Yamada vs.

Manila Railroad
1915 (OCC)
Facts:
Plaintiffs and 3 other companions hired a taxicab from Bachrach Garage and Taxicab Co for a trip
to Cavite Viejo.
On their way back, while crossing the tracks of defendant railroad in San Juan, municipality of
Cavite Viejo, the automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs injured.
Trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad Company and held the
defendant taxicab company liable for damages
the appellant contended on the trial and offered evidence to prove that, on approaching the
railroad crossing from the direction in which the automobile was travelling at the time, the view of
the railroad tracks in both directions was obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside
thereof, and that it was impossible for a person approaching the crossing even though on guard,
to detect by sight the approach of a train.
Railroad trains rarely pass over tracks without noise and their presence, generally speaking, is
easily detected by persons who take ordinary precautions.
Issue: WON taxicab company fully discharged its duty when it furnished a suitable car and selected a
driver who had 5-6 years experience
Held: NO

The Civil Code, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servant, makes
a distinction between private individuals and public enterprises. (Art. 1903, Civil Code.) That
article, together with the preceding article, is as follows:

ART 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for the persons for whom they should be
responsible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live with them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or
on account of their duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the proceeding article shall be
applicable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, master or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The liability referred to in this articles shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

President of company even testified that none of its drivers were accustomed to stop or even

reduce speed or take any precaution in approaching and passing over the railroad crossings, no
matter of what nature, unless they here the signal of the car
PNR v. BRUNTY
2006
Facts:
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the Philippines
for a visit sometime in January 1980.
Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio
City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita.
It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes,
was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at
Barangay Rizal,Moncada, Tarlac.
Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up
ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71.
Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other
passengers suffered serious physical injuries.
A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac,
where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival.
Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital.
PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection but
also in the supervision of its employees
It stressed that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty
to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing.
It insisted that there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides
of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident was Mercelitas negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight
signals to stop given by the guard
TC favored Brunty which CA affirmed
Issue: As between PNR and Mercelita, whose negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision?
Held: PNR
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of
negligence.
The records of the instant case show that both the RTC and the CA carefully examined the factual
circumstances surrounding the case, and we find no cogent reason to disturb the same. It is, however,
worthy to emphasize that PNR was found negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary
safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is liable
for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, viz:
o Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed
an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health

and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence
is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.

GARCIA and CASTRO v. SALVADOR

2007
FACTS:
Ranida Salvador was a trainee in the Accounting Department of Limay Buk Handling Terminal,
Inc. (the Company).
As a requisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community
Diagnostic Center (CDC) owned by Garcia, a MedTech. Garcia himself conducted the HBs Ag
(Hepatities B Surface Antigen) test and it indicated a result of HBs Ag: Reactive.
The result bore the signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as
pathologist.
Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, interpreted the results and told Ranida that he has
Hepatitis B, a liver disease.
Salvadors employment was terminated thereafter for failing the physical examination.Ranida
told his father Ramon of her sickness which resulted to Ramons heart attack and his
hospitalization at Bataan Doctors Hospital.
During her fathers confinement, Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test in the same hospital
which indicated a Negative result.
Ranida informed Dr. Sto. Domingo of the result of the latter test but the doctor said that the test
conducted by CDC was more reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.
Ranida then went back to CDC for confirmatory testing and this time, the Anti-HBs conducted on
her indicated a Negative result.
Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive.
Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the EO of the
Company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be
considered. CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which again indicated another
Negative result.
Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officerin-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification correcting the
initial result and explaining that the examining medical technologist (Garcia) interpreted the
delayed reaction as positive or reactive. Ranida was rehired by the Company.
Ranida and her father Ramon filed a complaint for damages against Garcia the MedTech and
Castro the pathologist claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation of the results of
Ranidas examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless
nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.
Garcia denied the allegations and reiterated a scientific explanation that resulted to the false
positive. On the other hand, Castro claimed that he only goes to CDC when a case is referred to
him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the results only bore his stamp signature.
TC: Dismissed the complaint for failure of the plaintiffs to present sufficient evidence to prove the
liability of Garcia and Castro.
1. The plaintiffs should have presented Dr. Sto. Domingo because he was the one who
interpreted the result of the first test in CDC.
2. The plaintiffs should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of Garcia
and Castro regarding the explanation behind the conflicting results.
CA: Reversed the Trial Court decision.
ISSUES:
WON Garcia and Castro were negligent
WON the negligence, if there is any, is an actionable wrong

HELD: Negligence is the failure to observe

o for the protection of the interest of another person
o that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
o whereby such other person suffers injury.
Test for health care providers: Did the health care provider
o either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or
that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done;
and
o that failure or action caused injury to the patient

.
.
.

Elements of an actionable conduct and application to the case:

o Duty Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as
well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Violation of a
statutory duty (RA 4688 in this case) is negligence.
a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist
medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician
results of any examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist
o Breach violations of RA 4688
In paper, Dr. Castro is the head of CDC but in his affidavit, he denied ownership and
supervision over CDC. It is Calderon, the MedTech, who administers, supervises, and directs CDC.
Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of Dr.

Castro

I
I

The disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the
authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.Failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated
is failure to observe that care required of medical professionals. Therefore, there is a breach of
duty.
o Injury She was terminated from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered
anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests.
o Proximate Causation All the above mentioned injuries suffered could have been avoided had
the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the
clinical report.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides the legal basis for damages:Every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
CA decision is Affirmed.

LG FOODS v. Philadelfa Pagapong-Agraviador

FACTS:
Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was
hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Yeneza
Charles died as a result of the accident.
An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver but
before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by
conscience and remorse.
The case was dismissed.
The spouses Vallejera then filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of
the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
LG Foods argues that the complaint is basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an
employer under the provision of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their
driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable.
Since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for
their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled; hence the lack of cause of action on the part of the
Spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Vallejeras cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code or
derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Although the spouses complaint did not explicitly state that they were suing the LG Foods for
damages based on quasi-delict, it is clear from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict
was their choice of remedy against the petitioners.
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by
the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for
the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which
diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said acciden
The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of
their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could
have prevented the vehicular accident.
Used CC 2180

Barredo v. Garcia
1942
Facts:
Taxi driven by Fontanilla, owned by Barredo, collided with a carretela carrying 16-year old Garcia,
who later on died.
Faustino was convicted of his criminal negligence.
Parents moved to file a civil case against employer Barredo.
Barredo claims that since Fontanillas offense is covered by the RPC, his liability as an employer
must only be subsidiary under Art 103 of the RPC.
Issue: WoN a separate civil action may be instituted against Barredo as an employer-- YES
Ratio:
The same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Art
100 of the RPC, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra- contractual under articles
1902-1910 of the Old Civil Code.
Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict
or crime.
Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Old Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Art. 1903. Those arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law shall
be subject to the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title XVI of this book.
Not punishable by law: liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is
the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the
meaning of Arts 1902 and 1903.
Note: The court goes on to say that a strict interpretation of not punishable by law would render the
scope and application of QD very limited since the RPC also covers negligent crimes.
1. Court decided to not use the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. (Meaning: QD may
now also cover acts that are punishable by the RPC, specifically, those criminal acts committed through
negligenceArt 365 of the RPC.)
2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required in criminal cases, while only a preponderance of evidence
is needed in civil cases. If all negligent acts could only be prosecuted under the RPC, many wrongs (not
proven beyond reasonable doubt) will be unvindicated.
3. This provides for a more expeditious way of obtaining relief since the employees property need not be
exhausted anymore. The plaintiff may make the employers directly responsible.

Elcano v Hill
1977
Facts:
Elcano seeks damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the
killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted.
Defendant-Apellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for the killing of plaintiff-apellants son, but
acquitted on the ground of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
TC dismissed, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages.
Issue:
1.) WoN present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.
2.) WoN Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code can be applied against Atty. Hill
(defendants father), notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally
married.
Held:
1st Issue:
Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while
in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a
bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'.
It is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons.
2nd Issue:
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
The clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation
Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons.

the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while
still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of
real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
Ruling: TC ordered to proceed.

GARCIA V. FLORIDO
1973
FACTS:

August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa
L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and
operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from
Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference
August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national
highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala
Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization
Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving alleging
that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their
respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of law or
traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding

ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with
the trial of the case

Essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code
are present, namely:
o act or omission of the private respondents
o presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car
o physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision
o existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and
the fault or negligence of private respondents
o the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
Violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners
Petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against
respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accuse
Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the
same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal
Court and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence
in both complaints would substantially be the same.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners
have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have
opted instead to recover them in the present civil case

Petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to
file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code)
already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from
bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for
respondent court's order of dismissal

Mendoza v. Arrieta
1979
Facts:

A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a Benz car owned and driven by petitioner Edgardo
Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel and sand truck
owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.

As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to
Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of Bulacan.

The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that
the collision between Salazars jeep and petitioners car was the result of the former having been bumped
from behind by the truck driven by Montoya.

Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol
for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioners complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against
private respondents
Held:

Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes.

Timbols submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the institution of such
separate civil action is untenable.

For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability
distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal
Code, no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case.
And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve,
in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of
civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery
of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for
separate application by the offended party.

The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his
cause of action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active
participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar.

The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination.

Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action
as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.

Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioners car for considering that the collision
between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the
rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault.
Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as
petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c)
which provides that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right arise did not
exist

Manliclic v. Calaunan
2007
.
.
.

FACTS
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to
Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.
Because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage
to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and
PRBLI.
According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow
lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking
the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit
Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep.
In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. On the
other hand, according to petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the
left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in
front of it.
Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case, he, along
with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to respondent.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
What is the effect of Manliclics acquittal to the civil case?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
SINCE THE CIVIL CASE IS ONE FOR QUASI DELICT, MANLICLICS ACQUITTAL DOES NOT
AFFECT THE CASE. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra- contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
o In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
o However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex
delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other than the delict complained of.
o As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author

10

of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Cangco v. Manila Railroad

1918
Facts:

Jose Cangco stepped off the train between 7-8PM on a dark night six meters before the train
reached a full stop.
Watermelons were placed at the edge of the platform for shipment to the market.
One or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons and he slipped and fell on the
platform.
His body then rolled off the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. His arm was amputated as a result.
Cangco instituted proceeding against Manila Railroad to recover damages due to the negligence
of servants and employees in placing the sacks of watermelons on the platform.
CFI: Although Manila Railroad was negligent, Cangco failed to use due caution in alighting from
the train therefore he cannot recover damages.

IssueWON Manila Railroad is liable for damages YES

Held

The legal liability of Manila Railroad is the contract of carriage and was bound by reason of duty
as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains.
The breach in contract makes them liable, different from the liability caused by the negligence of
its employees.
Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (now Arts. 2176 and 2180) apply only to culpa aquiliana
and not culpa contractual.
Because there was a pre-existing legal obligation, Manila Railroad cannot overcome the
presumption of negligence by demonstrating that they have exercised care and diligence of a
good father of a family.
It is not necessary for Cangco to specify whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault
or negligence on the part of Manila Railroad or its agents.
Proof of contract and nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.

The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. In such
cases, it is the wrongful or negligent act or mission itself which creates the viculum juris.

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MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. COMPANIA TRANSATLANTICA

1918
FACTS:
SS/Alicante, belonging to Compania Transatlantica de Barcelona was transporting two locomotive boilers for the
Manila Railroad Company. The equipment of the ship for discharging the heavy cargo was not strong enough to
handle the boilers. Compania Transatlantica contracted the services of Atlantic gulf and Pacific Co., which had the
best equipment to lift the boilers out of the ships hold. When Alicante arrived in Manila, Atlantic company sent out its
floating crane under the charge of one Leyden. When the first boiler was being hoisted out of the ships hold, the
boiler could not be brought out because the sling was not properly placed and the head of the boiler was caught
under the edge of the hatch. The weight on the crane was increased by a strain estimated at 15 tons with the result
that the cable of the sling broke and the boiler fell to the bottom of the ships hold. The sling was again adjusted and
the boiler was again lifted but as it was being brought up the bolt at the end of the derrick broke and the boiler fell
again. The boiler was so badly damaged that it had to be shipped back to England to be rebuilt. The damages
suffered by Manila Railroad amounted to P23,343.29. Manila Railroad then filed an action against the Streamship
Company to recover said damages. The Steamship Company caused Atlantic Company to be brought as codefendant arguing that Atlantic Company as an independent contractor, who had undertaken to discharge the boilers
had become responsible for the damage.
The Court of First Instance decided in favor of Manila Railroad, the plaintiff, against Atlantic Company and
absolved the Steamship Company. Manila Railroad appealed from the decision because the Steamship Company
was not held liable also. Atlantic Company also appealed from the judgment against it.
ISSUES:
1.
Was the Steamship Company liable to Manila Railroad for delivering the boiler in a damaged condition?
2.
Was Atlantic Company liable to the Steamship Company for the amount it may be required to pay the plaintiff?
RULING:
There was a contractual relation between the Steamship Company and Manila Railroad. There was also a
contractual relation between the Steamship Company and Atlantic. But there was no contractual relation between the
Railroad Company and Atlantic Company.
There was no question that the Steamship Company was liable to Manila Railroad as it had the obligation to
transport the boiler in a proper manner safe and securely under the circumstances required by law and customs. The
Steamship Company cannot escape liability simply because it employed a competent independent contractor to
discharge the boiler.
Atlantic Company claimed that it was not liable, because it had employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family and proper care in the selection of Leyden. Said argument was not tenable, because said defense was not
applicable to negligence arising in the course of the performance of a contractual obligation. The same can be said
with respect to the liability of Atlantic Company upon its contract with the Steamship Company. There was a
distinction between negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and negligence
considered as an independent source of obligation (culpa aquiliana). Atlantic Company wasis liable to the Steamship
Company for the damage brought upon the latter by the failure of Atlantic Company to use due care in discharging
the boiler, regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by the negligence of an employee who was qualified for
the work, duly chose with due care.
Since there was no contract between the Railroad Company and Atlantic Company, Railroad Company can had

12

no right of action to recover damages from Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which constituted the violation of the
contract. The rights of Manila Railroad can only be made effective through the Steamship Company with whom the
contract of affreightment was made.

SYQUIA v. CA
FACTS

Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the
remains of deceased.
After about a month, preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the
same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche
underground.
As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface, the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole
approx 3 in. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole.
Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Paraaque, they caused the opening of the
concrete vault and discovered that:(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding;(b) coffin was
entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass
panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased;(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the
deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled.
SYQUIAS filed a claim for damages against Manila Memorial on raising either:(1) breach of its obligation to
deliver a defect-free concrete vault;(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault(Art. 2176)Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLAMEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the
grave of the dead.
Syquias further claimed that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that lot
may hold single or double internment underground in sealed concrete vault" which should be waterproof.Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of Manila MEMORIAL provides that: Every earth interment shall be
made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of
which shall be made by the employees of the Association. Pursuant to this, a concrete vault was installed
and after the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
Trial Court ruled that contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be
waterproof; no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because
there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Manila Memorial; and that the act of
boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away.
CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also denied.

ISSUES:
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners, or alternatively (No)
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana (No)
HELD1. NO. Parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law between them.

A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot
be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v CA)

Reasoning- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care."

Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment.- "Sealed" meant "closed."

Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without
rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.

"Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt
as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.
2. NO. Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place."

13

In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family
Reasoning- Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence
of a culpa aquiliana, circumstances of the case do not show negligence. The reason for the boring of the
hole wasexplained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who saidthat: When the vault was placed on the
grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily
then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water.
Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of
water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. Finding no
evidence of negligence, there is no reason to award damages.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. NAVIDAD

2003
Facts:
On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a token.
While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security
guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
Marjorie, along with her children, filed complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA,
the Metro Transit Organization Inc. and Prudent for the death of her husband.
LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent.
Prudent denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards.
Trial court rendered decision in favor of the Navidads and against Prudent and Escartin;
complaint against LRTA and Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
In its decision, CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor and held the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
The CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a
contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where the
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token
therefor.
In exempting Prudent form liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security
agency to the death of Nicanor; that Marjorie failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows.
Issues:
1) WON LRTA and Roman can be held liable for the death of Nicanor.
2) WON Prudent can be held liable as Escartins employer.
Held:
1) Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers. Articles 1755, 1756, 1759 and 1763 of the Civil Code were cited. The foundation of LRTAs
liability if the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.
2) No. If Prudent will be made liable, that liability could only be for tort under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code. The premise however, for the employers liability is the negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes

14

the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil
Code can well apply. When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself 33constituted
the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.
Liability of Manila Railroad is direct. It cannot exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, as
the cause of action is a breach of contract of carriage. In the same vein, liability cannot be escaped by
proof that the fault was imputable to the employees.
Sps. Mamaril vs. Boy Scout of the Philippines
2013
Facts:

PUJ operators Sps. Mamaril would park their 6 passenger jeepneys every night at BSPs compound in
Malate, Manila for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit.
One day, one of the vehicles was missing and was never recovered.
According to the security guards Pea and Gaddi of AIB Security Agency with whom BSP had contracted for
its security and protection, a male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the
compound.
Sps. Mamaril prayed that Pea and Gaddi, together with AIB and BSP, be held liable for: (a) the value of the
subject vehicle; (b) amount representing daily loss of income/boundary reckoned from the day the vehicle
was lost; (c) exemplary damages; (d) moral damages; (e) attorney's fees; and (f) cost of suit.
BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to the
manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket itself expressly stated that the
"Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein."
It also claimed that Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from not being
parties thereto, its provisions cover only the protection of BSP's properties, its officers, and employees.

Issue: Whether or not BSP may be held liable for the loss of the vehicle caused by the negligence of its security
guards.
Held:

The proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security guards Pea and
Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle.
The records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP.
Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case.
Pea and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract.
No employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its
premises.
Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Guard Service Contract between defendantappellant BSP and defendant AIB Security Agency is purely between the parties therein.
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. If a contract
should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a
person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a
third person.
Thus, in order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred to as a
stipulation pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a
stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) The
contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person - the favor is not merely
incidental; (4) The favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) The third person communicated his or her
acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not represent, or are not
authorized, by the third party.
However, none of the foregoing elements obtains in this case.There is absolutely nothing in the said contract
that would indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of the parties therein in favor of third persons
such as herein plaintiffs-appellees.

15

Moreover, the Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the contract between the parties herein was one
of lease as defined under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in
a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease.
The agreement with respect to the ingress and egress of Sps. Mamaril's vehicles were coordinated only with
AIB and its security guards, without the knowledge and consent of BSP. Accordingly, the mishandling of the
parked vehicles that resulted in herein complained loss should be recovered only from the tort feasors (Pea
and Gaddi) and their employer, AIB; and not against the lessor, BSP.

Petron Corp. V. Sps. Jovero

Facts:

Rubin Uy leased a property from Cesar for a period of five years to operate a gasoline station in Estancia,
Iloilo.
He then entered into Retail Dealer Contract with Petron Corporation for the period May 1, 1984 to April 30,
1989, where he obligated himself to sell Petron products in quantities as ordered by him.
One of the provisions of the contract is that the dealer hold Petron harmless against all losses and claims for
death, personal injury or property damage arising out of any use or condition of the dealers premises,
regardless of any defects therein.
To comply with the obligation to deliver its products to the dealer, Petron entered into a hauling contract with
Jose Villaruz, doing business under the name Gale Freight Services, for the period of three years from
March 1988.
Under the hauling contract, Jose specifically assigned three trucks.
The parties also agreed that Jose shall hold Petron free from any liability on claims by third persons arising
out of but not limited to the terms of the hauling contract.
Delivery was defined as not only transportation but also proper loading and unloading and delivery.
Robin executed a Special Power of Attorney for the management of the gasoline station in favor of Chiong
and his wife, Dortina. Howver, Chiong left for Honkong on November 27, 1990, so Dortina was left with the
management of the station.
Ronnie, an employee of the station, ordered products from Petron, who then instructed Jose to deliver the
products.
The latter however used a truck not stipulated in the contract, but was allowed by Petron. During the
unloading of the petroleum from the truck to the fill pipe into the underground tank, a fire started in the fill
pipe and spread to the rubber hose connected to the tank truck.
When the driver (Pepito Igdanis), who was out of the premises saw the fire, he immediately drove the truck
in reverse without detaching the rubber hose from the fill pipe, starting a conflagration that damaged the
property of spouses Cesar and Erma (Jovero), Leonilo and Luzvilla (Samson), and Rogelio and Lucia
(Simpoco).
The aggrieved parties then filed cases for damages against Petron, Jose, Rubin and Dortina, which was
consolidated and tried by the RTC Iloilo. In its answer, Petron alleged that liability rests with Rubin and
Dortina and Jose, as it alleged that the products were already paid for and delivered to Rubin and Dortina,
while Jose transported the petroleum. It also asserted cross-claims against the other defendants, for
contribution, indemnity and subrogation if in case it is held liable.
RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiffs and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages.
It ruled that Igdanis, as an employee of Jose, was negligent in the performance of his work when he left the
premises while unloading was ongoing; Petron was also liable as it allowed Jose to use a truck different
from that stipulated in the contract; Rubin and Dortina owned the gasoline station at the time of the incident.
Court of Appeals, Petron held that when Ronnie, the gasoline station employee paid for the products, it
delivered ownership thereof to the gasoline station of the products hence it is not the owner of the petroleum
anymore; that it inspected the truck used and found the same to be in good condition; and that it cannot be
held culpable as the fire did not originate from the truck. Jose, who was the one responsible for the delivery
of the petroleum products, was not its employee, hence should be held liable alone. Jose, on the other hand
averred that it was not negligent in the selection of its employee, Pepito, who was not impleaded in the lower
court and could not defend himself. In the absence of proof that Pepito was negligent, he himself could not
be held liable as employer. Dortina alleged that she is not the owner or manager of the station, nor was
Pepito her employer.

ISSUE:
HELD:

16

The Supreme Court:

Petitioner merely prays for absolution from liability resulting from the fire by claiming that it had no direct
participation in the incident.

Petitioner asserts that there was no rational link between its alleged neglect in renewing the dealership
agreement and the act that caused the fire.

Moreover, petitioner points out, neither Igdanis nor Villaruz was its employee and, thus, it cannot be held
vicariously liable for the damages to respondents caused by Igdanis. Furthermore, it asserted that the tank
truck transporting the petroleum though not included in the enumeration in the hauling contract had
complied with the standards required of Villaruz.

Petitioner also alleges that there was no evidence that the fire was attributable to its distribution and storage
safety measures.

Finally, petitioner states that both hauler and dealer must bear the costs of their acts and those of their
employees, considering that this was an explicit provision in their respective contracts with it.

As petitioner itself points out, it owns the equipment relevant to the handling and storage of gasoline,
including the gasoline pumps and the underground tank. It is also responsible for the delivery of the
petroleum to the dealer. The incident occurred at the time the petroleum was being unloaded to the
underground tank petitioner owned. Aside from failing to show the actual cause of the fire, it also failed to
rebut the presumption that it was negligent in the maintenance of its properties and in the conduct of its
business.

Petitioner contends that under paragraph 8 of the dealership contract, the dealers liability is as follows:
LOSSES AND CLAIMS. BUYER shall make good, settle and pay, and hold SELLER harmless against all losses and claims (including those of the
parties, their agents and employees) for death, personal injury or property arising out of (1) any use or condition of BUYERs premises or the
equipment and facilities thereon, regardless of any defects therein (2) BUYERs non-performance of this contract, or (3) the storage and handling of
products on the premises.
While both parties to the contract have the right to provide a clause for non-liability, petitioner admits that they both share the maintenance of its
equipment. Petitioner states that its responsibility extended to the operating condition of the gasoline station, e.g. whether the fuel pumps were
functioning properly.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that petitioner likewise obligated itself to deliver the products to the dealer.
When the incident occurred, petitioner, through Gale Freight Services, was still in the process of fulfilling its
obligation to the dealer. We disagree with its contention that delivery was perfected upon payment of the
goods at its depot. There was yet no complete delivery of the goods as evidenced by the aforementioned
hauling contract petitioner executed with Villaruz. That contract made it clear that delivery would only be
perfected upon the complete unloading of the gasoline.
To reiterate, petitioner, the dealer Rubin Uy acting through his agent, Dortina Uy shared the responsibility
for the maintenance of the equipment used in the gasoline station and for making sure that the unloading
and the storage of highly flammable products were without incident. As both were equally negligent in those
aspects, petitioner cannot pursue a claim against the dealer for the incident. Therefore, both are solidarily
liable to respondents for damages caused by the fire.
Petitioner was likewise negligent in allowing a tank truck different from that specifically provided under its
hauling contract with Villaruz. The enumeration and specification of particular tank trucks in the contract
serve a purpose to ensure the safe transportation, storage and delivery of highly flammable products. With
respect to the claims of third persons, it is not enough for petitioner to allege that the tank truck met the
same requirements provided under the contract; it must duly prove its allegations. This, petitioner failed to
do. To reiterate, it was not able to prove the proximate cause of the fire, only the involvement of the tank
truck and the underground storage tank. Notably, both pieces of equipment were under its responsibility.
Absent any positive determination of the cause of the fire, a presumption exists that there was something
wrong with the truck or the underground storage tank, or both. Petitioner, which had the obligation to ensure
that the truck was safe, is likewise liable for the operation of that truck.
Petitioner maintains that by virtue of the hauling contract, Villaruz must be held responsible for the acts of
Igdanis, the driver of the tank truck. In this aspect, petitioner is correct. While it may be vicariously liable to
third persons for damages caused by Villaruz, the latter is nevertheless liable to petitioner by virtue of the
non-liability clause in the hauling contract. Under this provision, he saved petitioner from any and all claims
of third persons arising out of, but not necessarily limited to, his performance of the terms and conditions of
this agreement. Petitioner even obligated him to maintain an acceptable Merchandise Floater Policy to
provide insurance coverage for the products entrusted to him; and a Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance to cover any and all claims for damages for personal injury, including death or damages to
property, which may arise from operations under the contract[6].
To put it simply, based on the ruling of the lower courts, there are four (4) persons who are liable to pay
damages to respondents. The latter may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of
them simultaneously, pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code. These solidary debtors are petitioner
Petron, the hauler Villaruz, the operator Dortina Uy and the dealer Rubin Uy. To determine the liability of
each defendant to one another, the amount of damages shall be divided by four, representing the share of

17

each defendant. Supposedly, under the hauling contract, petitioner may require Villaruz to indemnify it for its
share. However, because it was not able to maintain the cross-claim filed against him, it shall be liable for its
own share under Article 1208 and can no longer seek indemnification or subrogation from him under its
dismissed cross-claim. Petitioner may not pursue its cross-claim against Rubin Uy and Dortina Uy, because
the cross-claims against them were also dismissed; moreover, they were all equally liable for the
conflagration as discussed herein.
Finally, the incident occurred in 1992. Almost 20 years have passed; yet, respondents, who were innocent
bystanders, have not been compensated for the loss of their homes, properties and livelihood. Notably, neither the
RTC nor the CA imposed legal interest on the actual damages that it awarded respondents. (Used Eastern Shipping
case)
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION vs. CA and L.C. DIAZ and CO.
2003

FACT:

In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank.

On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for
P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50.

Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya
also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.

Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook.

The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit
slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK
HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied
Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank
to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to
L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.

Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000. Macaraya and
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and

check.

The teller stamped the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE on the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip.

When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could
not remember to whom she gave the passbook.

When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than
Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya.

The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14 August 1991) of P300,000
from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of
L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo.

The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.

18

L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for
Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank.

The trial court absolved Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA.

CA reversed the decision of the trial court. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. But it modified
its decision by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.

RULING:

Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan.

Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that x x x savings x x x deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.

There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor.

The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. The bank is under obligation
to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of
their relationship.

This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe high standards of integrity and
performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary
nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.

Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or
contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791
prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks that banks must observe high standards of integrity and
performance in servicing their depositors.

However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract between the bank and
its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or implied.

Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust. The law simply
imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the
contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.

The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement because banks do not
accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves.

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Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation

Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is
demandable. For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its
depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took time and he had to go to Allied Bank for another
transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the processing of the deposit when Calapre left
Solidbank. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its
tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his
authorized representative. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and
Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to
the party authorized to receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or
negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached
its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that
Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove
that there was no negligence on its part or its employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to
the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him.
Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person retrieving the passbook, if
there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. The
defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa
contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. The bank must not only exercise high standards of integrity and performance, it must also
insure that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon
mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while
it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook
only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the
passbook to another person.
Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have happened. Thus, the proximate
cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than
that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such
contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but
does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract

Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. This means that
if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, then the courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory

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negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of
Solidbank should be reduced.
In PBC v. CA where the Court held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages between the depositor
and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this case, we hold that L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual
damages awarded by the appellate court. Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual damages.

Air France v. Carrascoso

1966
Facts:

Rafael Carrascoso was on his way to Rome, along with 48 other Filipino pilgrims.
He bought a first-class ticket through the agent Philippine Air Lines.
Carrascoso travelled first class from Manila to Bangkok, but at Bangkok he was asked by the
manager to vacate the seat because a white man had a better right to the seat.
Over my dead body, retorted Carrascoso.
A commotion ensued, and the other pilgrims pacified him to give the seat. He reluctantly gave his
first class seat to the plane. H
e was awarded, among others, P25,000 in moral damages by the CFI and CA. Air France
contends that, since Carrascoso claims breach of contract, moral damages are only awarded
upon bad faith, which the CA failed to make a finding of.

Issue:
W/N the award of award of moral damages was appropriate
Held:YES.
There was bad faith when Air France s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation after he was already seated.
As a result of Air France's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, Carrascoso
suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury.
While there is no specific mention of bad faith in the complaint, it may be drawn from the
circumstances.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature
nevertheless the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
Petitioners contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier - a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
For the willful malevolent act of petitioners manager, Air France, his employer, must answer. Art
21 is the legal basis, and Art 2219 provides for the recovery of damages for acts under Art 21.
Sirs Comments:
Hes not happy with the case. It did it not shed light on the overlap of culpa aquiliana and culpa

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contractual because used the terms tort and quasi delict. He said that the statement, an act that
breaks a contract may also be a tort is obiter and therefore not binding. But thats his opinion.
Butalid, Ma. Angela G.

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