat
ions in problems-posedness and there is no way any human being would ever be abl
e to predict every single one of them before they occur in real life. What we have sta
ted before is obviously not totally convincing, we have to add that there is not a mo
ment in history in which a new problem was not raised, so that we now hold a compl
ete proof of what we stated. A very commonly used sentence is: I have never seen t
hat before/that astonishes me. Why? Unexpected. World problems, actual problems.
With this, one easily understands that judgement/analysis is always out of the machi
ne scope, in its totality.

Here, we prove that a human being must always be more than a machine if t
his human being is a normal, healthy, human being, so that there is more to
human reasoning than Computer `Science’. Therefore, it is an absolute truth th
at one may write about a Pure Philosophy of Language, without any Comput
er/mathematical logic involved in that.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 15
F) The Sorites is precisely on that level, the one above
machine and mathematical logic (not reasoning, but e
xpression of reasoning), in what regards the observer
who is always judging and making decisions. Well, if a
single part of the problem cannot be perfectly translat
ed into the lingo of Mathematics, then it simply cannot
have its solution entirely inside of it, so that there is r
eally no point in insisting that the Sorites was ever a c
lassical problem. It might hold a reduced part of it - th
e final decision, at most – in the classical (or passive o
f expression via such) logic, once all human reasoning
is demanded to decide between No and Yes, classical
options. It is then obvious that:

All we need is an adequate interface of translation bet
ween human reasoning/judgement and the final resol
ution, in terms of a response to the query of the prese
nter of the Sorites, if we ever want to solve the proble
m the way the presenter demands.
Here, some difficulty in written expression is raised: there is the brains, which works
always in the full scope of Bloom’s taxonomy, and there is the written expression, wh
ich may, or may not, lie in what we are calling `logic’1, that is, the written expre
ssion, or symbolic expression - which is standard, pre-defined, and classifie
d under some specific name we make use of.

F1) We would now need to prove that the demands of the expression of the solution
to the Sorites cannot, possibly, lie in any other logical scope that is not purely philoso
phical, inside of the Philosophy of Language, with a hint of decision theory, that is, th
ere is Logic to it, but there is also a `forceful’ external element, lying outside of the l
ogical scope, to make it all fit there. It is not, however, an element which creates hig
her order vagueness, simply because everyone in the World seems to be happy enou
gh with the way lexicons are built, since they appeared. To take this last, very costy,
step, we need to further remind the reader that judgement is required, demande
d, and this judgement may only be obtained via personal interaction, individ
ual interaction, depending only on human’s senses. This way, every possible
answer is correct, once it all depends on the judgement of the person who is watch
ing, and nobody is able to convince a normal person that what they see is `red’ if the
y claim it to be, for instance, `rouge’. One easily sees that, with the Sorites, the pres
enter demands, and expects, an expression of an area of a human body that scapes
any sort of `unique’ correct decision about it. It is easy to see that, with the so few r
estrictions made on the observers (in the case of color, for instance, that they are no

1 Notice we are always trying to use `logic’ to point to logical systems and `Logic’ to point to Philo
sophy in its purest scope, that of the logical reasoning, which may, or may not, be passive of description by
symbols.
I. M. R. Pinheiro 16
t blind), anyone may answer whatever they think to be correct - or more accurate. O
h, well, it is obvious, then, that, unless we had a theory about how eyes and jugeme
nt would relate to each other, along with other factors, and it is also obvious that suc
h a theory is impossible to be attained in the next thousand years, the problem dema
nds expression of what cannot be of any other nature that is not pure Philosophy of L
anguage, that is, most accurate expression of what is purely human - classified as ilo
gical by some - but still possible to be expressed via Language: Language in its piece
which is fully non-reduceable to logical systems.

We have then proved that the Sorites belongs exclusively to the Philosophy
of Language, in its complementary set in relation to every possible logic contained i
n it, if belonging to Logic at all, that is, the Sorites may only be stated, and solve
d, inside of the purest Philosophy of Language, at most - no other logical syste
m, contained in it, can do. With this, we have actually proved that it is not of the w
ell-posedness theory, for Philosophy problems, that the Sorites problem is p
resented via any other symbols rather than the ones adopted in the dictiona
ries, at most. On the other hand, its solution demands observation and judge
ment, both belonging to the purely human scope of occurences in this World, what
makes its solution also not possible to be well described in terms of any othe
r symbols that are not those, at most, inherited from the dictionary. This is a
fundamental stone for any reader to accept that

G) The Sorites cannot, ever, be addressed with any log
ical system which makes use of symbols that are not p
resent in the lexicon of the specific language in which
it was proposed/is intended to be solved.
G1) The solution to the Sorites is located in the area that belongs exclusively to the P
hilosophy of Language, at most, but not to any computer-friendly system of logic. Th
e answer demanded by the person proposing the problem, however, is one of the sor
t `yes’ or `no’, which are answers from the Classical Logic system. Therefore, there
must be a `forced’ situation of translation of one system, which is purely human, int
o another, which is purely mechanized – all very simple and well determined, once it
is actually true that communication ends up happening between people and the inten
ded message is eventually passed from one person to the other (this is another fund
amental point: the decision always occurs, once there is always communication and
understanding by both parties).

G2) The problem seen in the Sorites is actually the same problem faced by every lexi
con expert: the trial of making speech and thought something with a common, gener
ically accepted, symbolic expression, of generalized use (lexicon symbols).

G3) Therefore, one must proceed like the linguist, and simply apply their techniques
to solve the Soritical problem. The same way the dictionary-writers do, we should d
o, in order to make something very large, different for each person, converge to som
ething everyone will accept as true. Notice, as well, that the factors involved in the S
orites, or entities, are precisely the same ones involved in lexicon creation (human b
eings' expression, human beings' mental reference, and forced judgment, imposed b
y linguist, over the symbolic pieces of the language).

G4) The issues raised by the Sorites presenter are actually about the own definition o

I. M. R. Pinheiro 17
f the predicates involved (where they start/where they end, `bounds of the definition
s’, or `scope of the definitions’, or even limits of the `object (Russel)'). As the linguis
t chooses, we shall choose: if there is any chance the classification, or word, does no
t fit description X, it will simply not fit until everyone changes their point of view, and
it is universally accepted as fitting. Easy to infer, whatever generates doubts gets a `i
t does not apply’ answer, a `No’. Doubts are assertion of `Yes’ and `No’ at the same
time, or anything, of any sort, which is different from either `Yes’ or `No’, exclusivel
y.

4. What a solution to a philosophical problem actually is

One could easily think that there is no need to even think of what a solution is for a p
hilosophical problem. However, we could not find any clear-cut, step-by-step recip
e, on how to check on whether a specific solution proposal to a philosophical problem
is, in fact, an actual solution. With this, we have decided to actually write it ourselve
s.

Basically, before departing to facing solutions, one must make sure the own propose
d problem is clear enough as it is necessary for it to be well addressed:

4A) before checking on whether a proposed solution is a solution for a particular phil
osophical problem, one must check on whether the proposed problem is writte
n in an acceptable manner; that is, agreeing with the well-posedness theory
for philosophical problems, which we believe to already have addressed in this ve
ry piece of work, somehow.
Specifically related to the Sorites problem, for it to be considered as well posed, it sh
ould present, in a very clear way, all possible enthymemes contained in it. There
fore, in a well-posed philosophical problem (or of any other scientific nature), no ent
hymemes should ever exist, unless they are clearly irrelevant for the understandi
ng of the problem, or the needed addressing of it.

4B) the language-terms used to describe the problem should be as objective
as they can possibly be. Any extra non-objective complication is going to easily ex
clude free thinkers to address the problem well. The intention of Science cannot, eve
r, be preventing any possible public from proposing a solution. It is actually true that
people who are brand-new to a field tend to present far many more innovative soluti
ons than the others. This proves that a new point of view, without paradigms, always
helps the solution to come quicker. Therefore, the language in which the problem is d
escribed should be as objective as it can, as simple as it can be. Several thinkers stu
died clarity in language; Russel and Friege are just a few of those. They can certainly
be read to make sure a very long standing problem is well-posed before giving it inte
rnational status.

4C) The area of knowledge where the problem is located should also be expli
citly mentioned in the problem proposal, so that people know what to study befo
re trying to address it. That saves time both of those addressing the problem and of t
hose proposing it, or checking its proposed solutions, what is, obviously, an intention
al quality in Science: saving time, optimization in every possible way.

On having the issue of the well-posedness problem solved, one may then check the p
ossible solution for it.

On the Sorites and well-posedness:
I. M. R. Pinheiro 18
It is very clear to us that the Sorites problem is generally presented in a very po
or manner, in terms of scientific standing. Several improvements are necessary
to make the problem both understandable, and easily addressable, by a broad audie
nce, or by the broadest audience as possible, which should always be the aim of Scie
nce: make it simpler, if it can ever be.

In the Sorites problem, it is clear that there are several enthymemes ( Note 9 ) that s
hould be clearly stated, so that the possible problem solvers save their time. All the p
resenter should ever intend, if ever scientific, is being fully understood in terms of wh
at the problem, itself, actually is. Nobody is able to address a problem that is not well
understood. Yet, many will try and will go wrong, as it happened with the Sorites.

Seen from the most basic and objective point of view, the Sorites problem is not e
ven a paradox, or ever was. Therefore, to start cleaning it, or making it scientific, t
he word paradox should never be contained in its description. Why?

Basically, if the premise `adding one grain of sand does not make any difference' ma
y only be generalized for very small pieces of the soritical sequence, what is blatantly
obvious, only where there are absolutely no shocking sights (something like a clear n
on-heap and a clear heap at the other end would be a shocking sight), we are left wit
h two objects contained in the same scope of definition (either a clear `heap’, or a cl
ear `non-heap’, or a clear `confusion area’). If the small sequence of objects that va
ry by one grain, and are indiscernible for the eyes, is entirely contained in a specific
definition scope of some standard dictionary word (heap, for instance), it is true that
there is no contradiction between the starting and the final object. Therefore, it coul
d not ever be said to be a paradox of sight. But that is how it is currently presen
ted!

The reason why the Sorites problem has been presented wrongly, so many times, is
because it was intended for general entertainment, not for Science, but scientists of
Language, or Philosophy, never bothered fixing its presentation to the standards dem
anded by Science, so that it could be included in the list of scientific problem.

A paradox in communication would demand that one starts with one piece of informa
tion but the audience understands it precisely the opposite as to what was originally i
ntended by the presenter. It cannot be a paradox in communication either then, beca
use one may assume that the audience always understands the problem the way it is
posed, not the opposite.

It could be a `logical’ system paradox of the sort `false’ and `true’, for instance, suc
h as the liar paradox (If I told you I always lie, would you believe me?), but there is
no truth values involved. Even to make the presentation of the Sorites problem be sc
ientific, there is no need to assign any truth values to each one of its parts; it is all a
bout language in its purest human part!

It cannot be a paradox in language either because it is precisely the same as asking t
he audience how linguists work, in terms of deciding on a certain scope of definition f
or a word, that is, the actual question contained in the Sorites, or its scientific questi
on (the simplest way to propose the problem, already explained why this would be th
e scientific way) is: what is the most precise definition for the word X – does it apply
to this object, Y, as well as to that object, Z?

The linguists, therefore, are the only people who would really be entitled to address t
I. M. R. Pinheiro 19
his question, or judge its addressing, in the best scientific way, once that is what the
y live for.

But if that is what they usually do, how can that possibly be a paradox? Do they reall
y find it hard to decide about it, or a new dictionary comes up updated every year, wi
th not a single issue directed to the general public about how `in doubt’, or `confuse
d’, they were when deciding on the word `X’’s scope?

Basically, it is widely known that if there is any doubt to whether a predicate (w
hich is also a lexicon word) applies, or not, to a situation, then it does not!

Conclusion that is obvious is that if there are any doubts as to the application of the
word `heap’ to a certain amount of sand, in any possible way (confused speech in an
y possible way (not yes or no, exclusively)), then it does not apply to that object ev
er, until there is no confusion anymore, for everyone involved! Therefore, `heap’ mea
ns all situations in which everyone in the audience said only `Yes, it is a heap’; `No
n-heap’ then means everything else, until the linguists accept another word called `n
on-heap’ in the dictionary, which they have not done so far. What gets defined is wha
t a `heap’ is, the words `non-heap’ not appearing in the dictionary at all. Therefore, i
f `non-heap’ gets to be the opposition to `heap’, `non-heap’ is everything that could
be a heap but is not, even a shirt… Basically, if tomorrow the whole World, or the ma
jority of it, wishes to say that a `heap’ is not a bunch of something anymore, and it i
s, instead, the absence of anything, that is what the linguists will take it to be, so tha
t references are not immutable, or even the referents, and one may easily find sever
al theories on that (Friege, Russel, Wittgenstein, etc.).

It is then not a paradox in language, not a paradox in sight, not a paradox in
communication, or of any other sort: absolutely not a paradox!

It is more an allurement, to prove how interesting the work of the linguist actually is.

Because Science is not there to `trick' people, as a commoner would be doing when
presenting something in a very similar situation to a `busker', in Australia, to attract
attention, the problem must be well-posed. One may easily notice that just by clearin
g it from any possible distraction that is not scientific, it gets as simple as to coincide
with a very well-known and old professional area: Linguistics.

In this case, unfortunately, there was never a `new’ striking problem, just an unskille
d writing, of a `busker’s' presentation, of something that could not ever be seen as s
cientific, or skilled.

This way, one could be stating that `adding one grain of sand to the previous amoun
t of sand does not make a difference', but one would also have to state that `adding
this x amounts of grains of sand to the first bunch of sand does make a difference'
(when the area of no clear distinction – named as blurred – is over, one may pick the
next element already, to compare with the first one, or any of the others in the blurr
ed area, where it all seems to fit in the same scope of language wording/eye sight) a
t some stage, because we see clearly a `heap’ and a `non-heap’ there, in those two
randomly chosen elements. The two previously mentioned premises are our enthyme
mes that should be clearly stated in the problem description so that nobody will ever
get confused. It is not a novelty we mention them, other people have done such. Ho
wever, we actually made it clear that the solution can only be (and proved it) in the s
cope of the purest Philosophy of Language, if in anywhere logical, that there is, in ter
I. M. R. Pinheiro 20
ms of it being totally human, and may only be addressed by a linguistic point of view
(the experts in actually writing dictionaries). The issue on whether the predicate start
s here, or there, is then addressed with the linguists solution (so far): if there is conf
usion, for any person in the audience, in terms of uttering `it is’ and `it is not’, or sh
e/he does not know (considering an audience of suitable people for the predicate und
er observation, as mentioned earlier on in this paper), then it does not apply: that is
it! This is precisely how we described our solution in the precursor paper with `Semio
tica’. However, here, we actually exhibit more developed argumentation as to defend
its standing as a full solution, much harder to be objected to, or, hopefully, impossibl
e.

Therefore, the Sorites problem, if ever presented correctly, is neither a new problem,
nor a paradox (Note 11): only the same problem faced by centuries now, that the ling
uists writing our lexicons face everyday at work, with very solid theories about its sol
ution.

If any problem might emerge there, it is the same problem the linguists would be stu
dying right now in their theories, which will not relate to computers logic, or Mathem
atics, and the question is a much more generic one: how can we define a word, with
precision, in a dictionary, so that everyone accepts it as such?

With this, the problem created, or raised, if any, because it would be no novelty as w
ell, would be a standard problem, related to a very specific and old profession, so tha
t the Sorites could never be seen as a scientific problem at all, in an isolated manne
r: at most an example, an allurement, as we have already stated. Or, if the linguists
wish, a very nice name for what they must do, in their work, when writing lexicons, e
ach and everyday.

Proposed step-by-step guide to judging a possible solution to a philosophica
l problem:

1) Is the problem well posed in the rigors of Science?

If the answer is yes, go to number 2. If the answer is No, re-write it first, following our previously proposed
guidelines for scientific problems, to then analyse its possible solution in terms of 2.

2) What scope does the problem belong to?

2.1) if it does not belong to Philosophy, forget it! If it is inside of Philosophy, it should bear some rational g
rounds in all its description/sequence of steps.

2.2) if the scope is, indeed, Philosophy, and the problem was not dropped at number
2, what part of Philosophy should it belong to?

First of all, one tries the top possible reduction, the most objective way of describing
it, once that should be the objective of Science. In the case of Philosophy, the top po
ssible reduction would be into Classical Logic terms.

Next step is checking on the possibility of another logical system, more complex - a
Non-Classical Logic system - being able to describe the whole problem in scientific te
rms. Still Computer `Science’. Why? Because any logic has got a system of reasonin
g assigned to it, and any system of reasoning, fully described in natural language, in
I. M. R. Pinheiro 21
precise rules of inference, may be inserted in a machine.

If ever decided that the problem cannot, ever, be totally reduced to the Computer `S
cience’ level, then it might belong to some specific area of Philosophy: Language, Sci
ence, etc…, which one?

3) If it belongs to Philosophy of Language, for instance, and it cannot be reduced to the most objectiv
e lingo of language, to any computer-friendly logical systems, then it must be in the purest scope of P
hilosophy of Language, the Philosophy properly stated as such, purest: totally human.

In this case, the problem may only be well-addressed if referring purely to theories in that particular area, s
o that a solution must be, first of all, checked against this criterion: is the solution using tools inside of the
most reduced area to which the problem belongs in Philosophy?

If it is not, the solution is discarded immediately; if it is, number 4 applies.

4) Now, in being inside of the right area, is the solution something based on
really accepted theories, or the theories used have suffered many objections
in their trials of general acceptance by the public involved?

If there were many objections to any of the theories involved, the same objections are going to be objection
s to the proposed solution. The solver must have then explicitly addressed those for his/her solution to be ev
er refereed.

If there was never any strong objection to the theories of the solution, or the theories have been popularly a
pplied for many years in practice (for instance, lexicon theories), then it is a definite solution if it addresses
the issues of the problem with perfection.

5. Further considerations and re-inforcements of what was stat
ed before:

Apparently, the presenter of a Sorites problem has never deserved to be listene
d to by a scientifically educated audience at all. Blame those who did not identif
y a confused speaker and did accept the Sorites as a paradox, creating problems for
us to think of!!!!

If one takes it to be a paradox for the eyes, it is not suitable, once Parallax ( Note 12 )
is a paradox for the eyes but we can actually prove it is such, with our own good eye
s. Same will never happen with the Sorites: It is not our observation that is faulty at
all, or our judgement. If one takes it to be a paradox in Language, it is again not suit
able, once, in language, there is no confusion: It is not the case that we then start d
oubting the concept of `heap’ and `non-heap’ at all, taking the original proposal.

What could then be taken into account, in Language, as paradox, in the sense of impl
ying contradictory conclusions, would be the if..then. We could easily start doubting
the if...then from Mathematics, and challenge the whole World of Mathematics/Class
ical Logic that way. But we then understand that the reduced scope of meaning, atta
ched to the Maths lingo, is not all that if...then may mean in language, by just visiti
ng the simplest dictionary, or book, on writing. Therefore, where could a paradox in L
anguage possibly lie?

Is it actually possible to find a single paradox in language at all? We actually
challenge you to think about this. The so-called liar paradox, for instance, seems to

I. M. R. Pinheiro 22
be a logical paradox, not a language paradox. It is also the case that, if re-written pr
operly, it will generate the same sort of reasoning, or very similar one for its solution.
And we, here, even suggest that, as possible extension of results. Basically, there is
one possible enthymeme involved in the liar paradox: `but in this previous ass
ertion, I did not (lie)'. If that is correct, then everything uttered by that speaker shou
ld always be false, apart from the particular time he/she has uttered that they alway
s lied. Therefore, there is absolutely no problem involved in believing them at all. The
issue about believing, however, is, once more, a personal issue, and depends on a po
ssibly dettached reasoning from whatever happens in reality. This way, there is no po
int in even analyzing that logically, unless we also know the mental attitude, as for a
recipe, for that particular person who is the object of the speech of the first one. If th
ey also lie when they say they always lie, then they do say the truth sometimes. In t
his case, whatever follows is useless for any logical purposes, or inferences, unless w
e know all enthymemes involved, and they may reassure us of when he/she lies, or n
ot. Basically, in dropping the logical use of the assertion, we are still following the `le
xicon reasoning', that of not accepting whatever is contradictory in the positive way o
f the definition. Interesting enough, the lexicon reasoning, as we have decided to n
ame it, seems to be the recipe, or underlying reasoning, to make every possible para
dox solved in Logic, when they do not belong to the most objective scope of it (logic,
Computer `Science’). That is a hint on what we could possibly be developing in the f
uture.

Well, if the paradox is not in Language, is not in our observation, or judgement, wher
e would it possibly be? Perhaps in the own ontology of the object, or in the conflict b
etween a premise, which states that adding a single grain does not make any differe
nce, and the conclusion. All we can say is that the premise does vary, but there are e
nthymemes because, by the time of the third step, it is already two grains, and not o
ne anymore, if you regard the first step. Therefore, the premise is always being rebui
lt, in what regards the first step, but remains the same in what regards the previous
one, so that there is no paradox at all, just like Physics, referential. It is all true and f
ine. If you think it is the ontology that is paradoxical, it then is missing pointing out
which. Is it the ontology of the `heap’, or the `non-heap’? Do you actually have dou
bts about those? It actually seems true that nobody doubts the first and the last step
in the Sorites so that nobody, in the whole Universe, has ever challenged what a `he
ap’ and a `non-heap’ is, in the most astonishing conclusion of all: we do have a univ
ersal concept of those in an Universe where even blind people inhabit!!!

Via the simplest observation of human->machine communication differences, we
get to understand what is what. Learning that a computer and a normal human being
cannot, ever, be thought to be the same, or a normal human being be thought as red
uceable to a machine [2, Turing contest], makes us understand why there is far
much more than what is contained in a logical system in the World of consis
tent theories, which may be expressed by us somehow. And that extra is certainly c
ontained in Philosophy, but not in what could possibly be encompassed in any logical
system rules. If mental processes were fully, and accurately, transmitted to others, t
hat is, Communication/Language could ever be machine-friendly, why would couples
ever divorce? Where there is full understanding and will to be married, why would pe
ople ever fail, once they know precisely what the other wants, or expects, and how t
o do it right? We are sorry to think that there are a lot of superficial thinkers out ther
e doing Philosophy, and publishing, to keep people occupied with this sort of thing for
so many years now. It is certainly true that Psychiatry and Psychology will explain it
all: the need that the whole World gets presented in the way they can possibly under
stand it logically. Why? Well...drugs, dettachment from others and reality, shortage o
I. M. R. Pinheiro 23
f interest in things that are purely human, too much wrong Army oriented formation
(war, strategy, more strategy )...shortage of being charged on being socially useful...

This way, we have managed to provide people with the desired output: `Yes, it is a h
eap/I agree' or `No, it is not a heap/I disagree'. This is the outcome for each single
observer, once if it ever happens that he/she states both or neither, or something w
ith the same effect as neither, we choose the second option, a `No, it is not', decision
provided by themselves based on the best dictionary writers' decisions, that is, lingui
sts: people working on the scope of the Philosophy of Language, as we stated to be a
requirement for the actual solution, once we have decided the problem belongs ther
e.

`One grain of sand does not make any difference' is/is not a fixed premise valid for a
ll propositions' - we have decided that this is not the case. This sentence may only be
regarded as premise if the other premises involved are neighbor utterances (face nei
ghborhood as that in Mathematics) by the presenter. Otherwise, we have to re-build t
he premise to account for as many intermediary grains as the ones added to go from
the initial premise to the last considered, taking into consideration the presenter alwa
ys works with only three basic premises in his/her inferences for the problem. Easy t
o see that, this way, there is absolutely no paradox in what regards the truth-values
of two of the premises, once the grain step is always true. It is just a natural thing to
judge and see, not a paradox anymore, that is, presented correctly, with no enthyme
mes, it is really not a shock. `I am also confused at the end of the presentation as m
uch as you, presenter, seems to be/I am not, you are an idiot'. Sorry to state we hav
e decided to state that the presenter was an actual idiot, that is, a very - and int
olerable - confused speaker.

YES, WE DO HOLD A DEFINITE SOLUTION FOR THE SORITES PARADOX. AND
WE ALSO DARE PROVING THAT IT WAS NEVER A PARADOX IN ANY POSSIBL
E SENSE!

We seem to hold an actual solution to the problem in every possible sense: no higher-order vagueness, no s
hortage of acceptance by the general public in terms of their own reasoning, there is a definite line where th
e predicate should stop being applied, or start, there is no doubt to where the line lies for each person being
submitted to the Sorites paradox, there is allowance for each person to have their own solution for each pre
dicate, and each object, that is, each soritical sequence presentation, so that it is not an imposition to the gen
eral public and even people with problems in the judgement (meaning unusual thinking) could express the
mselves correctly in logical entries. There are also no gluts or gaps of truth-values, once it is either the case
that a soritical sentence is TRUE, or it is FALSE, that is, the truth-values accepted, and always possible to b
e assigned, by both the utterer and our translation system, are the classical ones and, in Classical Logic, ther
e are no gaps or gluts.

We also do not commit the same mistakes made by Epistemicists, or Epistemologists, because we never say
there is a universal line, in any possible sense, and we actually believe this is the most serious mistake of al
l. There is no way a person can believe they are, ever, receiving what any utterer intended were to be receiv
ed. No wonder there is so much available in the literature about communication not being effective and, jus
t by luck, someone speaking to their own race, closest person, same language, as well as cultural backgroun
d, that is, with top similarities and things in common, will ever know, for sure, and with certainty, that they
have got the idea intended by the utterer, just like in the kids' game: cordless telephone!!! - You think it is n
ot good enough to make use of kids' games to explain? Talk about that with the greatest philosophers of all,
and also our best logician ever: Jesus Christ, son of God, That who knows it all...even what you think nobo
dy else knows, or sees!!! - Apart from that, we know some people might write that the other account actuall
y states that the object itself has got an ontology and, therefore, a very precise color, for instance. We do not
I. M. R. Pinheiro 24
ever deny something like that, that is probably totally true. However, it is never accessible by human beings
at all, once Language is not enough, and this is the broadest thing we have nowadays, in terms of d
escribing objects. A picture is also not good enough because of us - who are humans
- and, therefore, not popular in our observations. That just means that the ontology
of the object is something such as talking about God: totally perfect but unaccessible
to human beings in any possible way. To be totally sincere, even the name of God is
doubted until nowadays. God Himself, in the own Bible, states that we should refer to
Him as `God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’ (Matthew 22:32), that is, God, Himself, f
eels the need of presenting Himself as someone attached to other people. One must
understand, then, that it is only possible to refer to the ontology of an object, even h
umans considered as such (for a quick thing such as beauty contests), by associating
that object to something else - a reference - just like in Physics. What is actually me
ant is that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, actually know who God is, and what He is precisel
y like, but we are just going to dream about it, and always state that that is the `Go
d of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob'. With colors, or predicates in language, there is only
a dream we can actually express the ontology of the object perfectly well. But we ca
n easily say that that object is of the `red' stated by `Carla, Marcia, Pedro’, for insta
nce.

The color has to be attached to an observer, just like our God from the Bible. No boo
k could be wiser, or bring more enlightenment to life, or Science, than the Bible, trust
us. With this development, all we meant is that the solution must be personal, attach
ed to the observer, always. And we could come up with an argumentation on the line
s of Semantics, another part of the Philosophy of Language but we actually did, only
without mentioning it... We have a sort of walked through Wittgenstein, Russel, and
all the best researchers in the field, skipping their technical lingo. We are basically wr
iting about referent and object of reference, or designation and designated, etc.

Here, the issue that makes philosophers think the most is the higher-order vaguenes
s issue. Basically, the best criticism that could be done, in what regards that and our
solution, is that the choice of No and Yes would bear some lack of naturality, or prec
ise definition/scope. However, we believe to fully have solved both cases of higher-or
der vagueness.

One, we justify our choice with the own Philosophy of Language, Semiotics, and the
best researchers in the field, who all support our choice: when in doubt, do not assig
n that signifier to this signified, that is, if there is any doubt/confusion, choose it is n
ot the case that. Also, the further point, things are defined always in the positive wa
y, on what `they actually are', not on what `they actually are not', lexicon logic.

On the other hand, as soon as linguists come up with another decision theory, as for
the lexicon words, our solution is accordingly updated, so that it is always a solution.

As explained before, because we solve the problem of higher-order vagueness with f
ull justification in the own field the problem belongs to, we do hold an actual solutio
n.

IS THE SOLUTION TO THE SORITES PARADOX SOMETHING LOGICALLY USEF
UL? IF SO, IN WHAT SENSE?

The solution to the Sorites paradox is something logically useful in the sense that any prog
ress in human reasoning, or understanding, may be said to be of broad logic
I. M. R. Pinheiro 25
al future use. However, there is absolutely nothing extra gained in Logic, with the s
pecific solution to the Sorites paradox, besides progression in reasoning. The simple f
act that we tell people the problem was generated because people understood it wro
ng helps Logic progressing, once it helps logicians and researchers to observe things
better next time. However, our solution does not bring a new logic, simply explains al
l the different logical systems involved, and talks about one, which must be purely ph
ilosophical - human reasoning - not bearing any formal logical system.

Pure Human Reasoning (P.H.R.) is that part of reasoning in which there are feelin
gs, emotions, or any sort of unreasonable (for instantaneous observers)/individualize
d deductions, inferences, premises that, of course, cannot, ever, be translated into co
mputational logical systems (so far, up to our current knowledge on how the mind wo
rks in conjunction with what is deduced/felt/observed by an individual). The rest is al
so human reasoning, but may be said computable, or machine-friendly, like the Class
ical Logic one is. All that falls into the latter‘s scope, it is machine-friendly, in principl
e. In that sense, the final/verbal, or written, response to a proposition of a sp
ecific Sorites paradox, itself, is machine-friendly.

It is annoying to understand that, at the end of the day, there is absolutely no par
adox at all, it all derives from wrong observation and wrong premises-underst
anding, that is, actual premises in language, but faulty logical premises due to the o
verlooking of the fact that language is far more than the logical systems in plac
e, and not all of it may be translated into logical lingo/is not literally expressed, whils
t the opposite is always true, and verifiable. That is obvious, once a word in English,
one of the most objective languages in the World, bears several meanings, even in a
n English-English dictionary. More than that, different linguists may hold different int
erpretations, for any dictionary word (from an individual’s perspective). That just me
ans that we can only hope communication is successful, and this is obviously why pe
ople tend to have extensive courses on how to write, read, spell: just to have more c
hances of communicating what they actually want to the broadest audience as possib
le. It is obvious then that, even if one has two native English speakers speaking, ther
e is still the need of understanding their feelings, when they speak, to grasp the whol
e meaning behind their speech, so that even English-English communication is almos
t impossible, in terms of full effectiveness.

One may state they are communicating with others, but all a Logician, or a S
cience person, would be able to state is that they are making efforts to.

There are even books, and books, written on the subject on how effective communic
ation happens. This way, it is actually very easy to understand that language is also s
ymbols, and so is a logical system, just that the latter uses a far more reduced set of
symbols. If a logical system has got less symbols available than the natural languag
e, it is just scientific that it is impossible to even think of translating language into a l
ogical system, as a whole, because the only possible way would be an overlapping of
ideas converging into the same symbol, so that translation cannot, possibly, be accur
ate, ever, and, as such, it cannot be considered a translation: It is obviously humanly
impossible. On the top of that, there are the enthymemes, sentences usually omitted
in communication when it happens between people who know each other. That make
s it all absurd to be translated effectively, even if it is in writing And it is obviously th
e case that there lies the beauty of cinema, or plays: the much variety of interpretati
on a single action of an actor, a single word, generates. Everyone knows that `To be
or not to be' has been giving way to an infinite number of texts around the World an
d it is just six words...
I. M. R. Pinheiro 26
It is really unacceptable that anything different from what we described was ever ima
gined before regarding what was wrongly named `Sorites paradox'. The Sorites is ob
viously not a paradox in Logic, or Mathematics, not even in Language. It is simply a f
allacy the way it has been interpreted and described. The utterer wished it were a
paradox, the audience takes it to be a paradox. But it is definitely not a para
dox.

This way, the paradox in Language could be seen as a paradox with the own word `p
aradox', but we think that there is no doubt about the meaning of the word `parado
x'. Therefore, if one really wants to classify it as a paradox then it is obviously a `ma
rketing-made’ paradox. The intended message is X. X is false. The recipient of the m
essage, however, gets X, even being false, and accepts it - re-defining, consequently,
a dictionary word to be something it is not. Because the dictionary must be right, it c
an only be the case that the receptor was induced to think wrongly and, therefore, th
ere was some sort of apparent logic in the utterer's speech, which is not really a logi
c, but pretends to be such. This way, it is a paradox in communication because we, c
ontrary to the rest of the Universe so far, got the opposite message, so that there is
conflict, and paradox, in the scope of communication: It looks correct, it is the intend
ed message, but our conclusion is the opposite to the utterer's conclusion.

Conflict between receptor and transmitter, paradox, once communication is
supposed to occur the way it was intended by the transmitter.

Paradox, in Human Communication, still belongs to the Philosophy of Language, so th
at we are still correct. And it is again not possible to label it as `Sorites paradox' bec
ause if it belongs to the scope of Communication then it should be the `problem prop
oser's paradox' (in Communication) to which an example is the Sorites problem. The
obvious mistake then is having logicians, who are not from the scope of the Philosop
hy of Language, thinking they have a say there: They do not. Unless they are keen o
n writing in terms of the Philosophy of Language, that is, with all the background it d
emands, logicians really have no say in the Sorites problem.

The Sorites paradox, as our conclusion tells, is basically a motivation for the
listener to think of the beauty of the work developed by the linguists. The ba
sic question is: how hard is it to translate thoughts, as well as their expression, into s
omething accepted by everyone as a lexicon? How to do it?

Subtracting the Sorites from Logic, and Mathematics, leads us to a full understanding
of its beauty. It is as interesting as `to be or not to be'. One could write a whole libra
ry of books with just that inspirational thought: That is basically it.

We believe the solution to the Sorites paradox is there to make logicians, and mathe
maticians, see the limitation of their work, and accept that Language is far more tha
n Logic and Mathematics, not the other way around. One could easily say that Mathe
matics is the most reduced scope of Logic, and logic is the most reduced scope of La
nguage. Mathematics applies Russell and Frege's logic, the most objective way of co
mmunicating, which has ever existed. So much so, there are several mathematicians
who are well understood if they give a talk in, for instance, Romanian, but write good
self-explanatory Mathematics lingo on the board, or print it. That is a clear example t
o show that Mathematics is the Universal Language, that Language in which com
munication is always possible and effective. Logic is the third choice, following logical
systems, or computer-friendly systems. Pure Language is the messiest one, in which
only by means of luck one understands each other. And thought...don't even think ab
I. M. R. Pinheiro 27
out it! We have proposed that logicians worry about things they can do, and are actu
ally useful to humanity. For that end, we advise the reader to check on [9].

That is because there are several things in this World: it is obvious that calculations
would not be the only ones where Logic does apply. The problem, of course, is findin
g out what, inside of all this universe of choices, is truly relevant, so that if person X,
as a Logician, worries about it, the whole World is going to be thankful, and willing to
pay loads of money for any result X ever gets. Basically, mental diseases seem a won
derful way to go, even if to prove that, with some mental labels, it is better that they
only exist in theory, and are never applied to a subject (lexicon logical decision, when
there is doubt). Medicine should be a logical thing. If it is not, there is no point. It is t
ime to interfere, yeah, but not with language, which is so well structured, as a Scienc
e, and so wonderfully explained, as well as founded. It is time to interfere with what l
acks perfection, as we write in [10]: Whatever is perfect, like God, we should just b
ow for it, and respect… Let go.

Notes

Note 1 It is not that Dr Casti has declared that this is his intention, literally. We simp
ly infer that from how he is able to deal with higher-order mathematical concepts in
a popular way. See, for instance, [2].
I. M. R. Pinheiro 28
Note 2 Odd enough, we had this really well known Philosopher, whose specialization
is Logic, with more than one hundred published papers nowadays, demanding we pre
sented the problem in mathematical terms. Sometimes, one must just do it, given th
at those who truly matter, in terms of being convinced we hold a solution, seem to n
eed us to do it. In the World of Science, as we see it, there is very little which is reall
y scientific. Science seems to have regressed in its power and scope, not to say unde
rstanding. Whilst a single paper which contained striking results was enough for a pe
rson to be considered a Doctor of Philosophy in the past, we regressed to a whole th
esis of sometimes very ordinary results. Apart from that, people do not seem to have
not even the smallest admiration or respect for beauty and perfection, for God's rule
s, what should be the most basic requirement for someone to be even accepted as ca
ndidate to become part of Science. Why? Simply because God's intention, and that m
ust be the best intentions ever, is preserving what is perfect and beautiful and makin
g more perfect and more beautiful what is not. If someone does not respect beauty a
nd perfection, God's rules are not played and the Devil wins, what makes the World
worse, not better, what cannot possibly be the intentions of Science. How many Hiros
himas does the World hopes for, really? It is only the true passion for the laws that m
akes human beings respect it. It is not repetition, but the full understanding that the
y are the only means to get a perfectly harmonious society, with top allowed-in-the-s
ystem equality between the social members.

Note 3 The Mathematics used by us is not wrong, but it is simply the case that the p
roblem escapes its scope completely and any trial of representation of it, in mathema
tical terms, is doomed to failure, as it is easily proven by all easy and strong objectio
ns presented to all the solutions which have made use of mathematical tools to descr
ibe the own problem. It is easy to understand that a problem lying in a larger set, wit
h elements in the complementary set of the smaller one, cannot, possibly, be fully de
scribed, and should not be even partially described in terms of the symbols for the s
maller set. The explanation is very easy to be understood, but we must spend a few
works doing such in order to convince those who could possibly doubt it, as our so ill
ustrious Philosopher/Logician, mentioned before, because, once more, that is how m
odern scientific publications are achieved/settled.

Note 4 See www.geocities.com/trmsorfiap.

Note 5 The name of the person will remain confidential, might be disclosed for prev
ention of suit over false statements, but it is a real case, occurred in Brazil, Rio de Ja
neiro, more than 20 years ago.

Note 6 The first non-classical system ever created was created apparently by Nicolai
A. Vasiliev, in 1910. For more on Vasilev, please refer to [6].

Note 7 Zadeh's introduced his idea on Fuzzy logic in 1965, as mentioned in [7].

Note 8 Notice the difference, for us, between the set of all possible logical events, Lo
gic, and a particular reasoning that bears logical characteristics, logic. For example, F
uzzy logic is part of the Sub-philosophical-Science, Logic.

Note 9 Enthymemes involved in the previous utterances, always. The Sorites does n
ot state, but assumes that a proposition was understood in the middle of each furthe
r progression: If I add one grain of sand to the `previous amount of existing sand', t
hat is, it is not that it does not make any difference if added to another member of th
e sequence, only in that particular step, when one result is next to the other in the s
I. M. R. Pinheiro 29
equence (that is, uttering `a single grain of sand, therefore, being added to the previ
ous amount of sand does not make any difference' is a correct deduction, but `a sing
le grain of sand added to any amount of sand does not make any difference' is a wro
ng deduction from what was stated or, at least, a wrong `enunciation' of what was st
ated). If we propose a problem the wrong way, and that is basic scientific reasoning,
the solution is not achievable, once only very well defined, refined in all possibilities,
scientific problems, may be solved the way a lecturer, or proposer, or presenter, ever
intended them to be solved. Otherwise, a new problem might have been created, an
d it might not even be a well formulated problem, so that it is just dropped from an e
xam, for instance. The Sorites is proposed the same way lecturers would propose pro
blems to students, so that the same principles, of full clarity of presentation, should
apply. Otherwise, just drop it for another better defined problem. If it is ever to have
its solutions judged, or appreciated, it is more than necessary that it is correctly stat
ed. At this stage, one could easily think of why we simply did not forget about the pr
oblem: So it is not a problem at all! However, if a small group of members of the Sori
tes paradox is considered, `A grain of sand does not make any difference' would still
be a possible proposition. It is obvious, as well, that the Logic from Language would
never allow us to encompass every stated proposition along the way, stated as `a sin
gle grain of sand added will not make any difference if it is added on the top of the pr
evious amount', in the only, supposed to be, resulting global assertion `a single grain
of sand added will not make any difference if it is added on the top of any amount of
sand! If there is a language mistake, there is a logical mistake of some sort, all enco
mpassed in the Philosophy of Logic, which is part of Philosophy. Therefore, it cannot
be accepted as a well proposed, or defined, problem, this way.
This way, unfortunately, we are limited by the only two possible problem formulation
s: it is either the case that we hold a small amount of elements in the sequence to w
hich the generalized proposition could be added and, in this case, we would never fac
e `heap‘ and `non-heap’ in the same sequence, or there is no problem worth thinkin
g of. At this stage, once more, all we, and others, did might sound useless. However,
if one forgets about the `heap' and `non-heap' situation, and considers the only vali
d one, all the reasoning used by us is still valid, so that we are still the only ones to h
old an actual solution (it does not matter what) to the problem, if ever stated correctl
y.
In any hyp., in this note, all we needed to clarify is that there is no chance the Sori
tes implication is mathematical, ever. And it cannot be purely logical either (M
achine Reasoning), simply because it depends on human observation and judgm
ent, which falls inside of the scope of purely human reasoning. It is, therefore, a l
anguage implication only, in the complementary set of Mathematics and Co
mputer Science, never inside. As a language implication, and being the whole probl
em proposed in the scope of purely human reasoning (P.H.R.), only purely human r
easoning theories should address it well. We do believe that this is what we do
when we decide there must be a `translation interface', just like there is with lite
rary translation from one language into another (purely human scope).

Note 10 it is more an evidence of possible proof, once, as mathematicians, we would
never accept any practical proof to be like that, unless it were possible to guarantee t
hat every possible case is dealt with by that specific procedure.

Note 11
In [12], one will find the word paradox defined with the wording below:
Main Entry: par·a·dox javascript:popWin('/cgi-bin/audio.pl?parado02.wav=paradox')Pron
unciation: \'per-ə-ˌdäks, 'pa-rə-\ Function: noun Etymology: Latin paradoxum, from Gre
I. M. R. Pinheiro 30
ek paradoxon, from neuter of paradoxos contrary to expectation, from para- + dokein to t
hink, seem — more at decent Date: 1540
1: a tenet contrary to received opinion2 a: a statement that is seemingly contradictory or
opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps true b: a self-contradictory statement that at
first seems true c: an argument that apparently derives self-contradictory conclusions by
valid deduction from acceptable premises3: one (as a person, situation, or action) having
seemingly contradictory qualities or phases.
Note 12
Parallax mistake, as mentioned in [12]

Main Entry: par·al·lax javascript:popWin('/cgi-bin/audio.pl?parall02.wav=parallax')Pronu
nciation: \'pa-rə-ˌlaks\ Function: noun Etymology: Middle French parallaxe, from Greek
parallaxis, from parallassein to change, from para- + allassein to change, from allos oth
er Date: 1580
: The apparent displacement or the difference in apparent direction of an object as seen fr
om two different points not on a straight line with the object; especially : the angular diff
erence in direction of a celestial body as measured from two points on the earth's orbit.

References
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[2] Casti, J. Five Golden Rules. John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1997.
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[4] Wolenski, J. Maccoll on modalities. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3(1):
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[5] Hippocrates. On Ancient Medicine. http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/ancime
d.18.18.html, acc. Feb, 2007.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 31
[6] Bazhanov, V.A. Ocerki sotsialnoj istorii logiki v Rossii [Sketches of the Soci
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[9] Schmid, C. Course on Dynamics of multidisciplinary and controlled system
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[11] Read, S. Thinking about Logic: an introduction to the philosophy of logic.
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[12] Merriam-Webster dictionary online, ` http://www.m-w.com/’, as accessed in Feb. 20
07.
[13]Weisstein, Eric W. "Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem." From MathWorld--A Wolfra
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I. M. R. Pinheiro 32