Research Programme

Management
Supply chain safety management - test case 1: wheelsets

R&D Programme: report commentary

Supply chain safety management – test case 1: wheelsets
Research aims This project was required to identify potential supply contracts covering wheelset purchase and sample the existing elements in the supply chain to cover a representative cross section of suppliers and products within the supply chain. Research findings The findings from the research revealed considerable shortcomings in the supply chain. However, it did identify some areas defined as ‘quick wins’, where a fast benefit response can be made at a low cost. The research did not delve into the contractual side of wheelset procurement as anticipated; however the report is regarded as a useful reference for stakeholder consideration. Next steps The Research and Development team are currently undertaking a major consultation with stakeholders to determine the priorities for research in the 2004/05 financial year. Through this process, and reflecting stakeholder views, a decision will be taken as to what direction follow-on work is undertaken. Contact Richard Wheldon Head of Management Research Research and Development Programme Rail Safety and Standards Board richard.wheldon@rssb.co.uk

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RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD Safety Critical SCSM Wheelset Procurement Test Case Final Report

Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) Safety Critical Supply Chain Safety Management (SCSM) Wheelsets Procurement Test Case

Final Report

JOB NUMBER: 5014014 Issue 0 Issue 1 Draft Issue to RSSB First Issue

DOCUMENT REF: 5014014/doc/04 P Waite P Waite S Clark S Clark I Shannon I Shannon 20/06/03 10/07/03

Originated Revision Purpose Description

Reviewed

Authorised

Date

© Copyright 2004 Rail Safety and Standards Board
This publication may be reproduced free of charge for research, private study or for internal circulation within an organisation. This is subject to it being reproduced and referenced accurately and not being used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as the copyright of Rail Safety and Standards Board and the title of the publication specified accordingly. For any other use of the material please apply to RSSB's Head of Research and Development for permission. Any additional queries can be directed to research@rssb.co.uk. This publication can be accessed via the RSSB website www.rssb.co.uk

RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD Safety Critical SCSM Wheelset Procurement Test Case Final Report

Contents
Section
Executive Summary 1. 2. 3. 4.
4.1 4.2 4.3

Page
3 5 7 8 9
9 9 10

Introduction Scope and Purpose Status Wheelsets
Types Characteristics Standards

5.
5.1 5.2 5.3

Supply Chain
Generic Model Wheelsets Supply Chain Members

18
18 19 19

6.
6.1 6.2 6.3

Existing Accreditation Schemes
Background to Existing Accreditation Schemes Railway Group Standards Link-Up

23
23 23 24

7.
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

Failure Data Review
Background to Failure Review Wheel Failures Axle Failures Bearing Failures Conclusions from Failure Review

26
26 27 28 30 30

8.
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

Test Case Selection
Test Case 1 –First Great Western Class 180 (New Build) Test Case 2a – EWS Class 47 Locomotive (Overhaul) Test Case 2b – Plasser 07 Tamper (Overhaul of Maintenance Machine) Test Case 3 – Connex Class 465/0 & 1 EMUs (Replacement)

36
37 37 37 37

9. 10.
10.1 10.2 10.3

Supplier Questionnaires Findings
Overall Train Operation Train Ownership
1

45 47
47 48 50
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10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9

Train and Bogie Manufacture Train Overhaul and Maintenance Wheelset Agent Wheel and Axle Manufacture Standards Engineering Acceptance

52 52 53 53 54 55

11. 12.
12.1 12.2 12.3

Conclusions and Recommendations References
General Railway Group Standards Other Standards

57 62
62 62 62

13.

Glossary of Abbreviations Supply Chain Lifecycle

63

Appendix A

Appendix B Generic Question Set Appendix C Generic Question Set Mapping to SCSM Baseline Assessment Criteria

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Executive Summary
The Rail Safety & Standards Board (RSSB) has initiated a programme of work aimed at creating and deploying an improved method of working for the accreditation of suppliers of safety critical products and services. Atkins were commissioned to undertake one of the supporting work packages to this programme providing ‘test case’ research into the existing supply chain and procurement processes involved in the supply of Railway Wheelsets. This report is the final overall study report which describes the work undertaken and presents the results and conclusions from the research. The report provides an overview of the different types of wheelsets and their key characteristics in so far as these affect procurement processes and supply chain controls. A model of the activities and processes involved in the supply chain for wheelsets for use on Network Rail Controlled Infrastructure (NRCI) is also developed. The research also includes a review of existing accreditation schemes associated with the supply of wheelsets and a review of failure data over the last 25 years. A justification is given for the selection of a small number of sample supply chains on which to base the study. These were chosen to provide a diverse selection of supply routes and ensure as broad a perspective as possible is provided of the entire supply chain. A supplier questionnaire was developed in order to elicit information on the supplier safety management processes currently in place in each sample supply chain and responses from representatives from the members of each supply chain have been used to draw conclusions and support recommendations for possible improvements. A total of 23 individual recommendations have been made. The principal issues identified as requiring improvement relate to: • • The majority of influence in the risk associated with wheelsets rests with the authors of the relevant standards and the design authority. The key supply chain issue is whether the product producers in the supply chain can provide wheelsets in accordance with the specifications and standards consistently. Problems during manufacture are still resulting in occasional wheelset failures. There is a need for more effective auditing of suppliers of wheelsets. Supplier audits should be co-ordinated to ensure capability to meet all RGS requirements can be demonstrated by all parties from steel makers to wheelset overhaulers.

• • •

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Overall the strengths of the wheelset supply chain are the high level of safety awareness amongst all parties interviewed, the introduction of a more formalised way of setting supplier approval criteria in GM/RT2470 and the improvement made in wheelset standards over the years demonstrated by the low number of generic failure modes encountered. The weaknesses of the wheelset supply chain are the lack of co-ordination currently displayed in setting up safety critical supplier accreditation procedures, the level of interpretation required in setting up suitable audit teams under GM/RT2470 and the lack of information flow from operators down to the supply base to enable suppliers to better understand the risks they can import to train operation.

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1.

Introduction
In his report into the Ladbroke Grove Rail Accident, Lord Cullen recommended that: “Suppliers of products or services of a safety critical kind for use on, or regard to, the railways in Great Britain should be required to hold an accreditation as a condition of being able to engage in that activity. But the features of such a system require further study”. In response to this recommendation the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) has initiated a programme of work aimed at creating and deploying an improved method of working for the accreditation of suppliers of safety critical products and services. The programme of work to develop the new method of working is known as the Supply Chain Safety Management (SCSM) Programme (Reference 1). One of the supporting work packages to the SCSM Programme provides ‘test case’ research into the existing supply chain and procurement processes involved in the supply of Railway Wheelsets (Reference 2). Atkins were commissioned in February 2003 to undertake this package of work and this report is the final study report which describes the work undertaken and presents the results and conclusions.

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The report comprises a summary and 13 main sections as follows:

Executive Summary Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Introduction Scope and Purpose Status Wheelsets Supply Chain

Overall summary of project objectives, findings and recommendations. This section. A summary of the remit for this test case research. A statement on behalf of RSSB. Summary technical description of wheelsets. A description of the overall breadth and depth of the supply chain for wheelsets identifying the principal supply chain members. A review of existing schemes for the accreditation of members of the wheelset supply chain. A review of historical failure records for wheelsets. A justification for the selection of the chosen test case supply chains as being representative samples. A description of the approach adopted to elicit the information from industry to support this study. An extraction of the key findings from the test case research. Conclusions and recommendations arising from the findings. Key documents referenced in this report. Glossary of abbreviations.

Section 6

Existing Accreditation Schemes Failure Data Review Test Case Selection

Section 7 Section 8

Section 9

Data Collection Methodology Findings Conclusions and Recommendations References Glossary of Abbreviations

Section 10 Section 11 Section 12 Section 13

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2.

Scope and Purpose
The scope of this test case research was to provide a review of the supply chain processes and accreditations currently in place for a representative sample of wheelsets currently in use on UK National Railways, i.e. on Network Rail Controlled Infrastructure (NRCI). This included: • • • • • • Reviewing how responsibilities for safety are handled and what checks and controls are in place; Considering the information flow through the supply chain to support safety activities; Analysing the safety culture prevalent in the supply chain; Analysing failure / incident reporting and learning; Identifying best practice; Suggesting any quick win solutions.

The purpose of the work was to identify, through the choice of a number of selected test cases, a map of the flow of procurement through the supply chain from initial procurer through to all subcontractors. The investigation then considered safety and technical requirement specification and technical information flow from purchaser to supplier and vice-versa. In addition to capturing current practice in the supply of wheel sets, the work also aims to provide advice and assistance to develop and build upon good practice within this particular domain of product procurement.

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3.

Status
This report was commissioned by the RSSB (formerly Railway Safety) as part of their Research Programme, and produced by Atkins. Any findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the report are those of Atkins. RSSB, on behalf of the rail industry, will consider any such conclusions and recommendations, and what action needs to be taken as a result. A formal response will then be issued by RSSB as necessary. This report is strictly confidential and is not for copying and/or further distribution without permission from RSSB.

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4.
4.1

Wheelsets
Types
A wheelset is defined in the relevant British Standard (BS5892) as “a complete unit comprising an axle, two wheels together with any gear wheels, brake discs etc. but without axlebox bearings and their end caps, spacers, seals and other associated fittings”. Figure 4-1 shows a simplified wheelset construction. Traditionally within the rail industry the wheelset has been considered to be the unsprung parts of a train, that is the parts between the rail and the first stage of suspension. This could include, in addition to the items defined above, such components as axle bearings, axlebox, seals, axle end equipment for wheel slip protection (WSP) or speed signal, earth return equipment which can be mounted on axle end or on the axle body, and part of the transmission equipment such as motor suspension tube in the case of axle hung nose suspended motors. There are many different types of railway wheelset operating on NRCI. Prior to privatisation it was possible to interrogate the RAVERS database using a “Ferrit” report to identify the catalogue number and some details of each type including the class of vehicles to which the wheelsets were fitted. During privatisation the data contained in such databases was segregated so that one train operator could not establish the wheelsets that were being operated by another train operator without obtaining prior permission. As a result it is not possible to run such a report without obtaining the permission of some 30 train operators. According to the RAVERS Help Desk running such a report now, even with the train operators permission, would not be straightforward as the data segregation may require a series of some 30 reports to be generated. Table 4-1 shows an example of the data that can be extracted from the RAVERS database for some rolling stock that was operating in 1989 and is thought to be still operational today. As it is not possible to obtain a complete list of the wheelset types in operation within the timescale for this report a more qualitative approach has been adopted. Since the study is about Supply Chain Safety Management, a list of the technical differences between the wheelset types known to be operating on NRCI has been compiled. To this list has been added comments regarding the significance of these differences in terms of the effect they have on the risk control measures required to ensure satisfactory performance in service, see Table 4-2.

4.2

Characteristics
Wheelsets can be characterised by the functions they perform. These include: • • • • Supporting the static weight of the vehicles. Providing dynamic isolation of the vehicles from the track. Providing guidance for the train along the track. Providing a force path for the train’s traction and braking systems.
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• •

Providing a return to earth for the train’s electrical systems. Supporting other equipment, e.g. WSP and speed sensing equipment.

Safety can be compromised when one of these functions is not performed correctly. This can arise from a number of different root causes. As part of this study we have also looked at historical failure data for wheelsets to identify, in as much detail as records permit, the root causes of known wheelset failures on the UK Main Line railway (see Section 7).

4.3

Standards
Wheelsets used exclusively on NRCI must comply with the Railway Group Standards (RGS) in order for the trains to be given Route Acceptance to operate. The only exception to this is that ‘high speed’ trains that must comply with the Technical Standards for Interoperability (TSIs) and Notified National Standards. At present most of the standards relevant to wheelsets are Notified National Standards and a separate project is being undertaken to resolve the potential conflicts that can arise in the standards as a result. Internationally registered vehicles used outside the UK for prescribed periods need to comply with the relevant RIV (Regulations concerning the reciprocal use of wagons in international traffic) or RIC (Regulations governing the reciprocal use of carriages and brake vans in international traffic) regulations and appropriate technical standards and as such do not need to comply with the RGS. This investigation has been scoped on the basis of considering those vehicles operating exclusively on NRCI and therefore governed by the RGS as this covers the vast majority of wheelsets currently operating on these routes. Table 4-3 lists the RGS and typical associated standards or specifications concerned directly with the life cycle processes concerned with wheelsets. The associated standards and specifications are ‘typical’ as RGS do not prescribe particular associated standards and therefore they are contract specific. However, many of these associated documents are referred to in RGS as examples of good practice. The standards applicable to wheelsets under all types of rolling stock, excluding road/rail vehicles, on track machines and ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for shared running on NRCI’, are governed by the same suite of RGS. In the case of the exceptions there are simplified means of complying with RGS stated in the relevant RGS, also listed in Table 4-3. As the number of wheelsets fitted to locomotives, coaches, multiple units and wagons are far larger than those fitted to road/rail vehicles, on track machines and ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for shared running on NRCI’, the study concentrated most effort on the supply chains for the former groups, although some investigation was undertaken on an example of the latter group. In the case of locomotives, coaches, multiple units and wagons, the standards control to some level the process activities throughout the life cycle of a wheelset from specification, through manufacture, assembly and transportation to operation, repair and overhaul, see Appendix A It should be noted that these processes were . formally laid out during the early 1990s during the lead up to rail privatisation and whilst some of these standards simply formalised existing practice within British Rail

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the opportunity was taken to introduce some improvements in safety assurance (for example the independent scrutiny of Maintenance Plans and the setting down of Wheelset and Axle Bearing Maintenance and Overhaul Policies by train operators). This is explained in more detail in Section 5.1 of this report. On 7 December 2002 GM/RT2470 was brought into force. This standard lays down the method by which RSSB will approve suppliers of wheelsets. Prior to the introduction of this standard a list of approved wheelset manufacturers and assemblers existed in GM/RM2525 INF, however the process of approval was not clearly defined and there appears to have been no automatic mechanism f r the o removal of the approval (see Section 6.2). The list of approved suppliers was inherited by Railway Safety (now RSSB) from Railtrack. A meeting was held in May 2003 chaired by RSSB with the intention of agreeing to certain interpretations of GM/RT2470. It is understood that this will be contained in a “Guidance Note” that will be issued in early 2004. It is disappointing that the delay in issuing this note will reduce the available time for companies to undertake the Entry Audits specified to be complete by December of next year. Furthermore it is understood that RSSB do not intend to formally accredit teams of auditors and provide a register of approved auditors. C ompanies requiring audit will therefore have to search for audit teams to commission and then approach RSSB to establish if the team selected in each case will be acceptable to them to avoid obtaining a recommendation based upon audit that is later rejected by RSSB on the grounds of lack of relevant knowledge and experience of the audit team. Whilst this can be seen as a means of expanding the potential audit team it could be more effectively achieved by an accreditation process that accepted applications from teams nominated by any interested party.

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Table 4-1 : Example of Wheelset Type Data Extracted from RAVERS
Journal Diameter 120 Bearing Type Roller Roller Roller Wheel Type Solid Solid Solid Brakes Tread Tread Discs Wheelset Type Final Drive Trailer Trailer Wheel Dia 800 800 840 Bogie Type 14X 14X BX1, BT13, T3 Cat No 015/074216 820/129102 820/129202 097/007164 839/326502 880/502001 880/501901 015/078062 015/078063 015/070373 015/070374 015/070375 015/070376 015/070371 015/070372

Roller Roller

Solid Solid

Discs Tread

Motored Final Drive

840 840

BX1 BX8P, P3-10 BP38,

Roller

Solid

Tread Discs

Trailer Final Drive Trailer Trailer

840 840 840 914

BX8T, BT38 BP62 BT52 BT10

Roller

Solid

Discs Discs

063/009107 800/593101 800/593102

130

140

Roller

Solid

Discs (Axle Mounted) Discs (Axle Mounted) Discs (Axle Mounted) Discs

Final Drive Trailer Trailer Motored

840 840 920 925

P4-4A T4-4A BT41, BT46 BP20, P7-4 097/006474 097/007164 839/306101 097/007127 097/008360 098/009544 880/500001 071/003867 071/004652 071/004653

Roller Roller

Solid Solid

Discs Tread

Motored Motored

925 925

BP27 BP27, P7

Roller

Solid

Tread

Motored

1120

CP3

Roller Roller Roller 150 Roller Roller Roller

Solid Solid Tyred Solid Solid

Discs Discs Tread Dis cs Discs Tread

Motored Trailer Motored Motored Motored Motored

1020 1020 40" 40" 1020 1120

B4 B4 Mk6 P7-3 BP10 CP3 839/374501 071/003866 071/004650 071/004651

Roller Roller Roller

Solid Solid Solid

Tread Tread Tread

Motored Motored Motored

1120 1070 1150

CP19 CP20 BP9 090/002183 090/010685 090/010686 090/011238 090/011702 10/07/03

Roller

Solid

Tread

Motored

1000

BP52

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Journal Diameter 4.875"

Bearing Type Roller Roller

Wheel Type Solid Tyred

Brakes Tread Tread

Wheelset Type Motored Trailer - Pulley

Wheel Dia 42" 914

Bogie Type CP6 B5

Cat No 090/055035 018/000021 018/016649 018/034136 018/034138 018/007787 018/034116 018/034120 018/001879 018/001880 018/001908 018/001909 018/001913 018/034135 018/011625 018/034137 018/011052 018/001464 018/011053 090/008628 090/010687 090/010688 090/010887 090/010888 090/010889 None None None None None None None None None None None

4.625"

Roller

Tyred

Tread

Trailer - Pulley

42"

Commonwealth

Roller Roller

Tyred Tyred

Tread Tread

Motored Motored

42" 40"

Mk4, Mk6 Mk4, Mk6

4.5"

Roller Plain Plain Roller Plain

Tyred Tyred Tyred Tyred Tyred Resilient

Tread Tread Discs Discs Tread Tread

Trailer - Pulley Trailer - Pulley Trailer - Pulley Trailer - Pulley Trailer - Pulley Motored

914 914 914 914 40" 1155

B4 B4 B4 B4 B4 BP9

6.5"

Roller

120

Plain Plain Plain Plain Plain

Tyred Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid

Discs Tread Discs Single Disc None Tread Discs Single Disc Tread Discs Single Disc

Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon Wagon

724 953 953 953 953 953 953 953 953 953 953

140

Plain Plain Plain

150

Plain Plain Plain

Note to Table 4-1 : Journal and wheel diameters are in millimetres unless otherwise stated.

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Table 4-2 : Potential Differences in Wheelsets Leading to Different Risk Control Measures in Supply Chain
Factor Vehicle Type Options Locomotive/Multiple Unit/Coach/Wagon/ Plant Comments Application could affect risks to wheelset but not the general vehicle type except the acceptance process for plant is different to that for the other vehicle types. Affects the applied stress and therefore the probability of failure but not a supply chain issue unless design specification is incorrect. Various relating to maximum operational speed. Inter City/Suburban/ Non Passenger Affects the applied stress and therefore the probability and consequence of failure. Is a supply chain issue currently as the specification for NDT and wheel dimensional checks is dependent upon this parameter. Affects the applied stress and therefore the probability of failure. Potential supply chain issue if a vehicle transfers application following design although the load cases used in design should cope with track quality normally experienced on NRCI. Wagons carrying corrosive chemicals require special attention during maintenance. Vehicles running in crush laden condition for most of their operational mileage would need to be tested more frequently. This increases the applied stress, however more sensitive in service NDT is possible from the axle bore. Does introduce some additional operations during manufacture and corrosion protection is an issue for the bore in addition to external surfaces. Provided the requirements of the standards are observed either method should prove satisfactory. In both cases auditable records of the assembly have to be retained and prescribed branding of components assures trace ability. Most wheelsets in the UK are shrink fitted and most in Europe are press fitted. Press fitting increases the chance of damaging the wheelseat. Not considered essential to include examples of each type of fitment in this investigation. Resilient wheels are only used on a few wheelsets; mainly if not exclusively class 86 locomotives. Tyred wheels are more common although usually only on rolling stock more than 30 years old. Tyred wheels introduce different requirements for manufacture and maintenance and additional failure modes. Important issue during design but not considered critical in the selection of samples for this investigation. Apart from an isolated example of freight wheels, manufacture for the UK is by rolling and forging. This is an important issue for Supply Chain Safety Assurance but as the numbers are small in the UK it is not considered critical in the selection of samples for this investigation. Important issue during design but not considered critical in the selection of samples for this investigation. Bearing failures can trigger axle failure. Bearing failures most frequently arise through poor fitment or maintenance and there are a number of standards produced to try to mitigate these risks. Transmission type affects the potential failure modes and the nature of the fitting and maintenance work required. Important issue during design. Assembly is complicated by the need to ensure bearing inner race is secured during wheel fitment.

Axleload Speed

Track Quality

Payload

Passenger/Freight

Axle

Hollow or solid axles

Wheels (1)

Press or Shrink fitted wheels

Wheels (2)

Tyred, Monobloc or resilient wheels

Wheels (3) Wheels (4)

Curly/Straight Webs Rolled and Forged or Cast

Brake Type

Bearing Type

Tread, wheel cheek or axle mounted disc braking Plain/roller/cartridge

Transmission

Bogie Frame

Flexible drive/Quill drive/ Suspension Tube/None Bearings inboard/outboard of wheels

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Table 4-3 : Railway Group and Associated Standards governing Wheelset Processes
Standard BASS 502 BS5892 Pt 1 BS5892 Pt 2 BS5892 Pt 3 BS5892 Pt 4 BS5892 Pt 5 BS5892 Pt 6 GE/RT8250 GH/RT4000 GH/RT4004 GM/RC2516 GM/RT1300 GM/RT2000 GM/RT2001 GM/RT2004 GM/RT2005 GM/RT2020 GM/RT2023 GM/RT2025 GM/RT2026 GM/RT2027 GM/RT2028 GM/RT2030 GM/RT2243 GM/RT2402 GM/RT2450 GM/RT2451 GM/RT2452 GM/RT2466 GM/RT2470 GM/TT0083 GM/TT0089 GM/TT0120 GO/RC3560 GO/RT3260 COS UA 003 IB/CEPS 1002 IB/CEPS 1003 IB/CEPS 1017 IB/CEPS 1039 IB/COS UA 002 IB/MT280 IB/TS0648 IB/TS0692 x IB/TS0801 IB/TS258 MT288 MT300 SMG010 TG/RM0007 Title British Standards Code of Practice for BS5892 Wheelsets Specification for Axles Specification for Forged & Rolled Centres Specification for Monobloc Wheels Specification for Forged & Rolled Tyres Specification for Steel Bars for Retaining Rings Specification for Wheelsets Railway Group Standards Safety Performance Monitoring & Defect Reporting of Railway Vehicles, Plant & Machinery Drugs & Alcohol Changes in Working Hours Code of Practice for Training Personnel Undertaking Bearing Overhaul Engineering Acceptance of Road-Rail Vehicles and Associated Equipment Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles Design Scrutiny for the Acceptance of Rail Vehicles Requirements for Rail Vehicle Maintenance Certification processes for NDT Operatives, Equipment and Facilities used for Inspecting T&RS Policy for the Engineering of Wheelsets used on Railtrack Lines Wheelset Manufacture Branding of Wheels, Tyres and Axles Wheelsets: In Service Safety and Maintenance Attention Wheelsets: Off Vehicle Repair and Overhaul Wheelset Design Axle Bearing Maintenance Parameters for Hot Axlebox Detection Equipment Engineering Acceptance of Rail Mounted Maintenance Machines Qualification of Suppliers Safety Critical Engineering Products and Services Magnetic Particle Inspection Acceptance of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles for Shared Running on Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure Railway Wheelsets (From 2 August 2003) Wheelset Supplier Qualification Wheelset Records Geometric Interfaces between Wheelsets and Track Wheelset Testing Code of Practice: Competence Assessment Competence Management for Safety Critical Work Typical Maintenance Standards SKF SBU Cylindrical Roller Bearing Unit Overhaul Repair/Overhaul of SKF Spherical Roller Bearings Repair/Overhaul of Timken Taper Roller Bearings Repair/Overhaul of Timken SP Cartridge Bearings Repair/Overhaul of Timken AP & SP Cartridge Bearings incorporating Rubber Seals Repair/Overhaul of SKF MBU & TBU Cartridge Bearings Regulations for NDT of Axles Related Information for Wheelset Overhaul and Repair Code of Practice: Repair/Overhaul of Spherical and Taper Roller Bearings Identification & Labelling of Bearings (Draft Only) Fastening of Axle End Caps Wheel Tread Standards and Gauging Handling, Storage and Transportation of Wheelsets Code of Practice: Recording & Tracking Wheelsets in RAVERS RAVERS - NDT Reporting Task Guide 15 10/07/03

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Standard TL/TS0171 TN/TS0574 WOSS 612/10 WOSS 612/13 WOSS 612/27 WOSS 612/3 WOSS 612/5 WOSS 612/6 WOSS200/1

Title Specification for the NDT of New Axles Wheelset Repair Specification Wheelset Overhaul Procedures Assembly of Brake Disc Wheelset Overhaul for BT13, BX1, T3-7 Bogies Assembly of Brake Disc Assembly of Brake Discs Assembly of Brake Disc Inspection of Spur Gears for Mechanical Transmissions

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Figure 4-1 : Simplified Wheelset Construction

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5.
5.1

Supply Chain
Generic Model
Within the rail industry a generic model of a Supply Chain for rolling stock would start with the train operator who makes use of the train but, except for the Freight business, hardly ever purchases it. This is undertaken by Rolling Stock Leasing Companies or other Financial Institutions who provide the finance to have the trains manufactured. The train manufacturer will then usually control the technical requirements for the equipment including bogies and wheelsets although sometimes this will lead to one or more levels of sub-contract. The train manufacturer will usually provide the necessary maintenance documents to form that part of the Maintenance Plan concerned with the train and in some cases will also take full responsibility for the Maintenance including the supply of competent staff and depot and equipment facilities. The Engineering Acceptance process is the means by which the Design, Construction and Maintenance Plans are scrutinised supported by any routine and type testing as appropriate to ensure that the requirements of the relevant Standards are met throughout the life of the vehicles. As such this process is a major building block for the safety assurance of rolling stock. It feeds into the Route Acceptance Safety Case process which considers the interaction of the train with the infrastructure and considers hazards that rem ain potentially uncontrolled by the current standards. Vehicles that have been procured under the Engineering Acceptance process will therefore have detailed Maintenance Plans that will have been independently scrutinised against the requirements of the Railway Group and associated Standards. Vehicles that were procured prior to the establishment of the Engineering Acceptance process will have been procured by or designed by British Railways Board. In the case of these vehicles the Maintenance Plans will have been developed by the British Railways Board and will not have been subject to independent scrutiny. As the maintenance plans contain the documentation that forms the technical specification for the supply of replacement components, overhauled components etc. the completeness and accuracy of these documents is important to the safe operation of the trains. As it is unclear what impact the standards have had on the quality of the technical documentation relating to the supply of wheelsets, taking a wheelset supply sample from the time when British Rail was responsible for the design and from the time when a full independent scrutiny has been carried out is considered a critical factor. It is estimated that around 75% of vehicles currently in service on NRCI would be to a British Rail design or to a rolling stock company design that pre-dates RGS. The remaining 25% are likely to have been procured against the RGS requirements. In theory all wheelsets should now be maintained against a Maintenance Plan that has been scrutinised against RGS requirements, however many of the 75% of the population that predate RGS will have been accepted on the basis that the maintenance plans in existence in 1994 were deemed compliant rather than being developed and undergoing an independent scrutiny against the RGS requirements.

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5.2

Wheelsets
In terms of wheelsets there are perceived to be three circumstances under which they may be supplied, these are: New build Overhaul Replace relating to where wheelsets are being supplied to new trains replacing existing wheelsets during routine bogie overhaul with replacement new, overhauled or repaired wheelsets. out of course replacement of wheelsets with replacement new, overhauled or repaired wheelsets due to failures or defects b eing observed during inspection.

Each type of supply will involve a different route through the supply chain however, the working parameters and controls should remain fundamentally the same. The key activities that are included within each of these supply chain types comprise: Requirements the ability to specify the characteristics and performance of the components, sub assembly or overall installation Design Procure Manufacture the ability to meet the requirements by way of appropriate design incorporating appropriate standards the ability to commercially specify the requirements and design features as well as source appropriate qualified supply routes the ability to make the product in accordance with the procurement specification and demonstrate that the requirements are met by appropriate testing the adoption of appropriate procedures and guidelines to install new or replaced products. the application of routine servicing and repair logistics as per the designed requirements and specifications, including overhaul activity

Install Maintain

The interaction between these key activities should be supported by a full and auditable work process and change management system.

5.3

Supply Chain Members
The route through the supply chain is dependent upon whether the wheelsets are being procured at new build, overhaul or out of course replacement. Figure 5-1 shows the typical supply chain routes for wheelsets. The number of participants involved in the supply chain can vary from two, in the case of a train operator trading with large companies like Bombardier and Alstom to about six in the case of a train operator, vehicle owner, vehicle manufacturer/overhauler, bogie supplier, wheelset supplier and wheelset component suppliers. In some cases a wheelset component manufacturer may sub-contract one or more of the processes shown in the lower 5

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boxes of Figure 5-1. An increase in the number of participants in the supply chain may increase the chance of mis-interpretation of the requirements or may reduce the chance of the specification being correctly revised in reaction to new information about a product’s performance. However, the regulated way in which the Maintenance Plans are developed, involving scrutiny by a Vehicle Acceptance Body (VAB) supported by a Conformance Certification Body (CCB) in the case of RGS or a Notified Body (NoBo) in the case of the TSIs means that essential requirements for safety should be well documented and therefore easily transmitted to parties down the supply chain. The length of the supply chain should therefore not be a critical factor in the decision of which samples to include in the investigation. As stated earlier RGS require that wheelset suppliers should be approved by Railway Safety (now RSSB) and as Train Operators are bound by the RGS no supply chain should involve a wheelset assembler of axle/wheel supplier that is not approved. The branding of each wheelset includes a requirement to add an assemblers and manufacturers code, supplied by RSSB upon their approval, for traceability. Table 51 lists the companies currently approved by R SSB and identifies those known to have received an audit against GM/RT2470. By 31 December 2004 only companies that have undergone an Entry Audit as defined in GM/RT2470 and been found to meet the requirements of the Standard will be retained on the approved list. By considering companies that have been found to conform to this Standard as well as those yet to do so it may be possible to infer if some specific improvements in Safety Assurance at this point in the supply chain may follow. An interesting observation is that class 66 wheelsets were supplied by the Griffin Wheel Company in the USA who, despite being a well respected supplier of railway wheelsets, does not appear on the current list of approved suppliers provided by RSSB.

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Figure 5-1 : Wheelset Supply Chain
Train Operating Company

Overhaul

New Build

Wheelset Maintenance

Rolling Stock Owner ROSCO/Railpart Rolling Stock Manufacturer Wheelset Change at Depot Other Wheelset Attention

Wheelset/Vehicle/ Bogie Overhauler

Bogie Manufacturer

Railpart

Wheelset Mounted Equipment

Wheelset Assembler

VAB/ CCB or NoBo

Axle Bearings Axlebox Supplier Axlebox Seals Suspension Tubes Gearwheels Final Drive Tyres Earth Return Equipment WSP Equipment Speed Sensor Equipment

Axle Supplier

Wheel Supplier

Non-Destructive Testing

Machining

Heat Treatment
Forging

Steel Making

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Table 5-1 : Approved Wheelset Suppliers
Date of accreditation Audited to GM/RT2470

Company Name Alstom Transport (Renovation) Alstom Transport (Renovation) Alstom Transport (Renovation) Alstom, Le Creusot Bochumer Verein Verkehrstechnik GmbH Bombardier Transportation - Crewe Bombardier Transportation Ltd - Services Bonatrans a.s. CAF Cockerill Forges & Ringmill (Belgium) Construcciones Auxilliar Ferrocarriles SA Firth Rixson Rings limited Geismar (UK) Ltd. Hunslet Barclay ltd Huta L W LH Group Services Lucchini SpA, Ferroviaria Lucchini Sweden AB Lucchini UK ltd, Wheel Systems Division Matisa Materiel Industriel SA MWL Brasil Rodas & Eixos (formerly Maresa, Brasil) Nexus Nizhnedneprosky Tube Rolling Plant (NTRP) Plasser & Theurer Radsatzfabrik Ilsenburg GmbH Ringrollers SC SMRA SA, Romania Schmiedestrucke Hus Sachsen SWASAP Valdunes Valdunes Wabtec Rail Limited Code Type

Code M3 SC SE LCR BV M6 M1 ZB SLO CFR CAF SP CG AB LP LH LU S TB CM MW TWM KLW PT RI RR IOB PSW SW FY UV E6

Type A A A A

Audit date

25/02/1998

25/11/1998

B A A B Undergoing 01/08/1999 28/07/1998

08/03/2000

A M

29/05/1996

B M A A Undergoing Yes, Draft 2a Yes, Draft 1 02/09/2002 23/07/2001

18/10/2002 24/10/2001

M A B M B A M

11/03/2002 25/06/2001 14/06/2001 08/05/2001

A M A M M

Yes, Draft

14/01/2002 16/01/2001

01/08/2000

09/05/2001 20/07/2001

B M M B A A

03/04/2001 29/01/2001

= Unique Company Identifier = A (Assembler only), M (Manufacturer only), B (Both an assembler and manufacturer)

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6.

Existing Accreditation Schemes
This section considers existing accreditation schemes in the rail industry that are relevant to the supply of wheelsets. It also includes some history to help explain how the accreditation of wheesets has developed over time.

6.1

Background to Existing Accreditation Schemes
Prior to rail privatisation in 1994, wheelsets were in general specified and procured by the British Railways Board (BRB). The various manufacturers were subject to an inspection regime managed by the BRB’s Director of Mechanical & Electrical Engineering’s Quality Assurance Inspectorate. Depending upon the criticality of the component being manufactured, it was given a QA rating between 1 and 5 and this also defined the level and frequency of inspection given and requirements for Certificates of Conformity and/or test results. Following satisfactory inspections, manufacturers and assemblers were listed in MT/240 ‘Branding of Wheels, Tyres and Axles’. This list was kept up to date using amendment sheets.

6.2

Railway Group Standards
With the advent of rail privatisation, Railway Group Standards (RGS) were introduced covering a wide variety of safety related subjects in the railway industry. One of the earliest standards produced was GM/RT2450 (Qualification of Suppliers of Safety Critical Engineering Products and Services). This standard (which remains in force today) covers all such ‘safety critical’ products and services as defined in other standards such as GO/RT3260 (Competence Management Systems). Some wheelset manufacturers have been audited against the requirements of GM/RT2450, either by • • • the train manufacturer procuring wheelsets for new build, a train operator fulfilling his Safety Case obligations, or by the manufacturer himself wishing to get ‘approved’ in the UK.

Certificates showing the results of these audits exist in some cases, but not all. Some suppliers have also been audited against the requirements of GO/RT3260 to demonstrate that they have a robust and auditable Competence Management System for any staff deemed to be ‘safety critical’. This has itself presented problems since many non UK based suppliers do not recognise the term ‘safety critical’ as defined by various standards in operation in this country. The RSSB (formerly Railway Safety) and previously Railtrack (until 7 December 2002) owned document GM/RM2525INF which listed all the suppliers of wheelsets
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that were known to have supplied wheelsets to the UK railway industry. The exact criteria by which these manufacturers were ‘approved’ have become somewhat unclear over time, but is thought to be a mixture of • • • ‘grandfather rights’, approval to GM/RT2450, or a train manufacturers own supplier approval process.

Since 7 December 2002, GM/RM2525INF has been withdrawn and the suppliers formerly in it are now on a RSSB database. All these suppliers have until 31 n December 2004 to be approved to the requirements of the new standard GM/RT2470 (Wheelset Supplier Qualification). To date, only one supplier is known to have received a letter from Railway Safety (now RSSB) providing qualification to the new standard, although 2 or 3 others have been audited against draft versions (virtually as pilot schemes ). The new standard defines more closely the requirements for qualification of both the wheelset supplier and the audit team undertaking the approval process. The audit regime will run on a 6 year cycle, commencing with an entry audit followed by two biannual surveillance audits and then repeating the cycle. The nature of the accreditation regime under the new standard was the subject of a workshop run by RSSB on May 14th 2003. It was noted that the 2 or 3 suppliers that were audited against draft issues of GM/RT2470 including the one in possession of a letter from RSSB are NOT deemed to be compliant to the final issue. In other words, RSSB are starting with a level playing field and ALL suppliers will have to begin with the entry audit as defined in the standard. GM/RT2470 audits will be done by whosoever the wheelset supplier chooses, but the audit team must be "approved" by RSSB, who will also approve the submitted audit reports. Quite how the "approval" of auditors will work is unclear, because RSSB will NOT formally accredit audit teams nor will they keep a database of them. The current plan is that the Curricula Vitae of the audit team will be included in each audit report and RSSB will use this information to judge whether the audit t am is suitable to e have undertaken the audit. However, is should be noted that this is RSSB's currently proposed methodology.

6.3

Link-Up
Review of the Link-Up scheme is covered elsewhere in the work packages within the SCSM Programme and has been covered in summary in the Atkins Test Case for Track Circuits (Reference 3). The Link-Up supplier approval process has also been used by some suppliers of wheelsets and related components to gain approval in the UK rail industry, although the Link-Up approval processes and associated Proof audit protocols are far less well developed for Traction and Rolling Stock products and services than they are for infrastructure related products and services.

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It is interesting to note that, of the 32 suppliers of wheelsets (not related components) currently listed on RSSBs database, only 6 are currently registered with Link Up and “Qualified via Audit”. There are no suppliers who are on RSSBs database who are also on the Link Up list but having qualified without any form of audit. There are however some companies who are Link-up qualified without audit but none of these are in the RSSB approved list. More significantly, RSSB do not recognise Link-Up approval as a valid qualification for continued inclusion on their wheelset supplier database, and will rely on the outcomes of audits undertaken against the requirements of the new standard GM/RT2470 instead. This stance is perhaps peculiar to wheelsets which are recognised as being extremely safety critical, with minimal recovery available for failure and involving complex manufacturing issues.

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7.

Failure Data Review
Atkins commissioned Serco Railtest Ltd to undertake a review of wheelset failures arising over the last twenty years in order to establish the primary nature of failures that are currently occurring in service and hence whether any of the failures could be avoided by improvements in the supply chain. This will complement the test case research by providing a bottom-up approach to identify issues that might otherwise be missed by the top-down selective samples chosen for the test cases. The failures being reviewed are those investigated by the British Rail (BR) Materials Engineering Group prior to privatisation and those investigated by Serco Railtest Ltd since privatisation. As such, this may not cover all the failures occurring over the analysis period. However, it is likely to cover the majority of relevant failures. In order to draw meaningful conclusions, it is important to view the failure records in the context of the development of wheelset design and production processes over the analysis period. A brief background to the failure review has therefore also been given.

7.1

Background to Failure Review
Around 20 years ago BRB decided that it would supersede the BR wheel, axle and wheelset standards and in future would order all new wheelsets and their component parts against the then new British Standard, BS 5892, or equivalent standards. It was also decided that new vehicles would use only monobloc wheels and that the preferred grade for these wheels would be R8T fitted to grade A1T steel axles. Generally speaking these rules still apply, although minor quantities of other grades of wheels and axle steel have entered service. Wheel centres and tyres are still in use on some older vehicles, but their number continues to decrease. In terms of the mechanical properties of the wheelset components these changes had little effect. BS 5892 represented what was known to work best on the British & Continental Networks and the most proven BR grades were included in it. The methods of manufacture and shaping remained the same, but changes were made to the chemical composition of the steels to improve toughness and to decrease their propensity to form martensite during wheel slip. Steel making was undergoing rapid changes at the time BS 5892 was produced and steel for wheels and axles was specified to be produced by what was considered the best modern practice. The advances in steel production allowed low hydrogen steels to be made relatively simply and cheaply on a mass production basis. Low hydrogen levels allow the production of clean steels with very low sulphur and phosphorus levels which possess better fracture toughness, fatigue properties, ductility and resistance to Rolling Contact Fatigue (RCF). It is worth noting that these advances in steel making have not been restricted to what might be loosely termed the ‘highly industrialized countries’; the less developed countries have also adopted them and in conjunction with low labour cost their products are very competitive in quality and price.

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After a wheel failure on a High Speed Train (HST) in 1993, recommendations were made by Intercity to BR Group Standards that relevant wheelset standards should be amended to include the requirement that all new wheels on vehicles which operate at 110 mph and above shall: • • be manufactured from vacuum degassed steel, and have their rims non-destructively tested for internal defects during manufacture.

The defect acceptance criteria to be used were to be specified with regard to vehicle maximum speed, axle load and the presence or otherwise of tread brakes. RGS GM/RT2023 (Wheelset Manufacture) mandates these requirements for new wheels for speeds in excess of 110mph.

7.2

Wheel Failures
Table 7-1 presents many of the failures of monobloc wheels that have occurred in service over the last twenty years or so. It is not comprehensive but includes most of the failures that have arisen as a result of either manufacturing based or assembly problems. For wheels produced to BS 5892 requirements, analysing the causes of wheel failures indicates that poorly produced holes in wheel webs for balance weights and cheek discs have acted as stress raisers from which fatigue cracks have originated. One poor and highly stressed (tread braked) design of monobloc wheel has failed from laps and small areas of residual ‘as forged surface’ in the wheel web as well as from balance weight holes. A batch of ‘soft’ wheels was produced and suffered from excessive rim deformation. Two casts of tyres, and one cast of wheels, suffered hydrogen (shatter) cracking. At least ten monobloc wheels have suffered what is often termed ‘shattered rims’; these are failures caused by RCF initiating at defects/inclusions about 12 to 15mm below the tread running surface and causing the rim to collapse and eventually the detachment of a section of rim. If the failure causes are traced back to wheel or wheelset production it is clear that those initiated by drilled holes are related to the assembly of the wheelset and the remainder are related to wheel manufacture. However, the RCF and hydrogen failures initiated from defects that originated from the steel making process. The inclusions could not actually be detected by NonDestructive Testing (NDT) techniques until the wheels had been forged and heattreated and the hydrogen may not produce any cracks until the wheels (or tyres) have been in service for some time. The result of this is that only about 80% of such cases could be expected to be detected one month after manufacture. Such cases make the traceability of wheels back to cast vital in managing safety once discovered. BS 5892 requires that wheels, axles and tyres should have traceability

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back to their steel cast throughout their manufacturing process and that they should be stamped with their cast number. UK railway documentation mandates that for wheels and tyres their traceability to steel cast and date of manufacture is maintained when they are assembled. The actual forging and rolling of w heels gives rise to very few defects leading to wheel service failures. No wheel manufactured since the issue of GM/RT2023 has failed by fatigue cracking initiating from normal inclusions in the rim, i.e. inclusions of alloying elements as opposed to slag. However, two that had been ultrasonically tested failed from slag inclusions in the rim.

7.3

Axle Failures
All axles for use on Railtrack lines must undergo Ultrasonic Axle Testing (UAT) for opacity before they are assembled into wheelsets. When fully assembled, the wheelset (axle) should then again be ultrasonically tested. This testing regime is intended first to prove that an axle is of a quality that can be tested by ultrasonic techniques and finally that the assembled wheelset produces an ultrasonic trac e pattern that agrees with that in the approved ultrasonic procedure for that type of wheelset. It is the experience of Serco Railtest that this is not always correctly understood by axle, wheelset or vehicle manufactures and is certainly not always considered by Vehicle Acceptance Bodies (VABs). This has resulted in opaque A1N axles entering service and many assembled wheelsets only found to produce abnormal trace patterns when they receive their first in service UAT. It is believed that the problem does not exist with wheelset assemblers who are well established in the UK market as they know that this is a requirement. However, foreign vehicle manufacturers with little or no UK experience have problems because it is not a requirement for other railways in Europe. European administrations use only A1N axles, hence the vehicle builders may assume that the UK does. Similarly for UAT, it is not normally required in Europe. With the exception of hot box / bearing failures that sometimes fracture axle journals (see Section 7.4), axle failures are all caused by fatigue and in the vast majority of cases the fatigue crack originates at corrosion pits in the surface of the axle body. Many axles exhibit corrosion on their surface, sometimes caused by poor quality protective paint coatings and sometimes due to in service damage to otherwise sound coatings. Invariably any corrosion that forms develops corrosion pits and it is from these pits, acting as stress raisers, that fatigue cracks initiate and propagate. The choice of protective coating is generally not specified and this general lack of control from when an axle is new extends to each time it undergoes off-vehicle maintenance. The most common protective paint system is still based on the old BR Specification that required one layer of green undercoat and one layer of black gloss finish. Both coats were with oil-based paints and a minimum specific coating thickness was specified for brush and spray applications.

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The present axle population already contains many corroded axles; hence the application of improved protective coatings would not bring instant improvements to axle failure rates. In the long term it offers a far greater chance of reducing the failure rate, possibly scrapping rate as well, than do improved NDT techniques; it is better to prevent cracks than to rely on testing to find them. There is little evidence to suggest that there are any significant problems relating to axle production or to axle steel production. Experience has shown that the fatigue cracks do not usually initiate in the areas that visually appear to have suffered the most severe corrosion. Fatigue cracks most often initiate from areas of relatively light corrosion, even though these areas are adjacent to much larger areas of heavy corrosion. One possible reason for this may be that the older and larger the pit, the smoother their internal profile and the less its stress raising capability. However, to become a large corrosion pit clearly involves passing through the small corrosion pit stage at some time. It is therefore possible that only a small proportion of corrosion pits have an acuity sufficient to give rise to fatigue cracks. Unfortunately without being able to define the type of corrosion pit that poses the greatest risk, it is impossible to define an acceptable level of corrosion on an axle body. If no corrosion was allowed a very large number of axles would be rendered scrap. Freight vehicles that carry corrosive loads, particularly salt and potash, have axles at even greater risk of corrosion. Three such axles have failed in the last twenty years. Salt is particularly corrosive and its action actually favours corrosion pitting. These features have been known for a long time and the time between UAT reduced on wagons carrying corrosive commodities to ensure that cracked axles will be detected before the axle fractures. When this policy is operated correctly it appears to work. However, in the past, this system broke down when operators reduced the frequency of UAT immediately the vehicle stopped carrying corrosive loads. This is not acceptable practice and UAT frequency should not be relaxed until after the wheelset has been fully overhauled, preferably utilizing grit blasting to remove all paint and corrodent, followed by magnetic particle inspection to detect even small cracks. Hydrogen in axle steel can also give rise to numerous small internal cracks that could be propagated to failure by fatigue. However, hydrogen has not been responsible for an axle failure in service for many years and this may be attributable to the requirement that all new axles be ultrasonically tested for opaqueness and also routinely tested in service by ultrasonic procedures that are capable of detecting hydrogen cracks. Ultrasonic testing is the only NDT method in use that will detect internal defects in axles. Traceability requirements for axles in wheelsets differ from those of wheels. BS 5892 has always required that wheels, axles and tyres should have traceability back to their steel cast throughout their manufacturing process and that they should be stamped with their cast number. However, GK/RC2566 does not require that axles retain their cast number and date of manufacture when assembled into wheelsets; this is only transferred to the records for finished axles and can, and does sometimes, get lost as the wheelset is passed around a succession of assemblers. The cast number and date of manufacture are very important if an axle failure is attributable to manufacturing defects and in the past were branded on the axle end. Moreover, although cast numbers and date of manufacture are not branded on the
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axle end, geometry code and inspectors stamps are, even though these details are less important in understanding the root cause of defects found in service.

7.4

Bearing Failures
There have been a number of ‘axle failures’ caused by either plain or roller bearing failures generating very high temperatures and the very significantly weakened/softened journal simply twisting off; these have been considered as bearing failures and not axle failures. Plain bearing failures could also give rise to copper penetration in axle journals and this weakened the structure of the steel and initiated fatigue cracks. Very few plain bearings exist and at least one operator with a few remaining in service scraps any axle on which the plain bearing fails and there is reason to believe that copper penetration may have occurred.

7.5

Conclusions from Failure Review
Axles fail by fatigue and in the majority of cases axle body corrosion acts as a stress raiser that facilitates the initiation of fatigue cracks. Either reducing the incidence of corrosion on axles or improving the sensitivity of axle crack detecting methods, would be expected to reduce the number of axles failing. Applying improved paint systems to axles would reduce the incidence of corrosion, although for many old axles, corrosion damage would already be present and the improved paint system would only be able to prevent or at least slow the rate of further corrosion. If improving the method of crack detection is the chosen route, great care needs to be taken to not only increase test sensitivity, but to also decrease the possibility errors in testing by automating the NDT testing technique. Wheels also usually fail by a fatigue mechanism, but the factors that affect fatigue crack initiation are more varied than for axles, and corrosion pitting is not a problem. Rolling contact fatigue can cause wheel rim failures if the rim contains large inclusions, although it is difficult to define large with actual dimensions; greater than 1mm might suffice at present. Wheels are tested at manufacture for rim inclusions and any wheel failure arising from inclusions in the rim is entirely attributable to the wheel manufacturer. This is the only significant manufacturing problem causing wheelset component failures in service. Poorly drilled or chamfered holes in wheel webs are another major cause of wheel failures and this type of failure is usually attributable to the wheelset assembler. However if the wheels are purchased from the manufacturer in the finish machined condition it is possible that the manufacturer is responsible for the problem. These are all features that can be picked up at audit, particularly so if the auditors are familiar with the problems that cause wheelset failures. The mandatory documents controlling the sourcing, maintenance and testing of wheelsets have been refined over the years and are reasonably sound documents, but in respect of the supply of wheelsets on new vehicles it appears that they are not always applied. Considering that wheelsets are a safety critical item it might be expected that Vehicle Acceptance Bodies would require evidence that wheelsets conformed to Group Standard requirements. The number of new vehicles entering

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service with wheelsets that do not conform to mandatory standards clearly indicates that this is not so. These non-conformances are only discovered when problems are experienced with the wheelsets and invariably the vehicles continue in service with non-conforming wheelsets whose continued safety is hopefully maintained by expensive, non-standard and unproven testing regimes. The failure data review indicates that during wheel manufacturers quality audits, particular attention should be paid to the quality of the steel. Every audit team should include an auditor with in depth knowledge of modern steel making to audit the production of wheel steel, whether the steel is sourced in house or externally. It may be unwise to rely on wheel manufacturers own audits of their steel supplier. Wheelset assemblers also require careful auditing, but it is also necessary that assemblers from management level to machinists understand the necessity of following procedures and the service problems that result from not doing so. At present it is difficult to obtain up to date information regarding Network Rail approved suppliers of wheelset components and wheelset assemblers. A Web site might be an ideal means of supplying this information and it is suggested that for wheel, tyre and axle manufacturers, their approved steel suppliers should be included in this list. Over recent years there have been changes of ownership of component manufacturers and changes forced on manufacturers because of suppliers, in particular steel producers, closing down. There does not appear to be any clear indication of what, if any, action is required in regard to auditing these changes. In BRB days it was relatively easy to obtain data on wheelset failure figures. Now that the owners of failed components are free to have failure analysis carried out at a number of independent laboratories it is more difficult to obtain data. All these failures will in future have to be both investigated and reported on; again listing on a web site would allow those needing, or interested in, to obtain this data, witness trends etc. If this were the case then problems occurring in the supply chain could be more readily identified.

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Table 7-1 In-Service Wheel Failures
Date Vehicle Type / No. Class 156 Location Wheel Grade BR 108 grade C Report File No. Wheelset Life (yrs) 3.0 Comments Fatigue from manufacturing Defect in web Fatigue from cheek disc Bolt holes Thermal Fatigue Chamfer Cracks Chamfer Cracks Failed from cheek disc Bolt holes Fatigue from bolt hole Thermal fatigue in web Fatigue from chamfer crack Chamfer Cracks Fatigue from a Bolt Hole Fatigue at bolt hole Fatigue from bolt hole Hydrogen. cast no.W8339 Fatigue from corroded cheek disc bolt holes Thermal fatigue in web Fatigue from manufacturing Defect in rim Thermal Fatigue in web Fatigue from cheek disc bolt holes Fatigue initiating from Cast no. stamped in web Thermal fatigue in web Fatigue originating from Cast no.

BBA 900094

York

BR 108 grade C

TMT172-093-004

14.8

HAA 354908 1985/5 1985/5 1985/11 1986/3 Class 56 several Class 56 56108 BSGL 8150 BSGL 8169 BRT 8060 BR 108 Grade B BR 108 Grade B BR 108 grade C TMT171-093-004 TMT171-093-004 TMT172-093-004 TMT172-093-004 6 11.0 11.0

Motherwell Gloucester Rail Car Services Barry Wagon Shop Fenny Compton Toton

1986/4 1986/11 1986/12 1987/5 1988/1 1988/3 1988/5 1988/8

HAA 355738 90168 Class 56 Cement Wagon APCM 9385 MK3 HST 12008 Mk3 SLE10708 BT10 axle 62329 PAA Wagons

BR 108 grade B BR 108 grade C BR 108 Grade B

TMT172-093-004 TMT172-093-004 TMT171-093-004 TMT171-093-004

15.8 15.9

BR 108 grade D Wembley Laira Depot Motherwell BR 108 grade D BS 5892 grade R8T BR108 grade C

TMT173-093-004 TMT173-093-004 TMT778-093-004 TMT172-093-004

5.4 6.0

14.2

1988/9 1988/10

HAA 351757 Wheelset 52819

Ferry Bridge Ilford Depot Tyre Turning

BR 108 grade B

TMT172-093-004 TMT173-093-004

18.1

1989/5 1989/6 1989/10

HAA 351879 HAA 355766 BT10 10533 BT10 10610 Stone Wagon PRr27008

Cathays Cardiff

BR 108 grade B BS 5892 grade R8T

TMT172-093-004 TMT173-093-004 221 TMT 8.0 5.0 19.1

Maidenhead

BR 108 grade C

1990/6

1990/7

HAA 355923 HAA 357734 HAA 351689 100T Iron OreBSSC 26019

BR 108 grade B

TMT172-093-004

Immingham

BR 108 grade C

311 TMT

18.7

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Date

Vehicle Type / No.

Location

Wheel Grade

Report File No.

Wheelset Life (yrs)

Comments stamped in web Fatigue initiating from Chamfer crack. Rim Cracking From Inclusions Rim Cracking From Inclusions & pipe Rim Cracking From Inclusions Rim Cracking From Inclusions Rim Cracking From Slag Inclusions Rim Cracking From Inclusions Rim Cracking From Inclusions Rim Cracking caused by High Hydrogen Content Rim Cracking From Large Slag Inclusions Foreign Body Rolled Into Tread

1991/2 1991/2 1992/4

Class 58 58043 HST PC 43187 Iron Ore Tippler BSSC 26036 Class 90

Shirebrook

BS 5892 grade R8E BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 GradeR8T BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 Grade R8T BS 5892 Grade R8T

TMT 171-093-004 TMT778-093-004 TMT020-20-002 2 4

1992/6

TMT180-093-004

1

1993/2

HST PC 43076 Class 319

TMT778-092-004

2

1994/3

TMT176-093-004

7

1994/6 1995/10

Class 91 HST PC

EL8(596/94/DW) H2 3459/95(DW)

1 1

1998/4

Tyres from Cast Nos. 227 & 228 Tyre From Cast No. 389891 TB Wheel

EM/3(I520/98)

1999/4

EM/2(I580/99)

1999/7

EM/2(I631/99)

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Table 7-2 In-Service Axle Failures
Date Vehicle Type / No. DMU / Sc51113 DMU / 79968 EMU / E65681 DMU / Sc79104 Location Carlton Failure Position body Report File No. MM49/3, 6/9/60 Wheelset Life (yrs) 3.5 Comments Fatigue crack 13mm in from wheelseat Crack 1.5mm in from both wheelseats Fretting corrosion Crack initiated by thermal damage from drive oil seal Three fatigue cracks initiated in stress relief groove, no mech. Damage. Scored by faulty brake rigging

1960/8

1961/8 1963/12 1965/11

Methil Liverpool Street Cowlairs

Adjacent to wheelseats Wheelseat body

MM49/2, 27/7/61 W/12/9/3 MM15/513, 15/2/66

6.25

10.75

1975/2

Cl 52 loco / 501023

Oxford

No. 2 groove stress relief groove

TDE171-363-412 (ESB)

1976/3

45t acid tank / PR58908 / DB993006 wagon / HAA 358737 Cl 311 / wagon / UCV B743210 Cl108 DMU / M51910 wagon / TSV FF47388 Cl114 DMU / E53063 Cl114 DMU / E53024 Wagon / PGA TAMC 14667 Dept. wagon / ZCV DB726494

Insch

body

R&DD 178-2632(RJA) 29 2.5

1977 1977

Healey Mills Drax

mid-span Journal shoulder

1981/10 1982/5

Queens Park Bridgewater

T72 transition As forged body

Sc.R.Met.No.605, 10/81 QDL/9.4/JDH

20.5

1982/11 1983/2

Longsight Great Coates Trowel Elsham

Adjacent to wheelseat wheelseat

TM MF 72 15

1983/6 1983/12

Adjacent to Wheelseat Adjacent to wheelseat body journal

QDY 12/2/2/3 & QAH 106/5(PGF) TM MF 72

17.75 13.5

1984/1 1984/8

Hungerford Bow Somerset

R & RRP IP 1636, 22/6/84 172-83-4 SJH

12.75 28

Crack initiated at large internal defect Crack left in when reprofiled to T72 Cracked from hot stamping mark Cracked from machining mark Fretting corrosion/fatigu e 2 to 3mm in Cracked from area of corrosion Cracked from area of corrosion Fatigue from corrosion Journal surface not to specification, plain bearing to roller conversion Cracked from corrosion pitting 2 to 3mm within wheelseat

1985/3 1985/6 1986/1 1986/6

Mk3 coach / 12033 wagon / OOV B743400 Miniflat wagon / MCV 556438 wagon / JUA PR26478

Ashton Meheniot Symington Goring

body wheelseat

DL 613/48 & TMT173-93-4-L/SW) TMT 172-93-4SJH

10 26

body

M/Met/4

Crack initiated from corrosion pits

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Date

Vehicle Type / No. Track Machine / ZW DX68036 Cl87 loco. / 87017 Hopper wagon / JUA PR26517 Cl107 DMU / 52012

Location Dundee Carlisle

Failure Position wheelseat body

Report File No.

Wheelset Life (yrs)

Comments

1986/9 1987/4

023/TMT & BASS 1407 CAPSIS 706163 TMT 177-093-004

11.5

1987/4 1987/6

Hampstead Glasgow works

body 20mm from wheelseat

13.2

Cracked from score close to earth return Corrosion Crack from transformation products formed at pressing on Fatigue from pitting caused by salt Fatigue from corrosion pits Fatigue from heavy corrosion Fatigue from corrosion pitting Fatigue due to incorrect labyrinth rotating on the axle Fatigue from corrosion pits Torsional fatigue from score Fatigue from filliform corrosion Fretting fatigue under inboard bearing Fretting on inside bearing journal Fatigue from corrosion pitting Damaged fracture face, undecided Fretting Corrosion/fatig ue Fatigue from corrosion pitting Fatigue from corrosion pitting Fatigue from corrosion pits Cracked from martensite on earth return

1988/8

Freightliner / FGA 601608 Hopper wagon / PGA BRT14630 Alumina wagon / PAO ALCN12018 Mk3 coach / 12097 Cl56 loco. / 56125

Norton Bridge Wolvercot Woodhorn junc Greenhill Thonaby

body

172-83-7(DW) & 050-TMT 195-TMT 172-093-004

19.75

1989/3 1989/11

body body

15 18

1990/3 1990/5

body journal

278-TMT 308-TMT

10.5 13

1990/6 1991/6

Tank wagon / TEB BRT84014 Cl87 loco. / 87017 Mk2B coach / 5437 LTF25 /

Trent Sth. junc. Crewe Works Etches Park

body Body (cracked)

312-TMT 172-093-004

21.75

1992/3 1993/12

body body

TMT223-361-004DW 92/679/IRG

1994/9 1996/3

LTF25 bogie hop. / ARC 17930 Tank Wagon / STS53241 wagon / MK3 coach / 42078 Salt Hopper / PR8269 Iron ore tippler / BSSW 26632 MGR coal hopper / HFA 354312 Cl319 / 63058

Hungerford Rickerscote

Journal; body RR-STR-96-041 26

1996/11 1997/2

Westbury Newton Abbott Shields junction Margam

body journal

HSE SMR/235/260 D2(I462/97/DW)

1998/1 1998/10

body body

2002/6 2002/7

Bennerley Junction Luton

body body

F/2(W120/DW) EM/2(W134/DW/0 2) 16

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8.

Test Case Selection
Critical factors in selecting specific test case supply chains were considered to be: • Ensuring the differences in the supply chain from new build, wheelset change at overhaul and wheelset change during out of course replacement are all represented. Including a range of wheelsets containing technical differences that have been associated with wheelset failures or lead to different risk control measures. Including wheelsets for which the maintenance documentation has been generated before and after the requirement for scrutiny against RGS. Including wheelset suppliers who have and have not yet demonstrated conformance against GM/RT2470. Some investigation into a supply chain connected with one of road/rail vehicles, on track machines or ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for shared running on NRCI’. Selecting an example of an extended supply chain. Selecting supply chains in which the major players are likely to cooperate.

• •

• •

As the supply chain starts with the train operator we started with a short list of five train operators who operate rolling stock that between them meets the above criteria. From these five we refined the test cases by making initial contact and considering some initial information against the above criteria. We approached four of the train operators: • • • • First Great Western who operate class 180 (new build) and HST's (ex BR vehicles owned by a Leasing Company). EWS who operate a variety of Freight Locomotives and Wagons including both new build and ex BR. Connex who operate mainly Electric Multiple Units both new build and ex BR. Jarvis who operate Rail Maintenance Machines.

The fifth train operator, Virgin, were not approached. The interest in this case was the class 220 Diesel Multiple Units with inboard axle bearings. This is a new feature (based upon experience over the last 20 years) for passenger vehicles on NRCI which would make this fleet a good example for new build. However, it was felt that
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due to the relatively low mileage accumulated to date the chances of obtaining any service feedback from the supply chain would be limited in this case. The following specific test cases were therefore selected to investigate to what extent the idealised processes and information flows described in Section 5.1 above are present in the real world. They were chosen in order to encompass as much of the supply chain diversity described in Section 5.2 above as possible. The key considerations involved in the selection of these particular test cases is shown in Table 8-1. An additional ‘overhaul’ test case (Case 2b) was included to cover the circumstance for rail maintenance machines where they are not subject to the ‘full’ engineering acceptance process (they have their own specific ‘slimmed down’ standards).

8.1

Test Case 1 –First Great Western Class 180 (New Build)
The First Great Western Class 180 is a typical modern inter city diesel multiple unit (DMU). It has mechanical drive to an axle hung final drive gearbox with monobloc wheels and cartridge bearings. It is a recent new build unit built by Alstom. The supply chain is summarised in Table 8.2. This also provides an example of a wheelset introduced after the requirement for independent scrutiny against RGS was introduced following privatisation.

8.2

Test Case 2a – EWS Class 47 Locomotive (Overhaul)
The EWS Class 47 Locomotive has been in service for many years and although is primarily a freight locomotive, has also operated some passenger duties. The transmission is representative of many pre 1990 vehicles (including EMU’s) when dc traction motors were used. It has axle hung motors with suspension tubes, tyred wheels and non-cartridge roller bearings. The supply chain is summarised in Table 8.3. This also provides an example of a wheelset introduced prior to a requirement for independent scrutiny against RGS was introduced following privatisation.

8.3

Test Case 2b – Plasser 07 Tamper (Overhaul of Maintenance Machine)
This is a Rail Maintenance Machine that has been in service for many years. This test case has been included since maintenance machines are not subject to the full engineering acceptance process that applies to passenger and freight vehicles and hence potentially useful data relating to this issue may be uncovered. The supply chain is summarised in Table 8.4.

8.4

Test Case 3 – Connex Class 465/0 & 1 EMUs (Replacement)
The Class 465 EMU is a typical modern EMU operating suburban passenger services. There should be considerable experience of both overhaul and out of course wheelset replacement for these units. They incorporate both trailer and powered wheelsets with axle hung final drive gearbox, monobloc wheels, tread brakes and roller bearings. They were introduced during the transition to independent scrutiny against RGS around the time of railway privatisation. The supply chain is summarised in Table 8.5.

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Table 8-1 : Matrix of Critical Factors with Supply Chains
Operator Ensuring the differences in the supply chain from new build, wheelset change at overhaul and wheelset change during out of course replacement are all represented. Critical Factors in selection of Test Case Including a range of Including Including wheelsets containing wheelsets for wheelset technical differences which the suppliers who that have been maintenance have and have associated with documentation not yet wheelset failures or has been demonstrated lead to different risk generated conformance control measures. before and after against the requirement GM/RT2470. for scrutiny against RGS. Motored and trailer Before wheelsets. Wheel cheek mounted brake discs motored axles supplemented with tread brake. Flexible drive to gearwheel on axle. Cartridge bearings. Diesel Multiple unit After with mechanical drive to axle hung final drive gearbox with monobloc wheels and cartridge bearings. Bombardier Overall Comment Some investigation into a supply chain connected with one of road/rail vehicles, on track machines or ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for shared running on NRCI’. N/A Selecting an extended supply chain and supply chains in which the major players are likely to co-operate.

First Great Western Mature Inter City HST application with both overhaul and out of course wheelset replacement

Train Operator Substitute sample should EWS willing. Class 47 prove difficult.

First Great Western Inter City application Class 180 involving recent New Build

Alstom Le Creusot (New) Alstom UK (overhaul)

N/A

Train Operator willing. Involves at least 3 companies.

Typical modern diesel multiple unit example. Involves one of the 2 largest suppliers to the UK rolling stock market. Also provides an example of a wheelset introduced with Independent Scrutiny against RGS. Chosen for New Build Test Case.

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Operator Ensuring the differences in the supply chain from new build, wheelset change at overhaul and wheelset change during out of course replacement are all represented.

Critical Factors in selection of Test Case Including a range of Including Including wheelsets containing wheelsets for wheelset technical differences which the suppliers who that have been maintenance have and have associated with documentation not yet wheelset failures or has been demonstrated lead to different risk generated conformance control measures. before and after against the requirement GM/RT2470. for scrutiny against RGS. Bearings inboard of After wheels with every other axle driven by final drive gearbox mounted on axle. Wheel cheek mounted brake discs. Hollow axles. Axle hung motors with Before suspension tubes and tyred wheels. Non cartridge roller bearings. Lucchini Italy (New) Bombardier (overhaul)

Overall Comment Some investigation into a supply chain connected with one of road/rail vehicles, on track machines or ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for shared running on NRCI’. N/A Selecting an extended supply chain and supply chains in which the major players are likely to co-operate.

Virgin Class 220

Inter City application involving recent New Build

?

Some examples of difficulty could be explored covering the risks associated with assembling inboard axle bearings.

EWS Class 47

Mature application of a Freight locomotive, some of which have operated passenger duties. Involving overhaul and out of course replacement.

Wabtec (overhaul) & Bombardier Crewe (spare wheelsets)

N/A

EWS Class 66 or 67

Freight application involving recent New Build.

After

Griffin (66) & Wabtec (67)

N/A

Train Operator Transmission is representative of willing. many vehicles, including EMU's pre 1990 when dc traction motors were used. Also provides an example of a wheels et introduced before Independent Scrutiny against RGS. This provides a more suitable option than HST when combined with class 465/0 & 1. Chosen for the Overhaul Test Case. Train Operator Considered but FGW Class 180 willing. preferred for new build to avoid over emphasis on Freight Vehicles across the test cases .

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Operator Ensuring the differences in the supply chain from new build, wheelset change at overhaul and wheelset change during out of course replacement are all represented.

Critical Factors in selection of Test Case Including a range of Including Including wheelsets containing wheelsets for wheelset technical differences which the suppliers who that have been maintenance have and have associated with documentation not yet wheelset failures or has been demonstrated lead to different risk generated conformance control measures. before and after against the requirement GM/RT2470. for scrutiny against RGS.

Overall Comment Selecting an extended supply chain and supply chains in which the major players are likely to co-operate.

Connex Class 465/0 or /1

Mature suburban application with both overhaul and out of cours e wheelset replacement.

Jarvis Plasser 07 Tamper

Motored and trailer During wheelsets. Wheel cheek mounted brake discs , motored axles supplemented with dynamic brake. Flexible drive to gearwheel on axle. Cartridge bearings. Typical of modern EMU's post 1990. Mature Rail Trailer & power Before Maintenance Machine wheelsets with axle application with both hung final drive overhaul and out of gearbox, monobloc course wheelset wheels, tread brakes & replacement roller bearings.

Some investigation into a supply chain connected with one of road/rail vehicles, on track machines or ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for shared running on NRCI’. Bombardier Crewe N/A (Wheelsets) & Bombardier Chart Leacon to Bombardier Derby for overhaul

Train Operator & Owner willing. Involves at least 3 companies.

Typical modern electric multiple unit example. Involves one of the 2 largest suppliers to the UK rolling stock market. Also provides an example of a wheelset introduced during the transition from BR control to a process regulated by RGS. Chosen for the Out of Course Replacement Test Case. Some useful information could be obtained on the control of supply of wheelsets for a vehicle not subject to the 'full' Engineering Acceptance process. Chosen as additional Overhaul test case as potentially useful data available.

LH Group Yes (assembly) various component suppliers

Train Operator & Wheelset Overhauler willing.

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Table 8-2 : Test Case 1 (FGW Class 180) Supply Chain
Position In Supply Chain Train Operator Train Owner Train Manufacture Engineering Acceptance Bogie Manufacture Wheelset Manufacture Wheelset Steel Maker Wheelset Standards Company First Great Western (FGW) Angel Trains Alstom Correl Rail Alstom Le Creusot Bonatrans Trinecki RSSB (Formerly Railway Safety)

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Table 8-3 : Test Case 2a (EWS Class 47) Supply Chain
Position In Supply Chain Train Owner and Operator Train Overhauler Wheel Manufacture Wheel Steel Maker Axle Manufacture Axle Steel Maker Company English Welsh and Scottish (EWS) Bombardier Crewe Lucchini UK Lucchini Italy Firth Rixson Corus

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Table 8-4 : Test Case 2b (Plasser 07 Tamper) Supply Chain
Position In Supply Chain Train Owner and Operator Train Overhauler Wheelset Agent Wheel Maker (inc. Steel) Axle Maker Axle Steel Maker Jarvis LH Group Services Railway Wheelset & Brake Ltd MWL Swasap Iscor Company

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Table 8-5 : Test Case 3 (Connex Class 465) Supply Chain
Position In Supply Chain Train Operator Train Owner Wheelset Agent Train Maintainer Wheelset Assembler/Overhauler Wheel Manufacture Wheel Steel Maker Axle Manufacture Axle Steel Maker Connex HSBC Rail Railpart Bombardier Chart Leacon Bombardier Crewe Company

Lucchini UK Lucchini Italy Firth Rixson Corus

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9.

Supplier Questionnaires
In order to provide a robust and consistent approach to the information gathering from the members of the supply chains, a generic question set was developed to be used as an interview protocol. What was needed was a framework of questions constructed from best practice with regard to the development and supply of products or services. The framework developed in the SCSM programme b aseline assessment criteria report (Reference 4) was reviewed but was found to be primarily focussed on the provision of accreditation schemes rather than products or services themselves, which is the primary focus of this test case research. To fulfil the aims of this test case research we therefore turned to BS EN ISO9001:2000 as the most appropriate, internationally recognised, assurance standard for the development and provision of products and services. The development process for this questionnaire therefore involved a review of the benchmark criteria and BS EN ISO9001:2000. This process was also supplemented by a review of HSE HSG(65) (Reference 5) in light of comments received on our proposed approach when presented at the fourth SCSM Workshop. It also incorporated the results of internal Atkins reviews involving personnel with commercial experience in supply chain management and technical experience from across the supply chain. Each stage of the supply lifecycle (See Appendix A) was considered separately and appropriate specific questions developed under each o the headings contained f within ISO9001:2000. The complete set of questions was then distilled down to a generic set of key questions or issues to be explored in detail during the supplier interviews. Each question may have differing levels of applicability to particular members of the supply chain, but by approaching the exercise in this way, the number of questions generated can be realistically addressed during a single interview and the risk of missing important information through pre-selection of questions by the interviewer is also minimised. The generic question set is given in Appendix B. This was cross checked against the relevant sections in the SCSM programme baseline assessment criteria report (Reference 4) in order to ensure that all relevant issues from that document had been captured. The results of this cross check are given in Appendix C and it was concluded that the generic question set is generally sufficiently comprehensive but there is no direct mapping for ‘safety culture’. This runs through many of the questions but it was felt that the scope of generic questions 13 or 39 could be expanded during interview to cover this issue as necessary. The data gathering approach was to send the generic questionnaire to interviewees ahead of the interview together with a short briefing note and a copy of the open letter from Matt Walter of the then Railway Safety dated 23 January 2003 explaining the background to the study. All suppliers were given follow up telephone calls or visits as necessary in order to collect the required information. Of the 24 different companies identified in the test

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case supply chains shown in Tables 8-2 to 8-5, 15 detailed responses were obtained. Responses from the remaining 9 companies could not be secured despite substantial efforts and follow-up. Each response was reviewed and the key findings are recorded in the following section under each of the activity headings.

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10. Findings
This section describes the findings of the test case review. The key findings arising from the responses have been summarised in the following sub sections. Overall generic findings are summarised initially, and then the more detailed findings associated with each position within the supply chain (as defined in Appendix A and given Tables 8-2 to 8-5 for each test case) are detailed in separate sub sections. These findings draw upon the responses from the respondents having this position within each test case where relevant and available. Within these sub sections, a general overview is provided which is then followed by a series of specific summary findings. Where the findings result in recommendations the recommendations have been numbered sequentially and indicated in the text thus - ‘R1, R2 etc’.

10.1

Overall
Wheelsets for use on Network Rail Controlled infrastructure are closely controlled in technical terms by the Railway Group Standards (RGS) and through them the British Standard BS5892. The design authority for the wheelsets will specify the geometric requirements and through the standards the material chemical composition, steel making process, heat treatment and test requirements. The majority of influence in the risk associated with wheelsets therefore lies with the authors of the standards and the design authority. Beyond this the issue is whether the product producers in the supply chain can provide wheelsets in accordance with the specifications and standards consistently. It follows from this that if the RGS for wheelsets were to be changed to make them less prescriptive and provide more opportunity for innovation this would lead to the introduction of considerable risk as wheelset suppliers may then take on the role of Design Authority which, in the main, they are currently not doing. All respondents had a strong sense of the need for safety in the design and manufacture of railway wheelsets as there are many single point failure modes that could lead to multi-fatality accidents. All treated wheelsets and their components as ‘safety critical’. Whilst suppliers outside the UK are not always familiar with the UK definition of ‘safety critical’ they take steps to adequately control wheelset supply related processes and the staff involved. Those in the supply chain responsible for specifying the requirements for wheelsets when new and the replacement of wheelsets rely heavily on the relevant standards to ensure the products supplied are likely to perform safely and reliably and that suitable levels of trace ability are established. The findings of the Failure Data review support the supposition that the standards have been developed over many years to ensure steady improvements in safety and reliability whilst eliminating service problems of a generic nature. An example of this is the new standard GM/RT2466 which requires the use of non destructive testing on all wheel rims once the standard is implemented in August 2003. There is a need for improved auditing. Problems during manufacture are still resulting in occasional wheelset failures. These problems do not appear to be directly associated with relationships in the supply chain but are associated with

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occasional lapses in the processes undertaken within particular supply chain members. No evidence was found to suggest that any one supplier is more prone to such lapses than another and this illustrates the need for high levels of vigilance amongst the staff involved in the supply of wheelsets. It is therefore considered necessary for improved auditing to ensure such high levels of vigilance. (R1) Auditing of wheelset suppliers should be done against the requirements of all relevant Railway Group Standards and should be applied principally to the suppliers of overhaul, assembly and manufacture of wheelsets including the steel makers as all of these activities are currently the source of failures. (R2) GM/RT2470 has only recently been implemented and the first round of Entry Audits of wheelset assemblers and manufacturers must be complete by 31 December 2004. This standard requires some degree of interpretation and with careful direction, possibly through the publication of a supplementary guidance note, some additional focus could be applied to the level of scrutiny required in each relevant area including overhaul activities. (R3) Supplementary details required in this standard include: • • • Control of processes during steel making, Control of processes during wheelset overhaul, Analysis of failures and non conformities in production that are precursors to failure, identification of corrective and preventive actions and a recognition of the potential risks the supplier can import to the railway infrastructure if appropriate checks on products, equipment and staff competence are not controlled. Audit Team competence.

Wheelset suppliers are rarely provided with feedback in terms of the failure modes that can occur on the operating railway as a result of wheelset induced problems and this would enable the assessment of risk and safety awareness of staff to be enhanced (R4).

10.2

Train Operation
The train o perators are responsible for the safe o peration of the trains. In this context the train operators have approved Maintenance Plans containing the technical requirements for light and heavy maintenance including the technical requirements for the replacement (as required) of all spares. Generally the train operators are responsible for the light maintenance of trains which may include, in the case of wheelsets, removal and refitting when necessary and the non-destructive testing of axles in service at prescribed intervals. Heavy maintenance is usually the responsibility of the train owner, although sometimes it is the responsibility of the train operator and for some recent builds it is the responsibility of the rolling stock manufacturer. Ultimately it is the responsibility of the train operator to ensure the correct maintenance is undertaken at the correct intervals using competent staff and using the correct tools and equipment regardless of the complexity of the supply chain. In the case of the train operators interviewed in connection with this study this

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responsibility was well understood although the different operators had executed this responsibility in slightly different ways. All operators considered wheelsets to be safety critical and therefore applied the requirements of GM/RT2450 when selecting suppliers, including any parties between themselves and the wheelset manufacturer or assembler. One operator had set up their own Engineering Standard for Safety Critical Goods and Services (Connex EDS 2000), one had been involved in the introduction of an ATOC Code of Practice (ACOP/EC/01003) and another had set up a supplier approval process within their procurement manual. In principle EDS 2000 contains more detail relevant to Connex but it appears to comply with the broader requirements of ACOP/EC/01003 and both of the aforementioned documents appear to meet the higher level requirements of GM/RT2450. The fact that these alternative procedures have been developed demonstrates that the RGS provides only high level guidance and is not in itself a working accreditation system. In the case of wheelsets, train operators generally welcomed the introduction of GM/RT2470 as it should provide a means by which evidence would be made available to demonstrate that potential suppliers had met the minimum requirements of the standards to the satisfaction of recognised audit teams. The expectation of different train operators regarding whether this aspiration would be met was variable and whilst some would accept RSSB approval as sufficient to satisfy them that the selection of an approved company should satisfy their obligations under GM/RT2450 others considered that the relationship between GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 was unclear and would lead them to require formal approval under their own supplier approval systems which would be likely to require more audits rather than fewer in depth audits. GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 require re-issue to ensure the way they are intended to work together is better understood. (R5) There was a general view, particularly amongst the technical staff that Link Up approval was meaningless as the requirements to achieve this status were unclear. Many respondents considered the audit protocol did not probe in sufficient detail to differentiate suppliers with robust QMSs and Competence Management Systems from those with less capability. As a result only some operators demand Link Up approval as part of the contract for supply of safety critical products and services. (R6) Train operators all have wheelset and axle bearing policy statements that cover their implementation of the various RGS requirements. Through these policies systems have been set up to ensure staff classified as safety critical receive appropriate training and competence assessment. At the level where staff interface directly with the wheelsets and wheelset components formal competence assessment appears to be working however at the technologist level, where service problems are initially handled formal standards of competence are less clear. The engineering responsibility is held formally by a Professional Head of Engineering within each train operating company. Management, through the Professional Head, look for an appropriate blend of training, educational attainment and monitor performance through annual review and in some cases through more frequent one to one sessions. A more formal process of assessing the competence of staff involved in the initial diagnosis of problems and supporting the acceptance of engineering change should be considered. (R7)

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There appear to be significant differences in the control exerted by the operators over other parties in the supply chain. In at least one case suppliers are assessed against their ability to deliver within a carefully defined scope. This had resulted, for example, in a supplier being classified as a procurement and logistics supplier but not a supplier of safety critical products. The result of this was that the train operator had insisted on approving the supplier to the train operators supplier by way of joint audit under the train operators supplier approval process. This level of control is recommended as best practice and there may be financial gains to the industry as a whole if train operators were to jointly develop schemes to a level of detail greater than is currently the case. (R8) This may be encouraged by a revision to the standard GM/RT2450 to either prescribe accreditation processes in more detail or to include an appropriate example of good practice. (R9) All train operators have formal procedures covering Engineering Change control. These allied to formal document control procedures ensure that no engineering change to product, processes involving product or concessions to specification or standards are approved without seeking and obtaining the necessary scrutiny and acceptance. If mandatory requirements of standards could be affected by a proposed change this involves independent acceptance bodies otherwise risks are assessed by suitably qualified staff, although the level of competence assessment of such staff is unclear. (R7) In the case of wheelsets, train operators were aware of the traceability requirements specified in Railway Group Standards and these were applied. As such suitable wheelset records are retained by operators who are reliant upon the supply chain to provide them. Traceability is therefore possible back to individual axle and wheel casts and back to individual components in other wheelset items. Reference was made to the use of National Incident Room reports and the monthly inter operator meetings, for example the Train Safety Review Group in the case of former Network South East operators who make use of these to learning through feedback beyond their own experience. All operators interviewed had formal procedures in place for the feedback of service problems to the supplier, irrespective of warranty rights.

10.3

Train Ownership
The train owners are responsible for the provision of safe trains. In this context the train owners are constrained by the details of the lease agreement with the respective train operators. The passenger railway and freight railway were arranged differently at privatisation and subsequent re-negotiation of lease agreements and the procurement of new trains have increased the number of variations in the scope of contractual responsibility of the train owners. In most cases in the passenger railway they are responsible for the procurement of heavy maintenance services although in an increasing number of new builds this is the responsibility of the train manufacturer. In any event the technical content of the design and the specification of maintenance work required to ensure the trains continue to operate in accordance with the requirements of the standards must be included in the train operators maintenance plan. The activities that the train owner can influence that affect risk to train operation are therefore: • Content of the initial procurement/design specification.

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• • •

Content of the maintenance specifications. Engineering change to the products or processes used in their production during their service life. Selection of suppliers of the trains and subsequent spares.

The rolling stock owners interviewed in this study both have formal Quality Management Systems. (QMS). These systems include p rocedures to control the aforementioned risks. One of the train operators had conducted their own supplier approval audit on both of these owners in order to establish if they could be approved as suppliers of safety critical products and services under their own standard. In one case the owner had sufficient checks in place to meet the operators own requirements but in the other case this was found not to be so. As a result the train operator approved one to source heavy overhaul services and in the other case constrained the owner to procure such services only from a company approved for that scope by the train operator themselves until the owner could demonstrate that systems and competent staff are in place to meet the operators requirements. Such level of control does not appear to be consistent amongst train operators at present. (R8) (R9). At least one rolling stock owner has a formal safety management system incorporated within the formal QMS but neither has been independently accredited against a recognised national or international standard. Consideration should be given to the need for such independent accreditation for all suppliers of safety critical goods and services as this is likely to provide a more consistent level of support from such systems. (R10) Train owners have formal Engineering Change control procedures that require reference back to train operators and independent Vehicle Acceptance Bodies (VABs) depending upon whether the change affects an area covered by mandatory requirements of standards. Reviews are conducted on changes to standards and the potential for their impact on the requirements of procurement or maintenance of the trains and their components. Engineering change is controlled whether triggered by a change to standards, feedback from operators, through a request to modify components or processes by suppliers or due to internal initiatives to improve performance, reliability or cost effectiveness. Through these processes the train owner can effectively control of the Design Authority although in the case of a train operator applying aforementioned best practice in identifying a clear scope for their suppliers when approved it should be clear whether the train owner has the freedom to do this in isolation. In the case of wheelsets, almost any change to design will be in an area affected by mandatory RGS requirements and therefore a VAB and the process of Engineering Acceptance which will formally involve the train operator. The passenger rolling stock owners (RoSCos) have been reviewing the quality and accuracy of the data called up in the overhaul specifications as there have been consistent problems found during contract review with conflicting requirements being specified to suppliers. This has been particularly found to be so with some of the older rolling stock where data has been transferred from one document to another and some initiatives, for example reducing minimum scrapping diameter, have been investigated and accepted for specific applications. Some of these documents also

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reflect outdated contract responsibilities that can lead to some confusion with suppliers. These initiatives should be encouraged. (R11)

10.4

Train and Bogie Manufacture
The Design Authority in all cases in this study was either the British Railways Board or the Bogie Manufacturer. Often the train and bogie manufacturer are the same company although often geographically separated. There are a few ‘novel’ wheelset designs that have been patented by wheelset manufacturers but none of these apply to the test cases selected and no cases of such wheelsets are known by Atkins to be operating on Network Rail controlled infrastructure. The train manufacturer is therefore responsible for specifying to the bogie manufacturer the performance requirements and interfaces for the bogie. The principal agent in the control of risk arising from new wheelset designs is therefore the bogie manufacturer. Under the requirements of RGS any new design must be independently scrutinised by a VAB and in practice this process appears to be working sufficiently to mitigate wheelset failures through design. There have however been instances of non conformance found that suggest there is some room for improvement. Examples of this are the production of axles in A1N condition rather than A1T condition that makes the ultrasonic testing by far end scan difficult and in some cases impossible. This in itself is not a significant safety risk provided upon discovery they are removed from service before their next due test. However this demonstrates that axles have not been produced in accordance with the standards and in some cases could not have received the test on assembly that the standard requires. This issue is discussed further in section 10.9 below.

10.5

Train Overhaul and Maintenance
Significant risks can be introduced during overhaul and maintenance activities either through assembly being undertaken incorrectly or through essential activities not being done. Whilst overhaul and maintenance is often undertaken by different suppliers in the supply chain the nature of the risks arising are similar and the controls in place are essentially the same. In the case of wheelsets, maintenance generally involves wheelset replacement and axle testing in service. Overhaul involves principally stripping wheelsets back to component parts, inspection, renewal as necessary followed by MPI of axles, re-building, painting and final testing once assembled. Occasional problems occur in the overhaul process. These are n ot associated with any fundamental shortcoming in the supply chain but are associated with occasional failure in process within the activity of one or another of the supply chain members. Examples of such failure include setting wheels the incorrect distance apart on an axle, despatch of an assembled wheelset to a train operator without an axle end cap fitted and the fitting of an incorrect axle bearing type to a wheelset for a particular class of vehicle. As these lapses in performance are not associated with failures in communication between supply chain members but rather failure in each case to apply processes correctly that were already set up it is recommended that wheelset supplier approval procedures should be extended to cover wheelset overhaul activity in addition to wheelset manufacture and assembly. (R2)

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10.6

Wheelset Agent
In the test cases considered in this study this category applies to: • Railway Wheelset and Brake (RW&B) who are the sole agent of MWL (Brazil) for the supply of wheels to the UK and the sole agent of Swasap (South Africa) for the supply of axles to the UK. Railpart who are approved by Connex to supply logistical and materials management services but not to supply safety critical products without Connex being involved in the supplier approval process further down the supply chain.

It is necessary to clearly distinguish between the role of the supply agent in these two cases. In the first case the agent may be supplying a service to the manufacturer overseas and in so doing may i fluence the level of technical risk involved in the n supply. For example if the agent were to take on the role of obtaining and reviewing for impact changes to Railway Group Standards the agent should be considered as part of the suppliers organisation and the scope of approval would have to be based upon the supply being provided through that route. (R12) If the role of the agent is transparent in technical terms and is only supplying a support service to the manufacturer then the role of the agent is not relevant to the approval. In the case of RW&B there has been a long term partnership between the companies and the agent does not tender for the supply of wheels and axles. RW&B do influence risk but only in terms of the storage and transportation of the wheels and axles from port to customer, wheelset assembler or overhauler. In order to fulfil this role safely RW&B have a QMS in accordance with ISO9000 which is independently verified by an IRQA registered auditor. In the case of Railpart and the class 465 wheelset overhaul service the action of Connex has rendered Railpart’s activity as one of materials management and therefore their activity should not introduce any safety risk associated with the product and therefore their role in supply chain safety management terms is transparent.

10.7

Wheel and Axle Manufacture
The failure data analysis shows that most risk is introduced into wheelsets through the manufacture of wheels. Whilst it is also possible to introduce risk through the manufacture of axles this risk appears to have been more successfully mitigated. As has been explained in Section 6 of this report there have been wheelset supplier approval systems in place for many years although these processes were not well documented. In addition the wheelset standards have also been developed at a detailed level with the result that the manufacturers have only had an influence on the consistency of supply rather than the intrinsic safety and reliability of the products they produce. The result of these two controls is a very low rate of failure of wheelsets on the UK main line railways. That is not to say that the industry can afford to be complacent and all supply respondents involved in this study welcomed the introduction of GM/RT2470 provided it is applied equitably to all suppliers.

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As with the wheelset overhaulers, the manufacturers appear to have the necessary systems and procedures in place to provide the services in accordance with RGS and BS requirements. That said, in some cases competence is not assessed against formal standards in the way GO/RT3260 implies. In such cases the levels of competence are not necessarily inadequate but the work has not been broken into steps for which formal competence standards exist and the assessment made o n that basis. Often the whole operation is considered and the needs of the operator undertaking that operation by an experienced supervisor rather than a qualified assessor. It has not been possible within the scope of this study to differentiate between the effectiveness of such different approaches. As this study was based upon the co-operation of the relevant parties and was not in the form of an audit it was not feasible to test the claims of the companies involved. Nevertheless as all manufacturers will have to undergo an Entry Audit under GM/RT2470 within the next 18 months there will be an opportunity to establish if these companies do have all the systems in place and working to a satisfactory level. The failure data obtained and presented in section 7 of this report suggests that there are no pockets of poor performance in the supply chain but rather there are isolated cases of supply chain members failing to carry out the processes in place correctly. Examples of this are the inclusion of slag in wheel rims that give rise to cracks and ultimately loss of sections of wheel rim. Auditing of wheelset suppliers should be done against the requirements of all relevant Railway Group Standards and should be applied principally to the suppliers of overhaul, assembly and manufacture of wheelsets including the steel makers. (R2) Wheelset suppliers are not provided with feedback in terms of the failure modes that can occur on the operating railway as a result of wheelset induced problems. On the basis of the information obtained in this study wheelset suppliers are provided with feedback when they supply individual wheelsets that are found not to comply to specification either through inspection or as a result of failure, however they do not receive information relating to other wheelset failure modes and their potential consequences on the operating railway. Such information would benefit manufacturers as it would enable the assessment of risk and safety awareness of staff to be enhanced. (R4) There is evidence that at least some manufacturers have developed Competence Management systems that fully comply with the requirements of GO/RT3260.

10.8

Standards
Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) manage the following activities that are relevant to this project: • • • • Development, Issue and Maintenance of Railway Group Standards. Management of non-compliance to Railway Group Standards. Audit of Railway Group to Railway Group Standards and Safety Case. Agent for change and improved safety performance.

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A Standards Controller is responsible for the overall output and groups of individuals are formed to produce the standards. Staff may be brought into that team to provide required expertise or the standard production may be contracted out to another company. Railway Group Standards (RGS) are, by their nature, high level standards, however in the case of wheelsets some degree of prescription is included to ensure compatibility between trains and infrastructure and to mitigate risks that have arisen in the past and which have been referred to in section 7 of this report. During the review of this part of the supply chain the following issues were noted which could give rise to improvement. On rolling stock the railway group standards that apply are, except for those applied retrospectively, those applying at the time of the contract. When scrutinising design and changes to design it is therefore necessary to make reference to old versions of the standards to distinguish between the requirements that apply to unchanged items and to ensure appropriate conformance is demonstrated for the change in question. For this reason controls should be in place to permit access to former standards whilst identifying the status of these documents accordingly. (R13) The writers of Railway Group Standards have little feedback from end users, nor do they see the effects of implementation. It is recognised that practical sampling and feedback collection are expensive to perform but with standards there are huge downstream costs of ‘getting it wrong’. This end user feedback is lacking and is essential to continued improvement in the field of standards production. (R14) A generic engineering competence is required for those involved in the production of standards which is not easy to define in a competence standard and to assess against the requirement. Individuals have specific skill areas and will find the necessary input from others if required. The Subject Committee process assists with robust review to ensure that the standard is accurate. It s not easy to see how i defined competence standards could be produced to cover the technical requirements of standards; however a general one to ensure correct style, format and methods of collecting information could be produced. (R15) There are no targets or KPIs in existence which relate to ensuring that the standards perform the required function. There is a Group Standard on change of standards which encourages continuous improvement. A large number of these change requests are generated internally and it is not known what number come from the persons working to the standards. (R16) The scope of the standard is defined by the team responsible for the generation of the standard. There is no formal plan or definition of standards and how they should fit together, the piecemeal development of standards does not encourage ‘neat’ fitting together at the interfaces although the drafting groups try to identify the boundaries and take account of other surrounding standards. (R17) (R18)

10.9

Engineering Acceptance

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The process of Engineering Acceptance and the lower level conformance certification is controlled by Railway Group standards and bodies are accredited by RSSB to carry out this activity. In order to achieve accreditation companies have to have systems and procedures in place to carry out the necessary work and have competent staff (signatories) to ensure the work is done to an acceptable standard by competent personnel. RSSB carry out audits which in addition to ensuring that VABs and CCBs are able to demonstrate conformance to their own systems provides a form of clearing house where standards require some degree of interpretation. As VABs and CCBs have to compete for work in the open market the audit process is essential to prevent the gradual erosion of quality in this work by inappropriate competition. Problems highlighted in section 7 of this report regarding wheelsets that have not been produced in accordance with the standards suggest that the effectiveness of the construction conformance process requires improvement. Examples of these problems include axles heat treated to a condition not accepted in Railway Group Standards, wheelsets that have not received the test on assembly that the standard required, wheels that have been produced with levels of hardness below the requirements of the standards and wheels that have not been branded in accordance with the requirements of the standards.

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11. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions have been drawn against each of the findings described in Section 10 above and these are given in Table 11-1. Arising from these conclusions, where appropriate, recommendations for improvements have also been made. The recommendations include a section reference number in parentheses which enables traceability back to the report section containing the relevant finding(s). ‘Quick Wins’, which are defined as recommendations that could be implemented in a short timescale and at a low cost in order to gain a fast benefit response, are shown in italicised bold text. The recommendations R1, R2, R3, R5, R8, R9 and R12 are those considered to provide the highest safety benefit and are shown with a shaded reference number in Table 11-1. Table 11-1 : Conclusions and Recommendations Ref R1 Conclusions Recommendations

Problems during manufacture are There is a need for improved still resulting in occasional wheelset auditing and clear competence failures. requirements for audit teams should be specified (10.1). The suppliers of overhaul, assembly and manufacture of wheelsets including the steel makers should be audited regularly as all of these activities are currently the source of failures. Auditing of wheelset suppliers should be done against the requirements of all relevant Railway Group Standards and should be applied principally to the suppliers of overhaul, assembly and manufacture of wheelsets including the steel makers (10.1, 10.5, 10.7). With careful direction, possibly through the publication of a supplementary guidance note, some additional focus could be applied to the level of scrutiny required in each relevant area including overhaul activities (10.1). Providing feedback would enable the assessment of risk and safety awareness of staff to be enhanced (10.1, 10.7).

R2

R3

GM/RT2470 has only recently been implemented and the first round of Entry Audits of wheelset assemblers and manufacturers must be complete by 31 December 2004. This standard requires some degree of interpretation. Wheelset suppliers are rarely provided with feedback in terms of the failure modes that can occur on the operating railway as a result of wheelset induced problems.

R4

R5

The relationship between GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 require GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 is re-issue to ensure the way they are unclear and may lead train operators intended to work together is better to require formal approval of
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suppliers under their own supplier understood (10.2). approval systems which would be likely to require more audits rather than fewer in depth audits. R6 There was a general view, particularly amongst some Train Operators that Link Up approval was meaningless as the requirements to achieve this status were unclear. Many respondents, including suppliers, considered the audit protocol did not probe in sufficient detail to differentiate suppliers with robust QMSs and Competence Management Systems from those with less capability. At the level where staff interface directly with the wheelsets and wheelset components formal competence asses sment appears to be working however at the technologist level, where service problems are initially handled formal standards of competence are less clear. There appear to be significant differences in the control exerted by the operators over other parties in the supply chain. Significant work would be required to improve this system before it could be considered a credible means of supplier accreditation. Link Up in its current form should not be considered as an alternative accreditation for wheelset suppliers to the system specified in GM/RT2470 (10.2).

R7

A more formal process of assessing the competence of staff involved in the initial diagnosis of problems and supporting the acceptance of engineering change should be considered (10.2).

R8

There may be financial gains to the industry as a whole if train operators were to jointly develop schemes to a level of detail greater than is currently the case. The way in which Connex EDS 2000 is being applied was considered an example of best practice within the context of this study (10.2, 10.3). This may be encouraged by a revision to the standard GM/RT2450 to either prescribe accreditation processes in more detail or to include an appropriate example of good practice (10.2, 10.3). Consideration should be given to the need for such independent accreditation for all suppliers of safety critical goods and services as this is likely to provide a more consistent level of support from such systems (10.3).

R9

Conclusion as for Recommendation R8 above.

R10

At least one rolling stock owner has a formal safety management system incorporated within the formal QMS but neither has been independently accredited against a recognised national or international standard.

R11

The passenger rolling stock owners Initiatives to improve the quality and
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(RoSCos) have been reviewing the accuracy of specifications should be quality and accuracy of the data called encouraged (10.3). up in the overhaul specifications as there have been consistent problems found during contract review. R12 Supply agents are used in some It is necessary to clearly identify the instances in the supply of wheelsets role of the agent and whether this to train operators. role could introduce risk into the products or service provided. In cases where the agent can introduce risk the agent should be considered as part of the supplier’s organisation and the scope of approval should be based upon the supply being provided through that route (10.6). When scrutinising design and changes to design it is therefore necessary to make reference to old versions of the standards to distinguish between the requirements that apply to unchanged items and to ensure appropriate conformance is demonstrated for the change in question. RSSB need to include controls in RGS to mandate retention and traceability in the technical standards relating to the design installation and testing of equipment at the time of commissioning to permit modifications and review to be accurately carried out. Furthermore, RGS should also mandate that each technical standard should be clear in terms of the scope of the standard. i.e. to be retrospectively applied or for new works only (10.8). This will allow the standards in force at the time that ageing equipment was first introduced to be readily identified and sourced. RSSB should develop a method to ensure that appropriate end user feedback is collected and incorporated in the appropriate standards in all cases (10.8). RSSB should develop a competence system at an appropriate level to ensure that personnel developing standards can demonstrate suitable competence (10.8). RSSB should encourage feedback from end users, see (R13), and define suitable measures to show that the standards are fit for purpose in their operating environment and continue to
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R13

R14

The writers of some Railway Group Standards have little feedback from end users, nor do they see the effects of implementation. A generic engineering competence is required for those involved in the production of standards which is not easy to define in a competence standard and to assess against the requirement. There are no targets or KPIs in existence which relate to ensuring that the standards perform the required function.

R15

R16

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be so (10.8). R17 The scope of the standard is defined by the team responsible for the generation of the standard. There is no formal plan or definition of standards and how they should fit together, the piecemeal development of standards does not encourage ‘neat’ fitting together at the interfaces although the drafting groups try to identify the boundaries and take account of other surrounding standards. RSSB should develop, for each supply chain activity to be managed by a standard, a life cycle map showing the scope, processes, materials, resources, information and interfaces involved (10.8).

R18

Conclusion as for Recommendation RSSB should consider the bigger R17 above. picture analysis and define a standards strategy to ensure better ‘fitting together’ and coverage of activity areas. Sometimes small scale amendments lead towards a degrading of the standard quality and a more holistic review should be performed (10.8).

Overall the strengths of the wheelset supply chain are the high level of safety awareness amongst all parties interviewed, the introduction of a more formalised way of setting supplier approval criteria in GM/RT2470 and the improvement made in wheelset standards over the years demonstrated by the low number of generic failure modes encountered. The weaknesses of the wheelset supply chain are the lack of co-ordination currently displayed in setting up safety critical supplier accreditation procedures, the level of interpretation required in setting up suitable audit teams under GM/RT2470 and the lack of information flow from operators down to the supply base to enable suppliers to better understand the risks they can import to train operation. It is accepted that in a supply chain involving private companies that commercial considerations may exclude the possibility of unconstrained sharing of details surrounding failures and precursors to failure when discovered, however more could be done. In addition, the failure data review by Serco Railtest, described in Section 7, gave rise to the following specific recommendations: R19 Vehicle Acceptance Bodies should put more effort into obtaining evidence that the wheelsets conformed to Group Standard requirements, particularly in the area of non destructive testing requirements, based upon the experience of some recent new builds. Wheelset manufacture audit teams should include an auditor with in depth knowledge of modern steel making to audit the production of wheel steel, whether the steel is sourced in house or externally. It may be unwise to rely on wheel manufacturers own audits of their steel supplier.

R20

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R21

At present it is difficult to obtain up to date information regarding Network Rail approved suppliers of wheelset components and wheelset assemblers. A Web site might be an ideal means of supplying this information and it is suggested that for wheel, tyre and axle manufacturers, their approved steel suppliers should be included in this list. Now that the owners of failed components are free to have failure analysis carried out at a number of independent laboratories it is more difficult to obtain data. All these failures will in future have to be both investigated and reported on; again listing on a web site would allow those needing, or interested in, to obtain this data, witness trends etc. If this were the case then problems occurring in the supply chain could be more readily identified. Wheelset Standards under the control of RSSB should specify that a xles retain their cast number and date of manufacture when assembled into wheelsets.

R22

R23

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12. References
12.1 General
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Supply Chain Safety Management SCSM, Supplementary Information for SCSM ITTs, S.P1195.2.1, Issue 0.3, 02/08/02. Detailed Requirements - Wheelset Procurement Test Case Workpackage for SCSM Programme Phase 1, Issue 0.4. Safety Critical Supply Chain Safety Management (SCSM) Track Circuit Procurement Test Case, Final Report, 5014016/doc/04 Supply Chain Safety Management Baseline Assessment Criteria, S.P1195.3.4, Issue 1.0, 18/12/02. HSG 65, Successful Health and Safety Management, Health and Safety Executive.

12.2

Railway Group Standards
GM/RT 2450 GM/RM2525INF GM/RT2470 GO/RT3260 GM/RT023 Qualification of Suppliers of Safety Critical Engineering Products and Services. Wheelsets Manual Information Section Wheelset Supplier Qualification. Competence Management Systems. Wheelset Manufacture

12.3

Other Standards
BS 5892 Part 1 BS 5892 Part 2 BS 5892 Part 3 BS 5892 Part 4 BS 5892 Part 5 BS 5892 Part 6 BS EN ISO9001:2000 Specification for Axles Specification for Forged and Rolled Centres Specification for Monobloc Wheels Specification for Forged & Rolled Tyres Specification for Steel Bars for Retaining Rings Specification for Wheelsets Quality Management Systems Requirements

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13. Glossary of Abbreviations
BR BRB BS CCB DMU EMU EWS FGW HSE HST KPI NDT NoBo NRCI QMS RCF RGS RSSB RW&B SCSM TSI UAT VAB WSP British Rail British Railways Board British Standard Conformance Certification Body Diesel Multiple Unit Electrical Multiple Unit English Welsh and Scottish First Great Western Health and Safety Executive High Speed Train Key Performance Indicator Non Destructive Testing Notified Body Network Rail Controlled Infrastructure Quality Management System Rolling Contact Fatigue Railway Group Standards Rail Safety and Standards Board Railway Wheelset and Brake Ltd. Supply Chain Safety Management Technical Standards for Interoperability Ultrasonic Axle Test Vehicle Acceptance Body Wheel Slip Protection

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Appendix A - Supply Chain Lifecycle
Train Operator Wheelset Policy

Procurement Specification

Design Specification Conformance Check for Vehicle Design Component Design

Manufacturer/ Assemble including Identification and Production of Wheelset Records Conformance Check for Vehicle Construction

Component Testing

Installation into Bogie/Vehicle

Repair

Overhaul including Assembly and Repair Conformance Check for Maintenance Plan Including Wheelset Policy

Replacement Components (As Required)

Service Experience leads to Failures and/or Need for Modification

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Appendix B - Generic Question Set
Quality Management System (QMS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 What is your company’s role in the supply chain for wheelsets? Which other companies interface directly with you in the supply chain? Does your company recognise the term ‘Safety Critical’ in relation to the products supplied by you or to you by your suppliers? What is the nature of your companies QMS, is it accredited and if so by whom? Do you have any Quality Procedures that apply specifically to the supply of wheelsets? What document control procedures do you have in place? What procedures that control product version or modification state do you have in place? What records do you maintain to demonstrate conformance with specification and / or ensure traceability of supply?

Management Responsibility 9 Do members of your staff have written job descriptions containing a definition of their roles and responsibilities and are organisational charts available to indicate lines of reporting? Do you have a specific supply chain manager? Do you hold contract reviews with your suppliers or customers? Are records kept of these reviews and are any actions arising followed up? Has your company been subject to commercial takeover in the recent past and if so, what specific arrangements were put in place to protect the integrity of your position in the supply chain for wheelsets? Do you have a specific procurement strategy for sourcing your supplies and has this been subject to any form of risk assessment (e.g. large single source framework agreements or competitive tender amongst variety of suppliers)? Do you monitor and review your quality systems internally and if so in what way and how often?

10 11

12

13

Resource Management 14 Do you have a formal staff appraisal system and how are individual training needs identified?

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15 16

How do you assess staff competencies and how is this process managed? How do you ensure the plant, equipment and tools you use are sufficient to ensure the wheelsets you operate/supply will conform to necessary standards?

Product Realisation 17 Which standards or regulations relating to the supply of wheelsets do you consider apply to your activities (regardless of what your contractual requirements might specify)? What consideration is given by your Company of the through-life costs of the wheelsets related products you supply? Do you have performance or reliability targets for your products or the raw materials supplied to you and if so how are they monitored? Also, do these reflect a regime of continuous improvement? What processes are in place to manage customer feedback either from your customers or to your suppliers? Where you are involved in design, how are functional requirements defined and verified? Where you are involved in design, how are interfaces and any potential product constraints identified? Where you are involved in design, what is the scope of your responsibility e.g. do you also have an input to the specification of the maintenance regime or manufacturing or test requirements? What product reviews are undertaken to ensure that specifications and standards remain valid? How are specifications and standards (or changes to specifications and standards) validated to ensure the resulting wheelsets perform as required? How do you determine which standards are applicable to your wheelsets/products? Do you have an approved list of suppliers and if so on what basis is this managed and who has responsibility for the process? Do you rank approved suppliers? Do you require suppliers to hold accreditations of any kind? How are alternative bids ranked against each other when you tender for products or services? Do you specify the use of specific sub-contractors or suppliers further down the supply chain when letting supply contracts? Do you involve subsidiaries of your company in the supply chain and if so how is their performance measured against potential alternative suppliers?

18 19

20 21 22 23

24 25

26

27 28 29

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How do you verify that your suppliers supply you with products that conform to relevant standards and specifications and is this recorded? How are service and maintenance requirements defined and what steps are taken to ensure that any necessary or critical requirements are promulgated through the supply chain? What product identification systems do you have such as part numbers, serial numbers, modification states; and how are these recorded? What level of traceability do you have of the source of materials used in your products? What standards do you have for the packaging and transportation of your products or raw materials and how do you ensure that these have been complied with? How are calibration and monitoring of your production equipment and tools managed?

32 33 34

35

Measurement, Analysis and Improvement 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 What happens to any non-conforming products either supplied to you or by you? Do you operate a concessions system? Do you investigate root causes of non-conforming product and how is this managed? What management processes do you have in place for implementing corrective action? Do you operate a suggestions scheme and how are suggestions for improvement handled? Do you undertake any form of analysis of predicted and /or actual product performance? Are there any specific supply chain issues or concerns that you currently have? Have you made any changes to your procurement strategy or supply chain recently and if so why? What changes would you make to your procurement strategy or supply chain if you could and why? To what extent do you feel information is being adequately communicated up and down the supply chain (e.g. specifications, failure information, operational experiences)?

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Appendix C -

Generic Question Set Mapping to SCSM Baseline Assessment Criteria

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C) HOW ARE THE SCHEME/PRACTICE COMPETENCES AUTHORISED AND ASSURED
Baseline Assessment Criteria Question How are the competences of people and systems defined and checked. Is the scheme/practice comp etence based on the organisation or an individual within the organisation How is training including induction provided What audit/assessment processes assure the scheme/practice. Are there different levels of audit for differing levels of safety criticality. What levels of independence are specified for audits How is use of the scheme/ practice enforced and conformance achieved and maintained How is the scheme /practice assessed as fit for purpose Test Case Generic Question Set Question How do you assess staff competencies and how is this process managed? How do you assess staff competencies and how is this process managed? Do you have a formal staff appraisal system and how are individual training needs identified? Does your company recognise the term ‘Safety Critical’ in relation to the products supplied by you or to you by your suppliers? Do you have any Quality Procedures that apply specifically to the supply of wheelsets? What is the nature of your companies QMS, is it accredited and if so by whom? Do you monitor and review your quality systems internally and if so in what way and how often? There is no specific ‘scheme’ under review in the test cases, therefore this question is not really relevant.

No. 23 24

No. 15 15

25 26

14 3

5 4 13

27 28

29

-

D) HOW IS CHANGE MANAGEMENT SCHEME/PRACTICE HANDLED
No. 30 Baseline Assessment Criteria Question What change control requirements within the scheme/practice are necessary and how are they to be managed

AND

CHANGE

IMPROVEMENT

WITHIN

THE

No. 6 7 32

31

Are lessons learnt feed back into the scheme/practice. How are improvements incorporated.

20

37 38 39 32 How is the scheme/practice process challenged on an ongoing basis to ensure excellence in the market place How long has the scheme/practice been in use. Have changes occurred during its life. Have changes occurred during its life. 24

Test Case Generic Question Set Question What document control procedures do you have in place? What procedures that control product version or modification state do you have in place? What product identification systems do you have such as part numbers, serial numbers, modification states; and how are these recorded? What processes are in place to manage customer feedback either from your customers or to your suppliers? Do you investigate root causes of nonconforming product and how is this managed? What management processes do you have in place for implementing corrective action? Do you operate a suggestions scheme and how are suggestions for improvement handled? What product reviews are undertaken to ensure that specifications and standards remain valid? Have you made any changes to your procurement strategy or supply chain recently and if so why? Have you made any changes to your procurement strategy or supply chain recently and if so why?

33 34

42 42

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E) WHAT MECHANISMS EXIST FOR TRACEABILTY AND ALLOW LEARNING (FAILURES AND SUCCESSES) THROUGH FEEDBACK
No. 35 Baseline Assessment Criteria Question Who maintains and how are traceability logs organised by the supplier and by the customer after delivery of the product/service No. 31 Test Case Generic Question Set Question How are service and maintenance requirements defined and what steps are taken to ensure that any necessary or critical requirements are promulgated through the supply chain? What product identification systems do you have such as part numbers, serial numbers, modification states; and how are these recorded? What level of traceability do you have of the source of materials used in your products? Do you investigate root causes of non-conforming product and how is this managed? What management processes do you have in place for implementing corrective action? What processes are in place to manage customer feedback either from your customers or to your suppliers? How are service and maintenance requirements defined and what steps are taken to ensure that any necessary or critical requirements are promulgated through the supply chain? To what extent do you feel information is being adequately communicated up and down the supply chain (e.g. specifications, failure information, operational experiences)? What management processes do you have in place for implementing corrective action?

32

33 36 How are failures and near misses within the scheme/practice and of the product/service managed and/or registered How are operational and maintenance issues fed back to the product/service provider, in particular after the warranty period has expired 37 38 20

37

31

44

38

Does the scheme/practice have a process to inform all users that a functional update is necessary following an incident or perturbation with the product or service

38

G) HOW DOES THE SCHEME/PRACTICE RELATE TO THE COMPANY ORGANISATION AND THE CULTURE WITHIN THE ORGANISATION
No. 44 Baseline Assessment Criteria Question Is an organisational safety culture (cognitive, reliance, open, blame-free, etc) required for the scheme/practice Does the scheme/practice support a supplier organisation’s safety culture What aspects of the company and project organisation ensure the product/service safety critical requirements are met Are the activities for the management of safety defined No. 10 9 Test Case Generic Question Set Question No direct mapping for safety culture. This runs through many of the questions but the scope of 13 or 39 could be expanded to cover this issue. Do you hold contract reviews with your suppliers or customers? Are records kept of these reviews and are any actions arising followed up? Do members of your staff have written job descriptions containing a definition of their roles and responsibilities and are organisational charts available to indicate lines of reporting? Do you have a specific supply chain manager? What is the nature of your companies QMS, is it accredited and if so by whom?

45 46

47

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