You are on page 1of 8

Digest: People v.

Mapa (GR L-22301, 30 August 1967)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas,digests
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in aninformation
dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Codein connection
with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 andas further
amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being asecret agent of
Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower courtrendered a
decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year
and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated tothe
Supreme Court.
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor isexempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached partsof
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be usedin
the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms arein
possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued toofficers,
soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincialtreasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners
and jails.It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and
interpretationcome only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate withoutthem. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a
secret agent.Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no
longer speakswith authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note
that in Peoplev. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that
the appointmentof the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns anddetection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent evento a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in
the present case,therefore, the conviction must stand.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
People vs. Jabinal
February 27, 1974
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a
revolverwithout the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration
because,a l t h o u g h h e h a d n o l i c e n s e o r p e r m i t , h e h a d a p p o i n t m e n t s
a s S e c r e t A g e n t f r o m t h e P r o v i n c i a l G o v e r n o r o f B a t a n g a s a n d a s C o n fi d e
n t i a l A g e n t f r o m t h e P C P r o v i n c i a l Commander, and the said appointments
exp re s sl y carrie d wi th the m the au th ori ty top os se ss an d c arry th e sai d
fi r e a r m . T h e a c c u s e d f u r t h e r c o n t e n d e d t h a t i n v i e w o f h i s appointments, he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions inPeople vs. Macarandang and in
People vs. Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm
andammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were
reversedand abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courtsrulings in
the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

The appellant was acquitted.Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws,
are neverthelessevidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the
New Civil Codeprovides that, Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the
constitution shallf o r m p a r t o f t h e l e g a l s y s t e m . T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
u p o n a l a w b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the
law was originally passed, since thecourts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the lawthus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities isa restatement of the legal maxim
legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet
the interpretationplaced upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The doctrine laiddown in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law of thel a n d , a t t h e t i m e a p p e l l a n t w a s f o u n d i n p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e
fi r e a r m a n d w h e n h e w a s arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, thenew doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had reliedon the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t p o s s e s s e d a fi r e a r m p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r e
v a i l i n g doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability
wouldattach to his possession of said fi rearm, the appellant should be absolved. The
appellantmay not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable. _____________________ *The accused were acquitted for through their appointment
as confidential/secret agent theywere
to be peace offi cers. Peace offi cers had the privilege of carrying fi rearms without
license.**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that
thelaw did not explicitly provide that secret/confi dential agents are among those
who areexempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm.
Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552
[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes
thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are
not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances
may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the
Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are
protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must
be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional
Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation,
the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon
buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real
property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments

are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to
diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the
fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of
judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a
basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs.
Nitafan v CIR 152 SCRA 284
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987]FACTS:1. Petitioners
David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and qualified
Judgesof the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.2. Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of theSupreme Court) from making
any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
3. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes
a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 1
0, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries of Judges/Justices?HELD:The
SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil
552) andENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution
of their salaries during their continuance in office.The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries
of Justices and Judges are property subject to general income taxapplicable to all income earners
and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fallwithin the
constitution protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.The
debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it wasfinally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, inadopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but inkeeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organiclaw and of the people adopting it should
be given effect.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof,
and so violates the
Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be deemed discarded
L-6355-56August 31, 1953Facts
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencias andJustice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that
SEC. 13. No salarywherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall
be considered as exemptfrom the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensationfixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the
Solicitor General on behalf of appellantCollector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not receivedfavorably by Congress, because immediately after its
promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor
General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussionin the Lower House of House Bill
No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and
other members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 constitutional?
Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive
and wellconsidered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case
of Perfecto vs.Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income
taxes from the salariesof Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so o r d e r e d t h e r e f u n d o f s a i d t a xe s . O n t h e
i s s u e o f w h e t h e r S e c t i o n 1 3 o f Re p u b l i c A c t N o . 5 9 0 i s constitutional, the court
believes that this is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of themeaning
of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in offi ce,
found insection 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By
legislative fiatas enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that
taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof bythe Legislature is an invasion of the welldefi ned and established province and jurisdiction of theJudiciary. The rule is recognized
elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or actdeclaratory of what the law
was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. Alegislative
defi nition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere;otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The court reiterates thedoctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect
that the collection of income taxon the salary of a judicial offi cer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. Further, thecourt holds that the interpretation
and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within theexclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislaturemay not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, especiallywhen the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretationalready given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed,that Section 13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it
provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer
shall b e c o n s i d e r e d n o t t o b e a d i m i n u t i o n o f h i s c o m p e n s a t i o n fi xe d b y t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n o r b y l a w , constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the
judiciary. In this sense, the court is of theopinion that said section is null and void, it being a
transgression of the fundamental principles underlyingthe separation of powers. In the light of
the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissentingopinion of court cited that judges
are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to the Income TaxLaw prevailing.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provisionin
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. Theascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional constructionthat the intent of the framers of the organic law and
of the people adopting it should be given eff ect.Hence, court affi rms judgment as in
Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judgessalaries
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. Defendant,
admittingthe ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions, invokes as his legal
excuse the appointmentissued to him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governors letter which he presented as
and evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously
surrendering tothe office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been appointed as SECRET
AGENT to assist on themaintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and
carry in his possession 1 Riotshotgun.
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among
thoseauthorized to possess firearms.

Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit
butsection 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the
peace officers are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms.The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of
peace officer equivalent even to a Municipal Police
expressly covered by section879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and
theDefendant acquitted
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes
to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are
mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it
violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly,
this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the
facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using
the facial challenge.
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law
seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be
invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are
analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to
such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face
invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is
evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision
to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court
holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal.
The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional
law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe
element of the offense.
Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it
the accused cannot be convicted of plunder
We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be
culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to

do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder.
Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite
mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the
heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of
the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit
People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took
no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as Special Agent by
thenColonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an
undatedcertification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the
pistoldescribed in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment
as specialagent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance

of his official dutyand for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in
Plaza Miranda inpossession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them.
An investigation wasconducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the
accused. The caseunderwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged.
Hence, the case wasappealed to Supreme Court.
Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms
The appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
ordercampaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace
officerequivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879
(People v.Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with
the authority tocarry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his
official duties and for hispersonal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according
to Col. Maristela, as the firearmis government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt.
Adolfo Bringas as he was alreadyappointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa
revoked the doctrine in the Macarandangcase, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years
after the accused was charged. Under theMacarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellants appointment as secret agent, heincurred no criminal liability for possession of the
pistol in question.The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the
recommendation of theSolicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for
his provisional release; withcosts de oficio.