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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR
Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving
his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it
is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad
Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and
shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting
and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they
were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the
bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the
shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the
police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of
his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the
victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information,
the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful
and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that
he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on
the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a
cash bond of P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date,
approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation 8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had
filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend
cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11
July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling
the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July
1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender
himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was
recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11
July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing
the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had
been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all
proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by
respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the
Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August
1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit
petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of
his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case
for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22
November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of
public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a
month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated
in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment
on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the
following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged
had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he
showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation
at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived
his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial
court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order
(issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to
the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a
"Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a
Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders
from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest
had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively
waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validly
arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had
been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police
Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases
consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a
majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in
connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even
without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police
station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not
been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had
been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case,
misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of

petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such
offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like
the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense
which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that
the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest"
effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out
to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of
Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed
by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and
in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver,
he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a

preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed
in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that
he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon
Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor
proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was
substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded
him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also
entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that
petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out,
on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the
Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that
that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner
should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of
petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary
investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not
clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with
the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a reinvestigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial
court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's
omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a

petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation. 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest. is not a mere formal or technical right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety. petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail? Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation. we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. Finally. we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. Again. Accordingly. 25 It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one. the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses. Thus. In fact. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable. was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. secondly. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty. since it has in fact been established by statute. prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial." 24 In the instant case. in the circumstances of this case. it is a substantive right. The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that. 22 In the instant case. to hardened criminals. petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari. In People v. The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation. Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with. At the time of his arraignment. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice. in the instant case. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament. while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice. the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7. impact upon. not to speak of expense. perhaps. petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. humiliation. the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. trial on the merits has already commenced. is a valuable right. we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. Accordingly. when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. firstly.preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. however. and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. aggravation. Selfaison. We would clarify. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in . the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save. petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and.

" 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court oncertiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. petitioner did so "kicking and screaming. the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari." in a manner of speaking . upon the other hand. Meantime. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record. petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection. It would then be up to the trial court. If he submitted to arraignment at trial. the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. In any event. it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties. the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. No pronouncement as to costs. And.000. During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be. it would not be idle ceremony. and just before arraignment.00). in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand. in any case. it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation. and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. To reach any other conclusions here. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point. 30 If he did not walk out on the trial. and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process. strong. This Decision is immediately executory. During the trial. to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. rather. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. with extraordinary haste. in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100. should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. before the prosecution called its first witness. and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED. This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue. ACCORDINGLY. the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go. that is. conclude that probable cause exists. we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. the date set for arraignment of petitioner. could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. In respect of the matter of bail. and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses. . 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might. SO ORDERED.abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner.

shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening. In his defense. in Iloilo City. two shirts and two pairs of pants. 1 Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25. 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic. who was eventually convicted . J. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. The trial court.No. 8 Acting on this tip. 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1984. although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin. 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.00. Herminio T.00 for fare.000. tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant." 5The motion was granted.G. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him. 1984. Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but. and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation. 19 . traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.R. an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen. inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. CRUZ. 14 The trial court was unconvinced. On the basis of this finding. they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. disbelieving him. vs. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI. 6 According to the prosecution. the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accusedappellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. defendant-appellant. strangely. plaintiff-appellee. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400. 7 He was Identified by name. 4 Subsequently.: The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested. observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. At the PC headquarters.00 and gave away the other. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. they waited for him in the evening of June 25. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment. the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin. held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. chemical and chromatographic tests on them. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant. 74869 July 6. he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana. noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time. 2 Later. not to mention his other expenses. When they were verified as marijuana leaves.

sir. one saying it was two days before the arrest. who testified as follows: Q You mentioned an intelligence report. sir. I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. sir. two days before June 25. Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report? A Well. meaningful pauses and hesitation. 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin. making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. For instance. That is hardly fair or realistic. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip. The decision did not even discuss this point. we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team. Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests." 22 On this matter. considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. however. COURT: . that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. flush of face and dart of eyes. It is not disputed.. Q When did you receive this intelligence report? A Two days before June 25. 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources. report of illegal gambling operation. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest. the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113. Cipriano Querol. and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution. 1984? A Yes. But the trial judge sees all of this. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. Lt. are not described in the impersonal record. No bail has been allowed for his release. 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer.There is no justification to reverse these factual findings. There is one point that deserves closer examination. For his part. 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9? A Yes. prior to June 25. 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25. Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date? A Yes. and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant. Jr. Nuances of tone or voice. Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25. which may reveal the truth or expose the lie. you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25. The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination.

1984. Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing? A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities. did not know that he was coming but on June 23. 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin. only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned? A Yes. you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs? A Marijuana. LLARIZA: Q Previous to June 25.Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25. sir. did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin A Previous to June 25. Q You mean that before June 23. maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person. we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff. sir. I. you put him under surveillance? A Yes.1984.1984 two days before? A Yes. Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25. 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming? A Before June 23. sir. 1984. sir. 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming. COURT: Q And as a result of that report. Q In the intelligence report. Q From whom did you get that information? A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information. sir. Regarding the reports on his activities. Q But you received it from your regular informer? A Yes. ATTY. in my capacity. Q What were those activities? A Purely marijuana trafficking. Q Are you sure of that? .

Yet they did nothing. Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report? A No. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. And from the information they had received. Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore? A Search warrant is not necessary.A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman. In the case at bar. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 2. 1984? A Only on the 23rd of June. you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25. The present case presented no such urgency. more. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. The date of its arrival was certain. it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed. it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team. to justify the issuance of a warrant. indeed. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause. Arca. . houses. No effort was made to comply with the law. Q Why not? A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result. 23 That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement. the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary. Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23. His name was known. Contrary to the averments of the government. The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear: Sec. The vehicle was Identified. as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. 1984. This is still a government of laws and not of men. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses. 24 for example. especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.

committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. ACCORDINGLY. We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant. to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high. To all appearances. "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent. That evidence cannot be admitted. detained without charges and punished without trial. when any one could be picked up at will. he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree.handedness from the authorities. that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. again. for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent. the accused-appellant was not. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible. the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.In the case at bar. said. Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees. however praiseworthy their intentions." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another. at the moment of his arrest. especially the susceptible youth. While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent. especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm. the case of the prosecution must fall. and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him. As Justice Holmes. But as demanding as this campaign may be. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return. Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship. Hence. The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people. .

CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. but he seem not to understand. finally arrived. became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. but still to no avail. without appropriate legal authority. accused-appellant. that he was probably Taiwanese. but the latter did not to comprehend. the male passenger alighted. the man apparently understood and acceded to the request. prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. which he did. BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substance which he and CID suspected was shabu. No. Branch 66. CID surmised. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog. proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. This time. Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID). 7659. he signaled the man to follow. In the meantime. According to ALMOITE. Hence. the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. La Union. in violation of Section 15.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN. vs. CID then resorted to what he termed "sign language. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.m. etc. When the speedboat landed. No. ALMOITE. as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station. CID and six of his men led by his Chief Investigator. Eliciting no response from the man. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag. BADUA. 6425. Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando." he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. As CID wished to proceed to the police station. 7659. 1 Article III of Republic Act No. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995. CID then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent. CID then requested the man to open his bag." In view thereof.A. to have the assistance of a counsel. he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his I. he ordered his men to take up positions thirty meters from the coastline. No." The police authorities were satisfied that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty as to what language was spoken. CID and BADUA. 128222 June 17. SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA). CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an enterpreter. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R. plaintiff-appellee.A. In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband. the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places when dealing with similar situations. Mr. the man appeared impassive. as amended by Section 11 of R. But when the policemen asked the man several questions. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime . He then walked towards the road. carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights.D. Go Ping Guan. the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms. Speaking in English. however. finding him guilty of transporting. after having observed the facial features of the man. At the police station. he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p. 2 and sentencing him to "die by lethal injection. the judgement was brought to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. By this time. and using both hands. 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. The interpreter. then Ilocano.

For the defense. his arrest was tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been regarded inadmissible as . CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. Thereafter.7 kilos. its first witness. They presented the bag to him. When a crowd started to mill around them. At around 10:30 a. and whose testimony. RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. La Union. the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. he was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latter's 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached Dagupan. Trial finally ensued. a regulated drug. However. they escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. San Fernando. hence they appeared yellowish. inspected and weighed the contents. At his arraignment on 31 July 1995. CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was missing much to RONG's dismay when he learned of it. CHUA heard RONG asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were riding. RONG then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine waters. and with nary any spoken word. RONG left the ship. D-025-95. it was only after directing the request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA. He denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his "constitutional rights. CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu. Upon arrival at their destination. the police. In the meantime." particularly of his right to counsel.A. The police immediately approached CHUA. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. the information was subsequently amended to allege that CHUA "willfully. came back without the fish. Mainland China where they would buy fish. She also explained that they were unwashed. the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. they decided to dock. was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.nêt Later that same day. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. received a letter request 3 from CID — incidentally her husband — to conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored strawbag. 7659. The State presented evidence tending to establish the above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from the testimony of CID. that the facts of the case could support an indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug.m. While. Carlatan. they disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him from China.Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang. CHUA denounced the prosecution's story as a distortion of the truth. unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Article III of R.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport the same" in violation of Section 15.1âwphi1. Thelma Sales Go. the person on shore could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally. Later. In her Chemistry Report No. only gestures and hand movements. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case No. pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor..A. 6425 as amended by R. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter. opened it. but with two bags. La Union for laboratory examination. CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. Consequently. then proclaimed them as methaphetamine hydrochloride. sailing. Experts witness Theresa Ann Cid. the police arrived. low on fuel and telephone battery.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure. However. Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police. unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28. led by an officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. 4 she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets. Apparently. 4037. The tasks completed. Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. confirmed the entries of her chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing 28. On 21 March 1995. weighing 28. in turn. Region I.

000. 7659 as charged in the Information. He also maintained that CID never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao beach. Throughout the proceedings. Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion. No. as well as the whereabouts of the other bag. Bacnotan. 6425. No. and in view of all the foregoing.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. 15. this Court. the Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in coming to the Country from China and Taiwan. and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. (afterwards) participated in the trial of this case. Elmer Parong." The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details which did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the testimonies thus delivered.000. not to mention Chen Ho Fa. They quickly disappeared. who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao. He additionally claimed that when the crowd became unruly. the mayor took charge of the situation — he opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police. further that the quantity involved in this case is 28. having no other recourse but to impose the maximum penalty to accused. 20 of R. recalled that on the date in question. Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG.evidence. Art. III of R. and he ordered his officials to find an interpreter. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. . and attempted to take the remaining bag from accused. . coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that accused is a member of an organized syndicated crime group. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach but not CID. this Court finds the accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec. the police decided to bring CHUA to police headquarters. and to furnish this Court a . the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA transported 28. photographers were busy taking pictures to document the event. this Court hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die by lethal injection. He also remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had chased the latter's car.00).7 kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling specified in said Act. to wit: WHEREFORE. La Union. and to pay the costs. considering the language barrier and the observation that such irregularity was "rectified when accused was duly arraigned and . (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member. 7659 that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the quantity sold/possessed/transported is "200 grams or more" in the case of Shabu. he called for a forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag. Most significantly. The RTC also noted the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain silent. Tagliben 5 as authority.A. emphasizing that RONG alone exercised dominion over the same. There. and considering the provisions of Sec. The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores. he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag. hence it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. No. the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest.A. he arrived at the beach with the police. as amended by R. Invoking People v. but with several other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. a farmer and resident of Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the beach when two men and a lady arrived. as proven and established by convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused had conspired and acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong. and considering. to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10.A. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local police. BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away. The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine National Police to immediately form an investigating Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity. as such thought failed to make an impression in his mind.

an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid wararnt of arrest. The confiscated 28. in his presence. The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine National Police. In cases of in fragrante delicto. (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). 6 Before this Court. the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body. of course. SO ORDERED. when. arrest a person. The arresting officer. 12 and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. 7 Inseparable. 8 The Cosntitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not. Expectedly and quite understandably. forestall reasonable searches and seizure. "otherwise such search and seizure become "unreasonable" within the meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision. (2) seizure in plain view. (4) waiver or consent searches. We reverse the RTC. . however. and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuan to an equally valid warrantless arrest. The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and comtemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police action. 13 This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest.7 kilograms of Methaphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with the law. for." (2) granting weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies on material points. and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and seizures since he consented to the search. to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto. arrests. therefore. and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution. search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between him and an organized syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged in the information. La Union Command. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit. or is attempting to commit an offense. (3) customs searches. the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests. is actually committing. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial question. 9Verily. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons. must have personal knowledge of such facts 14 or as recent case law 15adverts to. the prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident.copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. while as a rule. is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy home and person." 10 This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures. is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence 11 in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles. the person to be arrested has committed. CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits. determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. the rule is. for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations against all illegal seaborne activities. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined on the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. houses.

finds that these do not constitute "probable cause. 18 the Court acknowledged that "the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges. 16 Specifically with respect to arrests. In the case at bar.personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. this Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. Q: To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his shoulder? A: To the east direction. for effecting warrantless arrest. that is. at least on the issue under discussion. by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender as well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. has been reduced and liberalized. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted to flee. accused was acting suspiciously. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities. be in that sense. 21 suspicious demeanor or behavior 22 and suspicious bulge in the waist 23 — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule. the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that compelling reasons (e. 17 In People v. and the urgency of the situation) constitutive of probable cause impelled police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest. and correlatively. e. therefore. those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright. At least in People v." In short.g. CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas. . 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same. i. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim." It should. Montilla. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. however. This Court.." (emphasis supplied) 19 Guided by these principles. Tangliben. and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas. ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers approached him. CHUA's suspicious behavior.e." or where "a probable cause exists." Noting that the previous statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been dubiously equated with probable cause. the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause — persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles. bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug. the Court explained: [F]elicitously. beyond the reach of Philippine laws.g. it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. there is no probable cause. that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial.. thus: Q: How far were you when the accused put the bag on his sholder? A: We were then very near him about three meters away from the male person carrying the bag. but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that was "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended." None of the telltale clues. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa). on the spot identification by an informant that accused was transporting prohibitive drug.

the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases. (sic) Q: He was walking away from you or going near you? A: He was going away from us. as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. e. what was the accused doing at that time? A: He was walking. 24 True. Cid went near him. 25 The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. Q No. and CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag.Q: In relation to you.g. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court 28 as already shown. In this instance. sir. the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. But gossamer to the officers' sense perception and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat. Q: To what direction he was walking? A: He was walking to the east direction. English and Ilocano which accused did not understand because he did not respond. he spoke in Tagalong. Reynoso and Maj. Cid was talking. the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. sir. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused? A: Yes sir and he stopped. whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. . The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest.. 27 To reiterate. These acts did not convey any impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores. That is why Sgt. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy. It is worth mentioning here that after introducing themselves. Neither were these overt manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA's criminal behevior as clearly established in CID's testimony. Q: Was Sgt. CHUA walking casually towards the road. Q: When Maj. Cid we approached the accused and when Maj. Reynoso held the right arm of the accused. where were you. the search was not incidental to an arrest. thus: Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced yourselves: A No. A: With the company of Sgt. Fom all indications. This was not obvious to the police. that is our objective. to approach the person and if ever or whatever assistance that we can give we will give. 26 a valid arrest must precede the search. so there was no reason for you to approach the accused because he was not doing anything wrong? A No.

This can be inferred from the manner by which the search performed. 29 CHUA never exhibited that he knew. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed by CHUA — in effect to "retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illegal search and seizure. sir. no answer. Okey (sic) now. sir. of the existence of such a right. a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. actual or constructive. Q No answer? A Yes. after introducing yourselves what did you do? A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word. thus: Q Together with your Chief Investigator. sir. it must first appear that the right exists. secondly. It is fundamental. in the first place why did you introduce yourselves? A That is normal practice in our part. Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to open his bag? A No. that the person involved had knowledge. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. there is no answer. and lastly. Q And when there was no answer what did you do next? A I used sign language sir. xxx xxx xxx SHERIFF: . Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you demonstrated that sign language of opening the bag mr. what was the first thing that you did when you approached him (CHUA)? A We introduced ourselves as police officers." The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented search. What else did he do? A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir. Q Okey. however. xxx xxx xxx Q If it is possible. sir.the police officcers immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. (sic) witness? A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this sir. actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same. that to constitute a waiver. Q When he did not utter any word.

I reform my question your honor. it is also our duty to inspect the baggage. sir. 30 CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed him. sir. The police hence concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages.) COURT: Did you open that personally? WITNESS: A No. This Court disagrees. why did you request the accused to open the bag? A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir. sir." They claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand motions and gestures. COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end of the zipper. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. sir. Q Okey. Q Now. but he remained completely deadpan. But in these cases. it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately. to open his bag? A No. intelligently. When CHUA failed to respond again to the police's request to open the bag. and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search." More importantly. 31 . and then I made a motion like this. they resorted to what they called "sign language. (sic) witness. mr. why was it — no. The police officers already introduced themselves to CHUA in three languages. Q But you simply requested him to open the nag? A Yes. sir. In some instances. it is our routine duty of a police (sic). your honor. the accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request. how could he understand the police's "sign language. the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. Witness: Yes. sir. mr. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him. Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to open his bag? A yes. (The witness repeating the motion described on record. (sic) witness. Q Why.The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and then manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag moving his right hand from left to right or from the opening to the end of the zipper. Is it normal procedure for you to examine anybody or to request anybody to open his bag? A The fact that he was a foreigner. (sic) you did not ask the accused.

In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result. . its disregard of the charter of its own existence. the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. 34 WHEREFORE. the same being the fruit of a poisonous trees 32 how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case — because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion.'. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. independently and beyond reasonable doubt. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence. the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or proceedings of the trial court. But the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded. feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA's conviction. 'the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. Indeed. Branch 66. 4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal accusation." 33 As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the posecution witnesses. . On a passing note. This aggravating circumstance is without question unsupported by the records.It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated subtance. Fealty to the Constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds. . this Court considers them trivial as they refer to insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case. but it is the law that sets him free. La Union in Criminal Case No. 'there is another consideration — the imperative of judicial integrity . SO ORDERED. for all the foregoing. . San Fernando. . otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. "There are those who say that . . Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws. But . the decision of the Regional Trial Court. . that is. if he must. this Court calls the attention of the trial court regarding its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. Costs de oficio. . . or worse. The criminal goes free. as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. the remaining evidence on record are insufficient.

. which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. D-668-81 dated July 29. 72564 April 15. plaintiff-appellee. on specimen marijuana submitted for examination. ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG. GUTIERREZ. microscopic examination. and to pay the costs. Act No. (Rollo. she prepared Chemistry Report No. Olongapo City. "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper. The information filed against the accused alleged: That on or about the 21st day of July 1981. Pat. "L"—Certificate of Field Test dated July 22.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G."C-1" Findings: Positive for marijuana. "D. vs.00. Alinea for accused-appellant. Daniel Obiña. "B" plastic container."D-1. Paulino Tiongco.". Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a marking "MB Store" (Exh. Branch 73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec.1 kilos dated July 25.000. Theresa Ann Bugayong. the duguenoi levine test and thirdly. 1981. D-668-81. Cpl. Rep. Leoncio Bagang. 1981. Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc. Daniel Obiño. 84977. The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. Theresa Ann Bugayong—22 years old. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves. She conducted three eliminations. dated July 25. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.1981 (Exhs. "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with Pat. "B. Cpl.R." "D-2"and "D-3. "H" Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. the prosecution offered the following document and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1. accused-appellant. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. "C"—Chemistry Report No."G"— Sworn Statement of Pat. p. JR. "B-1-a"—another plastic container. No.1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container. Antonio V. "F"—Victory Liner Ticket No. and the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution. single. "C" and "C-l"). did then and there wilfully. 13) The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence as follows: To prove the guilt of the accused. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. in the City of Olongapo. to pay a fine of P 20. 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. "B")."H-1"—date of of the request. Daniel Obiña and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana. Galindo. unlawfully and knowingly transport 1. 1981. the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized. J. 4. the confirmatory . Romeo C. After her examination.

In reply. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. At the police headquarters Investigation Section. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous. let us settle this at home. Tiongco. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo Santiago." "D-l.. and that on that date. accused told him. recover stolen items and apprehend suspects. Leoncio Bagang. and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same Victory Liner he took. a representative of the CANU. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. He did not. 1981. His family lives in Baguio City. He was assigned in June. Right after the accused alighted from the bus. Olongapo City. Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. photographs were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15. policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St. he used his badge and a free ride. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated. he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because as a policeman. "F" and "F-l"). he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. witness never knew the accused. he was seated on the second seat at the back. He was given a furlough for medical treatment." "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and time." However. Obiña. the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her. East Tapinac. however. witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. Pat. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused. Rita. Obiña testified that he has been a member of the INP. Prior to July 21. But it was only at San Fernando.1981. His job then was among other things to follow up reports in their office. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. (Exhs. suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obiña. policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables. Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs. 37 years old. 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. married. accused and himself Identified photographs shown to him in open Court. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag placed the . The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the CANU. 684977 which was confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. the witness presented the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. the accused and Sgt. The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obiña. 1981. do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City. Regarding himself. he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. While he was thus seated." "D2" and "D-3"). Olongapo City. although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled already. since 1970 up to the present. the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Obiña and that of Investigator Tiongco. "B. On cross-examination. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City on July 21. With the feeling that there was some unusual. On July 21.1981 and underwent treatment of his heart while he was there.examination of thin layer chromatographic test. On board the Victory Liner. "D. "Please go with me.

Obiña which are his initials. he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station. Obiña after Cpl. "B-2-a"). He confirmed his testimony on direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to settle the matter to which he refused. The marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote tops. The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang. 1981. The Certificate of Field Test indicated the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). "G"). Obiña and the accused and also of himself. he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Metrodiscom. Cpl. 40 years old. Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obiña (Exh. married and resident of 31 Canada St. Olongapo City. "B-2"). the marijuana contained in the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. East Tapinac. Galindo. 1981. Witness inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. Hence. On July 22. married and residing at No. However. a policeman of Olongapo City. he asked the accused whether she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused. East Bajac Bajac. Daniel Obiña arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the courtroom as Anita Claudio. As Duty Investigator. between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. residing at No. Galindo more than a kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. an active substance that can be only be found in marijuana. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago. However. Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat. 27 Jones St. Galindo he conducted a field test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. and numbers 210781 representing the date which was placed by Pat. Tiongco examined the suspected marijuana. Accused further testified that from the time the accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City. no statements were taken of her.. Witness Obiña became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they reached San Fernando. Exhs.." series which were already previously Identified by Pat. Cpl. Olongapo City. East Tapinac. "I")." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to the present. Pat. The bag contained the markings of Pat. Pat. assigned with Police Station "21. 52 years old. he was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. he interviewed apprehending officer Obiña and reduced his statements in writing. a prohibited drug. 41 years old. Thereafter. Pampanga. In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen. He also interviewed accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on a chair. The marijuana was placed in a plastic wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. after he checked the buri bag. As requested by Lt. married. pictures were taken inside the investigation room. the Evidence Custodian. he felt so nervous and had to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. as evidenced by a request signed by him dated July 22." Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court. Witness Identified the wrapper (Exh.bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her seat. Abello Identified a plastic bag of marijuana received from Lt. testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21. testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21. in 1981. he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac. After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables. Paulino Tiongco. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21. Pampanga. (Exhs. 1981 which is Exhibit "G. After appraising her of her constitutional rights.1981 (Exhs. Olongapo City. Ernesto Abello. Obiña reported to him that he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. "H"). he prepared a Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22. "D" and "E. In July. Olongapo City. 29 Alba Street.1981 (Exh. 1981. Obiña. for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory. It was only after having taken his medicine that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando. The bus stopped at said town to load some gasoline. bananas and some other vegetables. His fingers reached the very bottom of the bag. . Olongapo City.

there were vegetables and bananas. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2. give away to . Pat. the prosecution rested its case. Obiña he approached him and asked him what was happening. They boarded a tricycle. did not linger long at the investigation Division. He witnessed the taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. pp. he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station. Witness Identified in open Court. Sec. between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Obiña alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering somebody to alight from the same bus. II CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4. Sale. 6425 IF THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY. 4. ART II. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang. While in the Investigation Division. 6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. at the most. He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn. OF R. the woman riding inside the tricycle while Pat.A. 4 of the same Act. The latter section. Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. When he heard Pat. 4. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag. Obiña told him he apprehended a certain woman possessing dried marijuana. 4 provides: Sec. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT. the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the accused.He narrated that on July 21. East Bajac Bajac. he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried. witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to Cpl. stands for Daniel Obiña. III APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. for possession under Sec. After he saw the marijuana and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. II of Rep. Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case. Obiña then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with her a buri bag. Obiña sat behind the driver. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman possessing marijuana. He. 91) The accused alleges that she is only liable. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. administer. Act No." DO which is an initial. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. unless authorized by law. (Exh. Policeman Bagang Identified the accused in open Court. II OF R. he left the police station. shall sell. Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. (Rollo. When asked about the nature of the marijuana when it was brought out from the bag. he saw Pat. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and he was there when Pat. (Rollo. Pat.1981.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who.A. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle to police station. 8. "B-1"). however. Tiongcos question the place of delivery of the marijuana. 42-47) Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal: I CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4. The woman was still then inside the bus. Obiña reported to Cpl. and himself. ART. and not a signature.A. Art. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. ART. p. II OF R. Administration. Obiña. While he was at the said place. deliver. 6425 and not for violating Sec. Rita. Obiña in the presence of Cpl.

dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. the person to be arrested has committed. (Nolasco v. Claudio was caught transporting 1.— A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof. Rule 113. or is attempting to commit an offense. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. distribute and deliver said marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Sec. Act No. administration. 5(a) of the said Rules provides: . arrest a person: (a) When. she may not be convicted under Sec. The accused next contends the warrantless search. Pano. the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. its Rule 126. The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery. there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.another. (140 SCRA 259. 147 SCRA 509). Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence. without a search warrant. Therefore. she does not deny having had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec.. As held in the case of People v. Search incident to lawful arrest. 4. 4 of Rep. she claims that she should just be guilty of possession. 267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell. De . is actually committing. in the latter portion of said brief. Therefore. Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs. We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. A peace officer or a private person may. If the victim of the offense is a minor. (12a) Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale. Toledo. distribution and transportation of probihited drugs. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1. without a warrant. The contention is without merit. In a complete turnabout. xxx xxx xxx Meanwhile. 6425. distribute. This allegation is also unavailing. she claims that the evidence against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only planted. Sec. Pat. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto.1 kilos of marijuana. the intention of the possessor is unknown.1 kilos of marijuana. 12 provides: Section 12. At first. seizure and apprehension as unlawful.1 kilos of marijuana. in his presence. Instead.

Bautista. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Obiña for no reason at all. In the case at bar.Jesus. alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself (People v. De La Cruz. WHEREFORE. 148 SCRA 582). SO ORDERED. The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in Olongapo City all that time. . De la Cruz. We also find no reason from the records why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v. Moreover. 145 SCRA 521).supra). 147 SCRA 500).

. respondent. respectively. In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report. 52 and 72 years. only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation. another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. while Adriaan Van Elshout. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act.R. MELENCIO-HERRERA. No." on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated: xxx xxx xxx ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys. 58 years old. of the original twenty two (22). There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. The "Operation Report. or on 29 February 1988. Two (2) days after apprehension.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION. Laguna. 1988 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY.: A petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman. The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. One was released for lack of evidence. is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan. RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room. J. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO. vs. Laguna. are both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan. Thus. 82544 June 28. JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT. petitioners." dated 27 February 1988 read in part: Noted: There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite sometime. seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan. Laguna.

being pedophiles. Alverez vs. the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date." (People vs. Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition. 64 Phil. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release. coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles. 3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles. deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. 1 [1948]. this Office charges the respondents for deportation. is available to all persons. respondent denied considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. 667 [1937]. On 7 March 1988. but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III. . Syjuco 64 Phil.On 4 March 1988. The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia: Wherefore. We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General. petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a selfdeportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. are inimical to public morals." On 7 April 1988. petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which. However. respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners. People's Court. however. On 14 March 1988. search and seizure as required by the said provision. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof. CFI. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General. the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. To avoid congestion. who certified that petitioners were healthy. 80 Phil. petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest. 88-13). On 4 April 1988. in that: they. 33 [1937]). A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country. as heretofore stated. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. 2) Respondent violated Section 2. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. including aliens. as undesirable aliens. it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed. On 22 March 1988. public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives. therefore. 1967. in fact. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ. 101. L-27360. June 20. January 31. 1975. on p. February 28. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. November 17. June 30. The Writ has served its purpose. the ones with John Sherman being naked. in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. on 4 March 1988. 77 SCRA 377. the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. 1971 ed. and (2) when an offense has. L-22196. "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal. 1980. 1987 ed. Section 5).22 SCRA 857. The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions. actually committing. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. 1977. 1987 Constitution). That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. April 30." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code. his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical. Section 13. The restraint against their persons. L-49014. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms. and social wellbeing of our youth (Article II. which are substantially Identical. 1968. has become legal. the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. are administrative in character. 1050 [1947]). L-24646 & L24674. contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. 62 SCRA 543). Section 37(a) provides in part: (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception. Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary. been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113. although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code. p. the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them. L-61770. In this case. February 25. photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Bagcal vs. 1983. Director of Prisons. Vivo. L-39823. spiritual. cited in CRUZ. 77 Phil. are therefore. the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated. 89 SCRA 717). xxx xxx xxx The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding. Mago.. moral. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37.The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed. Constitutional Law. 20 SCRA 562). or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence. Deportation proceedings.1985 Rules on criminal Procedure). p. Rule 126. "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee. An order of . At any rate. as undesirable aliens. 143). Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and. Montoya. Villaraza. otherwise. 1979. 120 SCRA 525). People vs. 555. L-41686. on the other hand. Court of First Instance of Rizal. admissible in evidence (Section 12. 101 SCRA 86. Garcia.. Villanueva.

is not unconstitutional. Galang. 1968. February 29. as amended. 682 [1948]). 1963. that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him. 397). 1964. Montesa. 33 Phil.. xxx xxx xxx . [2d]. before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. 10145.. Fabre 81 Phil.S. Stracker 307 U. No. (U. 104 F. 53 F. Section 37 of the Immigration Law. However. and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. (Kessler vs. 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration. There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings. 10 SCRA 411). L-22196. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. 27 F. all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed. provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. [2d]. R. to be determined by a Judge. Murdock vs. The order of deportation is not a punishment. It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. 20 SCRA 562).deportation is never construed as a punishment. deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State. No." Before that. vs. Ward.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted. 53 F.S. 597. does not extend to deportation proceedings..S. that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution). [2d]. it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause. "The requirement of probable cause. Sercerchi vs. which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. 22) summary in nature.. Vivo. supra. 153). 437). 628. Uhl 211 F. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. Montesa (G. [2d]. conflicts with paragraph 3. No. leading to an administrative . The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. Vivo. De los Santos. relating the facts relied upon. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings..S.S. Hughes. 577. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. The deportation proceedings are administrative in character. Clark. Deportation Board (G. 155. G. vs. 270 F. 24576. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. vs. Eby. Pedaris.. The ruling in Vivo vs. 613. (U. 155). 1967. June 30. 55 F. (Morano vs." (Morano vs. which gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds required for the stay. citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination. July 29. Baker. (Ng Hua To vs. not a penal process. Clark.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel. September 30. 16 F. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37. solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued. It is preventive. 32). Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. 14. R. 10280. Supp. 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. if he so desires. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country. however. 264 U. Commissioner. It is essential. Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein.. (Lao Tang Bun vs. Ex parte Jew You On. supra. [2d]. (Maliler vs.. R. infra). it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.

investigation. abuse. if desired. in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners. Section 3[2]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect. SO ORDERED. . exploitation. 69. and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV. 949 [1958]). 104 Phil. 534 [1910]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State. 682 [1948]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. 41 [1918]). 4 SCRA 442)." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. was in order because in deportation proceedings. L-9700. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. of the ground upon which such action is contemplated." For. an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick. February 28. expelled. WHEREFORE. the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. Thus. and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. as heretofore stated. Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail. Commissioner of Immigration. or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation. that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel. also challenged by them. and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. Deportation of subject of foreign power. Commissioner of Immigration. conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent. to produce witnesses in his own behalf. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. 16 Phil.1962. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides: Sec. the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. cruelty. Deportation Board. probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. 38 Phil. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail. Fabre 81 Phil. Chuoco Tiaco et al. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel.. the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. supra). Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration. Thus. acted in the interests of the State.

GUALBERTO J.R. VASQUEZ. . 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e). she suffered extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15. . DE LA LLANA. As of this time. with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing. Special Prosecutor. she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action. 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. Danilo C. is petitioner's so-called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth. 1991.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. CONRADO M. As a result of the vehicular collision. Nestor P. . prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. an information dated May 9. as will hereinafter be discussed. 1993 MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO. Nos. petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. On even date. 1 3. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan. The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter. RESOLUTION REGALADO. Miriam Defensor-Santiago. Further. respondents. . an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E.000. 1991. 99289-90 January 27." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us. On May 13. petitioner. thus: 1. Defensor for petitioner. . SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA. Ombudsman." 2 which pertinently states in part: xxx xxx xxx 3. her injuries. Marciano P. vs. Republic Act No. we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution hereof.: Filed directly with the Court. 3019. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Cunanan for respondents.00. 2. J. On May 14. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.

She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled. 1991. she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.4. unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. She contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing. 1991 at the latest. the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21. On the other hand. in issuing said order. 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said court on or before June 5. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street. this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20. it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15. and a subsequent addendum thereto. and that by this motion. 1991. the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 7 8. 1991. and 91-94897 (for libel). She came and left unaided. on the above basis. petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15. originally set for June 5. respectively. xxx xxx xxx 4. On January 18. On May 15. and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 1992. respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. 1991. 6 7. On May 21. Further. 4 5.000. 9194555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 1991. 9. seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos. an intention she would like to prove as baseless.000. the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court. 1991. from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14. setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27. 1991. 1991. 1991. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated September 10. a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24. enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 3019). petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. 5 6. for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15.000. xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE. petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.00 be duly accepted. the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5. 1991. . Consequently. Acting on said manifestation.00. her arraignment. after staying for about fifteen minutes. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. Also on the same day. 8 10. Branch 3. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. On May 27. This Court. In a motion dated May 22. aside from the other legal fees. 46). 1991. hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency. 1992. Ermita. 1991. took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted. was inexplicably advanced to May 27. Likewise on May 24.

petitioner argues that: 1. 10 The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner. the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused unless authorized from (sic) this Court. the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 4. considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned. in a resolution adopted on July 6. 13 . Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption. appearing for arraignment. 5. 12 The voluntary appearance of the accused. nor that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously indisposed. pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.R. entering trial) or by filing bail. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable Court. whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. 2. 99290 dated May 24. In the instant motion submitted for our resolution. On the matter of bail. The right to due process of law. 99289 and No. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. the right to travel and the right to freedom of speech are preferred. the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner which reads as follows: Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes. all of which were overtaken by a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in G. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution. there is no reasonable ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes. since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused. It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested. Meanwhile. 1991. 1992. 1992. is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover. which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media. aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her characteristic transparency and candor. considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13.11. No. although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused. 3. as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 I. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F.

the appeal does not suspend the judgment. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits. it was petitioner herself. to determine whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and. hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal." and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence. in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that. unless otherwise ordered by the court. It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18. she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein. correlatively. who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. whether there was a valid posting of bail bond. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for. And. such as the Sandiganbayan. With the filing of the foregoing motions. Suffice it to say that in this case. with more reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court. Section 4. from interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. thereby rendering the same ineffectual. She contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it. hence respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice. 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order. II. a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. it becomes essential. petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted. It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15. by her own representations. Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond. 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order. even though it is not final.000.In the case at bar. 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. This is further buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. 4292925 dated May 15. or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction 17 and no formal order of . 15 It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective. She claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings.000.00 for her provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 16 A dismissal. discontinuance. therefore.

1992. we shall address this proposition which. 191. Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. even if such injunctive writ or order is issued. if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte. SP No.judicial power. . for all intents and purposes. 1989 and July 21.A. At any rate.) are not premature. there is no question that with the dismissal of the petition forcertiorari and the lifting of the restraining order. right to travel and freedom of speech. held that an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force. . 22 On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements. had no reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios. 23 The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari. 18 Consequently. . . which the court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves. promptly refuse to grant one. . make the ex parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court. in the first place. 21 This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of more recent vintage: The SEC's orders dated June 27. . . III. any court would. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them.dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC'sen banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. . the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10. The original and special civil action filed with this Court is. an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. The court of this State. It shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. on a hearing. that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. . to wit: . Petitioner further posits. commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. . the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action. a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction." .-G. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction. The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. 19 There must be a new exercise of . The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C. relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted. . by appealing and filing a bond.R. Whether generated by misconception or design. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari. . 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting. And. despite the petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner. however. 20 The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained. he can. as we have earlier mentioned. etc. . It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process. yet.

32 to the effect that: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. 29 Therefore. there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel. in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. pending the trial. public safety or public health. Court of Appeals. demands. implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it. since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him. Hence. convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers. Petitioner is in error. a grant of jurisdiction. it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction. Jr. the right to travel may be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security. in the absence of prohibitive legislation. the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Furthermore. vs. petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies. and at the same time. even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which. in addition to those expressly conferred on them. and. every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. instead. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Second. or questions ancillary or incidental to. Rule 114. 25 or essential to the existence. It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof. 28 and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. Perforce. since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court. Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecution and. the same was issued ex mero motu by the Sandiganbayan. and that under Section 6. petitioner does not deny and. to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in . while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction..First. with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order. 26 as well as to the due administration of justice. 27 or are directly appropriate. or growing out of. would not be within its cognizance. as may be provided by law. the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. even made a public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. as a matter of fact. and coming within the above principles. 31 Turning now to the case at bar. To reiterate. the main action. a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. et al. Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law. subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions. 24 These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction. or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party. matters. as original causes of action. dignity and functions of the courts. What ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances. that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined. 30Such being the case.

J. G. 97 SCRA 121). and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. . the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner. if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason. and. and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer. Apparently. 197. Article III. . Section 6. This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held: Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution. Article III. . public safety. Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security. S.. 404 (1935): . First Edition. the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center. As we have held in People vs.. . No. 61 Phil. the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. or public health" and "as may be provided by law. to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction. Rules of Court). xxx xxx xxx . Bernas. with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. because. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security. Uy Tuising. was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines. public safety. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order." The submission is not well taken. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. I. the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. . Vol. 33 One final observation. processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135. all auxiliary writs. otherwise.custody of the proper officer. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay. for that matter." a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution. p. which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v. 25 April 1980. Indeed. or public health. he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Joaquin. 263). said orders and processes will be nugatory. 53622.

through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions. not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay. prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein. reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein.This practice must be stopped. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which. or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu propio by said court. we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. intended or otherwise. in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure. Where. as in the present case. with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution. the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. WHEREFORE. We. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari. For the guidance of the bench and the bar. SO ORDERED. . or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. therefore. in the first instance. are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.

the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless. Present: CORONA. he is admitted to bail.[5] Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed. JJ. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. whose guilt has not yet been proven. . JR. the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 189122 Petitioner.[1] is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused. Chairperson. society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison . G.THIRD DIVISION JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE. between arrest and final adjudication?[2] Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the accusedspresence at trial. on application. in the dubious interval. VELASCO.NACHURA.[3] Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. J. however. opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. J.[4] An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper.: Bail.v e r s u s .R. 2010 x---------------------------------------------------x DECISION CORONA. often years long. Promulgated: March 17...[6] On the other hand. Respondents. No. PERALTA and MENDOZA.

then.[11] He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[14] For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending appeal. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.time. he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[10] THE FACTS Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas. the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused. that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.[12] Pending appeal. and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.[9] Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. It found that petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.[7] Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of theaccuseds flight from court custody.[15] . [13] It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal. x x x Notably. the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison. citing his advanced age and health condition. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician. the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.[8] Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt. Citing well-established jurisprudence. In the exercise of that discretion. it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.

the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. evaded sentence. or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. Bail. THE ISSUE The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years. However. or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal. reclusion perpetua. review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent. Should the court grant the application. with notice to the accused. (emphasis supplied) . of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist. provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. the accused shall be denied bail. when discretionary. quasi-recidivist. (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement. or habitual delinquent. considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5. (c) That he committed the offense while under probation. if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable. Petitioners theory is that. The appellate court may. admission to bail is discretionary. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? Section 5. or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification. motu proprio or on motion of any party. 5. bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. or life imprisonment. parole. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail. the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of thebondsman. (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail. or conditional pardon.

Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order. Furthermore. [19]It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law.[17] however. petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong. petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. or life imprisonment.Petitioner claims that. in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5. The abuse of discretion must be grave. admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. [18] Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Two. Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. that is. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5. Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules. In other . such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16] Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114. much less proven by the prosecution. BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS FORBID GRANT OF PETITION Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. reclusion perpetua. the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Thus. Section 5 [is] present. We disagree. the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. One. pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court.

habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration.words. Lee v. recidivism. commission of the offense while under probation. quasi-recidivism. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5.[23] (emphasis supplied) WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5. there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS INTERPRETATION The third paragraph of Section 5. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. previous escape from legal confinement. the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail. . As observed earlier. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely. undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. or other similar circumstances) not present. At best. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court. However. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not. for a petition for certiorari to prosper. People[22] is apropos: Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case. evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification.[20] Petitioner never alleged that. in denying his application for bail pending appeal. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts. In other words. even if its findings are not correct.[21] In this connection. parole or conditional pardon. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail. the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. However. or whether it raised a substantial question. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion.

an authority in remedial law: Under the present revised Rule 114. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed. if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal. if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand. Conversely. Similarly. bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion. Regalado. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death. Rule 114 is present. Herrera. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved. bail becomes a matter of discretion. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved.The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. 5). the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules: xxxxxxxxx e. the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5. no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. therefore. Rule 114 are absent. constitute abuse of discretion. and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years. Given these two distinct scenarios. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death. If it so determines. Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5. another authority in remedial law. and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not. that is. x x x[24] (emphasis supplied) Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. f. is of the same thinking: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. in the second situation. by and of itself.[25] (emphasis supplied) In the first situation. In other words. the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion. where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5. any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage. Rule 114 is present. This means that. to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. On the other hand. grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed. this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal . 5).

one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances. Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. On the other hand. between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options). it may either allow or disallow bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker. Rule 114. a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5.[27] on the basis thereof. Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. Rule 114 exists. if any such circumstance is present.[30] Thus. Otherwise. For petitioner. Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5. petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision thatupon . the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion. However. bail will be granted pending appeal. Instead. petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present. there is more than one possible outcome.[29] On the other hand. In short. Rule 114. by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere factfinding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. The implication of this position is that. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5. judicial discretion has been defined as choice. if the appellants case falls within the second scenario. then bail will be denied. petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.[28] Choice occurs where. in such a situation. Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5. the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. that is.and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where. Nonetheless. other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. including the demands of equity and justice. the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion. In particular.

Finally.[31] In view of the grave caution required of it. to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present. laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. under all circumstances. The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions. similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance. character and reputation of the applicant. under the rules. Hence. the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. The provision categorically refers to the following or other similar circumstances. at the very least. the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound. Even more significantly. a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. More importantly.[34] In other words. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that. [37] Moreover. . such as the record. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned. denial or revocation of bail pending appeal. the court should consider whether or not.conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. However.[36]specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error. the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5. [32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case. the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes. petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius[38] rule in statutory construction. admission to bail is discretionary.[33] among other things. an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court. bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. otherwise. Rule 114 is wrong. reclusion perpetua. its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. [35] This must be so. where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years. or life imprisonment.

(emphasis supplied) The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail. 3. The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. 4. 2-92 dated January 20. After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance. shall before final conviction. under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail. be bailed at the discretion of the court. when evidence of guilt is strong. 4. 5. the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right. is an offense which. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. A capital offense. exception. Sec. exception. except those charged with a capital . upon application. as amended. All persons in custody. Capital offense not bailable. compared to those convicted of less serious crimes? PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL Petitioners interpretation deviates from. 3. may be punished by death. as the term is used in this rule. and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail. Capital offense defined. After conviction by the Court of First Instance. 1992 as follows: The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. the history and evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal. Bail. may be punished by death. 6. All persons in custody. A capital offense. Sec. under the law existing at the time of its commission. Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure: Sec. shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right. which provides: Sec. Capital offense. be entitled to bail as a matter of right. under the law existing at the time of its commission. Sec. 3. a matter of right. is punishable by reclusion perpetua.Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses. a matter of right. defendant may. defined. except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which. as the term is used in this Rules. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows: Sec. is an offense which. No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong. Bail. Sec. even radically alters. The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6.

as amended. 2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal. after which. As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited. this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court. an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8. unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114. the following rules are laid down: 1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. Municipal Trial Court. 3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days. shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender. a matter of right. when evidence of guilt is strong. shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. 3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusionperpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts. Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information. his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. which are now pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty. 2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail.offense or an offense which. 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows: SECTION 4. Bail. is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Hence. under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail. The bondsman thereupon. the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court. the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied. his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal. to wit: 1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower thanreclusion perpetua and is out on bail. Pursuant to the aforecited provision. he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court. Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit . (emphasis supplied) Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. Sec. and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information. 12-94 dated August 16.

12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A. upon a showing by the prosecution. the accused may commit another crime. on motion and with notice to the adverse party. No person charged with a capital offense. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. (n) SECTION 6. maybe punished with death. and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation. No. The court. (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court. not bailable.Trial Court. bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons. . or an offense punishable byreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. may admit the accused to bail. may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. the accused shall be denied bail. defined. or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal. (emphasis supplied) The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. with sufficient sureties. (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement. of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist. or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled. with notice to the accused. as the term is used in these Rules. on application. Capital offense. (3a) SECTION 5. Bail.M. or habitual delinquent. when discretionary. evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification. under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail. or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration. under conditional pardon. shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (4) SECTION 7. when evidence of guilt is strong. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now. quasi-recidivist. be admitted to bail as a matter of right. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. the court. is an offense which. parole. The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle. in its discretion. that is. A capital offense.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death. it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. No. it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies. Administrative Circular No. Thus. even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No. what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5. Indeed. A. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. meaning. Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances. In our jurisdiction. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy. bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death.[39] The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. Rule 114 is present? The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. this Court has been guided by the following: . Now. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. it has even been pointed out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. Section 5. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail. In particular.[42] In fact. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. 12-94. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No.[41] While this is of course not to be followed blindly.[43] Furthermore.[40] Under the present rule. admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.M. More importantly. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right. 12-94 amending Rule 114.

This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Finally. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted. allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. the constitutional right to bail ends. In addition. the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. Article II of the Constitution provides: SEC. at the post-conviction stage. WHEREFORE. the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5. generally speaking. that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion. permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes. A FINAL WORD Section 13. Court of Appeals[45] (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective). Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would. At the risk of being repetitious. . or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. 13. the presumption of innocence terminates and. endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon. be absurd to admit to bail. the petition is hereby DISMISSED.[44] (emphasis supplied) As a matter of fact. the Court declared in Yap v. and therefore. be bailable by sufficient sureties. All persons. shall. x x x (emphasis supplied) After conviction by the trial court. letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. Furthermore. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. before conviction. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court.[46] From then on. and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. accordingly.

Costs against petitioner. 32159. .The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide. SO ORDERED. CR No. on the merits.R. with dispatch. the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.

1983. and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years. Borja denied the motion for bail on the finding that the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong and his minority was not proved. that his minority had never been challenged by the fiscal. is charged with murder for the killing of one Ramon Abiog (Criminal Case No.: In the Regional Trial Court of Naga City. 1967. petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. shall from time to time (sic) of his arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided. L-65228 February 18. 1983. and that the offense charged. Jr. MELECIO B." . petitioner then filed a motion with the lower court praying that he be placed in the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development (MSSD) pursuant to Article 191 of Presidential Decree No.. J. HON. one of the prosecution witnesses. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration stating that his minority had been proved by his birth certificate which was attached to the memorandum in support of his motion for bail. ET AL. respondents. the provincial. respondent Judge Melecio B. Again. On September 22. Detained in the city jail of Naga after his arrest.R. entitled as such to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code which would make the murder charge against him non-capital. ETC. he said that the quoted Article 191 is not applicable since it could be invoked only where the minor is charged with a bailable offense. vs. 83-184). JR. attached to the motion for reconsideration was a duly certified copy of petitioner's birth certificate. 1985 JOJO PASTOR BRAVO. as could be gleaned from the phrase "if unable to furnish bail. After a hearing during which the retracting witness (del Rosario) presented by petitioner made another turn-about and declared against the latter.. petitioner filed a motion for bail based on two reasons: (a) that the evidence against him is not strong in view of the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario. as regards petitioner. Failing in his bid for bail. is not capital because even if convicted. in its discretion upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court. release a youthful offender on recognizance. but did not contest the minority of petitioner. he could not be sentenced to death because of his minority. petitioner.. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) which provides: Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. The Fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the evidence of guilt is strong. That in the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial. The court may. of his previous statement naming petitioner as the assailant.. No. — A youthful offender held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal. Explaining the denial later. PLANA. respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration. BORJA. showing that he was born on February 26. respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit. city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required. In his order of September 21. if unable to furnish bail.

if any. with two supplementary petitions. But respondent judge claims that petitioner has not proved his minority. Ferdinand del Rosario. Again. such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail. "all persons.) Generally. is the penalty to be actually imposed on him in view of the attendant circumstances. the defense unilaterally moved orally that the trial of petitioner be reset in order to give the City Fiscal more time to study the NBI report.On September 22. as to him who is only 16 years old. but the motion was denied as dilatory. bail is a matter of right before conviction. This is inaccurate. the court has taken on this motion. copy of which was sent to the City Fiscal of Naga. the test to determine whether the offense charged is capital. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years old. Subsequently. regardless of the modifying circumstances. cannot be capital because the death penalty cannot be imposed on account of his minority which entitles him to a penalty reduction of one degree. Section 18. on November 2. 1983. There would then be a need for a complete trial. who killed the deceased Ramon Abiog. it follows that. Moreover. after respondent Judge had denied the motion for bail. the charge of murder. under petitioner's submission. 1983. petitioner unilaterally filed with the trial court a formal Motion for Reinvestigation praying "that the proceedings be suspended and that the City Fiscal of Naga be ordered to reinvestigate this case. which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending trial. except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. be bailable by sufficient sureties. unless the accused is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. the petition also seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding respondent Judge to remand the case to the City Fiscal of Naga for reinvestigation. When the murder case was next called for hearing on October 19. petitioner has filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus. It found that it was the prosecution witness. To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In effect. 1983. The obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. Neither does it appear that the City Fiscal of Naga has taken any move to reinvestigate the case. The charge against petitioner is murder qualified by treachery and attended by two aggravating circumstances: evident premeditation and nocturnity. a capital offense is "an offense which. In view of the aforesaid NBI report. the NBI Regional Office at Naga City submitted its report. if convicted." It is clear from this provision that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law. petitioner alleged that he was a minor of 16 and this averment was never challenged by the prosecution. Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. with reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. in his memorandum in support of the motion for bail." It does not appear what action. . it evidently refers to a finding of innocence or culpability. after which the judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. before conviction. This reason does not hold where the accused has been established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death. shall. As perceptively observed by the Solicitor General. therefore." (Article IV. petitioner attached a copy of his birth certificate. and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail. he would be given "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law. In his motion for bail. the crime is therefore a capital offense. The first question to be resolved is whether petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. and not the petitioner. may be punished by death. seeking the release of petitioner on bail or his transfer to the custody of the MSSD pending trial pursuant to Article 191 of PD No. under the law existing at the time of its commission. Against this factual backdrop. The petitioner however submits that even assuming that the evidence of guilt against him is strong." which effectively rules out the death penalty. Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law. And finally. Punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. when the Constitution or the law speaks of evidence ofguilt. 603. Nevertheless. Under the Constitution.

This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding it. In case of unjustified refusal by the City Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation. Section 7. ascertain the existence of a prima facie case and determine who should be criminally indicted. (Rules of Court. In the interest of dispatch.) It results that petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. — When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties. who has direction and control of the criminal prosecution and who is the primary official called upon to evaluate the evidence. Turning to the reinvestigation aspect of the petition. but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. WHEREFORE.00 and his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its approval by the trial judge. is entitled to be placed pending trial in the care and custody of the MSSD pursuant to Article 191 of P. being a minor. Evidence on motion. No. the proper recourse is to appeal to the Minister of Justice who exercises control and supervision over fiscals. Rule 133.D. This was error because evidence of petitioner's minority was already a part of the record of the case.attaching thereto a certified true copy of his birth certificate. unless petitioner is held for some other cause. bail for petitioner is fixed at P15. the plea therefor must be addressed to the City Fiscal of Naga. It would be a needless formality to offer it in evidence. the orders of respondent Judge denying bail to petitioner are set aside. It was properly filed in support of a motion. . SO ORDERED. 603.000. The petition for mandamus to compel reinvestigation of the case is denied. which makes it unnecessary to decide whether he. Respondents Judge however refused to take cognizance of petitioner's unchallenged minority allegedly because the certificate of birth was not offered in evidence.