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y The Henry Jackson Society

Background Briefing
communications@henryjacksonsociety.org http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org

Economic realities and socio-political solutions
By George Grant

Al-Qaeda and radical Islam:
Executive Summary
1. In the eight years since 9/11, al-Qaeda has become synonymous with Islamic extremism in the minds of many. The reality, however, is that al-Qaeda and its allies are very much minority Islamist movements. Moreover, what drives many of alQaeda’s so-called adherents is not ideology but poverty and a profound resentment at the corruption and mismanagement of ruling regimes. 2. In contrast to al-Qaeda’s globalist agenda, most Islamist movements are and always have been more concerned with rectifying the perceived failures of their own leaders and fellow Muslims. Conflating such organisations with al-Qaeda, particularly since many have renounced violence in recent years, is providing repressive regimes with an excuse to suppress all dissent in the name of aiding in the “War on Terror”, as well as pouring fuel on the fire of violent antiWesternism. 3. Al-Qaeda’s charge is that only a total rejection of non-Muslim innovations and a return to their interpretation of Islamic fundamentals can restore the Muslim world. On the contrary, if the Muslim world is to revive its fortunes and the appeal of radicalism is to be reduced, it must evidence a greater willingness to engage with outside ideas and innovations, philosophically as much as technologically. Concomitant with efforts to reduce poverty and corruption must be advances in the fields of democracy, freedom of expression and the rule of law. 4. However, if these vital reforms are to succeed in the long-term, they must take place within a recognisably Islamic framework and be driven forward by Muslims themselves. This cannot become a dialectic with Islamism on the one hand and secularism on the other. A renaissance within Islamic intellectual and theological discourse is a fundamental prerequisite to dismantling al-Qaeda’s claim to theological credibility and ultimately to bringing about its demise.

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Al-Qaeda: Popular perceptions and economic realities
It may seem a statement of the obvious that in order to win the fight against radical Islam, we must first understand what exactly it is that motivates those who subscribe to its cause. Unfortunately, eight years after the attacks of 11 September 2001, far too many people remain lamentably unclear on this point. To a certain extent, the blame for this can be levelled at the policy makers, journalists and others supposedly charged with explaining such things to us, particularly given how prominent a feature this issue is in the public consciousness. However, credit must also be given where it’s due, to al-Qaeda and its allies, who have proved that you don’t need a multimillion dollar public relations machine at your disposal to be effective at putting across the message that you want everyone to hear and believe. un-Islamic, but the entire concept of the nation state. Any human rights law that does not wholly correspond to the strictest interpretation of Sharia law is likewise summarily rejected. The final stumbling block, of course, is that peaceful coexistence with any non-Muslim and even any Muslim who does not embrace al-Qaeda’s particular interpretation of Islam is also impossible. Set in this context, the prospect of success in countries where the West is engaged but in which al-Qaeda’s philosophy is believed to hold as the solution to – more mundane grievances such as poverty, lack of opportunity, poor education, resentment at the oppression of domestic regimes and the West’s perceived role in the perpetuation of this misery. For many, indeed, it is grievances such as these that serve as the principle motivators to take up arms and jihadist movements are merely a means to an end. When journalists and others recoil at the prospect of “negotiating with moderate elements of the Taliban” as wholly unacceptable and defeatist, they do the Taliban a service by crediting it with a great deal more unity than it deserves, and many of its supporters with a coherent ideological conviction that in many cases simply does not exist. In Afghanistan, one of the world’s poorest countries, a significant part of the problem can be explained by reverting to basic mathematics. The Taliban pay their fighters $10 a day to take up arms, whereas the Afghan government pays just $4 a day.i This in a country where the average daily income is just $2 a day and unemployment is at 40 per cent.ii iii

Were it the case, as alQaeda would have us suppose, that the overriding motivation of every subscriber to its cause was the sincerest conviction that the al-Qaeda leadership’s violent ideology was the right one, to the point that they were happily willing to kill and be killed in its propagation, then we would be in real trouble. How can one beat an ideology in which everyone who walks under its banner is not only willing but eager to lay down his life in its defence? How can meaningful negotiations be had with people who operate within a paradigm so completely antithetical to one’s own that compromise acceptable to either side is quite impossible? Al-Qaeda, after all, rejects democracy not just as anathema, but as a rival religion, thus making adherence to it a crime punishable by death. Likewise, al-Qaeda refutes not only governments perceived as

Though al-Qaeda and its allies proclaim an over-arching ideological cause, this cause is sustained by and erroneously sold as the solution to - more mundane grievances such as poverty, lack of opportunity, poor education, resentment at the oppression of domestic regimes and the West’s perceived role in the perpetuation of this misery.
sway seem distant indeed. When, in Afghanistan, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar declares that “NATO has the watches, but we have all the time”, Western publics can perhaps be forgiven for believing the war to be unwinnable. Yet the reality of the situation is in fact quite different. It is true that the leadership of al-Qaeda and affiliated movements, and even some of its foot soldiers, are motivated out of deep-seated ideological convictions but it is impossible to separate these convictions from the lowlier concerns of geo-politics and simple economics. Though al-Qaeda and its allies proclaim an over-arching ideological cause, this cause is sustained by - and erroneously sold

Many Taliban militants are not diehard ideologues, but unemployed farmers, dissatisfied with the failures of the Karzai regime, and in want of a viable alternative. Winning the conflict against the Taliban is about convincing the majority of Afghans that their present and future prospects are brighter without the Taliban than they are with it. Not until this battle is won will the military battle subside with it. The same is likewise true of other alQaeda inspired movements around the world. According to the European Union’s latest terrorism report, two

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of the most dangerous al-Qaedabacked movements operating at present are Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), operating in North Africa, and al-Shabaab, operating in Somalia.iv Officially, AQIM professes many of the same objectives as al-Qaeda, yet all the evidence suggests that the motivations of its supporters are rather more parochial. Algeria, from where AQIM originates, has had significant success in persuading militants to lay down their arms by way of amnesty programmes, suggesting that many of AQIM’s so-called supporters want not so much to overthrow the existing order, as to have the chance to be a part of it. Recently, a number of former AQIM militants advised the Algerian government that tackling poverty was indeed central to winning the war against violent Islamism: “I know militants who repented who have resumed jihad because they were unable to work and live,” Hassan Hmida, a former AQIM militant, told Reuters in July.vi The US State Department’s most recent terrorism report has

likewise cited high unemployment amongst Algerian youth as one of the key drivers behind AQIM’s continued endurance.vii In Somalia, the world’s most comprehensively failed state, an

forthcoming.viii It is no coincidence that al-Shabaab has no discernable presence in Somaliland, the de facto autonomous state in northwestern Somalia. In Somaliland there is not only a comparative level of peace, but jobs, education and a measure of representative democracy that is simply unknown in south-central Somalia, where al-Shabaab is strongest. Moreover, the Somaliland government has a policy of actively countering the growth of the Wahabbist ideology to which al-Qaeda and their allies subscribe, by way of the provision of financial support to dozens of mosques including payments to influential Sheikhs in every major town.ix Though al-Qaeda tries to claim otherwise, much of its so-called support is the result of a shared opposition to the way things are more than any agreement on what the alternatives should look like. Indeed, it is significant that whilst al-Qaeda is explicit in what it opposes, it is deliberately vague about exactly what the Islamic Caliphate that it advocates would stand for, thus enabling it to garner support from as wide a pool of the disenchanted as possible.

almost total lack of opportunity and a widespread mistrust of the central government has fed the long running conflict and the Islamic insurgency, led by al-Shabaab. Moreover, concerns that Somalia may become “the next Afghanistan” are driven as much by the fact of the country’s being an attractive destination for international jihadists who exploit the domestic grievances of Somalis to generate support that would not otherwise be

The Near Enemy and the Far Enemy
It is also the case that even amongst those who are motivated out of genuine ideological convictions, the concern is predominantly with internal matters as opposed to external ones. That is, the majority of Islamist movements operating today are much more interested in rectifying the perceived failings of their own leaders and fellow Muslims than they are in any notion of bringing blood and fire to the West in global jihad. Historically, this has also been the case, making al-Qaeda’s explicitly globalist agenda more an anomaly than the norm. The domestic as opposed to internationalist focus of many Islamist movements was summarised with striking clarity by Muhamad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, the ideological guide of the group that assassinated Egypt’s president Anwar al-Sadat in 1981: “Fighting the near enemy is more important than fighting the distant enemy. In jihad the blood of the Muslims must flow until victory is achieved... To begin the struggle against imperialism would be a work that is neither glorious nor useful, but only a waste of time. It is our duty to concentrate on our Islamic cause, which means first and foremost establishing God’s law in our own country, and causing the word of God to prevail.1”x Nonetheless, such rhetoric is hardly less disturbing on account of the fact that the targets for destruction are domestic as opposed to international. Indeed, the bloodshed caused by such movements over the years has easily matched if not surpassed that achieved by al-Qaeda to date. Throughout the 1990s, Egypt, as elsewhere in North Africa, was rocked by an Islamist insurgency seeking to impose its solutions by violent means. Civilians, including tourists, were frequently targeted, culminating with the massacre of more than 60 people at a temple in Luxor in 1997.xi In Algeria the violence took the form of an 11year civil war between 1991-2002 [3]

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The Far Enemy- Why Jihad Went Global, by Faraz A. Gerges provides an excellent and much fuller exposition on this point.

that left upwards of 150,000 dead. Today, however, there is evidence that things may be changing. Though firmly opposed to existing regimes, Islamists in the region have largely abandoned violence as a legitimate means of bringing about change. In Egypt, Islamists have not resumed violence since the ceasefire that followed the Luxor massacre, and in Algeria, only AQIM continues to advocate violence. Many analysts believe AQIM has lost much of its support and influence and all of the main Islamist parties have explicitly disassociated themselves from its violent message.xii Moreover, there are also encouraging signs that many Islamists have now reconciled themselves to operating within a recognisably national and democratic framework. Whilst continuing to demand the application of Shari’a law, they now

tacitly acknowledge the need for it to take account of contemporary social realities and, consequently, for interpretative reasoning (ijtihad) and

By conflating Islamism wholesale with the ideology of al-Qaeda, the West has succeeded in providing repressive regimes with an excuse to suppress any Islamist movement, peaceful or not, that threatens their position in the name of aiding in the “War on Terror.”
deliberative processes to play their part in its elaboration.xiii This is not to suggest that Islamist movements are travelling inexorably toward the glorious sunlit uplands of liberal democracy, but it is important to draw the distinctions between them and al-Qaeda. It is

of great importance that Western policy makers take account of this fact when determining how best to conduct relations with Muslim states. By conflating Islamism wholesale with the ideology of al-Qaeda, the West has succeeded in providing repressive regimes with an excuse to suppress any Islamist movement, peaceful or not, that threatens their position in the name of aiding in the “War on Terror.” This results in the alienation of many Muslims otherwise opposed to violent resistance and pours fuel on the fire of antiWesternism as a motivator of Islamist insurgents. Such a conflation also risks unnecessarily curtailing what progress can and needs to be made within the ideology and goals of Islamists themselves by artificially putting them in al-Qaeda’s camp and making violent resistance a much more attractive option.

Render unto God that which is Caesar’s: Sunni Islam’s answer to the separation of “Church and State”
That such political and philosophical progress does take place within an Islamic theological sphere is important. The drive to promote democracy and the rule of law in the Muslim World cannot be presented as a dichotomy between full-blown and progressive secularism on the one hand and regressive and violent Islamism on the other. Indeed, expecting reform to take place wholly independent of Islamic influences is not only unrealistic but potentially counterproductive. In order to understand the significance of this point it is necessary to bear in mind the very different socio-political contexts in which the Muslim world and the West have evolved over the centuries. Whereas the separation of church and state has always been possible in the Christian world on account of Christ’s famous command, “Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and unto God that which is God’s”, the same cannot be said of Islam. In Sunni Islam, to of Islamic influence from the political sphere is seen not only as retrograde but wholly apostate. Understanding this also sheds greater light on the concept of the Muslim nation, and why it is that perceived injustices perpetuated upon Muslims in Palestine, for instance, can serve to radicalise Muslims living hundreds or even thousands of miles away. In the West, one of the consequences of the separation of church and state is that national identity has become principally determined in terms of where one lives as opposed to what one believes. In Sunni Islam, it could be said that the reverse is true. As already discussed, this does not mean that all Muslims subscribe to al-Qaeda’s vision of uniting the world under a single caliphate; rectifying local wrongs is the priority, but it does help to explain the strong affiliation many Muslims feel with coreligionists in foreign countries.

which al-Qaeda and the majority of Muslims subscribe, God’s law is very much the nation’s law, a law that extends to every part of Muslim life. Consequently, a total excising

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This relationship needs to be understood on another level also, which helps to explain the appeal of radical Islamism not just to the al-Qaeda hard-core, but also to all those others who are acutely aware and resentful of the Muslim world’s current weakness. Unlike Christianity, which teaches the insufficiency of human action to make man right with God, Islam is an orthopraxic religion in which the success or failure of a human being to find favour with the Almighty very much depends on his or her actions and behaviour. The ‘Five Pillars of Islam’ incumbent on every Muslim are based entirely on human action.2 Out of this has come a doctrine sometimes known as ‘Manifest Success’ in which the extent to which Muslims can know divine favour can be directly measured against the extent of their earthly success.xiv This doctrine is born out entirely by the astonishing success of Mohammad in spreading Islam during his life in the 7th century, since to Muslim eyes he was entirely faithful to God both doctrinally and

in terms of his character. Further success following his death in 632, which saw the dramatic expansion of Muslim territory out of the Arab world and into the Byzantine Empire, all the remainder of the Persian Empire, North Africa, India, South East Asia, parts of China and even Europe, confirmed, to Muslim eyes, that God was on their side.xv The important factor here is that all this had been done by Muslims without compromising their religion. That is to say that there had been no question of Muslims compromising their ideology in return for earthly gain, rather on the contrary, it was precisely because they had remained true to their religion that earthly gain had been granted to them by God. Consequently, the appeal of alQaeda’s ideology is that it offers a seemingly plausible explanation for the very weak geo-political position in which the Muslim world finds itself relative to the West. The claim of al-Qaeda and its allies is that Muslims have strayed far from the way of life advocated by the Quran and lived out by Mohammed, that

no country is today ruled wholly consistent with God’s law and that only a radical socio-political return to the perceived ways of Mohammed can reverse the Muslim world’s faltering fortunes. Indeed, the logic behind al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks was not simply to strike a blow against the United States as an end in itself, rather the attacks were intended to spark revolutions across the Muslim world; to replace US-backed regimes with Islamist ones by demonstrating the vulnerability of the United States and by extension the weakness of its apostate puppet regimes in Middle East and beyond. To impoverished Muslims, resentful at their lack of opportunities and the corruption of their leaders, and acutely aware of the Muslim world’s geo-political weakness, this explanation can seem appealing. It is, however, wholly erroneous. The reality is that the Muslim world’s geo-political weakness is the result of too little engagement with the non-Muslim world as opposed to too much.

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These are: Shahadah (profession of faith), Salah (ritual prayer 5 times a day), Sawm (fasting during Ramadan), Zakat (tax on the community) and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca)

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The Civilisation to end all civilisations? The cost of cultural isolationism
It has been to the lasting loss of Islamic civilisation that for too long it was so convinced of its own moral, political and cultural superiority that it made virtually no effort to learn from or to respect the outside world, and in particular, from the West. After all, in Islam, both Christianity and Judaism are corrupted deviations from God’s true way, and the message given by God to Mohammed is his final, authentic revelation. How then, could Muslims possibly move forwards by going backwards? This reluctance to engage with the West manifested itself in a number of fields. Technologically and scientifically, Western advances were frequently dismissed as mere ‘Frankish trickery’ as opposed to being studied and taken seriously.xvi Muslim advances in the fields of science and mathematics are not to be denied, but this early superiority ironically only made matters worse. When Western advances in these fields began to match and ultimately supersede those being made in the Islamic world, Muslims were painfully slow at acknowledging this fact and reacting accordingly. A telling indicator of how unconcerned the Muslim world was with knowing what the West was up to can be seen by the fact that the first permanent Ottoman diplomatic mission in Europe was not established until 1793.xvii Much the same has been true of the Muslim attitude to nonMuslim literature, be it historical, philosophical or merely cultural. Though again it is true that some pre-Islamic literature and philosophy, for instance the Platonic dialogues, were subjected to study and interpretation, this inquisitiveness has not extended to more recent works. Indeed, the extent of the Muslim world’s studied disinterest in non-Muslim literature can be seen from the disturbing statistic provided by the United Nations Development Programme in its 2003 Arab Development Report, that the total number of books translated into Arabic in the last 1,000 years, roughly equates to what Spain translates in a single year.xviii This failure to engage with methods and ideas that challenged existing assumptions has taken a Progress in almost any field, be it scientific, philosophical or otherwise, is very largely dependant upon practitioners subjecting their work to criticism, learning from others, and engaging in open-minded debate with people of a different point of view. In his work, On Liberty, the English philosopher J S Mill famously explained the danger to those unwilling to admit of opinions differing from their own: “If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error... There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and to point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life.” The ideology of al-Qaeda, which not only rejects any innovation or points of view not directly in conformity with their strict interpretation of Quaranic precepts, but which advocates extreme violence against all those, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who say otherwise, is thus the very last thing the Muslim world needs if it wishes to prosper. Unfortunately, al-Qaeda’s position is given a boon on account of its opposition to the wholly unIslamic despotism of the majority of governments throughout the Muslim [6]

The ideology of al-Qaeda, which not only rejects any innovation or points of view not directly in conformity with their strict interpretation of Quaranic precepts, but which advocates extreme violence against all those, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who say otherwise, is thus the very last thing the Muslim world needs if it wishes to prosper.
heavy toll on the Muslim world’s development. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of the extent of this failure can be seen through an examination of Nobel Laureates. Since the founding of the Nobel prizes in 1901, the recipients of which are generally considered to be the very best in their respective fields, 878 prizes have been awarded, in the fields of Chemistry, Economics, Literature, Peace and Physics. To date, just seven of those have come from the Arab world.xix

world. Al-Qaeda is surely correct in its assertion that these regimes have abandoned Quaranic principals, but they are absolutely incorrect when they assert that this is because these regimes have sold out to corrupt Western practices. The reality is that governments of Muslim countries are just as far away from the Western ideal as they are from the Islamic one. Yet whereas Islamic civilisation suffered historically from its reluctance to embrace external progress in any field, the modern era has witnessed regimes in Muslim countries embracing wholeheartedly Western technological and military innovations, whilst continuing to spurn reform in the fields of freedom of expression, democracy and human rights. Western collaboration with such regimes, be it for oil contracts, ‘winning the war on terrorism’, or some other consideration of realpolitik, only serves to further exacerbate the perception among Muslims that these regimes have rejected Islam in favour of Western modernity, and moreover, that the West is also responsible for their predicament. The reality, however, is that these regimes are anything but Western in their ideals and modern only in their means of repression. Just two of the world’s 47 Muslim-majority countries are full democracies, Indonesia and Mali, and throughout the Muslim world, freedom of the press - and freedom of expression generally - is severely restricted, corruption is endemic and the rule of law woefully limited.xx The official use of torture and widespread persecution that persists in many of these states has been instrumental in perpetuating a culture of victimhood and a desire for revenge that has enabled radical Islamist movements to mobilize generations of new recruits.xxi

It is progress in these fields, more than any other, that the Muslim world desperately needs and it is principally through reform in these fields that support for al-Qaeda and its ideology will be reduced to the greatest possible extent. Certainly, the West has its part to play in this, but the impetus must primarily come from Muslims themselves. So long as

The move toward reform cannot take place outside of the Islamic intellectual paradigm. If the choice is presented as a dialectic between radical Islam on the one hand and full-blown secularism on the other, then the consequences will not be happy ones. It is incumbent upon Muslim scholars, authors, journalists and others to provide the necessary, theologically grounded rebuttals to extremist interpretations of the Quran. Crucially, this means a greater willingness to accept criticism and to engage with new ideas and to accept the validity of differing points of view than is presently in evidence across much of the Muslim world. It also means an end to the culture of blaming external actors for all the Muslims world’s ills. Zionists and the West can only take so much of the blame. Perhaps no better illustration of the extent of this problem is the frighteningly low proportion of Muslims who believe Arabs were responsible for the 11 September attacks on the United States. According to the global opinion research agency Pew, barely one in seven Muslims believe that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks, based on a survey carried out in 2006 across Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey. The use of the word ‘Arab’ as opposed to ‘Muslim’ is significant, as it does not allow for respondents to answer on the basis that in their opinion the attackers were not true Muslims. Moreover, when asked “What is Most Responsible for Muslim Nations’ Lack of Prosperity”, almost 50 per cent cited “US & Western policies”, more than for any of the other four options which included “Government Corruption” (42%); “Lack of Education” (43%); “Islamic Fundamentalism” (13%) and “Lack of Democracy” (32%).xxii [7]

al-Qaeda and even more regionally focused Islamist extremists are able to dominate the resistance agenda, they will continue to enjoy levels of support disproportionate to the popularity of their message.

So long as al-Qaeda and even more regionally focused Islamist extremists are able to dominate the resistance agenda, they will continue to enjoy levels of support disproportionate to the popularity of their message.
Indeed, equal to the need for efforts at democratic reform and poverty reduction is a much stronger theological, intellectual and philosophical movement amongst Muslims to counter these radical ideologies. This is not, by any means, to suggest that such alternatives do not exist at present, but it is to say that these movements are often not as well-developed nor as vocal as they should be.

Conclusion
The greatest strength of al-Qaeda and related Islamist movements is not what they stand for but their effectiveness at highlighting what they oppose and offering themselves as a credible alternative. The irony is that much of what Al-Qaeda and those who oppose them stand against is the same. Both are in agreement that the majority of governments in Muslim countries are corrupt and ineffectual. Both are in agreement that the predicament of many ordinary Muslims is unacceptable and needs to change. It is the solutions themselves that are radically different. Many and almost certainly the majority of those who support al-Qaeda do so not because they passionately believe in al-Qaeda’s philosophy, but because they, like al-Qaeda, bitterly oppose the existing state of affairs. In the absence of coherent, credible alternatives, joining al-Qaeda as a means to an end thus becomes attractive. Reducing that pool of disenchanted to the greatest possible extent is therefore central to reducing the appeal of radical ideology and overcoming al-Qaeda and its allies. Efforts to reduce poverty and corruption and to increase opportunities in Muslim countries are vital to that end. Concomitant with such efforts must also be advances in the fields of democracy, freedom of expression and the rule of law, for it is in principally in the absence of the latter that the former proliferate. Yet if these necessary reforms are to succeed in the long-term, they must take place within a recognisably Islamic framework and be driven forward by Muslims themselves. This cannot become a dialectic with Islamism on the one hand and secularism on the other. A renaissance within Islamic intellectual and theological discourse is a fundamental prerequisite to dismantling al-Qaeda’s claim to theological credibility and ultimately to bringing about its demise. Not until these developments take place will al-Qaeda be overcome and nor, indeed, will the Muslim world start to fulfil its vast but far too often squandered potential.

The greatest strength of Al-Qaeda and related Islamist movements is not what they stand for but their effectiveness at highlighting what they oppose and offering themselves as a credible alternative. The irony is that much of what Al-Qaeda and those who oppose them stand against is the same.

George Grant is Africa Section Director at the Henry Jackson Society

The Henry Jackson Society is named after
United States Democrat Senator, Henry M. Jackson. The Society is a registered charity for the understanding and articulation of democratic geopolitics—a proactive and principled foreign policy which differentiates between constitutionally governed countries and autocratic regimes.

‘In matters of national security, the best politics is no politics.’
— Henry M. Jackson

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End notes
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii

http://www.mod.gov.af/ http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-04-02-IEDs_N.htm https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2009.pdf http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLG291757 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF115023 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122433.htm http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6788623.ece Angel Rabasa (2009): Radical Islam in East Africa, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, p.30 Lewis, Bernard (2002): What went wrong – Approaches to the modernity of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.107-8 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/32179.stm http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2884&l=1 & http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLI168211 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2618&l=1 Geaves, Ron; Gabriel, Theodore; Haddad, Yvonne & Idleman Smith, Jane (eds.) (1994): Islam and the West Post 9/11, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, pp.1-2 Ibid., pp.1-2 Lewis, Bernard (2002): What went wrong – Approaches to the modernity of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.75-81 Ibid., p.40 & p.65 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/arabstates/RBAS_ahdr2003_EN.pdf http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all/ http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009 Fawaz A. Gerges (2005): The Far Enemy – Why Jihad went Global, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.9 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=832

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