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The U.S.

Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The

Civil War on the
Atl ntic Coast
1861–1865

Cover: Storming Fort Wagner, Kurz & Allison, 1890 (Library of Congress)

CMH Pub 75–4

The

Civil War on the
Atl ntic Coast
1861–1865

by
R. Scott Moore

Center of Military History
United States Army
Washington, D.C., 2015

Introduction
Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the
start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to
matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the
Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The
war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over
six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle.
Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American
Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown
in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the
existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can
begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the
debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to
paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that
was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit
its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave
and half free,” and that could not stand.
Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the
soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal
reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions
and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring
states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic
of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers
on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went
to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues
to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the
fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to
seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink
to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and
minié ball.
Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and
only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy,

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the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These
campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in
commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember
that war and honor those in the United States Army who died
to preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the
story of those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy
despite the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War
was our greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep
study and contemplation.

RICHARD W. STEWART, PH.D.
Chief of Military History

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The Civil War on the
Atlantic Coast
1861–1865

The Civil War on the Atlantic coast began in comic-opera
fashion. While much of the South rejoiced over South Carolina’s
secession and cursed yet-to-be inaugurated President Abraham
Lincoln, fervent North Carolinians seized two Federal forts on
the Cape Fear River. Reacting to rumors of Federal ships headed
for the North Carolina coast, a newly formed Wilmington
militia company, dubbed the Cape Fear Minute Men, set out
to capture the dilapidated forts, each garrisoned by a caretaker
sergeant. Early in the morning of 9 January 1861, the enthusiastic
if ill-equipped militiamen pounded on the outer doors of Fort
Johnston, a collection of decayed U.S. Army buildings situated
near Smithville, on the entrance channel of the Cape Fear River.
The startled Army sergeant quickly surrendered the fort to the
invaders, but not before demanding and receiving a receipt to
ensure proper accountability of government property. The next
day, the Minute Men, flushed with victory, continued downriver
to secure the much more imposing, if crumbling, Fort Caswell at
the mouth of the Cape Fear, another post held by a lone ordnance
sergeant who duly signed it over. The victory proved short-lived.
Although likely to secede soon, North Carolina still remained
in the Union, and thus the militiamen had unlawfully seized the
forts. North Carolina Governor John W. Ellis, maintaining strict

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legalities, ordered the intruders to find the ordnance sergeants,
give them back the forts, and go home. The Cape Fear Minute
Men relinquished their conquests and returned to Wilmington,
devoid of the glory they imagined should be theirs. The restored
caretakers reported the forts none the worse for their ordeal, a
dubious qualification given their state of disrepair.
The exploits of the Wilmington militiamen soon faded as the
nation rushed toward civil war and newly seceding states seized
Federal property and installations. Local forces occupied Fort
Pulaski, Georgia, covering the seaward approaches to Savannah,
Georgia, and Fort Clinch near Fernandina in northeast Florida.
Fort Sumter, blocking the harbor in Charleston, South Carolina,
surrendered in mid-April after two days of bombardment.
Returning to Forts Caswell and Johnston, North Carolina troops,
this time with the governor’s approval, took permanent control,
as did others at Fort Macon, near Beaufort, a hundred miles up
the coast. Although showing the effects of years of parsimonious
budgets, the forts soon anchored Confederate defenses on the
Atlantic. Around them for the next four years would swirl a
succession of naval and land actions, most now forgotten and
many unnoticed even at the time. The coastal region from the
Outer Banks of North Carolina to the St. Johns River in Florida
saw pitched battles, innumerable skirmishes, sieges, raids and
retribution, amphibious landings, riverine operations, military
occupation, and partisan warfare involving thousands of troops
from both sides as well as a major portion of the U.S. Navy.
Not insignificantly, the operations also served as the battlefield
proving ground for African Americans. If lacking the historical
drama of the campaigns in Virginia or the West, those on the
Atlantic coast were key elements in a war that slowly strangled
the Confederacy.

Strategic Setting
In the years before the Civil War, the ports and waterways
of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and eastern Florida
fed the economies of the Atlantic region and, to a large extent,
much of the southeastern United States. The primarily agrarian
coastal states relied on exports, notably cotton, rice, and naval
stores, for their well-being. Cotton flowed through the ports of
Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington to mills in New England

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and, equally important, Great Britain. In return, buyers sent the
money, manufactured goods, and finished products that sustained
the Southern agrarian way of life. Thousands of merchant vessels
cleared the harbors, the busiest being Charleston, a center
of prosperity and, by mid-century, political agitation. Lesser
harbors, such as Jacksonville, Florida, and New Berne, North
Carolina, provided local hubs for collection and movement
of goods. Linking the ports to each other and to much of the
interior stretched a system of tidal rivers, inland sounds, and
navigable waterways. In North Carolina, shallow-draft vessels
maintained a lively trade on the Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds
and the Neuse and Roanoke Rivers. Canals running north from
the Albemarle created secure avenues to Norfolk, Virginia; the
James River; and the lower Chesapeake Bay. A maze of coastal
channels, barrier islands, and sluggish rivers offered protected
waterways and outlets to the sea for cotton and rice plantations
from northeast Florida into South Carolina.
The introduction of railroads added to the transportation
network. A rail line just inland from the coastal islands linked
Savannah to Charleston. Branch lines connected the two ports to
Columbia, Augusta, and Atlanta, Georgia. The Wilmington and
Weldon Railroad coupled Wilmington to Petersburg, Virginia,
intersecting at Goldsboro, North Carolina, with a line from New
Berne to Raleigh, North Carolina. These waterways and railroads
formed an interconnected economic network that sustained the
Atlantic states of the South.
Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, and the numerous rail
lines and waterways assumed critical strategic importance with
the onset of war. Largely lacking a manufacturing capability, the
newly formed Confederacy could not produce military equipage
in adequate quantities. For this, it required shipping to move
cotton to overseas European markets and to bring back essential
cargoes, which in turn depended on the Atlantic ports. The fundamental strategic problem for the new nation centered on thwarting
any Federal effort to close the ports, an immediate concern given
President Lincoln’s declaration of a naval blockade of the South
in April 1861. While coastal vessels could use the myriad inlets
and waterways to hide and smuggle some goods, they could
not compensate for large cargo-carrying blockade runners.
Additionally, the ports became key to the South’s courtship of
foreign support. If kept open, they remained symbols of sover-

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eignty and national viability, essential for diplomatic recognition.
Closed to trade by Lincoln, they signified Confederate illegitimacy.
Yet, the traits that made the Atlantic coast so valuable also
made it nearly indefensible. With the exception of the captured
Federal forts, in 1861 few defenses existed, leaving much of the
coastline open to invasion. Moreover, with limited resources
and threatened by Federal armies in Virginia and the West, the
Confederate government could spare little for coastal protection.
Regiments mustering into service departed to other theaters of
war, leaving state governors to scrape together what few remaining
units, local militia, and armament they could find. The situation
quickly exacerbated political cracks in the makeup of the newly
declared nation. Built on a foundation of states’ rights and highly
independent state and local governments, the demands of the
central government for troops and resources intensified distrust.
To state governors like Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, Francis
Pickens of South Carolina, and, later, Zebulon Vance of North
Carolina, who could look offshore and see enemy warships, the
immediate threat of naval assault trumped anything in far-off
Virginia or Tennessee. That Confederate President Jefferson
Davis did not share that view only antagonized them. As the
war dragged on and the dangers to the coast magnified, friction
between the Atlantic coast states and the Davis government grew
almost to the breaking point.
Nonetheless, in the summer and fall of 1861, despite shortages in men, weapons, and supplies, the Confederacy took
steps to defend its coast. In North Carolina, sand earthworks
and pile obstacles blocked Hatteras and other inlets along the
Outer Banks while local forces prepared to guard Albemarle
and Pamlico Sounds. On the Cape Fear River, a series of fortifications covered the two entrance channels; they would include
the most formidable coastal stronghold of the war by late 1864.
Charleston harbor and its adjacent inlets and islands boasted
numerous batteries. Newly constructed forts on Hilton Head
and Phillips Island barred entrance to Port Royal Sound, South
Carolina, while other earthworks shielded the coastal railroad
from Northern incursions up the inlets and rivers. A maze of
obstacles and upstream batteries augmented Fort Pulaski,
blocking the seaward entrances to Savannah, while to the south
earthworks dotted the St. Johns River. Indeed, nearly every
town along the coast seemed to be building defenses to prevent

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Federal access and protect blockade runners and smugglers.
Lacking a navy, the Confederate government also issued letters
of marque. A practice out of fashion with most nations, yet not
quite illegal, these letters authorized civilian ships to arm themselves and prey on Northern commerce. Local seafarers took
advantage. All along the coast, but especially at Hatteras, North
Carolina, and the Outer Banks, privateers began capturing and
sinking unarmed merchantmen. If the effects proved to be transitory, the panic caused to shippers was not. Northern merchants
demanded naval protection and greatly curtailed their trade with
the Caribbean and South America until the Navy could suppress
the menace. Despite limited resources, competing priorities, and
political friction, the South had managed to create an imposing
defensive barrier on the Atlantic coast (Map 1).
The Federal government also understood the strategic
importance of the seaboard region. A naval blockade, if somewhat
precipitously declared by Lincoln shortly after the surrender
of Fort Sumter, formed a vital part of Northern war strategy.
Desperate to limit the scope of the war to that of a domestic
conflict, at least in the eyes of Europe, the blockade served notice
to the European powers, especially Britain, that strict neutrality
would be enforced. Under international law, it allowed Lincoln
to close the rebellious ports, halt outbound trade, and use naval
force to prevent any ships, foreign or otherwise, from entering
them. Initially, the blockade was more a political gambit than
a military reality. Once declared, however, foreign powers were
expected to regulate their countries’ merchant fleets in accordance with accepted international protocols. Great Britain, a key
buyer of Southern cotton and potential supplier of war goods,
proved reluctant to challenge those precepts, having exercised
them in the past.
The blockade, even if initially enforced only intermittently,
struck directly at the Confederate war effort. No amount of smuggling or blockade running could supplant the scale of antebellum
trade, especially if foreign nations self-regulated their shipping.
It thus formed a crucial part of a grand strategy proposed by
Army General in Chief Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott and endorsed
by the Navy. Although derided and sarcastically nicknamed the
“Anaconda Plan” by the Northern press, General Scott’s proposal
to cordon off the Confederacy from the sea, while securing the
Mississippi River from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico and then

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KY

Wytheville

W E S T
V I R G I N I A

Western North Carolina RR

I

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in R

A

nton R

Florence

Cheraw

R

pe

Fe

ar

18 Feb 1865

FORT ANDERSON

Ca

Pe

ed

ee

R

WYSE FORK

8–10 Mar 1865

14 Dec 1862

Fort Caswell
Fort Johnston

Cape Fear

FORT FISHER
24–25 Dec 1864
13–16 Jan 1865

20–22 Feb 1865

WILMINGTON

Wilmington and Weldon RR

12 Mar 1862

FORT THOMPSON

co R

PA

M

LI

25–26 Apr 1862

FORT MACON

O

Cape
Hatteras

28–29 Aug 1861

S

HATTERAS INLET

CO

Cape Lookout

Beaufort

Morehead City

14 Mar 1862
1–3 Feb 1864

NEW BERNE

7–8 Feb 1862

e Sound

ROANOKE ISLAND

marl

PLYMOUTH

Albe

10 Feb 1862

ELIZABETH CITY

Dismal Swamp
Canal

17–19 Apr 1864

Pa m l i

EDENTON

Portsmouth

ton Roads

Norfolk

Hamp

Cape Charles
Fort Monroe

Yorktown

Hampton

12 Feb 1862

R

Tarboro
Ta
r R WASHINGTON
Mar 1863

20 Feb 1862

WINTON

KINSTON

Weldon

James

Petersburg

Atlantic and North Carolina RR

17 Dec 1862

GOLDSBORO

RALEIGH

Fayetteville

se

Wilmington and Manchester RR

eu

Roanoke R

South Side RR

Appomattox Court House

N O R T H
C A R O L I N A

Manchester

Salisbury

I

Danville

N

Stau

Lynchburg

R

R

S O U T H
C A R O L I N A

G

Greensboro

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Ya d

COLUMBIA

Charlotte

North Carolina RR

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Spartanburg

TENNESSEE

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Map 1

Joh

F L O R I D A

St.

20 Feb 1864

OLUSTEE

St. Augustine

Jacksonville

Fernandina

oR

10–11 Apr 1862

FORT PULASKI

A

T

7 Nov 1861

L

Edisto Island

FORT WALKER

Por t Royal Sound

Fort Beauregard

16 Jun 1862

SECESSIONVILLE

ay
Bulls B

CHARLESTON

Georgetown

Jul 1863–18 Feb 1865

Phillips Island

Sante e R

Hilton Head Island

Tybee Island

St. Simon’s Island

Fort Clinch

Brunswick

ist

Beaufort

Ed

Port Royal

Savannah

ah R

G E O R G I A

Statesboro

nn

O gechee R

Augusta

va

S t . M a r y ’s R

Sa

ns R

A

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11 Jul 1863
18 Jul–7 Sep 1863

BATTERY WAGNER

FORT SUMTER

12 Apr 1861
8 Sep 1863–18 Feb 1865

E

C
O
0

25
Miles

1861–1865

Battle

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C I V I L WA R A L O N G T H E AT L A N T I C C O A S T

T

I

C

A

defeating the South in pieces, became the strategic basis of the
war. The plan required Army-Navy cooperation, not just along
the Mississippi, but also along the Atlantic coast. The Navy fully
understood the requirements of a blockade at sea, having done
so fifteen years before in Mexico, but needed the Army to secure
its bases and seize key locations. The Army, although focused on
Virginia and the Mississippi, realized it must also play a role in
strangling the Confederacy through operations along the coast.
Strategically, if not always operationally, the Army and Navy
agreed on this basic war aim.
During the summer of 1861, Secretary of the Navy
Gideon Welles convened the Commission of Conference, more
commonly called the Blockade Board or Strategy Board. Its
members consisted of the chairman, Navy Capt. Samuel F. Du
Pont, Alexander Bache of the U.S. Coastal Survey, Army Maj.
John Barnard, a Corps of Engineers officer with extensive experience along the southern coast, and the board secretary (and
active participant) Navy Cdr. Charles Davis. Neither a strategic
planning group nor a permanent staff, the commission provided
information and recommendations but had no authority for
their implementation. Welles directed it to examine the Atlantic
coastline and suggest sites for advanced naval bases to support
the blockade. The advent of steam-powered ships meant the days
of extended duty along remote coasts, with the need for occasional resupply, had ended. Modern ships demanded constant
repairs and refitting, as well as regular replenishment of coal,
provisions, and ammunition in order to be effective. In 1861,
only Hampton Roads, Virginia, and Key West, Florida, remained
under Federal control, more than a thousand miles apart and
hundreds of miles from blockading stations on the Atlantic
coast. Ships sent to watch Savannah, Charleston, or Wilmington
could remain on station for just a short period before departing
on the long journey back to their bases. Distance dictated that
most would spend as much or more time coming and going as on
blockade duty. The Navy needed anchorages that could be seized
and easily defended. Welles wanted to know the best locations. In
addition, he tasked the commission to look closely at the inlets,
waterways, and coastal chokepoints that might, if closed, restrict
Confederate trade and privateering.
Beginning its deliberations in May 1861, by late summer
the commission produced several reports on proposed anchor-

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ages, complete with detailed analyses of the geography, hydrography, and defensibility of each site. Turning to operational
issues, the commission recommended dividing the single
Atlantic Blockading Squadron into two blockading squadrons
(the North Atlantic and South Atlantic) separated at the North
and South Carolina border. This command structure eased
control problems for the Navy but meant Army forces, with no
similar division, might find themselves operating across Navy
commands. In making these recommendations, the commission
assumed Army-Navy joint operations would be for the purpose
of establishing bases or cutting off Confederate access to the sea,
not harbingers of more extensive inland operations. While that
supposition would be stretched somewhat in the coming years,
especially in North Carolina, it remained a fundamental tenet
for both the Army and the Navy, restricting most coastal operations to seizing and defending advanced bases, sealing off ports,
and raiding. The Commission of Conference, in keeping with its
charter, did not establish policy or strategy, nor were its recommendations directive in nature. Its reports provided the essential
information needed for others to determine where and when
coastal operations would be conducted. As the summer of 1861
dragged on and the war saw its first major battles, those decisions
were not long in coming.

Operations
The Capture of Hatteras, 1861

While the Commission of Conference continued its work
in Washington, the first Atlantic coast operation got under
way. Stung by criticism in the press and Congress over the
lackluster nature of the emerging blockade (largely unjustified
given available resources) and recent depredations by privateers
operating off North Carolina, the Navy looked for a chance to
make amends. Lincoln pressed for some sort of offensive action.
Commodore Silas H. Stringham, commanding the Atlantic
Blockading Squadron (not yet divided), received reports that the
inlets of the Outer Banks lacked strong defenses and could be
easily seized to block exiting privateers. The Army, in the wake of
its disastrous defeat at the Battle of First Bull Run, Virginia, also
sought a low-risk victory to buttress morale and perhaps dampen
Confederate spirits. Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, commanding

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Federal forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and recently embarrassed by a defeat at the Battle of Big Bethel, Virginia, developed
a plan to do just that and perhaps redeem his reputation. Eyeing
Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, from which privateers emerged
almost daily, he sent proposals to Washington outlining a joint
expedition to close it. They fell into receptive hands at the War
Department and then found their way to Welles, who saw merit
in them. The Commission of Conference, although lukewarm
to the idea of operations in the sounds of North Carolina, also
endorsed the need to close the Outer Banks. General Scott was
reluctant to divert the Army’s barely trained forces from the
defenses of Washington but acceded to mounting pressure and
approved Butler’s plan. The first Atlantic coastal operation of the
war thus began.
A hastily organized Army-Navy force sailed from Hampton
Roads on 26 August 1861, fully observed and reported by
Confederate lookouts in Norfolk. The fleet consisted of six
warships, under the command of Commodore Stringham, in
his flagship, the screw frigate USS Minnesota, followed by a tug
and two troop transports loaded with soldiers. Butler’s force
consisted of the 20th New York Infantry and three companies of
the 9th New York Infantry, better known as “Hawkins’ Zouaves”
after their flashy French-inspired uniforms and self-promoting
commander, Col. Rush C. Hawkins. None of the troops had seen
combat, having been mustered into service barely three months
earlier. The flotilla arrived off Hatteras Inlet the next day and
prepared for battle. Stringham and Butler determined to conduct
a two-pronged assault, bombarding the forts from the sea while
troops landed unopposed north of enemy earthworks guarding
the inlet. If all went well, the operation would be over quickly.
Watching the arrival of the Federal ships, 350 ill-equipped
and poorly trained North Carolina troops and their commander,
Col. W. F. Martin, had little doubt as to the outcome of the
coming engagement. The men manned two hastily constructed
earthworks armed with an assortment of cannons and little
ammunition. Fort Clark, mounting five guns, faced seaward
at the entrance to the inlet. A low-lying earthwork of logs and
sand, it stood little chance of seriously challenging the Federal
warships. Fort Hatteras, less than a mile away across a marsh
bridged by a rudimentary catwalk, covered the sound side of the
inlet with an assortment of twenty-five guns. Somewhat better

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sited, it still lacked both the men and the ordnance to match
the force arrayed against it. Most of the Confederate guns had a
shorter range than those aboard the Federal ships, which merely
had to remain at a safe distance offshore and pound the forts
into submission. The Confederate defenders at Hatteras hoped
to make a good showing, perhaps inflict some damage on their
enemies, and delay the Federal expedition long enough for reinforcements to arrive.
Stringham and his warships began the attack on the
morning of the twenty-eighth. Steaming in an oval pattern, the
ships opened fire on Fort Clark with broadsides, kicking up
huge geysers of sand and quickly silencing its guns. Late in the
morning, Butler began landing the 20th New York Infantry two
miles to the north, getting the first wave ashore unmolested.
The amphibious operation, however, soon went awry. Winds
increased, causing boats in follow-on waves to swamp in high
surf. Men tumbled into the water, and, after getting only 320
troops to the beach, Butler halted further attempts, leaving the
20th New York alone with few supplies and its waterlogged
ammunition largely useless. The beleaguered troops soon
received a scare when a Navy gunboat covering the landings
opened fire on what appeared to be cavalry bearing down on the
exposed beachhead. Panic and confusion among the reported
cavalry ensued as horses scattered in all directions, revealing it
Sketch by Alfred R. Waud of Federal troops landing at Hatteras Island,
August 1861 (Library of Congress)

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to be a terrified herd of local wild ponies. Fortunately for the
New Yorkers, the Confederate defenders abandoned Fort Clark
after having endured several hours of bombardment. The Federal
troops occupied the earthwork, spending a restless night alone
and unsupplied, isolated from reinforcements by the winds and
surf. Stringham posted two warships offshore to provide gunfire
if needed and withdrew the others and the transports to sea to
ride out the increasing winds.
The next morning, the winds having subsided, Stringham’s
warships returned and took station off Fort Hatteras. Out of range
of the fort’s guns, they bombarded the defenders with impunity
and accuracy. The Confederates could do little to prevent the
inevitable, even after being reinforced the previous night with
troops ferried by steamers from Roanoke. After three hours’
punishment, Fort Hatteras surrendered. Butler, despite orders to
return his force to Fort Monroe once his troops had neutralized
the enemy’s earthworks, posted a garrison manned by Colonel
Hawkins and his Zouaves. Alarmed by the easy Federal victory
and apparent power of naval warships, the Confederates abandoned earthworks guarding Ocracoke and Oregon inlets along
the Outer Banks to the north as well. Initially hailed as a great
victory by the Northern press, Stringham received criticism
from within the Navy for not exploiting it and moving into the
sounds. Given the intended purpose of the mission as well as the
small size of Butler’s force, such criticism was unfair. The success,
however, wetted an appetite for coastal operations in both the
Navy and War Departments.

The South Atlantic Coast, 1861–1862

The next operation was not long in coming. At a meeting
in September, President Lincoln; Secretary of the Navy Welles;
the new Army General in Chief, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan;
and the newly appointed commander of the South Atlantic
Blockading Squadron, Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont, met to discuss
the need for anchorages to resupply and repair ships engaged
in the blockade. Armed with the recommendations of the
Commission of Conference, the Navy initially proposed seizing
Bulls Bay, South Carolina, and Fernandina, Florida. Although
unready for any large-scale land operations, the Army agreed
to provide 12,000 troops as a landing force, to be commanded
by Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman. Du Pont soon changed the

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primary objective to Port Royal Sound, South Carolina, which
he deemed better suited to the blockading squadron’s needs. Port
Royal offered perhaps the largest deep-water anchorage on the
coast, protected by coastal islands that Union forces could easily
defend, and from which they could conduct coastal raids. It was
also situated between Savannah and Charleston and was close
to the coast of Florida, making the anchorage convenient for his
ships. Port Royal had one drawback: the entrance was defended
by two Confederate forts, each more formidable than those
faced at Hatteras. Nonetheless, Du Pont felt his warships and the
troops provided by the Army could dispose of these defenses. By
late October, the expedition was ready.
On 29 October, more than fifty warships and transports
departed Hampton Roads and headed south. They immediately
encountered severe weather that scattered the fleet and threatened to end the operation before it began. When Du Pont’s
flagship, the USS Wabash, reached Port Royal Sound late on 1
November, barely half the ships could be found. Miraculously,
in the next few days most straggled in with only minor damage.
Unfortunately, at least three transports carrying supplies for
the Army, as well as several of the steamers necessary for beach
landings, floundered at sea. Worse, the vessel carrying most of
the troops’ small-arms ammunition did not arrive for several
days. Du Pont and Sherman realized a joint naval and land
attack would be problematic. Reluctantly, they agreed that the
Navy would have to deal with the rebel defenses, with Army
troops occupying the islands surrounding Port Royal once the
enemy had been neutralized and the passage into the anchorage
secured. On 4 November, having sounded the offshore bar and
found it passable at high tide, Du Pont moved the ships inshore
and anchored within sight of the enemy.
A 2½-mile channel separated two earthworks barring
entrance to Port Royal Sound: Fort Walker on Hilton Head Island
and Fort Beauregard on Phillips Island. Although each mounted
an assortment of guns with only limited supplies of ammunition,
their range and size could inflict damage on any ships operating
in the restricted waters at the entrance to the sound. A squadron
of Confederate gunboats patrolled the inland waters, ready to
attack any Federal ships entering the sound. Given the tidal
conditions and enemy dispositions, Du Pont decided to engage
the forts one at a time at close range from within the sound, using

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the firepower of his ships to quickly silence the enemy while
a small covering force kept the enemy gunboats at bay. On 7
November, he entered the sound and attacked Fort Walker. After
three hours, their guns mostly dismounted, the defenders abandoned their earthworks. Shortly thereafter, fearing they might
be trapped on the island, the rebels at Fort Beauregard hastily
withdrew. Naval landing parties quickly secured the empty forts.
Watching from their transports offshore, the troops cheered.
Over the next few days, they landed and secured Hilton Head
and Phillips Islands. Beaufort, a few miles up the Broad River, fell
to Navy gunboats two days later but was not fully occupied until
early December. To prevent enemy incursions and to fully secure
the anchorage, detachments of soldiers supported by gunboats
probed the tidal rivers and islands, as Sherman established his
main base on Hilton Head Island.

Officers of the 3d New Hampshire Infantry in camp on
Hilton Head Island (Library of Congress)

The loss of Port Royal Sound sent panic through much of
coastal South Carolina and Georgia. Plantation owners fled to
Savannah and Charleston, many setting fire to their valuable
cotton rather than letting it fall into Federal hands. The state
governors demanded reinforcements from President Davis.
Davis sent them General Robert E. Lee, formerly his military

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adviser but now appointed to command Confederate forces on
the coast. He immediately set about improving the defenses of
Savannah and Charleston but worried about how to protect
the connecting coastline, realizing he lacked the forces for a
strong defense everywhere. Observing a Federal raid up the
Coosaw River near Port Royal in December, Lee witnessed the
effectiveness of naval guns at keeping at bay any Confederate
forces imprudent enough to move within range. Indeed, once
landed, the Federal troops, lacking artillery, rarely strayed far
from their supporting gunboats. Lee decided that rather than
confront the gunboats, he would place his defenses upstream,
past the shallow waters preventing gunboats from further
ingress. Doing so would leave the island plantations vulnerable but would protect the vital railroad connecting Savannah
and Charleston. Stationing forces at key junctions and bridges,
Lee established a mobile reserve able to move rapidly along
the railroad to challenge any Federal movements inland. By
securing the rail line between the two major ports, Lee planned
to keep the Federal force at Port Royal at arm’s length without
tying down large numbers of Confederate troops.
As 1862 began, Du Pont and Sherman looked beyond
Port Royal. Du Pont wanted the Army to support the closing of
Savannah and to seize such ports as Fernandina and Jacksonville,
Florida. After the naval victories at Hatteras and Port Royal,
many naval officers convinced themselves that warships could
reduce enemy shore defenses without the need of the Army. They
saw the Army’s role solely as occupying newly won positions. Du
Pont became increasingly frustrated at Sherman’s unwillingness
to provide forces to follow in the wake of the Navy. Yet Sherman
had no orders from the War Department to venture elsewhere
and was reluctant to scatter his troops along the coast in small
garrisons. Additionally, without his shallow-draft launches lost
during the transit to Port Royal, Sherman lacked the waterborne
transport vessels necessary to support wide-ranging Navy operations. With differing perspectives, missions, and no common
commander, Du Pont and Sherman grew increasingly antagonistic toward each other. The situation conspired to limit the
effectiveness of the nearly 12,000 bluecoats now posted on the
South Carolina coast.
The two commanders finally agreed on two operations:
seizing Fernandina and blocking the entrance to Savannah.

21

Although Du Pont had disregarded the commission’s recommendation to secure Bulls Bay by taking Port Royal as his
main naval base, Fernandina remained in his plans. Sherman
offered a brigade to support its capture. On 2 March, seventeen
armed ships and six transports left Port Royal expecting a fight.
Unknown to them, Lee had ordered Fernandina abandoned,
with the last rebel train leaving the community as the Union
ships sailed into view. On 4 March, Federal soldiers landed and
occupied Fernandina. The expedition then moved on to seize
St. Augustine and Jacksonville, destroying any fortifications it
encountered. Gunboats scoured the St. Johns River and its tributaries looking for blockade runners.
In late March, Maj. Gen. David Hunter arrived at Port
Royal to assume command of the newly created Department
of the South, which encompassed the coasts of South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida. Although Du Pont still wanted to seize as
many coastal towns and ports as possible, Hunter concluded he
could not garrison them all and thus pulled many of his troops
back to Port Royal from Florida. Although he left the garrison
at Fernandina, his troops withdrew from Jacksonville without
consulting Du Pont, a move that infuriated the admiral and set
the tone for later squabbles.
Even as operations continued in northeast Florida, Federal
attention turned to Savannah. The Navy, after reconnoitering
the water approaches, determined its ships could not bypass
Fort Pulaski nor get into position to bombard it without excessive risk. As long as the fort remained in Confederate hands,
it threatened Port Royal and sheltered Savannah’s blockade
runners. Sherman and Du Pont thought a combined naval and
land assault on Savannah might be possible, but planning stalled
when the two disagreed on details, and reinforcements needed
for the operation were unavailable. Instead, the War Department
sent orders to reduce Fort Pulaski by siege and dispatched heavy
artillery for the purpose. Capt. Quincy A. Gillmore, a Regular
Army engineer tasked to plan the siege, chose Tybee Island,
about a mile off Fort Pulaski, as the best location for the arriving
batteries. As the artillery arrived in February and March, soldiers
toiled in the muddy soil to erect new battery sites.
By 10 April, Gillmore had succeeded in positioning eleven
batteries of artillery, including mortars, nine large 30-pound
Parrott guns and converted James guns, and four naval guns

22

transplanted from Du Pont’s ships. When the Fort Pulaski
garrison refused to surrender, the massed batteries opened fire.
Built in the 1840s to withstand smoothbore cannons, the fort’s
brick outer works could not long withstand the modern rifled
guns on Tybee Island. After just a day, Union fire had reduced the
wall facing Tybee Island from a height of more than seven feet
to half that, with large cracks in the masonry as well as an everwidening hole. The next day, the fort surrendered when shells
began passing through the wall and exploding dangerously close
to the magazine. In just thirty hours, Gillmore had demonstrated
the power of modern rifled artillery against fixed fortifications.
At little cost, the Federals had closed the port of Savannah.

The damage to Fort Pulaski from the Federal bombardment
(Library of Congress)

By the spring of 1862, the Confederacy no longer controlled
its coast south of Charleston. A pattern now emerged that persisted
for much of the war. The islands and inlets of South Carolina and
Georgia became contested zones in which skirmishes abounded,
but pitched battles rarely occurred. Federal troops supported
by gunboats raided along the tidal waterways, foraging for
food, confiscating cotton and lumber, destroying buildings and
goods deemed useful to the enemy, and freeing large numbers
of slaves whose owners fled inland. Local Confederate troops
patrolled the islands and harassed Federal outposts, but mounted
concerted challenges only when Federal expeditions moved up
the tidal rivers toward the railroad. Economically damaging and
the source of much angst, the almost continuous operations kept
the South Atlantic coast in constant turmoil.

23

The Burnside Expedition, North Carolina, 1862

As Federal forces seized Fernandina and prepared to
lay siege to Fort Pulaski, another expedition readied itself to
invade the sounds of North Carolina. Disappointed with the
failure to exploit the capture of Hatteras, both services looked
to control the inland waterways and perhaps threaten Norfolk
and Richmond, Virginia, from the south. In the fall of 1861,
Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside organized and equipped a
division capable of conducting operations in coastal waters.
He intended to move into the sounds of North Carolina and
penetrate the state via its waterways. With War Department
approval, he recruited regiments from New England and New
York composed of men whose
civilian occupations as fisherman and coastal mariners
made them familiar with waterborne operations. In addition,
he acquired gunboats, transports, and surfboats to support,
move, and land his soldiers.
Although finding it difficult
to procure transports, largely
because the Navy bought most
of the available ships for the
expanding blockade, Burnside
nonetheless mustered nearly
15,000 troops and a leaky
assortment of barges, transports, gunboats, tugs, steamers,
General Burnside
and surfboats in Annapolis,
(Library of Congress)
Maryland, by January 1862.
The Navy agreed to support
the expedition, providing warships and shallow-draft gunboats
under the command of Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough,
newly appointed commander of the North Atlantic Blockading
Squadron. On 9 January, Burnside’s force departed Annapolis
for Hampton Roads to join Goldsborough’s fleet. Two days
later, the joint expedition sailed south for Roanoke Island, its
first objective.
Blocking the only passage between Albemarle and Pamlico
Sounds, Roanoke Island held the key to the inland waterways.

24

Possession of the island would enable the Federals to control
much of eastern North Carolina. General McClellan, contemplating his campaign up the Virginia Peninsula to capture
Richmond, saw Burnside’s effort as a useful supporting operation, perhaps able to draw off Confederate forces or even forming
a pincer from the south as his main army moved directly on
Richmond from the east. Despite the strategic value of Roanoke,
the Confederate government could spare few resources to defend
it. In all, barely 2,000 newly raised troops from North Carolina
and Virginia occupied the island and surrounding waters.
Three forts defended the island and the passage, all indifferently
equipped with obsolescent or poorly maintained pieces and
manned by inadequately trained soldiers. The forts on Roanoke
Island faced toward the water in expectation of a naval attempt to
force the passage. A Federal attack up the island from the south
seemed improbable due to its swampy terrain. Beyond some
pickets, the southern half of the island lacked defenses, with only
a battery of artillery and some supporting infantry blocking the
single road and causeway in the center of it. The Confederate
Navy deployed a varied collection of gunboats, nicknamed the
“mosquito fleet,” in the passage itself, mostly coastal steamers
with a cannon mounted forward. On the mainland side, a canal
barge—anchored in the mud and mounting a battery of field
pieces—completed the defenses.
Arriving off Hatteras, shaken by severe weather and forced
to wait several more days until heavy seas subsided, the Federal
armada soon discovered that the inlet’s depth of six feet prevented
many of the larger warships and Army transports from crossing
into the sound. By grounding a ship and then using the fastmoving tides to dig out the sand around it, thus creating a deeper
channel, the fleet finally crossed on 4 February. Further delays
occurred as the ships repaired damage caused by the weather.
Goldsborough and Burnside, on good terms, used the time for
detailed planning and coordination. Finally under way, the expedition arrived off the southern end of Roanoke on the morning
of 7 February. Goldsborough moved quickly to engage the
mosquito fleet and neutralize the enemy forts. He soon silenced
their guns and chased away the gunboats, suffering little damage
to his own ships. In midafternoon, Burnside began landing at
Ashby Harbor to the south, while Goldsborough’s ships and
Army gunboats lobbed shells into the surrounding forest. Some

25

gunboats were partially manned by detachments of the 99th New
York Infantry, self-styled the “Coast Guard” and trained as shipboard gunners and landing parties. In a notable innovation, the
troops landed from flat-bottom boats boarded by climbing down
ladders placed on the sides of the transports and then towed to
the beach by steamers. Just offshore, the steamers turned sharply,
releasing the tow ropes and slinging the landing boats toward
Sketch map of Roanoke Island made shortly after the battle
(Library of Congress)

26

the shoreline. Oarsmen then took over and brought them to the
beach. By midnight, three brigades landed virtually unopposed
and prepared to move north in the morning.
Despite the state of Confederate defenses and the successes
of the previous day, Burnside’s troops faced a daunting task. Just
one road ran north through the island, with deep swamps on
either side. A mile from the landing area, the island narrowed,
and the terrain greatly favored the defender. Mud and quicksandfilled swamps virtually cut the island in two, crossed only by a
causeway. Here the Confederates placed a battery of three guns,
supported by infantry. They worried little about their swampinfested flanks, which they deemed impassable. Burnside felt
otherwise. Ordering one of his three brigades to attack straight
up the road, he directed the others to move through the bogs and
brush to his right and left. Early on 8 February, the attack began.
Led by the 25th Massachusetts Infantry, the center brigade
charged. Enemy artillery and rifle fire stopped the regiment,
inflicting severe casualties. The 10th Connecticut Infantry
passed through the Bay Staters from behind, advanced a little
farther but suffered a similar fate. On the flanks, largely unnoticed by the defenders, the other brigades moved forward. The
swamps proved to be passable, and, although slowed by muck
and brambles, the Federals soon enveloped the Confederate line.
Seeing mud-encrusted blue-clad soldiers emerge on their right
and left, the defenders broke and fled. On the main road, the 9th
New York Infantry, having spent the previous months tediously
guarding the forts at Hatteras, charged through the stalled
Connecticut troops and overran the remaining defenders. With
the Confederates in retreat, Burnside moved his force forward,
mopping up stragglers and forcing the surrender of the forts, all
three of which could offer little resistance to the Federal troops
in their rear. Although suffering less than a hundred killed or
wounded in battle, virtually the entire Confederate force on
Roanoke Island surrendered.
The Federals quickly exploited their victory. Goldsborough
dispatched a squadron of gunboats to Elizabeth City, North
Carolina, to deal with the remnants of the mosquito fleet,
destroying it and capturing the town on 10 February. Two
days later, Edenton fell to a naval landing party that burned a
schooner and spiked some antiquated cannons before departing.
On 20 February, Hawkins and his regiment burned Winton on

27

the Chowan River after receiving sporadic gunfire from local
militia. Although later claiming departing Confederates set
fire to the town, his actions brought him the lasting enmity
of North Carolina and suspicion from his own commanders.
Nonetheless, Burnside placed Hawkins in command of a
brigade at Roanoke and ordered him to keep Albemarle Sound
subdued. Gunboats with detachments of soldiers aboard soon
roamed the sound, seeking out Confederate forces, confiscating
supplies, seizing vessels, and closing down coastal trade. With
his rear secure, Burnside turned southward toward New Berne
and the Neuse River.
The defeat at Roanoke shocked the Confederate government and created panic in much of eastern North Carolina.
The Federals seemed capable of depositing troops anywhere
their gunboats could take them. The governor insisted that
his state troops stay in North Carolina rather than go north
to Virginia, a demand largely unheeded by the Confederate
government. Yet Confederate leaders, both in North Carolina
and in Richmond, realized New Berne likely would be the
next target. With a railroad line leading to the state capital and
connecting the port to the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad
at Goldsboro, New Berne provided an important terminus for
food and supplies gathered from the surrounding countryside.
In Confederate hands, the city offered a base to attack Federal
gains at Roanoke and Hatteras and to counter any moves against
the port of Beaufort. Under Federal control, New Berne would
threaten all of eastern North Carolina and could serve as a base
for a larger invasion of the state or a move on Wilmington to
the south.
With McClellan’s massive army readying itself for a spring
offensive in Virginia, the Confederate government could spare
few troops to defend North Carolina. Nonetheless, the state
managed to retain a few regiments, if only partially trained and
inadequately equipped. To prevent Federal ships from sailing up
the Neuse River, several forts guarded the water approaches to
New Berne, but the rebels did little to defend against a landward
attack along the road and rail line leading west from Morehead
City. Confederate Brig. Gen. Lawrence O. Branch established a
defensive line about six miles from the city, with the Neuse River
on his left and swampy pine forest on the right. With only about
4,500 raw troops, the short line anchored on Fort Thompson on

28

the Neuse River offered the best terrain to stop an advancing
Federal army. Branch positioned most of his forces between the
river fort and the railroad that split the center of his line. He
placed the remaining men to the right with their flank resting on
the forested swamp. A brickworks next to the railroad divided
the two sets of breastworks, causing the right to draw back about
150 yards and create a small gap between the two wings of his
force. Branch compensated by posting a militia battalion near
the works and a reserve regiment nearby. As word reached him
of a Federal expedition marshaling at Hatteras, Branch hastened
to finish the defenses and prepare his troops.
On 11 March, Burnside embarked nearly 11,000 troops
aboard transports at Roanoke, sailing to rendezvous with warships
anchored at Hatteras. Although Goldsborough departed to deal
with the emergency brought on by the Confederate ironclad CSS
Virginia at Hampton Roads, his subordinate, Cdr. S. C. Rowan,
assumed command in his place. Rowan and Burnside worked
well together. Sailing up the Neuse River, Burnside landed unopposed near Slocum’s Creek on 13 March. His three brigades then
marched on New Berne, seventeen miles distant, while gunboats
moved parallel along the river, occasionally firing just ahead of
the advancing troops to ward off any unseen enemy. By nightfall, despite drenching rains that turned the approach into a
nightmare of mud, the three brigades closed on the Confederate
defenses. Burnside planned to attack the next morning, with
two brigades abreast and one in reserve. Much like the enemy
he faced, the railroad split his forces and divided the attack into
two semi-independent efforts. To compensate, he centered his
reserve brigade to the rear, prepared to reinforce either wing.
Naval gunboats stood in the river, ready to provide fire support
and to suppress Fort Thompson.
The assault immediately broke down, as the right brigade
attacked before the left could get into position, and stalled in
the face of four North Carolina regiments crouched behind
parapets. Multiple charges on the Confederate earthworks failed
to gain ground. The 10th Connecticut Infantry then moved to
within 200 yards of the enemy and delivered covering fires for
their charging comrades while Rowan’s gunboats bombarded
the defenders. Some naval shells landed among the Federals,
creating confusion and a few friendly casualties. Rowan, noting
the damage done to the rebel works by his heavy 9-inch guns,

29

later stated unapologetically, “I thought it better to kill a Union
man or two than to lose the effect of my moral suasion.” The 10th
Connecticut’s rifle fire and Rowan’s naval guns notwithstanding,
the attack on the right failed.
Meanwhile, Burnside’s left brigade began its attack. The
leading regiment, the 21st Massachusetts Infantry, spotted
the gap in the center of the Confederate lines and moved to
Sketch map of the Battle of New Berne compiled from Federal and
Confederate sources after the battle (Library of Congress)

30

exploit it. Scattering the North Carolina militia battalion,
the Massachusetts soldiers broke through then faced right,
flanking the enemy breastworks from behind. A melee erupted
as the surprised Confederates tried to plug the hole in their
lines and the Federals sought to widen it. Elements of the 21st
Massachusetts soon found themselves nearly surrounded, but
they refused to budge. The tide eventually turned when the
Union reserve advanced into the gap and routed the remaining
defenders. A staunch Confederate stand quickly transformed
into a disorderly rout. Many of Branch’s troops did not stop until
they reached New Berne nearly six miles away, burning the Trent
River bridge behind them to delay Burnside’s pursuit. Rowan’s
gunboats, however, moved up the Neuse River and arrived at the
city wharf late on 13 March, just as the last Confederates set fire
to stores and buildings and retreated up the rail line westward
toward Kinston. The next day, U.S. troops ferried across the river
and entered the city, adding to the damage by going on a looting
spree that Burnside ended with difficulty.
After establishing defenses to forestall any Confederate
counterattack, Burnside directed Brig. Gen. John G. Parke to
seize Morehead City and Beaufort, thirty miles to the east on the
coast, and then force the surrender of the Confederate garrison at
Fort Macon. This would eliminate Confederate forces in his rear
and open a supply line from the port at Beaufort to New Berne,
using the railroad that connected the two, while capturing the
harbor at Beaufort for the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.
Parke moved rapidly, entering Morehead City on 22 March and
Beaufort the next night. Startled citizens awoke to find their
town occupied by blue-uniformed soldiers. Other than burning
bridges in the Federal path, the few Confederates in the area
offered little resistance. Nor could they. Southern authorities had
shifted most of the troops originally posted near Morehead City
to defend New Berne, leaving behind scarcely 400 men at Fort
Macon and a few local militia and cavalry in the countryside.
Reconnoitering a landing site on Bogue Banks out of range of
the guns of the fort, Parke shuttled across troops and artillery,
intending to lay siege to the post. Inching his lines forward to
within a mile, he hid his cannon and mortar batteries behind
sand dunes until ready to open fire, posting pickets to deflect any
enemy attempt to disrupt his preparations. On 23 April, Parke
sent a surrender ultimatum to the fort commander, who promptly

31

rejected it despite his nearly hopeless situation. Two days later,
the Federal bombardment began, augmented by offshore Navy
warships. Parke’s guns and mortars soon found the range, in no
small part due to an Army signal officer in Beaufort with a clear
view of the fort. He spotted the fall of the shells and sent corrections using flags. Unable to mount an effective response and with
the fort’s masonry walls cracking, the defenders of Fort Macon
formally surrendered on 26 April.

Operations in Eastern North Carolina, 1862–1864

With the capture of New Berne and Fort Macon, Burnside
next moved to consolidate his hold on the rest of eastern North
Carolina. His forces occupied Washington and Plymouth and
carried out a series of raids and marches intended to keep the
enemy off-balance. Meanwhile, gunboats patrolled the sounds
and rivers, sometimes landing troops to destroy Southern works
or commandeer supplies. Even before Fort Macon fell, a Union
force under the command of Brig. Gen. Jesse Reno had landed
at Elizabeth City, ordered by Burnside to destroy the locks on
the Dismal Swamp Canal connecting Norfolk with Albemarle
Sound. Burnside feared that the CSS Virginia might venture
south through the canal. The Confederate ironclad had recently
attacked the Federal fleet at Hampton Roads and dueled with
the USS Monitor. It now threatened the canals to the south from
its base at Norfolk. Reno’s force ran into Georgia troops sent to
protect the locks, and, after a day’s battle, the Federal expedition
withdrew before it could accomplish its mission. Fortunately, the
rebels scuttled and burned the Virginia on 11 May when Norfolk
became untenable, due to the advance of General McClellan’s
army up the Virginia Peninsula toward Richmond. In addition,
they disabled the locks, fearing Federal gunboats might use the
canal to attack Norfolk.
Around New Berne and southward, Union patrols clashed
with Confederate troops, burned saltworks, and foraged for food.
Then, in late June, the War Department directed Burnside to reinforce McClellan’s army on the Virginia Peninsula. The general
obliged, departing New Berne for Virginia with 7,000 men while
leaving Brig. Gen. John G. Foster to command the remaining
forces in North Carolina. For the next several months, Foster’s
troops, too weak for offensive action, strengthened defenses
around their enclaves and patrolled the countryside, occasion-

32

ally carrying out small foraging expeditions. In September and
October, Confederate troops deployed from Virginia tested the
Federal garrisons at Plymouth and Washington, penetrating
the towns before withdrawing under fire from gunboats. Foster
reacted by dispatching relief columns, but the raids caused little
beyond local alarms.
Not until late fall had Foster enough forces to move west
toward the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad. The reinforcements came in the form of New England militia pledged to nine
months of Federal service. Foster had the new men defend New
Berne, freeing his long-term veteran regiments for expeditions
inland. In November, Foster launched a raid toward Tarboro.
After a few skirmishes along the way, he learned of a large enemy
concentration converging on Tarboro and turned back. The next
month, he marched to interdict the Wilmington and Weldon
Railroad where it crossed the Neuse River at Goldsboro. On 11
December, a column composed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry
left New Berne, its movement timed as a diversion for the Army
of the Potomac’s operations at Fredericksburg, Virginia. Three
days later, at the Neuse River near Kinston, Foster clashed with
troops from North and South Carolina, inexplicably positioned
with the river to their backs. When the Federals flanked the
Confederate line, an orderly retreat by the South Carolinians
became a rout after rebels set the bridge across the Neuse on
fire before the retreating troops could cross it. Only with great
difficulty did the Confederates re-form, but not before Foster
captured nearly 400 rebels trapped on the wrong side of the river.
The Federal column continued toward Goldsboro, skirmishing
with enemy forces that paralleled its advance from the other
side of the Neuse. On 17 December, it arrived at the railroad
bridge just a few miles from Goldsboro, guarded by three North
Carolina regiments, which soon withdrew under Union cannon
fire. Foster’s troops burned the bridge, cutting the Wilmington
and Weldon Railroad, although not for long. Confederate engineers soon repaired the damage. Far from his base and facing
enemy troops hastily dispatched from Lee’s army in Virginia after
the Battle of Fredericksburg, Foster withdrew to New Berne.
For the next two years, a war of patrols, raids, small
battles, and foraging expeditions devastated eastern North
Carolina. Federal troops continually emerged from New Berne,
Washington, and Plymouth, or appeared from gunboats patrol-

33

ling the sounds to challenge local Confederate forces, replenish
food, and assert their control. Locally recruited Unionist irregulars roamed west and north from bastions resupplied by their
Northern sponsors. Their depredations spread fear and destruction, although perhaps no more than that inflicted by Confederate
partisans also operating in the area. A buffer zone emerged that
defied control by either side. Federal commanders, repeatedly
called on to dispatch regiments to Virginia or South Carolina,
rarely mustered sufficient strength to do more than defend their
enclaves and harass the enemy. In the winter months, Confederate
soldiers sent from Virginia to find supplies added to the misery
of a region already suffering from Federal foraging.
Occasionally, Lee sent a division from the Army of Northern
Virginia to strike at the Federal defenses, more to placate the
North Carolina governor and populace than to achieve any real
military gains. In March 1863, he sent Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill
to attack New Berne. Failing to make headway, Hill shifted his
forces to Washington to besiege the town but was unable to
capture it before Federal gunboats broke through with timely
reinforcements and supplies. In January 1864, Lee sent Maj.
Gen. George E. Pickett to assault New Berne from three sides,
supported by Confederate gunboats based on the Neuse River.
The Confederates launched a series of attacks during the first
three days of February against the Federal brigade holding the
town. The defensive works around the city proved formidable,
and coordination of the attacks was poor. Pickett suffered
much the same fate as Hill the year before and soon returned
to Virginia.
Lee replaced Pickett with Brig. Gen. Robert F. Hoke, a
native North Carolinian. Hoke concentrated on the isolated
Federal garrison at Plymouth, on the Roanoke River, just west of
Albemarle Sound. He struck on 17 April 1864 with two brigades
and artillery, supported by the CSS Albemarle, an ironclad built
on the Roanoke River and nearly impervious to the smaller
Federal gunboats near Plymouth. Abandoning their outer
breastworks, the Federals withdrew to the town’s inner defenses.
Early on 19 April, the Albemarle appeared, sailing past the river
defenses and sinking or dispersing the gunboats in its path.
Hoke then launched his final attack, overrunning the Federal
lines. Disorganized, with the enemy in the streets, and cut off
from evacuation or support from the river, the garrison surren-

34

dered. A few days later, the Federals evacuated Washington.
Unable to challenge the enemy ironclad, the U.S. Navy momentarily ceded control of Albemarle Sound, but the Confederates
failed to exploit their advantage. Lee demanded troops from the
Carolinas to forestall the campaign of Union Army General in
Chief Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in Virginia, stripping away much
of Hoke’s force.
During a spirited engagement with U.S. Navy gunboats in
May, the Albemarle, its machinery poorly maintained, received
enough damage to force it to anchor up the Roanoke River
for repairs. The ironclad still posed a threat even if unable to
venture forth for the moment. In October 1864, U.S. Navy Lt.
William Cushing crashed a tug over the ironclad’s protective
boom and drove a spar torpedo under the ironclad, sinking
it at its moorings. The rebels soon evacuated Plymouth and
Washington, followed closely by Federal troops who reoccupied the towns.

Charleston and the Battle of Secessionville, 1862

While the war ebbed and flowed in North Carolina, the
focus of Federal operations on the coast shifted to Charleston,
South Carolina. The emotional lure of the city seemed to hypnotize the Lincoln administration. Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Gustavus V. Fox railed at Charleston, calling it “Satan’s Kingdom,”
and repeatedly demanded that the South Atlantic Blockading
Squadron attack the city. To Fox, Charleston and Fort Sumter
personified treason. As early as November 1861, following the
seizure of Port Royal, the Navy had pressed the War Department
to send troops to help take Charleston. The Army estimated
that any effort to capture Charleston would require thousands
of men who it would have to divert from other more important
theaters of operations, and it denied the Navy’s request. To the
War Department, so long as the port could be blockaded, such a
distraction seemed unnecessary. Nearly 12,000 soldiers already
served along the South Carolina and Florida coasts; no more
could be spared.
By the summer of 1862, however, the Army could no
longer avoid pressure to attack Charleston. General Hunter had
assumed command of the newly created Department of the
South in March 1862, and he immediately took a more aggressive
stance than had his predecessor. In April, he sent forces to occupy

35

Edisto Island, South Carolina,
eastward toward Charleston,
moving closer to Charleston’s
outer defenses. On 12 May,
Robert Smalls, a slave pilot
aboard the Charleston steamer
Planter, commandeered the
vessel while the captain and
officers were ashore. Sailing it
past the harbor defenses, he
surrendered to an offshore Navy
blockader. Smalls brought news
that Confederate forces had
evacuated Coles and Battery
Islands, opening the entrance
to the Stono River and a potential back door to Charleston
via James Island, which lay
immediately southwest of and
General Hunter
(Library of Congress)
abutting Charleston. General
Hunter and Admiral Du Point
acted quickly, agreeing on
a plan to attack Charleston’s defenses from the rear by way of
James Island. With the southern approaches to the island and
the Stono River clear of enemy forces, the way looked open to
the city while bypassing the many batteries that protected the
entrance to the harbor.
Hunter loaded one division aboard transports, sailed them
up the Stono River, and landed them on James Island on 2 June.
He marched another division across Johns Island to be ferried
over to James Island. Navy gunboats covered the attack with the
fall of their shot spotted and adjusted by Army officers signaling
from shore to ship, an innovation previously tested during raids
on the tidal rivers near Port Royal. Naval shells dropped in
front of the troops, clearing woods of Confederate skirmishers,
at times firing beyond the direct observation of the gunboats.
The Federals greatly outnumbered their enemy, but Hunter was
convinced otherwise. Fearing a Confederate counterattack, he
had his men dig in. For more than a week, they skirmished with
local Confederate forces but did not move. Hunter then departed
for Port Royal, presumably to gather reinforcements, leaving

36

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham with strict instructions not to
attack until ordered.
While the Federals dallied, the Confederate commander
in Charleston, Maj. Gen. John C. Pemberton, rushed troops to
James Island. At a chokepoint between two tidal creeks about a
half mile from the village of Secessionville, they built Fort Lamar,
a W-shaped earthwork manned by more than 700 infantry and
artillerymen. The fort barred any move to cross James Island.
Using other regiments of infantry positioned at various points
on the island, Pemberton created a reserve ready to respond to
any Federal move (Map 2).
Aware of the enemy measures, Benham grew impatient.
Having received no instructions from Hunter, he decided to
strike on 16 June. An assault force totaling nearly 3,500 men
attacked in the early morning, hoping to surprise and overwhelm
Fort Lamar. A second force covered the Federal left, advancing
in parallel on the other side of a small tidal creek. As the main
force moved on Fort Lamar, the 8th Michigan Infantry came
within 200 yards of the enemy before grapeshot and rifle fire tore
into it. On its right, the 79th New York Infantry scaled the fort’s
parapet and fought hand to hand with the rebel defenders before
the Southerners forced it back. Repulsed, the Federals regrouped
and launched two more attacks, with little success. A quarter mile
to the left, across the tidal creek, the 3d New Hampshire Infantry
attempted to flank the fort but could not wade through the tidal
mud separating it from the enemy. Firing from across the creek,
the regiment nonetheless swept the facing parapets of defenders.
Success proved short-lived. Confederate reinforcements rushed
to the battlefield and cannon fire from the fort soon struck the
New Hampshire regiment. The best chance had been lost. About
midmorning, the attack ended when Benham ordered his troops
to withdraw, having suffered nearly 700 casualties. Outraged
on hearing of the failed assault and seeking to deflect criticism,
Hunter relieved Benham for disobeying his orders, then evacuated James Island.
If Hunter possessed a lackluster combat record, he achieved
lasting notoriety for his actions with regard to freed slaves. A
staunch abolitionist, upon assuming command at Port Royal in
1862, he had issued an order emancipating slaves in the department. Lincoln was not yet ready to take such a measure, in part
because he feared alienating the slave-holding border states that

37

er

a

p

n

o

do

o

ley River
Ash

Riv

C

4 Mile House

e

W

r

R
i v
e
r

C HARLESTO N
Hog Island

C h a rl e

st o n a

nd Sav

annah

Mount Pleasant

S hutes Folly Island

RR

CHARLESTON

Sullivan’s Island

Jul 1863–18 Feb 1865

Moultrieville

Fort Moultrie

Charleston
Harbor

FORT SUMTER

12 Apr 1861
8 Sep 1863–18 Feb 1865
Cummings Point

Battery Gregg

BATTERY WAGNER

James Island

11 Jul 1863
18 Jul–7 Sep 1863

Morris Island

SECESSIONVILLE
16 Jun 1862

o

n

o

R i v e

r

Johns Island

Secessionville

e

r

t
S
B a t ter y
Island

i

Folly Island

v
Coles Island

y
ll
Fo

R

A T L A N T I C

O C E A N

St
on
o I
nl
et

Kiawah Island

CHARLESTON AND VICINIT Y
1861–1865
Confederate Fortifications
Battle
0

1

4
Miles

Map 2

The 1st South Carolina Infantry (African Descent) on parade, Beaufort,
South Carolina, 1863 (Library of Congress)

remained loyal to the Union, and he quickly revoked the order,
but Hunter was undeterred. Already managing a large population
of former slaves, which he paid to grow crops on the sea-island
plantations in the Port Royal area as well as to perform labor
for the Army, the general launched raids explicitly to free slaves.
He forcibly removed slaves from the islands or armed them to
prevent the return of white slave owners or local militia. Going
a step further, Hunter raised a regiment of former slaves, the 1st
South Carolina Infantry (African Descent) in the summer of 1862.
Although initially employed as labor troops and soon disbanded
by the War Department, the seeds had been planted. Indeed, one
company, posted to distant St. Simon’s Island in Georgia to ward
off Confederate marauders, could not be reached and remained
on duty. In November, the company, under instructions from
Brig. Gen. Rufus B. Saxton, military superintendent of plantations in the area, raided nearby islands, burning saltworks,
confiscating foodstuffs, and removing slaves. Despite Lincoln’s
previous directive, by the end of the month and with Saxton’s
active complicity, the 1st South Carolina comprised more than
500 men, soon to be commanded by Col. Thomas W. Higginson,
a New England abolitionist and former supporter of abolitionist
John Brown. Higginson continued to build his regiment, even
sending recruiting parties as far south as Fernandina.
In late 1862, the president caught up with his field commander
and issued an Emancipation Proclamation that expressed the
government’s intent to free all slaves living in rebel territory. On 1
January 1863, the 1st South Carolina Infantry formally received a
set of regimental colors and a month later mustered into Federal

39

service. It was one of the first African American regiments
(predating the more famous 54th Massachusetts Infantry by
several months) and its soldiers were almost exclusively former
slaves from the coastal region. The 2d South Carolina Infantry
formed in May 1863, with two more units to follow later in the
summer. In early 1864, all were reflagged as United States Colored
Troops infantry regiments. These regiments paved the way for
the thousands of African Americans who fought in the Civil War,
a large number of whom would serve along the Atlantic coast.

Morris Island and Battery Wagner, 1863

Army interest in Charleston waned for more than a year
but not so for the Navy. Secretary of the Navy Welles continually sought ways to build the image of the Navy, much of which
remained unseen to the public in a thankless blockade. He
distrusted joint Army-Navy operations, grousing that the Army
claimed the glory for successes and blamed the Navy for failures,
a charge that had some grounds after Hunter claimed the Navy
had failed to support his troops at Secessionville. In April 1863,
Secretary Welles ordered Du Pont, against the admiral’s advice,
to mass his ironclad monitors and run past Fort Sumter and the
batteries of Charleston. Welles believed, based on past experiences early in the war, that ships’ guns could overcome any fortification and this seemed like an opportunity to prove that theory
and achieve a decisive naval victory. The effort failed against
the defenses of Charleston Harbor. In an aftermath filled with
recriminations, Welles replaced Du Pont with Rear Adm. John A.
Dahlgren. The War Department also relieved Hunter, replacing
him in June 1863 with Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, the man
who, as a captain, had engineered the surrender of Fort Pulaski
fourteen months earlier.
Gillmore believed a coordinated Army-Navy campaign
could take Charleston. Recently arrived reinforcements enabled
him to sustain operations from Port Royal to the south and to
undertake operations at Charleston. Meeting with Dahlgren on
4 July, Gillmore laid out a plan to march his troops across undefended Folly Island, cross over to Morris Island, and then overrun
the two fortifications protecting the mouth of the harbor, Battery
Wagner and Battery Gregg. The advance across Morris Island
would be supported by ships firing into the flanks of the enemy.
With Morris Island taken, heavy guns emplaced on Cummings

40

Point could neutralize Fort Sumter and cover the Navy as its
ships fought past the channel defenses into Charleston, opening
the city to capture. Dahlgren readily agreed to the plan.
On 10 July, the operation began. Covered by artillery on
Folly Island and Navy monitors firing on Confederate defenders,
Gillmore’s troops crossed to the southern tip of Morris Island.
Overcoming resistance with the aid of naval gunfire, they advanced
to within several hundred yards of Battery Wagner by nightfall.
Blocking the way forward, Battery Wagner abutted a marsh and
brush on one side and the ocean on the other. The only approach
consisted of a narrow strip of open sand just wide enough for
one regiment at a time. Soldiers from North and South Carolina
manned the fortification, which was built of sand, earth, and
logs in angled walls protected by an outer ditch. They sheltered
in bombproofs against artillery and naval gunfire, able to quickly
sortie to parapets if assaulted. Victory for an attacker was only
possible by brute force.
Buoyed by the rapid progress up Morris Island and hoping to
quickly overwhelm Battery Wagner, Gillmore ordered an attack for
the next morning. But he failed to notify the Navy, whose guns had
been a key part of the day’s success. Unaware of Gillmore’s plan,
Dahlgren’s ships did not support the assault on the Confederate
strongpoint. Early in the morning of 11 July, the 7th Connecticut
Infantry, followed by the 76th Pennsylvania Infantry and 9th
Maine Infantry regiments, advanced to within a few hundred
yards of the walls before coming under fire and charging. Some
of the Connecticut troops reached the crest of the wall, engaging
the defenders at close quarters. They went no farther. Regiments
behind the Connecticut soldiers, jammed together by the narrow
terrain and subjected to intense fire, broke and fled, leaving the
forward troops isolated. The Federals suffered more than 300 casualties in just a few minutes. The attack was a disaster.
Chastised by this setback but undaunted, Gillmore planned
a second assault. He positioned artillery and reinforced his forces
while offshore ships systematically shelled Battery Wagner with
their 11- and 15-inch guns. On 18 July, confident artillery and
naval gunfire had much reduced the fort’s defenses, Gillmore
formed ten regiments of infantry in a column of three brigades.
Terrain dictated the formation, a drawback that Gillmore hoped
the bombardment and sheer numbers would overcome. Leading
the attack was the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, an African

41

View of Battery Wagner after its capture
(Library of Congress)

American unit made up largely of freedmen from the Northeast,
which had only recently arrived in South Carolina and was eager
to prove itself.
After a final preparatory bombardment from artillery
and naval guns lasting nearly the entire day, Gillmore ordered
his troops forward shortly before sunset. Unfortunately, in
the growing dark the Navy could no longer observe its shot
well enough to avoid endangering the attack, and it ceased its
bombardment as the assault began. This left the enemy time to
emerge largely unscathed from his hardened shelters to man the
ramparts before the Federals could close on the fort. Channeled
into a killing zone, the assault dissolved in confusion. The 54th
Massachusetts broke through the palisade and started up the
fort’s sloping wall, only to be greeted by canister and rifle fire that
left it shattered. More regiments pushed in behind to meet the
same fate. Officers fell, regiments intermingled, some soldiers
fled, and order disintegrated. While a few troops managed to
breach the ramparts, those not killed or wounded huddled in the
ditch before the wall or in shell craters farther out. Elements of
the 6th Connecticut Infantry and 48th New York Infantry scaled
the seaward wall and entered the fort but went no farther. The
second brigade, observing the fate of those to the front, balked
when ordered to attack. Nonetheless, when the brigade eventually

42

moved forward and joined those pinned down at the base of the
wall, all charged. For a few moments, success seemed possible.
But the third brigade, waiting in reserve, inexplicably never
advanced. The Confederate defenders sealed off any penetrations
and continued to fire into the killing zone. Gillmore sounded
retreat. Of more than 5,000 Federal troops engaged, nearly a third
had been killed or wounded. The 54th Massachusetts mustered
barely 50 percent present for duty the next day.
Repulsed twice, Gillmore decided to besiege the rebels on
Morris Island while simultaneously neutralizing Fort Sumter.
In a textbook operation, trenches and traverses worked their
way toward Battery Wagner. Artillery and naval gunfire kept
the Confederates pinned down on Morris Island while slowly
reducing Fort Sumter to rubble. Heavy artillery began lobbing
shells into Charleston itself, using church spires as aiming points.
Although of limited military impact, the bombardment of the city
added a dimension to the campaign unseen in earlier operations.
Civilians now became targets. By early September, the siege lines
reached to within a few hundred yards of the walls of Battery
Wagner. The defenders, enduring increasing casualties and faced
with an overwhelming enemy both on land and offshore, notified
General P. G. T. Beauregard, commanding Confederate forces
in Charleston, that they could no longer hold out. As Gillmore
prepared for a final assault, they slipped away. On 7 September,
Federal troops bloodlessly occupied a nearly destroyed Battery
Wagner and moved on to Cummings Point. Morris Island had
finally fallen.

Charleston Under Siege

With the Federals occupying Morris Island, Fort Sumter
faced an onslaught. Battered by Federal bombardment by land
and sea, the artillery departed on Beauregard’s orders. Infantry
occupied the fort, more a symbol of defiance than any real
threat to the Federal forces. Yet it continued to attract Army
and Navy attention. Dahlgren organized a landing force of 500
sailors and marines and prepared to seize Fort Sumter on the
night of 8 September. He failed to notify Gillmore, whose artillery overlooked the fort. Compounding the lack of coordination,
Gillmore planned a similar operation the same night, unknown
to Dahlgren. Only at the last minute did Gillmore learn of the
Navy’s plans, and in a pique, he directed his commanders not to

43

Federal troops on Morris Island watch the USS New Ironsides firing a
broadside at the Confederate defenses of Charleston.
(Library of Congress)

support the Navy. If the Navy assault boats reached Fort Sumter
first, then the Army troops were to draw off and offer no help.
They did as ordered. The Navy attack proved to be a disaster.
Caught in the act of landing but unable to cross the rubble and
remaining fort walls, the sailors and marines succumbed to
enemy rifle fire from within the fort and artillery fire from across
the entrance channel at Fort Moultrie. Those not killed were
captured.
Fort Sumter’s defiance notwithstanding, with the capture
of Morris Island the Union had effectively closed the port of
Charleston. U.S. commanders could not justify the potential cost
of a full-scale assault on the city, so they chose to remain outside
instead, the infantry defending Morris Island and the approaches
to the Stono River. Skirmishing became an almost daily affair.
Occasional landings on James Island kept up the pressure and tied
down Confederate troops. At the harbor entrance from October
to December 1863, a sustained Army and Navy bombardment
pounded Fort Sumter into a largely useless pile of rubble, but the
many other Confederate harbor defenses kept the Navy from sailing
up the channel. In early 1864, Federal gunners began a steady
bombardment of the city that would continue for much of the next
year. Charleston did not fall until 18 February 1865 when isolated
and evacuated in the face of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s march
through South Carolina. Until then, it remained hemmed in and
under constant attack, unable to contribute to the war effort and
subjected to the punishment many in the North felt it deserved.

44

The Battle of Olustee, 1864

As the siege of Charleston dragged on, active operations
continued elsewhere in the Union Army’s Department of the
South. A constant stream of expeditions by detachments of
soldiers loaded aboard gunboats moved up and down the inlets
and rivers from Edisto Island, South Carolina, to the St. Johns
River in Florida. Raiding, skirmishing, foraging, defending
forward outposts, garrisoning towns and coastal fortifications,
and conducting an occasional foray inland occupied the daily
lives of soldiers sent to the department. The largest expedition
occurred in early 1864 in northeast Florida. Envisioned as a largescale raid to seize naval stores and prevent supplies and cattle
from being shipped from Florida through Georgia, as well as to
induce the Unionist factions in the region to swear allegiance,
the operation involved nearly 6,000 troops under the command
of Brig. Gen. Truman A. Seymour at Port Royal. Embarked on
transports escorted by gunboats, the force sailed for Florida in
early February 1864. Landing at Jacksonville on 7 February, the
troops fanned out to seize key crossroads, railroad bridges, and
enemy supplies. The 40th Massachusetts Infantry, mounted on
horses and equipped with repeating rifles, penetrated nearly fifty
miles inland. Confederate forces, mostly widely scattered local
militia, offered little opposition.
Unfortunately, early success succumbed to indecision.
Seymour had hesitated for several days after landing, unsure of
his next move. The delay allowed the Confederates to dispatch
reinforcements, to include veteran Georgia troops rushed from
Charleston. Gillmore finally ordered Seymour to consolidate his
forces and establish a defensive line anchored on Jacksonville, and
he appointed Seymour commander of a newly created District
of Florida. Now holding what he considered to be an independent command, Seymour decided after concentrating his forces
to advance west to cut the railroad line over the Suwanee River
on which cattle and foodstuffs moved north. On 20 February,
Seymour’s advance guard bumped into cavalry screening
Confederate forces assembling near Olustee. What began as a
skirmish quickly escalated into battle as both sides fed units
forward. A crisis arose when the 7th New Hampshire Infantry,
moving up to relieve forward elements, received contradictory
commands, lost order, and buckled in the face of advancing
enemy troops. On its left the 8th U.S. Colored Troops stood fast

45

but retreated after suffering nearly 300 casualties. Only the timely
arrival of a New York brigade prevented a Federal rout. Restricted
by pine forests and boggy ground, the antagonists were locked in a
bloody struggle, with the Confederates slowly gaining the advantage. A final charge by the Georgians forced back the Federals.
Sensing defeat, Seymour ordered a withdrawal, with the 54th
Massachusetts and the 35th U.S. Colored Troops acting as rear
guard. Thus protected against Confederate pursuit, the Federals
retreated to Jacksonville. Despite the defeat at Olustee, Union
forces occupied Jacksonville for the remainder of the war, blocking
inland access to the sea and conducting raids into the countryside.
Olustee marked the last major battle in the Department of
the South. Raids and skirmishing persisted among the sounds,
islands, and waterways, while artillery continued to shell the
city of Charleston and its outlying forts. Port Royal remained
the largest and most important base for the South Atlantic
Blockading Squadron, requiring an Army garrison to ensure its
security. In the spring of 1864, General in Chief Grant ordered
many of the veteran units serving in Florida and South Carolina
north to join his campaign against Lee. Regiments that had
served in the department during many of its major operations
would now fight alongside the Army of the Potomac in the siege
of Petersburg. When Sherman’s army approached Savannah at
the end of its “March to the Sea” in late 1864, the troops garrisoning the coastal islands conducted expeditions up the rivers
from Port Royal to divert Confederate troops and threaten the
railroad between Charleston and Savannah. In January 1865,
part of Sherman’s army shifted from Savannah to Beaufort, South
Carolina, to begin its march though the Carolinas. Those troops
left behind provided security and maintained control of what
had become a backwater while the war moved north.

The Wilmington Campaign, 1864–1865

By the fall of 1864, only one major seaport remained open
to the Confederacy. On 5 August 1864, Rear Adm. David G.
Farragut’s ships had fought their way past the defenses of Mobile
Bay, Alabama, effectively closing the last major Gulf port. With
Charleston under siege, New Berne occupied, and much of the
Atlantic coast subject to raids and occupation, Wilmington,
North Carolina, now provided the sole access for rebel blockade
runners. Upwards of seventy ships operated from the port,

46

smuggling essential goods, war supplies, and not a few luxuries.
Lee’s army in Virginia depended on them for many of the
weapons, supplies, and ammunition otherwise unavailable to an
increasingly exhausted South. Yet Wilmington seemed almost
impervious to interdiction. The city lay more than twenty-five
miles from the mouth of the Cape Fear River and well out of
range of naval guns. The entrance to the Cape Fear River and the
approaches to the city bristled with forts, earthworks, artillery
batteries, and defensive lines. Two inlets, separated by miles of
shallow water, islands, and shoals, made blockading problematic. For more than three years, the U.S. Navy had unsuccessfully tried to stop the blockade runners. To do so demanded
more than just warships.
The key to closing Wilmington rested with Fort Fisher, a
mammoth earthwork located between the sea and the river on a
peninsula formally named Federal Point but unofficially renamed
Confederate Point by local authorities. Shaped like an inverted
L, the mammoth fort consisted of a series of elevated battery
positions designed to withstand the strongest naval bombardment. Its sea face, nearly a mile long from south to north just
above the high-water line, held nearly twenty long-range guns,
mostly 8- and 10-inch Columbiads, in protected batteries. The
Mound Battery anchored the southern end, rising over forty
feet and mounting two heavy cannons. It not only fixed the
end of the fort and overlooked the inlet, it provided a beacon
for blockade runners. The land face cut for 500 yards across
the peninsula from the sea to the Cape Fear River. It mounted
twenty-two smaller cannons, in one- and two-gun batteries separated by traverses shielding them from enfilading naval gunfire.
A palisade and electronically detonated torpedoes (land mines)
were meant to break up any assault before it reached the walls. At
the river end, a pair of fieldpieces guarded the only entrance to
the fort via a road that crossed a stream immediately to the front
of the gate. At the apex of the land and sea faces rose the 32-foothigh Northeast Bastion, a combination firing battery and battle
command post that allowed observation over the entire fort and
its approaches. Inside the fort, a flat plain contained barracks
and three mortars, while sturdy bombproofs dug into the fort’s
walls protected the garrison and ammunition magazines. The
entire fort was constructed of sand and earth covered in sea oats
and grass designed to absorb the impact of naval shells. About

47

a mile west and south of the fort, at the tip of Federal Point,
stood Battery Buchanan, mounting two 10-inch Columbiads
and two 11-inch smoothbores overlooking the inlet and river. In
Confederate hands, Fort Fisher kept Wilmington open.
On 2 September 1864, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Fox and General Gillmore, recently reassigned to Washington,
D.C., but seeking more active duty, met with Grant at his headquarters at City Point, Virginia, to discuss their plan to seize
Fort Fisher. President Lincoln had expressed interest in the
plan but was unwilling to order Grant to back the operation if,
in the commanding general’s opinion, it was unwise to do so.
Stalemated by Lee at Petersburg and with Sherman stalled before
Atlanta, Grant saw little reason to siphon off troops for a risky
campaign he considered of secondary importance and a Navy
responsibility. He did, however, understand the political importance of the city. Wilmington remained a symbol of Confederate
sovereignty so long as ships could enter and leave. Additionally,
the summer battles in Virginia and Georgia had cost too many
lives for what much of the population in the North saw as little
gain. War weariness threatened to end the conflict short of a
Union victory. Lincoln needed some good news from the front
with the presidential election just a few months off, and the plan
appeared to offer a chance for some. Grant reluctantly agreed to
support the expedition, with the caveat that he would do so only
when troops became available.
No sooner had Grant tepidly endorsed the plan than the
strategic situation changed. On the day Grant met with Fox and
Gillmore, Sherman captured Atlanta. He then advised Grant to
support the operation against Wilmington as a useful adjunct to
his maturing plans to march to Savannah. The appointment of
Admiral David Dixon Porter, known and admired by Grant since
the Vicksburg Campaign in 1863, to command the North Atlantic
Blockading Squadron finally convinced him to support the expedition. Although still not fully committed, in late September he
directed 6,500 troops from General Butler’s Army of the James
to be prepared to sail to Wilmington and appointed Maj. Gen.
Godfrey Weitzel to command the force. Grant, however, hedged
his bets; while earmarking the troops and directing Weitzel to
plan for the expedition, he withheld orders to dispatch it. Delays
in gathering the troops and procuring transports further slowed
preparations. Grant nearly withdrew Army support when he

48

received reports that the Confederates knew an operation to be
forthcoming, but he gave in to continued pressure from Porter
and the Navy Department.
In early December, Grant learned that the Confederates
were withdrawing troops from Wilmington and Fort Fisher
to reinforce those confronting Sherman in Georgia. Sensing
an opportunity, he released Weitzel. Much to Admiral Porter’s
chagrin, however, Grant made no attempt to stop General Butler,
nominally Weitzel’s commander, from assuming active command
of the expedition. Whether deferring to Butler’s prerogatives as
commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina or
seizing the chance to remove, even if for a short while, the often
inept but politically connected Butler from operations around
Petersburg, Grant’s inaction produced an immediate effect. Any
prior goodwill between the Army and Navy evaporated. Porter
thought Butler a fool and still rankled over a feud dating to their
service at New Orleans two years before. Butler equally detested
Porter. The two rarely met, using messages and subordinates to
communicate. Fully aware of Fort Fisher’s formidable defenses,
Butler distrusted the Navy’s ability to neutralize them. Instead,
he proposed to load a ship full of explosives, beach it opposite
the fort’s sea face, and detonate it, blasting a gap in the wall and
stunning the garrison into defenselessness. Porter thought the
idea impractical but agreed to supply the flat-bottomed USS
Louisiana for the purpose. Nearly two more weeks elapsed before
the Federals could ready the ship, strip it down to look like a
blockade runner, and pack it with more than 200 tons of explosives. Finally, on 12 December Porter’s armada, the Louisiana
included, sailed from Hampton Roads, followed two days later
by Butler’s troop transports.
A comedy of errors and poor coordination ensued. Porter’s
ships put in to Beaufort, North Carolina, to coal and to complete
packing the Louisiana. Unaware, the Army transports arrived
at the designated rendezvous point off Wilmington on 15
December to find no Navy ships. Three days later, Porter arrived,
advising Butler by dispatch boat that the Navy would detonate
the explosives-packed ship that night. Surprised and enraged,
Butler sent Weitzel to Porter’s flagship demanding the detonation be delayed until it could be coordinated with the landing
of his troops. Neither Butler nor Porter talked directly, instead
using dispatches and subordinates. A storm struck the fleet on

49

19 December, halting all operations for the next two days. Butler
steamed his transports to Beaufort for refueling and provisioning
while the storm blew over. He then notified Porter, whose ships
remained off Cape Fear, that the Army transports would return
on 24 December. Porter chose not to wait. On the night of 23
December, the Louisiana proceeded toward the fort, crewed by
a few sailors. When about 600 yards offshore, the crew set the
charges and abandoned ship. Shortly before 0200 on 24 December,
the Louisiana exploded, sending flames and water skyward
but doing little else. Inside Fort Fisher, the garrison assumed
a blockade runner, chased aground by a Federal gunboat, had
been set afire and its magazines exploded. When the sun rose
in the morning, Porter sent a ship to assess the damage done. It
reported Fort Fisher unscathed.
With daylight, Porter’s ships commenced firing on Fort
Fisher in anticipation of Butler’s arrival and a Christmas Day
landing. The shelling lasted all day and, from the sea, looked to
be effective as geysers of sand flew and smoke covered the fort.
Unobserved, however, the garrison sat safely, if uncomfortably,
in bombproof shelters while the ramparts above them absorbed
the bombardment. In fact, many of the shells overshot the walls
and impacted on the plain behind, destroying barracks but
doing little else. Butler’s transports arrived that night. Fuming
over the Navy’s actions, he sent Weitzel to meet with Porter
and work out a landing plan. On Christmas Day, the attack
resumed. Late in the morning, troops went ashore from surfboats and barges north of Fort Fisher, covered by gunboats. The
fort remained silent, a sign taken by some, to include Porter,
that the bombardment had done its work. By late afternoon,
more than 2,500 troops landed, with another 4,000 men waiting
offshore in reserve. As the lead brigade turned toward the land
face of Fort Fisher, winds began to rise, threatening to halt
further landings. The Confederates emerged from their bombproofs to man the fort’s guns, most still intact. Faced with the
dilemma of only part of his force ashore, rising winds, and a
still strongly defended fort, Butler ordered a withdrawal. He
then promptly departed for Hampton Roads, even while many
of his troops remained stranded on the beach by high winds.
Porter was outraged at what he thought was cowardice, incorrectly believing his ships had silenced Fort Fisher. But he could
do little more than support the troops still ashore. Two more

50

days elapsed before all could be ferried back to their transports.
Porter then took his ships to Beaufort.
The failure at Fort Fisher produced immediate effects.
Lincoln recalled Butler, who never held another command. Porter
blamed the Army, convinced the fort could have been taken by
storm after the Navy had all but neutralized its defenses. The
allegations stung the War Department and Grant, who pledged
support for another attempt to seize Fort Fisher. The promise also
reflected a renewed strategic interest in Wilmington. On the day
Butler landed his troops near Fort Fisher, Sherman telegraphed
Lincoln offering Savannah as a
Christmas present. He proposed
to march north through the
Carolinas, and, while Grant
originally intended to shift
Sherman’s army to Petersburg,
he approved the new plan. Once
ambivalent toward Wilmington,
Grant now viewed the port
as an essential forward base
for Sherman’s campaign. In
early January 1865, he placed
Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry in
command of nearly 9,000 troops
for a second assault on Fort
Fisher. In written orders, Grant
directed Terry to cooperate
closely with Porter, warning
General Terry
him that no misunderstandings
(Library of Congress)
should come between the two.
Terry, a modest and capable
veteran who had commanded a brigade during the assaults on
Battery Wagner and a corps at Petersburg, impressed Porter
when they met at Beaufort on 8 January. They quickly bonded,
personally meeting each day for detailed planning.
On 12 January, the expedition got under way, led by nearly
sixty warships ranging from small gunboats to the USS New
Ironsides with its fourteen 11-inch Dahlgren guns. Twenty-two
transports carried Terry’s landing force of three small divisions,
to include one from the recently formed XXV Corps composed
entirely of African American regiments, along with field artillery,

51

heavy siege guns, and engineers. Facing the Federal force, the
Fort Fisher garrison mustered barely 700 men, although Lt. Gen.
Braxton Bragg, recently appointed to command the defenses of
Wilmington, promised reinforcements to the fort’s commander,
Col. William Lamb, should an attack occur. In December, in
response to Butler’s landings, Lee had dispatched 6,000 men
under the command of Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke to Wilmington
from the defenses of Petersburg. Although they had arrived too
late to be a factor, they had remained in Wilmington. In the event
of another assault on Fort Fisher, Bragg planned to move Hoke’s
division down Federal Point to block any movement toward
Wilmington and threaten the Federal rear. Bragg meant to protect
the city, believing Fort Fisher largely capable of defending itself.
Shortly after dawn on 13 January, Porter’s fleet positioned
itself off Fort Fisher and the beaches to its north while the troops
prepared to board boats, many rowed by sailors. Directly covering
the landing site, Navy guns opened fire into the woods and brush
behind the beaches, intent on keeping any Confederates at bay.
Despite high surf that drenched many of the soldiers, the operation went smoothly. Indeed, some troops stopped on the beach
to build fires and dry out while bands greeted follow-on waves.
After two hours and with several brigades ashore, skirmishers
advanced inland (Map 3).
Bragg ordered Hoke to take up positions on Federal
Point. A brigade deployed by river steamers went ahead, while
the remainder marched the fifteen miles from the city. Hoke,
convinced he faced a much larger force and leery of the naval
guns, chose to dig in and defend against attack rather than to
strike at the landing. About 350 South Carolinians, loaded on
boats, managed to reach Battery Buchanan and make their way
to Fort Fisher, where Lamb could muster barely a thousand
defenders to meet Terry. Meanwhile, Porter’s main battle line
opened fire on the fort, focusing on the gun positions and
the land face and its protective palisade. Tacitly admitting the
previous bombardment may not have been wholly effective, he
gave strict orders to his captains to carefully observe the fall of
shot. The naval bombardment systematically whittled away at the
defenses. Terry, meanwhile, consolidated his beachhead and late
that night the division from the XXV Corps extended a defensive
line across the peninsula two miles north of Fort Fisher. They
worked all night building breastworks and prepared to stop a

52

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Map 3

still-anticipated counterattack by Hoke’s Confederates less than
a mile away. Behind the defensive line, the rest of Terry’s force
readied to move south.
The next day, the remainder of Terry’s force landed,
along with much of the artillery and some of the siege guns.
The African American soldiers continued to strengthen the
defensive line while Hoke made little effort to probe it. In
midmorning, Porter’s ships again closed in and opened fire.
They disabled nearly all of the guns along the land face, tore gaps
in the protecting palisade, and killed or wounded Confederates
attempting to effect repairs or return fire. The two assault divisions moved slowly toward Fort Fisher, erecting a continuous
set of rifle pits and remaining concealed in the woods beyond
the beaches as they did so. Terry personally crept to within 400
yards of the wall to see the defenses for himself and finalize his
attack plan. Observing the damage from the naval bombardment and unsure of the size or intentions of the Confederate
force to his north, he determined to attack Fort Fisher the next
day rather than to settle into a lengthy siege. Terry then rowed
out to Porter’s flagship to coordinate the assault.
Terry’s plan exploited a weakness he had observed. His
main effort would be directed near the river, where the land
face ended at the road entrance to the fort. Two enemy fieldpieces protected the gate and a battery on the wall overlooked
the open ground to the front. Nonetheless, Terry felt his troops
could cross the ground and overwhelm the defenders while
avoiding fire from many of the guns farther down the land
face. The Federal forces would attack in a column of brigades,
each to be committed on Terry’s order. Once inside, they would
move along the land face, rolling up the batteries one at a time
from west to east. The two commanders agreed on a system
of flag signals to keep supporting naval gunfire just ahead of
the advancing troops, preventing Confederates from reestablishing their defensive positions. Porter then added a twist. He
intended to land a naval brigade of more than 2,000 marines
and sailors armed with cutlasses and pistols to overwhelm the
Northeast Bastion at the other end of the land face. Although
surprised by Porter’s plan, Terry said little. Grant had strictly
enjoined him to cooperate fully with the Navy. So far, cooperation had been excellent. The naval attack would not affect
Terry’s plan, so he did not object.

54

During the night, Terry advanced his brigades through the
wooded areas near the river. They settled into shallow rifle pits
within a few hundred yards of the land face. The 15th New York
Engineers built battery positions along the river for heavy artillery
to ward off any Confederate attempt to bring reinforcements down
the river or to shell the Federals from gunboats. In midmorning on
15 January, the naval brigade landed. Despite their officers’ efforts,
the sailors, undrilled in land tactics, formed into a loose column.
Marines deployed forward as sharpshooters, under orders to pick
off any enemy who might poke up his head. By 1500, they stood
within 600 yards of the fort, in full view of the Confederates. On
the far right, Federal soldiers deployed to their final positions,
led by sharpshooters who advanced to within 200 yards of the
fort. Arrayed in a column of four brigades, each deployed in line
to lessen casualties. At 1530, Terry signaled Porter to shift his
bombardment, and, five minutes later, Porter’s ships sounded their
whistles to start the attack.
Already under sporadic cannon and rifle fire, the naval
brigade charged in an elongated mass of shouting sailors and
marines, with the officers quickly losing control. When the naval
bombardment shifted to the sea face, the unsupported sailors
advanced down the open beach into a deadly hail of rifle fire and
canister from Confederates rushing to the parapet. Although
many of Lamb’s guns had been destroyed or dismounted, he
retained enough to punish the brigade. In a series of sprints and
halts to seek shelter, the sailors and marines moved in bounds,
fewer getting up to go forward each time. Confusion reigned
as officers fell and order disintegrated. With no covering naval
gunfire, Confederate defenders stood in the open and fired into
the mass below. It became a slaughter. A few sailors reached the
foot of the Northeast Bastion, only to be cut down from above.
Under withering fire and without direction, the sailors and
marines broke. The naval brigade quickly degenerated into a
disorganized mob fleeing back up the beach. The Confederates
cheered and catcalled the fleeing naval force, unaware the fort
had been breached elsewhere.
As the sailors and marines began their charge, Terry’s lead
brigade advanced from its wooded cover. Once in the open, the
soldiers came under fire from the battery on the land face and
the two field howitzers that covered the access gate. In addition,
a Confederate gun moved forward through a sally port a few

55

hundred yards up the land face and opened an enfilading fire.
Despite heavy casualties, the brigade pressed on. Reaching
the base of the palisade, the attacking soldiers discovered the
Confederate defenders could not fire down on them without
being exposed. The Federal troops regrouped and charged the
enemy parapet, cresting the top more than twenty feet above, and
became enmeshed in hand-to-hand combat. On the right, the
117th New York Infantry charged down the road and across the
half-destroyed bridge, straight into the two guns at the entrance
gate. The guns fired nearly point-blank into the New Yorkers’
faces. Those not killed or wounded closed on the battery, where a
melee occurred. The initial onslaught, meeting heavy resistance
at the gate and on the parapets, stalled. Observing from a vantage
point several hundred yards away, Terry ordered the next brigade
to press forward. Sheer numbers began to tell. The Confederates
at the gate and the overlooking battery finally gave way. At just
about the moment the naval brigade broke, Terry’s troops secured
a foothold at the other end of the land face. Inadvertently, the
sailors and marines had distracted the enemy just long enough
to ensure Army success.
Wheeling to their left, the Federal troops assaulted the
next battery on the land face, while others advanced in parallel
on the flat ground inside the fort. Lamb, previously focused
on the naval brigade’s charge, suddenly observed the breach
Land face of Fort Fisher looking toward the sea
(Library of Congress)

56

from his vantage point on the Northeast Bastion and shifted
what troops he had to reinforce those already in the fight. The
parapet restricted the battle to a continuous series of hand-tohand fights along a narrow frontage, enabling outnumbered
Confederates to match the Federals at the point of contact.
Confusion reigned in the bloody close-quarters fighting.
Attacking regiments, many of their officers killed or wounded,
lost cohesion even as the soldiers pressed on. Repositioned
to sweep the plain inside the fort, canister fire from cannons
on the sea face prevented any Federal advance on the open
ground. Momentarily stalemated, the assault soon regained
its momentum. Porter’s ships resumed firing on the land face,
aided by signals and careful observation of regimental colors.
The Confederates, outnumbered and assailed by Federal troops
and blasted by accurate naval fire, began to lose heart. Yet as
darkness fell and exhaustion on both sides set in, the battle
abated with the defenders still in control of half the land face.
Terry refused to let up. He ordered his final brigade
to move into the fort and to attack as soon as it could be in
position. At 2100, the brigade resumed the assault led by the 3d
New Hampshire Infantry, accompanied by many of the troops
who had fought all day. The Confederates gave way, too weak
and demoralized to resist any longer. Clearing the land face and
turning south along the interior base of the sea face, the attack
killed, captured, or pushed back the remaining defenders.
Some fled to Battery Buchanan to the south, seeking evacuation by boat. The 27th U.S. Colored Troops, redeployed from
the northern defensive line, now joined the advance. As they
closed on Battery Buchanan, the last defenders surrendered. In
a tragic postscript, early on 16 January, the fort’s main magazine
exploded in a roar, probably after entry by torch-wielding
soldiers, killing or burying as many as 200 men, both Federal
troops and Confederate prisoners. Fort Fisher had fallen.
With the seizure of Fort Fisher, the port of Wilmington was
closed. Yet Grant wanted more than to stop blockade runners;
he needed the port and city as a base for Sherman’s army as it
advanced though the Carolinas. Between Hoke’s division and
the various garrisons of the Cape Fear defenses, more than
7,000 Confederate troops still stood in the way. Terry lacked
the strength for the task, his original force of less than 10,000
depleted by the casualties suffered at Fort Fisher. In a testi-

57

mony to how far the United States Army had come since 1861,
Grant ordered the XXIII Corps, veterans of Sherman’s Atlanta
Campaign and most recently the Battle of Franklin, Tennessee,
to travel east from Nashville by train and board transports for
movement to North Carolina. He appointed its commander,
Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, to take personal command of
operations. Within three weeks, the lead division from the
corps arrived at Fort Fisher. On 11 February, Terry, now under
Schofield’s direction, advanced up the east side of the Cape Fear
only to be stopped by Hoke’s division, still dug in to the north.
Schofield ferried the division of the XXIII Corps to the west
side of the river. On 18 February, supported by Navy gunboats
moving in parallel, the division enveloped the Confederate
stronghold at Fort Anderson, fifteen miles downriver from
Wilmington, forcing the defenders to retreat. With the Federals
approaching Wilmington from the west and on the river, Bragg
ordered Hoke to withdraw to the city’s inner defenses. He made
one last stand on 20 February to allow Confederate stores to be
evacuated or destroyed. The Confederate forces departed two
days later, retreating northward toward Goldsboro. The 3d New
Hampshire Infantry led the procession into the city, closely
followed by a contingent of U.S. Colored Troops.
The capture of Wilmington all but ended Union operations along the Atlantic coast. Charleston surrendered on
18 February as General Sherman’s army stormed through
South Carolina. Schofield moved inland in pursuit of Bragg’s
rebels, directing newly arriving units of the XXIII Corps to
sail to New Berne, link with Federal forces there, and drive
toward Kinston and Goldsboro from the east. At the Battle
of Wyse Fork near Kinston on 7–10 March, they clashed with
a Confederate force under Bragg composed of local troops
and Hoke’s division. Although initially successful, Bragg was
outnumbered and facing entrapment by Schofield closing from
the south. He retreated to join General Joseph E. Johnston’s
army withdrawing slowly before Sherman. Bloody rearguard
battles at Averasboro and Bentonville in March did little to slow
Sherman, who continued to pursue the Confederates toward
Raleigh and Durham. On 26 April 1865, Johnston formally
surrendered to Sherman. With General Lee’s Army of Northern
Virginia having already surrendered on 9 April, the American
Civil War was finally drawing to a close.

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Analysis
Nearly every expedition or battle along the Atlantic coast
required Army-Navy cooperation to be successful. Port Royal,
Hatteras, Roanoke, New Berne, Morris Island, and Wilmington
and countless small forays would have been impossible without
it. Along the coast and in the North Carolina inland waters,
mobility and firepower depended on naval ships, ranging from
large warships to small gunboats. General Lee noted in early
1862 that Federal troops moving up the rivers and inlets of
South Carolina and Georgia rarely strayed out of range of naval
guns. Garrisons posted on the sea islands of South Carolina or
in towns bordering the inland sounds relied on naval forces for
their supply and often defense. Thus when naval superiority was
lost, as when the ironclad Albemarle sallied forth, Union troops
fell back and abandoned Plymouth. Once the ironclad was sunk
several weeks later, it was the Confederates who quickly withdrew
in the face of advancing Federal gunboats. Neither the Navy nor
the Army could have succeeded without the other.
Yet, despite their interdependence, cooperation between the
two services varied widely, often depending on the personalities
involved. Friction between Gillmore and Dahlgren at Charleston
and Butler and Porter at Fort Fisher poisoned chances for
success. In contrast, the close relationship between Burnside and
Goldsborough at Roanoke Island and New Berne proved key to
the quick victories.
If personalities played a role, so too did competing strategic goals. The Navy’s primary focus lay with the blockade;
it did not understand the Army’s reticence to support it. The
Army viewed the coastal war largely as a sideshow that threatened to drain badly needed soldiers from the main theaters of
conflict. The U.S. government never overcame this divergence
of priorities.
Bickering aside, over the course of four years of war,
Federal military operations along the Atlantic coast played a
key role in slowly strangling the Confederacy. Between 1862
and 1865, Southern cotton exports fell to just 5 percent of
prewar levels. The number of vessels entering Confederate
ports steadily decreased as the war went on. The broad strategy
first envisioned by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott and detailed by the
Commission of Conference ultimately proved highly effective.

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Bit by bit the North closed off rebel commerce while keeping
Southern coastal communities in a state of alarm that tied
down the Confederacy’s own hard-pressed military manpower.
Thus, despite their relatively few numbers and often forgotten
efforts, the soldiers who served along the Atlantic coast played
a crucial part in the outcome of the Civil War.

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The Author

R. Scott Moore is the director of the Field Programs and
Historical Services Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military
History. He previously served in the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and as a
senior defense analyst at Hicks and Associates. A Marine Corps
infantry officer from 1976 to 2001, he participated in combat,
expeditionary, and humanitarian operations in Panama, the
Balkans, Kuwait, the Far East, and Africa and commanded a
battalion landing team during noncombatant evacuation operations in Albania in 1997. Moore graduated from the U.S. Naval
Academy in 1976, earned a master’s degree in history from Duke
University, a master’s degree in international relations from Salve
Regina University, and a Ph.D. in conflict analysis and resolution
from George Mason University. He is a graduate of the Marine
Corps Command and Staff College.

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Further Readings

Browning, Robert M., Jr. From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War.
Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1993.
———. Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic
Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s, 2002.
Dobak, William A. Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored
Troops, 1862–1867. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of
Military History, 2011.
Fonvielle, Chris E., Jr. The Wilmington Campaign: Last Rays of
Departing Hope. Campbell, Calif.: Savas Publishing, 1997.
Nulty, William H. Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee.
Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1990.
Trotter, William R. Ironclads and Columbiads: The Civil War in
North Carolina, The Coast. Winston-Salem, N.C.: John F. Blair,
Publisher, 1989.
For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please
read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War
series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History
(www.history.army.mil).

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