1.

ADMIRALTY; JURISDICTION;
MARITIME CONTRACTS. —
Admiralty has jurisdiction over all
maritime contracts, in whatever form,
wherever they were executed or are
to be performed, but not over nonmaritime contracts.
2.—ID.; ID.; MARITIME
CONTRACTS DEPEND ON THE
SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF.
— Whether or not a contract is
maritime depends not on the
place where the contract is made
and is to be executed, making the
locality the test, but on the subject
matter of the contract, making the
true criterion a maritime service or
a maritime transaction.
3. ID.; ID.; CONTRACT OF
AFFREIGHTMENT;
PROCEEDING "IN REM" OR "IN
PERSONAM." — Admiralty has
jurisdiction of a proceeding in
rem or in personamfor the breach
of a contract of affreightment,
whether evidenced by a bill of
lading or a charter party. And
typical of a controversy over
contracts of affreightment is a suit
of one party against the other for
loss of or damage to the cargo.
4. PROHIBITION;
COURTS; JURISDICTION;
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
COURTS HAVE NO
JURISDICTION IN ADMIRALTY
CASES. — Cases in admiralty fall
within the original jurisdiction of

the Courts of First Instance to
which the jurisdiction of the justice
of the peace courts does not
extend and if the latter courts take
cognizance of such cases, they
may be restrained by the writ of
prohibition.
(Int'l. Harvester Co. of the Phil. v.
Aragon, G.R. No. L-2372, [August
26, 1949], 84 PHIL 363-367)
|||

[G.R. No. 29166. October 22, 1928.]
AUGUSTO
LOPEZ, plaintiffappellant, vs. JUAN
DURUELO, ET
AL., defendants. ALBI
NO JISON, appellee.
Angel S. Gamboa for
appellant.
Feria & La O for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. SHIPPING; COLLISION;
PROTEST. — The protest
required by article 835 of the
Code of Commerce in case of
collision between vessels is not
necessary to preserve the rights
of a person aboard a motor boat
engaged in conveying passengers

between ship and shore who is
injured in a collision between the
motor boat and the larger vessel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT
BAR. — A person desirous of
embarking on a ship which was
some distance away from the
shore in a Philippine port took
passage upon a small motor boat,
which was used in conveying
passengers and luggage to and
fro between the shore and the
shipside. Owing to the negligence
of thepatronor incompetence of
the person in charge — so the
complaint averred — the boat
approached too near to the stern
of the ship, with the result that the
propeller of the ship, which was
still turning, struck the motor boat
and sunk it, injuring the
plaintiff. Held: Upon demurrer,
that the failure of the complaint to
allege that the plaintiff had made
protest according to article 835 of
the Code of Commerce was no
impediment to the maintenance of
a civil action, under articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code, to
recover damages for the tort.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING
OF WORD VESSEL. — The word
"vessel " (Spanish, "buque,"
"nave") used in the Third Section
of Title IV, Book Third, of the

Code of Commerce, dealing with
collisions, does not include all
ships, craft or floating structures
of any kind without limitation. The
provisions of said section do not
apply to minor craft engaged in
river and bay traffic.

[G.R. No. 31865. February 28, 1930.]
MARIANO
B. ARROYO,
Provincial Sheriff of
Iloilo, plaintiffappellee, vs. MARIA
CORAZON YU DE
SANE, JOSE M. PO
PAUCO, and PO SUY
LIONG,defendantsappellants. PHILIPPIN
E NATIONAL
BANK, defendantappellee.
SYLLABUS
1. SHIPPING;
REGISTRATION OF
VESSELS; CHATTEL
MORTGAGE LAW, WHETHER
NOW APPLICABLE TO
VESSELS; ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE, SECTION 1171,
CONSTRUED AND APPLIED. —
Section 1171 of the Administrative

Code has modified the provisions
of the Chattel Mortgage Law, Act
No. 1508, particularly section 4
thereof. It is now not necessary
for a chattel mortgage of a vessel
to be noted in the registry of the
register of deeds. On the other
hand, it is essential that a record
of documents affecting the title of
a vessel be entered in the office
of the collector of customs at a
port of entry.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The
law as now existing is designed to
protect persons who deal with a
vessel on the strength of the
record title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. —
Mortgages on vessels, although
not recorded, are good as
between the parties. But as
against creditors of the mortgagor,
an unrecorded mortgage is
invalid.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.;
FORECLOSURE OF
MORTGAGE. — The procedure
provided by law for the
foreclosure of a mortgage must be
substantially carried out.

[G.R. No. 13695. October 18, 1921.]

STANDARD OIL
COMPANY OF NEW
YORK, plaintiffappellee, vs. MANUEL
LOPEZ
CASTELO, defendantappellant.
Gabriel La O for appellant.
Lawrence & Ross for
appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. GENERAL AVERAGE;
COASTWISE TRADE; JETTISON
OF DECK CARGO — When, in
conformity with marine
regulations, cargo is carried on
the deck of a steamer engaged in
coastwise trade, the jettison of
such cargo upon occasion of peril
makes a case for general
average.
2. JETTISON;
LIQUIDATION OF GENERAL
AVERAGE; OMISSION OF
CAPTAIN TO DISTRIBUTE
LOSS. — When jettison of cargo
occurs it is the duty of the captain
to effect the adjustment,
liquidation, and distribution of the
general average; and his
omission to take these steps

of a small craft engaged in the coastwise trade in the waters of the Philippine Islands. Held: That. the diligence required by the nature of the obligation assumed by them and required by the circumstances of the time and the place. the town of Catmon where it had been consigned. as G and J.constitutes an actionable dereliction of duty.. LIABILITY OF MASTER AND SUPERCARGO OF VESSEL FOR LOSS OF MONEY exercise. craft. and the latter is civilly liable for the acts of the former. This YU CON. Felix Sevilla y Macam for the carriers of said sum received from Y for its delivery to a shop in appellants. since the captain of the ship is the representative of the owner. SHIPPING. ID. were vested with the character of depositories of the same. — For this omission not only is the captain personally liable to the shipper of the jettisoned goods. but the latter may go at once upon the owner. they are liable. was stolen by persons not and JUSTO belonging to the boat. to be carried together with various merchandise from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon of the Province of Cebu. vs. in its safe-keeping. was there any indication that it NARCISO LAURON. ENTRUSTED TO THEIR CARE. ID. master — A certain sum of money was and supercargo. nor that its SOLAMO. upon payment of a fixed sum. and it was not proven nor GLICERIO IPIL. LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS. and as they failed to SYLLABUS 1. a fortuitous cause or to force majeure. 3. defendants- disappearance or loss was due to appellants.. Juan Singson and Dionisio Jakosalem for appellee. pursuant to . respectively.. delivered by Y to G and J. plaintiff- money disappeared from said appellee. ID.

. and the former must be CONSTITUTES A VESSEL. in relation to articles 1783. is a or negligence.] MANILA STEAMSHIP CO. Book 3. equipped and victualed all losses which. . No. and 1770 of the Civil Code. within the purview of the merchandise or effects delivered law and for the determination of to him for that transportation as the character and effect of the well as for the damages suffered relations created between the by their transportation. purpose of using it in the for its loss or misplacement. and for Islands. ID. may occur to the vessel. equipped and victualed it for the 1784. — The [G.. in on it and its owner. as those owners of the merchandise laden who contracted with him. ID. with from one port to another of these the corresponding interest Islands is under the law a thereon as an indemnity for the shipowner. September 29. and transportation of merchandise are obliged to deliver it to Y. 1956. captain in the legal acceptation of 2. 3.. and the master of the damage caused him through loss craft is to be considered as its of the same. according to consequence of misdemeanors the meaning and construction and crimes committed by him or given to the word vessel by the by the members of the crew of the Mercantile Code in treating of craft. maritime commerce under Title 1. through his fault for this purpose by its owner.R. LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNER FOR LOSSES CAUSED BY CAPTAIN. L-9534. — A held civilly liable for indemnities in minor craft used for the favor of third parties to which the transportation of merchandise by conduct of the latter of them may sea and to make voyages from give rise in the custody of the one port to another of these effects laden on the craft.the provisions of articles 1601 and owner of a minor craft who has 1602. WHAT this word.

petitioner. 3.. Claro M. MANUEL LASERNA. for respondents. respondents. Code of Commerce.] TEODORO R.. Blanco and Carlos Camins. . ID. SOLIDARILY.. respondents. ETC. — The shipowner is directly and primarily responsible in tort resulting in a collision at sea. SYLLABUS 1.R.INC.. COLLISION IMPUTABLE TO BOTH VESSELS. LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNER WHERE OFFICERS OF THE SHIP ARE UNLICENSED. LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS.. — In case of collision between two vessels imputable to both of them. Recto.) 2. and it may not escape liability on the ground that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of the vessels's officer and crew. hence. vs. LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS. YANGCO.. 1941. he can not escape liability because of the sinking of the vessel. Catis. for petitioner. October 29. Fernando P. MARITIME TORTS. petitioner. Pacifico de Ocampo for the petitioner. Nos. for respondents. (Article 827.. 47447-47449. SHIPS AND SHIPPING. Powell & Vega. COLLISIONS OR SHIPWRECKS. ID. Felix F. ID. each vessel shall suffer her own damage and both shall be solidarily liable for the damages occasioned to their cargoes. SYLLABUS 1. ET AL. [G. — The owner of a vessel who had caused the same to sail without licensed officers is liable for the injuries caused by the collission over and beyond the value of his vessel.. INSA ABDULHAMAN (MORO) and LIM HONG TO. vs. Jr. COMMON CARRIERS. ID.

— If the shipowner or agent may in any way be held civilly liable at all for injury to or death of passengers arising from the negligence of the captain in cases of collisions or shipwrecks. In the instant case it does not appear that the vessel was insured. plaintiffs-appellees. ET AL. S. vs. d efendant-appellant. and that the relationship between the petitioner and the passengers who died in the mishap rests on a contract of carriage. equipment. the exclusively "real and hypothecary nature" of maritime law operates to limit such liability to the value of the vessel. had its origin in the prevailing conditions of the maritime trade and sea voyages during the medieval ages. ORIGIN OF REAL AND HYPOTHECARY NATURE OF LIABILITY OF. the fact is not ignored that the ill-fated S. if any. Code of Commerce. and freight. or to the insurance thereon. To offset against these adverse conditions and to encourage shipbuilding and maritime commerce. MARITIME LAW. is a common carrier. . attended by innumerable hazards and perils. Book III. his liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction.CIVIL LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNER FOR INJURY TO OR DEATH OF PASSENGERS ARISING FROM NEGLIGENCE DIONISIA ABUEG. OF CAPTAIN. if any. it was deemed necessary to confine the liability of the owner or agent arising from the operation of a ship to the vessel. — The real and hypothecary nature of the liability of the shipowner or agent embodied in provisions of the Maritime Law. equipment. as a vessel engaged in interisland trade. his liability was extinguished. and freight. But assuming that petitioner is liable for a breach of contract of carriage.. In arriving at this conclusion. Negros. SHIPOWNER OR AGENT. so that if the shipowner or agent abandoned the ship. SYLLABUS 1. BARTOLOME SAN DIEGO. or insurance.

Even employees engaged in agriculture for the operation of mechanical implements. HEIRS OF . HEIRS OF ERNANIE DELOS SANTOS. charitable institutions and domestic service.2. as amended. for industrial employment "includes all employment or work at a trade. 4.. COASTWISE AND INTERISLAND TRADE. — The officers of motor ships engaged in fishing are industrial employees within the purview of section 39. MEANING OF. — The term "coastwise and interisland trade" does not have such a narrow meaning as to confine it to the carriage for hire of passengers and/or merchandise on vessels between ports and places in the Philippines because while fishing is an industry. HEIRS OF AMPARO DE LOS SANTOS. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. Said Act creates a liability to compensate employees and laborers in cases of injury received by or inflicted upon them. FISHING. 3. INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES. and aims at the amelioration of. WHEN A TRADE . OFFICERS OF MOTOR SHIPS ENGAGED IN FISHING EXCEPTIONS. the condition of laborers and employees. ID. HEIRS OF AMABELLA DELOS SANTOS.. paragraph (d). PROVISIONS OF CODE OF COMMERCE REGARDING MARITIME COMMERCE WITHOUT EFFECT IN APPLICATION OF. ID." The only exceptions recognized by the Workmen's Compensation Act are agriculture. HEIRS OF LENNY DELOS SANTOS. while engaged in the performance of their work or employment. are entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act. it is at the same time a trade. occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain. or the heirs and dependents of such laborers and employees in the event of death caused by their employment. — The provisions of the Code of Commerce regarding maritime commerce have no room in the application of the Workmen's Compensation Act which seeks to improve. if the catch is brought to a port for sale.

It must be stressed at this point that Article 587 speaks only of situations where the fault or negligence is committed solely by the captain. SYLLABUS 1. "(t)his rule is found necessary to offset against the innumerable hazards and perils of a sea voyage and to encourage shipbuilding and marine commerce. 73 Phil. AND RUBEN REYES. COMMON CARRIER. HEIRS OF DIEGO SALEM. — In cases where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed. Article 587 of the Code of Commerce is still good law. v. 587 of the Code of Commerce. responden ts. Severino Z. 332). ibid). (Decision. HEIRS OF TERESA PAMATIAN. petitioners. Contrary to the petitioners' supposition. et al. Inc. 29). Macavinta. As correctly stated by the appellate court. Rollo.. Notwithstanding the passage of the New Civil Code. Article 587 does not apply (see Manila Steamship Co. LIABILITY OF SHIP AGENT. RULE AND EXCEPTION. a shipowner or agent has the right of abandonment.. vs . COMMERCIAL LAW. for petitioners. MARITIME COMMERCE. ibid). CIVIL LAW. Dinglasan Law Office for private respondent. . 2. Laserna. and by necessary implication. Jr. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND COMPANIA MARITIMA. The reason lies in the peculiar nature of maritime law is which is "exclusively real and hypothecary that operates to limit such liability to the value of the vessel. — Under Art. p. or to the insurance thereon.MELANY DELOS SANTOS. 330. Laserna. Laserna. his liability is confined to that which he is entitled as of right to abandon — "the vessel with all her equipment's and the freight it may have earned during the voyage" (Yangco v. TASKED TO OBSERVE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THE VIGILANCE OVER THE GOODS AND SAFETY OF ITS PASSENGERS. the limited liability doctrine applies not only to the goods but also in all cases like death or injury to passengers wherein the shipowner or agent may properly be held liable for the negligent or illicit acts of the captain (Yangco v. if any (Yangco v.

however.. which cost so much damage to lives and properties.' an important device such as the radar could have enabled the ship to pass through the river and to safety. they are bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. M. 192195. 115). The foregoing clearly demonstrates that Maritima's lack of extraordinary diligence . Whenever death or injury to a passenger occurs. ID.Abdulhanan.. p. Further. NOT OBSERVED IN CASE AT BAR. see also Exh.. New Civil Code). Aklan due to darkness and the Floripon Lighthouse at the entrance of the Aklan River was not functioning or could not be seen at all (Exh.. the latest of which was typhoon Uring which occurred on October 20-25. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733 and 1755 (Article 1756. p. ID. Maritima. the vessel was left at the mercy of 'Welming' in the open sea because although it was already in the vicinity of the Aklan river. 38). M/V Mindoro was dry-docked for about a month.' there were about 17 typhoons that hit the country (Exh. 3. — Maritime presents evidence of the seaworthy condition of the ship prior to its departure to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in this case. In 1967 alone before 'Welming. 160). et al. 2-A. With the impending threat of 'Welming. 32. Consequently. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. ibid. could not present evidence that it specifically installed a radar which could have allowed the vessel to navigate safely for shelter during a storm. 100 Phil. 3-H. Storms and typhoons are not strange occurrences. Such a situation will be covered by the provisions of the New Civil Code on Common Carriers. New Civil Code). Necessary repairs were made on the ship. p. common carriers are tasked to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of its passengers (Article 1733. with a due regard for all the circumstances (Article 1755. New Civil Code). Owing to the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. ID. it was unable to enter the mouth of Aklan River to get into New Washington. While indeed it is true that all these things were done on the vessel. Life saving equipment and navigational instruments were installed. Index of Exhibits. Index of Exhibits.

INC. SYLLABUS 3. CASE AT BAR.coupled with the negligence of the captain as found by the appellate court were the proximate causes of the sinking of M/V Mindoro. petitioners. RECOVERY THEREOF IN AN ACTION BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION. vs. and properly so. Bautista. v. 109 Phil. INC. TAYONG. SEA HORSE SHIP MANAGEMENT. 712). He is right there on the vessel. The exceptions do not apply in this case since Reyes survived the incident and no evidence was presented to show that Maritima was guilty of bad faith. in command of its and (it must be presumed) knowledgeable as to the specific requirements of . CODE OF COMMERCE. v. Inc. — Reyes' claim for moral damages cannot be granted inasmuch as the same is not recoverable in damage action based on the breach of contract of transportation under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code except (1) where the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith. Bautista. COMMERCIAL LAW.. Hence. even if death does not result (Rex Taxicab Co. The captain is held responsible. — A ship's captain must be accorded a reasonable measure of discretionary authority to decide what the safety of the ship and of its crew and cargo specifically requires on a stipulated ocean voyage. INC. CAPTAIN'S CONTROL OF VESSEL AND REASONABLE DISCRETION AS TO ITS NAVIGATION. and TRENDA WORLD SHIPPING (MANILA). RULE AND EXCEPTION. MORAL DAMAGES. Mere carelessness of the carrier does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on its part (Rex Taxicab Co... for such safety. 4. Inc.. Maritima is liable for the deaths and injury of the victims.. INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES. ID. respondents .N ATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RIZALINO D. supra).

whether those be of the shipowner. in the exercise of sound discretion and in good faith. in such instructions. There. could not. In Compagnie de Commerce. It is a basic principle of admiralty law that in navigating a merchantman. The Sambia flying the German flag. cargo owners or of underwriters. Indeed. this Court recognized the discretionary authority of the master of a vessel and his right to exercise his best judgment. even in this age of electronic communications. under which the former as charterer loaded on board the Sambia. at the port of Saigon. It is the right and duty of the captain. charterers. The master of the Sambia decided to deviate from the stipulated voyage and sailed instead for the Port of Manila. as a reasonably prudent and competent mariner acting in good faith that the shipowner's or ship agent's instructions (insisted upon by radio or telefax from their officers thousand of miles away) will result. he cannot casually seek absolution from his responsibility. and reasonable discretion as to its navigation. Compagnie de Commerce sued in the Philippines . reach its ports of destination because war (World War I) had been declared between Germany and France. in the judgment of its master. Hamburg is instructive in this connection. in imposing unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship or crew. certain cargo destined for the Ports of Dunkirk and Hamburg in Europe. if a marine casualty occurs. Compagnie de Commerce v. a charger party was executed between Compagnie de Commerce and the owners of the vesselSambia. the master must be left free to exercise his own best judgment. The requirements of safe navigation compel us to reject any suggestion that the judgment and discretion of the captain of a vessel may be confined within a straitjacket. if the ship captain is convinced. to do all things with respect to the vessel and its equipment and conduct of the voyage which are reasonably necessary for the protection and preservation of the interests under his charge.seaworthiness and the particular risks and perils of the voyage he is to embark upon. in the very specific circumstances facing him. The applicable principle is that the captain has control of all departments of service in the vessel. with respect to navigating the vessel he commands.

where the judgment must in the nature of things be exercised. and under that obligation adopts a course which. it may properly be said of the course so taken that it was in a mercantile sense necessary to take it. though not inevitable. The Supreme Court. our Supreme Court held that the master of the Sambia had reasonable grounds to apprehend that the vessel was in danger of seizure or capture by the French authorities in Saigon was justified by necessity to elect the course which the took — i.. a man has the duty cast upon him of taking some action for another. where by the force of circumstances.e. and we cannot say that under the conditions existing at the time when the master elected to flee from that port. of course. — "The danger from which the master of the Sambia fled a real and not merely an imaginary one as counsel for shipper contends. in rejecting this contention also. there were no grounds for a 'reasonable apprehension of danger' from seizure by the French authorities. In affirming the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint. to flee Saigon for the Port of Manila — with the result that the shipowner was relieved from liability for the deviation from the stipulated route and from liability for damage to the cargo. cannot. is apparently the best for the interest of the persons for whom he acts in a given emergency.for damages arising from breach of the charter party and unauthorized sale of the cargo. CODE OF COMMERCE. at all events. and therefore no necessity for flight. The word 'necessity' when applied to mercantile affairs. ID." Compagnie de Commerce contended that the shipowner should. ID. what is meant by it in such cases is the force of circumstances which determine the course of a man ought to take. mean an irresistible compelling power. to the judgment of a wise and prudent man. was a possible outcome of a failure to leave the port of Saigon. 4. declared that: "But it is clear that the master could not be required to act on the very day of his arrival.. or before he had a reasonable . be held responsible for the deterioration in the value of the cargo incident to its long stay on board the vessel from the date of its arrival in Manila until the cargo was sold. Thus.. CAPTAIN'S CONTROL OF VESSEL AND REASONABLE DISCRETION AS TO ITS NAVIGATION. COMMERCIAL LAW. Seizure at the hands of an 'enemy of the King'.

Alidio & Azores for appellee. defendantappellant. SYLLABUS 1. and that he should not be held responsible for a reasonable delay incident to an effort to ascertain the wishes of the freighter. the cargo is perishable. or abandon the voyage. Villalva for appellant. Quijano. although the consequent delay be a long one. or sold. ADMIRALTY LAW. it must be proceeded with diligently. or given up. it ought to be forwarded. since he has control of the cargo and is entitled to elect. indeed. and earning the freight. without waiting for repairs. and upon failure to secure prompt advice." A. Custodio A. unless. time must be allowed to him to ascertain the facts. as the case may be. ANASTACIO AGAN. The master is entitled to delay for such a period as may be reasonable under the circumstances.opportunity to ascertain whether he could hope to carry out his contract and earn his freight. and if so done. MAGSAYSAY. before deciding on the course he will adopt. of shipowner. But once the time has elapsed. to decide for himself as to the course which he should adopt to secure the interests of the absent owner of the property aboard the vessel. and to balance the conflicting interests involved. whether by repairing or transshipping. and likely to be injured by the delay. or tranship. INC. If he delays. will be allowed a reasonable time in which to decide what course he will adopt in such cases as those under discussion. Where that is the case. he cannot escape that obligation by pleading the absence of definite instructions from the owners of the cargo or their underwriters.. he is bound to act promptly according as he has elected either to repair. vs. ACCIDENTAL . plaintiffappellee. he may claim a fair opportunity of carrying out a contract. the freighter will have no ground of compliant. underwriter on ship and freight. cargo owner. VESSELS. A shipowner or shipmaster (if communication with the shipowner is impossible). and owing to that delay a perishable cargo suffers damage. should the repair of the ship be undertaken.

. GENERAL AVERAGE. Being for the common benefit. (2) for the common safety part of the vessel or of the cargo or both is sacrificed deliberately. — The following are the requisites for general average: (1) there must be a common danger. therefore. while general or gross averages include "all the damages and expenses which are deliberately caused in order to save the vessel. gross averages are to be borne by the owners of the articles saved (Art. to be borne only by the owner of the property which gave rise to the same (Art. . ID.. ID. 812). the Code (Arts.STRANDING. 811). (3) from the expenses or damages caused follows the successful saving of the vessel and cargo. and (4) the expenses or damages should have been incurred or inflicted after taking proper legal steps and authority. from a real and known risk" (Art.. ID. ITS REQUISITES.. Generally speaking. its cargo. — In classifying averages into simple or particular and general or gross and defining each class. 809 and 811) at the same time enumerates certain specific cases as coming specially under one or the other denomination. ID. 810). — The law on averages is contained in the Code of Commerce. AVERAGES. averages are classified into simple or particular and general or gross. Under that law. 809) and are. While the expenses incurred in putting a vessel afloat may well come under number 2 of article 809 — which refers to expenses suffered by the vessel "by reason of an accident of the sea or force majeure" — and should therefore be classified as particular average.." but it specifically refers to "a vessel intentionally stranded for the purpose of saving it" and would have no application where the stranding was not intentional. No. the said expenses do not fit into any of the specific cases of general average enumerated in article 811. or both at the same time. 3. ID. CLASSIFICATION OF AVERAGES. simple or particular averages include all expenses and damages caused to the vessel or cargo which have not inured to the common benefit (Art. 6 of this article does mention "expenses caused in order to float a vessel. 2.

. 10 L. ed. and not of the voyage. defendantappellant. the cargo owners are not in law bound to contribute to the expense." the expenses incurred in floating the vessel do not constitute general average. ID. — It is the deliverance from an immediate peril. ID. ID.to enable it to proceed to its destination — and not for the purpose of saving the cargo. which constitutes the true foundation of general average. — Even if the salvage operation was a success. GENERAL AVERAGE.. by a common sacrifice.. is not subject to general average to satisfy the costs and expenses incident to the internment of the ship in a neutral port. yet if the sacrifice was for the benefit of the vessel . HAMBURGAMERICAN LINE. Ashby & Stribling.. NEUTRAL CARGO ON INTERNED VESSEL. ID. It is the safety of the property. WAR AS AFFECTING CONTRACT . Lawrence & Ross for appellee. ID. ID.. and belonging to a subject of a neutral power. Where there is no proof that the stranded vessel had to be put afloat to save it from an imminent danger. CONTRACT. plaintiffappellee. that constitutes the essence of general average (Columbian Insurance Co. ID.. — Agricultural machinery on board a merchant vessel carrying the flag of a belligerent nation. SYLLABUS 1. vs. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY IN RUSSIA.4. ADMIRALTY LAW. and hence no case for general average. Crossfield & O'Brien for appellant. 13 Peters 331. 2. In such case there is no common danger to vessel and cargo. 186). of Alejandria vs. ID. and what does appear is that the vessel had to be salvaged in order to enable it "to proceed to its port or destination. 5.

3. — A stipulation in a bill of lading emitted in a foreign country to the effect that all disputes arising under the contract shall be decided exclusively in the courts of the country wherein the contract is made can not have the effect of defeating the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippine Islands. ID. 4. WAR AS AFFECTING OBLIGATION OF SHIP. who recovered possession by means of an action of replevin. 6. STIPULATION LIMITING JURISDICTION OF COURTS.--The outbreak of war between two powers does not abrogate a contract between a subject of one of the belligerents and the subject of a neutral power. ID. ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACT. When the voyage was almost completed. — In the spring of 1914 a German vessel undertook to carry merchandise.. PRESUMPTION AS TO LAW OF PLACE OF CONTRACT--When it is proposed to invoke the laws of a foreign country as supplying the proper . the property of an American corporation. CONTRACT OF AFFREIGHTMENT. LIABILITY FOR COST OF FORWARDING CARGO. it will still be given effect if it can by any reasonable construction be treated as still capable of being performed in substance. where it was interned. CONTRACT MADE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY. The captain did not elect to discharge the cargo. war broke out between Germany and Russia. Held: That while the outbreak of war absolved the ship from its obligation to carry the cargo to the Russian port. and though the contract may thus become impossible of exact performance. and refused to surrender it to the owner. in and case involving the application of such contract..BETWEEN SUBJECTS or BELLIGERENT AND NEUTRAL NATIONS. the full freight having been received by the ship at the commencement of the voyage. and the ship put in to the port of Manila. reserving the right in case of inability to effect discharge at the port of destination to forward the same at its own expense by some other means. from Hamburg to Vladivostock. CONFLICT OF LAW. it was nevertheless liable for the cost of forwarding the cargo by another line. and properly coming before those courts.

vs. but simply as a privilege. it will be presumed that the law prevailing in the foreign country is the same as that which prevails in this jurisdiction. Otherwise. as to make it impossible for the conferees to agree upon a convention setting forth anything beyond "a pious wish" in the premises. plaintiffappellant. — The Sixth Convention. 3. Crossfield & O'Brien for defendant-appellant. at least.. — The master of a German . COMPAGNIE DE COMMERCE ET DE NAVIGATION D'EXTREME ORIENT.. SHIPPING. which may be accorded or refused at the option of the belligerent. adopted at the Second Hague Peace Conference (1907). Gilbert. DEVIATION. SYLLABUS 1. Cohn & Fisher for plaintiff-appellant. outweighs any advantage he can hope to gain by a refusal to recognize the practice as binding on him.rules for the interpretation of a contract. ID. with regard to the existence and binding character of a duty in this regard under accepted rules of international law. DAYS OF GRACE AND SAFE CONDUCTS. THE HAMBURG AMERIKA PACKETFACHT ACTIEN GESELLSCHAFT. ID. ID. ALIEN ENEMY VESSELS. def endant-appellant. justifies the conclusion that thereafter. the law upon which reliance is placed must be pleaded and proved. adherence to the practice by a belligerent could not be demanded for adherence to the practice inspired by his own commercial and political interests. a delai de faveur. ID... ID. 2. ID. — The fact that there was so substantial a divergence of views among the conferees representing their respective governments at the Second Peace Conference. not as a right.. recognized the practice of granting "days of grace' and "safe-conducts" to enemy merchant vessels found in the port of a belligerent at the commencement of hostilities.

for delivery in Dunkirk or Hamburg.. ID.. — Although the Republic of France appears to have authorized and directed the grant of "days of grace" and "safe-conducts. until such action had been taken the master 6. ID." soon after the outbreak of the war. with his vessel and her cargo and took refuge in Manila Bay. and the in the absence of any assurance in that regard upon which the master could confidently rely. and to his vessel's flag. ID. of the Sambia had reasonable grounds to apprehend danger of seizure by the French authorities in the event that the French Government should decline to conform to the practice. to the absolute security of a neutral port. which would secure the safety of his vessels and cargo en route... 4. — Under ordinary circumstances. nevertheless. fled.vessel. the Sambia which had just completed loading a cargo of the rice meal in the French port of Saigon. ID.D. VESSEL IN PORT OF REFUGE. her master had no such assurance. at the outbreak of the present war. I. his duty to his owner. etc. — Under the general provisions of maritime law.. ID.. Held: That under the circumstances surrounding the flight of the vessel. whose master has been compelled to 5. ID. under a contract of affreightment with a French shipper. to enemy merchant vessels in its harbours. and the express provisions of the charter party which contained a mutual exception with relation to "The act of God. DISPOSITION OF CARGO. ID. it may fairly be presumed in the absence of instructions from a shipper whose goods are found aboard a vessel lying in a port of refuge. under any settled rule of public international law." the shipowner was relieved from liability for the deviation of the Sambia from the route prescribed in the charter party. justified him in fleeing from danger of seizure in the port of an enemy.. the King's enemies. ID. as to the immunity of his vessel from seizure by the French authorities in Saigon as would justify holding that it was his duty to remain in that port. in the hope that he would be allowed to sail for the port of destination designated in the charter partly with a laissezpasser or safe-conduct. . and the resultant damages to the cargo.

neither he nor the shipowner is responsible for loss or damage suffered by the cargo as a result of its detention aboard the vessel during such time as may be reasonably necessary to come to a decision in this regard. so that any losses which resulted from the detention of the cargo aboard the Sambia must be attributed to the act of the "Enemy of the King. — Held: That under all circumstance set out in the opinion.. Held: That the interests of the absent shipper were consulted by the sale rather than the tranship perishable cargo aboard his vessel. when the cargo is a perishable one. ID. and did all that could be required of prudent man to protect the interests of the owner of the cargo aboard his vessel. after entering a port of refuge." which compelled the Sambia to flee to a port of refuge.. — Under all the circumstances as set out in the opinion in the case at bar. ID. 7. and though he must act promptly thereafter. FORCE MAJEURE. ID. but when the condition of the cargo is such as to render it inadvisable to attempt to tranship. when practicable. ID.. ID. ID. 9. the duty clearly rests upon the master to make such other advantageous disposition of the property of the absent shipper as circumstances will permit... and made necessary the retention of the cargo aboard the vessel at anchor under a tropical sun. ID. and without proper ventilation. the master of the Sambia proceeded with all reasonable dispatch. — A shipmaster must be allowed a reasonable time in which to decide what course he will adopt as to the disposition of his cargo. or if there is ground to believe that such will be the case before suitable means of transhipment can be secured. ID... until it could be ascertained that the interests of the absence owner would be consulted by the sale of this perishable cargo in the local market. . ID. 8. the master is bound to act for the cargo owner in that way. therefore.abandon the attempt to transport the cargo in his own vessel that the shipper's interest will be consulted by forwarding his property to the port designated by him in the contract of affreightment.

and 14. seeking affirmative relief. no part is earned until it is delivered.. unless it has been made payable in advance. or irrespective of delivery.. ID.. ID. ID. in an action for the breach of the charter party instituted in the court of the Philippine Islands. ID.. in the absence of any agreement. ID. to make payment for a partial performance of the contract. ID. and neither party to such an action will be permitted to submit the issues raised by the pleadings for adjudication.. 13. CHARTER PARTY. and even if it could be treated as such. by reference to which it was expressly stipulated in the charter party of the Sambia all questions of general average should be settled. ID. ID. ACTION FOR BREACH. ID. cited and adhered to: "Expenses voluntarily . — Under the "York-Antwerp Rules" of 1890. ID.10. express or implied. where freight is only payable on delivery.. and then. QUESTIONS OF GENERAL AVERAGE. ID.. when unsuccessful assail the court's jurisdiction on appeal.. ID. without objection. the shipowner would have no claim for freight. — The following general rule of maritime law prescribing the conditions under which a claim for general average contribution on account of ship's expenses. in reliance upon a stipulation in the charter party which he was at entire liberty to waive if he so desired.. — A provision in a charter party for the settlement of disputes by a reference to arbitration in London is waived by appearing and answering without objection. — Carrying the cargo of the Sambia from Saigon to Manila was not even a partial performance of the contract of affreightment which provided for its transportation from Saigon to Europe. ABANDONMENT OF CLAIM FOR FREIGHT. general average is not allowed unless the loss or damage sought to be made good as general average has been incurred for the "common safety" of ship and cargo.. ID.. he thereby wholly abandons any claim for freight in respect to them. 12. — Where a master relinquishes the attempt either to carry on the goods on his ship or to send them to their destination in another ship. 11.

the liability of the latter is limited to such part of the salvage compensation due for the entire service as is proportionate to the value of the ship. 2.. a claim to general average contribution. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT. ID. under the pressure of a danger or total loss or destruction imminent and common to them.841.. SYLLABUS 1. the salvage allowance should be charged against the ship and cargo in the proportion of their respective values.and successfully incurred or the necessary consequences of resolutions voluntarily and successfully taken. FLIGHT OF VESSEL NOT FOR THE COMMON SAFETY. and neither is liable of the salvage due from the other. vs. — In fleeing from the port of Saigon. — In determining the . 16. MACONDRAY & CO. ship and cargo. the same as in case of general average. — Where a ship and its cargo are saved together. and taking refuge in Manila Bay the master of the Sambiawas not acting for the common safety of the vessel and her cargo.977. — So much of the judgment as provides for the delivery to the plaintiff of the net proceeds of the sale of the cargo (128.32) reversed. RESPECTIVE OBLIGATION OF SHIP AND CARGO. for the safety of life. SALVAGE." 15. the ship being saved. The French cargo was absolutely secure from danger of seizure or confiscation so long as it remained in the port of Saigon.. plaintiffappellant. and the flight of the vessel was a measure of precaution adopted solely and exclusively for the preservation of the vessel from the danger of seizure or capture. by a person in charge of a sea adventure. defendantappellant.. where a personal action is brought by the salvor against the owner of the ship.71) affirmed.. ID. ID. give. Therefore. AMOUNT OF AWARD. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO. but so much thereof as allowed damages for a breach of the charter party (60.

Quisumbing & Quisumbing for defendant-appellee. — Three elements are necessary to a valid salvage claim... and good. Ltd. defendant -appellee. LACK OF MARINE PERIL. 384.. BARRIOS. (2) service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a special contract.. Laput & Jardiel for plaintiff-appellant. 34 Phil. 178. vs. but he interests of commerce would not be promoted by the encouragement of exorbitant charges. SYLLABUS 1.amount of the award to be allowed for salvage service the aim should be to hold out to seafaring men a fair inducement to the performance of salvage services without fixing a scale of compensation so high as to cause vessels in need of assistance to hesitate because of the ruinous cost. ADMIRALTY. it did not drift too far from the place where it was. The salvor is entitled as of bounty to something more than mere remuneration for his work. CASE AT BAR. plaintiffappellant. HONORIO M. TOWAGE SERVICE. ID.. that there was moonlight. there was no danger of its foundering or being stranded as it was far from any island or rocks. that there were only ripples on the sea which was quite smooth. — The circumstances that although the defendant's vessel was in a helpless condition due to engine failure. — Towage is not considered in itself a salvage service of high order of merit. 3. ID. and (3) success in whole or in part. SALVAGE. that the weather was fair. citing the case of The Mayflower vs. or that the service rendered contributed to such success. ID. (Erlanger & Galinger vs.S. REQUISITES. (1) a marine peril. 101 U. . ID. namely. and when the risk incident thereto is inconsiderable and other conditions favorable the compensation to be allowed should be moderate in amount. CARLO S A. The Sabine. that although said vessel was drifting towards the open sea.) 2. Swedish East Asiatic Co. clear. and its anchor could be released to prevent such occurrence.. GO THONG & COMPANY.

ID. EQUITY MAY NOT BE INVOKED WHERE THERE IS AN EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW APPLICABLE. as to warrant valid salvage claim for the towing of the vessel. that of a quasi-contract of towage where the crew is not entitled to compensation separate from that of the vessel. JOSE BACATAN.. is not entitled to payment for such towage service. — As the vessel owner had expressly waived its claim for compensation for the towage service rendered to defendant. Expedito P. may be entitled to remuneration.. ID. SWEET LINES. . — Plaintiff's service to defendant can be considered as a quasi-contract of "towage" because in consenting to plaintiff's offer to tow the vessel. that is... THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. Civil Code) applicable to the relationship created in this case. MARCIANO CABRAS and ANDREA VELOSO. there is no occasion to resort to equitable consideration. 4. ONLY OWNER OF TOWING VESSEL. ID. — Where the contract created is one for towage. ID. it is clear that plaintiff. ID. 5. QUINTOS. 2142. petitioner. respondents. 6. ID. FR.. whose right if at all depends upon and not separate from the interest of his employer. NOT ITS CREW.. CONSENTING TO OFFER TO TOW VESSEL.. FAILURE TO FULFILL UNDERTAKING AND/OR INTERRUPTION OF TRIP.. COMMON CARRIERS. to the exclusion of the crew of the said vessel. 3. Bugarin for respondents. ID. SYLLABUS 1. and the vessel was not a quasiderelict. WAIVER BY OWNER. MICAELA B. only the owner of the towing vessel. S. — There being an express provision of law (Art. captained by plaintiff..all show that there was no marine peril. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. Felixberto Leonardo and Ramon Tuangco for petitioner. TOWAGE.J. INC... ENTITLED TO REMUNERATION. vs. CIVIL LAW. defendant thereby impliedly entered into a Juridical relation of "towage" with the owner of the towing vessel. ID. ID.

— The voyage to Catbalogan was "interrupted" by the captain upon instruction of management. their destination. the conditions relied upon by petitioner cannot prevail over Articles 614 and 698 of the Code of Commerce heretofore quoted. ID. or refunded the value of the tickets purchased. In fact. — The crucial factor then is the existence of a fortuitous event or force majeure. A CRUCIAL FACTOR. 33 SCRA 284 [1970]). Furthermore. Had petitioner notified them previously. the right to damages and indemnity exists against a captain who fails to fulfill his undertaking or where the interruption has been caused by the captain exclusively. perhaps. It did not cancel the ticket nor did it refund the value of the tickets to private respondents. it left the next day for Manila to complete its voyage. there was no fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its undertaking of taking private respondents to Catbalogan. ID. The "interruption" was not due to . ID. Besides. Without it. after docking at Tacloban City. Even assuming that those conditions are squarely applicable to the case at bar. Pangasinan Transportation Co. As found by both Courts below. Private respondents' complaint is directed not at the delayed departure the next day but at the by-passing of Catbalogan... In the second place. petitioner did not comply with the same. it accounted only for the delay in departure. MAY NOT BE DIMINISHED OR CANCELLED BY CONDITIONS PRINTED AT THE BACK OF THE TICKET. In the first place. 1972.EXISTENCE OF FORTUITOUS EVENT. and offered to bring them to their destination at its expense. When the vessel finally left the port of Cebu on July 10. 2. petitioner cannot rely on the conditions in small hold print at the back of the ticket. The vessel was completely repaired the following day after it was towed back to Cebu. LIABILITY. mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that exempts the carrier from responsibility (Landingin vs. ID. there was no longer any force mucure that justified by-passing a port of call.. CIVIL LIABILITY OF OWNER AND SHIP AGENT. even granting arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event. — In defense. 3... it was not the vessel's sailing schedule that was involved. this controversy would not have arisen.

their destination and the vessel's first port of call. the Court is not inclined to grant them in addition to moral damages. The objective to meet its schedule might have been called for. the passengers' right to indemnity is evident. but it is malice nevertheless..fortuitous event or force majeure nor to disability of the vessel. MORAL DAMAGES. . NOT MITIGATED WHEN HARM OUTWEIGHS BENEFIT. The owner of a vessel and the ship agent shall be civilly liable for the acts of the captain. ATTORNEY'S FEES. 6. however. AWARD DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURT. pursuant to its normal schedule. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there was bad faith on the part of petitioner. Self-enrichment or fraternal interest. 4.00. RECOVERABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. although there was bad faith. respectively. since it is not the function of the Court to analyze and review evidence on this point all over again. but petitioner should have taken the necessary steps for the protection of its passengers under its contract of carriage. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. — The total award of attorney's fees of P5.000.000. for each of the private respondents. — Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code. 5. 7. moral damages are justly due in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Having been caused by the captain upon instruction of management. may have been the motive. ID.. — Insofar as exemplary damages are concerned. aside from the fact that the Court finds it faithful to the meaning of bad faith enunciated thus: "Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or illwill. ID.00 is in order considering that the case has reached this Tribunal. — Article 2215(2) of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner is inapplicable herein. The harm done to private respondents outweighs any benefits they may have derived from being transported to Tacloban instead of being taken to Catbalogan. ID.." Under the circumstances. AWARD HELD REASONABLE.. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. That finding of bad faith is binding on this Court. ID. and not personal illwill. the Court decides whether or not they should be adjudicated. the Court finds the award of moral damages excessive and accordingly reduce them to P3.

said award may.. LIABILITY UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION OF 1929 AND FOR OTHER BREACHES OF CONTRACT. revealing that he was traveling in his official capacity as delegate of the Republic of the Philippines to a conference in Tokyo.000. ID. — Articles 17. G. be considered as one for exemplary damages. ID. Tokyo. No. an agent of petitioner rudely compelled him. L-22425. At any rate. respondent was entitled to believe that this was a confirmation of his first class reservation and that he would keep the same until his ultimate destination. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw . considering that petitioners agent had acted in a wanton. also. Upon arrival at Okinawa. Neither the provisions of said articles nor others regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the air carriers. AIR CARRIERS. [August 31. — Respondent boarded petitioner's plane in Manila with a first class ticket to Tokyo. Since the offense had been committed with full knowledge of the fact that respondent was an official representative of the Republic of the Philippines. Cuenca.00 awarded as damages may well be considered as merely nominal. LIABILITY FOR NOMINAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. the sum of P20. 122 PHIL 403-407) ||| A. v.R. Inc. in the presence of other passengers. if the conditions specified are present. 18 and 19 of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 merely declare the airlines liable for damage in the cases enumerated therein.. 1965]. reckless and oppressive manner. respondent obeyed. Respondent protested. Held: Having been given first class accommodation as he took petitioner's plane in Manila. 2. CASE AT BAR. In order to reach the conference on time. to move to the tourist class. ID.. (Northwest Airlines.SYLLABUS 1.

on May 16. has the force and effect of law in this country. the Convention considered the four .Convention violates the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. declaring our formal adherence thereto. It is well-settled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. 1955. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate. It took effect on February 13. The presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in this country. there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. The classification of the places in which actions for damages may be brought is arbitrary and irrational and thus violates the due process and equal protection clauses. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof. 6 Courts generally avoid having to decide constitutional question. On September 23. 5 The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and. otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. 1950. 1950. President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 1951. 1933. Apparently. This attitude is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus. as such. The petitioner contends that Article 28(1) cannot be applied in the present case because it is unconstitutional. 1950." ticket in Manila and a person who purchases his ticket in San Francisco. through its Resolution No. and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9. The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption. 19. 201. He argues that there is no substantial distinction between a person who purchases a The treaty which is the subject matter of this petition was a joint legislativeexecutive act. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13. which enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming respect for each other's acts.

and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered — and this Court agrees that the respondent Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at P40. as the law says. is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. B. The petitioner is invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. 7 (Santos III v. it has become unconstitutional." He argues that in view of the significant developments in the airline industry through the years. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable because of a fundamental change in the circumstances that served as its basis. 1992]) ||| Certainly.00. tardily but safely. to the extent that it has lost its basis for approval.000. may be vindicated and recognized. as distinguished from all other places. [June 23. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage. No. we agree with the respondent court that this case can be decided on other grounds without the necessity of resolving the constitutional issue. "this doctrine constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal principle which would justify non-performance of a treaty obligation if the conditions with relation to which the parties contracted have changed so materially and so unexpectedly as to create a situation in which the exaction of performance would be unreasonable.R. She is however entitled to nominal damages — which. the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. the treaty has become irrelevant. As already mentioned. of course. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. She is not. G. Hence. her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila. At any rate." The key element of this doctrine is the vital change in the condition of the contracting parties that they could not have foreseen at the time the treaty was concluded.places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that Art. Northwest Orient Airlines. 101538. As to the purely technical argument that the award to her of such nominal damages is precluded by her . The petitioner goes at great lengths to show that the provisions in the Convention were intended to protect airline companies under "the conditions prevailing then and which have long ceased to exist. According to Jessup.

that Dr. 1990]. — The Court set aside the decision of the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. specifically referring to the California were cancelled.omission to include a specific claim therefor in her complaint. cdrep applicability of the Warsaw convention the airline carrier's liability for the lost baggage of private respondent Pangan is limited to $20. Pablo's right had been violated or invaded by it — absent any claim for actual or compensatory damages. G. 836). 270 PHIL 108-119) ||| AND SET ASIDE. LIABILITY OF AIRLINE CARRIER. (90 Phil. Intermediate Appellate Court. Inc. CIVIL LAW. L-40597. No. Applying the ruling in Mendoza v. [December 4. — On the basis of the stipulations printed at the back of the Airline ticket. 1979." which certainly is broad enough to comprehend an application as well for nominal damages. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS. EVIDENCE.R. it suffices to draw attention to her general prayer. "for such other and further just and equitable relief in the premises. following her plea for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. REVERSED (Alitalia v.00.00 per kilo or $600. REMEDIAL LAW. 91 SCRA 223) is squarely applicable to the instant case. Court of Appeals (G. Pablo upon the return to her of her baggage — necessarily raised the issue of nominal damages. and proof. SYLLABUS 1. petitioner cannot be held liable for the cancellation of respondents' contracts in the absence of showing that petitioner's attention was called to the special circumstances . petitioner should have realized that the explicit assertion. awarding private respondent's damages as for and for lost profits when their contracts to show the films in Guam and San Francisco. 71929. WARSAW CONVENTION.R. ACTUAL DAMAGES. as stipulated at the back of the ticket as the latter did not declare a higher value for his baggage and pay the corresponding additional charges. the case of Ong Yiu v. Philippine Airlines. June 29. 2. No. Besides. the prayer thereof having been voluntarily deleted by Dr.

he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner. 1988]. (Trans World Airlines v. he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. No. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration..00. Inc.R. More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances. the moral damages should be reduced to P300. 247 PHIL 231-242) ||| SYLLABUS 1.requiring prompt delivery of the respondent's luggage on or before a certain date. 2. Intermediate Appellate Court. MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 78656. This award should be reasonably sufficient to indemnify private respondent for the humiliation and embarrassment that he suffered and to serve as an example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive and discriminatory acts. BASIS FOR THE AWARD THEREOF IN THE CASE AT BAR. ID. (Pan American World Airways. Considering the circumstances of this case and the social standing of private respondent in the community. Consequently. v. G. — Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private respondent Vinluan for the sake of economy. He was a director of several companies and was active in civic and social organizations in the Philippines. amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. 1988]) ||| .R. Court of Appeals. DAMAGES. [August 30. However. particularly as to their convenience.000.00. — The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was subjected is undeniable. the private respondent was a practicing lawyer. MORAL DAMAGES. and the exemplary damages should be reduced to P200. ID.000. No.. the award of moral and exemplary damages by the respondent court is in order. a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. At the time of this unfortunate incident. CIVIL LAW. PRESENCE OF BAD FAITH JUSTIFIES AWARD THEREOF. G. 70462. [August 11.