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I.

INTRODUCTION
a. Republic Act No. 6735
b. Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
c. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
d. People vs. Pomar, G.R. No. L-22008. November 3, 1924
e. Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
f. Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997
g. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196. November 9, 1967
h. Sanidad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 90878. January 29, 1990
i. Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991
j. Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448. February 1, 2001
k. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980
l. Lascon vs. Perez, G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001
m. SANLAKAS vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004
n. Joya vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 96541. August 24, 1993
o. Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993
p. Agan vs. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003
q. Umali vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 131124. March 29, 1999
r. In Re: Cunanan, March 18, 1954
s. Province of North Cotabato vs. Govt. of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, GR No. 183591,
October 14, 2008
II. POLICE POWER
a. Agustin vs. Edu [88 SCRA 195]
Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its
implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and
did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to reduce
accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was
mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners at
56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and undue
delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the
petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.
Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?
Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power
of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a citizen to
obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in over
throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive was
fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed when parked for 30 minutes and
placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge
requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of ewds.
Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.
b. Ichong vs. Hernandez [101 Phil 1117]
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities
herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or
the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund
servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the
income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at
all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause
does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a

specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the
statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
c. Lutz vs. Araneta [98 Phil 148]
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act was promulgated in 1940 to
stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the
United States market and the imposition of export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal
Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the Act, alleging that such tax is
unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in
plaintiffs opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action has been
dismissed by the Court of First Instance.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that the tax is levied with
a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe
no constitutional limitation.
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very
enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of similar protection; but the
legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none.
d. Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board [151 SCRA 208]
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue
Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video
tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program.

Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent
(50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the
tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms
including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have
greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a
sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of
sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450
Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government
of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public
purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of
the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the
tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No.
1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund
movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by
the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with
brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's
permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

e. ALSP vs. Sec of DAR [175 SCRA 343]

Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:
a.A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition
are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as
qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131
and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d.
A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners
of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not
a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession
of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the
method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method
employed to achieve it
f. Lozano vs. Martinez [146 SCRA 323]
Facts:

Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case,
wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected
thus appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order
addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the
check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become
widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come
to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or
foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that
confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles
and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be
categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just
as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the
payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to
give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners posture
ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification
is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
g. Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila [41 Phil 103]
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest,
filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance
No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and
Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance
No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates
between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights.
They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In
view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The
police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee)
of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila,
with the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and
their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe
English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and
impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public
laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality.
All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The
obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such
as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order
to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of
person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of
the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied,
with costs against the appellants.

h. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [152 SCRA 730]


Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the petitioners either did
not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as
amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of
Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into
a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a
certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called
National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from
enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of
the NMAT as condition for securing (cea).
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they
prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement
Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as
valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational

requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What
we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional
and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the
current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
i. Govt of QC vs. Ericta [122 SCRA 759]
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL
GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE
VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
j. MMDA vs. Bel-Air [ SCRA ]
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private
road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was
apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter
wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with
police power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in
the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a
development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
k. Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac [207 SCRA 157]

III. EMINENT DOMAIN


a. Republic vs. Tagle (GR No. 129079, 2 Dec. 1998)
Facts: Helena Benitez is a registered owner of 2 parcels of land in Bgy. Salwag, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Sometime
in Sept. 1982, the Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center
(PHRDC), an agency under the Ministry of Human Settlements, negotiated with the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on technicalities of the establishment of ASEAN Human Resources
Development Project in the Philippines. Among the the 5 main programs of the proposed project was the
Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC), an agency now under the Department of Trade and
Industry.
Several transaction and agreements were entered into between Benitez (together with Philippine Womens
University) and the PHRDC with regards to the lease and consequently, the possible sale of the land which did
not push through because of Benitezs desistance. Thereafter, Benitez and PWU demanded from PHRDC the
payment of rentals and to vacate the premises. Benitez later filed an unlawful detainer case against PHRDC. In
turn, the state through DTI (with GMA as undersecretary), to which CMDF is attached instituted a complaint
for Eminent Domain, pursuant to EO 1935. In compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 42, DTI deposited with PNB in favor of Benitez P708,490 an amount

equivalent to the provisional value of the land sought to be expropriated. Subsequently, DTI filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession which had been granted but subsequently quashed by MTC Judge Tagle.
Issue: Whether Judge Tagle may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government
agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
Held: No. Judge Tagle is required to issue a writ of possession in favor DTI pursuant to Sec. 7 of EO 1035:
SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of the land as provided in the
preceding section, the government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to
immediately institute expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General, as the case may be.
The just compensation to be paid for the property acquired through expropriation shall be in accordance with
the provisions of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give priority to the adjudication of cases on expropriation and shall
immediately issue the necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of just
compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533; Provided, That the period within which said writ of possession
shall be issued shall in no case extend beyond five (5) days from the date such deposit was made.
Under this statutory provision, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial
court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.
The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although
eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all,
of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership. The writ of possession is both
necessary and practical, because mere physical possession that is gained by entering the property is not
equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the
expropriated property.
Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the States power of eminent domain. DTI has
deposited not just the 10 percent required under EO 1035, but the whole amount of the just compensation that
private respondent is entitled to. Thus, there is no any legal impediment for the issuance of a writ of possession
in favor of DTI. Precisely, the purpose of instituting expropriation proceedings is to prevent petitioner from
being ejected from the subject property; otherwise, the above-mentioned absurd and circuitous rulings would
arise.
b. City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery (40 Phil. 349)
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such
expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the
land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres
and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to
expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the
value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable
purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere
appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the
method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity
attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying such authority.
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain
is, without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity
is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question
that the courts have the right to inquire into.

c. Republic vs. PLDT (26 SCRA 320)


FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT tenable government offices to call private
parties. Their subscription agreement prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber
for his private use.
The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and
rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. On 7 April 1958, the defendant
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said
bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with
the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the
use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the
business of the PLDT. Soon after, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. Republic
commenced suit against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying in its complaint for
judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the
facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the
court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to
restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
ISSUE: Whether the courts may compel PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic.
HELD: We agree with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate
such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a
contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337,
Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not
compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system
and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears
why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an

easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between
both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public
use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the
State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is
paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone
systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

d. People vs. Fajardo (104 Phil 443 (1958))


People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958]
En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 9 concur
Facts:
On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of themunicipality of Baao, Camarines
Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7, series of 1950,providing that any person or persons who will
construct or repair a building should, beforeconstructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor, that a fee of notless than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for
each repair permitissued, and that any violation of the provisions of the ordinance shall make the violator liable
topay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days normore than 24
days or both, at the discretion of the court; and that if said building destroys theview of the Public Plaza or
occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. 4 years
later, after the term of Fajardo as mayor had expired,he and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, filed a written
request with the incumbent municipalmayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of landregistered in Fajardos name, located along the national highway and separated from
the publicplaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others thatthe
proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. On 18 January 1954,Fajardo and
Babilonia reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the request wasturned down by the mayor.
Whereupon, Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because
they needed a place of residence very badly, their formerhouse having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto
they had been living on leased property.On 26 February 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia were charged before and
convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo and
Babiloniaappealed to the Court of First Instance (CDI), which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced both to
pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view
of the public plaza of Baao. From this decision, Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter forwarded the records to the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the
ordinance in question.
Issue:
Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on the ground that the proposed building
would destroy the view of the public plaza is an undue deprivation of the use of the property in question, and
thus a taking without due compensation.
Held:
The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo and Babilonia was predicated on the
ground that the proposed building would destroy the view of the public plazaby preventing its being seen
from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates
to permanently deprive the latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of
police power, and amounts to a taking of the property without just compensation. But while property may be
regulated in the interest of the general welfare such as to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as

conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on Fajardos land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with
the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain
idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve
that result, the municipality must give Fajardo just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

e. City of Baguio vs. NAWASA (106 Phil (1959))


Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation, created under
Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water Works system,
assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of
said water works without just compensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion
the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent domain. The court denied the motion and
ordered the defendants to file an answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to
private property and cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the
exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this
is not just compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.
Held: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate, destroy or
appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all water works belonging to
cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is
placing them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting their efficient
management, but in so doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of
the assets of NAWASA.
The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property held in trust by a
municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a municipal corporation, water works
cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.
f. NPC vs. Guttierez (193 SCRA (1991))
Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its 230 KVMexico-Limay transmission
lines, its lines have to pass the lands belonging torespondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule and spouses
Misericordia Gutierrezand Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the rightof
way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Trial courts ordered that the
defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00
deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for the
purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three
commissioners, comprised of one representative of theplaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the
court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter,
prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paidto the owners of the lots. The lower court
rendered judgement ordered Napocor topay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square meter as the fair
andreasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area andP800.00 as attorney's fees'.
Napocor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by
adjudging the petitioner liablefor the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its

transmissionlines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easementransmits no
rights, except that of the easement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee orfull compensation for the land
traversed by its transmission lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domainresults in the taking or
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, theexpropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not beavailed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property,without loss of
title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way." In this case,the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Consideringthe nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitationsimposed by the NPC
against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 metersis allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated
isentitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever itis possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the
just and complete equivalentof the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of
theexpropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of takingby the Govt. are the
criteria for determining just compensation.
g. Republic vs. Castelvi (58 SCRA 336)
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement
with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP
refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic
commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more
than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for
public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi

property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a
year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a
determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need
of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New
Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent
domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract.

h. EPZA vs. Dulay (148 SCRA 305)


Facts: A land reserve was provided for the Export Processing Zone which some portion of the land is privately
owned by the respondents. Petitioner offered to purchase the land but both parties did not come to an agreement
in terms of the assessed value of the property. Petitioner files an expropriation case which the court decided in
favor of them and issued a writ of possession for the immediate possession of land subject to just compensation.
Respondents however are not amenable to the amount and thus the court appointed commissioners to determine
the appropriate property value. Petitioner now questions the appointment of commissioners to determine the
value of property while invoking PD No. 1533 that indicates the determination of just compensation is based on
the declared value indicated by the land owner and the assessor whichever is lower and there is no need to
appoint commissioners for the purpose of assessing the property value.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in appointing commissioners to the case at bar
Held: The court ruled that PD No. 1533 only serves as a guiding principle providing some considerations in the
determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. It does not substitute the discretion vested
upon the court to exercise in determining the fair and just compensation in expropriating property. The
appointment of commissioners is one way the court may determine the fair and just compensation in dispute for
judicial evaluation.
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone
Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued
an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out
that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by
the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is
lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the
respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives.
It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation
of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed
compensation.
i. Amigable vs. Cuenca (43 SCRA 360)

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings
or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership
and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its
consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The
only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the
taking.

j. Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC (244 SCRA 272)


PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC 244 SCRA 272 (1995)
FACTS: Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
COMELEC space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The
COMELEC space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to

make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The COMELEC
space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.Petitioner Philippine
Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme
Court to declare COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent COMELEC, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether or not compelling the petitioner to donate COMELEC space amount to taking of private
property for public use
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate COMELEC spaceamounts to taking of private personal property without payment of
the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not
been established by respondent COMELEC, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No.2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power
of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergencyto take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers
k. Reyes vs. NHA (GR No. 147511, 20 January 2003)
Facts: National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland owned by the
petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the expropriation is for the
expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from
Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots with payment of just
compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with the Supreme Court order, so they
filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before the RTC of Quezon City. They also said that NHA did not
relocate squatters from Manila on the expropriated lands which violate the reason for public purpose. The
petitioners prayed that NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that
judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment.
In the answer of NHA, they already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus, several issues are already
raised in the expropriation court.
The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public purpose because the relocation
of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into a contract with a developer for the
construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries. The payment of just
compensation is independent of the obligation of the petitioners to pay capital gains tax. Lastly, the payment of
just compensation is based on the value at the time the property was taken.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.
Held: The decision appealed is modified.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over the private
properties upon payment of just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties for the public
use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project.

The public use is synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public
convenience. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low
cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking.
Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the
developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies and
other private concerns.
The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or
the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner.
l. Municipality of Paraaque vs. VM Realty (292 SCRA 676)
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a
Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint
was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.
577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private
respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private
Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed
pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to
dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its lawmaking body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs
can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the
municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body,
the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government
Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being
the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
m. (175 SCRA 343)
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege
that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on
just compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and
that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without
due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the
decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the
said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police
power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for
noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the
taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.

n. Eslaban vs. Onorio (GR No. 146062, 28 June 2001)


o. Knecht vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 108015, 20 May 1998)
FACTS: Cristina de Knecht and Rene Knecht- owners of a land in which they constructed 8houses: 7 leased
out , 1 occupied by them. 1979 RP initiated a civil case for expropriation of their property for the purpose of
using it to complete the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards
Roxas Boulevard. CFI of Pasay issued a writ of possession but was annulled for an arbitrary choice for EDSAs
extension. 1982 City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for failure of petitioners to pay real estate
taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. Spouses Babieras and Spouses Sangalangs were the highest bidders.
1985 they sold the property to Salem Investment Corporation. The property was part of those expropriated
under B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the
EDSA Extension, passed on 1983. 1990 RP filed Civil Case 7327 for determination of just compensationfor
expropriated properties. Writ of possession was issued by the trialcourt. 7 of the 8 houses built on the property
were demolished. The Knechts refused to leave their house so Salem filed a case against them for unlawful

detainer. Court ordered Knechts ejectment. 1991 the Knechts filed for a Motion to Intervene and to Implead
Additional Parties after the trial court issued an order fixing the compensation of all the lands sought to be
expropriated by the govt. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision after
finding that petitioners had no legal interest over the property. ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to just
compensation. HELD: NO. Since B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation,
reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1. The
complaint.-- The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with
certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personalproperty sought to be condemned,
and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein,
showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately.The defendants in an expropriation case
are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. "Owner" when employed in statutes relating to
eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding,refers, as is the rule in
respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned.
If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to
intervene andlay claim to the compensation. The Knechts insisted that although they were no longer the
registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and
therefore should have been joined as defendants in the expropriation proceedings and entitled to a share in the
just compensation. 4 months prior filing of Civil Case No. 7327, a case for reconveyance was dismissed with
finality which resulted to the Knechts loss of whatever right or colorable title they had to the property. The fact
thatthe Knechts remained in physical possession was based on their claim of ownership, not on any juridical
title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Since the issue of ownership was put to rest in the civil case of
reconveyance, they had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation proceedings were
instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in denying their "Motion for Intervention
and to Implead Additional Parties.
p. Republic vs. Ker (GR No. 136171, 2 July 2002)
Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation of portions of
two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road
component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The Regional trial court rendered decision of a
fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for
site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of
the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Just
compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and
schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is taken into
account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for
sale in the public market.
In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the
taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be
taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first.
On this matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner's claim.

q. Manosca vs. CA (252 SCRA 412)

IV. TAXATION
a. Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works - 10 Phil 331
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then
governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be
used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said
Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved
the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals
and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be
upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said
property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation
of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact
that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance
with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be
expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on
which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
b. Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila - 95 Phil 46
Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing
it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax
on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law
authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on
persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201
of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The
lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what
amounts to double taxation.

Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax
all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which

cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the
National Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double
taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely
recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the
same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed
with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.

c. Osmena vs. Orbos - 220 SCRA 703


FACTS:
October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General
Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil
companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate
adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified
into a "trust liability account,". President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated E. O. 137 expanding the grounds for
reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery incurred as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products.
The petitioner argues inter alia that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated
as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a
specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the
purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further points out that since
"a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the
State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds collected under PD 1956 is an exercise of the power of taxation
RULING:
The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State. While the funds collected may be referred
to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how
much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what is involved here
is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not so much the
power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts
could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is
to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by
the police power of the State.
It would seem that from the above-quoted ruling, the petition for prohibition should fail.
d. Lladoc vs. CIR - 14 SCRA 292
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias,
Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality,m as
intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment
for donees gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof.

Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.


Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes.
The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as
contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the
transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the
use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such
excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
e. Casanova vs. Hord - 8 Phil 125
Facts: The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain mines. The plaintiff is now the
owner of those mines. The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties, contending that they
were valid perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of sec.134 of Act No. 1189 known as
Internal Revenue Act. The plaintiff paid under protest. He brought an action against the defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue to recover the sum of Php. 9, 600 paid by him as taxes. Judgment was rendered in favor of the
defendant, so the plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 164 is void or valid.
Held: The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff. The obligation of
which contract was impaired by the enactment of sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law infringing sec. 5 of the
Act of Congress which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted. Sec. 134 of
the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the
concessions of mine made by the Spanish Government. Judgment reversed.

V. DUE PROCESS
a. Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. Manila [20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967]
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for
the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that
hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in
first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners
also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.

There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.


The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the
ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute."
No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings
and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What
then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to
form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive,
or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.

In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license
fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and
order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order
and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v
Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the full
rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILAFacts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of thedue process
clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive butalso vague, indefinite
and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and theguaranty against selfincrimination.Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in
a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatoryprovisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind fromoperating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the citygovernment."The lower court ruled in favor of
the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Held:
No.
Rationale:
The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners.This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard publicmorals is immune from
such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported byanything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of policepower which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
4
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to
destroy the very purpose of the state if itcould be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, publicmorals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is that
inherent and plenarypower in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and

welfare of society.On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exerciseof the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations
topromote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutionalguaranties however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or propertyof any person is subject to
judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered aseither capricious, whimsical, unjust
or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call
for correction by the courts.The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the
Ordinance inquestion.
***
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevailover authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery.
b. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong [86 SCRA 270; No.L-29646; 10 Nov. 1978]
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private
respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of
such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule
of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who
may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines
to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens
within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
c. Namil vs. COMELEC [414 SCRA 553; G.R. No. 150540; 28 Oct. 2003]
Facts: On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat proclaimed the
petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein private respondents
were proclaimed winners as well. Private respondents claimed that they should be recognized as the winners,
and not the petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law
Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit their reports on
the matter. All of them found the second proclamation valid. Hence, the ted members of the Sangguniang
Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have assumed office. Petitioners
contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were not accorded due notice and hearing, hence
constituting a violation of the due process principle.
Issue: Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the effects thereof
without notice and hearing.
Held: No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of
a proclamation without notice and hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of
regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the same. The petitioners cannot be
removed from office without due process of law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the

COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be
annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Farias vs.
COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC and Gallardo vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially
or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
d. Ichong vs. Hernandez [101 Phil 1155; L-7995; 31 May 1957]
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article
XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police
power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of
the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations
of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet
there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons
of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason.
The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation
must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law

clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment
of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
e. Phil. Phosphate vs. Torres [231 SCRA 335; G.R. No.98050; 17 Mar. 1994]
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as
a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent
the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado
issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI
filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein
agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on
the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and
directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied;
hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter
was under.

Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by
the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing
to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
f. Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [39 Phil 660; G.R. No. 14078; 7 Mar. 1919]
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if
they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of

cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very
low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in
prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made
on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this
case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by
him and approved by the provincial board was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not
the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or
not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law
as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may
make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said,
refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation
to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can
adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor
class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
g. Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct. 1920]
Facts:
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a
complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No.
532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish
duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance
No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates
between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights.
They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In
view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The police
power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with
the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and
their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe
English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and
impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public
laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality.
All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The
obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such
as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order
to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of
person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of
the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied,
with costs against the appellants.
h. Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [47 Phil 385; G.R. No. 20479; 6 Feb. 1925]
Facts:

On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the account books
should not be in any other language exc. English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a penalty of fine of not more
than 10K or imprisonment for not more than 2 years will be imposed

fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the government agents and to prevent fraud in the
returns of merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the income tax

On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of account of Yu Cong Eng where it was found out that it is not
in accordance with Act 2972

A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in
Chinese

Yus defense:

Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants, claiming that they represent the other 12K filed a petition for
prohibition and injunction against the CIR, questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law
Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?
Ruling:

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised in the lower court and that court must be
given an opportunity to pass upon the question before it may be presented to the appellate court for resolution

Power of taxation
strongest of all the powers of government, practically absolute and unlimited

It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the control of the legislature. It is the Legislature
which must questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a tax, which must make all the necessary rules
and regulations which are to be observed in order to produce the desired results, and which must decide upon
the agencies by means of which collections shall be made

The power to tax is not judicial power and that a strong case is required for the judiciary to declare a law
relating to taxation invalid. If, of course, so great an abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and fundamental
rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act unconstitutional

The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the most favored nation

Their constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of
these persons cannot be taken without due process of law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, without regard to their race

Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants of
whatever nationality from making entries in the books of account or forms subject to inspection for taxation
purposes in any other language than either the English or Spanish language or a local dialect

the law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were necessary in order to facilitate
governmental inspection for tax purposes

The Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since
there are other aliens doing business in the Phils. There will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary
spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar
circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to
the extent of confiscation

Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in commerce,
industry, or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account books,
consisting of sales books and other records and returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, thus
valid and constitutional

i. Aniag vs. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. No. 104961; 7 Oct. 1994]
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other
deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or
police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC
also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in
gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house
and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the
checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then
explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms
ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829
directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position.
Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using or
transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is
unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot
when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued
to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a
warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In
the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly
packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could
not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional
injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano,
the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the
public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent
in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be
contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not
informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against
the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
j. Javier vs. COMELEC [144 SCRA 194; G.R. Nos. L-68379-81; 22 Sept. 1986]
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May
1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot
boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the

same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of
the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners
should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only
the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986,
during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being
moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in
his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls
the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to
be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and
reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will
reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
k. Ynot vs. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. No. 74457; 20 Mar. 1987]
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right
to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is
a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate
slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does
not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain
why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged

measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
l. Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz [180 SCRA 218; G.R. No.84818; 18 Dec. 1989]
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals in the
Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and
PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However,
Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction
of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue
operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to
reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds
that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does
not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the
provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196,
placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in
the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative
but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of
public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative
power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the
legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be
non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the
absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of ratefixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since no
hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
m. Eastern Broadcasting vs. Dans [137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 July 1985]
Facts:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had
been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio
station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to
establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action
which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion
seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It
appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition"
arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of
programs geared towards public affairs.
ISSUE: Was the closure, without hearing, violative of the freedom of the press?
RULING:
Yes. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Yet the freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to
the vitality of a representative democracy. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of
media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution
The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in AngTibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its
operations curtailed.
n. Ang Tibay vs. CIR [69 Phil 635; G.R. No. 46496; 27 Feb. 1940]
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National
Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were laid
off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went
to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching

importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay
which were not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court
must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due
process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing wdsshich includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
o. Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 May 1993]
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at
Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at
the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him
on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit
their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a
copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students
for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then
required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear

the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of
the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view
of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day
after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate
the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by
the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition
which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law
School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of
filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause
of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and
hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the
latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not
respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner
University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as
petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
p. Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita (469 SCRA 1)
FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods,
and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned
provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.