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TIJAM vs.

SIBONGHANOY
FACTS:Petitioner filed for recovery of a sum of money from respondent Sibongahanoy.
Defendantsfiled a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Judgment was in
favor of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants
moved for writ of execution against suretywhich was granted. Surety moved to quash the
writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising theissue on lack of jurisdiction. CA
affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss onthe ground of lack
of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 amonth
before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferiorcourts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA
set aside its earlierdecision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction
over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE :Whether or not surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court forthe first time upon appeal.
HELD :The Court believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea
afteralmost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question
of lack
of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a questio
n in differentways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or
estoppel by deed or by record, andof estoppel by laches. Furthermore, it has also been
held that after voluntarily submitting a cause andencountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction orpower of the court
-"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then acceptingthe
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. : Other
merits onthe appeal.The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion
to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary
hearing. In the case at bar, the surety hadbeen notified of the plaintiffs' motion for
execution and of the date when the same would be submittedfor consideration. In fact,
the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and itwas upon his
request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an
answer.Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The
surety cannot now,therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court The
orders appealed from are affirmed.