FACTS

Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Afterwards, private respondent, together with her husband, filed a complaint
against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between
the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, private respondent filed for a Motion
to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
ISSUE
WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the inferior court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f prejudicial question in Civil Case No. LP-060197.[
RULING
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree with
private respondents argument that a prejudicial question exists when the civil
action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the
pendency of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil
case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the
filing of the civil case.
it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by
amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the
meaning of the provision from that it originally had.In the instant case, the phrase,
previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved
in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is
further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify
the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede
the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be
construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws
on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system.This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[17]In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly
conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be
made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of
law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly
worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal
action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor
or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case.
This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the
principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil
Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised in
his affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an
administrative case is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the
same parties and involving the same piece of land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Respondent
over the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitioner
argue that the administrative case was determinative of private respondents right
toe eject petitioner from the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question
which bars a judicial action until after its termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioners
affirmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying
that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be dismissed and
the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment case
to be one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES
INVOLVING THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES A

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT

CASE.
DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4 SCRA 510
(1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial Question
comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending
and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue
must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can
proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the
criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of
the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
However because of intimate correlation of the two proceedings and the
possibility of the Land Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which
will terminate or suspend Private Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner,
the SC gave the lower court and advise. This advise became the which
became the basis for deciding the case.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to
have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioners right of possession being upheld in the
pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the
court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to
abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties
and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control
the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for

counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the
second action should be stayed. (at page 622)
While the rule is properly applicable for instances involving two [2] court actions,
the existence in the instant case of the same consideration of identity of parties and
issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as
well as the need to resolve the parties right of possession before the ejectment case
may be properly determined, justifies the rules analogous application to the case at
bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous
situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then CFI of Misamis Oriental
ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document
against several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until
the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged document
shall have been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action on
administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court
against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in Abeyance, thus:
As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago
Catane, etc, et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu CFI,
action on the herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally been
decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such decision.(SC
minute resolution April 27, 1962 in Adm Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs.
Santiago Catane, etc. et. al)
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial
question to an administrative case. We see no reason why the reverse may bot be
so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.
The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.
Finally, events occurring during the pendency of the petition attest to the wisdom of
the conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for
petitioner, it was stated that he intervenor Land Authority which later became the
Department of Agrarian REform had promulgated a decision in the administrative
case affirming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell issued in favor of the private
respondent. Wit this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to
proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.