RULE VIII Internal Union-Disputes

SECTION 1. Complaint. A complaint for any violation of the

constitution and by-laws and the rights and conditions of membership
under Article 242 may filed in the Regional Office where the union is
domiciled.
SECTION 2. Who may file. If the issue involves the entire
membership of the union, the complaint shall be signed by at least 30
percent of the membership of the union.
In addition to the above requirement, the petition must show on its
face that the administrative remedies provided for in the constitution
and by-laws have been exhausted or such remedies are not readily
available to the complaining members through no fault of their own.
However, if the issue affects a single member only, such member
may alone file his complaint.
SECTION 3. Contents of complaint. The complaint must, among
other things, contain the following:
(a) The person or persons charged;
(b) The specific violation/s committed;
(c) The relief/s prayed for; and
(d) Other relevant matters.
Such complaint must be in writing and under oath, and a copy thereof
served on the respondent.
SECTION 4. Procedure. Upon receipt of the complaint, the
Regional Director shall immediately assign the case to a Med-Arbiter.
The Med-Arbiter shall have twenty (20) working days within which to
settle or decide the case. The decision of the Med-Arbiter shall state
the facts and the reliefs granted, if any. If the conflicts involve a
violation of the rights and conditions of the membership enumerated
under Article 242 of the Code, the Med-Arbiter shall order the
cancellation of the registration certificate of the erring union or the
expulsion of the guilty party from the union, whichever is appropriate.
SECTION 5. Appeal. The aggrieved party may, within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the decision of the Med-Arbiter, appeal
the same to the Secretary on any of the following grounds:
(a) Grave abuse of discretion; and (b) Gross incompetence.
The appeal shall consist of a position paper specifically stating the
grounds relied upon by the appellant and supporting arguments
under oath.
SECTION 6. Where to file appeal. The appellant shall file his
appeal, which shall be under oath and copy furnished the appellee in
the Regional Office where the case originated.

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SECTION 7. Period to answer. The appellee shall file his answer
thereto within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the appeal. The
Regional Director shall, within five (5) calendar days, forward the
entire records of the case to the Office of the Secretary.
SECTION 8. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable. The
Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide
the appeal from receipt of the records of the case. The decision of the
Secretary shall be final and inappealable.
SECTION 9. Execution pending appeal. The execution of the order
of the Med-Arbiter shall be stayed pending appeal.

Topic: Union Representation, Petition

Case: Cruzvale Inc. vs. Laguesma
Facts:
1. On July 23, 1991, private respondent, a labor union, filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional
Office No. IV, a petition for certification election among the
regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner, docketed as Case
No. RO-400-9107-RU-0107.
2. On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed its comment to the petition
for certification election. It sought the denial of the petition on
the following grounds:
(a) That no charter certificate evidencing the organization
of a local union therein was attached to the petition or
submitted to the DOLE at the time the petition was filed;
(b) That the respondent Union has not presented any
proof that it is a legitimate labor organization; and
(c) That the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no
jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner
Company's place of business is located at Cubao,
Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of the
said Regional Office. Consequently, it is the National
Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has
jurisdiction over said petition (Rollo, p. 7).
MED-ARBITER DECISION:

1. On the status of the petitioner, it is established that the

petitioner is a legitimate organization with Dole Registration
Certificate No. 11106 LC (FED) and has a local chapter in the
respondent's company located at Cainta, Rizal. The existence
of a local union is likewise undisputed as the same is evidenced
by Charter Certificate No. 82 issued to it by the petitioner,
United Filipino Workers, and submitted to this Office, which
automatically forms part of the records of this case.
2. As regards the second and third issues on whether or not the
herein petition is duly filed or not, the allegation of the
respondent that the same is defective in form and substance
since no charter certificate and signatories were attached
thereto at the time of filing of this petition is unmeritorious and
without legal basis.
The respondent is an unorganized establishment which is
governed by Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 6715, which read as follows:
Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the
Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization (Rollo, pp. 74-75).
DOLE UNDERSECRETARY: upheld the order of respondent MedArbiter.
ISSUES:
1) Was there a legal error (by the DOLE usec) in LIMITING the
certification election to Cruzvale Inc. employees in Cainta and
did it disenfranchise other rank and file employees of the
petitioner?
2) Is there an issue on the venue when the principal office is in
Cubao?
HELD:
1) As to the second assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent
Undersecretary should not have limited the certification election to
petitioner's employees at the garment factory in Cainta but should
have also covered those employed in the cinema business
We agree with the following observation made by respondent
Undersecretary in his Decision dated September 25, 1992:
As regards the question on the composition of the bargaining unit, we
stress once more that the call for the conduct of election covers
all the regular rank-and-file employees of Cruzvale, Inc. at its
garment-manufacturing corporation. The use of the pronoun "all"
in our decision dated 16 December 1991 refers to all aforementioned

employees at the garment manufacturing operation based on the

finding that they were the ones sought to be represented by the
petitioner as clearly reflected on the face of the petition and as
embodied in the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 24 April 1992 which
was affirmed by this Office on appeal.
Moreover, as stated in the questioned Decision the employees at the
Cinema operation and those at the garment manufacturing operation
do not share commonality of interest as the former clearly perform
work entirely different from that of the latter. Thus, their separation
into two (2) distinct bargaining units is proper. This is in
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77395,
26 November 1988
2) As to the third assigned error, petitioner contends that the petition
for certification election should have been filed with the regional
office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
employer in accordance with Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Rollo, p. 27). Said
section provides:
Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with the
Regional Office, which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath (Emphasis
supplied).
The word "jurisdiction" as used in said provision refers to the
venue where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike
jurisdiction, which implies the power of the court to decide a case,
venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought
(Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]). Venue
touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the
substance of the case (Consolidated Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 198 SCRA 34 [1991]).
Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the
employees and the place of the principal office of the employer
are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office
where the petition for certification election is filed. The said
provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification
election where the place of work of the employees and the place of
principal office of the employer are located within the territorial
jurisdictions of different regional offices. We assume that in the
drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment took into consideration the fact that there are many
companies with factories located in places different from places
where the corporate offices are located.
The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party
whether as complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case
may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor

dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the

employer must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of
another competent agency sitting in another place to the
inconvenience of the worker (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 209 SCRA 834 [1992]).
Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing
on the petition for certification election before the Regional
Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city
where the principal place of business of petitioner is located.
Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the
petition for certification election be filed with the National Capital
Region Office, which holds offices in Manila.
Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional Offices,
the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters
have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch office which has
territorial
jurisdiction
over
the
"workplace
of
the
complainant/petitioner" (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules
defines the workplace as follows:
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place
or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause
of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is
supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or
travel.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision
as to when an objection to improper venue may be raised. The MedArbiter ruled that where the employer had appeared twice at the
hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning the
venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the
subsequent proceedings.
He observed:
This practice of deliberately delaying the legal proceedings cannot be
countenanced any further; otherwise, the ends of justice will forever
be defeated. We don't see any reason for the respondent to delay as
it did, the proceedings of the case only to assail later on the
jurisdiction of the office. This issue could have been brought up or
objected to during the initial hearing (Rollo, p. 77).
Respondent Undersecretary accepted the stance of the Med-Arbiter,
that the question of the venue in representation cases should be
raised at the first hearing.
DISPOSITIVE: No grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary
restraining order is LIFTED.

CERTIFICATION PROCESS:

1st misconception: CBA has an expiration of 5 years

Why? The 5 year period only pertains to the representation aspect.
2nd misconceptopn: When you say Freedom Period yan yung
ichchallenge mo yung Sole EBA. It pertains to 60 days PRIOR to
the expiration of the 5 year period from execution of the CBA
meaning it does not pertain to the EXPIRATION kasi nga walang 5
year expiration period
Thats the reason under the DO 40 Rule 8 Sec 14 that the 60 day
period based on the original CBA shall not be affected by any
amendment extension or renewal.
**
FREEDOM PERIOD
2 KINDS
1. 60 days before the expiration of the 5 th year of
the CBA
2. 60 days before the expiration of the CBA itself
wherein you can negotiate for a new CBA
Topic: Union Representation, Union as an Initiating Party, Organized
Establishment, Petition BEFORE Freedom Period
Case: Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. vs.
Laguesma
Facts:
1) Petitioner Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. is
engaged in the construction and fabrication business and conducts

its construction business in different construction sites here and

abroad while its fabrication operations are conducted by its Steel
and Marine Structures Group at its Batangas Marine and
Fabrication Yard ("BMFY," for brevity) in Bauan, Batangas where
the steel structures and other heavy marine works are fabricated.
2) In the exercise of its management prerogative, petitioner has
adopted the practice of hiring project employees when existing
fabrication capacity cannot absorb increases in job orders for steel
structures and other heavy construction works.
3) Said project employees are covered by the Project
Worker/Reliever Employment Agreements which indicate the
specific projects to which they are assigned and the duration of
their
employment.
Upon
the
expiration
of
their
contracts/agreements, the employment of these employees is
automatically terminated unless the projects to which they are
assigned have not yet been completed; in which case, they are
rehired for the remainder of the project.
4) The positions occupied by the regular rank-and-file employees
and the project employees are basically similar in nature and are
directly related to the main line of petitioner's business.
5) Petitioner signed a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the
AG&P United Rank & File Association ("URFA," for brevity), which
is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the regular rankand-file employees of the petitioner.
6) Private respondent Lakas ng Manggagawa sa AG&P-SMSGNational Federation of Labor ("LAKAS-NFL," for brevity) filed a
Petition for Certification Election with the Med-Arbitration Unit
to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the regular non-project employees of the Steel and Marine
Structure at the BMFY representing approximately 1,000
employees or that a certification be conducted among said
employees.
7) On September 25, 1990, public respondent Med-Arbiter Tomas F.
Falconitin of the Department of Labor and Employment ordered
that certification election among the regular "Project
Workers"/employees of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of
Manila, Inc. at its Steel and Marine Structures Group (AG&PSMSG) be conducted immediately. The Representation Officer is
hereby directed to conduct the usual pre-election conference in
connection thereof with the following choices to consider:
1 Lakas Ng Manggagawa Sa AG&P-SMSG National Federation
of Labor (LAKAS-NFL); and
2 No Union.
SO ORDERED.

8) On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed an appeal with the

Department of Labor and Employment.
9) USEC Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied petitioner's appeal for lack
of merit.
10) On November 28, 1990, petitioner's project employees at its
SMSG site who were not given regular employment
appointment on October 26, 1990 went on strike and
completely paralyzed petitioner's operations in Bauan,
Batangas.
11) Said strike was settled in a conciliation conference convened by
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on December 8,
1990 when an Agreement was reached by the petitioner and
private respondent LAKAS-NFL wherein petitioner agreed to
formally regularize all the remaining alleged project
employees with at least one year of service pending the final
outcome of the certification election case. 5 Thereafter, 686
additional regular project employees were regularized
effective December 1, 1990 in pursuance to said Agreement.
12) On December 6, 1990, petitioner received a letter from URFA
informing the former about the admission into URFA of the
membership of 410 regular project employees who were
formally regularized by the petitioner effective November 1,
1990.
13) On that same date, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on the Resolution dated November 22, 1990 alleging that the
employees sought to be represented by the private respondent
LAKAS-NFL are regular employees of the petitioner and are
deemed included in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement
of the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner which
motion was subsequently denied by the public respondent
Undersecretary Laguesma
14) Hence, this petition assailing said Order and Resolution
Issues:
1) Does the Contract Bar Rule Apply to this case?
2) Did they fail to consider the supervening fact that bargaining unit of
the alleged regular project workers has ceased to exist by the
regularization of all the alleged project workers with at least one
year of service?
HELD: The contentions of the petitioner are meritorious.
Section 1 of Article II of petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement
with URFA defined appropriate bargaining unit as follows:
ARTICLE II
SCOPE
Sec. 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit The appropriate bargaining
unit covered by this Agreement consists of those regular rank-and-file
employees of the COMPANY who have remained as such up to the

date of execution of this Agreement, as well as those who may

hereafter acquire the same status. It is hereby understood and
agreed that the following are not within the appropriate bargaining
unit and, therefore, this Agreement is not applicable to them, to wit:
a. Executives, division department and section heads, staff members,
managerial employees, and executive secretaries;
b. Workers hired by the COMPANY as project employees as
contemplated by existing laws including relievers of regular
employees who are sent abroad are not covered by this Contract.
Provided, however, that regular employees who are assigned as
relievers shall continue to be covered by this Contract, and provided
further that relievers who are assigned to regular positions which may
become vacant shall be duly considered for such regular positions
after attaining the six months probationary period.
c. Security personnel.
Although the aforementioned definition does not include
petitioner's regular project employees in the coverage of the
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner
and the URFA, the regularization of all the regular project
employees with at least one year of service and the subsequent
membership of said employees with the URFA mean that the
alleged regular project employees whom respondent LAKASNFL seeks to represent are, in fact, regular employees by
contemplation of law and included in the appropriate bargaining
unit of said Collective Bargaining Agreement consequently, the
bargaining unit which respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to
represent has already ceased to exist.
The Labor Code provides:
Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. The Bureau shall not
entertain any petition for certification election or any other action
which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing
collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under
Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.
Paragraph 2 of Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules
And Regulations likewise provides:
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement Leo:
mali yan ha. Tingnan mo yung code.
Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the petitioner and URFA, which is the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-

and-file employees of the petitioner including the regular project

employees with more than one year of service, bars any other labor
organization from filing a petition for certification election except
within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the enactment
of Article 232 of the Labor Code which was designed to ensure
industrial peace between the employer and its employees during the
existence of the collective bargaining agreement.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious, the assailed
Resolution of November 22, 1990 and the Order dated December 11,
1990 are hereby annuled and set aside. This temporary restraining
order issued is made permanent. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Topic: The Union as Initiating Party, Organized Establishment,
Petition AFTER Freedom Period
Case: National Congress of Union in Sugar Industry v. Ferrer-Calleja
Facts:
1) Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment.
2) Respondent Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja is impleaded in her
official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of
the Department of Labor and Employment, while private
respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGTKMU) is a labor organization duly registered with the Department
of Labor and Employment.
3) Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon)
based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five
hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three
hundred (300) on off-milling season.
4) Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon
entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term of
three (3) years, which was to expire on November 14, 1987.
5) When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and
Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended
for another three (3) years with reservation to negotiate for its
amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
6) However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage
increases and optional retirement.
7) In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a
suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to
evaluate and further study their positions. Hence, Labor
Management Council was set up and convened, with a
representative of the Department of Labor and Employment, acting

as chairman, to resolve the issues.

8) Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct certification or
certification election among the rank and file workers of
Dacongcogon.
9) On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved
to dismiss the petition on the following grounds, to wit:
i) Deadlock negotiation between intervenor and respondentcentral
ii) Petition was filed out of time
10) Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss filed by private
respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and directed the conduct of
certification election among the rank and file workers of
Dacongcogon
CERT. election among the rank and file employees/workers of the
Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., situated at Kabankalan,
Neg. Occ., be conducted with the following choices:
(1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP);
(2) National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW);
(3) No Union.
11) On February 9, 1989, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal
12) Petitioner filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration
praying that the motion for reconsideration and/or appeal be
denied for lack of merit.
13) Respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered
a resolution reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter FOR BEING
filed out of time.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed
after the 60-day freedom period.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Calleja committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the resolution dated June 26, 1989 setting aside, vacating
and reversing the order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter
Serapio, in the following manner:
1) by setting aside and vacating the aforesaid Order dated February
8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Felizardo Serapio and in effect dismissing the
Petition for Direct or Certification Election of Petitioner NACUSIPTUCP (Annex "A" hereof) without strong valid, legal and factual basis;
2) by giving a very strict and limited interpretation of the provisions of
Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Labor Code, as amended, knowing, as she does, that the
Labor Code, being a social legislation, should be liberally interpreted
to afford the workers the opportunity to exercise their legitimate legal
and constitutional rights to self-organization and to free collective
bargaining;

3) by issuing her questioned Resolution of June 26, 1989 knowing

fully well that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715 on 21 March
1989 she had no longer any appellate powers over decisions of MedArbiters in cases of representation issues or certification elections;
4) by ignoring intentionally the applicable ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La
Suerte-FOITAF vs. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977;
5) by clearly failing to appreciate the significance (sic) of the fact that
for more than four (4) years there has been no certification election
involving the rank and file workers of the Company; and,
6) by frustrating the legitimate desire and will of the workers of the
Company to determine their sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative through secret balloting. (Rollo, pp. 9-10)
However, the public respondent through the Solicitor General
stresses that the petition for certification election was filed out of time.
The records of the CBA at the Collective Agreements Division (CAD)
of the Bureau of Labor Relations show that the CBA between
Dacongcogon and private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU had expired
on November 14, 1987, hence, the petition for certification election
was filed too late, that is, a period of more than one (1) year after the
CBA expired.
The public respondent maintains that Section 6 of the Rules
Implementing Executive Order No. 111 commands that the petition for
certification election must be filed within the last sixty (60) days of
the CBA and further reiterates and warns that any petition filed
outside the 60-day freedom period "shall be dismissed outright."
Moreover, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code enjoins the filing of a representation question, if before a
petition for certification election is filed, a bargaining deadlock to
which the bargaining agent is a party is submitted for conciliation or
arbitration.
Finally, the public respondent emphasizes that respondent Director
has jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration interposed
by respondent union from the order of the Med-Arbiter directing a
certification election. Public respondent contends that Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 6715 is not applicable, "(f)irstly, there is as yet no
rule or regulation established by the Secretary for the conduct of
elections among the rank and file of employer Dacongcogon;
(s)econdly, even the mechanics of the election which had to be first
laid out, as directed in the Order dated February 8, 1989 of the MedArbiter, was aborted by the appeal therefrom interposed by
respondent union; and (t)hirdly, petitioner is estopped to question the
jurisdiction of respondent Director after it filed its opposition to
respondent union's Motion for Reconsideration (Annex
'F,' Petition) and without, as will be seen, in any way assailing such
jurisdiction. . . ." (Rollo, p.66)

We find the petition devoid of merit.

A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules
implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that:
Sec. 6. Procedure . . .
In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where
the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is
questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall
immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the
petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective
bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixtyday freedom period shall be dismissed outright.

The sixty-day freedom period based on the original

collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by
any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective
bargaining agreement for purposes of certification
election.
xxx xxx xxx
The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for
certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP should be
dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom
period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.
It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining
agreement i.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may
serve as a bar to certification elections. (Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Estrella, G.R. No. 45323, February 20,
1989, 170 SCRA 378, 382) It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor
Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining
agreement.
Hence, the contract-bar rule as embodied in Section 3,
Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is
applicable.
This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a
motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days
prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for
certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the
said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to
ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the
management by preventing frequent modifications of any
collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in
good faith and for the stipulated original period. (Associated
Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 77539, April 12,
1989, 172 SCRA 49, 57 citing Associated Trade Unions (ATU v.

Trajano, G.R. No. L-75321, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA 318, 322-323)
Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA
in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon had
not concluded a new CBA, We need only to stress what was held in
the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers,
Philippine Labor Union Association (G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August
1990, 189 SCRA 179, 191) quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that
"(i)t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal
effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in
force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.
Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.
Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its answer
stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that
the deadlock was submitted to the Labor Management Council.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the resolution of the
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Topic: Filing Party, Misrepresentation of Union Officers
Case: DHL Phil. Corp. United RAF Association FFW v. Buklod ng
Manggagawa
Facts
1. A certification election was conducted among the regular rank
and file employees in the main office and the regional branches
of DHL Philippines Corporation. The contending choices were
DHLs and "no union."
2. On the basis of the results of the certification election, with
petitioner receiving 546 votes and "no union" garnering 348
votes, the election officer certified the former as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the
corporation.
3. Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corporation
(BUKLOD) filed with the Industrial Relations Division of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for the
nullification of the certification election.
4. This misrepresentation was supposedly the basis for their
selection of petitioner in the certification election.
5. Med-Arbiter nullified the certification election and ordered the
holding of another one with the following contending choices:
petitioner, respondent, and "no choice."
6. Setting aside the Decision of Med-Arbiter, DOLE
Undersecretary held on appeal that the issue of representation

had already been settled with finality in favor of petitioner, and

that no petitions for certification election would be entertained
within one year from the time the election officer had issued the
Certification Order.
7. CA held that the withdrawal of a great majority of the members
of petitioner -- 704 out of 894 of them -- provided a compelling
reason to conduct a certification election anew in order to
determine, once and for all, which union reflected their choice.
8. According to the appellate court, broader considerations should
be accorded the disaffiliating member-employees and a new
election held to finally ascertain their will, consistent with the
constitutional and labor law policy of according full protection to
labors right to self-organization. The CA added that the best
forum to determine the veracity of the withdrawal or retraction
of petitioners former members was another certification
election.
9. The appellate court also held that the election officers issuance
of a Certification Order was precipitate because, prior thereto,
BUKLOD had filed with the med-arbiter a Petition for
nullification of the election. Furthermore, the Certification was
not in accordance with Department Order No. 9 (DO 9), Series
of 1997.
10.
The charges of fraud and deceit, lodged immediately
after the election by petitioners former members against their
officers, should have been treated as protests or issues of
eligibility within the meaning of Section 13 of DO 9, hence, this
Petition.
Issues
Whether or not the BUKLOD failed to follow strictly the procedural
technicalities regarding the period for filing their protest.
Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
DHL argues that the CA gravely erred in rendering its assailed
Decision, considering that no protest or challenge had been
formalized within five days, or raised during the election proceedings
and entered in the minutes thereof. DHL adds that BUKLOD did not
file any protest, either, against the alleged fraud and
misrepresentation by the formers officers during the election.
We disagree. When the med-arbiter admitted and gave due course to
BUKLODs Petition for nullification of the election proceedings, the
election officer should have deferred issuing the Certification of the
results thereof. Section 13 of the Implementing Rules cannot strictly
be applied to the present case.
BUKLODs contention is that a number of employees were lured by
their officers into believing that DHL was an independent union. Since
the employees had long desired to have an independent union that
would represent them in collective bargaining, they voted "yes" in
favor of DHL. Having been misled, a majority of them eventually
disaffiliated themselves from it and formed an independent union,
BUKLOD herein, which thereafter protested the conduct of the
election. Having been formed just after such exercise by the

defrauded employees who were former members of DHL, BUKLOD

could not have reasonably filed its protest within five days from the
close of the election proceedings.
Notably, after it had applied for registration with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), BUKLOD filed its Petition to nullify the certification
election. DHL insistently opposed the Petition, as BUKLOD had not
yet been issued a certificate of registration at the time. Because such
certificate was issued in favor of the latter four days after the filing of
the Petition, the misgivings of the former were brushed aside by the
med-arbiter. Indeed, the fact that BUKLOD was not yet a duly
registered labor organization when the Petition was filed is of no
moment, absent any fatal defect in its application for registration.
The circumstances in the present case show that the employees did
not sleep on their rights. Hence, their failure to follow strictly the
procedural technicalities regarding the period for filing their protest
should not be taken against them. Mere technicalities should not be
allowed to prevail over the welfare of the workers.15 What is
essential is that they be accorded an opportunity to determine freely
and intelligently which labor organization shall act on their behalf.16
Having been denied this opportunity by the betrayal committed by
DHLs officers in the present case, the employees were prevented
from making an intelligent and independent choice.
Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
Topic: Certification Election, Form of Petition
Case: National Mines vs. Secretary of Labor
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated August 4, 1992
of the secretary of Labor in Case No. OS-A-4-102-92. In said
decision, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the MedArbiter in Cases No. NCR-OD-M-91-09-106 and NCR-OD-M-91-10131, which granted the petition of respondent Federation of Free
Workers-Samahang Mangagawa sa Quality Container Corporation
(FFW-SMQCC), for a certification election to be conducted among
the rank and file employees of respondent Quality Container
Corporation (QCC).
Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor
federations duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent of
all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic
corporation engaged in the metal industry.
On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and respondent
QCC, respondent FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with
the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital Region
(NCR-OD-M-91-09-106) a petition for certification election. The
petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of company
employees, who signified their consent to a certification election
among the rank and file employees of QCC (Rollo, pp. 79-83).
Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFWSMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required consent to the

certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees

had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by law;
and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner,
had no personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.
On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second
petition for certification election, this time signed and verified by De
Pedro (NCR-OD-91-10-131).
On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for
certification election of respondent FFW-SMQCC in a decision, the
dispositive portion of which, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a certification election be
conducted among the rank-and-file employees of Quality Container
Corporation within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the usual
pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics
and other details of the election. The payroll of the company three (3)
months prior to the filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in
determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
a) Federation of Free Workers (FFW)- Samahang Mangagawa sa
Quality Container Corporation Chapter;
b) National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU); and
c) No union (Rollo, pp. 24-25).
Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor (OS-A-4102-92). On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Labor rendered a
decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the order
of the Med-Arbiter.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the assailed decision was issued in grave
abuse of discretion for the following reasons: (1) that Reynito de
Pedro is not the authorized representative of respondent FFWSMQCC, he being the duly elected president of petitioner; (2) that the
filing of the second petition for certification election did not cure, much
less correct, the defects in the first petition; and (3) that in the first
and second petitions, the signatures of the 141 employees, who
signified their support thereto, were either forged or pre-maturely
obtained prior to the 60-day period before the expiration of the
existing collective bargaining agreement.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of
petitioner, he had disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined
respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for certification election
was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De
Pedro from the company is of no moment, considering that the
petition for certification election was filed before his dismissal on
August 22, 1992.
Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional
requisite (Buenaventura v. Uy, 149 SCRA 22 [1987]; In the Matter of
the Change of Name of Antonina B. Oshita, 19 SCRA 700 [1967]).
Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective,
the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice
and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally,
technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases;
and this rule is specifically applied in certification election

proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely investigative and nonadversarial in character (Associated Labor Unions v. Ferrer-Calleja,
179 SCRA 127 [1989]); Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149
SCRA 470 [1987]). Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in
the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for
certification election.
Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a
list of 141 supporting signatures out of the 300 employees belonging
to the appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by respondent
FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list some
36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner,
likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the
validity of the signatures therein.
Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned,
this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75
i.e., 25% of the total number of company employees required by
law to support a petition for certification election. The disclaimer of 13
employees by their respective signatures covers only their own
personal participation and cannot in any way be extended to include
the rest of those who did not question the same.
Moreover, the fact that the list of signatures is undated does not
necessarily mean that the signatures were obtained prior to the 60day period before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining
agreement. What is important is that the petition for certification
election must be filed during the freedom period and that the 25%
requirement of supporting signatures be met upon the filing thereof.
These requirements have been compiled by respondent FFWSMQCC in their first and second petitions, and it was thus incumbent
upon the Med-Arbiter to order a certification election to be conducted
among the rank and file employees of the company (Labor Code of
the Philippines, Art. 256; Warren Mfg. Workers' Union v. Bureau of
Labor Relations, 159 SCRA 387 [1988]; Samahang Mangagawa ng
Pacific Mills v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]).
If indeed there are employees in the bargaining unit who refused to
be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC, with all the more
reason should a certification election be held where the employees
themselves can freely and voluntarily express by secret ballot their
choice of bargaining representative. A certification election is the most
effective and expeditious way to determine which labor organization
can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining
unit of the company (Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sec.
of Labor, 201 SCRA 584 [1991]; National Association of Free Trade
Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 164 SCRA 12 [1988]).
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of
Labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Topic: Certification Election, Substantial Support
Case: Port Workers Union etc. v. DOLE
FACTS

-The collective bargaining agreement of the International Container

Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) with private respondents Associate
Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union,
was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to
represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were
already plotting their moves.
-on March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa
Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The
consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining
unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the
petition.
-On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the
Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.
-another petition for certification election was filed by the Port
Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990.
The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990, or thirtyfive days after the filing of the petition.
-On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the
ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in
Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part
as follows: In a petition involving an organized establishment or
enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective
bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a
legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order
the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during
the Last sixty (60) days of the collective bargainingagreement and
supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%)
of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or
after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The
twenty-five percent (25%) requirementshall be satisfied upon the
filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
-the Med-Arbiter dismissed the consolidated petitions. PWUP
appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of The
Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted
simultaneously with the petition for certification election. DOLE
Undersecretary Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and
dismissed PWUPs appeal.
-ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement, which was concluded on September 28, 1990.
This was ratified by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit.
-PWUP claims grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent in theapplication of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The
article provides in part as follows: Art. 256. Representation issue in
organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a
verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and
Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of
the collective
bargaining agreement,
the
Med-Arbiter
shall
automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified
petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five
(25%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain
the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .

-The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter should
automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition is
supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit.
SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with the law when they
submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing the
petition. The petitioner complains that the dismissal of the petitions
for certification election, including its own petition for intervention, had
the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the ICTSI employees.
-Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on
Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section 6, Rule V,
Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under
Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of
the Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and
unappealable.
-For its part, APCWU questions PWUPs personality in these
proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures in its petition,
and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent
SAMADA or PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent
also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of the new CBA
by the majority of the workers was an affirmation of
their membership in the union that negotiated that agreement.
ISSUE
WON there was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when they
dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent
signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition
HELD
YES
-pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the
right to self-organization and collective bargaining, the constant and
unwavering policy of the Court has been to require a certification
election as the best means of ascertaining which labor organization
should be the collective bargaining representative.
-The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious
method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that
shall act as their representative in their dealings with the
establishment where they are working. The holding of a certification
election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
-the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the
25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification
election should not be strictlyapplied to frustrate the determination of
the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly,
the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks
to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at
best be given only a directory effect.
-It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not
carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement is in fact
not applicable to a petition in intervention.
-the certification election is not litigation but a mere investigation of a
non-adversary character where the rules of procedure are not strictly
applied. Technical rules and objections should not hamper the correct
ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of confidence of

the majority of the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in

their dealings with management.
-Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need
for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative. Subject to this
singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized
representative of the workers is in doubt must berejected in favor of a
more certain indication of the will of the workers. The certification
election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on
the crucial question of who shall represent them in their negotiations
with the management for a collective bargaining agreement that will
best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there be
no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous
management and a union covertly supporting it while professing its
loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated
because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its
approval and support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt
regarding the real representation of the workers be resolved in favor
of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the
suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy
observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over
substantial justice.
DISPOSITION
Petition GRANTED.
Case: Oriental Tin Can vs. Laguesma
FACTS: Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing Company,
Inc. (the company) is engaged in the manufacture of tin can
containers and metal sheets. On March 3, 1994, it entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin
Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the existing CBA was due to expire on
April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of the companys rank-and-file
employees authorized the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a
petition for certification election. On March 10, 1994, however, this
petition was repudiated via a written waiver by 115 of the signatories
who, along with other employees totalling 897, ratified the CBA on the
same date.
On March 18, 1994, armed with Charter Certificate No. IV-MEE-089,
respondent Oriental Tin Can Workers Union Federation of Free
Workers (OTCWU-FFW) filed a petition for certification election with
the National Capital Region office of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), pursuant to Article 256 of the Labor Code.
Purporting to represent the regular rank-and-file employees of the
company, the petition was accompanied by the authentic signatures
of 25% of the employees/workers in the bargaining unit.
The above petition for certification elections was opposed by the
OTCLU. For its part, the company filed a comment alleging inter
alia that the new CBA was ratified by 897 out of the 1,020 rankand-file employees within the bargaining unit. The OTCLU then
filed a motion to dismiss and/or position paper reiterating its position
that the petition did not comply with the 25% signature requirement
and maintaining that the new CBA was a bar to a certification
election.

The certification election was allowed.

ISSUE: WON the company has a personality to challenge the
conduct of a certification elections.
HELD: NONE
It is a well-established rule that certification elections are exclusively
the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal
personality to challenge the same. Law and policy demand that
employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The
bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from
any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining
representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees
alone and to no other.
The only instance when an employer may concern itself with
employee representation activities is when it has to file the petition for
certification election because there is no existing CBA in the unit and
it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor code. After filing the petition, the role of the employer ceases
and it becomes a mere bystander. The companys interference in the
certification election below by actively opposing the same is
manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends
to establish a company union.
The designation or selection of the bargaining representative
without, however, going through the process set out by law for
the conduct of a certification election applies only when
representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is
unanimously chosen by a majority of the employees as their
bargaining representative, but a question of representation arising
from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit
aspiring to be the employees representative, can only be
resolved by holding a certification election under the
supervision of the proper government authority.
NOTE: It is uncontroverted that the petition for certification election in
this case was filed on March 18, 1994, twenty-eight days before the
expiration of the existing CBA on April 15, 1994, and well within the
60-day period provided for by the Code. The OTCLU, however, is
concerned with the effect of the employees ratification of the new
CBA on the timely filing of the petition for certification election. Would
such ratification nullify the petition?
The law dictates a negative reply. The filing of a petition for
certification election during the 60-day freedom period gives rise to a
representation case that must be resolved even though a new CBA
has been entered into within that period. This is clearly provided for in
the aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is obvious.
A petition for certification election is not necessary where the
employees are one in their choice of a representative in the
bargaining process. Moreover, said provision of the Omnibus Rules
manifests the intent of the legislative authority to allow, if not
encourage, the contending unions in a bargaining unit to hold a
certification election during the freedom period. The agreement
prematurely signed by the union and the company during the freedom
period does not affect the petition for certification election filed by
another union.

As regards the 25% support requirement, the same has been met. As
previously held by the SC, once the required percentage requirement
has been reached, the employees withdrawal from union
membership (waiver in this case) taking place after the filing of the
petition for certification election will not affect the petition. On the
contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but
was procured through duress, coercion or for a valuable
consideration. Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the 6
employees from the union will not be counted against or deducted
from the previous number who had signed up for certification
Topic: Certification of Election: Forced Intervention, Motion for
Intervention
Case: PAFLU vs. Calleja
The basic facts of this case are undisputed:
A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of
the Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR) by respondent Malayang Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation (Samahan,
for short) and was docketed as BLR Case No. A-6-201-87. A motion
to intervene, accompanied by the written consent of twenty percent
(20%) of the rank-and-file employees of the said corporation was filed
by petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September
Convention), or PAFLU, on 27 April 1987, Likewise the Katipunan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to
intervene on 1 June 1987 but unaccompanied by a similar written
consent of the employer's workers. Due to such want of a written
consent, PAFLU moved for the striking out of KAMAPI's motion for
intervention. Acting on said motion, Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo
issued an order dated 8 June 1987 denying KAMAPI's motion for
intervention and allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the certification
election. On 17 June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's
order to the respondent Director of the BLR, who issued the aforequoted order. Thus, on 17 August 1987, this petition was filed. And as
prayed for in the said petition, We issued a temporary restraining
order dated 24, August 1987. Respondent Samahan has contested
the issuance of said restraining order and has prayed that it be lifted
since the delay of the certification election only defeats the
constitutional right of labor to organize.
The main issue in this petition was aptly deposited by the Solicitor
General in his consolidated comment; Whether or not KAMAPI
should be allowed to participate in a certification election thru a
motion for intervention without a prior showing that it has the required
support expressed in the written consent of at least twenty (20%)
percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit. In taking the
negative stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the Rules
Implementing Executive Order No. 111, which reads:
SEC. 6. PROCEDURE. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional
Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action.
The Med-Arbiter shall have twenty (20) working days within which to
grant or dismiss the petition. In a petition filed by a legitimate

organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter

shall grant the petition upon verification that the same is supported by
the written consent of at least twenty (20%) of all the employees in
the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%) support shall be
satisfied upon the filing of the petition for certification election,
otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed. In either case, he shall cite
the ground.
Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the
former relates, and which provides:
SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines are
hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx
Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the
petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization
shall be supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%)
percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt of
such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct of
a certification election.
Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the
instant petition for certiorari. The respondent Director did not abuse
her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is crystal clear from
the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20%
of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for
certification election only, and not to motions for intervention.
Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a
motion for intervention in a certification election must be
accompanied by a similar written consent. Not even in the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules
Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously, the percentage
requirement pertains only to the petition for certification election, and
nothing else.
This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20%
requirement is to ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial
interest in the representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, that a considerable number of workers
desire their representation by the said petitioning union for collective
bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that 20% of the workers in
the bargaining unit signify their support to the petition by their written
consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the Med-Arbiter to
order the holding of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs.
Noriel, 134 SCRA 152). The 20% requirement, thereof, is peculiar to
petitions for certification election.
In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in
the certification election since the essence of such proceeding is to
settle once and for all which union is preferred by the workers to
represent them (PAFLU vs. BLR, 69 SCRA 132; PAFLU vs. BLR, 72
SCRA 396). As long as the motion for intervention has been properly
and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to
anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual
purpose of the motion for intervention is to participate in the

certification election. After all the original applicant had already met
the 20% requirement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
Temporary Restraining Order dated 24 August 1987 LIFTED. With
costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Topic: Unorganized Establishment
Case: Sugbuanon Rural Bank v. Laguesma
FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is
a duly-registered banking institution with principal office in Cebu City
and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI Association
of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union
(APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade
Unions Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).1wphi1.nt
On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted
Certificate of Registration No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEUTUCP, hereafter referred to as the union.
On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification
election of the supervisory employees of SRBI. It alleged, among
others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor organization dulyregistered with the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more
supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these employees supported
the petition: (4) there was no existing collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between any union and SRBI; and (5) no certification election
had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months prior to the petition.
On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the
petition. The pre-certification election conference between SRBI and
APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the unions
petition. It sought to prevent the holding of a certification election on
two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact
managerial or confidential employees.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are
managerial employees and/or highly-placed confidential employees,
hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations and
engaging in union activities.
(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a
certification election upon the filing of a petition for certification
election by a registered union, despite the petitioners appeal pending
before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the unions
registration.
RULING:

(1) Petitioners explanation does not state who among the employees
has access to information specifically relating to its labor to relations
policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves as the secretary
of the banks Board of Directors may not be so classified.
Confidential employees are those who
(1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard
(2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies [specifically in the field of labor relations].9 The two criteria
are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential
relationship must exist between the employee and his superior
officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities
relating to labor relations.
Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential
employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial
employees equally applies to confidential employees. The
confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential
employees because in the normal course of their duties they become
aware of management policies relating to labor relations. It must be
stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to
confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition
against confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a
union.
(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article
242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the
requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a
legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the MedArbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic
conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the
issue of the validity of the unions registration. On this score,
petitioners appeal was correctly dismissed.
Topic: Cert - Employer as Initiating party / Bystander Rule
Case: Hercules Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS; CERTIFICATION
ELECTION; AS A GENERAL RULE, EMPLOYER IS NOT A PARTY THERETO;
EXCEPTION. In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled
that the employer is not a party to a certification election which is the sole or
exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186
SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining representative, the
employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly, deserves
no encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino

Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211). The only instance when the employer
may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to file a petition for
certification election on its workers request to bargain collectively pursuant
to Article 258 of the Labor Code. After the order for a certification election
issues, the employers involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral
bystander.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for certiorari * seeks to set aside the resolution ** dated
September 17, 1990 of the Undersecretary of Labor in the case entitled,
"National Federation of Labor v. Hercules Industries, Inc." denying the herein
petitioners appeal from respondent Med-Arbiters Order dated May 25, 1990
declaring the National Federation of Labor (NFL) as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file workers/employees of Hercules
Industries, Inc.
Hercules Industries, Inc., herein petitioner, is a corporation duly registered
under Philippine laws which employs more or less one hundred eighty (180)
workers.
On July 30, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor (NFL), a
legitimate labor federation, filed a petition for certification election alleging
that the existing collective bargaining agreement would expire in August,
1987 and that it enjoys the support of more than twenty per cent (20%) of
the rank and file employees in the bargaining unit.
On August 21, 1987, by agreement of the parties, the Med-Arbiter issued an
order for the conduct of a certification election with the following choices:
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(1) National Federation of Labor (NFL);

(2) Hercules Employees Labor Union (HELU); and
(3) No Union.
On September 21, 1987, a pre-election conference was conducted. The
parties, however, could not agree on the list of qualified voters who would
participate in the election. Specifically, Hercules Industries, Inc. charged that
the list included ninety eight (98) scabs; sixteen (16) capatazes; eight (8)
security guards; and nine (9) managerial employees.
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On October 26, 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, judgment should be, as it is hereby

promulgated, ordering the immediate conduct of the Certification Election
within fifteen (15) days from date hereof, at the premises of the Hercules
Industries, Inc., Laih, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur, with all the regular rank and
file workers appearing in the payroll of July, 1987, and the strikers, who have
not executed Quitclaim and voluntarily accepted separation pay, are eligible
participants in the Certification Election, except those that are hereinbelow
expressly and categorically excluded by virtue of their being classified as
managerial employees, legally separated and barred under the contemplation
of law.
"A. MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES (Excluded).
"x

"B. SECURITY FORCE DEPARTMENT (Excluded).

"x

"C. STRIKES EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE EXECUTED DEED OF QUITCLAIM AND

VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTED SEPARATION PAY
(Excluded)
"x

"The representation officer-designate is hereby ordered to post immediately

within five (5) days prior to the date of election the notices of Certification
Election together with the master list of eligible voters in conspicuous places
at the premises of the Respondent." (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
On November 4, 1987, NFL appealed the order to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR Case No. A-1-10-88 LRD Case No. 014-87) on the following
grounds:
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"1. The Med-Arbiter erred in unqualifiedly accepting all the names appearing
in the July 1987 payroll as eligible voters and in allowing the 98 contract
replacement worker to vote; and
"2. The Med-Arbiter erred in disregarding the fact that an earlier order for
certification election had already been handed down and that the workers
were on strike." (p. 29, Rollo.)
Pending the resolution of the NFLs appeal, a certification election was
conducted on November 7, 1990.
On January 6, 1988, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the DOLE rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted and the

certification election held on 7 November 1987 declared null and void.
"Let a new certification election among the rank and file workers of Hercules
Industries, Inc. be held. The payroll of July 1987 excluding the [ninety eight]
98 scab replacement, shall be the basis of the voters list." (p. 32, Rollo.)
On April 4, 1990, a pre-election conference attended by the management of
Hercules Industries, Inc. and NFLs representatives was held at the
Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office in Zamboanga City.
The NFL asked that a certification election be immediately scheduled on May
4, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. to be held in the Barangay Hall, Bato, Siay, Zamboanga
del Sur.
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Accordingly, a certification election was held on May 4, 1990 with the

following results:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"1. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR 89 Votes

"2. HERCULES LUMBER & EMPLOYEES
LABOR UNION 0 (Zero)
"3. MANAGEMENT (NO UNION) 0 (Zero)
"4. SPOILED/INVALID VOTES 2 (Votes)
TOTAL VOTES CAST: 91 Votes"

(p. 188, Rollo.)

On May 25, 1990, Med-Arbiter Melchor S. Lim issued a resolution declaring
and certifying the National Federation of Labor as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner.
On July 5, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with
the DOLE. It was denied on September 17, 1990 by Undersecretary
Bienvenido E. Laquesma on the grounds that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 6, Book
V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code on protests had not been
followed; that the records disclose that no protest was made before the
election, nor formalized within five (5) days after the election, as provided for
by the rules; and the DOLE has not found any legal obstacle to the
proclamation of the NFL as the collective bargaining agent of petitioners
workers.
On September 29, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied on October 26, 1990 by Undersecretary Laquesma.
Hence, the present recourse.
On January 21, 1991, Zamboanga Rubber Workers Union, a duly organized
labor union affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union,
filed a motion for intervention in this Court alleging that it had requested the
petitioner in writing to recognize it as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of its workers. The motion was noted by this Court without action.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner, Hercules
Industries, Inc., as employer, may question the validity of the certification
election among its rank-and-file employees. The answer is no.
chanroble s lawlibrary : re dnad

In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the
employer is not a party to a certification election which is the sole or
exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186
SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining representative, the
employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly, deserves
no encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino
Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211).
The only instance when the employer may be involved in that process is
when it is obliged to file a petition for certification election on its workers
request to bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code.
After the order for a certification election issues, the employers involvement
ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander. (Rizal Workers Union v. Calleja,
supra.).
In this case, the Solicitor General correctly observed that while the
employees themselves never requested the petitioner to bargain collectively,
still, they did not object to the results of the certification election. Hence,
petitioners appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations from the Med-Arbiters
Order certifying the NFL as the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file
employees, and its filing of this petition for certiorari with us, must be
rejected. The employers intervention in the certification election of its
workers is frowned upon by law.
In any event, petitioners challenge against the validity of the certification
election of May 4, 1990 is devoid of merit. Its allegations that no notice of
the certification election had been issued, hence, no copies of said notice
were given to it, nor posted in conspicuous places within the companys
premises; that the payroll of July 1987 was not used as the basis of the
voters list; and that only fifteen (15) out of the ninety eight (98) voters
signed their names showing that they actually voted, were belied by the
minutes of the pre-election conference (Annex "A" of Comment of private
respondent) which showed that petitioner was duly notified of the conference

and attended the same, and that during said conference the Med-Arbiter set
the certification election on May 4, 1990.
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The minutes of the certification election (Annex "C" of private respondents

Comment) also show that "the list of the names of the voters were (sic)
copied from the payroll of 1987 per order of the Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Manila, . . ." (p. 188, Rollo).
Finally, the same minutes certified that: "The certification election just
concluded was conducted in the most just, honest and freely (sic) manner
without untoward happening. Further, we certify that the result above is true
and correct" (p. 188, Rollo) thereby refuting petitioners allegation that only
fifteen (15) out of ninety eight (98) workers signed the master list to show
that they actually voted again.
Besides, neither the records of the case nor the minutes of the certification
election show that petitioner protested the conduct of the certification
election as provided in Section 3 of Rule VI (ELECTIONS) of Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which states:
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"SECTION 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot questions.

The Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising
from the conduct of the election. The interested party may however, file a
protest with the representation officer before the close of the proceedings.
"Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be contained
in the minutes of the proceedings." (Emphasis ours.)
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On the basis of the election minutes, which are the only relevant and
competent evidence on the conduct of the election, the Med-Arbiter did not
err in declaring the NFL as the duly elected exclusive bargaining agent of the
petitioners rank and file workers. That finding should be accorded not only
respect but also finality by this Court for it is supported by substantial
evidence (Chua v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 354).
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed decision of
the NLRC, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.