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H.25. City of Iligan v.

Director of Lands
H.26. Gascon v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the Agreement to Arbitrate entered into by
and between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T.
Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez,
Jr., dated 6 January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for the return of radio and television
stations (TV Station Channel 4), and to enjoin the Arbitration Committee created under the
aforesaid agreement from adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN.
Whether the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the
Agreement to Arbitrate with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation
Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known
as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the Agreement to Arbitrate
was signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the
legislative and executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the President was
(and even now) assisted by a Cabinet composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were
appointed by and accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as
heads of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into
the Agreement to Arbitrate with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and
in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and
binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto.
H.27 Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
Petitioners questopn the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon.
Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the
management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Departments regulatory and

supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the
management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the Board of
Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the
Management Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of
the general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the
removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general
membership of the cooperative and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the
Department of Agriculture auditors shows that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating
that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and
the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that the Order was issued
by the Department in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of
P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.
whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is illegal
Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175)
provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the
members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall
have an opportunity to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPMs bylaws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. Any elected director or committee
member may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good
standing present at the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having
been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual
general assembly and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and
officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the
express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners
cannot be deprived of that right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture
arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to

remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No.
175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not
give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of
duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its
equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they
are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with dayto-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of
management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with
policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of
violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon
budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of
the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the
manner by which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known
better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general
membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in
exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the
proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretarys power under paragraph (d),
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of
any cooperative includes the milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the election
of new officers. Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated.
Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as postulated, there is the requirement of a
hearing. None was conducted.
H.28. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period

only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to
declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP
the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under
Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of
which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists
no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not
destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

H.29. Olaguer v. Military Commission No.34

G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer, Othoniel V.
Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos
Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C.
Amado were arrested by the military authorities. They were all initially detained at Camp Crame
in Quezon City. They were subsequently transferred to the detention center at Camp Bagong
Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who remained in detention at Camp Crame.
Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily surrendered to the authorities sometime in June, 1980 and
was, thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All of the petitioners are civilians.
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for subversion upon the
recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of the respondent
Minister of National Defense. The case was designated as Criminal Case No. MC-34-1.
On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines created the respondent Military Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed
against the petitioners. On July 30, 1980, an amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7)
offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy
to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members
Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs.
Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder
of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver;
and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. Sometime
thereafter, trial ensued.
In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19, 1980, the petitioners went
to the Supreme Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.They
sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of
their case. They likewise sought their release from detention by way of a writ ofhabeas
corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try
civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. They also
maintain that the proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross
violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.
whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts
are open and functioning
No. Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged
offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused
stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.

The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter
as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military
commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system.
Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as are duly established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts,
which have exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty
or property of a citizen.
Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government and
even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and
are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President
as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives. Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of
interpreting the laws as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is
primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive
Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain
open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of
martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it
otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian
As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals cannot
try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or not
martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no moment.
The imprimatur for this observation is found in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to
A state of martial law, does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
H.30. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders
have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the
AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of
the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place
and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003,
both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the
Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article
VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP,
and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the
report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit
a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend
that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there
was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.
1. Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
2. Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court
may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The
issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the

President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless
arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not
as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless
arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas
and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,
that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
H.31. Gudani et al. v. Lt. Gen. Senga et al.
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining
officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the
AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which
seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has

adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not
so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has
the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of
prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional
hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege,
and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the
ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn
on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is illadvised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
H.32. David et al. v. Arroyo et al.
G.R. No. 171396

03 May 2006

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in
issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion.
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National
Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also
issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and
prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the
following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right
are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President;

Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus
representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the
said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing
the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in
Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash
disks containing information that Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the
PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel
Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo
administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements
were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo
groups within the police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for
the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent
disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories
and various documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985
warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano,
et. al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have
been violated, thus the case at hand.
1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners
contention that the said proclamation has none of it;
3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly
violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right
against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to
peaceably assemble.

The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question that the issues being raised
affect the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of
expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided
provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its
issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise
of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court
cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was
something that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O.
No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.
Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are
normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall
only be done if the offense is committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based
on personal knowledge both of which are not present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being
done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right
of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a
blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State
has a right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and
hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of
government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare
such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
H.33. Salviar M. Kulay an et al. v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan
H.34. Torres v. Gonzales
152 SCRA 272 Political Law Constitutional Law Pardon Not Subject to Judicial
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was
charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali
Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive

Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa
charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before
Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
H.35. Monsanto v. Factoran
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of

P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum
of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court which subsequently
affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon
which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioners letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of
the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers
from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also
directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan
had required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation,
be satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing
that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in
the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982
whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment;
whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code
Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense,
it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of
guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not

forgetfulness. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the
offenders innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal
act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him
from nothing more. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction
for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the persons
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to
that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was
forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.
Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
H.36. People v. Salle Jr.
G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995
The accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson and were each sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Ricky Mengote was granted a conditional pardon.
whether or not a pardon granted to an accused is enforceable during the pendency of
his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress. (emphasis supplied)
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be
exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely
different where the requirement is final conviction, as was mandated in the original provision
of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or conviction by final judgment, as presently
prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be
extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected,
(b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial
court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore
attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.
H.37. Garcia v. COA
G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was summarily dismissed from
the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of several
telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc,
Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision.
Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal case for
qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting
petitioner of the offense charged.

Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his

acquittal in the criminal case. In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980, petitioners request to be
reinstated was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the
President of the Philippines for executive clemency.
On 26 August 1981, acting on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of
Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission, Deputy Presidential
Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of the President, per Resolution No. O.P.
1800, granted executive clemency to petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries
effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by the COA in
its 5th Indorsement dated 12 October 1982 on the ground that the executive clemency granted
to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in
the service.
Petitioner again filed a claim to recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April 1975, the
date of his dismissal, to 12 March 1984, when he was reinstated. In Decision No. 362 embodied
in its 3rd Indorsement dated 23 July 1985, respondent COA denied the claim stating that the
executive clemency was silent on the payment of back wages and that he had not rendered
service during the period of his claim.
whether or not petitioner who has been granted executive clemency is entitled to
reinstatement and back salaries
In Monsanto v. Factoran, the Supreme Court firmly established the general rule that
while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does
not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt
and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence, it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender
regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the
conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement
because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.
But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms
this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of
the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the
offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby

restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of
In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of
the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The
acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary reason behind the
grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his
reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the
adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered
his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement,
which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no
longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back
wages. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were
thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. There is no
doubt that petitioners case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any
criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the direct
consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which
the President, as its head, has the power of control. The Presidents control has been defined to
mean the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to the judgment of the former for the latter. In
pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power of
control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The
clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and relieved him from administrative liability. The
separation of the petitioner from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back
H.38. Llamas v. Orbos
G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991

Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac

and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the
governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent
Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days.
Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this
petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of
the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor.
Sometime in 1989, petiotioner, together with Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon,
Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a verified complaint dated June 7, 1989 against
respondent governor before the then Department of Local Government (DLG, for short),
charging him with alleged violation of Section 203(2) (f) 203(2) (p), and 208(w), of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and other
appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Prior to that, petitioner
filed with the Office of the Omdusman a verified complainant dated November 10, 1988 against
respondent governor for the latters alleged violation of Section 3-G of Republic Act. (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The complaint before the DLG was subsequently tried, where both petitioner and
respondent govemor presented their respective evidence. The Secretary of the then
Department of Local Government rendered a decision finding Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III
guilty of having violated Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, which act amounts to serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of
Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to the effect that the
decision of the Office of the President in administrative suspension of local officials shall be
immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, petitioner, on March 1,
1991, took his oath of office as acting governor. Under the administrative suspension order,
petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On the same date (March 1, 1991),
respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the Executive Secretarys Resolution, to
which petitioner filed an opposition. From the allegations of the petitioner in his petition,
respondent govemor accepted his suspension and turned over his office to petitioner.
Petitioners main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro vided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)

whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive
clemency in administrative cases
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may
be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII,
Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioners proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses. (When we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the government.)
The Presidents executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage,
except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, no pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by
the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC (Article IX, C, Section 5,
Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those
adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.
The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city
officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local Government
(Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this
authority, however, is the supervision and control power of the President to reduce, if
circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or removal order,
even in the sense of granting executive clemency. Control, within the meaning of the
Constitution, is the power to substitute ones own judgment for that of a subordinate. Under the
doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of
the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or
reprobated by her. Replying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General that in the
present case, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all
executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially
where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the
power of the President not only to grant executive clemency but also to reverse or modify a
ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the
facts alleged would support the same.
H.39. Eduardo Kapunan v. Court of Appeals
H.40. Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading
G.R. No. L-14279 October 31, 1961

Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion
and garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila from August 25 to September 7, 1954. Some
shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much as none of the shipments
had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the
goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations
of section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circulars
of the Central Bank. In due course, the Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on
September 4, 1956, declaring said goods forfeited to the Government and the goods having
been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds, filed by the same, as
principal, and the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, in compliance with orders of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942 and 23852 thereof directing that
the amounts of said bonds be paid, by said principal and surety, jointly and severally, to the
Bureau of Customs, within thirty (30) days from notice.
On appeal taken by the consignee, said decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of
Customs on December 27, 1956. Subsequently, the consignee sought a review of the decision
of said two (2) officers by the Court of Tax Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs and ordered that the aforementioned bonds be cancelled and
The latter is based upon the following premises, namely: that the Central Bank has no
authority to regulate transactions not involving foreign exchange; that the shipments in question
are in the nature of no-dollar imports; that, as such, the aforementioned shipments do not
involve foreign exchange; that, insofar as a Central Bank license and a certificate authorizing
the importation or release of the goods under consideration are required by Central Bank
Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, the latter are null and void; and that the seizure and forfeiture of the
goods imported from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328, not only
because the same seeks to implement an executive agreement extending the effectivity of
our Trades and Financial Agreements4 with Japan which (executive agreement), it believed,
is of dubious validity, but, also, because there is no governmental agency authorized to issue
the import license required by the aforementioned executive order.
whether or not the executive agreement sought to be implemented by E.O. No. 328 is
invalid for lack of concurrence in the making thereof
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two
thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without
the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and
those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of
treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-

established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days
of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
H.41. Lourdes Rubrico et al. v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et al.
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging
to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field
Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added,
her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior
Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners
prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the
aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President
may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition
and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his comembers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that
the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it
in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the
enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

I.1. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. PARC et al.


Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R.
No. 171101, July 5, 2011
In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold
Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, to the
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco
Sr. Group. The Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a dollar loan from
a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso
price component of the sale, with the condition that the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be
subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any,
and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land
Tenure Act. Tadeco however did not comply with this condition.
On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against
Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that
Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, besides which sugar lands of which the hacienda
consisted are not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations(PD 27-rice and corn). The
Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.
On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the
Office of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et
al. The CA dismissed the case, subject to the PARCs approval of Tadecos proposed stock
distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its farmworkers. [Under EO 229 (Sec10) and later RA
6657(Sec31), Tadeco had the option of availing stock distribution as an alternative modality to
actual land transfer to the farmworkers.] On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off
corporation, herein petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers.
For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and
other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.
On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of
Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock
Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the SDOA was formally entered into by
Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico.
The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventually approved by
the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which
5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.
As may be gleaned from the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are: (a) productionsharing equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the production of the agricultural
land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or incentive bonus; and (b) distribution of free
homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to family-beneficiaries. The production-

sharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable "irrespective of whether [HLI] makes money or not,"
implying that the benefits do not partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily
understood under corporation law. (5,117 out of 5315 = shares; 132 = land distribution)
Prior to approval, DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago proposed that the SDP be revised,
along the following lines:
1. That over the implementation period of the [SDP], [Tadeco]/HLI shall ensure that there will
be no dilution in the shares of stocks of individual [FWBs];
2. That a safeguard shall be provided by [Tadeco]/HLI against the dilution of the percentage
shareholdings of the [FWBs], i.e., that the 33% shareholdings of the [FWBs] will be
maintained at any given time
November 21, 1989 - the PARC, under then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, issued Resolution No.
89-12-2, approving the SDP of Tadeco/HLI.
From 1989 to 2005, HLI claimed to have extended the following benefits to the FWBs:
(a) 3 billion pesos (P3,000,000,000) worth of salaries, wages and fringe benefits
(b) 59 million shares of stock distributed for free to the FWBs;
(c) 150 million pesos (P150,000,000) representing 3% of the gross produce;
(d) 37.5 million pesos (P37,500,000) representing 3% from the sale of 500 hectares of
converted agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita;
(e) 240-square meter homelots distributed for free;
(f) 2.4 million pesos (P2,400,000) representing 3% from the sale of 80 hectares at 80 million
pesos (P80,000,000) for the SCTEX;
(g) Social service benefits, such as but not limited to free hospitalization/medical/maternity
services, old age/death benefits and no interest bearing salary/educational loans and rice
sugar accounts.
Two separate groups subsequently contested this claim of HLI. (the petitions/protets)
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from
agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application
on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the
FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other
On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of
Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter.
Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial
Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial complex. From this area
was carved out 2 parcels(180 has and 4 has), for which 2 separate titles were issued in the
name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) in payment of LIPCOs PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to
RCBC(dacion en pago). LIPCOs titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC.
The other 200 has was transferred to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate
transactions in 1997 and 1998, both uniformly involving 100 hectares for PhP 250 million each.
Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita
and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX)
complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.
Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of
2003. The first was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a
renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation. The second petition, praying for

the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda,
was filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR
then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After
investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied with its obligations under
RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP, AND RECOMMENDED. On December 22,
2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO
plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands be forthwith placed under the
compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP.
From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding, HLI also
filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the DARs hasty placing
of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before PARC could rule or even read the motion for
reconsideration. PARC would eventually deny HLIs motion for reconsideration via Resolution
No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.
(1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLIs SDP?
(2) [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)] Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows
stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
(3) Is the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid? [Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the
subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory acquisition and distribution
(4) Should those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO
acquired by purchase be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution? [Did the
PARC gravely abuse its discretion when it included LIPCOs and RCBCs respective properties
that once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via
the assailed Notice of Coverage?]
HLI: PARC has no authority to revoke the SDP; it has the power to disapprove, but not to recall
its previous approval of the SDP. It is the court which has jurisdiction and authority to order the
revocation or rescission of the PARC-approved SDP
(1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLIs SDP under the doctrine of
necessary implication.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for
stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLIs
posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be,
as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest
the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however,
is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express
power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners
necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan. To deny PARC such
revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same
agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would
be without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.

HLI: the parties to the SDOA should now look to the Corporation Code, instead of to RA 6657, in
determining their rights, obligations and remedies. The Code should be the applicable law on
the disposition of the agricultural land of HLI.
SC: NO! the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA embodying the SDP
are primarily governed by RA 6657. It should abundantly be made clear that HLI was precisely
created in order to comply with RA 6657, which the OSG aptly described as the "mother law" of
the SDOA and the SDP. It is, thus, paradoxical for HLI to shield itself from the coverage of
CARP by invoking exclusive applicability of the Corporation Code under the guise of being a
corporate entity.
(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refused to
pass upon the constitutional question because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity
and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has
been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition
under RA 9700.]
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small
minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657 as early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita
or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, and why its members received benefits from the
SDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval
of the SDP that said plan and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to
stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA
petition did NOT question the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the
purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public
respondents, as represented by the Solicitor General, did not question the constitutionality of
the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to AMBALA,
raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental
Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21,
1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in
the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with
nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were
derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed
to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and
activities which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis
mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional
issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. If some other grounds exist by
which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to
which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged noncompliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And
before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched
and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of
these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said

section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the
SDP that is flawed.
It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has
all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said Sec.
31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: [T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of
acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition. Thus,
for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no
longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is
unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
(3) YES, the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid. [NO, the PARC did NOT gravely abuse its
discretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs
compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme.]
The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines of HLIs
stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of each original
FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days and the hiring of
additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to
what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.
In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock
distribution, We find that it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:
3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall
arrange with the FIRST PARTY [TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY
[FWBs] on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30)
of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently
owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85
shares shall have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.
[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the time of
the approval of the SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each
original FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs got less than the
guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and distribution of the
HLI shares were based on man days or number of days worked by the FWB in a years
time. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal year
before he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB,
unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The number of HLI shares distributed varies
depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI
hired farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in the
Compliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of
farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include the
original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the
33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation
of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days and
the hiring of additional farmworkers.
Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year
timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the approved stock distribution plan

within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan by
PARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in the names of
the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be submitted
to the SEC within sixty (60) days from implementation.
To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the threemonth threshold. Remove this timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade
compliance with agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd limits the implementation of the
stock distribution scheme. the reason underpinning the 30-year accommodation does not apply
to corporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified beneficiaries, as the
shares may be issued in a much shorter period of time.
Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld
[because of violations of] DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC
and the DAR have the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a
product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be duly
complied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989 approving the HLIs SDP is nullified and
(4) YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and
LIPCO acquired by purchase should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed
PARC resolution.
[T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good faith,
namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and
fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the
claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC are purchasers in good faith for value
entitled to the benefits arising from such status.
First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial land,
there was no notice of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any
other person has a right to or interest in such property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said
parcels of land, only the following annotations appeared on the TCT in the name of Centennary:
the Secretarys Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretarys Certificate in favor of
Shintaro Murai, and the conversion of the property from agricultural to industrial and residential
The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of Hacienda Luisita, only
the following general annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed of Restrictions,
limiting its use solely as an industrial estate; the Secretarys Certificate in favor of Koji Komai
and Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of RCBC to guarantee the payment of
PhP 300 million.
To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to
CARP coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was
annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honest
belief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and for
which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2

and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly
allows conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land
acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized
and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes. Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and
gave them the opportunity to comment or oppose the proposed conversion. DAR, after going
through the necessary processes, granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita
pursuant to its primary jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and its original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order became final and executory after
none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual setting, RCBC and LIPCO
purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous
registered owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously subject of
CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.
And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value.
Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP750
million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On the other hand, in a Deed of
Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of Hacienda Luisita
in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP431,695,732.10.
In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation and conversion order, both RCBC
and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita
are industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and
consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed LIPCOs and RCBCs
property which once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory
acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of Coverage.
[The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to determine what should be done in the
aftermath of its disposition of the above-enumerated issues:
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution
Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain operative facts
that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the operative fact doctrine realizes that, in
declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and
effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should
realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and
obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act is,
prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are upheld,
the revocation must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right
of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the
FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the MOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by
PARC per its Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs
were said to have received from HLI salaries and cash benefits, hospital and medical benefits,
240-square meter homelots, 3% of the gross produce from agricultural lands, and 3% of the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to
SCTEX. HLI shares totaling 118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. On August 6,
20l0, HLI and private respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave the
FWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or remain as HLI stockholders, and as
a matter of fact, most FWBs indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts

and circumstances tend to indicate that some, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to
continue as HLI shareholders. A matter best left to their own discretion.]
The dissents in the July 5, 2011 decision
The dissents of the minority justices were on the other fine points of the decision.
Chief Justice Corona dissented insofar as the majority refused to declare Sec. 31 of RA 6657
unconstitutional. The provision grants to corporate landowners the option to give qualified FWBs
the right to own capital stock of the corporation in lieu of actual land distribution. The Chief
Justice was of the view that by allowing the distribution of capital stock, and not land, as
compliance with agrarian reform, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 contravenes Sec. 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which, he argued, requires that the law implementing the agrarian reform program
should employ [actual] land redistribution mechanism. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, he noted, the
corporate landowner remains to be the owner of the agricultural land. Qualified beneficiaries are
given ownership only of shares of stock, not [of] the lands they till. He concluded that since an
unconstitutional provision cannot be the basis of a constitutional act, the SDP of petitioner HLI
based on Section 31 of RA 6657 is also unconstitutional.
Justice Mendoza fully concurred with Chief Justice Coronas position that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is
unconstitutional. He however agreed with the majority that the FWBs be given the option to
remain as shareholders of HLI. He also joined Justice Brions proposal that that the reckoning
date for purposes of just compensation should be May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed
by Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs. Finally, he averred that considering that more than 10 years
have elapsed from May 11, 1989, the qualified FWBs, who can validly dispose of their due
shares, may do so, in favor of LBP or other qualified beneficiaries. The 10-year period need not
be counted from the issuance of the Emancipation Title (EP) or Certificate of Land Ownership
Award CLOA) because, under the SDOA, shares, not land, were to be awarded and distributed.
Justice Brions dissent centered on the consequences of the revocation of HLIs SDP/SDOA. He
argued that that the operative fact doctrine only applies in considering the effects of
a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute or a rule issued by the Executive Department that
is accorded the status of a statute. The SDOA/SDP is neither a statute nor an executive
issuance but a contract between the FWBs and the landowners; hence, the operative fact
doctrine is not applicable. A contract stands on a different plane than a statute or an executive
issuance. When a contract is contrary to law, it is deemed void ab initio. It produces no legal
effects whatsoever. Thus, Justice Brion questioned the option given by the majority to the FWBs
to remain as stockholders in an almost-bankrupt corporation like HLI. He argued that the nullity
of HLIs SDP/SDOA goes into its very existence, and the parties to it must generally revert to
their respective situations prior to its execution. Restitution, he said, is therefore in order. With
the SDP being void, the FWBs should return everything they are proven to have received
pursuant to the terms of the SDOA/SDP. Justice Brion then proposed that all aspects of the
implementation of the mandatory CARP coverage be determined by the DAR by starting with a
clean slate from [May 11,] 1989, the point in time when the compulsory CARP coverage should
start, and proceeding to adjust the relations of the parties with due regard to the events that
intervened [thereafter]. He also held that the time of the taking (when the computation of just
compensation shall be reckoned) shall be May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed by
Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs.
Justice Sereno dissented with respect to how the majority modified the questioned PARC
Resolutions (i.e., no immediate land distribution, give first the original qualified FWBs the option
to either remain as stockholders of HLI or choose actual land distribution) and the applicability of
the operative fact doctrine. She would instead order the DAR to forthwith determine the area of
Hacienda Luisita that must be covered by the compulsory coverage and monitor the land
distribution to the qualified FWBs.
Erroneous interpretation of the Courts decision

The High Tribunal actually voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition of HLI and
to AFFIRM the PARC resolutions. This is contrary to media reports that the Court voted 6-4 to
dismiss the HLI petition. The five (not four) minority justices (Chief Justice Corona, and Justices
Brion, Villarama, Mendoza, and Sereno) only partially dissented from the decision of the
majority of six (Justice Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, and
Perez). Justice Antonio Carpio took no part in the deliberations and in the voting, while Justice
Diosdado Peralta was on official leave. The 14th and 15th seats in the Court were earlier vacated
by the retirements of Justices Eduardo Antonio Nachura (June 13, 2011) and Conchita CarpioMorales (June 19, 2011).
Another misinterpretation came from no less than the Supreme Court administrator and
spokesperson, Atty. Midas Marquez. In a press conference called after the promulgation of the
Courts decision, Marquez initially used the term referendum in explaining the High Courts
ruling. This created confusion among the parties and the interested public since a referendum
implies that the FWBs will have to vote on a common mode by which to pursue their claims over
Hacienda Luisita. The decision was thus met with cries of condemnation by the misinformed
farmers and the various peoples organizations and militant groups supportive of their cause.
Marquez would later correct himself in a subsequent press briefing. But since by then the
parties had already filed their respective motions for reconsideration, he called upon everyone
to just wait for the final resolution of the motion[s], which is forthcoming anyway. The resolution
of the consolidated motions for reconsideration came relatively early on November 22, 2011, or
less than five months from the promulgation of the decision.