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***Islamophobia Aff/Neg***

***Info***

Two Definitions for Islamophobia


Definition of Islamophobia
Ali et al. 11 (Wajahat, Wajahat Ali is a writer and co-host of Al Jazeera America's social media driven talk
show The Stream. He is the author of the play The Domestic Crusaders and lead author of the investigative report
Fear Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America
Center for American Progress. August)

An exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is
perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and
the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from social, political, and civic
life.

Another Definition of Islamophobia


CAIR 07 (Council of America-Islamic Relations http://www.cair.com/issues/islamophobia/is- lamophobia.aspx)
Islamophobia refers to unfounded fear of and hostility towards Islam. Such
fear and hostility leads to discrimination against Muslims, exclusion of
Muslims from mainstream political or social process, stereotyping, the
presumption of guilt by association, and finally hate crimes...Islamo- phobia
has resulted in the general and unquestioned acceptance of the following:
Islam is monolithic and cannot adapt to new realities.
Islam does not share common values with other major faiths.
Islam as a religion is inferior to the West. It is archaic, barbaric and
irrational.
Islam is a religion of violence and supports terrorism.
Islam is a violent political ideology.

What is CRT?
Housee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Wolverhampton, 2012
(Shirin, Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2012, 101120, accessed
7/3/2015 JCP PB)
In my attempt to get to the deep-root of racism in education, I turn to critical race theory (CRT). CRT
has its roots in US legal scholarship, Bell (1992), Crenshaw et al. (1995), Delgado (1995), and

Williams (1993), are often referred to as the founders of this movement. In the last decade CRT has crossed over to
other disciplines including Sociology, History, Womens Studies and Education. And through the work of Gillborn

CRT has no single statement of what it is,


rather, as Gillborn suggests, CRT is a perspective that is growing, adapting and
adopting new ideas. And as a perspective it is a set of interrelated beliefs
about the significance of race and racism, and how it works in western
societies. (Gillborn 2006a, 19). To this end, CRT has a series of defining elements and conceptual tools.
Firstly, it argues that racism is endemic and is deeply ingrained legally
and culturally in Society. Secondly, the concept objectivity is false because
there is no neutrality and third, experiential knowledge of people of colour
should be welcomed via a call for context (Delgado 1995). Finally, and most
importantly to this article, CRT links anti-racism to social justice issues.
CRT is constantly developing and evolving through a continued reciprocal
dialogue between scholarship and activism. Ladson-Billings and Tate (2006) were the first to
(2006a, 2006b, 2008) it has now arrived to Britain.

apply CRT to education. They claim that the continued racial discrimination in schools and colleges, the race
specific pedagogic issues of curricular and the marginalisation of black students in classroom teaching, continue to
be features of the education institution in the United States. In this critique they highlight the importance of black
cultural identities in its analysis of such issues. Con- firming this view, Solrzano and Yosso (2009, 132) argues that:

Critical race theory... in education...works toward the elimination of


racism... [It] is a set of insights, perspectives, methods, and pedagogy
that seeks to identify, analyze and transform the structural and cultural
aspects of education that maintain subordination and dominant racial
narratives in and out of the classroom

***AFF***

***1ACs***

1AC Legalism
The FBIs domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and
organizations has trickled down to the state and local level
these tactics spread terror throughout Muslim communities
while innocent people are harassed, watched, profiled, and
policed all in the name of protecting the nation from Islamist
Extremism
Shamas, 13 (Diala; attorney at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &

Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of
Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board of a prominent Arab-American

It has sent undercover officers into Muslim students


organizations. It created a unitformerly dubbed the Demographics Unitthat deploys officers into coffee
shops to pretend to be patrons, order their favorite dishes and listen in on coffee-house banter. It has placed
video cameras outside mosques to monitor congregants. It has even
organization.

designated entire mosques as terrorism enterprises in an attempt to


give itself legal cover to conduct multi-year investigations into mosques
religious leaders, congregants and basic daily activities. Since 2001, the
NYPD has mapped Muslim communities and their religious, educational
and social institutions and businesses in New York City and beyond. It has
riddled communities with undercover officers and informants. And it has done so
unapologetically. Contrary to popular perception, however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD
is following in the footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both
agencies claim their intelligence gathering activities are governed by
rules; the difference is that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with
regards to the validityor relevanceof its justifications, the FBIs own
surveillance policies have been accorded far more deference . As an attorney
working with New Yorks Muslim communities at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility
(CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along with student attorneys and colleagues, I have engaged in various
efforts to hold the NYPD accountable for its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we
represent Muslim individuals and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPDs surveillance program. But

the NYPDs tactics are not exceptional.


Aggressively intrusive and harmful intelligence gathering on Muslims
daily lives is a national epidemicand the chief culprit is the FBI. The task of
holding the NYPD accountable must not supersede the equally, if not more important, task of holding the
FBIand the broader law enforcement communityto account for their
CLEAR clients experiences also show us that

own misguided post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer
Prize for their investigative series based on a trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then
become a book, the recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin Ladens Final
Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many activists, paint a picture of a rogue police
department with Ray Kelly at the helm, and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder.
The NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power struggles among people who
need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of
domestic counterterrorism policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have contributed to a perception that the
federal agencys intelligence gathering is somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These

reactions mask the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have joined forces with
other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and
showing continuity in profiling policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that prohibits racial profilingeven
overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both. Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has
supported a future inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance practices. The
NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices in three different
federal lawsuits. This election season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by

the majority of our clients at CLEAR


are victims of aggressive intelligence gathering by the FBI , not the NYPD. Of the
decrying suspicionless surveillance. ADVERTISEMENT Yet

more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe have served, most have been targeted for what are often
misleadingly termed voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing

FBI interrogations are as terrifying as they are clumsy:


What Islamic lecturers do you follow? Would you travel to Bangladesh

expeditions. These

unaccompanied by a male relative? (this one directed at a young, devout


woman) What do you think of the Arab Spring? Do you hate Israel?
How often do you call your mother in Yemen? On a daily basis, our
clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and
protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their
homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside
their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary.
FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an
attorney present that they can do this the easy way or the hard way. One
client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI headquarters and let them
strap him to what they claimed was a polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions,
accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an informant. While the precise
number of these interviews is not available, our experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members

we often ask for a show of


hands in the room of people who have themselves been, or know others
who have been, interrogated by law enforcement. In many mosques, every
hand will go up. The interrogations have a devastating chilling effect on communities. Being
pressed about their religious and political affiliations or their community
activities inevitably makes our clients hesitate before being active in their
mosque or community. After a visit by the FBI, one 20-year-old client scrubbed his Facebook account,
facilitate Know-Your-Rights workshops at mosques in New York City,

un-joining groups and deleting the news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It
did not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is approached for questioning, he
the majority are young Muslim menis perceived by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom
people want to keep their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI agents cars
because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose their families, but also did not want their
neighbors to see them. Ive had conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class workload against their

the balancing involved exposure to further FBI


questioning if they were to become more active Muslims, and whether their past
extracurricular commitments,

experience being questioned by the FBI would be bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join.
And the FBI doesnt just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD,

the FBI sends informants

into Muslim communities . The agency maintains over 15,000 informants,


and tens of thousands more unofficial ones. Expanding its roster of Muslim
informants is a law enforcement priority. A presidential order from 2004 called for a broad
expansion of the FBIs informant program; in 2007 an FBI official boasted of the intelligence gathering derived from
its Confidential Human Source Program. The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for

the tragic fallout of this


aggressive drive has been well documented, as informants prey on the
vulnerable and sow fear and distrust in communities. But the FBI isnt going rogue,
a program to track and manage the growing number of informants. By now,

either. Like the NYPD, the agency shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it operates. But an examination
of these rules shows that they are woefully permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG),

based on
2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an assessmentthe lowest
level of investigationwithout needing any approval, or showing any
factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put, suspicion of criminal or
terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate individuals or send
informants into mosques, neighborhoods or organizations. The DIOG also
which governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended. Today,

prescribes domain management assessments to collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows
FBI agents to consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular
criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much

FBI is operating on the same faulty and


dangerous assumptions that guide the NYPD: that the religious practices
of what the NYPD is doing. In using these tactics, the

of millions of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity .

In 2007,

the NYPD laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal implications to commonplace

The FBI has propagated the same logic in its training


materials for years. Both agencies consider wearing religious attire and
religious practices.

growing facial hair to be indicators of a potential terrorist . Both agencies make it


their business to intrude on sacredand First Amendmentprotectedspaces. Neither has shown that this is a
strategy that makes us any safer.

Domestic surveillance of Muslim communities sustains broader


securitization of Islam this is informed by a broader culture
of Islamophobia
Kumar & Kundnani 15 (Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar "Race, Surveillance, and
Empire," respectively associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at
Rutgers University and professor at New York University, Spring 2015, Issue #96 of
International Socialist Review, http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire)

measures that the US national security system has adopted in


recent years flow from an analysis of Muslim radicalization, which
assumes that certain law-abiding activities associated with religious
The various

ideology are indicators of extremism and potential violence. Following the


the radicalization model claims to be able to
predict which individuals are not terrorists now but might be at some later
date. Behavioral, cultural, and ideological signals are assumed to reveal
who is at risk of turning into a terrorist at some point in the future.59 For example, in
the FBIs radicalization model, such things as growing a beard, starting to
wear traditional Islamic clothing, and becoming alienated from ones former life are
listed as indicators, as is increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group
or political cause. Thus, signifiers of Muslimness such as facial hair,
dress, and so on are turned into markers of suspicion for a surveillance gaze
that is also a racial (and gendered) gaze; it is through such routine
bureaucratic mechanisms that counterterrorism practices involve the
preventive logic discussed above,

60

social construction of racial others. Official acceptance of the model of


radicalization implies a need for mass surveillance of Muslim populations
and collection of as much data as possible on every aspect of their lives in order
to try to spot the supposed warning signs that the models list. And this is exactly
the approach that law enforcement agencies introduced. At the New York

Police Department, for instance, the instrumentalizing of radicalization


models led to the mass, warrantless surveillance of every aspect of
Muslim life.

This type of Islamophobia creates a broader state of violence


against Muslims this logic extends beyond the domestic to
the War on Terror that drums up support for militarization
abroad
Kundnani 15 (Feb. 15, 2015. Arun Kundnani is the author of The Muslims are
Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror and teaches at
New York University. Islamophobia is just the latest in a history of US imperialism
The National. http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/islamophobia-is-just-thelatest-in-a-history-of-us-imperialism#full)
The shooting of three American Muslim students in Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, this month has focused attention on anti-Muslim hatred in the US.

There are strong reasons for thinking the suspect, Craig Stephen Hicks, was motivated by anti-Muslim animosity to
murder Deah Barakat, 23, Yusor Abu-Salha, 21, and Razan Abu-Salha, 19. The FBI is now investigating the case as a
possible hate crime, although initial reports stated the murder may have been about a dispute over parking. In

In a suburban
restaurant in Houston, I saw a poster that perfectly captured the nature of
the problem. The restaurant owner had used a photograph of a lynching in
the early 20th century, featuring a tree, a dead body hanging from a
branch and a crowd of white people in the foreground looking jubilant. In
place of the black victim of the original image, the face of a stereotypical
Arab was superimposed with the caption: Lets play cowboys and
Iranians. It was a disturbing sight. In the same neighbourhood, I had heard stories of teenagers beaten up at
2011, I spent a year travelling around the US investigating anti-Muslim prejudice.

school simply for being Arab, of harassment of mosque congregations and of death threats against Muslims aired on

racist imagery appeared to be a perfectly


normal way to decorate a restaurant. But the image was also revealing
because it shows anti-Muslim sentiment in the US is part of a longer racial
history. The posters caption played on the phrase cowboys and Indians
and was an implicit celebration of the genocide of Americas indigenous
peoples by European settlers, the first act in the racial history of the US
local radio stations. It was also disturbing because

and one that continues to haunt an American culture obsessed with enemies at its frontiers. Likewise, the use of a
photo of a lynching ties its meaning to the history of racial segregation after the abolition of slavery, and the ways

Anti-Muslim prejudice is the most


recent layer in this history, a reworking and recycling of older logics of
oppression. From this perspective, Islamophobia, like other forms of
prejudice, should not be seen only as a problem of hate crimes committed
by lone extremists. The acts of individual perpetrators can only be made
sense of if they are seen as the product of a wider culture, in which
glorifying racial violence is acceptable. All empires require violence to
sustain themselves, and the violence perpetrated overseas by imperial powers
always flows back, in one form or another, to the homeland. In modern times, that violence
that violence was used to maintain white supremacy.

also always takes on a racial character. The British Empire relied upon racist ideology to maintain its authority, both
domestically and in colonial settings, and particularly in the face of resistance to its rule. Blacks and Asians from the
colonies who settled in Britain after the Second World War encountered the racism imperialism had fostered there,
persisting long after the British Empire itself no longer existed. Since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy
planners have regarded the Middle East as their most troublesome territory, where resistance seems to be

Large sections of the US political


and cultural elite have turned to racial ways of explaining resistance to its
authority. Rather than see the Palestinian movement, for example, as rooted in a struggle against military
especially strong against the USs key regional ally, Israel.

In
other words, the problem is their culture, not our politics. With the War on
Terror, that rhetoric was generalised to Muslims as a whole: the religion
somehow especially prone to terrorist violence. The US governments own
violence torture, drone strikes, and military occupations, which result in
many times more deaths than jihadist terrorism can then be more
easily defended. Take, for example, the popular US writer Sam Harris, one of the sooccupation and for human rights, it has been more convenient to think that Arabs are inherently fanatical.

called new atheists who seem to have influenced Craig Hicks in Chapel Hill. Harris has said that Islam is the

claims
human rights problems in what he reductively calls the Muslim world
are caused by Islam, as if it is a monolith that mechanically drives
followers to acts of barbarism. But beliefs reflect social and political
conditions as much as they shape them. Global opinion polls suggest that whether one
thinks that violence against civilians is legitimate, for example, has more
to do with political context than religious belief. Such violence is
considered more acceptable in the US and Europe than everywhere else in the world. Indeed,
mother-lode of bad ideas and that we are misled to think the fundamentalists are the fringe. He

Sam Harris himself has written in support of killing civilians for the beliefs they hold. In his book, The End of Faith,
he says that

some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical

to kill people for believing them. He maintains this is what the US


attempted in Afghanistan.

It is what we and other western powers are bound to attempt, at an

even greater cost to ourselves and to innocents abroad, elsewhere in the Muslim world, he wrote. We will

religious belief becomes


a proxy for imminent threat in order to justify wars of aggression against
a population defined by its religion. His argument not only provides
rhetorical support for wars that have led to the deaths of at least half a million people since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, but also gives a rationale for acts of Islamophobic
violence at home. Since 2001, dozens of people have been killed in the US by
continue to spill blood in what is, at bottom, a war of ideas. In this argument,

right-wing extremists who have absorbed the racist logic of American


imperialism

more than by the jihadists regarded as the chief threat of terrorism. However the online

response to the Chapel Hill murders shows there is also another America one that recently took to the streets to
protest against police racism with the slogan #BlackLivesMatter. (This month, the slogan #MuslimLivesMatter also

For this other America to overcome the USs long racial


history, it will need to understand that Islamophobia is more than the
hatred of a small number of individuals, but a system of violence and
oppression, inherently connected to imperialism.
began to trend on Twitter.)

In addition, western knowledge is grounded in Orientalism


This epistemic racism lays the foundation for an untold amount
of violence done in the name of universal, neutral, value-free
values intended to protect white civilization
Grosfoguel, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies, and
Mielants, Assistant Professor in Sociology, 2006
(Ramn, University of California at Berkeley, Eric, College of Arts and Sciences at
Fairfield University, 9-23-2006, The Long-Dure Entanglement Between
Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal WorldSystem: An Introduction,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2/, accessed 7/5/2015 JCP
PB @ GDI)

The myth about Western males capacity to produce a knowledge that is


universal beyond time and space was fundamental to imperial/global
designs. The Cartesian egopolitics of knowledge inaugurated what Colombian philosopher Santiago CastroGomez called the point zero perspective. The point zero perspective is the Western myth of a point of view that

Western men to claim their


knowledge to be universal, neutral, value-free and objective. Contemporary
authors like Samuel Huntington (1996) reproduce a combination of old Occidentalism with Orientalism. The
superiority of the West is taken for granted and the epistemic privilege of
Western identity politics from which to produce judgments of the Other
and global/imperial designs around the world is an unquestioned
presupposition. Moreover, in a male dominated academic culture such as Harvard, a scholar and national
assumes itself to be beyond a point of view. This myth allowed

defense apologist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to internal
American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to
challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ultimately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).

It is from Western hegemonic


identity politics and epistemic privilege that the rest of the
epistemologies and cosmologies in the world are subalternized as myth,
religion and folklore, and that the downgrading of any form of nonWestern knowledge occurs. The former leads to epistemic racism, that is, the inferiorization and
subalternization of non-Western knowledge, while the latter leads to Orientalism. It is also from this
hegemonic epistemic location that Western thinkers produce Orientalism
about Islam. The subalternization and inferiorization of Islam were not
merely a downgrading of Islam as spirituality, but also as an epistemology.
Islamic critical thinkers are considered inferior to the Western/Christian
thinkers. The superiority of Western epistemology allows the West to
construct with authority the Islamic Other as an inferior people or
culture frozen in time, and leads Western scholars to write entire books
about what went wrong with Islam (e.g. Lewis 2002), as if problems in the Middle East or poverty
What is the relevance of this epistemic discussion to Islamophobia?

in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their
region, effectively turning the Islamic World into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the

Islamophobia as a form of racism is not


exclusively a social phenomenon but also an epistemic question. Epistemic
Orientalization of Islam. This is crucial because

racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western

The thinking coming from non-Western locations is not


considered worthy of attention except to represent it as uncivilized,
primitive, barbarian, and backward. Epistemic racism allows the West to unilaterally
global/imperial designs.

decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue.

Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only


manifested in the labor market, education, public sphere, global war
against terrorism, or the global economy, but also in the epistemological
battleground about the definition of the priorities of the world today.
Recent events such as the September 11 attacks on American soil, the riots in Parisian
banlieues, anti-immigrant xenophobia, the demonstrations against Danish cartoons of the Prophet,
the bombing of London metro stations, the triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian elections, the resistance of

and the
nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic
language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some exceptions
such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if
not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.
Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to
legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics
and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim
people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their
Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11),

Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the
inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the
Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.

Orientalism causes racist imperialist violence and pre-emptive


warfare
Said 03Frmr prof, English and Comp Lit, Columbia. PhD, Harvard (Edward, A
window on the world,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation)

I wish I could say that general understanding of the Middle East, the Arabs and Islam in the US has improved, but
alas, it really hasn't. For all kinds of reasons, the situation in Europe seems to be considerably better. What
American leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept
clean like a blackboard, so that "we" might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these
lesser people to follow. It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the
map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar.
But this has often happened with the "orient", that semi-mythical construct which since Napoleon's invasion of
Egypt in the late 18th century has been made and remade countless times. In the process the uncountable
sediments of history, a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, are swept aside or
ignored, relegated to the sandheap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken

My argument is that history is made by men and women, just as


it can also be unmade and rewritten, so that "our" east, "our" orient
becomes "ours" to possess and direct. And I have a very high regard for the powers and gifts
of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be. There has been
so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on contemporary Arab
and Muslim societies for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and
abrogation of women's rights that we simply forget that such notions as
modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple and
agreed-upon concepts that one either does or does not find like Easter
eggs in the living-room. The breathtaking insouciance of jejune publicists who speak in the name of
out of Baghdad.

foreign policy and who have no knowledge at all of the language real people actually speak, has fabricated an arid
landscape ready for American power to construct there an ersatz model of free market "democracy". But there is a
difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion,
careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge that is part of an overall campaign

It is surely one of the intellectual catastrophes of history that


an imperialist war confected by a small group of unelected US officials was
waged against a devastated third world dictatorship on thoroughly
ideological grounds having to do with world dominance, security control
and scarce resources, but disguised for its true intent, hastened and
reasoned for by orientalists who betrayed their calling as scholars . The major
of self-affirmation.

influences on George W Bush's Pentagon and National Security Council were men such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad

experts on the Arab and Islamic world who helped the American hawks to
think about such preposterous phenomena as the Arab mind and the
centuries-old Islamic decline which only American power could reverse.
Today bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing
screaming headlines about Islam and terror, the Arab threat and the
Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to
knowledge imparted by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the
heart of these strange oriental peoples. CNN and Fox, plus myriad evangelical and rightwing
Ajami,

radio hosts, innumerable tabloids and even middle-brow journals, have recycled the same unverifiable fictions and
vast generalisations so as to stir up "America" against the foreign devil. Without a well-organised sense that
the people over there were not like "us" and didn't appreciate "our" values - the very core of traditional

orientalist dogma - there would have been no war. The American advisers
to the Pentagon and the White House use the same clichs, the same
demeaning stereotypes, the same justifications for power and violence (after
all, runs the chorus, power is the only language they understand) as the scholars enlisted by the

Dutch conquerors of Malaysia and Indonesia, the British armies of India,


Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa, the French armies of Indochina and
North Africa. These people have now been joined in Iraq by a whole army of private contractors and eager
entrepreneurs to whom shall be confided everything from the writing of textbooks and the constitution to the
refashioning of Iraqi political life and its oil industry. Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not
like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilise, bring order and
democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing
intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires. Twenty-five years after my book's publication,

Orientalism once again raises the question of whether modern imperialism


ever ended, or whether it has continued in the orient since Napoleon's entry into Egypt two centuries ago.

Arabs and Muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depredations of empire are only ways of
evading responsibility in the present. You have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. This of
course is also VS Naipaul's contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to
the dogs. But what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how little it wishes to face the long
succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of Palestinians or Congolese or

that starts with Napoleon, continues with the rise


of oriental studies and the takeover of North Africa, and goes on in similar
undertakings in Vietnam, in Egypt, in Palestine and, during the entire 20th
century, in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the Gulf, in Iraq,
Syria, Palestine, and Afghanistan. Then think of the rise of anti-colonial
nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of
military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational
struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of
"natives". Each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own
Algerians or Iraqis. Think of the line

reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. My idea in Orientalism was to use humanistic critique to open up
the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of
polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us. I have called what I try to do "humanism", a word I continue to
use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated postmodern critics. By humanism I mean
first of all attempting to dissolve Blake's "mind-forg'd manacles" so as to be able to use one's mind historically and
rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding. Moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community
with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an
isolated humanist. Thus it is correct to say that every domain is linked, and that nothing that goes on in our world
has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. We need to speak about issues of injustice and suffering
within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. I have spent a great deal of
my life during the past 35 years advocating the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination, but I
have always tried to do that with full attention paid to the reality of the Jewish people and what they suffered by
way of persecution and genocide. The paramount thing is that the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be
directed toward a humane goal, that is, coexistence, and not further suppression and denial. As a humanist whose
field is literature, I am old enough to have been trained 40 years ago in the field of comparative literature, whose
leading ideas go back to Germany in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. I must mention too the supremely
creative contribution of Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan philosopher and philologist whose ideas anticipate those
of German thinkers such as Herder and Wolf, later to be followed by Goethe, Humboldt, Dilthey, Nietzsche,
Gadamer, and finally the great 20th-century Romance philologists Erich Auerbach, Leo Spitzer, and Ernst Robert
Curtius. To young people of the current generation the very idea of philology suggests something impossibly
antiquarian and musty, but philology in fact is the most basic and creative of the interpretive arts. It is exemplified
for me most admirably in Goethe's interest in Islam generally, and the 14th-century Persian Sufi poet Hafiz in
particular, a consuming passion which led to the composition of the West-stlicher Diwan, and it inflected Goethe's
later ideas about Weltliteratur, the study of all the literatures of the world as a symphonic whole which could be
apprehended theoretically as having preserved the individuality of each work without losing sight of the whole.
There is a considerable irony to the realisation that as today's globalised world draws together, we may be
approaching the kind of standardisation and homogeneity that Goethe's ideas were specifically formulated to
prevent. In an essay published in 1951 entitled "Philologie der Weltliteratur", Auerbach made exactly that point. His
great book Mimesis, published in Berne in 1946 but written while Auerbach was a wartime exile teaching Romance
languages in Istanbul, was meant to be a testament to the diversity and concreteness of the reality represented in
western literature from Homer to Virginia Woolf; but reading the 1951 essay one senses that, for Auerbach, the
great book he wrote was an elegy for a period when people could interpret texts philologically, concretely,
sensitively, and intuitively, using erudition and an excellent command of several languages to support the kind of
understanding that Goethe advocated for his understanding of Islamic literature. Positive knowledge of languages
and history was necessary, but it was never enough, any more than the mechanical gathering of facts would
constitute an adequate method for grasping what an author like Dante, for example, was all about. The main
requirement for the kind of philological understanding Auerbach and his predecessors were talking about and tried
to practise was one that sympathetically and subjectively entered into the life of a written text as seen from the
perspective of its time and its author. Rather than alienation and hostility to another time and a different culture,
philology as applied to Weltliteratur involved a profound humanistic spirit deployed with generosity and, if I may use

the word, hospitality. Thus the interpreter's mind actively makes a place in it for a foreign "other". And this creative
making of a place for works that are otherwise alien and distant is the most important facet of the interpreter's
mission. All this was obviously undermined and destroyed in Germany by national socialism. After the war,
Auerbach notes mournfully, the standardisation of ideas, and greater and greater specialisation of knowledge
gradually narrowed the opportunities for the kind of investigative and everlastingly inquiring kind of philological
work that he had represented; and, alas, it's an even more depressing fact that since Auerbach's death in 1957 both
the idea and practice of humanistic research have shrunk in scope as well as in centrality. Instead of reading in the
real sense of the word, our students today are often distracted by the fragmented knowledge available on the
internet and in the mass media. Worse yet, education is threatened by nationalist and religious orthodoxies often
disseminated by the media as they focus ahistorically and sensationally on the distant electronic wars that give
viewers the sense of surgical precision, but in fact obscure the terrible suffering and destruction produced by
modern warfare. In the demonisation of an unknown enemy for whom the label "terrorist" serves the general
purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited
at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post-September 11 period has produced. Speaking both as an
American and as an Arab I must ask my reader not to underestimate the kind of simplified view of the world that a
relative handful of Pentagon civilian elites have formulated for US policy in the entire Arab and Islamic worlds, a
view in which terror, pre-emptive war, and unilateral regime change - backed up by the most bloated military
budget in history - are the main ideas debated endlessly and impoverishingly by a media that assigns itself the role
of producing so-called "experts" who validate the government's general line. Reflection, debate, rational argument
and moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced
by abstract ideas that celebrate American or western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and
regard other cultures with contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between
humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society
which along with unprecedented power possesses the internet and F-16 fighter-jets must in the end be commanded
by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. But what has really been lost is a
sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor brushed
aside as irrelevant. That is one side of the global debate. In the Arab and Muslim countries the situation is scarcely
better. As Roula Khalaf has argued, the region has slipped into an easy anti-Americanism that shows little
understanding of what the US is really like as a society. Because the governments are relatively powerless to affect
US policy toward them, they turn their energies to repressing and keeping down their own populations, with results
in resentment, anger and helpless imprecations that do nothing to open up societies where secular ideas about
human history and development have been overtaken by failure and frustration, as well as by an Islamism built out
of rote learning and the obliteration of what are perceived to be other, competitive forms of secular knowledge. The
gradual disappearance of the extraordinary tradition of Islamic ijtihad - the process of working out Islamic rules with
reference to the Koran - has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, with the result that critical thinking
and individual wrestling with the problems of the modern world have simply dropped out of sight. This is not to say
that the cultural world has simply regressed on one side to a belligerent neo-orientalism and on the other to blanket
rejectionism. Last year's United Nations world summit in Johannesburg, for all its limitations, did in fact reveal a vast
area of common global concern that suggests the welcome emergence of a new collective constituency and gives
the often facile notion of "one world" a new urgency. In all this, however, we must admit that no one can possibly

The terrible conflicts that herd


people under falsely unifying rubrics such as "America," "the west" or
"Islam" and invent collective identities for large numbers of individuals
who are actually quite diverse, cannot remain as potent as they are, and
must be opposed. We still have at our disposal the rational interpretive skills that are the legacy of
know the extraordinarily complex unity of our globalised world.

humanistic education, not as a sentimental piety enjoining us to return to traditional values or the classics but as
the active practice of worldly secular rational discourse. The secular world is the world of history as made by human
beings. Critical thought does not submit to commands to join in the ranks marching against one or another
approved enemy. Rather than the manufactured clash of civilisations, we need to concentrate on the slow working
together of cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together. But for that kind of wider perception
we need time, patient and sceptical inquiry, supported by faith in communities of interpretation that are difficult to
sustain in a world demanding instant action and reaction. Humanism is centred upon the agency of human
individuality and subjective intuition, rather than on received ideas and authority. Texts have to be read as texts
that were produced and live on in all sorts of what I have called worldly ways. But this by no means excludes power,
since on the contrary I have tried to show the insinuations, the imbrications of power into even the most recondite
of studies. And lastly, most important, humanism is the only, and I would go as far as to say the final resistance we
have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history.

The way we discuss these issues matters Xenophobic


violence is justified by manufacturing support through racist
ideology
Collins and Glover 2002

(John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting
Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language: A
User's Guide to America's New War, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)
As any university student knows, theories about the social construction and social effects of language have

Conservative critics often argue that


those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruction) are just talking
about language, as opposed to talking about the real world. The essays in this
book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads
directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (including genocide), the
physical destruction of human communities, and the devastation of the
natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust,
it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have
succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political
language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth
itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violencefrom the
become a common feature of academic scholarship.

horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the Soviet Union to the
destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan is

intimately linked with


the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the
processes of manufacturing consent and shaping peoples perception of the world
around them; people are more likely to support acts of violence committed
in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as
terrorists, or if the violence is presented as a defense of freedom. Media
analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive effects that this kind of process has on

the most
fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects
of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language
that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human
bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with
land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can easily
be made more palatable through the use of euphemisms such as
pacification or, to use an example discussed in this book, targets. It is important to point out,
however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the
violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of vital
interests and surgical strikes and the flattering language of
civilization and just wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental
gaze from the physical effects of violence.
the political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however,

The United States federal government should curtail its


domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and communities.
This solves Surveillance is rooted in Islamophobia and
violates the populations fundamental rights to privacy and
religion.
Kundnani, 14 (Arun Kundnani;leading commentator on racism, immigration and
multiculturalism in Britain, professor at New York University; Stop Spying On
Muslim-Americans, Providence Journal, 1 Edition; July 21, 2014 Monday)
The U.S. government has been snooping on prominent members of the
Muslim-American community, according to documents released by National
Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden and publicized in a story by Glenn

Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain of the online publication Intercept. That story
reveals that the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation covertly
monitored the emails of five Mus-lim-Americans who have "all led highly
public, outwardly exemplary lives," the article said. Among the five is Faisal
Gill, who served in President George W. Bush's Department of Homeland
Security and is a longtime Republican Party activist. "I've done everything in
my life to be patriotic," Gill told the Intercept. "I served in the Navy, served in the
government, was active in my community. I've done everything that a good citizen,
in my opinion, should do." Another victim of this snooping is Nihad Awad, who
heads up the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the largest Muslim
civil rights organization in the United States. The three others are: Asim
Ghafoor, whom the article identifies as "a prominent attorney who has
represented clients in terrorism-related cases;" Hooshang Amirahmadi,
"an Iranian-American professor of international relations at Rutgers
University;" and Agha Saeed, "a former political science professor at
California State University, who champions Mus-lim civil liberties and
Palestinian rights." It appears that the government spied on these five not on
the basis of reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal or terrorist
activity but simply because of the expression of legitimate religious or
political opinions that the government considers unacceptable . The
Intercept article revealed what it called " blatant prejudice against MuslimAmericans ." And it showed good proof: One NSA document instructed staff on
how to draw up a target list for surveillance. In place of the target's real name,
the memo used the following fake name: " Mohammed Raghead ." These
documents suggest that the government is viewing all Muslims - be they Arab,
Asian or African-American - as suspect because of their membership in a
religious community. And when their Islamic belief is combined with political
opinions critical of U.S. foreign policy, they become even more suspicious - to the
point of being treated as possible terrorists. This violates the First Amendment
of the Constitution, which prevents discrimination on the basis of one's
religious or political opinions. It is also a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, which protects us from unlawful searches. The spying on
Muslim-Americans is all too reminiscent of the FBI's COINTELPRO and the
NSA's Project Minaret decades ago, which spied on people like Joan Baez, Jane
Fonda and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. We have to strongly reject the
surveillance of Muslim-Americans and recognize that an attack on the
rights of one group of people inevitably fans out to others. As the U.S.
labor movement once put it - an injury to one is an injury to all.

Ending domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and


communities dismantles the legal mechanisms of racial
profiling, infiltration, and subversion that perpetuate
Islamophobia
Shamas, 13 (Diala; attorney at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of

Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,


http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board
of a prominent Arab-American organization. It has sent undercover officers into
Muslim students organizations. It created a unitformerly dubbed the
Demographics Unitthat deploys officers into coffee shops to pretend to be
patrons, order their favorite dishes and listen in on coffee-house banter. It has
placed video cameras outside mosques to monitor congregants. It has
even designated entire mosques as terrorism enterprises in an attempt
to give itself legal cover to conduct multi-year investigations into
mosques religious leaders, congregants and basic daily activities. Since
2001, the NYPD has mapped Muslim communities and their religious,
educational and social institutions and businesses in New York City and
beyond. It has riddled communities with undercover officers and
informants. And it has done so unapologetically. Contrary to popular perception,
however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD is following in the
footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both agencies claim their
intelligence gathering activities are governed by rules; the difference is
that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with regards to the validityor
relevanceof its justifications, the FBIs own surveillance policies have
been accorded far more deference . As an attorney working with New Yorks
Muslim communities at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along with student attorneys
and colleagues, I have engaged in various efforts to hold the NYPD accountable for
its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we represent
Muslim individuals and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPDs
surveillance program. But CLEAR clients experiences also show us that the NYPDs
tactics are not exceptional. Aggressively intrusive and harmful
intelligence gathering on Muslims daily lives is a national epidemicand
the chief culprit is the FBI. The task of holding the NYPD accountable must not
supersede the equally, if not more important, task of holding the FBIand the
broader law enforcement communityto account for their own misguided
post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman
and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer Prize for their investigative series based on a
trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then become a book, the
recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin
Ladens Final Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many
activists, paint a picture of a rogue police department with Ray Kelly at the helm,
and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder. The
NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power
struggles among people who need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed
policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of domestic counterterrorism
policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have
contributed to a perception that the federal agencys intelligence gathering is
somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These reactions mask

the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have
joined forces with other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD
activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and showing continuity in profiling
policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that
prohibits racial profilingeven overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both.
Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has supported a future
inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance
practices. The NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and
intelligence-gathering practices in three different federal lawsuits. This election
season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by
decrying suspicionless surveillance. ADVERTISEMENT Yet the majority of our
clients at CLEAR are victims of aggressive intelligence gathering by the
FBI, not the NYPD. Of the more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe
have served, most have been targeted for what are often misleadingly termed
voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing
expeditions. These FBI interrogations are as terrifying as they are clumsy:
What Islamic lecturers do you follow? Would you travel to Bangladesh
unaccompanied by a male relative? (this one directed at a young, devout
woman) What do you think of the Arab Spring? Do you hate Israel?
How often do you call your mother in Yemen? On a daily basis, our
clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and
protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their
homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside
their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary.
FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an
attorney present that they can do this the easy way or the hard way.
One client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany
them to FBI headquarters and let them strap him to what they claimed was a
polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions, accused
him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an
informant. While the precise number of these interviews is not available, our
experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members facilitate KnowYour-Rights workshops at mosques in New York City, we often ask for a show of
hands in the room of people who have themselves been, or know others
who have been, interrogated by law enforcement. In many mosques, every
hand will go up. The interrogations have a devastating chilling effect on
communities. Being pressed about their religious and political affiliations or
their community activities inevitably makes our clients hesitate before
being active in their mosque or community. After a visit by the FBI, one 20year-old client scrubbed his Facebook account, un-joining groups and deleting the
news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It did
not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is
approached for questioning, hethe majority are young Muslim menis perceived
by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom people want to keep
their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI
agents cars because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose

their families, but also did not want their neighbors to see them. Ive had
conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class
workload against their extracurricular commitments, the balancing involved
exposure to further FBI questioning if they were to become more active
Muslims, and whether their past experience being questioned by the FBI would be
bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join. And the FBI doesnt
just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD, the FBI sends informants
into Muslim communities . The agency maintains over 15,000 informants,
and tens of thousands more unofficial ones. Expanding its roster of Muslim
informants is a law enforcement priority. A presidential order from 2004 called
for a broad expansion of the FBIs informant program; in 2007 an FBI official boasted
of the intelligence gathering derived from its Confidential Human Source Program.
The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for a
program to track and manage the growing number of informants. By now, the
tragic fallout of this aggressive drive has been well documented, as
informants prey on the vulnerable and sow fear and distrust in
communities. But the FBI isnt going rogue, either. Like the NYPD, the agency
shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it
operates. But an examination of these rules shows that they are woefully
permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), which
governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended.
Today, based on 2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an
assessmentthe lowest level of investigationwithout needing any
approval, or showing any factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put,
suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate
individuals or send informants into mosques, neighborhoods or
organizations. The DIOG also prescribes domain management assessments to
collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows FBI agents to
consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated
with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other
words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much of what the NYPD is doing. In
using these tactics, the FBI is operating on the same faulty and dangerous
assumptions that guide the NYPD: that the religious practices of millions
of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity . In 2007, the NYPD
laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal
implications to commonplace religious practices. The FBI has propagated the
same logic in its training materials for years. Both agencies consider
wearing religious attire and growing facial hair to be indicators of a
potential terrorist . Both agencies make it their business to intrude on sacred
and First Amendmentprotectedspaces. Neither has shown that this is a strategy
that makes us any safer.

Ending domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and


communities dismantles the legal mechanisms of racial
profiling, infiltration, and subversion that perpetuate
Islamophobia
Shahabuddin 15 (Madiha Shahabuddin is the editor-in-chief of the Chapman
Law Review, The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be: How
Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,
February 16, 2015, http://www.chapman.edu/law/_files/publications/clr-18shahabuddin.pdf, N8)
Most recently, the post-9/11 era has been characterized by government
surveillance of Muslim American communities in the name of
counterterrorism efforts. The governments conduct in this surveillance
program was highlighted in news stories that broke around August 2011
about the NYPD conducting mass surveillance of Muslim communities in
New York. The Associated Press ran a series of investigative reports on this topic, noting that the NYPD
effectively monitored every aspect of Muslim life and built databases on
where innocent Muslims eat, shop, work and pray. And in July 2014, it was
revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had at the minimum
spied on five politically active Muslim American leaders, including a past
Bush administration official, a successful attorney, a Rutgers professor, a
former California State University professor, and an executive director of
the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR). At the root of these
investigations is the tool of profiling, which allows the NYPD, FBI, or other
governmental entity to target certain groups of individuals solely based
upon their religious affiliation and pursue an almost carte blanche fishing expedition for
evidence condemning the targeted Muslim of some link to terrorist activity . Justification for this
treatment of Muslim American communities has come from the idea that
the post-9/11 era calls for urgent action to thwart mass destruction that
can come from a potential terror attack, and thereforeas the argument goesconstitutional
infringements like this are a small price to pay for [Americas] safety. C. Surveillance of Muslim Americans At
the core of this issue is what Sahar F. Aziz has called Selective counterterrorism
enforcement. This manifests itself in: the disproportionate targeting of
Muslims for surveillance; government-sent informants tasked with
infiltration and what many have argued should be legally considered
entrapment of individuals; and mapping and spying on predominantly
Muslim neighborhoods, Muslim-owned businesses, mosques, and Muslim
Student Associations. Outside the scope of this comment, but still critically troubling, are the
deportations of religious leaders and imams for sermons deemed too critical of the American government, the
criminalization and prosecution of charitable and humanitarian aid organizations under sweeping material support
statutes, and private acts of prejudice against Muslims in the form of mosque vandalism and employment

in the context of
surveillance of Muslims, the government has used intelligence gathering
as a means of manufacturing counterterror prosecutions that result in
what a federal judge has called a fantasy terror operation created and
incited by a government informant. Such intelligence gathering assists the
government in furtherance of an adversarial system that prioritizes
bolstering the number of terrorism investigations, prosecutions, and
convictions of Muslims in America.
discrimination. As author and investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson argues,

The law is key to combat Islamophobia on both a legislative


and discoursive front we should use political coalitions to
engage in incremental reforms that dismantle Islamophobia
Yazdiha 13 (Haj Yazdiha, PhD in Sociology at the University of North Carolina,

"Law as Movement Strategy: How the Islamophobia Movement Institutionalizes Fear


Through Legislation," Social Movement Studies
First, the successful use of law as strategy brings Islamophobia into an elite
political sphere. Any movement to successfully counter Islamophobias
legislative efforts must

also

gain access to the political arena and the

support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
attempted counter- movements. How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.

A shift in cultural consciousness and discourse is as much a goal of

the Islamophobia movement as is its legislative gains . Furthermore, these broader


cultural successes create further discursive opportunities on which
movements can build and through which related movements can be
framed.

1AC Critical
The FBIs domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and
organizations has trickled down to the state and local level
these tactics spread terror throughout Muslim communities
while innocent people are harassed, watched, profiled, and
policed all in the name of protecting the nation from Islamist
Extremism
Shamas, 13 (Diala; attorney at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &

Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of
Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board of a prominent Arab-American

It has sent undercover officers into Muslim students


organizations. It created a unitformerly dubbed the Demographics Unitthat deploys officers into coffee
shops to pretend to be patrons, order their favorite dishes and listen in on coffee-house banter. It has placed
video cameras outside mosques to monitor congregants. It has even
organization.

designated entire mosques as terrorism enterprises in an attempt to


give itself legal cover to conduct multi-year investigations into mosques
religious leaders, congregants and basic daily activities. Since 2001, the
NYPD has mapped Muslim communities and their religious, educational
and social institutions and businesses in New York City and beyond. It has
riddled communities with undercover officers and informants. And it has done so
unapologetically. Contrary to popular perception, however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD
is following in the footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both
agencies claim their intelligence gathering activities are governed by
rules; the difference is that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with
regards to the validityor relevanceof its justifications, the FBIs own
surveillance policies have been accorded far more deference . As an attorney
working with New Yorks Muslim communities at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility
(CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along with student attorneys and colleagues, I have engaged in various
efforts to hold the NYPD accountable for its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we
represent Muslim individuals and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPDs surveillance program. But

the NYPDs tactics are not exceptional.


Aggressively intrusive and harmful intelligence gathering on Muslims
daily lives is a national epidemicand the chief culprit is the FBI. The task of
holding the NYPD accountable must not supersede the equally, if not more important, task of holding the
FBIand the broader law enforcement communityto account for their
CLEAR clients experiences also show us that

own misguided post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer
Prize for their investigative series based on a trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then
become a book, the recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin Ladens Final
Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many activists, paint a picture of a rogue police
department with Ray Kelly at the helm, and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder.
The NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power struggles among people who
need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of
domestic counterterrorism policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have contributed to a perception that the
federal agencys intelligence gathering is somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These
reactions mask the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have joined forces with

other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and
showing continuity in profiling policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that prohibits racial profilingeven
overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both. Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has
supported a future inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance practices. The
NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices in three different
federal lawsuits. This election season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by

the majority of our clients at CLEAR


are victims of aggressive intelligence gathering by the FBI , not the NYPD. Of the
decrying suspicionless surveillance. ADVERTISEMENT Yet

more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe have served, most have been targeted for what are often
misleadingly termed voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing

FBI interrogations are as terrifying as they are clumsy:


What Islamic lecturers do you follow? Would you travel to Bangladesh

expeditions. These

unaccompanied by a male relative? (this one directed at a young, devout


woman) What do you think of the Arab Spring? Do you hate Israel?
How often do you call your mother in Yemen? On a daily basis, our
clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and
protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their
homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside
their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary.
FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an
attorney present that they can do this the easy way or the hard way. One

client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI headquarters and let them
strap him to what they claimed was a polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions,
accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an informant. While the precise
number of these interviews is not available, our experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members

we often ask for a show of


hands in the room of people who have themselves been, or know others
who have been, interrogated by law enforcement. In many mosques, every
hand will go up. The interrogations have a devastating chilling effect on communities. Being
pressed about their religious and political affiliations or their community
activities inevitably makes our clients hesitate before being active in their
mosque or community. After a visit by the FBI, one 20-year-old client scrubbed his Facebook account,
facilitate Know-Your-Rights workshops at mosques in New York City,

un-joining groups and deleting the news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It
did not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is approached for questioning, he
the majority are young Muslim menis perceived by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom
people want to keep their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI agents cars
because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose their families, but also did not want their
neighbors to see them. Ive had conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class workload against their

the balancing involved exposure to further FBI


questioning if they were to become more active Muslims, and whether their past
extracurricular commitments,

experience being questioned by the FBI would be bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join.
And the FBI doesnt just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD,

the FBI sends informants

into Muslim communities . The agency maintains over 15,000 informants,


and tens of thousands more unofficial ones. Expanding its roster of Muslim
informants is a law enforcement priority. A presidential order from 2004 called for a broad

expansion of the FBIs informant program; in 2007 an FBI official boasted of the intelligence gathering derived from
its Confidential Human Source Program. The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for

the tragic fallout of this


aggressive drive has been well documented, as informants prey on the
vulnerable and sow fear and distrust in communities. But the FBI isnt going rogue,
a program to track and manage the growing number of informants. By now,

either. Like the NYPD, the agency shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and

unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it operates. But an examination
of these rules shows that they are woefully permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG),

based on
2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an assessmentthe lowest
level of investigationwithout needing any approval, or showing any
factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put, suspicion of criminal or
terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate individuals or send
informants into mosques, neighborhoods or organizations. The DIOG also
which governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended. Today,

prescribes domain management assessments to collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows
FBI agents to consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular
criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much

FBI is operating on the same faulty and


dangerous assumptions that guide the NYPD: that the religious practices
of what the NYPD is doing. In using these tactics, the

of millions of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity .

In 2007,

the NYPD laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal implications to commonplace

The FBI has propagated the same logic in its training


materials for years. Both agencies consider wearing religious attire and
religious practices.

growing facial hair to be indicators of a potential terrorist . Both agencies make it


their business to intrude on sacredand First Amendmentprotectedspaces. Neither has shown that this is a
strategy that makes us any safer.

Domestic surveillance of Muslim communities sustains broader


securitization of Islam this is informed by a broader culture
of Islamophobia
Kumar & Kundnani 15 (Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar "Race, Surveillance, and
Empire," respectively associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at
Rutgers University and professor at New York University, Spring 2015, Issue #96 of
International Socialist Review, http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire)

measures that the US national security system has adopted in


recent years flow from an analysis of Muslim radicalization, which
assumes that certain law-abiding activities associated with religious
The various

ideology are indicators of extremism and potential violence. Following the


preventive logic discussed above, the radicalization model claims to be able to
predict which individuals are not terrorists now but might be at some later
date. Behavioral, cultural, and ideological signals are assumed to reveal
who is at risk of turning into a terrorist at some point in the future.59 For example, in
the FBIs radicalization model, such things as growing a beard, starting to
wear traditional Islamic clothing, and becoming alienated from ones former life are
listed as indicators, as is increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group
or political cause. Thus, signifiers of Muslimness such as facial hair,
dress, and so on are turned into markers of suspicion for a surveillance gaze
that is also a racial (and gendered) gaze; it is through such routine
bureaucratic mechanisms that counterterrorism practices involve the
60

social construction of racial others. Official acceptance of the model of


radicalization implies a need for mass surveillance of Muslim populations
and collection of as much data as possible on every aspect of their lives in order
to try to spot the supposed warning signs that the models list. And this is exactly
the approach that law enforcement agencies introduced. At the New York
Police Department, for instance, the instrumentalizing of radicalization

models led to the mass, warrantless surveillance of every aspect of


Muslim life.

This type of Islamophobia creates a broader state of violence


against Muslims this logic extends beyond the domestic to
the War on Terror that drums up support for militarization
abroad
Kundnani 15 (Feb. 15, 2015. Arun Kundnani is the author of The Muslims are
Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror and teaches at
New York University. Islamophobia is just the latest in a history of US imperialism
The National. http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/islamophobia-is-just-thelatest-in-a-history-of-us-imperialism#full)
The shooting of three American Muslim students in Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, this month has focused attention on anti-Muslim hatred in the US.

There are strong reasons for thinking the suspect, Craig Stephen Hicks, was motivated by anti-Muslim animosity to
murder Deah Barakat, 23, Yusor Abu-Salha, 21, and Razan Abu-Salha, 19. The FBI is now investigating the case as a
possible hate crime, although initial reports stated the murder may have been about a dispute over parking. In

In a suburban
restaurant in Houston, I saw a poster that perfectly captured the nature of
the problem. The restaurant owner had used a photograph of a lynching in
the early 20th century, featuring a tree, a dead body hanging from a
branch and a crowd of white people in the foreground looking jubilant. In
place of the black victim of the original image, the face of a stereotypical
Arab was superimposed with the caption: Lets play cowboys and
Iranians. It was a disturbing sight. In the same neighbourhood, I had heard stories of teenagers beaten up at
2011, I spent a year travelling around the US investigating anti-Muslim prejudice.

school simply for being Arab, of harassment of mosque congregations and of death threats against Muslims aired on

racist imagery appeared to be a perfectly


normal way to decorate a restaurant. But the image was also revealing
because it shows anti-Muslim sentiment in the US is part of a longer racial
history. The posters caption played on the phrase cowboys and Indians
and was an implicit celebration of the genocide of Americas indigenous
peoples by European settlers, the first act in the racial history of the US
local radio stations. It was also disturbing because

and one that continues to haunt an American culture obsessed with enemies at its frontiers. Likewise, the use of a
photo of a lynching ties its meaning to the history of racial segregation after the abolition of slavery, and the ways

Anti-Muslim prejudice is the most


recent layer in this history, a reworking and recycling of older logics of
oppression. From this perspective, Islamophobia, like other forms of
prejudice, should not be seen only as a problem of hate crimes committed
by lone extremists. The acts of individual perpetrators can only be made
sense of if they are seen as the product of a wider culture, in which
glorifying racial violence is acceptable. All empires require violence to
sustain themselves, and the violence perpetrated overseas by imperial powers
always flows back, in one form or another, to the homeland. In modern times, that violence
that violence was used to maintain white supremacy.

also always takes on a racial character. The British Empire relied upon racist ideology to maintain its authority, both
domestically and in colonial settings, and particularly in the face of resistance to its rule. Blacks and Asians from the
colonies who settled in Britain after the Second World War encountered the racism imperialism had fostered there,
persisting long after the British Empire itself no longer existed. Since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy
planners have regarded the Middle East as their most troublesome territory, where resistance seems to be

Large sections of the US political


and cultural elite have turned to racial ways of explaining resistance to its
authority. Rather than see the Palestinian movement, for example, as rooted in a struggle against military
occupation and for human rights, it has been more convenient to think that Arabs are inherently fanatical. In
especially strong against the USs key regional ally, Israel.

other words, the problem is their culture, not our politics. With the War on
Terror, that rhetoric was generalised to Muslims as a whole: the religion
somehow especially prone to terrorist violence. The US governments own
violence torture, drone strikes, and military occupations, which result in
many times more deaths than jihadist terrorism can then be more
easily defended. Take, for example, the popular US writer Sam Harris, one of the socalled new atheists who seem to have influenced Craig Hicks in Chapel Hill. Harris has said that Islam is the

claims
human rights problems in what he reductively calls the Muslim world
are caused by Islam, as if it is a monolith that mechanically drives
followers to acts of barbarism. But beliefs reflect social and political
conditions as much as they shape them. Global opinion polls suggest that whether one
thinks that violence against civilians is legitimate, for example, has more
to do with political context than religious belief. Such violence is
considered more acceptable in the US and Europe than everywhere else in the world. Indeed,
mother-lode of bad ideas and that we are misled to think the fundamentalists are the fringe. He

Sam Harris himself has written in support of killing civilians for the beliefs they hold. In his book, The End of Faith,
he says that

some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical

to kill people for believing them. He maintains this is what the US


attempted in Afghanistan.

It is what we and other western powers are bound to attempt, at an

even greater cost to ourselves and to innocents abroad, elsewhere in the Muslim world, he wrote. We will

religious belief becomes


a proxy for imminent threat in order to justify wars of aggression against
a population defined by its religion. His argument not only provides
rhetorical support for wars that have led to the deaths of at least half a million people since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, but also gives a rationale for acts of Islamophobic
violence at home. Since 2001, dozens of people have been killed in the US by
continue to spill blood in what is, at bottom, a war of ideas. In this argument,

right-wing extremists who have absorbed the racist logic of American


imperialism

more than by the jihadists regarded as the chief threat of terrorism. However the online

response to the Chapel Hill murders shows there is also another America one that recently took to the streets to
protest against police racism with the slogan #BlackLivesMatter. (This month, the slogan #MuslimLivesMatter also

For this other America to overcome the USs long racial


history, it will need to understand that Islamophobia is more than the
hatred of a small number of individuals, but a system of violence and
oppression, inherently connected to imperialism.
began to trend on Twitter.)

In addition, western knowledge is grounded in Orientalism


This epistemic racism lays the foundation for an untold amount
of violence done in the name of universal, neutral, value-free
values intended to protect white civilization
Grosfoguel, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies, and
Mielants, Assistant Professor in Sociology, 2006
(Ramn, University of California at Berkeley, Eric, College of Arts and Sciences at
Fairfield University, 9-23-2006, The Long-Dure Entanglement Between
Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal WorldSystem: An Introduction,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2/, accessed 7/5/2015 JCP
PB @ GDI)

The myth about Western males capacity to produce a knowledge that is


universal beyond time and space was fundamental to imperial/global
designs. The Cartesian egopolitics of knowledge inaugurated what Colombian philosopher Santiago CastroGomez called the point zero perspective. The point zero perspective is the Western myth of a point of view that

Western men to claim their


knowledge to be universal, neutral, value-free and objective. Contemporary
authors like Samuel Huntington (1996) reproduce a combination of old Occidentalism with Orientalism. The
superiority of the West is taken for granted and the epistemic privilege of
Western identity politics from which to produce judgments of the Other
and global/imperial designs around the world is an unquestioned
presupposition. Moreover, in a male dominated academic culture such as Harvard, a scholar and national
assumes itself to be beyond a point of view. This myth allowed

defense apologist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to internal
American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to
challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ultimately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).

It is from Western hegemonic


identity politics and epistemic privilege that the rest of the
epistemologies and cosmologies in the world are subalternized as myth,
religion and folklore, and that the downgrading of any form of nonWestern knowledge occurs. The former leads to epistemic racism, that is, the inferiorization and
subalternization of non-Western knowledge, while the latter leads to Orientalism. It is also from this
hegemonic epistemic location that Western thinkers produce Orientalism
about Islam. The subalternization and inferiorization of Islam were not
merely a downgrading of Islam as spirituality, but also as an epistemology.
Islamic critical thinkers are considered inferior to the Western/Christian
thinkers. The superiority of Western epistemology allows the West to
construct with authority the Islamic Other as an inferior people or
culture frozen in time, and leads Western scholars to write entire books
about what went wrong with Islam (e.g. Lewis 2002), as if problems in the Middle East or poverty
What is the relevance of this epistemic discussion to Islamophobia?

in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their
region, effectively turning the Islamic World into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the

Islamophobia as a form of racism is not


exclusively a social phenomenon but also an epistemic question. Epistemic
Orientalization of Islam. This is crucial because

racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western

The thinking coming from non-Western locations is not


considered worthy of attention except to represent it as uncivilized,
primitive, barbarian, and backward. Epistemic racism allows the West to unilaterally
global/imperial designs.

decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue.

Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only


manifested in the labor market, education, public sphere, global war
against terrorism, or the global economy, but also in the epistemological
battleground about the definition of the priorities of the world today.
Recent events such as the September 11 attacks on American soil, the riots in Parisian
banlieues, anti-immigrant xenophobia, the demonstrations against Danish cartoons of the Prophet,
the bombing of London metro stations, the triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian elections, the resistance of

and the
nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic
language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some exceptions
such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if
not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.
Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to
legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics
and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim
people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their
Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11),

Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the
inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the
Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.

The way we discuss these issues matters Xenophobic


violence is justified by manufacturing support through racist
ideology
Collins and Glover 2002

(John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting
Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language: A
User's Guide to America's New War, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)
As any university student knows, theories about the social construction and social effects of language have

Conservative critics often argue that


those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruction) are just talking
about language, as opposed to talking about the real world. The essays in this
book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads
directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (including genocide), the
physical destruction of human communities, and the devastation of the
natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust,
it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have
succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political
language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth
itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violencefrom the
become a common feature of academic scholarship.

horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the Soviet Union to the
destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan is

intimately linked with


the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the
processes of manufacturing consent and shaping peoples perception of the world
around them; people are more likely to support acts of violence committed
in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as
terrorists, or if the violence is presented as a defense of freedom. Media
analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive effects that this kind of process has on

the most
fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects
of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language
that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human
bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with
land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can easily
be made more palatable through the use of euphemisms such as
pacification or, to use an example discussed in this book, targets. It is important to point out,
however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the
violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of vital
interests and surgical strikes and the flattering language of
civilization and just wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental
gaze from the physical effects of violence.
the political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however,

The 1AC is a starting-point for building resistance against


Islamophobia our educational exchanges have the potential
to disrupt racist teaching practices and curriculum
Shirin Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Jan. 4, works at the School of Humanities,
Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK Whats the point? Anti-racism and students
voices against Islamophobia, Volume 15, Issue 1

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student
comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is
fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically,
psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is
just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom
discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to
this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work
of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom
exchanges; students engaged learning could be the key to promoting
anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the
socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist

The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as


found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political
work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage
the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I
acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces,
I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational
exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political
projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates,
thinking possible in class.

such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices
and the curriculum, because: if

we are not working for equity in our teaching and


learning environments, theneducators are inadvertently maintaining the
status quo. In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is
a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on
people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by

in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks


are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have
been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The
point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for
me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions ,
optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: Education can
enlighten students and promote positive attitudes. Education settings
can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia.
It is to education that our attention should be directed. (162)
suggesting that

Our 1AC is a pedagogical shift intended to deconstruct


Islamophobia through the performance of our speech act this
enables us to be agents that challenge the dynamics of white
supremacy and Islamophobia
Jasmin Zine 4, Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies, is a researcher studying
Muslims in the Canadian diaspora. She teaches graduate courses in the Department
of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education of the University of Toronto in the areas of race and ethnicity, anti-racism
education and critical ethnography., Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative

Pedadogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines, American Journal of Islamic
Social Sciences 21:3
As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as
September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response
to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities
of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions . Among the most vulnerable
were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were
experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically
neutral arena of crisis management. Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear
resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to
name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within
the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism part of an all-too-

the notion of Islamophobia did not have any currency at all. In


it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly
used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and
antiracist pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological
and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for
addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational
frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to
address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and
anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with
Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not
exist. Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: Anti-Islamophobia Education.
Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of
Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would
take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a
methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was
necessary to develop some discursive foundations , arrive at a definition of
Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to
challenge and resist. From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely
common denial
fact,

translated as an attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents. However, this definition presents a
narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions
through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from
being based on mere ignorance, Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and
domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea
that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from ignorance
allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an
essentially irrational fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression,
which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions
through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a fear
and hatred of Islam and Muslims and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual,
ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For
example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic
forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as

exclusionary practices are shored


up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed
notions designed to pathologize Muslims as terrorists and impending
threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of
oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and
systemically became a key component of developing educational tools
that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge
these dynamics. From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative
racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These

anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and
religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this
understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This
includes the need to reclaim the stage through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and
suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. Reclaiming

the stage requires

adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse


away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject
Otherness ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical
counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and clash of civilizations narratives
typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global

Another
foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating
the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by
analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain
social inequality. Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith,
or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that
criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of color-coded
sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging.

streaming, whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into
lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by
teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited
chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that Islam doesnt value education for girls or
Black students wont succeed. These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the hidden curriculum

Developing
critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these
systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory
pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both
schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education
involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of
of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7

difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical

Deconstructing
and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a
critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making . Critically
examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social
and ideological divide between us and them is important to exposing
how power operates through the politics of representation.
terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world.

***Inherency***

Yes Surveillance Muslim Communities


There is massive domestic surveillance of Muslim communities
Management and policing is undertaken with video and audio
monitoring, legal designations, undercover officers and
informants, interrogations, and racial profiling
Shamas, 13 (Diala; attorney at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &

Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of
Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board
of a prominent Arab-American organization. It has sent undercover officers into
Muslim students organizations. It created a unitformerly dubbed the
Demographics Unitthat deploys officers into coffee shops to pretend to be
patrons, order their favorite dishes and listen in on coffee- It has even
designated entire house banter. It has placed video cameras outside
mosques to monitor congregants. mosques as terrorism enterprises in
an attempt to give itself legal cover to conduct multi-year investigations
into mosques religious leaders, congregants and basic daily activities.
Since 2001, the NYPD has mapped Muslim communities and their
religious, educational and social institutions and businesses in New York
City and beyond. It has riddled communities with undercover officers and
informants. And it has done so unapologetically. Contrary to popular perception,
however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD is following in the
footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both agencies claim their
intelligence gathering activities are governed by rules; the difference is
that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with regards to the validityor
relevanceof its justifications, the FBIs own surveillance policies have
been accorded far more deference . As an attorney working with New Yorks
Muslim communities at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along with student attorneys
and colleagues, I have engaged in various efforts to hold the NYPD accountable for
its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we represent
Muslim individuals and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPDs
surveillance program. But CLEAR clients experiences also show us that the NYPDs
tactics are not exceptional. Aggressively intrusive and harmful
intelligence gathering on Muslims daily lives is a national epidemicand
the chief culprit is the FBI. The task of holding the NYPD accountable must not
supersede the equally, if not more important, task of holding the FBIand the
broader law enforcement communityto account for their own misguided
post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman
and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer Prize for their investigative series based on a
trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then become a book, the
recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin

Ladens Final Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many
activists, paint a picture of a rogue police department with Ray Kelly at the helm,
and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder. The
NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power
struggles among people who need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed
policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of domestic counterterrorism
policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have
contributed to a perception that the federal agencys intelligence gathering is
somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These reactions mask
the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have
joined forces with other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD
activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and showing continuity in profiling
policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that
prohibits racial profilingeven overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both.
Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has supported a future
inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance
practices. The NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and
intelligence-gathering practices in three different federal lawsuits. This election
season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by
decrying suspicionless surveillance. ADVERTISEMENT Yet the majority of our
clients at CLEAR are victims of aggressive intelligence gathering by the
FBI, not the NYPD. Of the more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe
have served, most have been targeted for what are often misleadingly termed
voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing
expeditions. These FBI interrogations are as terrifying as they are clumsy:
What Islamic lecturers do you follow? Would you travel to Bangladesh
unaccompanied by a male relative? (this one directed at a young, devout
woman) What do you think of the Arab Spring? Do you hate Israel?
How often do you call your mother in Yemen? On a daily basis, our
clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and
protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their
homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside
their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary.
FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an
attorney present that they can do this the easy way or the hard way.
One client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany
them to FBI headquarters and let them strap him to what they claimed was a
polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions, accused
him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an
informant. While the precise number of these interviews is not available, our
experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members facilitate KnowYour-Rights workshops at mosques in New York City, we often ask for a show of
hands in the room of people who have themselves been, or know others
who have been, interrogated by law enforcement. In many mosques, every
hand will go up. The interrogations have a devastating chilling effect on

communities. Being pressed about their religious and political affiliations or


their community activities inevitably makes our clients hesitate before
being active in their mosque or community. After a visit by the FBI, one 20year-old client scrubbed his Facebook account, un-joining groups and deleting the
news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It did
not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is
approached for questioning, hethe majority are young Muslim menis perceived
by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom people want to keep
their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI
agents cars because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose
their families, but also did not want their neighbors to see them. Ive had
conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class
workload against their extracurricular commitments, the balancing involved
exposure to further FBI questioning if they were to become more active
Muslims, and whether their past experience being questioned by the FBI would be
bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join. And the FBI doesnt
just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD, the FBI sends informants
into Muslim communities . The agency maintains over 15,000 informants,
and tens of thousands more unofficial ones. Expanding its roster of Muslim
informants is a law enforcement priority. A presidential order from 2004 called
for a broad expansion of the FBIs informant program; in 2007 an FBI official boasted
of the intelligence gathering derived from its Confidential Human Source Program.
The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for a
program to track and manage the growing number of informants. By now, the
tragic fallout of this aggressive drive has been well documented, as
informants prey on the vulnerable and sow fear and distrust in
communities. But the FBI isnt going rogue, either. Like the NYPD, the agency
shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it
operates. But an examination of these rules shows that they are woefully
permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), which
governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended.
Today, based on 2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an
assessmentthe lowest level of investigationwithout needing any
approval, or showing any factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put,
suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate
individuals or send informants into mosques, neighborhoods or
organizations. The DIOG also prescribes domain management assessments to
collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows FBI agents to
consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated
with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other
words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much of what the NYPD is doing. In
using these tactics, the FBI is operating on the same faulty and dangerous
assumptions that guide the NYPD: that the religious practices of millions
of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity . In 2007, the NYPD
laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal
implications to commonplace religious practices. The FBI has propagated the
same logic in its training materials for years. Both agencies consider

wearing religious attire and growing facial hair to be indicators of a


potential terrorist . Both agencies make it their business to intrude on sacred
and First Amendmentprotectedspaces. Neither has shown that this is a strategy
that makes us any safer.

Muslim Profiling has worsened in post-9/11 era- Anti-Arab and


Anti-Muslim conflicts arise
Bonet 11 (Sally Wesley, Bonet has a Bachelors of Art; Psychology, and Masters of Science;

Education, and is a PhD candidate in Educational theory. She teaches at Rutgers University. Educating
Muslim American Youth in a Post-9/11 Era, Project Muse #95. Fall)

The terrorist attacks of September 11th on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, though nearly
a decade ago, are still indelibly marked in the lasting consciousness of Americans and people
worldwide. The literature suggests that living in a post 9/11 America has been an increasing
challenge for Arabs, Arab Americans, and Muslims as they are often seen as the "other," a
threat to the nation, and inherently linked to terrorism and violence (Ajrouch, 2004; Akram &
Johnson, 2004; Jamal & Naber, 2008). This challenge appears to be especially demanding for Arab American youth
as they navigate education in this post-9/11 context (Abu El-Haj, 2006, 2007, 2009; Abu El-Haj & Bonet, 2011;
Bayoumi, 2008; Wingfield, 2006; Zaal, Salah & Fine, 2007). As the most visible hand of the state and oftentimes the
first one that students encounter, public schools have profound effects on the ability of students to negotiate their
sense of nation, belonging and citizenship (Banks 2004, 2008; Suarez-Orosco, 2001; Wingfield, 2006).

anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment, (as evidenced by incidents such the


backlash against building of an Islamic youth center "near" Ground Zero in New York City
and the Floridian pastor who gained attention worldwide after threatening to burn dozens of
Qurans) that I situate this literature review.1 Through this review of educational research, I pose a few key
It is in light of the growing

questions: What federal and state policies, specifically those constructed [End Page 46] as measures of ensuring
national security, have found their ways into public secondary schools? What are the effects of those policies on
Muslim American youth2 ? And finally, what pedagogical practices can be changed to engage these youth in active
citizenship-in a post 9/11 context- for meaningful inclusion and participation in their societies?

Muslim communities are targeted- the government and white


Americans lash out against Muslims due to Islamophobia
Bonet 11 (Sally Wesley, Bonet has a Bachelors of Art; Psychology, and Masters of Science;

Education, and is a PhD candidate in Educational theory. She teaches at Rutgers University. Educating
Muslim American Youth in a Post-9/11 Era, Project Muse #95. Fall)

he Patriot Act is arguably the most pervasive of securitization policies issued soon after 9/11-one that
indubitably had the most negative impact on Arab and Muslim American youth. The USA PATRIOT Act, an acronym
for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism," was submitted several days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It was drafted by the Department of Justice

increase the powers of federal agencies to conduct searches, use electronic


surveillance to intercept communications both nationally and internationally, and detain
suspected terrorists. The Patriot Act was signed into law by President George W. Bush within four days of its
to

presentation to the House and Senate. Doyle (2002), writing on behalf of the Library of Congress, contended that
the law sought to further protect American borders against foreign terrorists as well as remove those found within
its borders. Doyle also argued that the law

enabled the creation of new crimes, new penalties

and

facilitated more efficient procedures to be used against domestic and international terrorists.
While Doyle (2002) and other supporters of the law (Sales, 2010; Wong, 2006) framed it as an innocuous and
necessary means of maintaining national security, the law was not without critics and opponents. Many opponents
of the act viewed it as a dangerous encroachment on civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (Vasi & Strang,
2009). Even Doyle (2002) recognized that critics of the law contend that some of its provisions go too far. The act

amended several previous restrictions which protected civil liberties and privacy including

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and,
most pertinent for this research, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 (Doyle, 2002; Lugg &
Soho, 2006; Sales, 2010).
Lugg and Soho (2006) highlight how the PATRIOT Act may potentially affect students' formerly protected privacy.
FERPA had formerly provided students and their parents with broad privacy rights, which protected student data

Patriot Act allows the Attorney General to access


student records if they are considered necessary for a terrorism-related
investigation, without the knowledge of students or their parents. Due to the secrecy involved in these
investigations, many people's records were subjected to searches and subpoena without their knowledge.
and records. According to Lugg and Soho, the
and procure

According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) over 7,000 people have reported abuse and numerous others
were unaware that they were being searched due to secrecy required by the law (Vasi & Strang, 2009).
The literature suggests that the political climate after the attacks of 9/11 facilitated the passing of this act (Sales,
2010; Wong, 2006). Wray-Lake et al. (2008) contend that citizens surrender certain individual freedoms to a
government in exchange for the guarantee that their liberties will be secured. Polls (Pew Research Center,
8/18/2004) show that shortly after the attacks, 49% of Americans agreed that it was acceptable and wise to
sacrifice individual freedoms to ensure national security. As time passed, however, Americans became increasingly
critical of the law and its effects on their privacy and other civil liberties, as evidenced by lower poll numbers of
agreement with the law, which by 2004, had dropped to 38%. Reports of targeted abuses gave rise to more
criticism as it became apparent that the Patriot Act disproportionately affected Arab non-citizens, Arab Americans
and Muslims (Salaita, 2006).

Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments have peaked after 9/11 attacks (Akram & Johnson, 2004;
Jamal & Naber, 2008; Murray, 2004; Salaita, 2006). This is evidenced by the violent attacks on Arabs, Muslims,
South Asians and anyone who "appeared" to fall into these categories in the wake of 9/11 (Grewal, 2003; Salaita,

Mosques were burned and vandalized; individuals were violently attacked,


mocked, spat on and even killed (Jamal & Naber, 2008). These hate crimes were committed by those
who saw Arabs and Muslims (and anyone who can be mistaken for them such as Latinos, Sikhs, etc.) as
the "enemy within" and lashed out as an attempt to pay them back for "their" treachery (Akram & Johnson,
2004; Grewal, 2003; Salaita, 2006). These hate crimes and a steadily rising anti-Arab and anti-Muslim
sentiment are indicative of Islamophobia, defined by Zine (2004) as a fear of Islam and Muslims which
2006).

manifests itself in oppression and discrimination, occurring on both individual and structural levels. This fear of
Islam and its followers indicated that after 9/11, America had redefined itself and somehow, Arab Americans had
fallen outside the boundaries of the "new" post 9/11-imagined community of America (Anderson, 1983/1991).
Grewal (2003) highlights the ways that America as nation became a site for the new articulations of gender and
race after 9/11. He argues that America, as a nation-state, experienced a new form of nationalism that became
overt and accepted (both inside and outside of the nation) post 9/11. Arabs and Muslims seemed to fall outside the
boundaries this post 9/11 nationalism overnight, which was articulated by hegemonic state power. Grewal also

that the transnational figure of the "terrorist" suggests that such a figure is beyond
redemption and is of such high risk to the nation/state as to be incarcerated or destroyed
immediately. He then questions this newly formed racialized form of nationalism asking "how then do we
suggests

understand the incarceration and criminalization of certain kinds of bodies which are identified as inclined to
commit violence or having tendencies of violence essential to them" (2003, p. 539)?
This question articulated by Grewal seems especially poignant in light of the over-targeting of Arabs and Muslims in

Arabs, Arab Americans and


Muslims were disproportionately subjected to a myriad of abuses including secret
evidence, denial of due process, indefinite detentions, airline profiling, illegal
wiretapping and surveillance. Vasi and Strang (2009) report that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) took over a thousand mostly Arab
and/or Muslim - noncitizen U.S. residents into custody, mostly without any official charge.
the aftermath of 9/11 by federal agencies. Wingfield (2006) reports that

Human Rights Watch (2002) confirms these abuses of detainment, methods of questioning and the secrecy involved
in much of the FBI's dealings. Salaita (2006) notes that

and Muslims were detained


solitary confinement.

after the attacks of 9/11, thousands of Arabs


and many of them were held for months in

in undisclosed locations

Arab Americans were also subject to clear violations of existing privacy acts, even those left intact after the Patriot
Act was passed. Lynette Clemenson of The New York Times (7/30/2004), reports that the Census Bureau provided

When accused by the


Arab American Institute (AAI) of violating constitutional safeguard s, the Department of
Homeland Security explained away the action as a measure with which they can identify
which airports needed announcements conducted in Arabic . This illustrates how private
detailed information about Arab Americans to the Department of Homeland Security.

information of Arab Americans is often singled out as a "measure of security." Many lawsuits resulted from these
abuses, including one settled in February of 2006, in which the federal government paid $300,000 to Ehab

a restaurant owner in New York who reported being physically abused while
he was held in a federal detention center for over a year (Vasi & Strang, 2009). Elmaghraby
and countless others tell stories of extended solitary confinement as well as physical
Elmaghraby,

and mental abuse. Clearly, Arabs and Muslims were disproportionately affected by the easing
[End Page 48] of surveillance and policing. However unsettling these incidents are, it is arguably more
disturbing when children and youth become targeted citizens.

Ending domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and


communities dismantles the legal mechanisms of racial
profiling, infiltration, and subversion that perpetuate
Islamophobia
Shahabuddin 15 (Madiha Shahabuddin is the editor-in-chief of the Chapman
Law Review, The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be: How
Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,
February 16, 2015, http://www.chapman.edu/law/_files/publications/clr-18shahabuddin.pdf, N8)
Most recently, the post-9/11 era has been characterized by government
surveillance of Muslim American communities in the name of
counterterrorism efforts. The governments conduct in this surveillance
program was highlighted in news stories that broke around August 2011
about the NYPD conducting mass surveillance of Muslim communities in
New York. The Associated Press ran a series of investigative reports on this topic, noting that the NYPD
effectively monitored every aspect of Muslim life and built databases on
where innocent Muslims eat, shop, work and pray. And in July 2014, it was
revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had at the minimum
spied on five politically active Muslim American leaders, including a past
Bush administration official, a successful attorney, a Rutgers professor, a
former California State University professor, and an executive director of
the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR). At the root of these
investigations is the tool of profiling, which allows the NYPD, FBI, or other
governmental entity to target certain groups of individuals solely based
upon their religious affiliation and pursue an almost carte blanche fishing expedition for
evidence condemning the targeted Muslim of some link to terrorist activity . Justification for this
treatment of Muslim American communities has come from the idea that
the post-9/11 era calls for urgent action to thwart mass destruction that
can come from a potential terror attack, and thereforeas the argument goesconstitutional
infringements like this are a small price to pay for [Americas] safety. C. Surveillance of Muslim Americans At
the core of this issue is what Sahar F. Aziz has called Selective counterterrorism
enforcement. This manifests itself in: the disproportionate targeting of
Muslims for surveillance; government-sent informants tasked with
infiltration and what many have argued should be legally considered
entrapment of individuals; and mapping and spying on predominantly
Muslim neighborhoods, Muslim-owned businesses, mosques, and Muslim
Student Associations. Outside the scope of this comment, but still critically troubling, are the
deportations of religious leaders and imams for sermons deemed too critical of the American government, the
criminalization and prosecution of charitable and humanitarian aid organizations under sweeping material support
statutes, and private acts of prejudice against Muslims in the form of mosque vandalism and employment

in the context of
surveillance of Muslims, the government has used intelligence gathering
as a means of manufacturing counterterror prosecutions that result in
what a federal judge has called a fantasy terror operation created and
incited by a government informant. Such intelligence gathering assists the
government in furtherance of an adversarial system that prioritizes
discrimination. As author and investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson argues,

bolstering the number of terrorism investigations, prosecutions, and


convictions of Muslims in America.

The profiling of Muslims is tied to a constant fight against


terrorism-Muslims are detained and interrogated so as to
monitor the populations solely because of their religious
affiliations
Mishra and Lokaneeta 12 (Sangay Mishra specializes in immigrant political
incorporation, global immigration, and racial and ethnic politics. Before Joining Drew
University, he was a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Lehigh University, PA. Jinee
Lokaneeta is a professor of political science at Drew University, Jinees research
focuses on the Debates on Law, Violence, and State Power in Liberal Democracies.)
The profiling of Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians started immediately
after the September 11 attacks. The response of the United States government after the
9/11attacks was two pronged: looking for the perpetrators of the attack outside the U.S. which resulted in the
invasion of Afghanistan and a domestic war on terror which started with detention and interrogation of thousands

The initial phase after 9/11 was


defined by a systematic targeting of Muslims on the basis of religion and
nation of origin and the policies initiated under the broad rubric of
domestic war on terror resulted in the arrests, detention, interrogations,
and deportations of thousands of people, particularly Muslim men on temporary visas. The
of American Muslims, Arabs, Middle Easterners, and South Asians.

estimates range from 2000 to 5000. A number of policies were put into effect which used immigration laws as
counterterrorism tool and Muslim men on temporary visas were the chief target of these initiatives. These policies
were termed as clear examples of profiling based on race, religion, and nation of origin and each of them not only
led to interrogation, detention, and deportation of people not involved in terrorist activities but also contributed to
the notion of Muslims as a suspect community. The first round of investigations, termed as Pentagon Twin Tower
bombing Investigation (PENTTBOM), was started by the FBI immediately after the 9/11 attacks with two primary
objectives: identifying the terrorists and their accomplices involved in the attack and coordinating all levels of law

Approximately 1200 citizens


and noncitizens were detained for interrogation within the first two
months of the attacks. Many of these detainees were interrogated and subsequently released but a
sizable number was detained for immigration law violations.7 According to a review conducted
by the Department of Justice (DOJ), it was clear from the beginning that
many of these detainees had no connection to terrorism at all and their
detention could only be explained by their religion, ethnicity, and nation of
origin. A large number of them were detained because of profiling by ordinary citizens, who called government
enforcement to prevent subsequent attacks on the United States.

agencies about neighbors, coworkers and strangers based on their ethnicity or appearance. 8 The DOJ report found
that law enforcement agencies selectively followed up on such dubious tips for persons of Arab or Muslim
extraction. In fact, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) accepted the arbitrary nature of arrests and designation
as special interest by FBI in its 2003 report.9 The excessive use of immigration laws in the initial investigation of
9/11 attacks was quite extraordinary. Soon after 9/11, the INS issued eleven operational orders to its field offices
regarding the handling of 9/11 detainees, which altered normal procedure for immigration detainees significantly.

The extraordinary nature of this investigation and an exceptional


approach towards Muslims detainees was reflected in the FBIs policy of
hold until cleared under which the agency required that the INS not
release any individual until cleared by FBI that the person is not
implicated in a terrorism investigation. There seemed to be a presumption of guilt until
proven otherwise in the case of Muslims detained in the post-9/11 sweep. The process of clearance decision
making was secret where neither detainee nor public had access to the criteria by which the cases were being
evaluated. In fact, detainees were tried in secret and the clearance was fraught with delays. According to the
governments own OIG report, the average case took eighty days for the FBI to clear.10 The violation of due process
was justified on the basis their alien status and exceptions created under the PATRIOT Act.

Yes Surveillance FBI Informants


Security Agencies have targeted Muslim communitys
specifically with the inability to distinguish the difference
between these civilians and the terrorists who perpetrated
9/11
Bazian 2012

(Hatem, Professor University of California Berkely, ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL VOLUME 1, NO. 1,
SPRING 2012, PP. 163-206)

the FBI and other security agencies have


resorted to the recruitment of Muslim informants by means of enticement
and, if necessary, threats of deportation or financial ruin. From the cases that have
come to light, it is clear that vast sections of the Muslim community and its civic and
Since the events of September 11, 2001,

religious institutions are the intended targets of these FBI operations.

As

the then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated after the Lodi indictments, Since the terrorist attacks of Sept.
11, 2001, the number one priority of the (Justice) Department has been to detect, disrupt and prevent terrorist
attacks, which means using every tool available including the recruitment and deployment of paid informants.5 For
many, this is a legitimate use of national resources to possibly prevent another 9/11, and the Muslim community,
collectively, should be ready to cooperate with the authorities in conducting these much needed operations. A more

the FBI and the Justice Department


views Muslim American communities as incubators of terrorism that must
be monitored and, if needed, infiltrated to preemptively catch them before they plan an attack. These
preemptive security operations are directed at the Muslim American
community with the goal of smoking the terrorists out before they can
do us harm as well as eliciting maximum cooperation from its leadership on the global war on terror. The
direct conclusion drawn from these operations is that

FBI operations mentioned above and others that can be readily documented point toward a comprehensive
intelligence program directed at the American Muslim community and all of its civic, religious and charitable
institutions.6 At its core, the program is rationalized with the intent to detect and disrupt terrorism activities

the assumption underlying it is that every American


Muslim is a suspect until proven otherwise. The FBI and other security agencies
before they take place; however,

have deemed American Muslim communities enemies of the state and no


resource should be spared in targeting them and disrupting their potential operations. From the outset, it
appears that the FBI and the security agencies have not distinguished
between the terrorists who carried out the operations on 9/11 and the
American Muslim community who, along with the rest of this countrys citizenry, was a victim of the
attacks, and instead a dragnet security approach seems to be the preferred method. Important questions must be
raised as to the causes behind current and future FBI programs targeting the American Muslim community; what
are the specific strategies deployed and how to best protect and defend the community as it faces massive
constitutional and civil rights violations? How similar or dissimilar are the current operations to those deployed in
the 1960s, and what lessons, if any, were learned by civil rights advocates and how to best utilize them in the
current period? More importantly, should the Muslim community expect to sacrifice its constitutional and civil rights
in exchange for security and a sense of belonging in a post 9/11 America? The answers to these questions can best
be attained by examining an earlier period in American history that witnessed a program targeting the African
American community and civil rights movements in the 1950s, 60s and early 70s that was recorded as a success
for the FBI and the security agenciesthe COINTELPRO Programs.

Yes Surveillance COINTELPRO


The strategies utilized by COINTELPRO programs are the same
strategies being used against Muslim Americans today
Bazian 2012

(Hatem, Professor University of California Berkely, ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL VOLUME 1, NO. 1,
SPRING 2012, PP. 163-206 //ASG)

Declassified documents at both ends of the country provide ample evidence as to


the existence of a massive intelligence gathering program, which focused
on members of the Arab, Muslim and Southeast Asian communities,
treating them all as suspects and using discredited methods from the 1960s to catch the

terrorists before they do us any harm. The red-scare of the 1960s has become a green one by utilizing the same
method. The targets at the present are the Arab, Muslim and South East Asian populations with all of their subdivisions, ethnic groupings, theological orientations and levels of political involvement. In his book, War at Home

four major methods1. Infiltration; 2. Psychological


Warfare From Outside; 3. Harassment Through the Legal System; 4.
Extralegal Force and Violence29employed by the FBI during the height of the COINTELPRO
program. I propose comparing the four mentioned strategies used by the FBI and security
(Date?), Brian Glick identifies the

agencies in the COINTELPRO programs to what is being done today to


Arabs, Muslims and South Asians in the current War on Terrorism and
seeing if a sufficient case can be made of systematic violations of civil and
constitutional rights. Taking the issue of infiltration first, at present Muslim communities globally are

subject to a massive infiltration campaign, and the same goal is pursued domestically inside the United States. The
problem confronting the Department of Homeland Security today is how to gain access to a closed religious
community that has been identified as the new enemy of the state, one that the country must be defended
against to prevent possible future attacks. Here we are concerned with identifying the active operational methods
and tools of those who are designing and implementing a new infiltration program directed at law abiding Muslim

the FBI has


engaged in a massive recruitment campaign directed at members of Arab,
Muslim and South East Asian communities. In major cities with large Arab, Muslim and South Asian
communities in America. Since immediately after the attacks of September 11th, 2001,

populations, the FBI placed ads in newspapers and on TV and radio, seeking individuals with language skills as well
as knowledge of the identified/targeted communities. Such an effort followed an old proven tactic of the carrot and
stick. In some cases, recruitment was undertaken by means of a very sweet tasting carrot, that being money,
position, prestige and allure of the world or a green card for an illegal immigrant. At times, though, the best tool for
recruitment is a very long and mighty stick, which produces results; however, the first method is often preferable
since it originates in an inherent weakness in the individual that makes them want to cooperate to secure a benefit
they have been after for some time. The second is less full proof since the individual has possibly 185 demonstrated
a resistance to a carrot offer and only after reaching a breaking point he/she becomes ready to cooperate and be
employed by the security agencies. In my estimation, the period of recruitment was put in place immediately after
September 11th, and it is still underway twelve years removed from the tragic events as FOIA documents from the
NYPD and SFPD demonstrate. I do not know the number of those to be recruited, but it would take a large
investment in human agents to infiltrate a 3-7 million member community with all its sub-groups and nationalities.
In the previous COINTELPRO programs, the most frequently used intelligence collection technique was through the
deployment of informants accounting for 83% frequency followed by 74% of a confidential police source being the
source for information.30

Yes Surveillance Police


Surveillance of Muslim Communities has silenced them from
being able to speak up about the anthracites inflicted upon
them. Forcing religious suppression, stripping them of their
free speech, and embracing self-repression
Shamas & Arastu 2013

(Diala Shamas, Nermeen Arastu, Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and its Impact on
American Muslims)
Since 2001, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has established a secret
surveillance program that has mapped, monitored and analyzed American
Muslim daily life throughout New York City, and even its surrounding states. In 2011, the
unveiling of this program by the Associated Press (AP) and other journalists1 who had obtained leaked internal
NYPD documents led to an outcry from public officials, civil rights activists, American Muslim religious leaders, and

advocates held that such racial and religious


profiling was not only an example of ineffective policing and wasteful
spending of taxpayer dollars, but it also marginalized and criminalized a
members of the public. Protesters and

broad segment of American Muslims.

Almost a year later, in August 2012, the Chief of the

NYPD Intelligence Division, Lt. Paul Galati admitted during sworn testimony that in the six years of his tenure, the
unit tasked with monitoring American Muslim life had not yielded a single criminal lead.2 Proponents of the
sprawling surveillance enterprise have argued that, regardless of its inefficacy, mere spying on a community is
harmless because it is clandestine and that those who are targeted should have nothing to fear, if they have
nothing to hide. Our findings, based on an unprecedented number of candid interviews with American Muslim
community members, paint a radically different picture.

We have found that surveillance of

Muslims quotidian activities has created a pervasive climate of fear and


suspicion, encroaching upon every aspect of individual and community
life. Surveillance has chilled constitutionally protected rightscurtailing
religious practice, censoring speech and stunting political organizing. Every
one of our interviewees noted that they were negatively affected by surveillance in some way - whether it was
by reducing their political or religious expression, altering the way they exercised those
rights (through clarifications, precautions, or avoiding certain interlocutors), or in experiencing social
and familial pressures to reduce their activism . Additionally, surveillance has
severed the trust that should exist between the police department and
the communities it is charged with protecting. Section One of the findings highlights
the impact of NYPD surveillance on religious life and expression. Interviewees felt

that the NYPDs spotlight on American Muslims practice of their faith, their degree of religiosity and their places of
worship disrupted and suppressed their ability to practice freely. Many also indicated that within heterogeneous
Muslim communities, this has resulted in the suppression of certain practices of Islam more than others. Interviews
also highlighted the atmosphere of tension, mistrust and suspicion that permeates Muslim religious places which
the NYPD has infiltrated with informants and undercover agents, deeming them hot spots. These law enforcement
policies have deeply affected the way Muslim faith is experienced and practiced in New York City. Section Two

NYPD surveillance has chilled American Muslims freedom of


speech. Interviewees noted a striking self-censorship of political speech and
activism. Conversations relating to foreign policy, civil rights and activism
documents how

are all deemed off-limits as interviewees fear such conversations would draw greater NYPD scrutiny.
This same fear has deterred mobilization around Muslim civil rights issues,
and quelled demands for law enforcement accountability. Parents discourage their children from being active in
Muslim student groups, protests, or other activism, believing that these activities would threaten to expose them to

government scrutiny. Surveillance has also led to a qualitative shift in the way individuals joke, the types of
metaphors they use, and even the sort of coffee house chatter in which they engage.

Yes Islamophobia Genealogy Imperialism


Islamophobia is rooted in the racist actions of Western
colonialism and imperialism its just the most recent layer of
the history of oppression.
Kundnani 15 (Feb. 15, 2015. Arun Kundnani is the author of The Muslims are
Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror and teaches at
New York University. Islamophobia is just the latest in a history of US imperialism
The National. http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/islamophobia-is-just-thelatest-in-a-history-of-us-imperialism#full)
The shooting of three American Muslim students in Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, this month has focused attention on anti-Muslim hatred in the US.

There are strong reasons for thinking the suspect, Craig Stephen Hicks, was motivated by anti-Muslim animosity to
murder Deah Barakat, 23, Yusor Abu-Salha, 21, and Razan Abu-Salha, 19. The FBI is now investigating the case as a
possible hate crime, although initial reports stated the murder may have been about a dispute over parking. In

In a suburban
restaurant in Houston, I saw a poster that perfectly captured the nature of
the problem. The restaurant owner had used a photograph of a lynching in
the early 20th century, featuring a tree, a dead body hanging from a
branch and a crowd of white people in the foreground looking jubilant. In
place of the black victim of the original image, the face of a stereotypical
Arab was superimposed with the caption: Lets play cowboys and
Iranians. It was a disturbing sight. In the same neighbourhood, I had heard stories of teenagers beaten up at
2011, I spent a year travelling around the US investigating anti-Muslim prejudice.

school simply for being Arab, of harassment of mosque congregations and of death threats against Muslims aired on

racist imagery appeared to be a perfectly


normal way to decorate a restaurant. But the image was also revealing
because it shows anti-Muslim sentiment in the US is part of a longer racial
history. The posters caption played on the phrase cowboys and Indians
and was an implicit celebration of the genocide of Americas indigenous
peoples by European settlers, the first act in the racial history of the US
local radio stations. It was also disturbing because

and one that continues to haunt an American culture obsessed with enemies at its frontiers. Likewise, the use of a
photo of a lynching ties its meaning to the history of racial segregation after the abolition of slavery, and the ways

Anti-Muslim prejudice is the most


recent layer in this history, a reworking and recycling of older logics of
oppression. From this perspective, Islamophobia, like other forms of
prejudice, should not be seen only as a problem of hate crimes committed
by lone extremists. The acts of individual perpetrators can only be made
sense of if they are seen as the product of a wider culture, in which
glorifying racial violence is acceptable. All empires require violence to
sustain themselves, and the violence perpetrated overseas by imperial powers
always flows back, in one form or another, to the homeland. In modern times, that violence
that violence was used to maintain white supremacy.

also always takes on a racial character. The British Empire relied upon racist ideology to maintain its authority, both
domestically and in colonial settings, and particularly in the face of resistance to its rule. Blacks and Asians from the
colonies who settled in Britain after the Second World War encountered the racism imperialism had fostered there,
persisting long after the British Empire itself no longer existed. Since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy
planners have regarded the Middle East as their most troublesome territory, where resistance seems to be

Large sections of the US political


and cultural elite have turned to racial ways of explaining resistance to its
authority. Rather than see the Palestinian movement, for example, as rooted in a struggle against military
occupation and for human rights, it has been more convenient to think that Arabs are inherently fanatical. In
other words, the problem is their culture, not our politics. With the War on
especially strong against the USs key regional ally, Israel.

Terror, that rhetoric was generalised to Muslims as a whole: the religion


somehow especially prone to terrorist violence. The US governments own
violence torture, drone strikes, and military occupations, which result in
many times more deaths than jihadist terrorism can then be more
easily defended. Take, for example, the popular US writer Sam Harris, one of the socalled new atheists who seem to have influenced Craig Hicks in Chapel Hill. Harris has said that Islam is the

claims
human rights problems in what he reductively calls the Muslim world
are caused by Islam, as if it is a monolith that mechanically drives
followers to acts of barbarism. But beliefs reflect social and political
conditions as much as they shape them. Global opinion polls suggest that whether one
thinks that violence against civilians is legitimate, for example, has more
to do with political context than religious belief. Such violence is
considered more acceptable in the US and Europe than everywhere else in the world. Indeed,
mother-lode of bad ideas and that we are misled to think the fundamentalists are the fringe. He

Sam Harris himself has written in support of killing civilians for the beliefs they hold. In his book, The End of Faith,
he says that

some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical

to kill people for believing them. He maintains this is what the US


attempted in Afghanistan.

It is what we and other western powers are bound to attempt, at an

even greater cost to ourselves and to innocents abroad, elsewhere in the Muslim world, he wrote. We will

religious belief becomes


a proxy for imminent threat in order to justify wars of aggression against
a population defined by its religion. His argument not only provides
rhetorical support for wars that have led to the deaths of at least half a million people since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, but also gives a rationale for acts of Islamophobic
violence at home. Since 2001, dozens of people have been killed in the US by
continue to spill blood in what is, at bottom, a war of ideas. In this argument,

right-wing extremists who have absorbed the racist logic of American


imperialism

more than by the jihadists regarded as the chief threat of terrorism. However the online

response to the Chapel Hill murders shows there is also another America one that recently took to the streets to
protest against police racism with the slogan #BlackLivesMatter. (This month, the slogan #MuslimLivesMatter also

For this other America to overcome the USs long racial


history, it will need to understand that Islamophobia is more than the
hatred of a small number of individuals, but a system of violence and
oppression, inherently connected to imperialism.
began to trend on Twitter.)

Yes Islamophobia Genealogy Eurocentrism


The history of Islamophobia began with Eurocentrism
Charoenying 08 (Timothy. Timothy is a second year doctoral student in the
school of education. Nelson Maldonado-Torres: PhD, Religious Studies with a
Certificate for Outstanding Work in Africana Studies, Brown University BA,
Philosophy, University of Puerto RicoIslamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical
Approach. University of California, Berkeley Center for Race and Gender.
http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach)
speakers: Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley by TIMOTHY CHAROENYING The year 1492
marked a major turning point in the trajectory of Western Civilization . Elementary age
children are taught this as the year Columbus famously crossed the Atlantic. An equally
significant event that year, was the Spanish conquest of al-Andalus a Moorish province on
the southern Iberian peninsula established eight centuries earlierand more importantly , the last major
Muslim stronghold on the European continent. Critical race scholars have argued
that these two events would not only shift the geopolitical balance of power from
the Orient to the Occident, but fundamentally alter conceptions about religious and
racial identity. According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, of the University of California, Berkeley,
the expulsion of the Moors from continental Europe marked a transition from an age
of imperial relations between Christian and Muslim empires, to an age of European
colonial expansion throughout the known world. The discovery of godless natives in the Americas would
also inspire the great debates between Las Casas and Seplveda in 1550 on the nature of the human soul. Such
a geopolitical and philosophical shift, Maldonado-Torres argues, would lead to a
Eurocentric, re-categorization of humanity based upon religousand ultimately
racialdifferences. Maldonado-Torres has proposed that anti-black racism is not
simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks, but rather, is an
amalgam of old-world Islamophobia linked to the history of the Iberian peninsula,
and to the notion of souless beings embodied in popular conceptions about the
indigenous natives of the Americas. These beliefs would contribute to an ideological basis for, and
justification of, colonial conquests in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way for the
enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.

The repression and targeting of Muslim Americans has ties to


slavery, eugenics, mass media characteristics of the
American state that validate surveillance.
Shelton 05 (Steven Malik. His articles have appeared in the Final Call, the

Michigan Chronicle, the Michigan Front Page, the Michigan Citizen, and he is a staff
writer for the the American Muslim Magazine. He is currently writing a book about
the historical, spiritual and contemporary effects of violence in America, and how
this violence impacts upon the minds and the lives African people in particular and
all people in general. Islamophobia. Afromerica.
http://www.afromerica.com/columns/shelton/vantagepoint/islamophobia.php)
According to a recent national survey, 44 percent of Americans believe the US
government should suspend civil rights and use surveillance techniques to spy on
Muslim Americans. The poll was commissioned by the Media and Society Research
Group through Cornell University's Department of Communication. In what may
indicate increasing intolerance for Islam and Muslims in America, 22 percent of

respondents believed the federal government should profile Muslims as potential


internal security threats, and 27 percent of pollsters were in favor of formal
registration of Muslims and 26 percent replied that places were Islamic services are
held should be routinely monitored by law enforcement agencies. The poll also
indicated that sixty-five percent of Christian respondents believed that Islam is
prone to violence more than any other religious faith. Also 50 percent viewed
Islamic nations as fanatical, dogmatic and dangerous. Since most Americans have
little, if any, personal contact with Muslims, their views and opinions are shaped and
shaded by what they absorb from the mass media particularly television network
news channels. Mainstream movies, magazine periodicals, and newspaper articles
also play a central role in fashioning Islamic prejudices and fears. "Our findings
highlight that personal religiosity as well as exposure to news media are two
important correlates for support of civil liberties," said Dr. James Shanahan, who is
one of the authors of the Cornel Report. "We need to explore why these two very
important channels of discourse may nurture fear rather than understanding."
Another contributing factor to Islamophobia and hysteria are demagogue authors
like Daniel Pipes. Using the successful methodology and ideology of religious bigotry
and racism, and receiving tacit approval for his anti-Muslim diatribes from George W
Bush who nominated Pipes to be on the board of the United States Institute of
Peace, he has reached national prominence. Mr. Pipe's jaundiced views have been
widely distributed in America and have garnered a large measure of acceptance
judging from several polls taken in the new millennium. In an article published in the
Boston Globe (12/24/01) Pipes said: "(The) Muslim population in this country is not
like any other group for it includes within it a substantial body of people who share
with suicide hijackers a hatred of the United States." And referring to African
American Muslims, Pipes writes, "Black converts tend to hold vehemently antiAmerican, anti-Christian and anti-Semetic attitudes."(Commentary 6/1/200) How Mr.
Pipes arrived at these conclusions was never explained. Steven Emerson is another
prominent author accused of an anti-Muslim agenda. He received national attention
for his 1994 PBS production, "Jihad in America" and is almost universally
condemned by Muslims as a purveyor of defamatory and racist attacks on the
Islamic community. He is also notorious for his "scatter gun" style of journalism and
he falsely blamed Muslims for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1994, and the downing
of TWA flight 800 in 1996. [1] Pat Robertson, the nationally syndicated Christian
fundamentalist broadcaster has also fanned the flames of fear and hatred,
describing Islam as, "Not a peaceful religion that wants to co-exist, but one that
wants to co-exist until they can control and dominate and then, if need be, destroy."
(2/02) This is not by accident, but follows an American propensity of scapegoating a
particular segment of the population to further the agenda of powerful political and
economic elitist groups. This inclination should be a source of alarm for not only
Muslims, but for all people because the successful repression of any group makes it
easier to circumvent and to violate the rights of all other groups. The mass media
is owned and controlled by corporate conglomerates. For example, Westinghouse
Corporation has controlling interest in NBC News and Viacom Corporation controls
CBS. Apparently Islam and Muslims are looked upon as a threat to the hegemony of
corporate power and stability. The mass media is a powerful tool for molding public
perception and opinion. This shaping of public prejudices against targeted groups
was crucial in the internment of hundreds of thousands of Japanese Americans in
concentration camps during World War II, and is a prime example of how the

American people can be manipulated through mis-information and scare tactics to


perceive their fellow citizens as dangerous spies and traitors simply because of
racial and cultural differences and beginnings, and to arrive at these conclusions
without a shred of evidence to validate these suspicions and allegations. There is
also precedent for this in Nazi Germany, where Adolph Hitler utilized his highly
efficient propaganda machine to portray the Jews and other non-Nordics as
dangerous sub-species on the same level as vermin. In less than a decade millions
were exterminated or interned in forced labor camps while the majority of the
German populace were guilty of complicity in the holocaust or looked the other way.
[2] In fact, Hitler borrowed many of his ideas of racial purity from America and
racial, ethnic, and religious groups have been targeted in America since its
inception. Invariably they are first portrayed as somehow menacing and dangerous
and their human worth and characteristics are ridiculed and diminished. Thus
paving the way for justification for the most brutal and inhumane treatment. The
wholesale thievery and genocide perpetuated against the Native Americans is one
example. The demonization and exploitation of Chinese immigrants is another. And
the astoundingly vicious treatment of Africans during centuries of chattel slavery is
yet another. In more recent times the depiction of Black people in American culture
as mentally, spiritually, and socially inferior has culminated in a litany of crimes
against them. One of the more infamous was the US Government sponsored
Tuskegee experiments that lasted for a period of 40 years. The federal government
through the agency of the US Public Health Service experimented on 399 Black men
that were in the late stages of syphilis. The men were not told that they had the
disease only that they would receive free government subsidized treatment for what
was described as "poor blood." The experiment was an outgrowth of the American
eugenics movement, which took the country by storm in the 1920's and was
sponsored by some of America's most prominent and prestigious scientists,
politicians, businesses and foundations. And included among its advocates US
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. The eugenics movement campaigned
to have entire groups of people that were considered inferior or useless either
sterilized or eliminated. The targeted groups included immigrants, the poor, the
handicapped, the non-White, and even people with speech impediments. [3] In the
1960's and the 1970's the CIA, the FBI, along with state and local police, spied on,
jailed and in some instances murdered Americans who were regarded as incendiary
or threats to national security. The FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (INTERLPRO)
was notorious for using agent provocateurs, legal frame-ups and assassination to
further its agenda. [4] In contemporary America, Blacks are projected as dangerous
criminals and reprobates by the corporate controlled media. The depiction of Black
communities as crime ridden where police are literally expected to perceive every
Black person as a criminal and given the green light to shoot first and ask questions
later, is widely known throughout America. In the aftermath of 9-11 and the advent
of military attacks against the Muslim countries of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
threats and saber rattling against the Islamic nations of Iran and Syria, the age-old
Western habit of portraying Muslims as fanatical terrorists has intensified. This has
produced a heightened climate of fear and distrust in America as well as in several
European countries, and sparked a rash of assaults, arson and discriminatory
practices against Muslims and Islamic institutions. And with the orchestrated
American belief that Muslims are at worst bloodthirsty terrorists and at best
untrustworthy and unpatriotic , the road is open to impose more draconian laws and

privacy shattering surveillance techniques. Since the invasion and occupation of


Iraq in 2003, US forces have used sophisticated surveillance technology to keep
tabs on Iraqi citizens in an effort to stem "insurgents." Reportedly, plans are also
being made to have retinal scans taken of Iraqis and to issue identification cards.
[5] In December of 2004, the United States Congress passed legislation that
requires States to relinquish their regulatory authority over driver's licenses and
birth certificates to the Federal Department of Homeland Security. This bill
establishes what is effectively a national identification card. The bill stipulates that
beginning in 2005 the Department of Homeland security will issue uniformity
regulations to each state requiring that Driver's licenses and birth certificates meet
federal standards pertaining to US citizen data and security concerns. All American
citizens are to be issued a social security number at birth, which will be included in
their Birth Certificate along with biometric markers. And all Birth Certificates will be
registered in a Federal Government database maintained by the Department of
Homeland Security. [6] These federally mandated drivers' licenses will contain
information about the bearer's financial history including credit and cash balances.
The Department of Homeland Security also plans to establish an I.D. system for US
citizens to use prior to boarding aircraft. Most psychologists and sociologists agree
that the seeds of ignorance, misinformation and suspicion produce fears that lead to
divisiveness, hatred, and violence. "The West has feared Islam both religiously and
politically," said Seyyed Hossein Nasr, professor of Islamic Studies at George
Washington University. "Today the paradox of Islamophobia remains that many
people that are afraid of Islam know very little about it." With the passing of more
restrictive laws and the controversy surrounding the stripping of Constitutional
rights and personal freedoms , many are concerned that America is ripe for fascism.
And almost all agree that the only way to avert it is with activism, education,
communication, and understanding. "When we speak of Islam, we are speaking of
the religion of over 20 percent of the human population spread across the globe and
expressed through many cultures," explained Muslim American, Javed Amir. "It is
important to recognize the greatness of Islam, its civilizations and its immense
contributions to the richness of the human experience." Also, contrary to the
popular belief that Islam is foreign to America, it has roots that go back to African
Muslim explorers who arrived in the West before Christopher Columbus and later in
the holds of slave ships. (Some historians estimate that, as many as a third of
enslaved Africans brought to the Americas were Muslims). "Muslim African
Americans are not at odds with the West," says Imam Abdur Rashid. "We are the
West."

Yes Islamophobia Genealogy Anti-Blackness


Islamophobia is not new - can be traced back to the slave era
Ali 10 (Zaheer. Sept. 7. Islamophobia Did Not Start At Ground Zero Zaheer Ali is
a doctoral student in history at Columbia University, where he is focusing his
research on 20th-century African-American history and religion. His dissertation is
on the history of the Nation of Islam in Harlem, N.Y., during the time of Malcolm X's
ministry.
http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2010/09/islamophobia_did_not_start_at_grou
nd_zero.html)
Last week the newly formed Coalition of African American Muslims held a press
conference to express support for the Park51 Community Center (the so-called
Ground Zero mosque, which is neither a mosque nor at Ground Zero) and, more
broadly, to condemn the spread of Islamophobia. The group represented a wide
array of prominent African-American Muslims, including Minister Louis Farrakhan,
Imam Siraj Wahhaj, Imam Zaid Shakir and others, who likened the attacks on Islam
and Muslims to "Jim Crow exclusionary practices and policies." They vowed to
challenge any attempts to "relegate either ourselves or our co-religionists from
other ethnic backgrounds to second-class citizenry." Their intervention in the
national discussion, and invocation of the African-American experience, highlight an
important but overlooked feature of Islamophobia: its historical use as a tool in
white racist attacks on people of African descent. While most examinations of
Islamophobia suggest that it is only the most recent expression of American
nativism -- made manifest after the 9/11 terror attacks -- the history of using the
fear of Islam as a tactic actually extends much further back. The first attacks on
Islam in the Western Hemisphere had little to do with religion and more to do with
suppressing Africans during slavery. As early as the 1500s, European colonial
powers began passing anti-Muslim legislation as a way to prevent the importation of
African Muslims, who were often involved in slave rebellions in the New World.
African Muslims led some of the earliest slave revolts in the Spanish colonies,
played a role in the Haitian Revolution against France and led several major revolts
against the Portuguese in Bahia, Brazil. From these early encounters, Islam came to
signify a challenge to the authority of white slave owners and the state-sanctioned
subjugation of African people. While neither the American colonies nor the United
States experienced the same kind of slave revolts seen in the rest of the New World,
the presence of enslaved African Muslims in America who possessed their own
religion and culture challenged white attempts to portray Africans as a people in
need of the "civilizing" effects of slavery. These anxieties and fears received their
airing in a 1959 television news broadcast anchored by a young Mike Wallace,
entitled "The Hate That Hate Produced" -- arguably the first major example of
Islamophobia in the mainstream U.S. media. The program introduced the Nation of
Islam, its leader Elijah Muhammad and spokesperson Malcolm X to the American
public in the most sensationalized way possible, hoping to scare whites into
supporting more moderate African Americans in the civil rights movement. At the
beginning of the broadcast, Wallace issued disclaimers distinguishing the Nation of
Islam from "orthodox" Muslims; but throughout the program, he loosely used
"Muslim" interchangeably or in combination with "Negro" to emphasize the threat
posed by Islam in the African-American community: Negro American Muslims are
the most powerful of the black supremacist group. They claim a membership of a

quarter of a million Negroes. ... Their doctrine is being taught in 50 cities across the
nation. Let no one underestimate the Muslims [emphasis added]. They have their
own parochial schools like this one in Chicago, where Muslim children are taught to
hate the white man. Even the clothes they wear are anti-white man, anti-American,
like these two Negro children going to school. Wherever they go, the Muslims
withdraw from the life of the community. They have their own stores, supermarkets,
barber shops, restaurants. Here you see a progressive, modern, air-conditioned
Muslim department store on Chicago's South Side ... "Let no one underestimate the
Muslims." Here was Islamophobia front and center, used as a proxy for white fears
of black self-determination and economic independence: Forget the furor over
mosques; let's talk about the threat posed by modern, air-conditioned Muslim
department stores! More than 50 years later, the specter of "Negro American
Muslims" -- or even the mere suggestion of them -- still causes anxiety and panic
among some in white America. Witness the recent incident when anti-mosque
demonstrators gathered at the site of the proposed Park51 Community Center and
attacked a black man they mistakenly thought was Muslim, simply because he wore
a skullcap. Or the black Broward County, Fla., judge up for re-election who found
himself having to fend off accusations that he was a secret Muslim, simply because
his first name was Elijah -- the name of a Hebrew prophet in the Old Testament that
was, more important for purposes of Islamophobia, also the first name of Nation of
Islam leader Elijah Muhammad. For his part, President Obama has disavowed the
rumors in every way possible, short of wearing a crucifix around his neck. But this
"Obama as Muslim" (and the more extreme "Obama as Malcolm X's love child") is
not so much a concern about whether he prays to Allah as it is a proxy for political
dissatisfaction being used disproportionately by whites. No matter how ridiculous
these cases of mistaken religious identity may be, they reveal how Islamophobes
have historically targeted, and may continue to target, African Americans as proxies
for Muslims regardless of their religious persuasion. Any effective strategy to
combat the spread of Islamophobia, then, will have to take into account the historic
relationship between anti-Muslim bigotry and anti-black racism. Hopefully this will
be one of the contributions the Coalition of African American Muslims makes to this
struggle.

Yes Islamophobia Media


The medias construction of Muslims as militantly anti-Western
provides the cultural backbone of Islamophobia
Housee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Wolverhampton, 2012
(Shirin, Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2012, 101120, accessed
7/3/2015 JCP PB)
The media plays a fundamental role in the construction of knowledge and
are a key source through which identities in relation to the Other is
constructed (Van Dijk 1993, 243). The events of 9/11 and 7/7, together with the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan
and the war on terror, have been used to bring Muslims/Muslim identity to the forefront of global media. Since

an increasingly intense focus has been placed on the worlds Muslim


population, and particularly those Muslims living in the West. Muslim women wearing the hijaab, and men
with beards, or any other dress code associated with Islam, has provoked hostility . In
then

Britain, the 7th July 2005 London bombings and the realisation that these acts were carried out by Muslims born

In its
scaremongering tactics, the press, for example, has succeeded in creating a
moral panic concerning an internal terrorist threat constructed around a
new folk devil that of the young British Muslim male (Abbas 2001,248). Asian male
and raised in the country, has led to increased anxiety concerning British Muslim youth (Abbas 2007, 8).

masculinities are read through images of terrorist youth juxtaposed with the passivity of Asian Muslim female

Media discourse is one of the primary arenas in which the debate


concerning the discourse of the Muslims/and Islam has been played out.
The literature regarding media representations of Islam and Muslims
generally cohere in their identification of a pattern of negative
stereotyping, bias and underlying Islamophobia (Poole 2002). Poole argues that
the dominant discourse on Muslims suggest that, ...Muslims are
associated with militancy, danger and anti-Western sentiment (Poole 2002, 42).
Said maintains that the media fails to provide a fair representation of Islam and its
followers through a mixture of ignorance, cultural hostility and racial
hatred... (Poole 2002, 42). Indeed Said (1981, 43) acknowledges this fact when he points out
that... it is the media that form the cultural apparatus through which
Europeans and Americans derive their consciousness of Islam .
femininities.

***Internals***

Internals Domestic Surveillance = Islamophobia


The government's warrantless surveillance of Muslims in the
name of counterterrorism is a result of our Islamophobically
securitized mindset that frames those with otherwise harmless
racial or religious markers as a dangerous Other that needs to
be combated.
Kumar & Kundnani 15 (Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar "Race, Surveillance, and
Empire," respectively associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at
Rutgers University and professor at New York University, Spring 2015, Issue #96 of
International Socialist Review, http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire)

measures that the US national security system has adopted in


recent years flow from an analysis of Muslim radicalization, which
assumes that certain law-abiding activities associated with religious
The various

ideology are indicators of extremism and potential violence. Following the


preventive logic discussed above, the radicalization model claims to be able to
predict which individuals are not terrorists now but might be at some later
date. Behavioral, cultural, and ideological signals are assumed to reveal
who is at risk of turning into a terrorist at some point in the future.59 For example, in
the FBIs radicalization model, such things as growing a beard, starting to
wear traditional Islamic clothing, and becoming alienated from ones former life are
listed as indicators, as is increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group
or political cause. Thus, signifiers of Muslimness such as facial hair,
dress, and so on are turned into markers of suspicion for a surveillance gaze
that is also a racial (and gendered) gaze; it is through such routine
bureaucratic mechanisms that counterterrorism practices involve the
60

social construction of racial others. Official acceptance of the model of


radicalization implies a need for mass surveillance of Muslim populations
and collection of as much data as possible on every aspect of their lives in order
to try to spot the supposed warning signs that the models list. And this is exactly
the approach that law enforcement agencies introduced. At the New York
Police Department, for instance, the instrumentalizing of radicalization
models led to the mass, warrantless surveillance of every aspect of
Muslim life.

Internals Islamophobia = Global WOT


Islamophobic surveillance is a result of the war on terrorislamophobic attitudes are empirically proven to lead to the
increased use of the police restrictions and police scrutiny on
Muslims as a direct result of islamophobia
Sides and Gross 12 (John Sides, Department of Political Science, George
Washington University Kimberly Gross, School of Media and Public Affairs, George
Washington University, Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror,
2012, http://home.gwu.edu/~jsides/muslims.pdf, N8)

Our argument is different. We think that the enemy is not so shadowy, and that Americans perceptual lenses may
have more focus, as it were, when it comes to the War on Terror. In Converses (1964) treatment of group-centrism,

specific social groups only matter under certain circumstances:


The individual must be endowed with some cognitions of the group as an
entity and with some interstitial linking information indicating why a
given party or policy is relevant to the group (237). Thus, issues can be more or less
he argued that

group-centric depending on whether specific events, political debates, and issue frames provide this linking
informationand group cues are salient and clear (Conover1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Nelson and Kinder 1996).
For example, American attitudes toward Germans and Italians were related to support for intervention in Europe in
1939 (Berinsky 2009). During the Cold War, the more Americans perceived the Soviet Union as threatening and
untrustworthy, the more they favored a militaristic foreign policy and containment of the Soviet Union (Hurwitz and
Peffley 1990).

In the War on Terror, Muslims should matter over and above a


broader authoritarian or ethnocentric inclination because the conditions
necessary for this more specific form of group-centrism to affect policy
attitudes are met. As we have already shown, citizens do have, to use Converses language,
some cognitions of the group as an entity. That is, they have
generalized and often negative views of both Muslims and MuslimAmericans. The necessary interstitial linking information is also present. The enemy in the War
on Terror is not entirely strange and shadowy but is instead routinely
depicted as extremist Muslims, whether embodied in Osama bin Laden himself, various al-Qaeda
leaders, or nameless others depicted in news stories about terrorism. And these depictions tap into portrayals of

Thus,
those with a negative overall view of Muslims should be more likely to
support the War on Terror. The only research that connects attitudes
toward Muslims and the War on Terror finds that unfavorable views of
Islam were associated with increased support for subjecting Muslims
within the United States to additional legal restrictions or police scrutiny
both Muslims and Arabs that have existed for centuries in literature, travelogues, and popular culture.

(Nisbet, Ostman, and Shanahan 2007, Schildkraut 2002). Our analysis extends this research by examining both
Muslims and Muslim-Americans, by considering different stereotype dimensions, and by linking these dimensions to
a broader range of policy preferences. One way our argument pushes further is through a focus on stereotype
dimensions. Any linking information may not only identify the relevant group, but also help to describe and define
that group in terms of its characteristicswhether it is, for example, peaceful or violent. People can then link not
only their overall view of a group, but their assessments of the group in terms of specific traits, to their attitudes on
an issue. For example, perceptions that blacks are lazy are more strongly associated with attitudes toward
government assistance for blacks, welfare, and affirmative action than are perceptions that blacks are violent
(Gilens 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), but stereotypes of blacks as
violent are associated with attitudes toward criminal justice policies (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997)

Surveillance of Muslims has taken place by the FBI in the name


of the war on terror-the two are intertwined
US Commission on Civil Rights 10 (The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is
historically a bipartisan, independent commission of the U.S. federal government,
created in 1957, that is charged with the responsibility for investigating, reporting
on, and making recommendations concerning civil rights issues that face the nation,
Domestic wiretapping in the war on terror, 2010,
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr12d2010.pdf, N8)
This program cannot be analyzed in isolation and must be viewed in light
of what we publicly know has taken place as part of the Governments
efforts in the War on Terror during the past few years. As I indicated earlier,
another program adopted by the US Government under the umbrella of
counter terrorism was the FBIs voluntary interview initiatives. These
interviews, which were initiated in 2001 and 2002 but which continue to
take place today on a more informal basis, demonstrated that individual
Constitutional liberties and protections were being used by the FBI in its
threat-assessment processes. Specifically, examples collected by ADC have
demonstrated that some FBI agents and other law enforcement officials who engage
in these interviews as part of the multiple Joint Terrorism Task Forces violate their
publicly-stated parameters and engage in Patriotism tests of some individuals.
While the manner by which the FBI obtains its information is classified, and
understandably must remain so, questions such as individual religious
practice, political views about the war in Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, and religious affiliation and practice (including some inquiries of
whether a person is a Sunni or Shiia Muslim and how many times per week
a person elects to pray) continue to be asked. These examples, although rare
in frequency, have increased the negative perceptions of the US Government, and
specifically the FBI and law enforcement, within the Arab, Muslim, and South Asian
American communities and have caused many to question whether there is a link
between the FBIs domestic investigative efforts and the warrantless spying
program.

Internals Islamophobia Islam Conflated with


Terrorism
Intelligence groups conflate Islam with terrorism, perpetuating
a culture of discrimination that makes it impossible for
Muslims to be accepted no matter what steps they take
MACLC and CLEAR 13 (The Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC)
is a New York-based coalition of citizens, community and faith leaders, organizers,
advocates, attorneys, and organizations. he Creating Law Enforcement
Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project is housed at Main Street Legal
Services, Inc., the clinical arm of the CUNY School of Law, Mapping Muslims: NYPD
Spying and its Impact on American Muslims, 2013,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/MappingMuslims.pdf,N8)

Another recurring theme was apprehension about NYPDs anti-Muslim culture both within the Intelligence Division and outside of it.

documents and statements made by


the NYPD reflected a deep misunderstanding of Islam, a conflation of
Islam with terrorism, and an alarming level of indifference by NYPD
leadership to overt anti-Muslim actions and statements within the Departments ranks. A
notorious example of the anti-Muslim culture at the NYPD that left many
of our interviewees and New Yorkers in general ill at ease was the
widely-publicized screening of a virulently anti-Muslim film, The Third
Jihad, on continuous loop during the NYPDs cadet training program from October to December 2010. The film
presents a montage of images of terrorist attacks, beheadings and dead
bodies, while a narrator suggests that American Muslims aim to infiltrate
and dominate America,and that they are engaging in a cultural Jihad
aimed at infiltrating and undermining American society . The screenings at police
Even before the Associated Press reports shed light on surveillance,

trainings were made public through NYPD documents obtained by the Brennan Center for Justice, sparking a public outcry. Adding to
the communitys frustrations was the fact that Police Commissioner Ray Kelly and NYPD Spokesman Paul Brown had participated in
the films production and that the NYPD never did a review of its police cadet training protocols.

A lawsuit filed
in 2006 by a former American Muslim officer described in great detail a
culture of systematic discrimination, with hundreds of anti-Muslim and
anti-Arab email briefings sent to the unit over the course of two years. The
majority of the emails were sent by Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence
advisor to the NYPD Bruce Tefft, but the complaint also made it clear that supervisors and ranking officers
within the intelligence unit either turned a blind eye or worse, participated. For instance, Muslim officers
were made to leave the room when certain briefings occurred. Among the eCriticism of the NYPD Intelligence Divisions work has also come from within its own ranks.

mails that were circulated to the unit was a commentary to a news headline that [o]ne in four hold anti-Muslim
views. The email noted: Then 1 in 4 is informed. Or Burning the hate-filled Koran should be viewed as a public
service at the least. The officer had repeatedly complained to four different supervisors, but his complaints were
all ignored

Islamophobia is unfounded-Surveillance of Muslim


communities is specifically due to conflations with terrorism
and the war on terror, yet proves ineffective in the long run.
MACLC and CLEAR 13 (The Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC)
is a New York-based coalition of citizens, community and faith leaders, organizers,
advocates, attorneys, and organizations. he Creating Law Enforcement
Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project is housed at Main Street Legal

Services, Inc., the clinical arm of the CUNY School of Law, Mapping Muslims: NYPD
Spying and its Impact on American Muslims, 2013,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/MappingMuslims.pdf,N8)
The NYPD has frequently justified the broad based surveillance of
American Muslim communities by claiming its effectiveness in thwarting
terrorist plots. In the wake of the Associated Press reports, an NYPD Deputy Commissioner, Paul Browne,
credited the NYPD Intelligence Division with thwarting terrorist plots. New York City officials have asserted that
surveillance has thwarted 14 terrorist plots. On closer scrutiny, however, such claims of the programs effectiveness

Investigative reporters have debunked the notion


that any plots that the NYPD helped thwart were a result of its spying
activities. In reality, of the fourteen plots listed on the NYPD website only three were actual potential terrorist
seem to lack any factual basis.

plots, and not one was prevented by the NYPD. Further, the other cases either involved government informants who
played a dominant and enabling role in the plot, were so lacking in credibility that federal officials declined to bring
charges, or were instances where plots were abandoned.

Nor has the NYPD shown that its secret surveillance program has any role
to play in yielding leads to potential criminal activity. In fact, the
Intelligence Divisions documents themselves show an emphasis on
separating intelligence gathering from criminal investigation . Our interviews
with ex-NYPD intelligence or counterterrorism officials confirmed that the Demographics Units efforts to spy, map,
and document American Muslim life were unrelated to active investigations. Correspondingly, Assistant Chief of the
Intelligence Unit, Thomas Galati, testified that the Demographics Unit never led to a single lead or investigation.

The law believes that the religious practices at the foundation


of Islam can create terrorists via radicalization-it is belief in
this process that gives grounds to surveil American-Muslim
communities
MACLC and CLEAR 13 (The Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC)
is a New York-based coalition of citizens, community and faith leaders, organizers,
advocates, attorneys, and organizations. he Creating Law Enforcement
Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project is housed at Main Street Legal
Services, Inc., the clinical arm of the CUNY School of Law, Mapping Muslims: NYPD
Spying and its Impact on American Muslims, 2013,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/MappingMuslims.pdf,N8)
In a 2006 policy report entitled Radicalization in the West: The
Homegrown Threat, the NYPD presented its theory of how individuals
become radicalized. The report described many of the spaces where
Muslims congregate in their daily life as radicalization incubators and
venues that provide extremist fodder. These included mosques, cafes, cab driver hangouts, and student

report also highlighted typical signatures that individuals on


a purported trajectory towards violence adopt: wearing traditional Islamic
clothing, growing a beard, becoming involved in social activism and
community issues, even giving up drinking, cigarettes and gambling. Thus, in addition to social spaces ,
signs of community mobilization and religious practice were all explicitly
designated as potential signs of radicalization and meriting close police
surveillance.
associations. The

The NYPDs Radicalization in the West report cast a shadow of suspicion on a large swath of Muslim life. The Muslim
American Civil Liberties (MACLC) first convened to respond to this report, noting its troublesome implications for
racial and religious profiling.
After several meetings with various NYPD officials, the NYPD appended a clarification to the published document,
noting that the report is not intended to be policy prescriptive.

Years later, with the publication of the leaked documents ,

it has become evident that the


NYPDs flawed radicalization theory was in fact a blueprint for a policy of
profiling and suspicionless surveillance.

Internals Race Key Domestic Surveillance


Race must be at the forefront of our analysis of domestic
surveillance policy
Kundnani and Kumar 15
(http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire)
The following month, Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux published another story for The Intercept, which revealed

under the Obama administration the number of people on the National


Counterterrorism Centers no-fly list had increased tenfold to 47,000. Leaked
classified documents showed that the NCC maintains a database of terrorism
suspects worldwidethe Terrorist Identities Datamart Environmentwhich contained a million names by
that

2013, double the number four years earlier, and increasingly includes biometric data. This database includes
20,800 persons within the United States who are disproportionately concentrated in Dearborn, Michigan, with its
significant Arab American population.2 By any objective standard, these were major news stories that ought to have

Yet the stories barely registered in the


corporate media landscape. The tech community, which had earlier expressed
outrage at the NSAs mass digital surveillance, seemed to be indifferent when
details emerged of the targeted surveillance of Muslims. The explanation for this reaction is
not hard to find. While many object to the US government collecting private data on ordinary people, Muslims
tend to be seen as reasonable targets of suspicion. A July 2014 poll for the Arab American
attracted as much attention as the earlier revelations.

Institute found that 42 percent of Americans think it is justifiable for law enforcement agencies to profile Arab

the debate on national security


surveillance that has emerged in the United States since the summer of 2013 is
woefully inadequate, due to its failure to place questions of race and empire at the
center of its analysis. It is racist ideas that form the basis for the ways national
security surveillance is organized and deployed, racist fears that are whipped up to
legitimize this surveillance to the American public, and the disproportionately targeted racialized
groups that have been most effective in making sense of it and organizing opposition. This is as true
Americans or American Muslims.3 In what follows, we argue that

today as it has been historically: race and state surveillance are


intertwined in the history of US capitalism .

Likewise, we argue that the history of national

security surveillance in the United States is inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire.

History proves; surveillance has and is only used to extend and


promote neoliberalism
Kundnani and Kumar 15
(http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire)

history of national
security surveillance in North America, tracing its imbrication with race, empire, and
capital, from the settler-colonial period through to the neoliberal era. Our focus here is on
The argument is divided into two parts. The first identifies a number of moments in the

how race as a sociopolitical category is produced and reproduced historically in the United States through systems

throughout the history of the United States the systematic


collection of information has been interwoven with mechanisms of racial oppression.
From Anglo settler-colonialism, the establishment of the plantation
of surveillance. We show how

system, the postCivil War reconstruction era, the US conquest of the


Philippines, and the emergence of the national security state in the postWorld War II era, to neoliberalism in the post-Civil Rights era, racialized
surveillance has enabled the consolidation of capital and empire.

In the

the politics of the War also been


used on Terror shape national security surveillance practices. The intensive surveillance of
Muslim Americans has been carried out by a vast security apparatus that has against dissident
movements such as Occupy Wall Street and environmental rights activists, who
represent a threat to the neoliberal order. This is not new; the process of targeting dissenters has
second part, we turn our attention to the current conjuncture in which

been a constant feature of American history. For instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s were passed
by the Federalist government against the Jeffersonian sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged

State surveillance
regimes have always sought to monitor and penalize a wide range of dissenters,
radicals, and revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of
these cases. Our focus here is on the production of racialized others as security
threats and the ways this helps to stabilize capitalist social relations. Further, the
current system of mass surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and overlaps with other
systems of racialized security surveillance that feed the mass deportation of immigrants under the
Nathan Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American Revolution.

Obama administration and that disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their mass incarceration

the New Jim Crow.4 We argue that racialized


groupings are produced in the very act of collecting information about certain
groups deemed as threats by the national security statethe Brown terrorist, the
Black and Brown drug dealer and user, and the immigrant who threatens to steal
jobs. We conclude that security has become one of the primary means through
which racism is ideologically reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal era. Drawing on
and what Michelle Alexander refers to as

W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part
through racialized notions of security that offer a new psychological wage as compensation for the decline of the
social wage and its reallocation to homeland security.

***Impacts***

Impacts Surveillance Neoliberalism


This surveillance contributes to upholding the racist neoliberal
system
Kundnani and Kumar 14

(Arun Kundnani teaches at New York University. His latest book is The Muslims
Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (Verso Books, 2014)., Deepa Kumar is an
associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University. She is the author of
Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Haymarket Books, 2012).)Race, Surveillance, and Empire

Further, the current system of mass surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and


overlaps with other systems of racialized security surveillance that feed the mass
deportation of immigrants under the Obama administration and that
disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their mass incarceration
and what Michelle Alexander refers to as the New Jim Crow. 4 We argue that
racialized groupings are produced in the very act of collecting information about
certain groups deemed as threats by the national security statethe Brown
terrorist, the Black and Brown drug dealer and user, and the immigrant who
threatens to steal jobs. We conclude that security has become one of the primary
means through which racism is ideologically reproduced in the post-racial,
neoliberal era. Drawing on W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we
argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized notions of
security that offer a new psychological wage as compensation for the decline of
the social wage and its reallocation to homeland security.

Impacts Surveillance White Supremacy


Systems of racialized surveillance have historically allowed for
suppression of racial groups and radical elements which
stabilizes the capitalist social relations- this continues today
with surveillance of immigrants and Muslim and Black
Americans
Kundani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication, and Kumar, associate professor of Media
Studies and Middle East Studies, 2015
(Arun, New York University, Deepa, Rutgers University, Race, surveillance, and
empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, International
Socialist Review issue # 96, spring 2015, accessed 6/29/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
The argument is divided into two parts. The first identifies a number of
moments in the history of national security surveillance in North America ,
tracing its imbrication with race, empire, and capital, from the settler-colonial period through to the neoliberal era.

Our focus here is on how race as a sociopolitical category is produced and


reproduced historically in the United States through systems of
surveillance. We show how throughout the history of the United States the systematic
collection of information has been interwoven with mechanisms of racial
oppression. From Anglo settler-colonialism, the establishment of the plantation system,
the postCivil War reconstruction era, the US conquest of the Philippines , and the
emergence of the national security state in the post-World War II era , to neoliberalism in the postCivil Rights era, racialized surveillance has enabled the consolidation of
capital and empire. It is, however, important to note that the production of the racial
other at these various moments is conjunctural and heterogenous . That
is, the racialization of Native Americans, for instance, during the settler-colonial period
took different forms from the racialization of African Americans. Further, the
dominant construction of Blackness under slavery is different from the construction of Blackness in the neoliberal

empire and capital, at


determine who will be targeted by state surveillance, in what
ways, and for how long. In the second part, we turn our attention to the
current conjuncture in which the politics of the War on Terror shape
national security surveillance practices. The intensive surveillance of
Muslim Americans has been carried out by a vast security apparatus that
has also been used against dissident movements such as Occupy Wall Street and
environmental rights activists, who represent a threat to the neoliberal order. This is
not new; the process of targeting dissenters has been a constant feature
of American history. For instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s were passed by the
era; these ideological shifts are the product of specific historic conditions. In short,
various moments,

Federalist government against the Jeffersonian sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged Nathan

State surveillance regimes


have always sought to monitor and penalize a wide range of dissenters,
radicals, and revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of these cases. Our
focus here is on the production of racialized others as security threats
and the ways this helps to stabilize capitalist social relations. Further, the
current system of mass surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and
overlaps with other systems of racialized security surveillance that feed
the mass deportation of immigrants under the Obama administration and that
Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American Revolution.

disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander

as the New Jim Crow.4 We argue that racialized groupings are produced
in the very act of collecting information about certain groups deemed as
threats by the national security statethe Brown terrorist, the Black and Brown drug dealer
and user, and the immigrant who threatens to steal jobs. We conclude that security has
become one of the primary means through which racism is ideologically
reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal era. Drawing on W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the
refers to

psychological wage, we argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized notions of
security that offer a new psychological wage as compensation for the decline of the social wage and its
reallocation to homeland security.

Systematic surveillance for the purpose of gaining knowledge


about a racialized other has historically been used as an
avenue to integrate the other into modern society
Kundani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication, and Kumar, associate professor of Media
Studies and Middle East Studies, 2015
(Arun, New York University, Deepa, Rutgers University, Race, surveillance, and
empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, International
Socialist Review issue # 96, spring 2015, accessed 6/29/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)

John Comaroffs description of this process in southern Africa serves equally to summarize the colonial states of
North America: The

discovery of dark, unknown lands, which were


conceptually emptied of their peoples and cultures so that their
wilderness might be brought properly to orderi.e., fixed and named and mappedby
an officializing white gaze.9 Through, for example, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the United States
sought to develop methods of identification, categorization, and enumeration that made the Indigenous population

Surveillance that defined and


demarcated according to officially constructed racial typologies enabled
the colonial state to sort tribes according to whether they accepted the priorities of the settlercolonial mission (the good Indians) or resisted it (the bad Indians). 10 In turn, an idea of the US
nation itself was produced as a homeland of white, propertied men to be
secured against racial others. No wonder, then, that the founding texts of the modern state invoke
visible to the surveillance gaze as racial others.

the Indigenous populations of America as bearers of the state of nature, to which the modern state is

The earliest
process of gathering systematic knowledge about the other by colonizers often
began with trade and religious missionary work. In the early seventeenth century, trade
counterposedwitness Hobbess references to the the Savage people of America.11

in furs with the Native population of Quebec was accompanied by the missionary project. Jesuit Paul Le Jeune
worked extensively with the Montagnais-Naskapi and maintained a detailed record of the people he hoped to

By studying and documenting where and how the


savages lived, the nature of their relationships, their child-rearing
habits, and the like, Le Juene derived a four-point program to change the
behaviors of the Naskapi in order to bring them into line with French Jesuit morality.
convert and civilize.12

In addition to sedentarization, the establishment of chiefly authority, and the training and punishment of children,
Le Juene sought to curtail the independence of Naskapi women and to impose a European family structure based on

The net result of such missionary work was to


pave the way for the racial projects of colonization and/or integration
into a colonial settler nation. By the nineteenth century, such informal techniques of
surveillance began to be absorbed into government bureaucracy . In 1824,
male authority and female subservience.13

Secretary of War John C. Calhoun established the Office of Indian Affairs (later Bureau), which had as one of its
tasks the mapping and counting of Native Americans. The key security question was whether to forcibly displace
Native Americans beyond the colonial territory or incorporate them as colonized subjects; the former policy was
implemented in 1830 when Congress passed the Indian Removal Act and President Jackson began to drive Indians
to the west of the Mississippi River.

Systematic surveillance became even more

important after 1848, when Indian Affairs responsibility transferred from the Department of War to the
Department of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs sought to comprehensively map
the Indigenous population as part of a civilizing project to change the savage into a civilized
man, as a congressional committee put it. By the 1870s, Indians were the quantified
objects of governmental intervention; resistance was subdued as much
through rational techniques of racialized surveillance and a professional
bureaucracy as through war.14 The assimilation of Indians became a comprehensive policy through
the Code of Indian Offenses, which included bans on Indigenous cultural practices that had earlier been catalogued
by ethnographic surveillance. Tim Rowse writes that For the U.S. government to extinguish Indian sovereignty, it
had to be confident in its own. There is no doubting the strength of the sense of manifest destiny in the United
States during the nineteenth-century, but as the new nation conquered and purchased, and filled the new territories

U.S.
sovereign power was not just a legal doctrine and a popular conviction; it was an
administrative challenge and achievement that included acquiring, by the 1870s, the
ability to conceive and measure an object called the Indian population. 15
The use of surveillance to produce a census of a colonized population was
the first step to controlling it. Mahmood Mamdani refers to this as define and
rule, a process in which, before managing a heterogeneous population, a
colonial power must first set about defining it; to do so, the colonial state wielded the
with colonists, it had also to develop its administrative capacity to govern the added territories and peoples.

census not only as a way of acknowledging difference but also as a way of shaping, sometimes even creating,
difference.16 The ethnic mapping and demographics unit programs practiced by US law enforcement agencies

state
agencies use of demographic information to identify concentrations of
ethnically defined populations in order to target surveillance resources and
to identify kinship networks can be utilized for the purposes of political policing.
Likewise, todays principles of counterinsurgency warfarewinning hearts
and minds by dividing the insurgent from the nonresistantecho similar
techniques applied in the nineteenth century at the settler frontier.
today in the name of counterterrorism are the inheritors of these colonial practices. Both then and now,

Impacts WOT Endless War


This profiling has led to an endless war on terrorperpetuates continued suffering and the right to
self-security outweighing the law itself
Butler 6

Judith
,( Professor at UC Berkeley, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence Ch. 3:
Indefinite Detention, p. 50)
If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter of deciding whether criminal acts occurred.
Indeed, "deeming" someone dangerous is an unsubstantiated judgment that in these cases works to preempt
determinations for which evidence is required. The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of
suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of "deeming," is potentially enormous.)

We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of


thousands of Arab residents or Arab- American citizens, sometimes on the
basis of last names alone; the harassment of any number of US and non-US
citizens at the immi- gration borders because some official "perceives" a
potential difficulty; the attacks on individuals of Middle Eastern descent on
US streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses. When
Rumsfeld has sent the US into periodic panics or "alerts," he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a

This objectless panic translates too quickly into


suspicion of all dark-skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or
appear to look so to a population not always well versed in making visual
distinctions, say, between Sikhs and Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab
Jews and Pakistani- Americans. Although "deeming" someone dangerous is considered a
state prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial
perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and
judging in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or
those taken to be Islamic, has become targeted by this government mandate
to be on heightened alert, with the effect that the Arab population in the US
becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and
monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers
in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain "indefinite
heightened awareness of suspicious activity.

containment" takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace? A falafel
restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly
the flag in the months following September Il, zooi were a sign of sympathy with al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but
which nevertheless ruled public culture-and business interests_at that time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed
dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be proven to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population
unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national
and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not regarded as subjects, humans who are not
conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so

We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos of


the shackled bodies in Guantanamo released by the Department of Defense. The DOD did
not hide these photos, but published them openly. My speculation is that they published these photographs to
humans who are not humans.

make known that a certain vanquishing had taken place, the reversal of national humiliation, a sign of a successful vindication.
These were not photographs leaked to the press by some human rights agency or concerned media enterprise. So the international
response was no doubt disconcerting, since instead of moral triumph, many people, British parliamentarians and European human
rights activists among them, saw serious moral failure. Instead of vindication, many saw instead revenge, cruelty, and a nationalist
and self-satisfied flouting of international convention. So that several countries asked that their citizens be returned home for trial.

There is a reduction of these human


beings to animal status, where the animal is figured as out of control, in need of
total restraint. It is important to remember that the bestialization of the human in
But there is something more in this degradation that calls to be read.

this way has little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the
animal against which the human is defined . Even if, as seems most probable, some or all of these people
have violent intentions, have been engaged in violent acts, and murderous ones, there are ways to deal with murderers under both
criminal and international law. The language with which they are described by the US, however, suggests that these individuals are
exceptional, that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively
reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings such as these. The treatment of
these prisoners is considered as an extension of war itself, not as a postwar question of appropriate trial and punish- ment. Their
detention stops the killing. If they were not detained, and forcibly so when any movement is required, they would appar- ently start
killing on the spot; they are beings who are in a permanent and perpetual war. It may be that al-Qaeda representatives speak this
way-some clearly do-but that does not mean that every individual detained embodies that position, or that those detained are
centrally concerned with the continuation of war. Indeed, recent reports, even from the investigative team in Guantanamo, suggest
that some of the detainees were only tangentially or transiently involved in the war effort." Other reports in the spring of 2003 made
clear that some detainees are minors, ranging from ages thirteen to sixteen. Even General Dunlavey, who admitted that not all the
detainees were killers, still claimed that the risk is too high to release such detainees. Rumsfeld cited in support of forcible detention
the prison uprisings in Afghanistan in which prisoners managed to get hold of weapons and stage a battle inside the prison. In this

the war is not, and cannot be, over

sense,
; there is a chance of battle in the prison, and there is a warrant
for physical restraint, such that the postwar prison becomes the continuing site of war. It would seem that the rules that govern
combat are in place, but not the rules that govern the proper treatment of prisoners separated from the war itself. When General
Counsel Haynes was asked, "So you could in fact hold these people for years without charging them, simply to keep them off the
street, even if you don't charge them?" he replied, "We are within our rights, and I don't think anyone disputes it that we may hold
enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict. And the confiict is still going and we don 'z see an erm' in sig/zz right now" (my

If the war is against terrorism, and the definition of terrorism


expands to include every questionable instance of global difficulty, how can
the war end? Is it, by definition, a war without end, given the lability of the
terms "terrorism" and "war" ? Although the pictures were published as a sign
of US triumph, and so apparently indicating a conclusion to the war effort, it
was clear at the time that bombing and armed confiict were continuing in
Afghanistan, the war was not over, and even the photographs, the
degradation, and the indefinite detention were continuing acts of war.
Indeed, war seems to have established a more or less permanent condition
of national emergency, and the sovereign right to self-protection outranks
any and all recourse to law.
emphasis). | 1

War on Terror hypocritical on Americas partperpetuators demonize the Middle East while
aware of American past of terrorism
Diana Ralph 6, PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate
Professor of Social Work at Carleton University, "ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WAR ON
TERROR: THE CONTINUING PRETEXT FOR U.S. IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of
9-11-2001 (Research in Political Economy, Volume 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
pp.261-298,

The 9-11 attacks were intended to shock, frighten, and outrage Americans into accepting
the myth that Muslim terrorists pose such a serious threat to their security that they
should cede virtually unlimited power and money to Bush to carry out a war on terror.
However,

terrorism has never posed a serious threat to American


people. The chance of dying of a terrorist attack in the United
States has always been virtually zero, even in 2001. (Moore,
2003, pp. 96-97). Even if the 9-11 attacks had been perpetrated

without U.S. collusion (which is highly unlikely), they did not


qualify as a threat significant enough to turn the U.S. and its allies
into security states, trampling international law and Constitutional
protections, much less as a justification for launching unprovoked
military conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq. For the victims, their
families, and their communities, the 9-11 events were a horrific
tragedy. But as shocking as they were, many 9-11 family members felt strongly that they
did not justify vengeful, military assault: Peaceful Tomorrows members have asked that
violent responses to the September 11 tragedies, such as the US bombing campaign in
Afghanistan, not be done in their names and the names of their loved ones. Members say
they were concerned about the lack of discussion about options to respond to the events of
September 11. Our

single-minded rush to war has been made


without thoughtful consideration of long-term consequences for
our safety, security, and freedom. We will use our voices to
promote a discussion about better solutions, ones based on
justice, not vengeance. (September 11 families for peaceful tomorrows, 2002).

Without in any way trivializing the 9-11 attacks, it is worth remembering that they lasted
less than two hours, and posed no threat to the U.S. economy, infrastructure, or
government. In spite of numerous false alarms, no other terrorist act has occurred in the U.S.
since 9-11. By contrast, many CIA-instigated terrorist initiatives, such as the Contra
campaign against the Sandinistas, lasted for years and had disastrous, long-term
consequences for entire nations (Chomsky, 1991, p. 4). John Stockwell, a former highranking CIA agent testified in 1987 about CIA terrorist interventions. What we're talking
about is going in [to foreign countries] and deliberately creating conditions where
government administration and programs grind to a complete halt, where the hospitals are
treating wounded people instead of sick people, where international capital is scared away
and the country goes bankrupt. (Stockwell, 1987) About 2,600 people died in the 9-11
attacks. As of February 22,. 2006, 3,146 U.S. troops and coalition members have been
killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

At least 225,412 Afghani and Iraqi people,


including 186,825 civilians have been directly killed (Unknown
News, 2005).9 That does not include the many more civilians who
are dying from lack of food, water, electricity, medicine, and
shelter. Even if 9-11 had been a real terrorist incident (as opposed to a made-in-the U.S.

fraud), normal criminal justice, international law, or diplomatic options for redress were
rejected. There was no move to consider international law, to give the Taliban any avenue of
retreating with some honour and dignity, no intention or sign of giving a measured and
reflective response to the threat of al Qaeda, nor any introspection as to the reasons behind
why these attacks occurred. (Geaves & Gabriel, 2004, p. 7). In its rush to war, Washington
briskly dismissed Taliban offers to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country and Iraqi
assurances that it was fully complying with U.N. sanctions and that it had no weapons of
mass destruction. Leaping to a military response (especially threatening global war) is an

unprecedented response to a terrorist attack like this (Pillar, 2001, pp. 29, 50-56). Prior to 11
September 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not regard transnational Islamic
terrorism as a strategic threat. In fact, in the past states have generally chosen to
downplay or minimize military response to terrorist campaigns. (Stevenson, 2004, pp. 7-8).

In his war on terror speech, Bush promised to fight until every


terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated (2001, p. 4). The phrase of global reach is the key
here, since the U.S. actually continues to condone active terrorist
groups on its soil. Anti-abortion groups like the Army of God have
been responsible for at least six murders and 15 attempted
murders, and 200 bombings and arsons (Clarkson, 2005). White
supremacist, paramilitary, and neo-fascist groups such as the
Northern Michigan Regional Militia (of which Timothy McVeigh was
a member) terrorize non-whites and Jews. And right-wing CubanAmerican groups like Alpha 66 and the Commanders of United
Revolutionary Organizations (CORU) have carried out more than
50 bombings and blown up a Cabana passenger plane in 1976,
killing all 73 people aboard (Franklin, 2001). All three types of U.S.
terrorist groups have financial and political ties to Bush. So the
United States certainly harbors terrorist groups, and Bush, himself,
has financial ties to anti-Castro Cuban terrorist groups (as well as to bin Laden) (Franklin,
2001). To be consistent with his war on terror policies, Bush should have bombed Michigan
and Florida, and turned himself in to be detained and possibly tortured as an enemy
combatant.10

American government covered attempts to create enemies for


self-benefit- War on Terror equivalent to modern times
Diana Ralph 6, (PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate
Professor of Social Work at Carleton University, "ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WAR ON
TERROR: THE CONTINUING PRETEXT FOR U.S. IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of
9-11-2001 (Research in Political Economy, Volume 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
pp.261-298,)

There has been no definitive proof


that bin Laden had anything to do with the 9-11 attacks. The U.S.
never produced Colin Powells promised White Paper of evidence,
Who attacked our country? Al-Qaeda:

and Tony Blairs White Paper proof was widely dismissed as a weak exercise in public
relations (Blair, 2001). As Francis Boyle points out:"[T]here

was no real case


against al-Qaeda, bin Laden, and the Taliban government of
Afghanistan. Such was the conclusion of senior diplomats from friendly nations who
attended the so-called briefing [the U.S. gave to NATO members]." (Boyle, 2001). In fact, as
Richard Saunders points out: Every time the U.S. has gone to war, pretext incidents have
been used as triggers to justify military action. During the Cold War, dozens of covert and

overt wars were promoted using specific pretext episodes (Saunders, 2003, p.1). As early

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had developed Operation


Northwoods to create a legitimate provocation as the basis for
U.S. military intervention in Cuba (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962).
The plan proposed to create an incident which would demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft had attacked and shot down a
chartered civil airliner (Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba, 1962). In
as 1962,

the ensuing months and years, the White House vehemently resisted all attempts to
investigate the 9-11 attacks. Under enormous pressure, Bush finally appointed a highly
partisan 9/11 Commission in 2003, with an extremely limited mandate and blocked access to
documents or to interviewing key witnesses. The resulting Report is an obvious cover-up. As
David Ray Griffin quipped, some people may wonderis there anything in the 9/11
Commission Report that is untrue? Butthe big question is, can I find a true sentence in the
Report? (Griffin, 2005, p. 45). Enemies of freedom, freedom itself is under attack,
they hate our freedoms:

Some groups the U.S. labels as terrorists


actually are freedom fighters, struggling for the liberation of their
peoples or countries, for example, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas,

and the Irish Republican Army. Others are heavily infiltrated or even financed by the CIA,
such as the Abu Naidal Organization and the Abu Sayaff Group (Ahmed, Chapter 3; Country
Reports on Terrorism, 2004, 2005) . Even if bin Laden were the architect of 9-11, his stated
grievances with the U.S. are not with its freedoms, but with its leading role in violating the
freedoms (and lives) of others (Bodansky, 2001). Al-Qaeda... is...imposing its radical beliefs
on people everywhere.

It is the U.S. which has imposed its policies on


people everywhere, and particularly in the Middle East as part of
its relentless defense of vital U.S. interests in the region (Klare,
2001, p. 62). Many Islamist movements have grown up in reaction against more than 80
years of colonial exploitation and brutal political, military, and economic manipulation by
first the British, and since World War II, the U.S. (Ahmed, 2003; Bodansky, 2001; Everest,
2004; Kamrava, 2005). Rather than a clash of civilizations, there is a tawdry pursuit of oilbased profits at the expense of fundamental human rights (Bacher, 2000, p. 60). There
are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their
own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they
are trained in the tactics of terror. It is true that Islamist movements, many of which reject
violence, have spread throughout the world. However, Bush conveniently fails to
acknowledge the U.S.s role in creating, funding, transporting, training, and arming the ArabAfghani mujahedin, or CIAs continuing connections with al Qaeda (Ahmed, 2005). They
want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries... Again, it is far more
evident that the U.S. not only seeks to, but has actually overthrown many existing
governments. As William Blum notes: "From 1945 to the end of the century, the United
States attempted to overthrow more than 40 foreign governments, and to crush more than
30 popular-nationalist movements struggling against intolerable regimes. In the process, the
U.S. caused the end of life for several million people, and condemned many more to a life of
agony and despair. (Blum, 2000, p. 2). They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East.
They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These
allegations are designed to outrage both Christian and Jewish Americans. A wide range of

Islamist and Arab liberation groups hope to take back control of their countries from
imperial-imposed puppets, and to eventually to establish a democratic Arab Economic Union
similar to the E.U. (Al-Alim, 2005; Third Cairo Conference, 2005). 13 Most Islamist groups and
many Jewish and Christian groups, as well as the United Nations support the cause of
Palestinian people, and oppose the imperialist role Israel continues to play both in the
Occupied Territories and worldwide as a U.S. strategic asset (Kosky, 2002, p. 25). In short,

justifications for launching the war on terror are based on


groundless lies and appeals to Islamophobic prejudice.
Bushs

Impacts WOT Threat Construction


American War on Terror creates a good guy bad guy
rhetoric- creates racist and stereotyped judgement of
targets
Goitein 13 ('Good guys' and 'bad guys' in the war on terror, Author Elizabeth

Goitein, co-directs the Liberty and National Security Program at New York University
School of Law's Brennan Center for Justice: December 9th 2013,
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/12/war-on-terrorcounterterrorismguantanamo.html)
In numerous meetings and panel discussions over the past several years, I have observed U.S. government officials
involved in the detention or targeting of suspected members of foreign terrorist groups refer to these individuals as
the bad guys. The corollary, usually unstated, is that we the people doing the detaining or targeting are the
good guys. The first time I heard a government official use the term, I cringed. Bad guy is the term parents use
to describe criminals to their four year olds, on the premise that young children lack the capacity for any more
nuanced understanding. The officials use of the label bad guys infantilized his audience, which happened to be a
room full of experienced attorneys. I found it patronizing, but more than that, I was embarrassed by his use of a
term that children use when playing games on the playground, which seemed so unsophisticated and
unprofessional. Yet he was simply adopting the prevailing jargon. As I heard officials utter these words in meetings
and instatement after statement, I was increasingly disturbed by them.

The bad versus good guys

narrative reflects certain aspects of the U.S. governments approach to


counterterrorism that are both counterproductive

and deeply troubling. First, the term is

symptomatic of the attitude that Americans should not ask, or seek to understand, the motivations of those who
wish to attack us. To be sure, some politicians throw out facile statements positing reasons for terrorists actions. In
2001, former president George W. Bush famously proclaimed, they hate our freedoms. Earlier this year, during a
radio talk show, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee suggested that Islam is inherently violent. Such twodimensional explanations, however, do not count as serious efforts to understand the enemy. They are simply
another way of saying bad guys. It seems far more likely that people join Al Qaeda or similar groups for a variety
of reasons. Some may indeed interpret Islam as requiring violent jihad against perceived enemies of the religion.
Others could be impressionable young men pressed into membership by friends, relatives or mentors. Still others
may simply be attracted to war, an affinity that has plagued mankind throughout history. And undoubtedly, some
join terrorist networks to oppose what they consider U.S. interference in the Arab world, such as the war in Iraq
or simply to seek revenge for loved ones killed in U.S. attacks. However,

the notion that terrorists could

be motivated by a complex range of thoughts, emotions, and external realities


rather than by pure evil is anathema in American public discourse . It is almost never

reflected in the public pronouncements of national security officials. The 'bad guy vs. good guy' frame precludes an
objective assessment of America's own conduct in the war on terror. If terrorists are bad guys, further inquiry is
unnecessary. Indeed, it is effectively stifled. Americans who seek a better understanding of why we are under threat
of attack cannot freely search online for the speeches or writings that reportedly inspire our enemy. U.S.-based
websites like YouTube remove such materials from their public server. Moreover, anyone surfing the web for these
items risks being placed on a government watch list. To be sure, the U.S. government since 9/11 has devoted
significant time and money to researching strategies for countering violent extremism. This research, however,
has focused more on identifying visible signs of radicalization and crafting interventions than understanding why it
happens.

The emphasis on outward indicators things like growing a beard, wearing

conservative religious dress, or changing ones mosque attendance patterns itself


betrays an oversimplified perspective. Empirical studies suggest that there is no consistent, linear
path to terrorism, and no reliable indicators that someone is on this path other than the subjects criminal
preparations. There is a cost to the nations security in this approach. Fighting a loosely defined, stateless collection
of terrorist groups is not like a conventional war between nation states. It cannot be won with military force alone
a fact that U.S. officials acknowledge when they say the so-called war on terror is, in large part, a struggle for
hearts and minds. A more nuanced understanding of the enemys motivation, rather than a simplistic recitation of
theyre the bad guys, is critical to that endeavor. The bad guy vs. good guy frame is also problematic because it
precludes an objective assessment of Americas own conduct in the war on terror. Before it became public that the
U.S. had tortured detainees, most Americans believed that only bad guys tortured people. Our popular culture
reflected this understanding: in the movies, it was the villains who engaged in torture an unambiguous symbol of
their villainy. Public perception shifted quickly after the CIAs waterboarding and other enhanced interrogation
techniques came to light in 2004. Today, a majority of Americans considers torture to be acceptable under some
circumstances. The shift is evident in the American pop culture. The face of the torturer is now Jack Bauer, a
counterterrorism agent and heroic protagonist from the television show 24. Why the switch? Americans have a
tendency to judge what we do by who we are, rather than judging who we are by what we do. We are the good
guys; ergo, if we torture people, torture must not be entirely bad. The truth is harder to swallow: The
waterboarding of Guantnamo detainees like Abu Zubaydah who was water-boarded83 times in the span of a
month and the torture of an unknown number of other detainees was a fundamental violation of human rights,
and therefore we, as a country, have unclean hands. No country should be judged solely by its worst conduct.
Moreover, the United States can still take steps to make partial amends for its actions. Specifically, the U.S.
government can allow the truth to come out by declassifying the Senate intelligence committees 6,000page report on the CIAs interrogation program, and by allowing detainees to testify about their experiences. The
U.S. can renounce torture by codifying specific limits on the techniques used by intelligence agencies to obtain

information from suspected detainees. And the U.S. can hold those who violated the law after 9/11 responsible. But
if we have already decided that were the good guys, even when engaged in acts of torture, there is little
incentive to hold ourselves accountable for actions that otherwise might seem for lack of a better word bad.
There is no doubt that the deliberate taking of innocent life a terrorists standard mode of operation is a
reprehensible act. But the caricature of bad guy versus good guy does our country a great disservice. It
prevents us from understanding our enemies a necessity in this unconventional war of ideologies. And it gives us
false license to act against Americas own stated values in the struggle.

Impacts WOT Blowback


The War on Terror has increased risk of violent
retaliation against outrages perpetuated by
Americans and their allies
Diana Ralph 6, PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate Professor of Social
Work at Carleton University, "ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WAR ON TERROR: THE CONTINUING PRETEXT
FOR U.S. IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of 9-11-2001 (Research in Political Economy, Volume
23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.261-298,

To directly fomenting terrorism, the U.S. has often


installed leaders, only to hunt them down later as terrorists.
Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, and bin Laden are all recent
examples. The U.S. supported the Taliban as freedom fighters,
and only labelled them terrorists after it realized they could not
provide political stability for the natural gas pipeline Unocal
wanted to build across Afghanistan (Monbiot, 2001; Power, 1999; Ruppert, 2004, pp. 94-100). In
other words, the Bush administrations approach to terrorism is expedient, related almost exclusively to protecting oil and military

In fact, far from making Americans


safer, the war on terror has increased the risk of violent
retaliation against outrages perpetrated by Americans and their
allies (Anonymous, 2004). More importantly, it has undermined
the infrastructure on which peoples actual security rests: health,
education, housing, social services, environmental protection,
democratic accountability, due process, human rights, the U.N.
and international law. The failure of prevention and rescue operations in New Orleans following Hurricane
interests, rather than the security of ordinary Americans.

Katrina in 2005 dramatically exposed the human costs of this war that was supposed to protect Americans (Sheer, 2005).The $204.4
billion appropriated thus far for the war in Iraq could have purchased any of the following desperately needed services in our
country: 46,458,805 uninsured people receiving health care or 3,545,016 elementary school teachers or 27,093,473 Head Start
places for children or 1,841,833 affordable housing units or 24,072 new elementary schools or 39,665,748 scholarships for

For Muslims
worldwide, and especially for Afghani and Iraqi people, the war
on terror has not only failed to protect their security, but actively
destroyed it. The billions Bush has poured into unprovoked assaults on Afghani and Iraqi people, money siphoned from
university students or 3,204,265 port container inspectors. (Bennis, Phyllis & Leaver, Eric, 2005, p. 6)

fulfilling basic human needs, threatens to plunge U.S. and world economies into a disastrous depression (Fram, Feb. 14, 2005). The
war on terror threatens everyone on the planet with military assaults through the Missile Defense system, which also has the
potential to end life on the planet by creating nuclear winter (Behrens, 2004; Caldicott, 2002, pp. 10-11).

The concept

of a war on terror pre-dates 9-11 by 22 years . Its seeds were first planted in 1979
at the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism (JCIT) organized by Benjamin Netanyahu (future Israeli Prime Minister). JCIT

It featured: preemptive attacks on states that are alleged to support terrorists;


kicked off a campaign for a war on terror against international terrorism (Netanyahu, 1981).

an elaborate intelligence system apparatus; slashed civil liberties,


particularly for Palestinians targeted as potential terrorists,
including detention without charge, and torture; and propaganda
to dehumanize terrorists in the eyes of the public (Ahle, 1990; Asa, 1979;
Netanyahu, 1995, pp. 43-44; Peres, 1981, p. 10). George H. W. Bush Sr. and George Schultz, Reagans Secretary of State
enthusiastically endorsed this concept. Bush Sr. gave a speech at JCIT advocating precisely the type of war on terror that his son
implemented in 2001. But he acknowledged that such a policy would be highly unpopular. I must urge drastic surgery as the only
reasonable course and by that I mean determined action, firmness under the duress of blackmail, and swift and effective
retribution. The problem for the open society is how to have, build up and preserve this essential tool of defense which in the
long run is indispensable for the protection of ordinary people and not so outrage the liberal conscience that the legitimate
exercise of state power is frustrated. (George H.W. Bush, 1981, p. 333, 337)

Impacts WOT Dehumanization


The War on Terror is racist assumptions that demonize Muslims
and those similar in physical characteristics backed by
stereotypes
Deepa Kumar 13 (is an associate professor of media studies and Middle Eastern
studies at Rutgers University. She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of
Empire and Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Global; Twelve Years Post 9/11,
Islamophobia Still Runs High, September 11th 2013)

Kumar: It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the


United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world,
that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to,
you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to
the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be
about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese
need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to
intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But
what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash
of civilizations, which is basically

the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are

rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful,


and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on
and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to
be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And
so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs
cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make
change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination both
of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with
this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic
policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that

U.S. imperialism in particular,


always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian
cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars
abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the
I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and

Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of
course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to

, it was entirely
about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing.
After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about
fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan,
be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course

go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this
menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the
oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the

. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and


often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East,
international threat

North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some of them
Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled
because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book
about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, and things like

. So, you
know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and
people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.
deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth

Impacts WOT Racism


The War on Terror a justification for islamophobia- sustains
racist normalities that are imbedded in a systematic intent
Deepa Kumar 13 (is an associate professor of media studies and Middle Eastern
studies at Rutgers University. She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of
Empire and Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Global; Twelve Years Post 9/11,
Islamophobia Still Runs High, September 11th 2013)

I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are


racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs
and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true
that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact
Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of
a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes
back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the
political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the
system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the
far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of
justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete
picture of what is at work in this form of racism.
Absolutely not.

The portrayal of racialized groups as thugs or terrorists


because of their rejection of American ideals is similar to the
portrayal of Filipno resistance to American control, both of
which resulted in
Kundani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication, and Kumar, associate professor of Media
Studies and Middle East Studies, 2015

(Arun, New York University, Deepa, Rutgers University, Race, surveillance, and
empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, International
Socialist Review issue # 96, spring 2015, accessed 6/29/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
The resistance that Filipinos mounted to American benevolence could then only be
seen as an atavistic barbarism to be countered through modern techniques of
surveillance and repression. While local police departments within the United States had begun to
develop techniques of political surveillance, it was under the US colonial regime in the
Philippines that systematic and widespread surveillance of political
opponents and the manipulation of personal information as a form of
political control was first institutionalized. A unit within the police called the Constabulary
Information Section was established in Manila in 1901, founded by Henry Allen, a former military attach to Tsarist

The Constabulary Information Section cultivated hundreds of paid Filipino


agents across the country, making it scarcely possible for seditionary measures
of importance to be hatched without our knowledge, as Allen wrote to President Theodore
Roosevelt.33 The techniques of compiling dossiers on dissidents private lives,
spreading disinformation in the media, and planting agents provocateurs
Russia.32

among militants were applied to combating radical nationalist groupings in Manila. Control over
information proved as effective a tool of colonial power as physical force. As historian Alfred W. McCoy notes, during
World War I police methods that had been tested and perfected in the colonial Philippines migrated homeward to

After
years of pacifying an overseas empire where race was the frame for
perception and action, colonial veterans came home to turn the same lens
on America, seeing its ethnic communities . . . as internal colonies
requiring coercive controls.34 On this basis, a domestic national security
apparatus emerged, with notions of race and empire at its core . From 1917,
the FBI and police department red squads in US cities increasingly busied
themselves with fears of subversion from communists, pacifists,
anarchists, and the ten million German Americans who were suspected of harboring
disloyalties. During World War I, thirty million letters were physically examined and 350,000 badge-carrying
provide both precedents and personnel for the establishment of a US internal security apparatus.

vigilantes snooped on immigrants, unions, and socialists.35

Impacts Islamophobia Hate Crimes


Muslim Students get targeted- Federal and Educational Figures
discriminate Arabs and Muslims through espionage and
oppressing
Bonet 11 (Sally Wesley, Bonet has a Bachelors of Art; Psychology, and Masters of Science;

Education, and is a PhD candidate in Educational theory. She teaches at Rutgers University. Educating
Muslim American Youth in a Post-9/11 Era, Project Muse #95. Fall)
The research above highlights the many injustices and hate crimes Arabs and Muslims were subjected to after 9/11.
The lines were blurred for the aggressors committing these crimes, who were unable to distinguish Arab noncitizens, Arab Americans and Muslims from the fundamentalist terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon. In fact, Arabs, Arab Americans and Muslims were associated with the "axis of evil" that threatened
America and all it stands for. The rhetoric and political climate of nationalism (as evidenced by the spike in the
displaying of American flags on buildings, businesses and homes) seemed to exclude those who might be

As Islamophobia continued to rise, the racially


charged crimes against Arab Americans and Muslims found their way into the schools, and Arab
American and Muslim youth became targets of all types of abuse. Wingfield (2006) reports that
after 9/11, Arab American students were subjected to many forms of harassment including
mockery, as well as physical violence and even death threats, not only from other students but
from teachers and students as well.
"associated" with terrorism (Grewal, 2003).

The literature suggests that Arab, Arab American and Muslim students are over-targeted by measures of
surveillance, securitization and investigation. Lugg and Soho (2006) suggest that the Patriot Act affects the privacy
of students' records, which can be requested and acquisitioned by the federal government if it is deemed necessary
for a terrorism investigation. In Abu El Haj's (2007) work with Palestinian high school-aged youth, she highlights the

discrimination Arab and Muslim students experienced , particularly in the wake of the 9/11
attacks. Muslim young women who wore the hijab (head scarf worn as a symbol of religious
propriety) were especially vulnerable at their schools. Abu El-Haj (2007) reports that several Muslim
veiled female students were harassed in their neighborhood school, being told by their
teachers that they "look like a disgrace in that thing," while some were threatened with
disciplinary sanctions if they did not remove their scarves . Additionally, a student was
disciplined for mispronouncing the word "tourist," which was heard by his teacher as "terrorist." This student had to
resort to legally challenging the school district to have the incident removed from his permanent record. Another
student was sent to the principal for disciplinary action after drawing two planes hitting the twin towers, despite the

A
particularly disturbing event occurred on the day of September 11th, when an angry teacher
stormed into the principal's office and demanded that all the Palestinian and Arab
students be "rounded up". To this the principal mockingly replied, "And would you like
me to put targets on their backs as well?" (Abu El-Haj, 2007, p. 303). In the wake of the anger
against the 9/11 culprits, some teachers and school personnel were unable to distinguish
between the fanatic and radical Islamists who attacked the twin towers and their
own Muslim students, causing their students to feel alienated and unsafe in their own
neighborhood school.
fact that countless students of all ethnicities, races and religions were reported as having drawn similar pictures.

In her research with high-schooled aged students and parents in a Sunni community in Canada, Zine (2001)
highlights the difficulties students experience as a result of their identification as Muslims. While Islamophobia was
present before 9/11, and Muslim students have long been subjected to racialized treatment, these experiences
became more acute after 9/11. The students she interviewed and observed came from a wide cross-section of

Muslim students whose reported ethnicities were South Asian, Arab, Somali and Caribbean. Students
wearing the hijab reported experiencing patronizing interactions with teachers who
before knowing them seem to equate their difference (in this case difference in dress) to
foreignness. One student tells of how teachers who do not know her speak slowly to her
until she replies in fluent English at which time the teachers seem relieved that she is
"OK". Another student speaks of the messages she received about "whiteness" and how
it is equated to all things [End Page 49] good and beautiful. Her dark skin as a Pakistani Muslim

was in stark contrast to this ideal of beauty. An Indian mother speaks of her daughters' entrenched ideas that being

"brown" and wearing the hijab was a barrier in dealing with Caucasians who are more respected and "listened to".
Young women who wore the hijab had particularly difficult experiences with discrimination
as they have often become the metaphor of Muslim oppression. Despite the fact that many women wear the hijab
out of a sense of religious identification and modesty, the dominant culture continues to interpret this as a symbol

have been exposed to harassment in public schools


and teachers who have said ignorant comments from "Are you bald?"
and "Do you have a head injury?" to asking them to remove their hijab or go home.
of coercion. Young women wearing the hijab
by administrators

Research has established that tracking is inherently tied with race and class (Oakes, 2005; Rubin, 2006). Zine

many Muslim youth report never being academically challenged by


their teachers. When asked what they attribute to this treatment, students reported that they believed
teachers had lower expectations of them due to their minoritized status . Many of them
were on lower and non-college bound tracks despite their academic promise. Karima, a
Pakistani young woman (who incidentally wore the hijab), had an excellent academic
record, reported feeling that teachers and counselors dismissed her academic aspirations due to the
misconception that education for Muslim women is not valued. Her attempts to graduate from high
school in three years rather than four were foiled by a guidance counselor who was unhelpful
in assisting her. He later told her that "she surprised him" with her persistence and that "she
was very strong-headed," displaying his stereotypical notions of Muslim women . She also
reports being discouraged from taking math and science courses and being steered towards, general,
non-academic tracks. Other Muslim students report being recommended to the general-level, non-collegiate
(2001) reports that

track despite their academic achievement. Zine (2001) also reported that Muslim students have been placed in ESL

Sajjad, a Guayanese student whose


first and only language was English, was placed into ESL upon his arrival to his neighborhood
school. He speaks of the difficulties this posed upon his academics since he was "forced out of"
math, science and French, with no ability to make it up due to his presence in the ESL
classroom. Similarly, a Pakistani student was placed in ESL classes without her
knowledge or consent, despite the fact that he was born and raised in North America. When
his mother went to the school to question this decision, she was told that her son had
trouble following directions and understanding instructions. While this might be warrant
academic accommodations or even interventions for one student, the school deemed it necessary
place a native English speaker in ESL classes . Beyond being questionable practice, these
classes, regardless of their knowledge and command of English.

placement decisions have significantly negative effects on students' ability to participate in college-bound tracks,
which have profoundly negative effects on their future life outcomes.

Impacts Islamophobia Culture of Fear


Islamophobia controls how the U.S. functions because of
societys perception of the other and the fear that
perpetuates.
Brzezinski 7.

(Zbigniew, March 25, American Political scientist and Counselor to


Lyndon B Johnson, Washington Post, Terrorized by War on
Terror, http://static.twoday.net/Klodynis/files/Terrorized-by-Waron-Terror.pdf)
The culture of fear is like a genie that has been let out of its bottle. It
acquires a life of its own -- and can become demoralizing . America today is not the
self-confident and determined nation that responded to Pearl Harbor ; nor is it
the America that heard from its leader, at another moment of crisis, the powerful words "the only thing we have to
fear is fear itself"; nor is it the calm America that waged the Cold War with quiet persistence despite the knowledge
that a real war could be initiated abruptly within minutes and prompt the death of 100 million Americans within just

We are now divided, uncertain and potentially very susceptible to


panic in the event of another terrorist act in the United States itself. That is the result of five
a few hours.

years of almost continuous national brainwashing on the subject of terror, Terrorized by 'War on Terror' washingtonpost.com http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/... 2 von 3 26.03.07 22:52 Uhr
quite unlike the more muted reactions of several other nations (Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany, Japan, to mention
just a few) that also have suffered painful terrorist acts. In his latest justification for his war in Iraq, President Bush
even claims absurdly that he has to continue waging it lest al-Qaeda cross the Atlantic to launch a war of terror

fear-mongering, reinforced by security entrepreneurs,


the mass media and the entertainment industry, generates its own
momentum. The terror entrepreneurs, usually described as experts on terrorism, are necessarily engaged in
competition to justify their existence. Hence their task is to convince the public that it
faces new threats. That puts a premium on the presentation of credible
scenarios of ever-more-horrifying acts of violence, sometimes even with
blueprints for their implementation. That America has become insecure and
more paranoid is hardly debatable. A recent study reported that in 2003, Congress identified 160 sites as
here in the United States. Such

potentially important national targets for would-be terrorists. With lobbyists weighing in, by the end of that year the
list had grown to 1,849; by the end of 2004, to 28,360; by 2005, to 77,769. The national database of possible
targets now has some 300,000 items in it, including the Sears Tower in Chicago and an Illinois Apple and Pork
Festival. Just last week, here in Washington, on my way to visit a journalistic office, I had to pass through one of the
absurd "security checks" that have proliferated in almost all the privately owned office buildings in this capital -and in New York City. A uniformed guard required me to fill out a form, show an I.D. and in this case explain in
writing the purpose of my visit. Would a visiting terrorist indicate in writing that the purpose is "to blow up the
building"? Would the guard be able to arrest such a self-confessing, would-be suicide bomber? To make matters
more absurd, large department stores, with their crowds of shoppers, do not have any comparable procedures. Nor
do concert halls or movie theaters. Yet such "security" procedures have become routine, wasting hundreds of

Government at every level has


stimulated the paranoia. Consider, for example, the electronic billboards over
interstate highways urging motorists to "Report Suspicious Activity " (drivers in
turbans?). Some mass media have made their own contribution. The cable channels
millions of dollars and further contributing to a siege mentality.

and some print media have found that horror scenarios attract audiences, while terror "experts" as "consultants"
provide authenticity for the apocalyptic visions fed to the American public. Hence the proliferation of programs with

Their general effect is to reinforce the sense of


the unknown but lurking danger that is said to increasingly threaten the
lives of all Americans. The entertainment industry has also jumped into the act. Hence the TV
serials and films in which the evil characters have recognizable Arab features,
bearded "terrorists" as the central villains.

that exploit public anxiety and stimulate


Islamophobia. Arab facial stereotypes, particularly in newspaper cartoons, have at times been rendered in a
sometimes highlighted by religious gestures,

manner sadly reminiscent of the Nazi anti-Semitic campaigns. Lately, even some college student organizations
have become involved in such propagation, apparently oblivious to the menacing connection between the

The
atmosphere generated by the "war on terror" has encouraged legal and
political harassment of Arab Americans (generally loyal Americans) for conduct that
has not been unique to them. A case in point is the reported harassment of the Council on
stimulation of racial and religious hatreds and the unleashing of the unprecedented crimes of the Holocaust.

American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) for its attempts to emulate, not very successfully, the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Some House Republicans recently described CAIR members as "terrorist apologists" who

Social discrimination, for


example toward Muslim air travelers, has also been its unintended
byproduct. Not surprisingly, animus toward the United States even among Muslims otherwise not particularly
should not be allowed to use a Capitol meeting room for a panel discussion.

concerned with the Middle East has intensified, while America's reputation as a leader in fostering constructive
interracial and interreligious relations has suffered egregiously. The record is even more troubling in the general
area of civil rights. The culture of fear has bred intolerance, suspicion of foreigners and the adoption of legal
procedures that undermine fundamental Terrorized by 'War on Terror' - washingtonpost.com
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/... 3 von 3 26.03.07 22:52 Uhr notions of justice.

Innocent until proven guilty has been diluted if not undone, with some -even U.S. citizens -- incarcerated for lengthy periods of time without
effective and prompt access to due process. There is no known, hard evidence that such

excess has prevented significant acts of terrorism, and convictions for would-be terrorists of any kind have been few

Someday Americans will be as ashamed of this record as they


now have become of the earlier instances in U.S. history of panic by the
many prompting intolerance against the few. In the meantime, the "war on terror" has
and far between.

gravely damaged the United States internationally. For Muslims, the similarity between the rough treatment of Iraqi
civilians by the U.S. military and of the Palestinians by the Israelis has prompted a widespread sense of hostility

It's not the "war on terror" that angers Muslims


watching the news on television, it's the victimization of Arab civilians. And
toward the United States in general.

the resentment is not limited to Muslims. A recent BBC poll of 28,000 people in 27 countries that sought
respondents' assessments of the role of states in international affairs resulted in Israel, Iran and the United States
being rated (in that order) as the states with "the most negative influence on the world." Alas, for some that is the
new axis of evil! The events of 9/11 could have resulted in a truly global solidarity against extremism and terrorism.

A global alliance of moderates, including Muslim ones, engaged in a


deliberate campaign both to extirpate the specific terrorist networks and
to terminate the political conflicts that spawn terrorism would have been
more productive than a demagogically proclaimed and largely solitary U.S.
"war on terror" against "Islamo-fascism." Only a confidently determined and reasonable
America can promote genuine international security which then leaves no political space for terrorism. Where is the
U.S. leader ready to say, "Enough of this hysteria, stop this paranoia"? Even in the face of future terrorist attacks,
the likelihood of which cannot be denied, let us show some sense. Let us be true to our traditions.

Impacts Islamophobia Torture


Islamophobia is direct motivation for torture and war.
Hudson 10.
(Adam, journalist from Stanford, Stanford Progressive, Imperialism, Islamophobia,
and Torture, http://web.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=893)
Racism is not just an individual problem of prejudice or hate. It is an ideology used to justify
systems of hegemony and oppression. It creates a binary between the Self
and the Other. The Self is ascribed all positive aspects of humanity, such as rationality, intelligence, high
culture, and credit for creating the benefits of modern civilization. The Other is ascribed all negative aspects of

By categorizing certain
groups as inferior others, hegemonic powers rob those people of their
humanity, thus, making it easier to commit acts of brutality against them
for imperial interests. Racism, under the banner of manifest destiny, was used to justify the genocide
humanity, such as irrationality, primitivity, criminality, and barbarity.

committed against the Native Americans that made room for American territorial expansion. Racism was used to
justify the enslavement of millions of black Africans whose free labor was exploited to work on plantations and build
the American economy. Despite the advancements made during the civil rights movement, racism still exists in
many areas of American life, such as the disproportionate number of African-Americans and Latinos in prison, de
facto housing segregation, inequality in the education system, and police brutality committed against people of
color. Some of the most recent cases of police brutality were the deaths of 22-year-old Oscar Grant in
Oakland[xvi] and 7-year-old Aiyana Jones in Detroit[xvii] both of whom were African-American. Americas wars
against Afghanistan and Iraq serve to maintain American global hegemony and access to key resources such as oil.

The racist dehumanization of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians is


committed to justify Americas wars and acts of torture primarily against
people from countries whose populations are predominantly Muslim and
black and brown-skinned, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. It is not difficult to
witness the manifestations of Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism in
American society. It exists within the media and underlies the sophistry of politicians and leading
intellectuals. Muslims, Arabs and South Asians are always suspected of being terrorists, similar to how black and

Racism is the
fundamental ideological motivation behind Americas wars and use of
torture. The key task now is to end Americas use of torture and, more
broadly, eliminate racism and imperialism; a daunting task but a necessary one,
Latino people are suspected of being drug-dealers, gang members and criminals.

nevertheless. First, it is important for everyone, of all races, to see and treat every other person as a human being.
Despite our cultural differences, we are part of one human family. Second, it is crucial that we hold our political
leaders accountable for authorizing acts of torture and starting wars. At Stanford, we can start by pressuring our
government to hold current Professor and former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and other
government officials, accountable for authorizing torture and engaging in aggressive wars against Iraq and
Afghanistan. Third, it is vital that we work to build institutions that foster peace instead of war and sustain humanity
rather than destroy it. To build a better future for humanity is by no means an easy task. But a million-mile journey
begins with one step. Lets make that first step.

Islamophobia justifies the torture of many innocent people.


Hudson 10.
(Adam, journalist from Stanford, Stanford Progressive, Imperialism, Islamophobia,
and Torture, http://web.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=893)
One key element of American imperial history is its use of torture, which can be traced back to Americas treatment

an analysis of torture, especially in the post-9/11 era, is


very uncommon in mainstream political discourse. As such, before I proceed, it is
important to dispel the current myths about torture propagated in the mainstream media. As is well
known, the United States has tortured hundreds of detainees suspected of
of African slaves. Such

being involved in terrorism. It is hard not to notice when the former Vice President brags about
personally authorizing the use of torture on national television[v]. These acts included waterboarding, physical beatings, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and, in
some cases, murder[vi]. The primary justification is that torture is a
necessary tool to extract information from people who might know about
impending threats of terrorism. Politicians (both Republican and Democrat), intellectuals, pundits and
other leaders argue that America faces a new kind of threat. America is up against extremist,
religious fanatics who hate the United States and wish to kill innocent
Americans. Current domestic and international laws and law enforcement tactics are not sufficient to subdue
this threat. As Alberto Gonzalez said to former President George W. Bush, the Geneva Conventions are obsolete in

As a result, the United States must be willing to


torture terrorist suspects in order to extract vital information that could
prevent the next terrorist attack. This apocalyptic mindset has impacted
the current American psyche and post-9/11 American foreign policy . Since the
this new war against terrorism.[vii]

war is against a nebulous enemy, the war against terrorism is essentially a permanent war. Despite the compelling
arguments used to justify torture, adopting an objective view of the facts rips them asunder. First, there is little to
no evidence to prove that torture is a useful interrogation technique. In fact, the evidence that does exist proves the
opposite that torture is ineffective because the suspect will say anything, whether its true or not, in order to make
the torture stop. Ali Soufan, an intelligence official who interrogated Guantanamo terror suspect Abu Zubaydah,
stated[viii]that conventional interrogation techniques compelled Zubaydah to provide actionable intelligence. It was

most
of the people detained, usually indefinitely, in places like Guantanamo Bay
and CIA-owned black sites are not diehard terrorists. The vast majority of
them are innocent. Even President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and
other high government officials may have been aware of this[ix]. Lawrence Wilkerson, a
only after Zubaydah was waterboarded several times that he could not provide useful intelligence. Second,

top aide to former Secretary of State Colin Powell said that Cheney had absolutely no concern that the vast
majority of Guantanamo detainees were innocentIf hundreds of innocent individuals had to suffer in order to

The apocalyptic mindset of the broader


War on Terror justified this tragedy.
detain a handful of hardcore terrorists, so be it.

Impacts Islamophobia Hate Crimes


Islamophobia justifies hate crimes and raises tensions between
the US and the Islamic State.
Carter 15.
(Tom, February 19, Global Research, Mounting Violence Against Muslims in
America, http://www.globalresearch.ca/mounting-violence-against-muslimsin-america/5432212)
On February 10, three Muslim-American students Deah

Shaddy Barakat, 23, his wife

Yusor Mohammad Abu-Salha, 21, and her sister Razan Mohammad Abu-Salha, 19 were

found shot in
the head, execution-style, in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The two young
women were wearing traditional hijabs when they were killed . The man who
turned himself in to authorities in connection with the murders had previously brandished guns at the victims and
threatened them. Before the shooting, Yusor Abu-Salha told her father, Daddy, I think he hates us for who we are

On February 12, an Arab-American man was brutally attacked


by two white men at a Kroger supermarket in Dearborn, Michigan. The
attackers also taunted his daughter, who wears a hijab, making references to ISIS and Muslims. The
attackers called the man and his daughter rhead and said, Go back to
your country. On February 13, the Quba Islamic Institute in southeast Houston, Texas was the target of an
and how we look.

arson attack that destroyed a substantial portion of the building and caused an estimated $100,000 in damage. On
February 17, police in Austin, Texas arrested a man for threatening to bomb an Islamic center as well as a Middle
Eastern restaurant. Last month, a Texas Muslim Capitol Day event (the declared purpose of which was to engage
American Muslims in the political process) was attacked and disrupted by anti-Muslim thugs. Another attack was
organized on Muslim Day in Oklahoma City. The attacking groups Facebook page screamed, Get Islam Out of

The rate of hate crimes against Muslims in the United States stands
at five times what it was before September 2001 . A recent poll found that out of all
America.

religions, Americans harbor the most negative feelings towards Muslims.The American political and media
establishment bears a significant portion of the responsibility for these trends.A recent report by the Center for
American Progress entitled Fear, Inc. 2.0, The Islamophobia Networks Efforts to Manufacture Hate in America
exposes a veritable Islamophobia industry operating on the periphery of the American state. Tens of millions of
dollars have been spent over the past decade to promote anti-Muslim bigotry through a shady network of

This Islamophobia network enjoys


close ties with police departments and the intelligence agencies. AntiMuslim bigotry, the report indicates, can often be found masquerading as
law-enforcement counterterrorism training. The training materials and experts,
politicians, journalists, foundations, activists and experts.

according to the report, encourage police and intelligence agents to see a terrorist plot in every mosque. The
intentional whipping up of anti-Muslim bigotry has intensified internationally in the wake of theCharlie
Hebdo attacks last month. As the World Socialist Web Site has explained, the campaign to vilify Muslims serves
definite political ends. Anti-Muslim hysteria provides a justification for imperialist mayhem abroad as well as a
wedge with which to attack democratic rights at home. Policies can be pursued in the climate of such hysteria that

as with all such campaigns against racial and


religious minorities throughout the twentieth century, murderous and
would otherwise be unthinkable. And,

fascistic elements are mobilized that, in a crisis, can be unleashed against


the working class as a whole . In cultivating the conditions for an
intensification of anti-Muslim violence within the United States, a
particularly reprehensible role has been played by the racist, homicidal
film American Sniper. The film features an elite US soldier heroically slaughtering Iraqi savages for
God and country. Chris Kyle, the real-life sniper behind Clint Eastwoods pro-war propaganda film, boasted of killing
more than 300 people. (He was apparently also a pathological liar who bragged about having shot and killed dozens
of looters in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and to have participated in other events that are unlikely ever to
have happened). During a military investigation of allegations that Kyle killed an unarmed civilian in Iraq, Kyle said,
I dont shoot people with Korans. Id like to, but I dont. In the current toxic social climate, and in the absence of
any progressive outlet for social discontent,American Sniper has met with a certain and disturbing response.
American sniper makes me wanna go shoot some fing Arabs, wrote one individual on Twitter. Nice to see a
movie where the Arabs are portrayed for who they really are, wrote another, vermin scum intent on destroying
us. Another individual wrote, Great fing movie and now I really want to kill some fing rheads. And another:
American sniper made me appreciate soldiers 100x more and hate Muslins (sic) 1000000x more. The AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee described a drastic increase in hate speech on social media following the

It is not difficult to see how these kinds of responses can


translate into real violence. A revealing episode was provided by the National Prayer Breakfast on
films release.

February 5. Bowing to pressure from the right, Obama utilized the occasion (a reactionary spectacle under any
circumstances) to denounce ISIL, a brutal, vicious death cult that, in the name of religion, carries out unspeakable
acts of barbarism, terrorizing religious minorities like the Yezidis, subjecting women to rape as a weapon of war, and
claiming the mantle of religious authority for such actions. Obama also mentioned the Crusades and the Inquisition
as examples of terrible deeds committed in the name of religion. Obamas appearance fueled an ongoing
campaign by the Republican right denouncing the White House for not going far enough in vilifying Muslims. Obama
was criticized on the grounds that his invocation of the Crusades and the Inquisition throws Christians under the
bus. The words radical Islamic terrorism do not come out of the presidents mouth, declared Republican Senator
Ted Cruz. The word jihad does not come out of the presidents mouth. And that is dangerous. The presidents
comments at the prayer breakfast are the most offensive Ive ever heard a president make in my lifetime, former
Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore told reporters. He has offended every believing Christian in the United States. This
goes further to the point that Mr. Obama does not believe in America or the values we all share. The engines of
anti-Muslim agitation in the United States do not include only the usual suspects: the Republican Party, the military,
AM talk radio, police, the intelligence agencies, Fox News, the Murdoch Press, religious zealots, billionaire

anti-Muslim prejudice has been lent a


certain respectable gloss by so-called liberal and left sections of the
political establishment. These layers either endorse the vilification of
Muslims, acquiesce to it, or make hand-wringing scholarly inquiries into
whether or not Islam is inherently violent. The rash of horrific attacks
in the name of Islam, read a front-page article in the New York Times on January 9, is spurring
an anguished debate among Muslims here in the heart of the Islamic world
about why their religion appears cited so often as a cause for violence and
bloodshed. The article then weighs argumentsfor and againstthe proposition that Islam is inherently
reactionaries, the Tea Party and so forth. Instead,

more violent than Judaism or Christianity. No significant section of the political establishment in any of the
imperialist countries has shown itself capable of taking a principled stand in opposition to the promotion of anti-

Muslim sentiment. That task falls to the socialist movement, which stands for the international unity of the working
class, defends its democratic achievements, and rejects all attempts to whip up national, ethnic or religious bigotry.

Impacts Islamophobia Imperialism


Islamophobia leads to imperialism and unfair prosecutions of
Muslims, especially in the U.S.
Kumar 12.

(Deepa, professor at Rutgers University, July 25, SocialistWorker.org, Islamophobia


and U.S. Imperialism, http://socialistworker.org/blog/criticalreading/2012/07/05/islamophobia-and-us-imperialis)
The events of 9/11 brought this legal apparatus in line with the foreign policy
establishment. Barely had the ashes settled from the Twin Towers when loud
proclamations that Islamic terrorists represented existential threats to
the United States began to echo in the public sphere. From then on, US policy
was geared towards keeping Americans safe from Muslim evildoers.
The clash of civilizations rhetoric became the ideological basis for the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as domestic attacks on Muslims and Arabs. The war
on Iraq, however, did not go the way the neocons wanted it to. Instead of
greeting US forces as liberators, the Iraqi people resisted and rejected US
hegemony. During his second term, Bush moved away from hard power and
toward winning hearts and minds. But by the end of his second term, the failing
occupations in Afghanistan and Iraqas well as an economic crisis of proportions
not seen since the Great Depressionmeant that it was time for a changing of the
guard. Obama was voted into power by an electorate disgusted by the hubris and
arrogance of the Bush regime. The ruling elites also gave him their blessing, hoping
to put a friendlier face on US imperialism. The Democrats were ready to take on this
role. In January 2007, a leadership group on US-Muslim relations headed by
Madeleine Albright, Richard Armitage (former deputy secretary of state under
George W. Bush) and a number of academics produced a document titled
Changing Course: A New Direction for US Relations with the Muslim
World. The document, which received high praise, argued that distrust of the
United States in Muslim-majority countries was the product of policies and actions
not a clash of civilizations. It went on to argue that to defeat violent
extremists, military force was necessary but not sufficient, and that the
United States needed to forge diplomatic, political, economic, and
cultural initiatives. The report urged the US leadership to improve
mutual respect and understanding between Americans and Muslims, and
promote better governance and improve civic participation in Muslim majority
countries. The reports call to action stated that it would be vital for the next
president to reflect these ideas in his/her inaugural speech and to reaffirm the
United States commitment to prohibit all forms of torture. Barack Obama has
proven brilliantly effective at embodying such a posture. In one of his first speeches,
in Cairo, Obama rejected the clash of civilizations argument, emphasizing the
shared common history and aspirations of the East and West. Whereas the clash
discourse sees the West and the world of Islam as mutually exclusive and as polar
opposites, Obama emphasized common principles. He spoke of civilizations debt
to Islam, which pav[ed] the way for Europes Renaissance and Enlightenment,
and acknowledged Muslims contributions to the development of science, medicine,
navigation, architecture, calligraphy and music. This was no doubt a remarkable
admission for an American president, but one that Obama clearly saw as vital to

bolstering the United States badly damaged image in the Muslim world. Indeed,
this speech marked a significant rhetorical shift from the Bush era; a shift to the
language of liberal imperialism and liberal Islamophobia. The key characteristics
of liberal Islamophobia are the rejection of the clash of civilizations
thesis, the recognition that there are good Muslims with whom
diplomatic relations can be forged and a concomitant willingness to work
with moderate Islamists. Liberal Islamophobia may be rhetorically gentler but it
reserves the right of the US to wage war against Islamic terrorism around the
world, with no respect for the right of self-determination by people in the countries
it targets. It is the white mans burden in sheeps clothing. The truth is that my
foreign policy is actually a return to the traditional bipartisan realistic policy of
George Bushs father, of John F. Kennedy, of, in some ways, Ronald Reagan,
Obama once said. Since taking office, he has embraced and expanded Bushs
second-term policies. He has deployed 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan,
expanded the war into Pakistan, tried to bully Iraq into granting an
extension of the US occupation (which failed), carried out drone attacks
and black ops in Yemen and Somalia and participated in the NATO-led
war in Libya. Domestically, Obama has continued Bushs policies of torture,
extraordinary rendition and pre-emptive prosecution. American Muslims
continue to be harassed and persecuted by the state. Obama has even
gone further than Bush in several ways, not only by securing the power to
execute US citizens suspected of ties to terrorism without so much as a
trial but also by signing the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
which, among other things, allows the military to detain indefinitely
without charge terror suspects who are US citizens. His 2011 counterradicalizationstrategy document elicits the help of Muslim American teachers,
coaches and community members, who are to be turned into a McCarthy-type
informant system.

Impacts Islamophobia Detention


Since 9/11, the government has unlawfully been
detaining innocent Muslims through the motivation
of Islamophobia. Malhotra 4.
(Anjana, professor SUNY Buffalo Law School, December 10, Overlooking Innocence:
Refashioning the Material Innocence Law to Indefinitely Detain Muslims Without
Charges, https://www.aclu.org/files/iclr/malhotra.pdf)
One of the most basic rights in international law is the safeguard against
arbitrary detention. This protection of the right to liberty has been defined

by international tribunals to mean, at a minimum, that the detention of any


individual must be in accordance with previously established law and based
on objectively reasonable criteria, defined without regard to race, religion,
gender, or national origin. The architects of these international legal
principles drew from the central tenets in the Magna Carta prohibiting
arbitrary detention: the importance of curbing the power of the monarch to
jail its subjects with unchecked authority. A principle drafter and proponent of
the international rules prohibiting arbitrary detention, the U.S. since
September 11 has joined many countries in abrogating these rules in its
counterterrorism investigations, implementing new policies and
refashioning existing authority to indiscriminately hold Muslims, Arabs
and South Asians without probable cause. Following September 11, FBI

agents swept through Muslim communities to pick up suspects often based


on leads that, according to the Justice Department, were often quite general
in nature, such as a landlord reporting suspicious activity by an Arab
tenant.1 Under the systematic programs the Justice Department
implemented over the past three years, it has detained over 5,000 Muslims

since September 11 and registered more than 80,000 immigrants from


Muslim communities, though yielding not one conviction of an individual
involved in the attacks of September 11.2 One key tool the government has

used to detain Muslim men without charges is the material witness law.
Congress enacted the material witness statute to authorize the government
to briefly hold a person who has witnessed a crime when it appears he may
flee. Before September 11, this law was only to hold witnesses who were
scared to testify, such as witnesses to a mafia or alien smuggling trial. Since
September 11, however, the government has used this law to circumvent
probable cause requirements to hold Muslim witnesses it believes to be
suspects, indefinitely without charges. The Justice Department has

succeeded in using the material witnesses law to preventatively detain


Muslim men since September 11 because it held witnesses to testify in
terrorism-related grand jury proceedings, where the executive branch is
given broad authority to investigate a crime. Also, relying on grand jury
secrecy rules, the government has held witnesses pursuant to closed
detention proceedings without any public accountability. Even on requests

from Congress, the Justice Department has refused to disclose the names
or number of witnesses it has held, where or for how long witnesses were
detained, or the details surrounding material witness arrests. The Justice

Department released general statistical information, including that half of the


witnesses it has arrested in the September 11 investigation were held for
more than 30 days.3 Concerned with these secret detention the ACLU, with
Human Rights Watch, undertook a study this year to document how the
government has used the material witness law in its counterterrorism
investigation since September 11. Based on interviews with witnesses, their
family members, lawyers and * Anjana Malhotra is the Aryeh Neier Fellow
with the ACLU and Human Rights Watch. government officials, we
documented the detention of more than 70 material witnesses held in
connection with counterterrorism investigations. In documenting these
cases, we learned how the government has systematically abused its
material witness authority to hold Muslim men in violation of basic
international protections against arbitrary detention . We will release the

full findings of our research in a forthcoming report in January 2005. In this


essay we describe the material witness law and how the government
systematically used the law in a manner unauthorized by Congress to detain
and investigate suspects and impermissibly used witnesses race, national
origin and religion as a basis for detaining witnesses.

After 9/11, the government began stretching their own rules


on arresting material witnesses in order to protect national
security.
Malhotra 4.

(Anjana, professor SUNY Buffalo Law School, December 10, Overlooking Innocence:
Refashioning the Material Innocence Law to Indefinitely Detain Muslims Without
Charges, https://www.aclu.org/files/iclr/malhotra.pdf)
Enacted in its current form in 1984, the material witness statute authorizes the government to arrest and detain

To arrest a material witness, the


government must show (1) that a witness can provide information
material to a criminal proceeding, and (2) that it would be impracticable to
secure a witnesss testimony without a subpoena. The material witness law
favors ordering a deposition of a material witness in lieu of his detention,
reflecting Congressional concern that witnesses should be detained only
in narrow circumstances. Before September 11, the government generally used the material witness
individuals to secure their testimony for a criminal proceeding.

law to arrest individuals who had witnessed a crime and who had a legal reason or had made clear to the
government that he or she would not comply with a subpoena to testify at a criminal trial. The former INS made the
most material witness arrests, most commonly to hold immigrants who were smuggled into the country in order to
obtain their testimony for trials against alien smugglers and courts were careful to release witnesses if they faced

Before September 11, courts were reluctant to jail a witness


absent proof that the witness was a fugitive or had resisted government
attempts to call witnesses to testify. Following September 11, however,
the government used the material witness law in a manner that reduced
judicial oversight protecting these standards for holding a witness,
detaining witnesses who had cooperated with the government,
demonstrated no risk of flight, and had little or no relevant information to
a crime. According to lawyers who represented witnesses since September 11, one reason for this change is
continued detention.

that courts have deferred to the governments arguments that witnesses need be detained because of national

The Second Circuits recent decision in U.S. v. Awadallah, the


only appellate case to resolve the governments post 9/11 use of the
material witness law, reflects this deference; the Second Circuit
substantially lowered the burden on the government to prove a witness is
not likely to comply with a subpoena, holding that the material witness in
that case was a flight risk largely because he did not step forward to the
FBI to volunteer information that he may have. In crafting this standard, the Second
security concerns.

Circuit not only made several significant inferential leaps in presuming that an individual has relevant knowledge
to the investigation, but also broke with pre-September 11 case law that required the government to prove the
witness was a flight risk because she had previously evaded service or was a fugitive from justice. The second
reason the government has been able to detain witnesses without judicial oversight is that it held material
witnesses more frequently for grand jury proceedings, where courts are largely restricted in reviewing the Justice

the Justice
Department has exceedingly broad powers of investigation in grand jury
investigations to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.
Thus, in Awadallah, the Circuit held that the government need only
produce a mere statement from a government official that a witness has
material information to establish that his testimony is necessary for a
grand jury investigation. Arresting material witnesses for grand jury investigations has also allowed
Departments subpoena powers. Unlike a trial, where there is a defendant and a concrete crime,

the government to hold material witnesses in complete secrecy. Grand jury proceedings and records have long been

The government has


applied these rules to detain grand jury material witnesses in closed
proceedings and with sealed records, although some courts reviewing
post-9/11 material witness detentions have balanced these rules against
the presumptively public determination to jail a witness . The secrecy surrounding
kept under seal because of the preliminary nature of the investigation.15

the post-September 11 grand jury material witness arrests also departed from past practice; for example, the
government read the material witness arrest warrant in an open bond proceeding for material witness Terry Lynn
Nichols, arrested in connection with the grand jury investigation to the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing.

Islamophobia has caused the legal system to detain and


harshly investigate civilians without a real justification.
Malhotra 4.

(Anjana, professor SUNY Buffalo Law School, December 10, Overlooking Innocence:
Refashioning the Material Innocence Law to Indefinitely Detain Muslims Without
Charges, https://www.aclu.org/files/iclr/malhotra.pdf)
Behind the unprecedented secrecy surrounding post-September 11
material witness arrests, our review of material witness detentions
indicates that the Justice Department has arrested and detained witnesses
in a manner unauthorized by Congress and the U.S. constitution to evade
proving probable cause. In the days following September 11, Attorney General John
Ashcroft made clear that the material witness law was part of the Justice Departments legal arsenal
to hold suspects, declaring that [a]gressive detention of lawbreakers and material
witnesses is vital to preventing, disrupting, or delaying new attacks. 18
Material witnesses consistently described to the ACLU and HRW that from the moment of their arrest, the Justice
Department treated them as high profile terrorism suspects, arresting witnesses in their homes or in public with
armed agents with their guns drawn, shackling witnesses and transferring them to maximum security prisons and

Many witnesses report being


subjected to the same or similar physical and verbal abuse and detention
conditions that high interest detainees faced at MDC Brooklyn, documented by the
holding them in solitary confinement with the lights on 24 hours a day.

Inspector General of the Justice Department.19 During interrogations of material witnesses, FBI agents and U.S.
attorneys made direct and veiled threats to material witnesses and their families. In a number of cases, the Justice
Department made clear that it arrested individuals as witness to his own criminal proceeding, often initiating a
criminal proceeding only after arresting the witness, submitting evidence replete with admissions that the witness

was a major suspect in a terrorismrelated crime, and telling witnesses that they faced long jail sentences or capital

the Justice Department roadblocked witnesses efforts


for release by seeking continuances to delay witnesses testimony when
they were prepared to testify and refusing to grant witnesses immunity in
exchange for their testimony. Almost half of the material witness detained
in counterterrorism investigations since September 11 did not testify in
any criminal proceeding. This pattern, however, also reflects the costs of the governments end-run
punishment. In other cases,

around the constitutional requirement of proving that there is probable cause to detain a suspect; in many cases,
the government used flawed and unsubstantiated evidence to hold material witnesses who had no information
about any crime. Government officials have issued statements acknowledging or apologizing for the
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES REPORT 4 wrongful detention of at least 11 material witnesses, most of whom
spent weeks in detention, often in solitary confinement, and Congress, federal courts and the Department of
Justices internal review agencies has initiated investigations into flawed or prolonged material witness arrests.20

The May 2004 arrest of Oregon attorney and Islam-convert Brandon


Mayfield as a material witness to a grand jury investigation into the March
11 Madrid bombing illustrates the governments pattern of using the
material witness law to hold suspects. In sealed proceedings, the FBI obtained a
warrant to arrest Mr. Mayfield, a U.S. citizen and a father of three, on the
basis of proof suggesting that Mr. Mayfield was involved with the bombing

that it had made a 100 % positive identification of Mr. Mayfields fingerprint with a print found on a bag of
detonators found near the Madrid bombing.21 The FBI further informed the court that it believed that Mr. Mayfield
was in Spain even though he did not have a valid passport or records indicating he had left the country in ten years;

the government argued that Mr. Mayfield was a flight risk because his
fingerprint was found in Spain, making it likely that he traveled under a
false or fictitious name, with false or fictitious documents .22 In justifying the
arrest of Mr. Mayfield, it did not connect him with anyone who was under
investigation for the bombing and had not yet convened a grand jury investigation. To the
contrary, the Justice Department identified Mr. Mayfield in court filings as a potential target.23 Based on this

armed FBI agents arrested Mr. Mayfield as a material witness at his


law office and jailed him in solitary confinement, restricting contact with
his family. The FBI searched his law offices, his home and seized his legal files. During his detention, U.S.
evidence,

attorneys suggested that he could face capital punishment if criminally charged and refused to grant him immunity

After detaining Mr. Mayfield for three weeks in jail and


under house arrest, on May 24, 2004 the Justice Department moved to
dismiss him as a material witness when Spanish authorities apprehended
an Algerian man who had a real match to the Madrid print . The FBI
subsequently admitted that it mismatched Mr. Mayfields print and issued an apolog[y] to Mr.
Mayfield and his family for the hardships that this matter has caused .24 The
in exchange for his testimony.

Department of Justices Office of Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility is currently
investigating the conduct of the U.S. Attorneys and the FBI in this case.

Impacts Islamophobia Blowback


Islamophobia in the U.S. creates blowback from other
countries through their dehumanizing treatment of Muslims.
Muqawama 13.

Abu, June 17, writer for Center for a New American Security, Center for a New
American Society, Some Thoughts on Blowback, http://www.cnas.org/blog/somethoughts-on-blowback-6025#.VZr3axNViko)
This leads into a larger problem, which is with the concept of blowback
itself. Chalmers Johnson, who popularized the term, described blowback, in its usage of CIA analysis of the
coup against Mossadegh, as "a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the
US government's international activities that have been kept secret from
the American people." Of course, now blowback encompasses overt military operations as well as
covert machinations, and now not simply to the actions of say, the aggrieved victims of a war, but sympathizers
mobilized by it indirectly - to the point where a Christian of Nigerian descent, born and raised in London, could

The aggressor
does something wrong, like invade Iraq or harass Muslims, and collects
the bloody wages of its work. Of course, this is essentially a justification. So instead, it seems
qualify as blowback. Blowback makes sense to many as an implicit moral narrative.

appealing to paint such events as the obvious and inevitable consequence of adopting such policies. One of the
Woolwich killers argued, "The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by
British soldiers." Yet privileging the public justification of an act as its explanation requires too much credulity and

It is entirely possible to make blowback arguments in a


rigorous fashion, but establishing motivation, let alone actual causality,
is very difficult, particularly when you are trying to extrapolate from
what is very often the equivalent of a suicide note . Just as an explanation is not
inherently a justification, a stated justification is not inherently an explanation. Simply because
somebody says that "multiculturalism/Iraq/Islamic terrorism/the Zionist conspiracy made me
decide to kill people" does not inherently tell us that whatever policy they are
upset about exerted some kind of gravitational pull on their agency . More
too little reflection.

than an accurate self-assessment of the forces of history upon our psyches, these kinds of justifications are
narrative elements in how a person presents themselves to the world. People tell narratives to and about
themselves because that renders our lives and the worlds comprehensible and meaningful, especially when
they're about to undertake an action that will alienate them from wider society and possibly result in their own
death. But from a social science perspectives, we know the stories that people tell too and about themselves
don't necessarily reflect the underlying causal forces. The stuff that makes for good last words can help inform us
about somebody's ideology and beliefs, but to give credence to their grievances simply because of what they said
just grants them that their ideology and beliefs accurately reflect how the world works. This is not to say that
understanding the political grievances of terrorists isn't important, and Freedland likely goes too far in saying we

just as it is erroneous to pretend that


violent domestic backlash is some immutable law of policy to which our
polities must remain in thrall, so too is to approach violence as some
meaningless product of historical entropy. In reality these are human choices. It is folly to
should not ever try to understand motive. After all,

simplistically invoke the boogeyman of blowback when the vast majority of even radical objectors to government
policies do not decide to hack people to death or gun down children at a youth camp. Yet it is also dangerous to
be so dismiss the actions we often label blowback, even if we wish to delegate it as a problem to be managed
rather than almost superstitiously avoided. Understanding the moral justifications and narratives invoked in
blowback arguments matter, just as studying any aspect of ideology would. We have to resist the temptation,
however, of cherry-picking which parts of grievances we wish to use (the notion that blowback, radicalization, and
the operationalization of preexisting grievances are not mutually exclusive). The problem is, blowback emerged
as a description after the fact, and made its way into policy arguments as more of a moral piety than as a

Blowback now basically describes the malign


consequences, overt or covert, of U.S. foreign policy, and in the sense
described above, its violent ones. Unfortunately, while illustrating history as Hosea 8:7 is useful
concept with strong empirical content.

rhetorically, understanding the mechanisms of blowback beyond the morally intuitive narrative is more difficult.
Some enterprising scholars have made attempts to understand the mechanisms by which violence provokes

counterproductive effects. As Jason Lyall pointed out in his unsettling study of Russian shelling of Chechen

even indiscriminate violence can result in suppression of


violence from insurgent groups, with weak or negative correlations with
casualties and property damage. There are naturally other examples. Despite a massive global
populations,

Tamil diaspora and a long history of conflict, the massive, bloody Sri Lankan assault on Tamil Tiger strongholds in
the 2000s saw the routine application of horrific force among and against civilian populations. However squalid a
victory it might seem, and however strong the Tamil diaspora which contributed logistically to the fight, local and
international blowback seems insignificant in comparison to the strength of Tamil militancy prior. This is not to say
Sri Lanka's victory was a flawless success for the implementing elite - but the validity of blowback as a
disincentive depends, at least, on the reaction to violence invalidating the cost of implementing it.

Impacts Islamophobia Racism


Western knowledge uses the claim of objectivity to generate
epistemic privilege that normalizes Islamophobia, which is
manifested in the Wests toxic cultural views and destructive
foreign policy
Grosfoguel, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies, and
Mielants, Assistant Professor in Sociology, 2006
(Ramn, University of California at Berkeley, Eric, College of Arts and Sciences at
Fairfield University, 9-23-2006, The Long-Dure Entanglement Between
Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal WorldSystem: An Introduction,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2/, accessed 7/5/2015 JCP
PB @ GDI)
The myth about Western males capacity to produce a knowledge that is
universal beyond time and space was fundamental to imperial/global
designs. The Cartesian egopolitics of knowledge inaugurated what Colombian philosopher Santiago CastroGomez called the point zero perspective. The point zero perspective is the Western myth of a point of view that

Western men to claim their


knowledge to be universal, neutral, value-free and objective. Contemporary
authors like Samuel Huntington (1996) reproduce a combination of old Occidentalism with Orientalism. The
superiority of the West is taken for granted and the epistemic privilege of
Western identity politics from which to produce judgments of the Other
and global/imperial designs around the world is an unquestioned
presupposition. Moreover, in a male dominated academic culture such as Harvard, a scholar and national
assumes itself to be beyond a point of view. This myth allowed

defense apologist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to internal
American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to
challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ultimately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).

It is from Western hegemonic


identity politics and epistemic privilege that the rest of the
epistemologies and cosmologies in the world are subalternized as myth,
religion and folklore, and that the downgrading of any form of nonWestern knowledge occurs. The former leads to epistemic racism, that is, the inferiorization and
subalternization of non-Western knowledge, while the latter leads to Orientalism. It is also from this
hegemonic epistemic location that Western thinkers produce Orientalism
about Islam. The subalternization and inferiorization of Islam were not
merely a downgrading of Islam as spirituality, but also as an epistemology.
Islamic critical thinkers are considered inferior to the Western/Christian
thinkers. The superiority of Western epistemology allows the West to
construct with authority the Islamic Other as an inferior people or
culture frozen in time, and leads Western scholars to write entire books
about what went wrong with Islam (e.g. Lewis 2002), as if problems in the Middle East or poverty
What is the relevance of this epistemic discussion to Islamophobia?

in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their
region, effectively turning the Islamic World into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the

Islamophobia as a form of racism is not


exclusively a social phenomenon but also an epistemic question. Epistemic
Orientalization of Islam. This is crucial because

racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western

The thinking coming from non-Western locations is not


considered worthy of attention except to represent it as uncivilized,
primitive, barbarian, and backward. Epistemic racism allows the West to unilaterally
global/imperial designs.

decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue.

Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only


manifested in the labor market, education, public sphere, global war
against terrorism, or the global economy, but also in the epistemological
battleground about the definition of the priorities of the world today.
Recent events such as the September 11 attacks on American soil, the riots in Parisian
banlieues, anti-immigrant xenophobia, the demonstrations against Danish cartoons of the Prophet,
the bombing of London metro stations, the triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian elections, the resistance of

and the
nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic
language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some exceptions
such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if
not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.
Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to
legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics
and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim
people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their
Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the
Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11),

inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the
Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.

Epistemic Islamophobia results in racist policies and incorrect


cultural assumptions about Muslims because it informs the
Wests world view
Grosfoguel, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies, 2010

(Ramn, University of California at Berkeley, 1 January 2010, Epistemic


Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol8/iss2/5/, Human Architecture:
Journal of the Sociology of Self Knowledge, Volume 8, Issue 2 Islam: From Phobia to
Understanding, article 5, accessed 7/5/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
The importance of this discussion about epistemic Islamophobia is that
the latter is manifested in contemporary debates and public policy. The
epistemic racism and its derivative Eurocentric fundamentalism in social theory are manifested in discussions about

Non-Western epistemologies that define human


rights and human dignity in different terms than the West are considered
inferior to Western hegemonic definitions and, thus, excluded from the
global conversation about these questions. If Islamic philosophy and
thought are portrayed as inferior to the West by Eurocentric thinkers and
classical social theory, then the logical consequence is that they have
nothing to contribute to the question of democracy and human rights and
should be not only excluded from the global conversation, but repressed.
human rights and democracy today.

The underlying Western-centric view is that Muslims can be part of the discussion as long as they stop thinking as

Any Muslim
that attempts to think these questions from within the Islamic tradition is
immediately suspicious of fundamentalism. Islam and democracy or Islam and Human
Rights are considered in the hegemonic Eurocentric common sense an oxymoron. The incompatibility
between Islam and democracy has as its foundation the epistemic
inferiorization of the Muslim world views. Today an artillery of epistemic
racist experts in the West talks with authority about Islam, with no
serious knowledge of the Islamic tradition. The stereotypes and lies repeated over and over
Muslims and take the hegemonic Eurocentric liberal definition of democracy and human rights.

again in Western press and magazines ends up, like in Goebbels Nazi theory of propaganda, being believed as

A corps of experts on the Islamic world


has grown to prominence, and during a crisis they are brought out to
pontificate on formulaic ideas about Islam on news programs or talk
shows. There also seems to have been a strange revival of canonical,
though previously discredited, Orientalist ideas about Muslim, generally
nonwhite, peopleideas which have achieved a startling prominence at a
time when racial or religious misrepresentations of every other cultural
group are no longer circulated with such impunity. Malicious
generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of
denigration of foreign culture in the West; what is said about Muslim mind, or character, or
truth. As Edward Said said not too long time ago:

religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or
Asians. My contention is that most of this is unacceptable generalization of the most irresponsible sort, and

What we expect
from the serious study of Western societies, with its complex theories,
enormously variegated analyses of social structures, histories, cultural
formations, and sophisticated languages of investigation, we should also
expect from the study and discussion of Islamic societies in the West. (Said
1998: xixvi) The circulation of these stereotypes contributes to the portrayal of
Muslims as racially inferior, violent creaturesthus, its easy association
with terrorism and representation as terrorist.
could never be used for any other religious, cultural, or demographic group on earth.

Impacts Islamophobia Serial Policy Failure


European colonialism and modern day American Imperialism
are the current proximate cause of Islamic extremism because
they are rooted in an Islamophobia epistemology that cause
military interventions
Reifer, Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2006

(Thomas Ehrlich, Affiliated Faculty in the Ethnic Studies programme at the University
of San Diego, 9-23-2006, Militarization, Globalization, and Islamist Social
Movements: How Todays Ideology of Islamophobia Fuels Militant Islam,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/5/, Human Architecture:
Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 5, accessed
7/6/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
In responding to September 11, 2001, Westerners and policy makers, influenced above all by the work of Bernard
Lewis (2003)awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President George Bush for his role as an intellectual
architect of the invasion and occupation of Iraqhave focused, on What Went Wrong? in the Islamic world.

Instead of looking at the impact of colonization in the subordination of


much of the Muslim world in the global system, Lewis instead paints a
picture of a modernist West, spreading the benefits of modernity through
colonialism, democracy and development, and a stagnant East, once a
great center of civilization but now unable to realize the benefits of
modernity due to internal stagnation. Subsequently, of course, this
discourse on bringing democracy to the Middle East was used to provide
retrospective justification for the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, after the failure to
find any weapons of mass destruction or links with Al Qaeda. Indeed, President Bush, in his second inaugural
address of 2005, promised to ally with democratic reform movements across the world, arguing that an
undemocratic Middle East and Islamic world more generally was a National Security threat to the U.S. and larger

the U.S. not


only continues to ally with brutally repressive states in the Middle East
and across the globe but is also increasingly violating fundamental human
rights more directly, notably in its widespread imprisonment and torture
of Muslims, in violation of domestic and international law and treaties (New York Times, 2007a; Reifer, 2007a).
Moreover, a quick investigation of the underlying causes of Islamist militancy
shows that it is U.S.-led processes of neoliberal militarization and
globalization that are among the prime causes of the contemporary
Islamist resurgence (see Lubeck & Reifer, 2004; Walton & Seddon, 1994; and Reifer, 2006d). And, of
course, the failure of development across the Islamic world , from the Middle East to
Africa and Asia, are rooted in the legacy of Western colonialism and related
processes of underdevelopment and intervention, including after formal
independence. These processes, of course, go back to the very beginnings of the modern worldsystem (see
Reifer, 2006, a, b, c). Yet by positing Islam as the obstacle to progress, now
replacing traditionalism and communism in the modernization paradigm,
the newly invigorated discourse of Islamophobia has provided the
structural opportunity for an increasingly militarized and aggressive
Western foreign policy, culminating in the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq and the U.S. supported
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 (see Gerges, 2006: 4-5).6 These policies, combined with the
ongoing support for the political repression and exclusion of Islamists,
have largely backfired, providing as it does an important basis for
grievances which Islamist social movements can mobilize against (see Hafez,
global community. This promissory note, to ally with freedom, remains of course unfulfilled, as

2003). Indeed, as Ken Silverstein (2007) has pointed out, if democracy actually spread throughout the Islamic world,

Islamiststhanks in part to U.S. policies that have increased support for these groups, including by refusing to
engage with themwould control substantial blocs if not majorities of the electorate in nearly every Muslim
majority state in the Middle East.

American militarism and imperialism is the root cause of


Reifer, Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2006
(Thomas Ehrlich, Affiliated Faculty in the Ethnic Studies programme at the University
of San Diego, 9-23-2006, Militarization, Globalization, and Islamist Social
Movements: How Todays Ideology of Islamophobia Fuels Militant Islam,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/5/, Human Architecture:
Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 5, accessed
7/6/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, as mentioned above, gave Al Qaeda and
Muslim radicalism a new lease on life, helping to recruit an entirely new
generation of terrorists, many of them becoming involved in the jihad for the first time (see Chomsky,
2006b: 18-24). The war also allowed Al Qaeda to develop roots in Iraq for the first time, notably in al-Anbar
province, where they are now the dominant force, making it possible for Al Qaeda to claim that they are the
vanguard of the resistance to the U.S. invaders (see U.S. Marines, 2006; Washington Post, 2006b). That being said,

Iraqis as a whole have a strongly unfavorable view of Al Qaeda (WPO, 2006d).


Yet even though polls from across the Islamic world show that most Muslims reject terrorism and state they have
no confidence in Osama bin Laden, U.S. policy has dramatically increased support for
militant Islam among large sections of the Muslim world and given Al
Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups a second life (WPO, 2007b; see Gerges, 2005,
2006). And of course, negative views of the U.S. in the Muslim world and beyond
are increasing (see WPO, 2007b). The creation of terrorist networks in Iraq where none existed before now
allows the Bush administration to claim that Iraq is now the central front in the global war on terrorismalbeit a
front the U.S. of course createdand to paint the war in Iraq as being connected to the larger war against militant
Islam, true enough now that U.S. invasion and occupation has fueled the growth of Islamic militancy across the
world, including in Iraq. Indeed, Iraq is now serving to fuel the global jihad in ways similar to the role of Afghanistan

terrorist
attacks increased dramatically after the invasion of Iraq. Globally there was a
in the 1980s (see Chomsky, 2006b: 18-24). Indeed, according to a new study, The Iraq Effect,

607% rise in the average yearly incidence of attacks (28.3 attacks per year before and 199.8 after) and a 237
percent rise in the fatality rate (from 510 to 1,689 deaths per year).10 And in by far the most comprehensive study
of suicide bombing to date from 1980, Robert Pape (2006) shows that Iraq had no instances of suicide bombings
before the U.S. invasion. After the invasion, however, suicide bombings in Iraq have more than doubled each year.

over 95% of all suicide bombings in the world


since 1980 have virtually nothing to do with anyone hating our
freedoms and everything to do with the policies of the U.S. and its allies.
Moreover, Pape (2005, 2006) shows that

Suicide bombers seek to force foreign forces to withdraw from territory they consider important or their homeland,
and this includes September 11, 2001, as U.S. forces were then stationed in Saudi Arabia, home to some of Islams
most sacred sites, Mecca and Medina (see Scheuer, 2004, 2006). After the U.S. invasion of Iraq the remaining U.S.
troops in Saudi Arabia were withdrawn, but by then the U.S. invasion and occupation of oil rich Iraq had conjured a
new generation of jihadist militants into being (Chomsky, 2006b: 18-38).11 According to Pape (2005, 2006),

there is every reason to expect that the end of the U.S. occupation could
end or at least reduce the steady campaign of suicide bombing in Iraq, and
elsewhere, as has been the case in past examples where occupations generated suicide bombing, yet the Bush
administration and its allies continue to argue that we have to fight the terrorists abroad in Iraq lest they follow us

the Bush administrations illusory Islamophobic arguments


distract people from the real factors driving Islamist militancy, such as
U.S. policy and related socio-structural factors. What we are seeing here are nationalist
home.12 Of course,

movements, many of them in pan-Islamic and pan-Arab guises, fighting national liberation wars so as to compel the
U.S. and allied troops to withdraw from Muslim territory and to stop propping up repressive regimes (Pape, 2006). In
this instance, though, the territory occupied is often more broadly defined as Muslim lands as a whole rather than
individual Muslim majority states. The Bush administrations actions towards the Muslim world, notably its invasion
and occupation of Iraq and support for Israel, have undoubtedly contributed to converting national liberation
movements into more pan-Islamic ethno-religious transnational social movements against Western imperialism and
its local manifestations (see Caryl, 2005; see Khosrokhavar, 2005).

The U.S. invasion of Iraq and

the torture revealed at Abu Ghraib and thereafter, scandals that flowed
from decision-making at the highest levels of the U.S. government, was a
godsend here for Osama bin Laden and militant Islam as a whole in terms
of their ability to recruit new members (see Reifer, 2007a; see also Gerges, 2006: 57-58).13
As shown in Papes detailed study, the most comprehensive of its kind, the primary dimension of suicide bombing
campaigns is nationalist resistance against foreign occupation. Religious difference between the occupied and
occupier is secondary to the occupation itself, though still critically important in generating suicide bombing

Mobilization then, against the presence of foreign troops and the


propping up of U.S. client regimes, as in Saudi Arabia, or today in Iraq, is
based on opposition to what Al Qaeda calls real or veiled colonialism, or
what Anibal Quijano and Walter Mignolo have called the coloniality of power, referring to the
continuing colonial-like relations even in the absence of formal colonial
rule (see also Pape, 2006: 117-119). The U.S., by attacking and invading Muslim majority countries, has here
campaigns.

been instrumental in globalizing modern jihad and adding an ever-more important transnational dimension to its

Yet these crucial findings from social science have


not worked their way into popular consciousness in the U.S., where
popular discourse continues to be dominated by Islamophobia. As Farwaz Gerges
(2006: 71- 72) notes: the demonization of Muslims, which began in the 1970s, has
reached new heights in the West. A sampling of recent book titles provides evidence enough: The
ideology of pan-Islamist rhetoric.

Age of Sacred Terror; Islam and Terrorism; The Blood of the Moon; Sword of Islam; Extreme Islam; and Religion of

These books lump Islam, Muslims, Islamists, and


jihadists together as a monolith, constituting a threat not merely to
Western nations but to Western civilization itself. Muslims have become
the New Barbarians.
Peace or Refuge for Terror?

Impacts Securitization Racism


The very foundation of America was built upon the
securitization and surveillance of racial Others by our
colonialist gaze, in attempts to either demarcate or define
them.
Kumar & Kundnani 15 (Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar "Race, Surveillance, and
Empire," respectively associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at
Rutgers University and professor at New York University, Spring 2015, Issue #96 of
International Socialist Review, http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire)

National security surveillance is as old as the bourgeois nation state ,


which from its very inception sets out to define the people associated
with a particular territory, and by extension the non-peoples, i.e.,
populations to be excluded from that territory and seen as threats to the
nation. Race, in modern times, becomes the main way that such threatsboth
internal and externalare mediated; modern mechanisms of racial oppression
and the modern state are born together. This is particularly true of settlercolonial projects, such as the United States, in which the goal was to
territorially dispossess Indigenous nations and pacify the resistance that
inevitably sprang up. In this section, we describe how the drive for territorial expansion and the
formation of the early American state depended on an effective ideological erasure of those who
peopled the land. Elaborate racial profiles, based on empirical observation

the precursor to more sophisticated surveillance mechanismswere thus


devised to justify the dispossession of native peoples and the obliteration
of those who resisted. The idea of the American nation as the land of
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants enabled and justified the colonial-settler
mission. Thus, when the US state was formed after the Revolutionary War , white supremacy
was codified in the Constitution; the logical outcome of earlier settler-colonial systems of
racial discrimination against African slaves and Indigenous populations. 6 But the leaders of the
newly formed state were not satisfied with the thirteen original colonies and set their sights on
further expansion. In 1811, John Quincy Adams gave expression to this goal in the following
5

way: The whole continent of North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be
peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political
principles, and accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs. 7 This doctrine, which
would later come to be known as manifest destiny animated the project of

establishing the American nation across the continent. European settlers


were the chosen people who would bring development through scientific
knowledge, including state-organized ethnographic knowledge of the very
people they were colonizing. John Comaroffs description of this process in southern Africa
8

serves equally to summarize the colonial states of North America: The discovery of dark, unknown
lands, which were conceptually emptied of their peoples and cultures so that their
wilderness might be brought properly to orderi.e., fixed and named and mapped
by an officializing white gaze.9 Through, for example, the Bureau of Indian

Affairs, the United States sought to develop methods of identification,


categorization, and enumeration that made the Indigenous population
visible to the surveillance gaze as racial others. Surveillance that
defined and demarcated according to officially constructed racial typologies
enabled the colonial state to sort tribes according to whether they

accepted the priorities of the settler-colonial mission (the good Indians) or


resisted it (the bad Indians).10 In turn, an idea of the US nation itself was produced
as a homeland of white, propertied men to be secured against racial
others. No wonder, then, that the founding texts of the modern state invoke the Indigenous
populations of America as bearers of the state of nature, to which the modern state is counterposed
witness Hobbess references to the the Savage people of America. 11

Despite hopes that racism is behind us, the security narratives


that are built upon the safety of the white citizen and that
criminalize racial Others are still ever present in society. This
results in the mindset that the security and surveillance state,
which uses a variety of oppressive measures to fight against
our "enemies," is necessary to protect ourselves.
Kumar & Kundnani 15 (Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar "Race, Surveillance, and
Empire," respectively associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at
Rutgers University and professor at New York University, Spring 2015, Issue #96 of
International Socialist Review, http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire)

The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was said to have ushered in a new post-racial
era, in which racial inequalities were meant to be a thing of the past. African Americans and Muslim
Americans placed their hopes in Obama, voting for him in large numbers. But in the so-called

post-racial era, the security narrative of hard-working families (coded


white) under threat from dangerous racial others has been as powerful as
ever . The unprecedented mass deportation of more than two million people
during the Obama presidency is one form taken by this post-racial
racialized securitization. Over the last two decades, the progressive
criminalization of undocumented immigrants has been achieved through
the building of a militarized wall between Mexico and the United States,
hugely expanding the US border patrol, and programs such as Secure
Communities, which enables local police departments to access
immigration databases. Secure Communities was introduced in 2008 and stepped up
under Obama. It has resulted in migrants being increasingly likely to be
profiled, arrested, and imprisoned by local police officers, before being
passed to the federal authorities for deportation. Undocumented migrants can no
longer have any contact with police officers without risking such outcomes. There is an irony in the
way that fears of illegal immigration threatening jobs and the public purse have become stand-ins for
real anxieties about the neoliberal collapse of the old social contract: the measures that such fears
lead toracialization and criminalization of migrantsthemselves serve to strengthen the neoliberal
status quo by encouraging a precarious labor market. Capital, after all, does not want to end
immigration but to profit from a vast exploitable labor pool that exists under precarious conditions,
that does not enjoy the civil, political and labor rights of citizens and that is disposable through
deportation. What brings together these different systems of racial

oppressionmass incarceration, mass surveillance, and mass deportation


is a security logic that holds the imperial state as necessary to keeping
American families (coded white) safe from threats abroad and at home.
The ideological work of the last few decades has cultivated not only racial
security fears but also an assumption that the security state is necessary
to keep us safe . In this sense, security has become the new psychological
wage to aid the reallocation of the welfare states social wage toward
homeland security and to win support for empire in the age of

neoliberalism. Through the notion of security, social and economic


anxieties generated by the unraveling of the Keynesian social compact have been
channeled toward the Black or Brown street criminal, welfare recipient, or
terrorist. In addition, as Susan Faludi has argued, since 9/11, this homeland in need of
security has been symbolized, above all, by the white domestic hearth of the
prefeminist fifties, once again threatened by mythical frontier enemies, hidden
subversives, and racial aggressors. That this idea of the homeland coincides culturally
with the denigration of capable women, the magnification of manly men, the heightened call for
domesticity, the search for and sanctification of helpless girls points to the ways it is gendered as well
as racialized.67

Impacts Epistemology Racism


Epistemic racism privileges western social theory at the
expense of non-western thought, contributing to larger
systems of racial oppression
Grosfoguel, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies, 2010
(Ramn, University of California at Berkeley, 1 January 2010, Epistemic
Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol8/iss2/5/, Human Architecture:
Journal of the Sociology of Self Knowledge, Volume 8, Issue 2 Islam: From Phobia to
Understanding, article 5, accessed 7/5/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Epistemic racism and epistemic sexism are the most hidden forms of
racism and sexism in the global system we all inhabit , the Westernized/Christianized
modern/ colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system (see Grosfoguel 2008a). Social, political, and economic
racisms and sexisms are much more visible and recognized today than epistemological racism/sexism. However,

epistemic racism is the foundational form and older version of racism in


that the inferiority of non-Western people as below the human (non-humans
or subhumans) is defined on their closeness to animality and the latter is defined on the
basis of their inferior intelligence and, thus, lack of rationality. Epistemic racism operates
through the privileging of an essentialist (identity) politics of Western
male elites, that is, the hegemonic tradition of thought of Western
philosophy and social theory that almost never includes Western Women and never includes
nonWestern philosophers/philosophies and social scientists. In this tradition, the West is
considered to be the only legitimate tradition of thought able to produce
knowledge and the only one with access to universality, rationality
and truth. Epistemic racism considers non-Western knowledge to be
inferior to Western knowledge. Since epistemic racism is entangled with epistemic sexism,
Western centric social science is a form of epistemic racism/sexism that privilege Western males knowledge as
the superior knowledge in the world today.

If we take the canon of thinkers privileged


within Western academic disciplines, we can observe that without
exception they privilege Western male thinkers and theories, above all those
of European and Euro-North-American males. This hegemonic essentialist identity
politics is so powerful and so normalizedthrough the discourse of
objectivity and neutrality of the Cartesian ego-politics of knowledge in the social sciences
that it hides who speaks and from which power location they speak from,
such that when we think of identity politics we immediately assume, as
if by common sense, that we are talking about racialized minorities . In fact,
without denying the existence of essentialist identity politics among racialized minorities, the hegemonic
identity politicsthat of Eurocentric male discourseuses this identitarian,
racist, sexist discourse to discard all critical interventions rooted in
epistemologies and cosmologies coming from oppressed groups and nonWestern traditions of thought (Maldonado-Torres 2008). The underlying myth of
the Westernized academy is still the scientificist discourse of objectivity
and neutrality which hides the locus of enunciation of the speaker , that
is, who speaks and from what epistemic body-politics of knowledge and
geopolitics of knowledge they speak from in the existing power relations
at a world-scale. Through the myth of the ego-politics of knowledge (which in reality always speaks
through a Western male body and a Eurocentric geopolitics of knowledge) critical voices coming
from individuals and groups inferiorized and subalternized by this hegemonic

epistemic racism and epistemic sexism

are denied and discarded as particularistic. If epistemology


has coloras African philosopher Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1997) points out so well and has gender/coloras
African-American Sociologist Patricia Hills Collins (1991) has arguedthen the Eurocentric epistemology that

The construction of the epistemology


of Western males as superior and the rest of the world as inferior forms
an inherent part of the epistemological racism/sexism which has prevailed
in the world-system for more than 500 years
dominates the social sciences has both color and gender.

***Solvency/Framework***

Solvency 1AC
The United States federal government should curtails its
domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and communities.
This solves Surveillance is rooted in Islamophobia and
violates the populations fundamental rights to privacy and
religion.
Kundnani, 14 (Arun Kundnani;leading commentator on racism, immigration and
multiculturalism in Britain, professor at New York University; Stop Spying On
Muslim-Americans, Providence Journal, 1 Edition; July 21, 2014 Monday)
The U.S. government has been snooping on prominent members of the
Muslim-American community, according to documents released by National
Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden and publicized in a story by Glenn
Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain of the online publication Intercept. That story
reveals that the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation covertly
monitored the emails of five Mus-lim-Americans who have "all led highly
public, outwardly exemplary lives," the article said. Among the five is Faisal
Gill, who served in President George W. Bush's Department of Homeland
Security and is a longtime Republican Party activist. "I've done everything in
my life to be patriotic," Gill told the Intercept. "I served in the Navy, served in the
government, was active in my community. I've done everything that a good citizen,
in my opinion, should do." Another victim of this snooping is Nihad Awad, who
heads up the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the largest Muslim
civil rights organization in the United States. The three others are: Asim
Ghafoor, whom the article identifies as "a prominent attorney who has
represented clients in terrorism-related cases;" Hooshang Amirahmadi,
"an Iranian-American professor of international relations at Rutgers
University;" and Agha Saeed, "a former political science professor at
California State University, who champions Mus-lim civil liberties and
Palestinian rights." It appears that the government spied on these five not on
the basis of reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal or terrorist
activity but simply because of the expression of legitimate religious or
political opinions that the government considers unacceptable . The
Intercept article revealed what it called " blatant prejudice against MuslimAmericans ." And it showed good proof: One NSA document instructed staff on
how to draw up a target list for surveillance. In place of the target's real name,
the memo used the following fake name: " Mohammed Raghead ." These
documents suggest that the government is viewing all Muslims - be they Arab,
Asian or African-American - as suspect because of their membership in a
religious community. And when their Islamic belief is combined with political
opinions critical of U.S. foreign policy, they become even more suspicious - to the
point of being treated as possible terrorists. This violates the First Amendment
of the Constitution, which prevents discrimination on the basis of one's
religious or political opinions. It is also a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, which protects us from unlawful searches. The spying on


Muslim-Americans is all too reminiscent of the FBI's COINTELPRO and the
NSA's Project Minaret decades ago, which spied on people like Joan Baez, Jane
Fonda and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. We have to strongly reject the
surveillance of Muslim-Americans and recognize that an attack on the
rights of one group of people inevitably fans out to others. As the U.S.
labor movement once put it - an injury to one is an injury to all.

Ending domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and


communities dismantles the legal mechanisms of racial
profiling, infiltration, and subversion that perpetuate
Islamophobia
Shamas, 13 (Diala; attorney at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of
Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board of a prominent Arab-American

It has sent undercover officers into Muslim students


organizations. It created a unitformerly dubbed the Demographics Unitthat deploys officers into coffee
shops to pretend to be patrons, order their favorite dishes and listen in on coffee-house banter. It has placed
video cameras outside mosques to monitor congregants. It has even
organization.

designated entire mosques as terrorism enterprises in an attempt to


give itself legal cover to conduct multi-year investigations into mosques
religious leaders, congregants and basic daily activities. Since 2001, the
NYPD has mapped Muslim communities and their religious, educational
and social institutions and businesses in New York City and beyond. It has
riddled communities with undercover officers and informants. And it has done so
unapologetically. Contrary to popular perception, however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD
is following in the footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both
agencies claim their intelligence gathering activities are governed by
rules; the difference is that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with
regards to the validityor relevanceof its justifications, the FBIs own
surveillance policies have been accorded far more deference . As an attorney
working with New Yorks Muslim communities at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility
(CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along with student attorneys and colleagues, I have engaged in various
efforts to hold the NYPD accountable for its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we
represent Muslim individuals and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPDs surveillance program. But

the NYPDs tactics are not exceptional.


Aggressively intrusive and harmful intelligence gathering on Muslims
daily lives is a national epidemicand the chief culprit is the FBI. The task of
holding the NYPD accountable must not supersede the equally, if not more important, task of holding the
FBIand the broader law enforcement communityto account for their
CLEAR clients experiences also show us that

own misguided post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer
Prize for their investigative series based on a trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then
become a book, the recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin Ladens Final
Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many activists, paint a picture of a rogue police
department with Ray Kelly at the helm, and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder.

The NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power struggles among people who
need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of
domestic counterterrorism policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have contributed to a perception that the
federal agencys intelligence gathering is somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These
reactions mask the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have joined forces with
other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and
showing continuity in profiling policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that prohibits racial profilingeven
overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both. Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has
supported a future inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance practices. The
NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices in three different
federal lawsuits. This election season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by

the majority of our clients at CLEAR


are victims of aggressive intelligence gathering by the FBI , not the NYPD. Of the
decrying suspicionless surveillance. ADVERTISEMENT Yet

more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe have served, most have been targeted for what are often
misleadingly termed voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing

FBI interrogations are as terrifying as they are clumsy:


What Islamic lecturers do you follow? Would you travel to Bangladesh

expeditions. These

unaccompanied by a male relative? (this one directed at a young, devout


woman) What do you think of the Arab Spring? Do you hate Israel?
How often do you call your mother in Yemen? On a daily basis, our
clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and
protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their
homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside
their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary.
FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an
attorney present that they can do this the easy way or the hard way. One

client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI headquarters and let them
strap him to what they claimed was a polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions,
accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an informant. While the precise
number of these interviews is not available, our experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members

we often ask for a show of


hands in the room of people who have themselves been, or know others
who have been, interrogated by law enforcement. In many mosques, every
hand will go up. The interrogations have a devastating chilling effect on communities. Being
pressed about their religious and political affiliations or their community
activities inevitably makes our clients hesitate before being active in their
mosque or community. After a visit by the FBI, one 20-year-old client scrubbed his Facebook account,
facilitate Know-Your-Rights workshops at mosques in New York City,

un-joining groups and deleting the news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It
did not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is approached for questioning, he
the majority are young Muslim menis perceived by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom
people want to keep their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI agents cars
because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose their families, but also did not want their
neighbors to see them. Ive had conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class workload against their

the balancing involved exposure to further FBI


questioning if they were to become more active Muslims, and whether their past
extracurricular commitments,

experience being questioned by the FBI would be bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join.
And the FBI doesnt just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD,

the FBI sends informants

into Muslim communities . The agency maintains over 15,000 informants,


and tens of thousands more unofficial ones. Expanding its roster of Muslim
informants is a law enforcement priority. A presidential order from 2004 called for a broad
expansion of the FBIs informant program; in 2007 an FBI official boasted of the intelligence gathering derived from

its Confidential Human Source Program. The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for

the tragic fallout of this


aggressive drive has been well documented, as informants prey on the
vulnerable and sow fear and distrust in communities. But the FBI isnt going rogue,
a program to track and manage the growing number of informants. By now,

either. Like the NYPD, the agency shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it operates. But an examination
of these rules shows that they are woefully permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG),

based on
2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an assessmentthe lowest
level of investigationwithout needing any approval, or showing any
factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put, suspicion of criminal or
terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate individuals or send
informants into mosques, neighborhoods or organizations. The DIOG also
which governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended. Today,

prescribes domain management assessments to collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows
FBI agents to consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular
criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much

FBI is operating on the same faulty and


dangerous assumptions that guide the NYPD: that the religious practices
of what the NYPD is doing. In using these tactics, the

of millions of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity .

In 2007,

the NYPD laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal implications to commonplace

The FBI has propagated the same logic in its training


materials for years. Both agencies consider wearing religious attire and
religious practices.

growing facial hair to be indicators of a potential terrorist . Both agencies make it


their business to intrude on sacredand First Amendmentprotectedspaces. Neither has shown that this is a
strategy that makes us any safer.

The law is key to combat Islamophobia on both a legislative


and discoursive front we should use political coalitions to
engage in incremental reforms that dismantle Islamophobia
Yazdiha 13 (Haj Yazdiha, PhD in Sociology at the University of North Carolina,

"Law as Movement Strategy: How the Islamophobia Movement Institutionalizes Fear


Through Legislation," Social Movement Studies
First, the successful use of law as strategy brings Islamophobia into an elite
political sphere. Any movement to successfully counter Islamophobias
legislative efforts must

also

gain access to the political arena and the

support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
attempted counter- movements. How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.

A shift in cultural consciousness and discourse is as much a goal of

the Islamophobia movement as is its legislative gains . Furthermore, these broader


cultural successes create further discursive opportunities on which

movements can build and through which related movements can be


framed.

Solvency Legalism - Islamophobia


The law is key to combat Islamophobia on both a legislative
and discoursive front we should use political coalitions to
engage in incremental reforms that dismantle Islamophobia
Yazdiha 13 (Haj Yazdiha, PhD in Sociology at the University of North Carolina,
"Law as Movement Strategy: How the Islamophobia Movement Institutionalizes Fear
Through Legislation," Social Movement Studies
First, the successful use of law as strategy brings Islamophobia into an elite
political sphere. Any movement to successfully counter Islamophobias
legislative efforts must

also

gain access to the political arena and the

support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
attempted counter- movements.

donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.

A shift in cultural consciousness and discourse is as much a goal of

the Islamophobia movement as is its legislative gains . Furthermore, these broader


cultural successes create further discursive opportunities on which
movements can build and through which related movements can be
framed.

Religious law can never be neutral under the backdrop of an


Islamophobic epistemology - it will always be slanted against
Muslims out of fear of radicalization and terrorism
Ghachem, Associate Professor of History, 2013

(Malick W., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE


FINANCIAL WAR ON TERROR, First Amendment Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, Fall
2013, LexisNexis Academic, accessed 7/10/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Plug in the government on one side and any religious party (Quaker, Catholic,
Buddhist, Jewish, etc.) on the other, and a "neutral" theory of religious liberty
should generate a correct result that applies across the board,
independent of culture, politics, and history. Thus, we have theories of "equal liberty" and
"equal liberty of conscience," prescriptions of "no money and no coercion," statements of "substantive neutrality"
(itself defined in opposition to "formal neutrality"), "church autonomy," and now "freedom of the church" - to take a
few of the more notable recent examples. n1 The impulse to justify or critique one or another form of [*142]
religious freedom in abstract terms seems a necessary and unceasing part of the law and religion enterprise,
notwithstanding legal-historical accounts of religious liberty that make clear no single theory of church-state law

The
case law, meanwhile, follows a judicial variation on this theme: identify
the governing legal standard, be it constitutional or statutory, boil down
the messy religious and other particulars of the case to the dispositive
legal issue, and then derive a neutral result in terms that can be justified
can account for the tremendous pluralism and dynamism of American religious conflict and collaboration. n2

on general grounds. This tendency is understandable, even commendable.


Casuistry in the area of church and state, as in any area of law, can be a bad thing.
n3 Most of us believe that like cases should be treated alike, and that, in
principle, no area of law is incapable of being analyzed with such
evenhandedness. The study of religious liberty in the era of the "war on
[*143] terror," n4 however, inevitably entails a disproportionate emphasis on
the legal condition of one particular American religious community:
Muslim Americans. And the generalizing scholarship just described does not like to focus on specific
religious communities, for such a focus seems to exude an air of casuistry and identity politics that is incapable of
making any genuine "theoretical" contributions to the law of religious liberty. There is some validity to that concern,

it participates in a catch-22 situation: because the law of


religious liberty is itself conceived of in general, theoretical terms, any
analysis of that law that fails to match its generality and neutrality
inevitably falls short of the desired mark. One result is that we have very
little understanding of what has happened to the law of religious liberty in
the context of the war on terror, despite concerns that Muslim Americans
have increasingly faced profiling, political and social marginalization , and
worse in the years since 9/11. n5 The leading scholarly hypothesis infers that federal
judges [*144] have internalized popular fears of Muslim America as a source
of danger to national security. n6 While we cannot exclude this possibility,
as an account of legal doctrine it is, at best, incomplete. The problem with this
answer is not simply that it assumes facts not in evidence. The hypothesis also reflects an
too. But finally

overbroad framing of the question it purports to answer. A litigant can assert many different kinds of religious
liberty claims in an American court, and Muslim Americans have appealed to every available category in recent

in the period from 1996 to 2005, Muslim Americans, who by


most accounts make up somewhere between one and two percent of the
population, had a hand in about fifteen percent of the religious liberty
claims brought in federal courts. n8 Therefore, the question cannot be why
Muslim Americans, against a backdrop of real and feared marginalization
and persecution, have not embraced the protections of the American free
exercise tradition more vigorously, as one prominent scholar of law and
religion has framed the issue in passing. n9 Nor would it be possible to measure the strength
years. n7 Indeed,

of a [*145] specifically Muslim-American legal activism, whether in religious liberty or other terms. During the
Second World War, when persons of Japanese descent were detained in internment camps on the American and
Canadian west coasts, "the actions of both white and Japanese advocates fused in litigation that was appealed to
the highest courts." n10 A similar merger of civil libertarian and community-level institutional activism has
characterized the post-9/11 period. n11

The state is able to reduce discrimination towards Muslims by


taking policy steps to make their laws less discriminatory
Amnesty International, 2012

(Choice and Prejudice: Discrimination Against Muslims in Europe,


https://www.aivl.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/Rapportchoiceandprejudice.pdf,
accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
States have an obligation to take measures to prevent discrimination, not
only by their own officials but also by private individuals or other nonstate actors To achieve this aim, laws should prohibit discrimination on grounds
of religion or belief, and on any other grounds such as ethnicity and
gender, in all areas of life including employment . Such legislation should be effectively
applied in the private sector. Amnesty International maintains that differences of treatment implemented by
private, and in some cases public, employers against Muslims wearing religious and cultural symbols and dress with
the purpose of promoting a specific corporate image, pleasing clients, or enforcing a concept of neutrality, amount
to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Therefore,

states and European institutions

should ensure that laws combating discrimination in employment are


effectively implemented in a way which is consistent with human rights
standards. States should avoid introducing general bans on cultural and
religious symbols or dress which apply to pupils and students . Although pupils
rights to freedom of expression and religion or belief may sometimes be restricted by individual schools to achieve
a legitimate aim, such as the need to promote human rights of the others, states should ensure that schools do not
implement restrictions which are not necessary or proportionate to the sought aim . When a restriction on religious
or cultural symbols or dress is applied to pupils, it is up to the restricting authority to prove it is in line with
international human rights standards and it does not result in the violation of the best interest of the child.

Amnesty International is concerned about the lack of adequate places of


worship in Catalonia, which results in Muslims praying in outdoor spaces such as football courts or car parks,
and about the discriminatory provision prohibiting the building of minarets in Switzerland. States should
ensure that the right to have adequate places of worship, which is a key
component of the right to freedom of religion or belief, is fulfilled. To this end,
states should ensure that provision is made for space which can be used
for building new places of worship in the same way as they make provision
for space to establish other community facilities which the local
community needs. Local authorities should genuinely consult religious associations when developing
urban management plans, refrain from supporting campaigns against the establishment of new places of worship
and put in place effective policies aimed at resolving disputes between local residents and Muslim associations.

Public debate about restrictions on religious and cultural symbols and


dress perceived as Muslim has focused largely on the headscarf or fullface veil worn by women. Sometimes anxiety about womens status in Islam has been proposed as a

justification for such measures. States are required to bring an end to discrimination against women in the
enjoyment of their rights, which includes eradicating all forms of violence against women, irrespective of the
religion, culture, or racial and ethnic identity of the victim or perpetrator, and effective prevention consists in states

But it is stereotypical to assume that


women who wear certain forms of dress do so only under coercion. Space
offering appropriate services to women at risk.

should be made for women and girls in diverse religions and traditions to debate and inform others about the reality

They should be free to challenge religious and cultural practices


or not to, to discuss how they can be changed or maintained without
pressure or constraints imposed by the state or by any non-state actor
likely to strengthen prejudices instead of counteracting them. States should
of their lives.

adopt a more rational approach to concerns about womens equality in minority religions and cultures based on the
views and preferences of the women themselves and their experience of discrimination either by those who claim
to be in their community, or those from other parts of society.

Islamophobia is best dealt with by legal reforms


Love 12 (Erik Love, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Dickinson College, "What

To Do About Islamophobia: Why the Election Counts,"publication for Institute for


Social Policy and Understanding, the Duke Islamic Studies Center, November 2012
http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ispu_brief_islamaphobia.pdf)
Islamophobia is a problematic term that has become a popular way of
referring to bigotry, hate crimes, discrimination, policies, and practices
directed against a range of communities including Muslims. Despite the appearance of Islam
in Islamophobia, neither Islam nor Muslims are its exclusive targets, for Arabs, South Asians, and other
ethnic communitieswhether Muslim or notare also confronted with it. The consistent discrimination
and hate crimes suffered by Sikhs who are mistaken for Muslims serve as stark reminders that
religion alone cannot explain why this phenomenon persists . Islamophobia, in the form of
rhetoric and concrete policies issuing from this mistaken belief, remains one
of the most pressing issues in the 2012 elections and will remain relevant in both the 2013
and2014 off-year elections.

Islamophobia is a complexbut not an intractable

issue . While changing culture and attitudes will take time, many of this

phenomenons aspects can be effectively addressed by changes in policy.


Local and state elections enable voters to elect officials who can make such policy changes.

Solvency Patriot Act


The PATRIOT Act serves to reify Islamophobia it justifies
unreasonable surveillance against Muslim-Americans in
institutions of higher education and fuels invasion of civil
rights.
Ahmadi, 11 (Shafiqa Ahmadi, J.D.; Assistant Professor of Clinical Education at the
Rossier School of Education at the University of Southern California; The Erosion of
Civil Rights: Exploring the Effects of the Patriot Act on Muslims in American Higher
Education, Rutgers Race and the Law Review, 12 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 1, 2011)

Another provision, Section 507 of the Patriot Act, which altered The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974 (FERPA), or the Buckley Amendment, should also be reconsidered due to its effect on individual civil rights.
n136

Section 507 of the Patriot Act authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to

compel colleges and universities to turn [*28] over education records


pertaining to any person suspected of "domestic or international
terrorism." n137 Arguably sidestepping the Fourth Amendment , the
Patriot Act removes the necessity of probable cause, requiring only
specific articulated facts giving reason to believe that the education
records are likely to contain information relevant to the investigation. n138
This language is so broad that it makes it very easy for law enforcement officials to obtain education records.

n139

The loosened standard for acquiring academic records is alarming and


unnecessary . Intellectual privacy, defined as the protection of records of our intellectual activities, n140 is
essential to the ability to engage in intellectual exploration. The easy acquisition of academic records threatens a
vital piece of intellectual privacy - that intellectual exploration "be both private and confidential." n141 Law
enforcement authorities have always been able to access academic records necessary for an investigation by way

The loosened standard provided by the Patriot Act


does not improve the government's ability to access records; it simply
removes the need for the government to have a good reason for the
intrusion. Ultimately, this loosened standard seems difficult to justify as a necessary security measure, given
of subpoena or discovery orders.

n142

there are other means the government can use to obtain student academic records, provided [*29] they
demonstrate a compelling need. The American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers
(Association) in Washington, D.C. reported that immediately after 9/11, the FBI and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (the "INS") contacted educational institutions - all of which released information about foreign
students to the federal authorities. n143 An Association survey also revealed that federal authorities had contacted

The
coercive NSL requests have prompted some higher education institutions
to express apprehension about the dilution of FERPA protection. n145
However, more needs to be done to protect the privacy rights of students
and scholars/faculty who fall under the protection of FERPA. Attempting to root
203 schools and served subpoenas on twenty-two, ordering the release of student information. n144

out terrorists, Congress created a law that has quite specific and extensive implications for the quality of intellectual
and interpersonal engagement and discourse on college campuses. n146 Clearly, the intent of the Patriot Act was not
to serve as a barrier to educational pursuits and to limit academic freedom and civil rights. Yet, the Patriot Act's
consequences for American higher education and its effect upon the global community must be [*30] considered.

The comprehensive erosion of civil rights, beyond individual protection,


can be readily observed within institutions of American higher education.
America's fears, namely Islamophobia, have coalesced into measures that
appear to have a crippling effect on civil rights , and are debilitating to
academic freedom in institutions of higher education. Free speech and

association, the most important civil rights within institutions of higher


education, are more aptly considered under the concept of academic
freedom. William Tierney defines academic freedom as "pertaining to the right of faculty to enjoy considerable
autonomy in their research and teaching." n147 Academic freedom, theoretically, preserves the right for free inquiry
and free ideological exchange. This broad concept of academic freedom creates the context for faculty to freely
"pursue and disseminate knowledge [,]" n148 inherently encompassing a myriad of civil rights. American colleges and
universities pride themselves on their status as leading institutions of research, teaching, and diversity of
ideological exchange. According to a 2009 study, more than one-third of the world's top 100 universities are located
in the United States. n149 As such, many American colleges and universities rely on global and [*31] international
collaboration, with internationally recognized scholars to conduct cutting-edge research, teach across borders, and
promote international student programs that contribute significantly to the institutions' revenue, the diversity of

The Patriot Act


arguably infringes on academic freedom by constraining free speech,
ideological exchange on campus, and the development of the world's intellectual talent.

association, inquiry, and ideological exchange of those within higher


education institutions by limiting the ability of international scholars and
students to access and interact with American institutions of higher
education. For example, Dr. Adam Habib, one of the best-known political scientists and public intellectuals in
South Africa, was denied entry to the U.S. in October of 2006. n150 Dr. Habib is deputy vice chancellor of the
University of Johannesburg and Executive Director of the Democracy and Governance Programme at the Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the largest research institution in South Africa. n151 He was visiting the U.S. as
part of an official delegation from the HSRC, led by its CEO Olive Shisana, to consult with the World Bank. n152 His
wife was admitted, but officials refused to admit Dr. Habib and offered no ex-planation. n153 Dr. Habib has a tenyear visa and has visited the U.S. numerous times over the past decade. n154 Though he is a practicing Muslim, Dr.
Habib is not Arab, Pakistani, or Afghan - he is of Indian descent. n155 The ACLU is representing Dr. Habib as he [*32]
files a court action to appeal his visa denial. n156 Dr. Habib's case is one of many cases of international scholars
and students whose denial of visas and entry into the U.S. has placed a limitation on interna-tional and ideological
exchange between American and international scholars.

War on Terror hypocritical on Americas partperpetuators demonize the Middle East while
aware of American past of terrorism
Diana Ralph 6, PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate
Professor of Social Work at Carleton University, "ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WAR ON
TERROR: THE CONTINUING PRETEXT FOR U.S. IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of
9-11-2001 (Research in Political Economy, Volume 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
pp.261-298,

The 9-11 attacks were intended to shock, frighten, and outrage Americans into accepting
the myth that Muslim terrorists pose such a serious threat to their security that they
should cede virtually unlimited power and money to Bush to carry out a war on terror.
However,

terrorism has never posed a serious threat to American


people. The chance of dying of a terrorist attack in the United
States has always been virtually zero, even in 2001. (Moore,
2003, pp. 96-97). Even if the 9-11 attacks had been perpetrated
without U.S. collusion (which is highly unlikely), they did not
qualify as a threat significant enough to turn the U.S. and its allies
into security states, trampling international law and Constitutional

protections, much less as a justification for launching unprovoked


military conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq. For the victims, their
families, and their communities, the 9-11 events were a horrific
tragedy. But as shocking as they were, many 9-11 family members felt strongly that they
did not justify vengeful, military assault: Peaceful Tomorrows members have asked that
violent responses to the September 11 tragedies, such as the US bombing campaign in
Afghanistan, not be done in their names and the names of their loved ones. Members say
they were concerned about the lack of discussion about options to respond to the events of
September 11. Our

single-minded rush to war has been made


without thoughtful consideration of long-term consequences for
our safety, security, and freedom. We will use our voices to
promote a discussion about better solutions, ones based on
justice, not vengeance. (September 11 families for peaceful tomorrows, 2002).

Without in any way trivializing the 9-11 attacks, it is worth remembering that they lasted
less than two hours, and posed no threat to the U.S. economy, infrastructure, or
government. In spite of numerous false alarms, no other terrorist act has occurred in the U.S.
since 9-11. By contrast, many CIA-instigated terrorist initiatives, such as the Contra
campaign against the Sandinistas, lasted for years and had disastrous, long-term
consequences for entire nations (Chomsky, 1991, p. 4). John Stockwell, a former highranking CIA agent testified in 1987 about CIA terrorist interventions. What we're talking
about is going in [to foreign countries] and deliberately creating conditions where
government administration and programs grind to a complete halt, where the hospitals are
treating wounded people instead of sick people, where international capital is scared away
and the country goes bankrupt. (Stockwell, 1987) About 2,600 people died in the 9-11
attacks. As of February 22,. 2006, 3,146 U.S. troops and coalition members have been
killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

At least 225,412 Afghani and Iraqi people,


including 186,825 civilians have been directly killed (Unknown
News, 2005).9 That does not include the many more civilians who
are dying from lack of food, water, electricity, medicine, and
shelter. Even if 9-11 had been a real terrorist incident (as opposed to a made-in-the U.S.

fraud), normal criminal justice, international law, or diplomatic options for redress were
rejected. There was no move to consider international law, to give the Taliban any avenue of
retreating with some honour and dignity, no intention or sign of giving a measured and
reflective response to the threat of al Qaeda, nor any introspection as to the reasons behind
why these attacks occurred. (Geaves & Gabriel, 2004, p. 7). In its rush to war, Washington
briskly dismissed Taliban offers to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country and Iraqi
assurances that it was fully complying with U.N. sanctions and that it had no weapons of
mass destruction. Leaping to a military response (especially threatening global war) is an
unprecedented response to a terrorist attack like this (Pillar, 2001, pp. 29, 50-56). Prior to 11
September 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not regard transnational Islamic
terrorism as a strategic threat. In fact, in the past states have generally chosen to

downplay or minimize military response to terrorist campaigns. (Stevenson, 2004, pp. 7-8).

In his war on terror speech, Bush promised to fight until every


terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated (2001, p. 4). The phrase of global reach is the key
here, since the U.S. actually continues to condone active terrorist
groups on its soil. Anti-abortion groups like the Army of God have
been responsible for at least six murders and 15 attempted
murders, and 200 bombings and arsons (Clarkson, 2005). White
supremacist, paramilitary, and neo-fascist groups such as the
Northern Michigan Regional Militia (of which Timothy McVeigh was
a member) terrorize non-whites and Jews. And right-wing CubanAmerican groups like Alpha 66 and the Commanders of United
Revolutionary Organizations (CORU) have carried out more than
50 bombings and blown up a Cabana passenger plane in 1976,
killing all 73 people aboard (Franklin, 2001). All three types of U.S.
terrorist groups have financial and political ties to Bush. So the
United States certainly harbors terrorist groups, and Bush, himself,
has financial ties to anti-Castro Cuban terrorist groups (as well as to bin Laden) (Franklin,
2001). To be consistent with his war on terror policies, Bush should have bombed Michigan
and Florida, and turned himself in to be detained and possibly tortured as an enemy
combatant.10
As well, the United States has often directly financed, trained, and facilitated terrorists. The
Bay of Pigs fiasco against Cuba, the Contra campaign against Nicaragua, the violent
overthrow of the Allende government in Chile, and the short-lived coup against Hugo Chavez
in Venezuela are well-known examples of U.S.-backed terrorism. But there are many more.

Solvency Research/Scholarship
Our role as scholars of domestic surveillance policy should be
to produce research and arguments that deconstruct
ideological investments in the War on Terror
Elliot, professor of American literature, 2012
(Emory, UC Riverside, Terror, Theory, and the Humanities ed. Di Leo, Open
Humanities Press, http://openhumanitiespress.org/Di%20Leo%20and%20Mehan
%20-%20Terror%20Theory%20and%20the%20Humanities.pdf, accessed 7/6/2015
JCP PB @ GDI)

In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in

In a
repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society
thats filled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be
the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their
arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering
that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a
vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they
infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to.
(qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillos statement are that we are all engaged in
national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of
representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical
violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for
the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere . In the early
days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images , such as those of the
mother of all bombs and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to
influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong
support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those
days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military
agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruc- tion, scandals and
our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II:

illegalities, and domestic and international demon- strations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction

critical readers of political and


social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more
urgently than ever to analyze the relation- ships between political power
and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians
and others to further their destructive effects in the world. If humanities
scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices
such as we see in those photos achieve their affective appeal, citizens may
begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by
emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these
of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as

verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable

we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the


defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have
been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the
significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth
that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to
result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from
inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have
been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward po- larized thinking and
dis- cussion,

opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist re- ligious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world,

leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions.


Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the
problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human
issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter
the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of
the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we
have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching
and hope to influence others to question the meaning and motives of what
they see and hear.

Depictions of Islam are rooted in orientalist ideology that


falsely equates all of Islam with violent political movements
and terrorism and only committed groups of individuals can
begin to break down this mode of thinking
Arkoun, emeritus professor at La Sorbonne, 2003
(Mohammed, senior research fellow and member of the Board of Governors of the
Institute of Ismaili Studies, Rethinking Islam Today, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and
Changing Realities (Jul., 2003), pp. 18-39, JStor, accessed 6/30/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Islam holds historical significance for all of us, but at the same time, our
understanding of this phenomenon is sadly inadequate . There is a need to
encourage and initiate audacious, free, productive thinking on Islam
today. The so-called Islamic revivalism has monopolized the discourse on Islam; the social scientists,
moreover, do not pay attention to what I call the "silent Islam"-the Islam of true
believers who attach more importance to the religious relationship with
the absolute of God than to the vehement demonstrations of political
movements. I refer to the Islam of thinkers and intellectuals who are
having great difficulties inserting their critical approach into a social and
cultural space that is, at present, totally dominated by militant
ideologies. ... [T]he main intellectual endeavor represented by thinking
Islam or any religion today is to evaluate, with a new epistemological perspective,
the characteristics and intricacy of systems of knowledge -both the historical and the
mythical. I would even say that both are still interacting and interrelated in our modem thought after at least three
hundred years of rationalism and historicism. There is no need to insist on the idea that thinking Islam today is a

the ultimate goal


of the project is to develop-through the example set by Islam as a religion
and a social-historical space-a new epistemological strategy for the
comparative study of cultures. All the polemics recently directed against Orientalism show clearly
that so-called modem scholarship remains far from any epistemological project
that would free Islam from the essentialist, substantialist postulates of
classical metaphysics. Islam, in these discussions, is assumed to be a specific,
essential, unchangeable system of thought, beliefs, and non-beliefs, one
which is superior or inferior (according to Muslims or non-Muslims) to the Western (or
Christian) system. It is time to stop this irrelevant confrontation between two
dogmatic attitudes-the theological claims of believers and the ideological
postulates of positivist rationalism . The study of religions, in particular, is handicapped by the
task much more urgent and significant than all the scholastic discussions of Orientalism;

rigid definitions and methods inherited from theology and classical metaphysics. The history of religion has

religion as a universal dimension of


human existence is not approached from the relevant epistemological
perspective. This weakness in moder thought is even more clearly illustrated by the poor, conformist, and
collected facts and descriptions of various religions, but

the
enterprise of thinking Islam today can only be achieved-if ever-by dynamic
teams of thinkers, writers, artists, scholars, politicians, and economic
producers. I am aware that long and deeply rooted traditions of thinking
cannot be changed or even revised through a few essays or suggestions
made by individuals. But I believe that thoughts have their own force and
life. Some, at least, could survive and break through the wall of uncontrolled
beliefs and dominating ideologies. ... Many other problems must be raised and solved because
sometimes polemical literature on the religions of the Book, as we shall see. . . .Thus presented,

Islam has regulated every aspect of individual and collective life; but my wish here is to indicate a general direction
of thinking and the main conditions necessary to practice an itihdd [-my intellectual effort to find adequate
answers-] recognized equally by Muslims and modern scholars.

The American academys view of religion is burdened with an


implicit ideological stance due to rationalist methodology and
access to grant money
Dubois, Assistant Professor at National University of
Singapore, 2005

Thomas David, Hegemony, Imperialism, and the Construction of Religion in East


and Southeast Asia, History and Theory, Vol. 44, No. 4, Theme Issue 44: Theorizing
Empire (Dec., 2005), pp. 113-131, JStor, accessed 6/30/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Moreover, imperial power and scholarly authority being the two distinguishing
features of European exceptionalism, Said's criticisms are even more
relevant in the postcolonial order, particularly with respect to the
American academy. Along with the rise of the United States as an economic and military
superpower, the years after World War II saw the eclipse of imperial academies by the
institutions and methodologies of American social science . Despite the size
and diversity of the postwar American academy, the study of religion remains very much, as
Jonathan Z. Smith famously called it, a "product of the scholars' study," and academics still work
within clear constraints, the most fundamental of which is the need to
maintain the language of objectivity.42 For Said, such pretense not only
masks layers of political and religious ideology; when he remarks on
American social science's "singular avoidance of literature," his real
criticism is that the rationalist methodology of the social sciences
prevents them from taking culture or belief seriously .43 Like legal procedure, the
academic study of religion itself is automatically burdened with an implicit
ideological stance. Beyond the dictates of personal or professional
conscience, this stance is enforced by the ultimate arbiter: access to grant
money through the largest scholarly bodies and funding agencies. The most influential of these
bodies, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), represents the
ambivalent role of ideology in the development of American social science
as a whole. Founded as a service organization in 1923, the SSRC funded individual research on pressing social
issues until 1930, when it was decided that such a tactic was merely "a piecemeal attack on a wide range of
problems in society, but no coordinated attack at any point" and that it would be better to concentrate on a few
select themes.44 Thus began a new role for the SSRC in actively determining research initiatives through multi-year

This more activist stance has allowed the SSRC to have an


immense impact on the nature and mission of social-science research, a
role that has led critics such as the historian Harry Harootunian to characterize the
committees as the "sole custodians and vigilant guard dogs" of an
intellectual orthodoxy under the guise of free inquiry .45
research committees.

Solvency Pedagogy
Education about Islamophobia is key to prevent rampant
violence and exclusion of Muslim communities
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004
(Jasmin, Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from
the Educational Front Lines, http://i-epistemology.net/v1/attachments/847_Ajiss213%20-%20Zine%20-%20Anti%20Islamophobia%20Education.pdf, American Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3, accessed 7/1/2015 JPC PB @ GDI)
As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that

there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address


and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims
from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and
youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the
backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools
were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of crisis
management. Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance
to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia . In fact, the
discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did

While schools were reluctant to name


specific incidents as racism part of an all-too-common denial the notion of
Islamophobia did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part
of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators,
even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy. I
realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical
terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing
Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and
not even exist within the educational discourse.

pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However,

the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the


accompanying educational resources simply did not exist . Developing a new
framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: Anti-Islamophobia Education. Being able to
name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia
was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place
from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting antiIslamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of
Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist.

Ramberg, 2004
(Ingrid, 1-6 June 2004, Islamophobia and its consequences on Young People,
Seminar report for the Council of Europe,
https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Publications/Islamophobia_conseq
uences_young_people_en.pdf, accessed 7/1/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
What young people experience what they are exposed to from others, as well as their own
behaviour and attitudes matters tremendously. Like Ms Hadia Himmat said in her talk on the situation
of young women: Young Muslims, as every young person, are in the process of
building their personality and identity. They are subject to many
influences which come from outside and from different directions. What
then, if the young people she referred to are constantly exposed to
Islamophobic acts and attitudes? Hadia Himmat summarises the detrimental effects: Lack of

self-esteem, of confidence and of a sense of belonging. Furthermore: as


much as this matters on the individual level, it also helps shaping an
entire generations expectancies of life. Discrimination is not something
that people grow out of or that you easily recover from. This goes for the
victims of Islamophobia, and it is equally true for the perpetrators. The
prejudices that children are fed with during their upbringing have a very
strong tendency to remain part of their worldview as adults . There is no
guarantee, hence, that wisdom grows with age alone. Quite the contrary: once carved out, a
persons sense of normality, of what can be expected from life, can not
easily be changed. The above statement makes the role of the perpetrator
and of the prejudiced majority, all the more important . As we shall see in the
following, this was also where the emphasis of the seminar was placed.

Solvency Possible Narrative


Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004
(Jasmin, Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from
the Educational Front Lines, http://i-epistemology.net/v1/attachments/847_Ajiss213%20-%20Zine%20-%20Anti%20Islamophobia%20Education.pdf, American Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3, accessed 7/1/2015 JPC PB @ GDI)
Voices from the Aftermath of 9/11 After September 11 my teacher told
me I should change my name from Muhammed, because it was not a good
name. Other kids keep telling me to go back where I came from. When
landlords hear my Muslim name when I call for an apartment, suddenly
theres no vacancy. My Muslim clients have stopped coming to homeless
drop-in centres, and Muslim women are withdrawing from community
programs. My son said, Mom, we came from a war and now we are not
safe or wanted in this country. After September 11, we stopped being
seen as Canadian citizens and became the enemy. These statements
were collected from students, parents, and service providers in the
Greater Toronto area after the tragic events of 9/11 changed the
sociopolitical landscape for Muslims across North America. As a scholar,
researcher, educator, and activist, I gathered these testimonies during my research in schools and among Muslim
immigrants and refugees facing the continuing realities of poverty and homelessness in Canada, and who now had
to contend with the added challenge of Islamophobia.

I heard impassioned narratives that


spoke poignantly about the lived experiences of racial exclusion, religious
discrimination, and xenophobia. For racially and religiously marginalized
Muslims, being part of a common framework of citizenship and Canadianness
quickly became a fragile reality, as we were increasingly being pushed
outside the carefully guarded boundaries of nation and community. Our
bodies were positioned as alien and suspect, our national loyalties were
questioned, and we were subjected to harassment and state-sanctioned
policies of racial profiling. Across the globe, Muslims have faced individual
and systemic acts of discrimination and violence after 9/11 as a form of
retaliation for the collective guilt ascribed to followers of Islam and
anyone who resembled them. In Toronto, a city dubbed the most multicultural city in the
world, hate crimes escalated. The type of incidents reported ranged from
verbal abuse to physical threat, violence, and the destruction of property .
According to a report by the Toronto Police Services, there was a 66 percent increase in hate crimes in 2001.1 The

Hate crime incidents in Toronto included the


stabbing of a Muslim man, the beating and subsequent hospitalization of a
15-year-old boy, and drivers who attempted to run down Muslim women as
they crossed the street. Mosques, which often house Islamic schools,
received threats. Outside of Toronto, a Hindu temple was firebombed after
being mistaken for a mosque. In other examples of widespread discrimination, the Refugee
Housing Task Force in Toronto noted that numerous landlords were
refusing to rent to Muslims after 9/11.2 A recent study I conducted on homelessness among
largest increase was against Muslims.

Muslims in Toronto also revealed the lived experiences of housing discrimination based on both race and religious

Another Toronto-based study identified significant barriers to veiled


Muslim women trying to get jobs.4 Therefore, not only was the safety of
Muslims (and those mistaken as Muslims) being compromised, but so was their ability
to access such basic needs as employment, housing, and social service
support. In local schools, parents and students reported numerous
identity.3

incidents of racism, Islamophobia, and harassment. Many parents spoke of the


harassment they faced when coming to the schoolyard to pick up their children. My own son, whose
name is Usama, was routinely referred to as Bin Laden at school, and
was called a terrorist and told that his house should be blown up. In
other incidents, schoolgirls wearing hijabs had stones thrown at them as
they walked to and from school. As a result of these circumstances and
the broader related factors of globalization, trans-nationalism, and the
changing geopolitical landscape, new challenges are being posed for
education in a pluralistic society. Within the current political context of
war and the rise of military and economic imperialism, the role of critical
educators committed to antiracism, equity, and social justice becomes
increasingly salient

Solvency Education
Anti-racist education allows for the critical consciousness
necessary to pursue social justice and fight against oppression
Housee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Wolverhampton, 2012
(Shirin, Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2012, 101120, accessed
7/3/2015 JCP PB)
This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that
critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a
starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our
classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for
pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university
spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational
exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political
projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates,
such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct
classroom practices and the curriculum, because: if we are not working
for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then...educators are
inadvertently maintaining the status quo. In conclusion I argue that a classroom
where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom
where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social
justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal
awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions . I end by suggesting
that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and
September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race
Relations 2010).

The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist

challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it
might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: Education can enlighten
students and promote positive attitudes.... Education settings can be the
first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to
education that our attention should be directed. (162)

Solvency Epistemology
The aff reclaims the epistemological foundations that are the
root cause of Islamophobia by shifting the discourse of Islam
away from essentializing portrayals of Muslims as terrorists
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004

(Jasmin, Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from


the Educational Front Lines, http://i-epistemology.net/v1/attachments/847_Ajiss213%20-%20Zine%20-%20Anti%20Islamophobia%20Education.pdf, American Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3, accessed 7/1/2015 JPC PB @ GDI)
From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within
a integrative anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class,
gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one

key epistemological foundations for


anti-Islamophobia education.6 This includes the need to reclaim the stage
through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide
bombers to a platform of peace and social justice . Reclaiming the stage
requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media
discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of
abject Otherness ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a
critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and clash of
civilizations narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a
more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global
sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are
confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect of antiIslamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms
through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the
dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. Racial
profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith,
or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic
barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities.
another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some

A critical analysis of western epistemology is a necessary


prerequisite to any accurate understanding of Islam
Arkoun, emeritus professor at La Sorbonne, 2003

(Mohammed, senior research fellow and member of the Board of Governors of the
Institute of Ismaili Studies, Rethinking Islam Today, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and
Changing Realities (Jul., 2003), pp. 18-39, JStor, accessed 6/30/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
This is at the same time a methodology, an epistemology, and a theory of
history. It is certainly an operative intellectual framework used and perpetuated by generations of Muslims
since the debate on authority and power started inside the community according to patterns of thinking and
representing the world specific to the islahi movement. ... To rethink Islam one must comprehend the socio-cultural
genesis of isla-hi thinking and its impact on the historical destiny of the societies where this thinking has been or is

To assess the epistemological validity of islihi thinking, one has to


start from the radical and initial problems concerning the generative
process, the structure and the ideological use of knowledge. By this, I
mean any kind and level of knowledge produced by man living, acting, and
actually dominant.

thinking in a given social-historical situation. Radical thinking refers to the


biological, historical, linguistic, semiotic condition shared by people as
natural beings. From this perspective, the Revelation of Islam is only one attempt, among many others, to
emancipate human beings from the naturalimitations of their biological, historical, and linguistic condition. That
is why, today, "Islamicizing knowledge" must be preceded by a radical
epistemological critique of knowledge at the deepest level of its
construction as an operative system used by a group in a given socialhistorical space. We need to differentiate ideological discourses produced
by groups for assessing their own identity, power, and protection, from
ideational discourses, which are controlled along the socio-historical
process of their elaboration in terms of the new critical epistemology. ... The
difference between the new emerging rationality and all inherited rationalities-including Islamic reason-is that the
implicit postulates are made explicit and used not as undemonstrated certitudes revealed by God or formed by a
transcendental intellect, but as modest, heuristic trends for research. In this spirit, here are six fundamental
heuristic lines of thinking to recapitulate Islamic knowledge and to confront it with contemporary knowledge in the
process of elaboration.

Solvency Deconstruction
Students specifically need to develop the critical pedagogical
tools necessary to analyze the way in which hegemonic
discourses lead to Islamophobia
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004

(Jasmin, Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from


the Educational Front Lines, http://i-epistemology.net/v1/attachments/847_Ajiss213%20-%20Zine%20-%20Anti%20Islamophobia%20Education.pdf, American Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3, accessed 7/1/2015 JPC PB @ GDI)
In schools, the practice of color-coded streaming, whereby a
disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are
channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of
institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and
guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to
assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes
as the notion that Islam doesnt value education for girls or Black students wont succeed. These negative
attitudes are relayed to students through the hidden curriculum of schooling and lead to lower expectations being

Developing critical pedagogical tools to


analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of
building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward
achieving greater social justice in both schools and society. Another key
goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify
stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference
have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular
culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as
the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and
demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a
critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically
examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social
and ideological divide between us and them is important to exposing
how power operates through the politics of representation.
placed upon youth from specific communities.7

Were a key counter-measure to our culture of Islamophobia


Sayyid 14 (S. The University of Leeds, Sociology and Social Policy, Faculty

Member. A Measure of Islamophobia ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL VOLUME 2,


NO. 1 Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project, Center for Race and
Gender, University of California, Berkeley.
http://crg.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Measure-SSayyid.pdf)
I have indicated that the performance of Islamophobia is a complex multi-faceted
operation that is simply not reducible to questions of the representations or whether
images of Muslims and Islam reflect closed or open views. Islamophobia is not
just idiosyncratic eruptions reflecting social or psychological profiles of
the perpetrators, but rather its occurrence has to be seen in specific
assemblages. By identifying these assemblages it should be possible not
only to take a measure of Islamophobia, but also to take countermeasures against it. Conventional strategies for diminishing Islamophobia often
take the wellintentioned but also well-worn form in which authoritative speakers are

asked to make declarations along the lines that Islam is a religion of peace or that
Muslims are not homogenous or the majority of Muslims are moderates. While
in a moment of urgency such declarations may have some part to play, on their own
they are unlikely to counteract Islamophobia. These declarations apparently
challenge the idea that Islam is a religion of violence, or all Muslims are
extremists; but this exchange takes place in a context in which Muslims
continue to be narrated in subaltern positions, and thus, are easily
countered by assertions that Muslims are extremist or Islam is violent. The
logic of Islamophobia in its various forms is a relationship of domination.
The end of Islamophobia will come about when the hierarchy that makes it
possible dissolves. Countering Islamophobia requires the dismantling of
the assemblages that make it possible. These assemblages are specific, and
while any strategy would need to be as granular as the circumstances of the
occurrence of Islamophobia, it may be useful to suggest that the most successful
means of ending a relationship of domination is to facilitate and
empower those who are its subjects. Counter-measures against
Islamophobia have to be more than just refutation of the claims made by
Islamophobia; ultimately, they have to tell different stories not just in
words but also in deeds. These alternative stories need to abandon a
Westernizing horizon as a common destiny.
CONCLUSION In this paper I have made three main claims: (1) that ontic approaches
to Islamophobia cannot do justice to the concept, (2) that a Heideggerian
Wittgensteinian approach to Islamophobia is better than what is currently
in play, (3) that it is possible to use such an approach to open a
conversation with public policy. To describe a phenomena as Islamophobic is not
to disclose a pre-existing pattern of behavior. To name something as being
Islamophobic is a constitutive act; it enables the gathering of disparate elements
into recognizable formations of cruelty and injustice, which is the first task of
making demands for their rectification. To account for Islamophobia in a way that
can make a difference in social policy requires an understanding of it that sees it as
a definite issue, not simply as an amorphous mass of tangentially related attitudes
and beliefs. The implicit demand is that 23 Islamophobia should be
measurable in ways that produce evidence, which could be the basis of a
rational policy. The difficulty, of course, is that Islamophobia is so
contested as a concept that any evidence for its occurrence is unlikely to
be forthcoming as such. This is simply because there is little agreement on what
Islamophobia entails and therefore what evidence would support or undermine it. In
this article, I have argued that it is important to clarify the conceptual
haze surrounding Islamophobia so as to better understand what kind of
ameliorative measures can be taken. To this end, I have suggested that it
is important to understand Islamophobia as belonging to the family of
racism. I have also suggested a Heideggerian phenomenological understanding of
knowledge acquisition, which ties in with a Wittgensteinian-inspired understanding
of the language game, played around the category of Islamophobia which allows a
us to measure Islamophobia phronetically. The emergence of Islamophobia points to
two key developments: firstly, Islamophobia posits a post-racial subject that is
subjected to exclusionary practices. Secondly, Islamophobia marks the
transformation in the balance of power and anxieties generated by the de-centering
of the West. Naming something 'Islamophobia' is a way of alerting us to the

persistence of the racial in the post-racial. Much of the opposition to the deployment
of Islamophobia reminds us of the post in the post-racial.20

Solvency Genealogy
Learning about the historical basis for Islamophobia allows for
students to deconstruct the discursive practices that justify
western militarism towards Islam
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004

(Jasmin, Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from


the Educational Front Lines, http://i-epistemology.net/v1/attachments/847_Ajiss213%20-%20Zine%20-%20Anti%20Islamophobia%20Education.pdf, American Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3, accessed 7/1/2015 JPC PB @ GDI)
The historical foundations of Islamophobia are also addressed as a part of
this critical pedagogical enterprise. Islamophobia did not begin on 12
September 2001; rather, it has a long history that well predates the
current context. Tracing Islamophobias genealogy through interactive roleplay activities takes students
back to seventh-century Arabia, where members of the young Muslim community were persecuted and exiled for

students learn how Islamophobic


discourses were activated at particular historical moments: during the Crusades,
their beliefs. Through mapping the trajectory of Islamophobia,

the expulsion of the Muslim Moors in sixteenth-century Spain, and European colonization of Muslim societies.

These history lessons demonstrate how Islamophobic representations


have been constructed as ideological tools to legitimate campaigns of
political, social, economic, and military domination. Unraveling
Islamophobias historical roots is critical to deconstructing how
contemporary discursive practices sustain and legitimate the current
conditions of global militarism and imperialism.

Openness about Islams history with the US will only help


discussion acknowledgment is key
Curtis 12 (Edward E. IV. Edward E. Curtis IV is Millennium Chair of the Liberal Arts
at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. He is the editor of the
Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History. For American Muslims, Everything Did
Not Change After 9/11 http://religionandpolitics.org/2012/07/05/for-americanmuslims-everything-did-not-change-after-911/)
Everything changed after 9/11. This political mantra has become part of our
national life. It is invoked to explain war-making in foreign lands, the creation of
government departments such as Homeland Security, and the expansion of federal
surveillance powers, both at home and abroad. In the past decade, it has also drawn
special attention to the presence of Muslims in the United States. Scholars, analysts,
and policy-makers have emphasized the unique nature of the threat posed either by
or to Muslim Americans in the post-9/11 era. On the one hand, the administrations
of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama have identified the radicalization of
Muslim Americans as one of the greatest security problems faced by the United
States today. On the other hand, civil libertarians, immigration activists, and
progressives have decried the violations of Muslims civil rights in the course of
prosecuting the war on terrorism. Both of these rhetorical strategies mean to call
attention to the post-9/11 Muslim American. And yet, both rhetorics are also a form
of forgetting, a severing of Muslim Americans from their deep roots in U.S. history. A

key theme resounds in Muslim American history: the belief that Muslim American
dissent is a threat to national security. Dissent does not equal terrorism (more about
that shortly), but the fear that Muslim American dissent begets violence was a
concern long before 9/11. There are important similarities between pre-9/11 and
post-9/11 state surveillance of Muslim Americans. For much of the twentieth
century, it was not Muslim immigrants, but rather indigenous African American
Muslims who were, from the point of view of federal authorities, the public and
potentially dangerous face of American Islam. The parallels between earlier and
later periods of state surveillance are striking. We seem to be living in a new age of
consensus in which, like the late 1940s and 1950s, a vital center has identified
Islamic radicalism, and by extension Muslim American dissent, as an existential
problem, a dangerous expression of extremism. It hasnt always been this way. One
common mistake is to assume that prejudice toward Muslims is unchanging and
static. To be sure, fears of Muslim aggressors in North America are as old as the
Puritans and other Europeans who brought such phobias with them from the
Occident. And certain common features of Islamophobiaideas about Islam and
Muslims as violent, misogynistic, and backwardhave remained potent throughout
U.S. history. But our national discourse on Islam in the past two centuries has been
far more dynamic and rich than this. In the pre-Civil War period, for example, the
administration of President John Quincy Adams identified enslaved Muslim
Americans as foreigners who were friendly to American interests. His secretary of
state, Henry Clay, mistook these West Africans for Moors, or North Africans, and
argued that by freeing and repatriating them, the young nation might be able to
improve relations with the Barbary states against whom the United States fought its
first foreign war. With Clays approval, Abdul Rahman Ibrahima, an enslaved Muslim,
was feted up and down the East Coast by some of the United States most
important citizens, including David Walker, the Tappan brothers, Francis Scott Key,
and Edward Everett. The Origins of American Islamophobia So what happened? How
did domestic Muslims go from being rather friendlyif not misunderstood
foreigners to dangerous dissenters? At what point did domestic Muslims become a
major threat to the American nation-state? The origins of government-supported
Islamophobia emerged explicitly in the post-World War I period. The U.S. acted on its
fears of physical and ideological pollution through immigration laws, like the 1924
National Origins Act, as well as through the suppression of organizations like Marcus
Garveys Universal Negro Improvement Association. Fueling national suspicion of
African American Muslims was the fear that immigrants of color were bringing
political diseases like Bolshevism and anti-colonialism with them, and that such
disease would spread among black people. There was much at stake, since
enormous federal, state, and local resources were maintaining Jim Crow
segregation. Terrifying predictions of Americas people of color uniting with
colonized people abroad ensued, and the federal government put Islam among
black Americans at the front of its surveillance agenda. Nonetheless, the formation
of American Islam as a simultaneously religious and political response to colonialism
and racism only accelerated in the 1930s. In 1930, W. D. Fard, a person of color
whose background remains contested, founded the Nation of Islam (NOI). Other
black-led Sunni organizations followed suit, founding groups in Cleveland, Brooklyn,
and along the East Coast; many of them eventually convened in Philadelphia in
1943 to form the United Islamic Society of America. The FBI viewed the
transnational ties and diasporic consciousness of these black Muslim Americans as
truly dangerous. This perception only worsened when thousands of African

Americans, Muslim or not, put their hopes in the messianic prophecy that the
Empire of Japan would liberate them from the cage of American racism through a
military invasion. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, black Muslims, black Jews,
advocates of black emigration to Africa, and black advocates for pan-Asian solidarity
declared their public support for Japan, a fellow colored nation. A Japanese
national, Major Satokata Takahashi, formed a Development of Our Own group to
galvanize such feelings in Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis. Several African American
leaders appropriated Takahashis ideas. As the fear of a Japanese invasion spread in
the early 1940s, the U.S. government arrested African American leaders suspected
of stoking such feelings. Among the twenty-five leaders charged with sedition was
Elijah Muhammad, leader of the Nation of Islam. Muhammad was acquitted of the
sedition charge but was jailed for refusing to register for the military draft. Radicals
and Counter-Intelligence After World War II, federal agencies experimented with
different approaches to neutralizing the political power of African American Islam,
culminating in extensive counter-intelligence operations against the Nation of Islam
and other Muslim groups. One strategy was the denial of First Amendment
protections to Muslim prisoners. The Justice Department argued that since the NOI
was not an authentic religious movementbut rather a cult that operated as
political organizationits followers in prison did not have the right to meet or
conduct religious services.By redefining Islam as a cult the government could
avoid the messiness of legal protections for religious expression. As was often the
case, the word cult was used to label a religion that lots of people disliked or
feared. Making out the Nation of Islam to be a cult was an easy argument to make,
if not in federal court then at least in the media. The FBIs campaign against the NOI
also included commissioning and releasing to the public sociological scholarship
that depicted black Muslims as false ethnics. In the early 1960s the Bureau
commissioned a full-length monograph on the NOI; it argued that the African
American identification with Islam represented a psychologically dysfunctional
association of black Americans with a foreign culture. Mainstream media echoed
these claims, covering black Muslims as deluded fakes. Despite such disinformation,
the Nation of Islam achieved success as perhaps the most prominent black
nationalist organization in the late 1950s and early 1960s. NOI also emerged, at
least for a period, as the preeminent challenge to the liberal promise of the civil
rights movement. This is why Martin Luther King, Jr., singled out the NOI for special
attention in his Letter from the Birmingham Jail in 1963. The NOI and African
American Islam more generally also became a symbol of black American resistance
to U.S. foreign policy in the developing world, especially in Vietnam. NOI created
what Penny Von Eschen called a spacefor the most part unthinkable in the Cold
War erafor an anti-American critique of the Cold War.Elijah Muhammad and
Malcolm X lauded the rise of independent Muslim-majority nations, and sought to
become allies of third-world Muslim leaders. After Malcolm X separated from the
Nation, he became even more politically radical.But there was no more effective
symbol of both domestic and international political resistance to U.S. power than
Muhammad Ali. Ali, a hero to many people of color and leftists around the world,
was seen as a fifth columnthe enemy inside the wallsby the U.S. government,
which sought to blunt his rising popularity by convicting him in 1967 of draft
evasion. It was by then a familiar way of dealing with troublesome black Muslims. In
the second half of the 1960s, at the height of U.S. troop commitment in Vietnam
and with the rise of Black Power groups like the Panthers, the federal government

adopted even more aggressive techniques to either destroy or at least transform


the Nation of Islam. Its weapon of choice was the Counter-Intelligence Program,
better known as COINTELPRO. Though the FBI had long run surveillance on the
Nation, COINTELPRO represented an escalation of government interference, a high
water mark of pre-9/11 fears about the Muslim threat to the United States. Counterintelligence operations included the placement of agents inside an organization,
often within the leadership structure; the spreading of dissension; and the planting
of false information. Cutting its teeth on the New Left, white hate groups, and the
Communist Party in the early 1960s, COINTELPRO expanded its operations in 1967
to include Black Nationalist-Hate Groups. This category of COINTELPRO included
360 separate operations, becoming the second largest area of all domestic counterintelligence operations. The NOI was perhaps the most popular target of all the
Black Nationalist groups. In 1968, the FBIs field office may have begun a campaign
to install W. D. Mohammed as Elijah Muhammads successor, writing in one
declassified memorandum that Wallace was the only son of Elijah Muhammad who
would have the necessary qualities to guide the NOI in such a manner as would
eliminate racist teachings. Whether the FBIs paper support for W. D. Mohammed
translated into operational support inside the NOI is not yet known. But we do know
that under his leadership, the NOI became a downright patriotic organization with
flags waving in the mosques. Parallels with the Post 9/11 Era The public face of
Muslim America has changed since the 1960s. It is no longer represented by bowtied black men hawking copies of Muhammad Speaks or the beautiful, semi-naked
body of Muhammad Ali. Despite the fact that the largest single ethnic-racial group
of Muslims in the United States is still people of African descent, the stereotypical
Muslim is now brown rather than black. What changed? What explains the shift? It
wasnt the Nation of Islam. While the original Nation became a Sunni organization
under the leadership of Imam W.D. Mohammed and changed its name several
times, Minister Louis Farrakhan recreated a version of the Nation of Islam in 1978
that followed Elijah Muhammads teachings. He was able to attract thousands of
followers. A million men showed up in 1995* at a march he led in Washington, D.C.,
proving that the Nation of Islam still had great appeal. It wasnt the Nation that
changed. It was the government: the FBI no longer saw the NOI as a major threat.
Today, the transnational Muslim American terrorist has become the primary focus of
domestic counter-intelligence. This was largely a result of 9/11, though the FBI and
other agencies were already at work trying to blunt the threat of Islamic terrorism
before then. Their concern grew amidst the larger phenomenon of Islamism, or
political Islam, which flowered in the 1970s as a religious and political response to
repressive governments in Asia and Africa and to U.S. foreign policy. In the
aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979, foreign policy analysts, think tanks, and
politicians interpreted Ayatollah Khomeinis consolidation of power to be a new
trend: the emergence of Muslim militant groups and governments bent on opposing
the United States and its allies for religious reasons. In one sense, these analysts
were right to fear an increasing threat to U.S. power emanating from groups that
based their political platform on Islamic ideas and symbols. In this era of global
religious revival, many Muslim political parties and activist groups organized around
Islamic themes and institutions, often because they lived in politically repressive
countries where the government did not allow for freedom of assembly, association,
or speech in other venues. Religious organizations and religious sites were among
the last places where people could congregate and by default provided a space for
political protest. The administrations of both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan saw

opportunities to advance U.S. interests by allying with some of these Muslim


resistance groups and their Muslim American supporters. In 1979, President Carter
met with twelve leaders of various Muslim American groups met to discuss how they
might bring about a peaceful resolution to the Iranian hostage crisis. President
Reagan and the U.S. Congress, as is well known, hailed the Islamist resistance to
the Soviet Union, providing support via the CIA, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. What is
less known is that the Reagan administration also allowed interested Muslim
Americans to contribute to the efforts of the Afghan mujahidin via what was called
the Jihad Fund of the Muslim Students Association. These alliances were alarming
developments for those who saw Islam as in and of itself a form of terrorism.
According to the 1980s bestseller, Terrorism: How the West Can Win, edited by
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the world of Islam invented terrorism
in the middle ages, and even in the modern world, remained medieval in its
outlook. In addition, the book claimed, Islam was, at its very heart, anti-democratic
and intolerant of diversity.After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union
formally came to an end in 1991, stereotypes of the Muslim as enemy became
even more prominent among U.S. foreign policy makers. Throughout the 1990s,
Harvard professor and former National Security Council official Samuel P. Huntington
popularized his clash of civilizations thesis, which argued that Islamic and other
non-Western civilizations were fund namentally irreconcilable with Western
civilization, and that conflict in the post-Cold War era would occur along religious
and cultural lines. He claimed the fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic
fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of
the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.
U.S. Presidents in the twenty-first century could not afford to be this simplistic and
openly biased. The governments of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama
adopted a different rhetoric toward Islam than that of Huntington. They attempted
to incorporate and co-opt Islam in the name of U.S. interests. Islam is peace,
declared George W. Bush on September 17, 2001. Muslims make an incredibly
valuable contribution to our country, he said. Similarly, Barack Obama proclaimed
in his 2009 address in Cairo that Islam has always been a part of Americas story.
Rather than reject Islam outright, both presidents attempted to legitimize forms of
Islam that were either apolitical or seemingly pro-American. At the same time, both
Bush and Obama used classic COINTELPRO techniques from the 1960s to discipline
Muslim American political activity. The Bush administration determined internally
that it could wiretap its own citizens without judicial or legislative oversight. It
detained material witnesses who were not granted the right of habeus corpus and
rounded up 1,200 people in the frightening days after 9/11. Muslim American
charities that provided non-military aid to organizations designated as terrorist
groups, such as the Palestinian party Hamas, were raided and shut down. The U.S.
also barred foreign Muslim scholars, such as Tariq Ramadan, from attending
professional meetings or speaking on American soil. President Obamas
administration has largely continued the Bush era policies. Guantanamo Bay has
remained open; the American mosque has remained a primary target of domestic
counter-intelligence; and deportation of foreign nationals has actually increased.
Obama personally ordered the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan,
two U.S. citizens who produced speeches and web materials in support of al-Qaeda.
Many civil libertarians saw their targeted killings as violations of constitutional
guarantees of due process and trial by jury. More recently, the White House gave its
support to the National Defense Authorization Act, which allows the executive

branch to detain foreigners, and perhaps Americans, accused of substantially


supporting terrorism indefinitely without trial. Domestically, the Obama
administration has outlined its Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in United States. One of the primary sites for
implementation is the American public school, where teachers and students are to
be trained to identity potential terroristspeople who, according to National
Security Council official Quintan Wiktorowicz, use the word infidel, defend Osama
bin Laden, or watch extremist videos. But rather than debating whether or not this
or any other technique is particularly effective in combatting terrorism, my final
question is this: is there a way in the midst of the war on terrorism to carve out
more public space for Muslim American dissent? The governments new consensus
on terrorism has helped to convey the message that if you support controversial
Muslim political parties or groups in Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Somalia,
Yemen, Iran, etc., you should expect that you will be put under surveillance. If you
say that you support al-Qaeda, you should expect the government will find a way to
silence youby whatever means practical. For many Americans, that may be an
acceptable and even laudable restriction on free speech. But where does it end?
There must be a distinction made between political dissent and terrorism. Dissent of
various kinds can too easily be mistaken as the threat of violence or as violence
itself. Its happened before, when the government kept African American Islam
under close surveillance. Today, if we open our national dialogue to include a
greater variety of Muslim American and other dissenting views, I would predict that
once again, many Americans would be offended by what they hear from their fellow
citizens. Perhaps some Muslim missionaries will dream, as they did in the 1980s and
1990s, of converting all Americans to Islam. Perhaps others will defend Irans
nuclear program. But you can also be sure that the first people to challenge these
views will be other Muslim Americans. That kind of openness is exactly what we
need. Defining dissent as unacceptable speech constrains Muslim American civic
engagement and limits the political imagination of Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Instead, we should bring this and other forms of religious and political dissent into
the public square. Such discussions must address the subject of Islam and Muslims
in U.S. politics. Tens of millions of Americans, perhaps more than a hundred million
Americans, hold strong opinions about Shariah, the Quran, and the Prophet
Muhammad, worrying that Islamic religion fuels terrorism. Millions of other
Americans, both Muslim and non-Muslim, explain Muslim terrorism not as the
inevitable outcome of Islamic religion but instead as an understandable, if
destructive, reaction to U.S. foreign policy. One of my admittedly modest ideas for
furthering this discussion is to ask academics, policymakers, and community
members to look again at the American past. Framing post-9/11 Muslim American
life as an incomparable moment impoverishes our national conversations by
depriving us the benefit of historical narrative, one that will allow us to seek new
ways of thinking about our present. Muslims are not foreigners in U.S. history.
Revisiting our colonial ancestors and fellow Americans from the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries onward provides a space in which Muslim American dissent and
contemporary fears about Islam might be safely explored, more deeply understood,
and radically reimagined, even if we come to little agreement. As the past informs
us, for Muslim Americans, everything did not change after 9/11. What did change
deserves our scrutiny, and ultimately, our participation to insure dissentersMuslim
and non-Muslim alikeare welcome in American life.

***Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)***

CTS Good General


Traditional terrorism studies are bad- the field is rife with
academic inadequacies and ideological biases
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence 2008
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth
University, April 8, 2008, Why we need critical terrorism studies, http://www.eir.info/2008/04/08/why-we-need-critical-terrorism-studies/, accessed 7/7/2015 JCP PB
@ GDI)
As with any relatively new field of research and teaching, terrorism studies faces a number of
conceptual, epistemological, and methodological problems and challenges .
[1] Some of these problems include: the failure to develop rigorous theories
or even to agree on a definition or set of identifying criteria for the fields primary concept
(there are over two hundred different definitions of terrorism currently used in the literature); the
treatment of terrorism as an objective, ontologically stable phenomenon
that can be studied unproblematically; an over-reliance on secondary
sources and a frequent failure to undertake primary research , particularly in
terms of face-to-face engagement with individuals and groups named as terrorists (most terrorism experts have

a failure to appreciate the cultural-ideological biases


inherent to Western academic and political discourses of terrorism ; a restricted
set of specific research topics within the field, including an over-emphasis on non-state forms
of terrorism and the lack of research on state terrorism; a large number of new
never met a terrorist);

scholars since 11 September 2001 who lack adequate grounding in the extensive existing literature on the wider

and a persistent tendency to treat the


current terrorist threat facing certain Western states as unprecedented,
highly threatening and exceptional. In addition, a number of critically-minded scholars have
study of political violence and social movements;

argued that the field must also face up to a number of unique normative and political challenges. These include:

political biases in common research subjects, including the tendency to


focus on groups and states which Western states are opposed to (and the
simultaneous failure to study the terrorism practiced by Western states and their allies); the tendency to
reinforce and reproduce (rather than challenge) many of the dominant myths about
terrorism put forward by the state and the popular media, including the myths that
terrorism poses a major threat to international security and that terrorists are mentally unstable; the failure
to appreciate and reflect upon the politics of naming in regards to
terrorism and the social-political consequences of terrorism research for
particular communities and individuals; the adoption of what can broadly
be called problem-solving approaches to the study of political terror ;
frequently compromising financial and political relationships between
states and their security agencies and some scholars and analysts
engaged in the study of non-state terrorism; and the prioritising of topics
tailored to the demands of policy-makers for practically useful knowledge
in the fight against terrorism.

CTS Good State Terror


Utilizing traditional terrorism studies justifies state-terrorism
and allows for hegemonic power structures to go unquestioned
Jackson, Deputy Director for the National Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, 2008
(Richard, University of Otago, 2/14/08, The Study of Terrorism after 11 September
2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments, Political Studies Review,
volume: 7, academia.edu, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Another perennial question for terrorism studies lies in its obvious
ideological bias, particularly its state-centrism. This can be seen most
visibly in the way that the vast majority of terrorism studies scholars focus
on groups which Western states and their allies currently oppose, and not
on Western-supported terrorist groups, for example.62 Unsurprisingly in terms of its origins in
counter-insurgency studies, the number and prominence of former government officials and counter-terrorism

the construction of terrorism as the


most morally evil kind of political violence, it is nonetheless a problem
that the field orients its research primarily towards the goal of state or
national security. It is fair to say that the vast majority of terrorism research attempts to provide policymakers with useful advice for controlling and eradicating terrorism as a threat to Western interests. As such, it
takes a classic problem-solving perspective, which does not question
whether the state itself might be implicated in causing or perpetuating
the problem of terrorism and other forms of political violence. This can be
a real problem when it distorts research priorities, co-opts the field and
turns scholars into an uncritical mouthpiece of state interests. 64 In other
words, there is a real need for terrorism scholars to reflect on how they may be acting, perhaps
unwittingly, as organic intellectuals in a hegemonic power structure . Certainly,
practitioners within the ranks of terrorism experts63, and

there is a need for terrorism scholars to reflect more deeply on ethical-normative issues, such as whether their
research ought to be oriented towards national security or towards human security65, as the two are quite often not

A related problem with the field today is the relative lack of


debate and engagement with CTS and other critical approaches such as
historical materialism, especially on the substantive ontological, epistemological
and normative issues raised by these movements. Although there have been a few
exceptions66, for the most part, mainstream terrorism scholars have thus far refused
to substantively engage with the serious and important questions and
issues raised by critical scholars, most often characterizing such
interventions instead as mere polemics. In part, this attitude is engendered by the need to
the same thing.

protect the core interests and boundaries of the field, and by the roots of the field in positivist social science and a
problem-solving approach. Nevertheless,

it represents a missing opportunity to inject


new perspectives, approaches and questions into the mainstream of the
field, potentially leading to important new projects and insights.

Traditional terrorism studies act as an intellectual arm of


Western ideology, allowing for state terrorism and western
exceptionalism to go unquestioned
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth


University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth,
and Gunning, accessed 7/3/2015 JCP PB @GDI)
The desire to assist governments in their efforts to control the destructive effects of non-state terrorism is not
necessarily problematic in and of itself; nor does it imply any bad faith on the part of individual scholars (Horgan
and Boyle, 2008). In fact, the prevention of violence against civilians is a highly laudable aspiration. However,

when virtually the entire academic field collectively adopts state priorities
and aims, and when it tailors its research towards assisting state agencies
in fighting terrorism (as defined by state institutions), it means that terrorism studies
functions ideologically as an intellectual arm of the state and is aligned
with its broader hegemonic project. The fields problem-solving, state-oriented and therefore
ideological character is also illustrated by the way in which the fields knowledge functions to
delegitimise any kind of non-state violence while simultaneously reifying
and legitimising the states employment of violence; and the way it constructs
terrorism as a social problem to be solved by the state but never as a
problem of state violence itself. From this viewpoint, the silence regarding state terrorism within
the discourse (Jackson, 2008b), and in particular the argument of many terrorism studies scholars that state actions
should not be defined as terrorism, actually functions to furnish states with an authoritative academic justification

it
provides them with greater leeway when applying terror-based forms of
violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by a great many states who
intimidate groups and individuals with the application of massive and
disproportionate state violence. In other words, by occluding and obscuring the
very possibility of state terrorism, and as a field with academic and
political authority, the discourse of terrorism studies can be considered
part of the conditions that actually make state terrorism possible. Furthermore,
for using what may actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens. In effect,

the discourse is deeply ideological in the way in which its core assumptions, narratives, and knowledge-producing
practices function to legitimise existing power structures and particular hegemonic political practices in society. For

the primary focus on the problem of non-state terrorism functions


to distract from and deny the long history' of Western involvement in
terrorism (see Blakeley, forthcoming), thereby constructing Western foreign policy
as essentially benign - rather than aimed primarily at reifying existing
structures of power and domination in the international system , for example.
That is, by deflecting criticism of particular Western policies, the discourse works to maintain
the potentially dangerous myth - the accepted common sense among Western scholars and
Western publics - of Western exceptionalism. This sense of exceptionalism in turn permits Western
instance,

states and their allies to pursue a range of discrete and often illiberal political projects and partisan interests aimed

by reinforcing the
dominant knowledge that non-state terrorism is a much greater security
threat than state terrorism and by obscuring the ways in which
counterterrorism itself can morph into state terrorism (see Jackson, forthcoming),
the discourse functions to legitimise the current global war on terror and
its associated policies of military intervention and regime change,
extraordinary rendition, military expansion to new regions, military
assistance programmes (often to repressive regimes), the imposition of sanctions,
the isolation of oppositional political movements, and the like (see, among many
others, Stokes and Raphael, forthcoming; El Fadl, 2002; Mahajan, 2002, 2003; Callinicos, 2003). More directly, the
discourse provides legitimacy to broader counter-insurgency or
counterterrorism programmes in strategic regions where the actual
underlying aims clearly reside in the maintenance of a particular politicaleconomic order - such as is occurring in Colombia at the present time (see Stokes, 2006). At the domestic
level, the dominant terrorism discourse can and has been used by political
at maintaining dominance in a hegemonic liberal international order. Specifically,

elites to justify and promote a whole range of political projects, such as:
expanding and strengthening the institutions of national security and the military-industrial complex; the
construction of extensive surveillance and social control systems; the
normalisation of security procedures across all areas of social life; expanding the powers and jurisdiction of state
security agencies and the executive branch, in large part by normalising a state of exception; controlling wider
social and political dissent, restricting human rights, and setting the parameters for acceptable public debate: and
altering the legal system - among others (see, among many others, Mueller, 2006; Lustick, 2006; Cole,
2007. 2003; Jackson, 2007c; Scraton, 2002).

Critical terrorism studies fix the state-centric nature of


traditional terrorism studies because they adopt better
research methodologies
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence 2008
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth
University, April 8, 2008, Why we need critical terrorism studies, http://www.eir.info/2008/04/08/why-we-need-critical-terrorism-studies/, accessed 7/7/2015 JCP PB
@ GDI)
It is in this context that advocates of a distinctly critical approach to the study of terrorism
suggest that one way to overcome many of these weaknesses and
challenges in the field is to adopt a particular set of ontological,
methodological, and political-normative commitments. The specific commitments and
attitudes of CTS have been discussed in detail elsewhere.[2] They can be summarised briefly as:
an acute sensitivity to the politics of labelling and the acceptance of the
fundamental ontological insecurity of the terrorism label and thus extreme care in
its use during research; a commitment to inter-disciplinarity and a willingness to engage with research from
disciplines outside of international relations (there is some excellent terrorism research from anthropology, for

a commitment to transparency regarding the values and political


standpoints of researchers, particularly as they relate to the geo-political interests and values of the
example);

states they work in; a willingness by researchers to expand the focus of their research to include topics such as the
use of terrorism by states, gender dimensions of terrorism, ethical-normative analysis of counter-terrorism, and the

adherence to a set of
responsible research ethics which take account of the various users of
terrorism research, including the suspect communities from which
terrorists often emerge and the populations who bear the brunt of
counter-terrorism policies; a commitment to taking the subjectivity of both
the researcher and the researched seriously, particularly in terms of being willing to talk to
terrorists; and a commitment to normative values and a broadly defined
notion of emancipation. These commitments go beyond simply the call to engage in more rigorous and
discursive foundations which make terrorism studies possible in the first place;

self-reflective research. In their normative dimensions in particular, these kinds of commitments amount to an
orientation that shares many of the same attitudes and approaches as the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and

The call for the establishment of a new, more


reflexive critical terrorism studies (CTS) is a self-conscious and deliberate
attempt to try and overcome some of the problems that have been noted
about the broader field of terrorism studies, and to attract scholars who study terrorism but
are uncomfortable associating with a field that has historically been closely aligned with the state. The initial
aim of CTS advocates has been to map out a new critical set of
approaches to the study of political terrorism, and to generate a new,
broader research agenda. To this end, we convened a new Critical Studies on Terrorism Working Group
the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies.

(CSTWG) within the British International Studies Association (BISA) in early 2006.[3] The intention of the working
group is to establish an international network of critically-oriented terrorism scholars, to generate and coordinate
new kinds of research activities, and to organise papers and panels for conferences. Later, in October 2006, we

organised a special conference on the topic, Is it time for a critical terrorism studies?, partly out of which we
published a symposium on The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies in the journal, European Political Science
(volume 6, number 3). In terms of teaching, a number of openly critical terrorism studies modules and
programmes have been established at Aberystwyth University, the University of Kent at Canterbury, the University
of Manchester, and elsewhere. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, in early 2007 we launched a new peerreviewed academic journal entitled Critical Studies on Terrorism.[4] The aim of the journal is to provide a focal point
for the publication of explicitly critical research on terrorism, to provide a forum in which critical and orthodox
accounts of terrorism can engage in respectful debate, and to review and influence developments in the wider field
of research.

CTS Good Epistemology


Terrorism studies utilize a flawed epistemology because
skewed research priorities perpetuate the use of harmful
policies like blanket surveillance of Muslims
Jackson, Deputy Director for the National Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, 2008

(Richard, University of Otago, 2/14/08, The Study of Terrorism after 11 September


2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments, Political Studies Review,
volume: 7, academia.edu, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Another ongoing problem in the field which is not unrelated to the first two problems is a
skewed set of research priorities which results in an over-focus on certain
issues and the perennial neglect of others. For example, there is a massive and
everexpanding literature on weapons of mass destruction terrorism, al Qaeda and Islamist
terrorism, the tactic of suicide terrorism, so-called new terrorism and aspects of religious terrorism,
including the rapidly expanding radicalization literature.58 At the same time, subjects like the
history of terrorism, state terrorism, terrorism in the Global South 59, the
actual nature of the terrorist threat and most importantly, the empirical evaluation of counter-terrorism measures,

remain under-researched. As already mentioned, the reasons for this distortion lies
partly in the event-driven nature of terrorism (or more accurately, how terrorism has
been socially constructed as an unpredictable event), partly in the dominant narratives and
myths which lie at the heart of the field60, and partly in the current
institutional structures of the field (see below). The main point is that vast amounts of
energy and resources are currently being invested in research questions
of lesser or even dubious value, while far more pressing issues remain
under-researched. The issue of the empirical evaluation of counter-terrorism policies is a particular case
in point. As Lum et.al.s study discovered, despite literally hundreds of billions of dollars spent on counter-terrorism
measures over the past ten years, hundreds of thousands of deaths in counter-terrorism operations, a plethora of
new laws and security measures, and a truly vast terrorism literature, there is an astounding lack of empiricallybased research into the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. Only a tiny handful of studies have been
conducted (Lum et.al.s survey found seven rigorous empirical studies on counter-terrorism measures from 1975
2002), and these have discovered that many of the most commonly used counter-terrorism measures offensive
military operations, target hardening, and harsher laws, for example did not have a statistically discernible effect

this
shocking assessment raises extremely uncomfortable questions about the
utility of current terrorism research for policy-makers, and its role in
perpetuating the continued use of counter-productive or even harmful
policies.
on reducing terrorism across time and, in some cases, led to increases in terrorism.61 By itself,

CTS Good Permutation


Perm: Dialogue between critical and orthodox terrorism
studies is necessary to produce better research and avoid
permanent bifurcation
Jackson, Deputy Director for the National Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, 2008
(Richard, University of Otago, 2/14/08, The Study of Terrorism after 11 September
2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments, Political Studies Review,
volume: 7, academia.edu, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)

Drawing upon auto-ethnographic observation in my own project of trying to promote critical terrorism studies since
2006, I would like to conclude the article with a discussion of some of the main challenges which I see facing the

An important future challenge will be to avoid


bifurcation into critical and orthodox intellectual ghettos in which CTS
scholars continue to meet in separate conferences, publish in their own
journal and book series, and largely fail to engage with mainstream
terrorism scholars and vice-versa. In part, I view this challenge as resting
largely on the shoulders of mainstream scholars who have with only a few
exceptions failed to respond to calls for more sustained dialogue with
critically-oriented scholars.70 The danger is that the CTS scholars who are
eager to enter into dialogue on crucial issues may eventually stop trying
to engage with mainstream scholars and will instead direct their energies
elsewhere. In part, this challenge is intimately related to the quite obvious trans-Atlantic divide in terrorism
field over the next few years.

studies, which is in turn reflective of the different research cultures between Europe and North America, particularly

it is up to individual scholars on both sides to


make genuine efforts to engage fruitfully with each other
in IR and security studies. In both cases,

CTS Good Research


Dont evaluate orthodox terrorism studies- they rely on the
same recycled and flawed evidence and the field is devoid of
any reflective thinking on epistemology or methodology
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth


University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth,
and Gunning, accessed 7/3/2015 JCP PB @GDI)
A principal cause for this critique is the surprisingly few research
inventories conducted over the years designed to fundamentally question
theories, assumptions, and knowledge production. This type of state-of-the-art research
inventory is necessary for preparing the next wave of research. My own anthology, Mapping Terrorism Research
(2006a), convinced me that every new researcher entering the field of terrorism studies
produce their own critique and research inventory as a precursor for any further research to

ought to

fundamentally question established epistemological and methodological


approaches. Far too few self-reflexive books, chapters, or journal articles actually
exist taking stock in a unifying sense of the terrorism studies field to account for
what we know; how we know what we know; and what research questions we ought to focus on in terms of
individual and collective research efforts. Even fewer exist which address the theory and
methods of studying terrorism. One explanation for this absence pertains
to the relative absence of debate among the orthodox terrorism scholars.
This invisible college of terrorism researchers often recycled empirical information,
some with questionable credibility and precision, and interchanged contexts,
frequently without sufficient regard for situational, political, social or
security specificity. As argued by Martha Crenshaw, researchers should try to avoid constructing general
categories of terrorist actors that lump together dissimilar motivations, organizations, resources and contexts

Often disparate evidence is woven together selectively to


suit the case without regard for specific context. Relying on eachothers
work alongside government and media reports produced an ever
expanding intellectual quilt that had a tendency to grow in size, but less in
layered intellectual depth. The same mantras or analogies as exemplified by Brian Jenkins
(Crenshaw, 2000: 405).

terrorism likes a lot of people watching not a lot of people dead (see Jenkins, 1998) appeared across the
terrorism studies literature without anyone ever critically questioning what it really meant and the social scientific
basis or qualitative/quantitative method for getting to this conclusion. This problem has been underscored by
Michael Stohl who accurately pointed towards what: Popper (1934) might caustically designate as wisdom rather
than science. Thus, the assembled wisdom might be correct but the demarcation between wisdom and science
that would allow proposing the necessary conjectures, collecting the appropriate data and subjecting these
conjectures and data to tests which might arguably demonstrate their falsifiability has not yet met the standards of

much of the writing


in terrorism studies is impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time
often also pretentious, venturing far-reaching generalizations on the basis
of episodal evidence (Schmid and Jongman, 1988).
social science epistemology. (Stohl, 2005) As complained by Schmid and Jongman,

Terrorism studies are flawed at a fundamental level because


they repeat US government analysis and fail to critique
counter-terrorisms use of terrorism
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth


University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth,
and Gunning, accessed 7/3/2015 JCP PB @GDI)
Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise
much of the fields research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the
South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply
replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated
primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US
government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated
assertion . This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been
revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject .
Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to
insulate from critique those counterterrorism policies justified as a response to the
terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly silence the way terrorism
is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist
interventions in the South. That is, counterterrorism campaigns executed or
supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling
violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 1819). These two features of the literature are hugely significant.
Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced
a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter
the illusion of objectivity. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve
a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty
years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily
through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global
South undertaken under the rubric of various war(s) on terror. After setting out the
method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main
problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the
function that this research serves for the US state.

Critical terrorism studies are necessary to overcome the


Western epistemology that dominates mainstream terrorism
studies
Jackson, Deputy Director for the National Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, 2009
(Richard, 14 December 2009, Critical Terrorism Studies: An Explanation, a Defence
and a Way Forward, http://www.bisa.ac.uk/index.php?
option=com_bisa&task=download_paper&no_html=1&passed_paper_id=54,
accessed 7/3/2015 JCP PB @GDI)
Similarly, a central concern of CTS scholars must be to expand the set of
accepted research topics to include those which have been ignored or
silenced as a result of dominant ideological commitments. In particular, besides a greater
focus on historical context, there is a real need to bring the state back in to terrorism studies (Blakeley,
2007) to examine the nature and causes of state terrorism , particularly that by
Western democratic states. It is also vital to make gender much more central to terrorism research (Sylvester and

The ontological rejection of traditional


theorys fetishization of parts means, among other things, that epistemologically, a
critical approach to terrorism should embed the phenomenon in broader
social and political theory. Greater inter-disciplinarity with a view to eventually doing away with
Parashar, 2009), among many other topics (see below).

disciplinary boundaries altogether is one way to do this, although it is important to heed Booths warning against
lowest common denominator interdisciplinarity (Booth 2008). The establishment of an explicitly critical field
should help to bring in those from cognate disciplines who have so far shunned Terrorism Studies because of its

reputation, earned or not, for political bias and lack of theoretical sophistication (see Gunning 2007a; Dalacoura,

Another way to embed terrorism research in broader theory is to link


terrorism more explicitly to the broader social processes of which it is
part, and study it for what it has to say about these broader processes (see Gunning, 2009). One of the
consequences of the ontological and epistemological positions adopted by
CTS is a commitment to transparency in regard to the researchers own
values and standpoints, particularly as they relate to the geo-political interests and values of the
society in which they live and work. In turn, this implies an abiding commitment to
seeking to overcome the Euro/Westo-centric, Orientalist, and masculinised
forms of knowledge which currently characterise the Terrorism Studies
and Security Studies fields and social science more generally (see Toros and
2009).

Gunning, 2009; Gunning, 2009; Sylvester and Parashar, 2009). It also implies a commitment to taking subjectivity

This means
being aware of and transparent about the values and impact of the
researcher on the process and outcomes of the research, and being willing
to seriously engage with the subjectivity of the terrorist. Importantly, this latter
seriously, in terms of both the researcher and the research subject (see Breen Smyth, 2009).

point implies an additional commitment to engaging in primary research when relevant, as opposed to relying
primarily on secondary sources a long-standing practice in terrorism research due to the perceived difficulties and
dangers of face-to-face encounters with terrorists (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996).

CTS Good History


Lack of context and historicisation of terrorism results in kneejerk political moves and leaves other forms of violence such as
counter-terrorism morally permissible and unquestioned
Jackson, Deputy Director for the National Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, 2008
(Richard, University of Otago, 2/14/08, The Study of Terrorism after 11 September
2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments, Political Studies Review,
volume: 7, academia.edu, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
A second related problem is the prevailing tendency towards the
decontextualisation and de-historicisation of terrorism . For the most part, and
notwithstanding the above-noted definitional problems, in data sets and research projects, terrorism tends
to be extracted out from other forms of political violence and non-violent
struggle and examined in isolation from the broader context in which it occurs.
This broader de-contextualisation of terrorism is reflected in the ongoing
neglect of research on historic terrorist campaigns. As Silke concludes, Before 9/11,
only one article in twenty-six looked at historical conflicts. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, interest in historical
cases effectively collapsed and not even one article in fifty was focused away from current events.52 Clearly,

understanding

any social phenomenon whether it be forms of democracy and voting patterns,

terrorism requires deep historical


and contextual knowledge. Trying to understand terrorism without
detailed knowledge of the history and context in which it emerges, or the way in which
terrorism as a strategy has evolved and developed over previous centuries, can only
result in surface-level forms of knowledge and highly dubious and
ideological distortions (such as the notion of new terrorism). In part, this problem is
related to the way terrorism is treated in Western society as a very
immediate and highly unpredictable phenomenon. Certainly, the media tends to report
terrorism in a highly de-contextualized manner, and politicians similarly tend to respond to it
in a knee-jerk fashion.53 Terrorism studies scholars have often followed a
similar pattern: the sudden and massive explosion in research on al Qaeda following the 9/11 attacks54 is
illustrative of this tendency. In part, this problem is also related to the way the early
terrorism scholars attempted to construct terrorism as a separate and
unique category of political violence, which required its own specialized approaches and
immigration, the functioning of the European Union, or indeed

dedicated scholars.55 In this context, the exclusion of other approaches and cognate fields could be viewed as part
of the process of attempting to maintain the boundaries of a core terrorism studies field, which is separate from
other disciplines. As noted above, however, I believe that the pluralization and growing multi-disciplinarity of the
field is making it more and more difficult to maintain the previous essential core to the field. In any case,

an

unfortunate result of the essentializing and de-contextualizing of


terrorism has been analytical and normative distortion in the sense of
viewing terrorism as fundamentally and irrevocably different and more
morally evil than other forms of political violence such as war and counterterrorism. Importantly, it has resulted in a failure to absorb and build upon the
research findings of cognate fields, which also study political violence, such as war and civil war
research, genocide studies, and most obviously, peace and conflict studies. I have recently argued that it is
something of a puzzle why conflict studies and terrorism studies have developed largely separate from each other,
especially given that they study the same thing, namely, violent political conflict.56 In addition to understanding

looking at processes of knowledge


subjugation can be a useful lens for understanding how relevant
knowledge and approaches have been excluded from the field .57
how terrorism emerged as a separate field,

CTS Good AT: Data


Even seemingly objective data about terrorism shouldnt be
trusted- unverifiable and journalistic data makes its way into
academic papers, which is then propagated throughout the
field
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth
University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth,
and Gunning, accessed 7/3/2015 JCP PB @GDI)
Howards assessment can be considered as true today as it was thirty years ago. A major global
strategic surprise event like 9/11 is bound to attract unscrupulous
characters, pseudo-academics alongside outright fraudsters, often
masquerading behind a thin facade of privileged access to secret sources,
often unverifiable in contravention to standard academic praxis. In most cases,
this type of rumor intelligence (RUMINT) masquerading as scientific evidence
lacks any acceptable academic rigor. Additionally, journalistic speculation or
even inaccuracies in reporting events as they unfold, move effortlessly
from fiction to becoming established facts. Rarely are these empirical facts investigated or

challenged with enough effort. Even rarer are those instances when these well established facts are investigated to

This becomes especially


troublesome as these established empirical facts become continuously
reused in other academic contexts to fit ready-made assumptions and
arguments. Blurring boundaries between journalism and academic
expertise, facts or fiction obfuscate the reliability of data and erode
serious terrorism research based on rigorous theory-building andthe use
of sound methodologies. Good journalism and interesting reporting should not be confused with
further develop a greater degree of granularity in both detail and context.

academic rigor or scientific standards. Within terrorism studies, there are sometimes no bounds to the ingenuity of

Perhaps the most celebrated and


outrageous case is that of the Frenchman, Alexis Debat, who managed to rise
from being a journalist reporter to the position of Director of the Terrorism
and National Security Program at the Nixon Center in Washington DC, as well as contributing editor
to The National Interest. In an extensive expose by the French news media Rue 89 in June 2007 , it was
revealed that Debat had made up several bogus interviews with former US
experts, and at times, outright deception and fraud.

President Bill Clinton, former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Microsoft
founder Bill Gates, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and fomier UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,

After resigning from ABC News


as a terrorism consultant, after it was dis- covered he did not hold a PhD
from Sorbonne University as he had claimed on his resume , a series of other claims
for the French magazine, Polilique imemationale (B. Ross, 2007).

also proved fraudulent, such as: being a former advisor to the French Ministry of Defence on Transatlantic Affairs;
having been Director of the Scientific Committee for the Institut Montaigne (Paris); 'working on the largest
manuscript ever written on the history of the Central Intelligence Agency'; and working with RAND, among many
other cases (Boumier and Lesnes, 2007).

CTS Good AT: Experts


Dont trust terrorism experts- theyre mostly one-off authors
who have no background in terrorism studies
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth
University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth,
and Gunning, accessed 7/3/2015 JCP PB @GDI)

Another exceptionally perceptive explanation offered to account for the absence of introspective critiques within the

Stampnitzky. Convincingly, she argues that this absence


is due to the fact there are no barriers of entry to the terrorism studies
field and that a high proportion of those writing on the topic have no
significant background in the topic (Stampnitzky, 2007a). Unlike area studies or
more professionally specialized social scientific disciplines where there is
greater rigor in peer-review practices and professionalized barriers of
entry, any retrained Soviet specialist or international relations generalist
can in theory and practice become a specialized terrorism expert
overnight. As outlined by Andrew Silke, there were 490 articles in the two core
terrorism studies journals in the period 19909 with 83 percent written by
one-time authors (Silke, 2003). The transitory nature of the field of terrorism studies can provide the seeds
of intellectual vitality. However, it can also be a major drawback as very few onetime
contributors are ambitious enough to critique the field of study or
command enough knowledge to do so. The case made by Stampnitzky about
no or low barriers of entry into terrorism studies is supported by Avishai Gordons study that
suggests that core journals in terrorism studies had significantly higher
rates of contributions from non-academic authors than journals in political
science or communication studies (Gordon, 2001). Hence, even journalists, like Peter
Bergen, without PhD or social scientific training in methodology or theory but
with privileged access from the terror frontlines, have become the new
form of pseudo-academic terrorism expert. As noted by Stampnitzky, terrorism
expertise is constructed and negotiated in an interstitial space between
academia, the state, and the media. The boundaries of legitimate
knowledge and expertise are particularly open to challenges from
selfproclaimed experts from the media and political fields, and this has
had significant consequences for the sort of expert discourses that tend to
be produced and disseminated. (Stampnitzky, 2007b) The terrorism studies field relies on peerterrorism studies field is made by Lisa

review as a means of quality control, but suffers from the very absence that drives academic knowledge forward

Much of the
literature does not engage with alternative schools of thought or theorybuilding. The majority of debate is currently occurring in book review sections and rarely encompasses
rigorous critique of the validity of theories or methodology. However, even where articles are
peerreviewed, the peers reviewing may lack the expertise, as so much
terrorism knowledge is fragmented. Few terrorism experts are really
qualified to authoritatively comment on the internal structures of different
terrorist groups across different contexts. However, as pointed out by Ken Booth: diversity
against-the-grain theories and rigorous intellectual debates and critiques among scholars.

and debate is not therefore a problem for Terrorism Studies, but a sign of life (Booth, 2008: 67). It is essentially in
the post-9/11 era that these types of essential and major academic debates have been surfacing with widely
different schools of thought. Many of these debates have been sparked as a response to the construction of

databases and from these have emerged analyses that go against the grain of widely-held assumptions and
challenge the main orthodoxy.

***ATs***

2AC AT: T/Framework


Legal reforms of the NSA are ineffective in tackling
Islamophobic surveillance - questioning and discussing the
underlying epistemology of the surveillance state in terms of
who it affects and why is a better method of achieving change
Jordan & Kundnani 15 (Brandon Jordan & Arun Kundnani, respectively a

journalist and associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at
Rutgers University, " Interview: Author Arun Kundnani on Understanding Terrorism, the
Surveillance State & How to Discuss Reform," FireDogLake - progressive news site, January
16th 2015, http://firedoglake.com/2015/01/16/interview-author-arun-kundnani-on-origins-ofthe-surveillance-state-and-possible-reforms/)
JORDAN: In a column on March 28 for The Guardian, you noted the tools of the state could
not be dismantled even with National Security Agency reforms. What
would be needed, therefore, to diminish the American Islamophobic
surveillance complex? KUNDNANI: I think it is back to what Martin Luther King said; we need
a revolution of values. Right now in the NSA debate, you have a lot of people who are
very concerned about government surveillance. But the actual advocacy
work has two strands to it: One is the legal argument to introduce legal
reforms, which in my opinion wont make any difference . The other is a
technical solution, where the tech community advocates for better encryption. What neither
of those two groups of advocates is addressing is the politics of this. Why is there
government surveillance and who is under surveillance ? Its actually not a
situation where were all equally vulnerable to government surveillance. It
is specific communities (Muslims, Arabs, political activists, leftists, journalists) being
targeted. Sometimes it is a result of racial or religious profiling. For Muslim communities,
surveillance is not just about digital surveillance, but FBI informants in the mosques and the
communities. But the debate about NSA surveillance does not really address that. It doesnt really
want to talk about those issues and how targeted surveillance can also be a violation of peoples
rights.

We need to start having a much richer conversation about

surveillance . When you start doing that, you will soon realize it is not just
about one or two legal reforms here or there. It is about fundamentally
questioning what the purpose of governmental surveillance is. It is not just to
go after the so-called terrorists or criminals. Its to go after political dissidents or communities having
radical critiques of the government. Once you start looking it at the way, then you
start to think about all kinds of aspects of the surveillance state .

A legalistic approach to curtailing surveillance fails due to its


focus on the white middle class, only confronting the racial
history of surveillance can create real change
Kundani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication, and Kumar, associate professor of Media
Studies and Middle East Studies, 2015
(Arun, New York University, Deepa, Rutgers University, Race, surveillance, and
empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, International
Socialist Review issue # 96, spring 2015, accessed 6/29/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)

we are once again in a period of revelation, concern, and debate on


national security surveillance. Yet if real change is to be brought about, the
Today,

racial history of surveillance will need to be fully confrontedor


opposition to surveillance will once again be easily defeated by racial
security narratives . The significance of the Snowden leaks is that they have laid out the depth of the
NSAs mass surveillance with the kind of proof that only an insider can have. The result has been a
generalized level of alarm as people have become aware of how intrusive
surveillance is in our society, but that alarm remains constrained within a
public debate that is highly abstract, legalistic, and centered on the
privacy rights of the white middle class. On the one hand, most civil liberties
advocates are focused on the technical details of potential legal reforms
and new oversight mechanisms to safeguard privacy. Such initiatives are
likely to bring little change because they fail to confront the racist and
imperialist core of the surveillance system. On the other hand, most technologists believe
the problem of government surveillance can be fixed simply by using better encryption tools. While encryption tools
are useful in increasing the resources that a government agency would need to monitor an individual, they do
nothing to unravel the larger surveillance apparatus. Meanwhile, executives of US tech corporations express
concerns about loss of sales to foreign customers concerned about the privacy of data. In Washington and Silicon
Valley, what should be a debate about basic political freedoms is simply a question of corporate profits.69

Reforming the NSA is an ineffective way of trying to tackle


Islamophobic surveillance - its manifested in too many other
places for NSA alone to solve anything
Kundnani 14 (Arun Kundnani, associate professor of Media Studies and Middle
East Studies at Rutgers University, "No NSA Reform Can Fix The American
Islamophobic Surveillance Complex," The Guardian, March 28th 2014
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-americanislamophobic-surveillance-complex)
Better oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus may
finally be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee
unveiled plans this week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records. The
debate opened up by Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the
parsing of hops and stores and metadata. These reforms may be reassuring, if
sketchy. But for those living in so-called "suspect communities" Muslim
Americans, left-wing campaigners, "radical" journalists the days of
living on the receiving end of excessive spying wont end there.

How come

when we talk about spying we don't talk about the lives of ordinary people being spied upon? While we have been
rightly outraged at the government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less interested in the

my
book on Islamophobia and the War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to
Texas and Minnesota to Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their mosque
was under surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined
the congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at colleges to question every student who
consequences of mass surveillance for those most affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing

happened to be Muslim. All of them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives abroad were
wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by government officials. There were the young Somali
Americans in Minnesota who described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents for no reason
other than their ethnic background. Some had been placed under surveillance by a local police department, which

FBI intelligence on Somali-American


There were the Muslim students at the City University of New

disguised its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the
political opinions.

York who discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been
informants all along, working for the New York Police Department's
Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no reasonable
suspicion of any crime; it was enough that the targeted students were active in the Muslim Students Association.
And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the
FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents . The government
had no evidence of any terrorist plot; the sole pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US
government. These are the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being two "hops"
away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred to

by outgoing NSA director Keith

Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file
compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by the Muslim
American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass surveillance. In targeted communities,
a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to break down. As one interviewee
said: "You look at your closest friends and ask: are they informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance looks
like: not knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with care when talking politics in public, the unpredictability
of state power. Snowden has rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals
intelligence" the surveillance of our digital communications but equally important is "human intelligence", the
result of informants and undercover agents operating within communities. Underpinning all the surveillance of
Muslim Americans is an assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more
people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or
permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but law-abiding people, some
of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution.
Just the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists but

So let's reform the NSA and its countless


But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000 intelligence analysts
working on counter-terrorism and the 15,000 paid informants helping
them do it. Let's not forget the New York Police Department's intelligence and
counter-terrorism division with its 1,000 officers, $100m budget and vast
program of surveillance. Let's not forget the especially subtle psychological terror of
being Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be
they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one.
collections.

stored for much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're
always being watched.

2AC AT: T/Framework ROTJ


The role of the judge is to be an anti-racism educator who uses
their ballot to help replace oppressive ideas with progressive
ones
Housee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Wolverhampton, 2012

(Shirin, Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2012, 101120, accessed
7/3/2015 JCP PB)
Teaching in an anti-racist way, is, in my view, a political project. If we argue
that the unequal structures, institutions and ideas of racism, and sexism
and other oppressive ideologies, are articulated within society and has
damaged our understanding and reasoning, then a job (in my view) for the
anti-racist educator must be to facilitate the process that help undo
oppressive ideas, in order that we can reconstruct progressive ones. My
challenge, therefore, is to nurture democratic sentiments that critique
discrimination and injustices through teaching that , as Nagda (2003, 168) says:
...fosters a critical consciousness by which students and teachers see their
experiences situated in historical, cultural contexts and recognized
possibilities for changing oppressive structures. Social justice in education takes a moral
position that critiques society as unjust towards the marginalised and the excluded. In terms of antiracism, the focus of this position is twofold: to highlight the moral
imperative that racism is wrong, and that the commitment to anti-racist
education, is to work to empower learners so they can raise their voice
against such racism. Education for social justice then, takes an approach to learning and teaching based
on human rights, active participation, the evaluation of change and the empowerment of people to become actively

Translated into anti-racist/oppressive education


practice, this is, according to Clarke and Drudy (2007, 13) about: ...reflective practice
that requires a conscious, systematic, deliberate process of framing and
re-framing classroom practice in light of... democratic principles,
educational beliefs, values and the preferred visions which teachers bring
to the teaching-learning event
involved in their own future.

2AC AT: Threats Real


AT But they are a threat: The identification of racialized groups
as a threat is epistemologically flawed and justifies
indiscriminate violence and exclusion
Kundani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication, and Kumar, associate professor of Media
Studies and Middle East Studies, 2015
(Arun, New York University, Deepa, Rutgers University, Race, surveillance, and
empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, International
Socialist Review issue # 96, spring 2015, accessed 6/29/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
These racialized notions of security are also inflected by gender . As Du Bois notes in
the above quote, free Black men were positioned as threats to white women in the
postCivil War era. Unlike during slavery, when Black men were not
indiscriminately labeled as rapists and lynching was rare, the period
between 1865 and 1895 saw the lynching of over ten thousand African
Americans. Fredrick Douglass argued that, when all the other methods of demonizing Black people failed, the
myth of the Black rapist was developed to justify lynchings and white terror.23 Vigilante groups like
the Ku Klux Klan justified their brutality by claiming to keep white women
safe from the Black rapist, as visualized, for instance, in D. W. Griffiths Birth of a Nation. Such
constructions of white women in need of protection from predatory Black men were reminiscent
of the captivity scenarios of the seventeenth century, in which Native
Americans were accused of kidnapping white women, a charge that then
justified genocide.24 Thus, from the early settler-colonial period onwards, security and
protection were defined by elites in gendered and racial terms. In particular,
the white, heterosexual family was positioned as the subject of a security narrative that cast racialized others as
threats to the homeland. The homeland so defined also needed to be secured from racialized immigrant

When Irish
immigrants began to arrive in the United States in large numbers from the
1850s onwards, they were considered nonwhite because they were perceived to be of
threats, but which immigrants counted as white in this homeland was somewhat unstable.

Celtic rather than Anglo Saxon background. More importantly, Irish Catholics faced the same exclusionary practices
that Catholics did in previous centuries. Even though by the mid-eighteenth century, the need for English colonies
to be economically sustainable and militarily secure from indigenous threat, opened up non-English immigration to
North America, Catholics (along with Indian tribes) were denied basic rights on the grounds that they were

Over time, however, Irish and


Italian immigrants were made white. From the late nineteenth century, the
policing of the United Statess borders was another context where racial
and imperial security was intertwined with practices of surveillance.
Congress first sought to police borders as part of a strategy of regulating
labor in 1882, when it excluded Chinese immigrants . In 1909, US immigration officials
religiously and culturally different from the WASP population.25

began excluding around half of all Asian Indians from entering. Following concern from the British government that
anti-colonial nationalists from India were using the United States as a base to spread radical politics, US officials
began to interrogate Indian migrants at West Coast ports, and a British agent arranged for the Justice Department
to monitor all mail moving between India and the Berkeley and San Francisco post offices.26

2AC Islamophobia Term Bad


Use of the term Islamophobia helps to unify the MuslimAmerican community and condemn racist violence.
Mujahid 8 (Abdul Malik Mujahid, American Muslim religious leader, activist, film

producer, and non-profit entrepreneur, as well as an interfaith activist; 14 Ways You


Can Fight Islamophobia; Sound Vision, Muslim website dedicated to information and
awareness,
http://www.soundvision.com/info/islamophobia/fightingislamophobia.asp, 2008.)
Note that incidents of Islamophobia are not isolated . Whether it's threat of
bombing Makkah, calling Islam evil, depicting the Prophet as a terrorist,
disrespecting the Quran, discriminating against Muslims, profiling Hindus,
Sikhs, or Latinos thinking they look like Muslims, torturing prisoners,
bombing civilians, these are all signs of Islamophobia. 3. Also note that not
all media or all non-Muslims support this type of insulting behavior. Many
have been at the forefront of condemning torture, bombing and
occupation. There are 75 million Americans who, despite all Islamophobic media,
think positive about Islam and Muslims. 4. Equate racism, anti-Semitism and
Islamophobia. They all are fruits of the same tree of hate. 5. Start using
the word Islamophobia to describe any kind of hate crime or speech
against Islam and Muslims. Doing this will make the term uniform and
eventually, an accepted part of the English language the way the term
"anti-Semitism" is. 6. If you are involved in interfaith work, bring up the topic
of Islamophobia at your meetings. Stress the urgency and need for people
of all faiths to help address and condemn it and all other forms of
intolerance publicly. If possible, get the organization to issue a public
statement condemning Islamophobia in general, as well as in response to
specific incidents like those mentioned above. 7. Sponsor reports on
Islamophobia. Unless more documentation and yearly opinion surveys are
conducted, people will continue to dismiss Islamophobia as a reality. So
far, the UK is the only country which has officially commissioned a report on
Islamophobia. The word has yet to become a part of American media. 8.
Request your local library to purchase some of the latest books and
articles on the phenomenon of Islamophobia. Some of these include
Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy, Islamophobia and Anti-Americanism:
Causes and Remedies and Combating Islamophobia depends on unlearning
intolerance 9. Report any and every incident of Islamophobia you, your
family or friends encounter. The FBI collects hate crime statistics. Report
Islamophobia to them at your local FBI office. File a report with the Council on
American-Islamic Relations. They issue an annual report on Muslim civil rights in the
US. Also report the crime to your local police office. 10. If it's an election year, make
sure your local Congressman or Congresswoman who relies on your vote is
aware of Islamophobia. Organize a delegation of Muslims in your constituency if
you can and arrange to make a presentation on the topic, as well as a list of clear
things you would like your Congressman or Congresswoman to do about

Islamophobia if they want your vote. 11 .For every incident of Islamophobia ,


write a letter to the editor and your local civil rights organization about it.
12. Organize a program at your local mosque or community center about
the problem of Islamophobia today. Hold a brainstorming session as part of the
program as well to discuss how to solve this problem. 13. Thank those who
speak out or act against Islamophobia . A quick call, even leaving a message
and/or a two-line email message are sufficient.

Specificity of the term Islamophobia serves to distinguish


between its effect on discourse against Muslim-Americans and
the hate crimes caused by anti-Muslim racism.
Richardson, 13 (Robin Richardson, a former director of the Runnymede Trust
and the editor of Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All; Islamophobia or anti-Muslim
racism or what? concepts and terms revisited; http://www.insted.co.uk/antimuslim-racism.pdf)
There is an international cluster of terms and phrases referring to
negative feelings and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. The most
widely known member of the cluster is Islamophobia. But competing with it in certain

contexts, countries and international organisations, and amongst academic observers, there are several other
terms. They include anti-Muslim racism, intolerance against Muslims, anti-Muslim prejudice, antiMuslim
bigotry, hatred of Muslims, anti-Islamism, anti-Muslimism, Muslimophobia, demonisation of Islam and
demonisation of Muslims. There is a similar range of contested terms in other languages, not just in English. In
German, for example, there is a contest between Islamophobie and Islamfeindlichkeit, the latter implying hostility,
not fear. In French, the contest is in part between islamophobie on the one hand and racisme anti-arabe or racisme
anti-maghrbin on the other, the latter two phrases indicating that the phenomenon is primarily to be seen as a
form of anti-immigrant racism directed towards communities from parts of the former French Empire, not primarily
to do with religion or culture. The Scandinavian term Muslimhat translates literally into English as Muslim hatred,
though more accurately as hatred of Muslims, with echoes of legal usage in English terms such as incitement to

Such differences in terminology reflect, but they do not


exactly correspond to, differences of understanding and focus . For
hatred and hate crimes.

example, they reflect different views of causes, influences, drivers and


key features , and therefore different kinds of proposal and practical
agenda, and different approaches to media analysis. Also, the different terms may be
used to distinguish between different manifestations of the phenomena
under discussion, so that the term anti-Muslim racism is used to refer to
hate crimes, and to harassment, rudeness and verbal abuse in public
spaces, whereas the term Islamophobia refers to discourse and mindsets
in the media , including the broadsheets as well as the tabloids (Sivanandan
2010).

The term Islamophobia helps to form Muslim-American activist


movements categorizing similar forms of oppression and
pushing unification against the specific form of prejudice.
Richardson, 13 (Robin Richardson, a former director of the Runnymede Trust
and the editor of Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All; Islamophobia or anti-Muslim
racism or what? concepts and terms revisited; http://www.insted.co.uk/antimuslim-racism.pdf)

Despite its disadvantages, the term Islamophobia looks as if it is here to stay it cannot now be discarded from the
lexicon. Not least, this is because

it has acquired legitimacy and emotional power

amongst people who are at the receiving end of anti-Muslim hostility and
prejudice, and acts therefore as an activist concept (Bevelander and Otterbeck
capable of mobilising opposition and resistance . It has been observed, say Peter
Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, that movements against discrimination do not begin
until a commonly understood label evolves that brings together under
2012)

one banner all forms of that particular prejudice . They continue: Resistance to gender
discrimination coalesced under the term sexism. The civil rights movement gained momentum when harnessed to
the notion of racism that encapsulated the variety of innate prejudices and institutional obstacles in a white
dominated society. The concept of antisemitism has provided a powerful tool to object to anti-Jewish sentiment that
was once, like the denigrations of women and blacks, considered normal and left largely unchallenged by people

Increasingly, and particularly among Muslims, Islamophobia


provides a term to similarly draw attention to a normalised prejudice and
fitting the norm.

unjustified discrimination . Undoubtedly this term will elicit the same unease among and even
backlash from some of those whose notion of normal it challenges, just as its historical predecessors have and still
do. (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008: 11)

It often happens that people at the receiving


end of religious intolerance turn to their religious tradition for solace and
moral support, and this strengthens their sense that it is their religion
which is primarily under attack (Birt 2009). For this reason too, the concept of Islamophobia is
It is helpful to recall in this respect that the concept is
recognisably similar to terms such as homophobia, xenophobia and
europhobia, none of which imply mental illness , and that it not infrequently happens, in
now here to stay.

the history of language, that words are coined that are less than ideal. The word antisemitism, for example, is
lexically nonsensical since there is no such thing as semitism; and in any case not all Jewish people are so-called
Semites, nor are all so-called Semitic people Jewish. The word has been current long enough now, however, for it to
be generally accepted as unproblematic. The same kind of acceptance is apparently being accorded to
Islamophobia, despite the problems and disadvantages outlined above. It is nevertheless apposite to note and
discuss some of the alternative terms which have been proposed, in particular anti-Muslim racism and intolerance
against Muslims

Breaking Islamophobia down into Islam and phobia is a


counterproductive semantic move which reifies Ableism
Sayyid 8, Reader in Postcolonial and Racism Studies at the University of Leeds,
and Director of the Centre of Ethnicity and Racism Studies. THINKING THRU
ISLAMOPHOBIA Symposium Papers, ARE UNICORNS MUSLIM? Centre for Ethnicity &
Racism Studies, May, p.1-2
Those who see Islamophobia not as a polemical but as an analytical term are confronted with the paucity of its

Neither consistently defined, deployed, or understood,


Islamophobia comes off as a nebulous and perpetually contested category .
This has allowed it to circulate widely, but ineffectively: useful, for some, to vent grievances; used, by
others, to pontificate; conveniently toothless platitudes and sound bites
for canvassing politicians and opinion makers unable or unwilling to see
its value as a tool for justice . Questions about what Islamophobia is, often (and not unreasonably
in the practical domain of public policy and everyday life) slip into questions about who exactly
is and is not Islamophobic. This type of question in turn slides into others
that inquire whether Islamophobia actually exists , which in turn impinges upon what,
current formulation.

if any, relationship is there between Islamophobia and racism, or Islamophobia and Orientalism. What, in short, do

Confronted with the


whirlpool of polemics and emotions around the concept, there is a strong
we gain, and lose, by talking about Islamophobia rather than racism or Orientalism?

temptation to clear the decks, mistaking essential contestion for


semantic ambiguity and thus to offer rigorous and nuanced definition by
way of solution. The most common such approach, which further mistakes the etymology of the concept
for conceptual definition, is to try and understand Islamophobia by breaking it down into its constituent parts: we
know what Islam is, and we know what phobia means, thus we can
understand Islamophobia as fear of Islam (and its cognates). While not
devoid of heuristic value this approach does not help us to account for
the range of phenomena marshalled by and mobilisations around
references to Islamophobia.

There is a difference between the word phobia and the suffix


-phobia Islamophobia indicates prejudice against MuslimAmericans rather than an irrational fear.
Beck, 12 (Laura Beck, writer at Jezebel.com, ex-editor for VICE, graduate from
New York University; The AP Says No More 'Homophobia," 'Islamophobia,' or 'Ethnic
Cleansing', Jezebel.com; 11/26/12 9:15pm)

In the past few months, the AP has removed homophobia, Islamophobia, and ethnic cleansing from their Style Book,
explaining that "'-phobia,' 'an irrational, uncontrollable fear, often a form of mental illness' should not be used 'in
political or social contexts,' including 'homophobia' and 'Islamophobia.' It also calls 'ethnic cleansing' a
'euphemism,' and says the AP 'does not use 'ethnic cleansing' on its own. It must be enclosed in quotes, attributed
and explained.'" Interesting. However, a commenter on Politico points out that "[t]his is completely wrong .

They
have confused the WORD "phobia" with the SUFFIX '-phobia' . The word
"phobia" is just what they said: a technical term denoting an extreme,
debilitating fear. The suffix '-phobia', on the other hand is much broader. It
can mean not just fear of, but also dislike of, aversion to, prejudice
against, having a really bad (physical) reaction to, etc . Consider
'Anglophobia', 'Francophobia', 'hydrophobia', photophobia, etc. It has
become an all-purpose (suffix) antonym to '-philia' . (bibliophilia, bibliophobia)."

2AC AT: PC DA Link Turn


Plan is popular counter-terrorism funding is unpopular with
both house and senate
Wong, defense reporter at the Hill, 2014

(Kristina, 07/20/14, Lawmakers leery of counterterrorism fund,


http://thehill.com/policy/defense/budget-appropriations/212739-lawmakers-leery-ofobamas-counterterrorism-fund, accessed 7/10/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
The spending request sparked a heated debate Thursday over increased
funding and presidential authority, as the Senate Appropriations
Committee marked up the draft bill. "There is just too much of a chance
that those weapons will land in the hands of extremist s, just like in Iraq," said Sen.
Mark Pryor (D-Ark.). Pryor., who is looking at a tough re-election battle this fall, proposed an amendment to quash

Obamas proposal also received sharp


reactions in the House. If the president had this authority a year ago,
wed be involved in a war with Syria right now ... Americans are tired of
being at war," said Rep. Austin Scott (R-Ga.) at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on Wednesday.
Lawmakers at a House Budget Committee Thursday hearing also grilled
defense officials on why the administration did not put its request for the
counterterrorism initiative into its base defense budget request due in
March, so lawmakers could scrutinize the proposal before drafting their defense authorization and spending bills.
Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work said that the request could not be made
earlier, because war funding depended on knowing troop numbers in Afghanistan, and those figures were not
clear until May. We were caught by a time issue, he said. Rather than try to predict which
the Syrian training program. His measure failed 9-21.

account would need more money next year, it made more sense to have a generic fund they could tap into based
on emerging needs, Work said. We felt that this would be -- actually provide us with more flexibility, Work said.
Adm. James Sandy Winnefeld, who testified alongside Work, said the Pentagon also was too constrained by
Congress-imposed defense budget caps under sequestration. See, most of the authorities that Congress has
provided, sir, have caps on them. And the whole purpose of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund was to use those

Lawmakers, however, said the details were


lacking and accused officials of trying to create a slush fund they could
tap into to spend without congressional scrutiny. This seems like a lot of
leeway that really hampers Congress' oversight mission, said Rep. Tammy
Duckworth (D-Ill.) at the Armed Services Committee hearing. It seems this has become yet
another slush fund where you can just transfer it between accounts
without accountability and you can transfer it even between departments
and you're asking for $5 billion, which seems like a large amount of money
to have that little oversight on, she said. Work responded that officials did not believe
it was a slush fund that will allow us to just go willy-nilly. We think there are going to be all sorts of
checks and balances, he adding that there is a 15-day notification for
Congress for use of the funds. But Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), ranking member on
the committee scoffed, referencing the administrations decision to ignore
a 30-day notification period in advance of releasing Guantanamo Bay
detainees in exchange for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl. I'm not sure arguing right now about
notification requirements is the best approach with this committee , he said.
existing authorities in a flexible way, he said.

Plan is popular Congress wants profiling of Muslim


communities to end
Chaffee 12 (Devon, Legislative Policy Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative
Office. Members of Congress Urge Investigation of FBI Muslim Surveillance.
American Civil Liberties Union. June 7.)
Yesterday 22 Members of Congress sent a letter to the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice urging him to launch an investigation into the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's improper recording and dissemination of
information about the First Amendment-protected activities of American
Muslims. Several of the members who joined the letter-including Representatives Pete Stark (D-CA-13), Anna
Eshoo (D-CA-14), Sam Farr (D- CA-17), Mike Honda (D- CA-15), Zoe Lofgren (D-CA-16), and Barbara Lee (D-CA-09)
-represent districts in Northern California in which FBI memoranda document the use of community outreach for

letter rightly highlights the negative impacts of the FBIs


misuse of community and mosque outreach to gather intelligence about Americans. The
letter states: Any FBI practice of taking information collected during
community outreach efforts for the purpose of utilizing it as intelligence threatens
to erode crucial trust between federal law enforcement and American
communities. It is also contrary to basic constitutional principles of free speech
and freedom of religion. In April, the ACLU sent its own letter to the Inspector General following the
intelligence purposes. The joint

release of FBI documents obtained through FOIA litigation, which demonstrate that from at least 2004 through
2010, the San Francisco and Sacramento FBI field offices documented and disseminated records on American

Recorded activities include: the content of


a religious sermon; the content of identified speakers' speeches at
community events; and individuals' religious affiliations and associations. The
Muslims' exercise of their First Amendment rights.

FBI's retention of such information in its intelligence files-almost all of the documents were classified as secret or

the FBI-violates federal


Privacy Act prohibitions against the maintenance of records about
individuals' First Amendment-protected activity.
marked as positive intelligence, and were labeled for distribution outside of

2AC AT: Terrorism DA Surveillance Kills


Intelligence
Surveillance creates a safe haven for violent extremism kills
intelligence gathering
Patel 2011
(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)
American Muslims sensitivity to being treated as a suspect class may also
have the unintended consequence, over the long term , of stimulating radicalization . Those
charged with enforcing anti-terrorism laws have recognized this risk. One high-ranking LAPD officer told the Senate that the
departments ultimate goal is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslimsnot merely to disrupt
terrorist activities.191 Thus, while law enforcement agents must hunt down and neutralize small numbers of clusters on the
criminal side of the radicalization trajectory, they should do so with precision and care.192 As the officer put it, What good is it to
disrupt a group planning a mall bombing if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages

Scholars who study radicalization and


terrorism have expressed similar concerns. Sageman, for example, has testified that the American
Muslim community is very sensitive to the action of local law
enforcement agencies, and if it perceives them to act against its members, it will assume that the state is also
against it.194 At the same hearing, another expert warned against creating a grievance base in the
United States. In the United Kingdom, the experience of Muslims as a community historically
subject to discrimination and then singled out and defined in terms of the threat it potentially poses to security
many more to enter the radicalization process?

has provided a tangible basis on which to graft violent Islamist ideology.195 Although such a grievance base has not traditionally

Muslims in this country begin to feel


more markedly singled out and/or defined in terms of terrorism and
threats to national security, the easier it may be for some among them to
understand the worldview and vision of Islamic extremism as something
been present among American Muslims, the expert warned, Should

that addresses their life circumstances .196 Those charged with designing our domestic
counterterrorism policies should carefully evaluate whether current tactics could create such a grievance base in the United
States.

The combination of intelligence gathering and community


outreach undermines those outreach programs and creates
backlash because it betrays the trust of community members
ACLU, 2011
(American Civil Liberties Union, 12-1-2011, ACLU EYE on the FBI Alert COMMUNITY
OUTREACH AS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, https://www.aclu.org/aclu-eye-fbi-alertcommunity-outreach-intelligence-gathering?redirect=national-security/aclu-eye-fbialert-community-outreach-intelligence-gathering, accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
The trust that community outreach efforts are intended to engender is
undermined when the FBI exploits outreach programs and events to
gather intelligence against religious and community organizations and
their members. There is no indication in the FBI documents obtained by the ACLU that
community members and organizations are informed that the FBIs
outreach activities are used for intelligence gathering purposes, or that the

information shared with FBI officials in these informal settings will be documented and stored in intelligence files,
shared with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and potentially used to target these individuals, their

The FBI has also documented


individuals First Amendment-protected activities in violation of the
Privacy Act, which specifically prohibits the FBI (and other federal agencies) from
maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by
statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless
pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity. A key purpose of the Privacy Act, according to Congress, is to prevent records obtained by federal
organizations or communities for further investigation.

agencies for a particular purpose from being used or made available for another purpose without the targeted

The ACLU calls on the FBI to cease using


community outreach for intelligence purposes, to be honest with
community organizations regarding what information is collected and
retained during community outreach meetings and to purge all
information collected improperly. We also call on the Department of Justice Inspector General to
individuals consent. THE SOLUTION:

investigate Privacy Act violations within the FBIs San Francisco and Sacramento Divisions, and to initiate a broader
audit of FBI practices throughout the nation to determine the scope of the problem and identify solutions.

Characterizing Muslims as extremists justifies heavy-handed


law enforcement practices that further radicalizes Muslims
Brooks, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette
University, 2011

(Risa, Muslim Homegrown Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the
Threat?, International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011, pp. 7-47, Project
MUSE, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
These political obstacles aside, more should be done to promote a balanced
discussion of terrorist threats in the United States. Otherwise, Americans are presented
with a distorted picture in which terrorist attacks appear to be originating primarily with Muslims, rather than with
extremists of all varieties. In an era when the mistrust of Muslim communities is a serious social and political issue,

unbalanced presentation is corrosive to American society.151 Finally,


mischaracterizing and inflating the Muslim homegrown American threat
could prove self-defeating to the countrys efforts to defend against it.
Especially worrisome is the potential that, in an atmosphere in which the threat of
homegrown terrorism appears serious and worsening, law enforcement
will employ counterproductive methods that threaten the trust between
its officials and Muslim communitiestrust that underpins the
demonstrated capacity and willingness of American Muslim communities
to self-police and root out militants in their midst .152 For example, although the
this

cultivation of informants and infiltration of undercover agents into Muslim communities can be helpful to
investigators, there are inevitable risks associated with these [End Page 45] methods, and using them requires care

In many places,
federal law enforcement and local police departments have sought to
build strong relationships through outreach to Muslim communities. Such
efforts help to lay the groundwork for good relations and ease tensions
associated with law enforcements monitoring efforts.153 But FBI sting
operations, such as those employed in the case of the Portland bombing suspect, Mohamed Osman
Mohamud, can seriously test those relationships .154 Evidence of mismanagement and
insensitivity are similarly troubling.155 More broadly, the perception that authorities
routinely run armies of informers through American Muslim
communities contributes to the sense, as the president of the Islamic Society of North America
describes it, that law enforcement is viewing our communities not as partners
but as objects of suspicion.156 Equally insidious is how these tactics, by
and awareness of how they may affect the communities in which they are employed.

generating suspicion and eroding norms of communal openness,


undermine the communitys capacity to self-police, thereby making it
harder for members to detect militants in their midst. 157

Turn- Overstating the threat of homegrown terrorism makes us


unprepared for other kinds of terrorism and alienates Muslims
from law enforcement, which prevents detection of
homegrown terrorism
Brooks, Assistant Professor of Political Science, 2011
(Risa A., Marquette University, Muslim Homegrown Terrorism in the United States:
How Serious Is the Threat?, International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011,
Project MUSE, accessed 7/5/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Clearly, public officials and analysts are worried about the prospect that
Americans will face a growing trend of violent attacks from extremist
elements within the countrys Muslim population. Less certain , however, is
whether those warnings and the sense of urgency associated with the homegrown terrorism threat
are warranted. In fact, the threat of Muslim American terrorism may not be
especially serious or growing. It could remain a modest challenge, similar to what it was for much
of the decade following September 11. The stakes for Americans in an accurate assessment of the threat of Muslim

If the threat is overstated, the United States risks


becoming preoccupied with this incarnation of terrorism and could make
unwarranted investments in intelligence and law enforcement to address
it, while underemphasizing other terrorist or nonterrorist threats.
Overstating or miscasting the homegrown threat could also undermine
societys resilience to terrorism, while feeding a climate of fear and
misunderstanding between Muslims and other Americans. In addition,
overestimating the threat could contribute to the adoption of
counterproductive counterterrorism methods, especially those that
threaten to alienate Muslim communities from law enforcement. Given that
cooperation from these communities has proven a major safeguard
against the homegrown threat, any breach of trust between their members and government
homegrown terrorism are significant.

authorities would be a worrisome development.

2AC AT: Terrorism DA Surveillance of Muslims


Fails
Law Enforcement agencies rely on scattershot intelligence
gathering this strategy violates the civil rights of Muslim
American and is effectively useless in actually preventing any
kind of terror
Patel 2011
(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)
Obviously, some terrorists are Muslims, but only a tiny sliver of a fraction of American
Muslims engage in terrorism. How can law enforcement and intelligence agencies combat terrorism
without tarring an entire community? We have faced such complex public safety challenges before in our history.
Organized crime, for example, has often been rooted in specific ethnic or religious communities. Using the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act and other tools, law enforcement broke the back of crime families.

law
enforcement agencies current response to the complex question of
radicalization among American Muslims is heavily reliant on scattershot
intelligence gathering, even when this risks good relations with the very communities with which it
But it did so without randomly probing and stigmatizing entire ethnic communities. In contrast,

seeks to partner in fighting terrorism. When asked what it is doing to combat the threat of radicalization among
American Muslims, the FBI generally has two responses: 1) it cites its own intelligence-gathering capabilities and its
leveraging of the intelligence-gathering capabilities of its federal, state, and local law enforcement partners; and 2)
it notes its efforts to foster good relations with Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities and to encourage them
to report on the radicalization of individuals toward violent Islamic extremism.125 Occasionally, the Bureau casts

Although
the FBI does not explain how it deploys its intelligence-gathering
capabilities, there is accumulating evidence that its monitoring and
the latter set of activities as attempts to dispel misconceptions that may foster radicalization.126

surveillance efforts target American Muslim communities and religious


institutions. This response is congruent with the religious conveyor belt theory of radicalization. Less
is known about local law enforcement agencies intelligence activities, but
there are indications that they follow a similar pattern. Often the
information collectede.g., about communities considered susceptible to radicalization and about the
tenor and content of sermons and peoples views about religion and politicsis relevant
only to the early stages of radicalization as envisioned by law enforcement
agencies rather than to operational planning for an attack.

Terrorists connection to Islam is often overstated and


misunderstood
Patel 2011

(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)

Given the rhetoric used by the 9/11 attackers and those who have come in their wake, it
is no surprise that religion is assumed to lie at the heart of Islamist
terrorism.60 This assumption has led some to suggest that we should look to Muslim communities to find
incipient terrorists and that expressions of devout faith are signs that someone is
likely to become a terrorist . The notion that the practice of Islam is, in and of
itself, a precursor to terrorism appears to have gained a hold on the
American psyche, as demonstrated by the recent furor over plans to build an Islamic cultural center in
downtown Manhattan and protests against mosques around the country.61 The view that Islam drives
terrorism also seems to have found its way into some government
understandings of the radicalization process. Even leaving aside the important First
Amendment and profiling concerns raised by the embrace of such an assumption by government officials, the
religiosity-terrorism connection is simply not borne out by empirical research. The British MI5 Study explicitly
debunked this view. It found that [f]ar from being religious zealots,

a large number of those

involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly . Many lack


religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices .62
Sagemans review of 500 cases, as well as multiple other empirical studies, have found that a lack of religious
literacy and education appears to be a common feature among those that are drawn to [terrorist] groups.63
Indeed, there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent
radicalization.64 A recent study of 117 homegrown terrorists in the United States and United Kingdom (FDD
Study) examined the linkage between terrorism and a conservative understanding of Islam.65 While there are
questions as to whether the type of sampling technique used in the study is at all useful in predicting violence,66

a significant
proportion of actual terrorists exhibited the religious behaviors
identified as indicative of radicalization.67 For example, only 17.1 percent of the sample
even among the sample population examined, the FDD Study was unable to establish that

exhibited low tolerance for perceived theological deviance and only 15.4 percent of the sample attempted to

The relatively low correlation between


religiosity and terrorismin a study that seemed aimed at finding such a correlationis a
strong indication that conservative religious belief may play a lesser role
in radicalization than one might assume. Overall, the available research does not support the
impose their religious beliefs on others.68

view that Islam drives terrorism or that observing the Muslim faitheven a particularly stringent or conservative
variety of that faithis a step on the path to violence.69 In fact, that research suggests the opposite: Instead of
promoting radicalization, a strong religious identity could well serve to inoculate people against turning to violence
in the name of Islam.

2AC AT: Terrorism DA Intelligence Gathering


Fails
Radicalization efforts are inherently flawed they are based on
the idea that there is a path to extremism, which is never the
case
Patel 2011
(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)
Despite the impetus to find a terrorist profile or hallmarks of radicalization to hone in on incipient terrorists,

empirical research has emphatically and repeatedly concluded that there


is no such profile and no such easily identifiable hallmarks. An in-depth empirical

study by the United Kingdoms security service MI5 (British MI5 Study)45 found there was no typical profile of the

the process by which people came to embrace violence


was complex. It emphasized that there is no single pathway to extremism , and that
all those studied had taken strikingly different journeys to violent extremist
activity.47 In 2010, another key U.K. government agency cautioned, We do not believe that it is accurate to
British terrorist,46 and that

regard radicalization in this country as a linear conveyor belt moving from grievance, through radicalization, to
violence This thesis seems to both misread the radicalization process and to give undue weight to ideological
factors.48 The conclusions of MI5 are largely consistent with the analysis in Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the
Twentieth Century, in which former CIA case officer and psychologist Marc Sageman analyzed more than 500 cases
to II. RETHINKING RADICALIZATION | 9 understand how people evolve into terrorists.49 While Sageman described

emphasized that there was no linear


progression from one stage to the next and that [o]ne cannot simply draw
a line, put markers on it and gauge where people are along this path to
see whether they are close to committing atrocities .51 Similarly, 14 years of research
the radicalization process as having several stages,50 he

conducted at [the Rand Corporation] and elsewhere suggests that no single pathway towards terrorism exists,
making it somewhat difficult to identify overarching patterns in how and why individuals are susceptible to terrorist
recruitment as well as intervention strategies.52 Rands model was unable to predict who among similarly situated
people would adopt radical views, or to identify the smaller sub-set of individuals who would commit violence.53
Indeed, the latter was the most difficult to isolate and was often a matter of happenstance.54

2AC AT: Terrorism DA No Impact Domestic


Terrorism
There is zero evidence that there is any elevated risk of
homegrown Muslim terrorism- 3 reasons
Brooks, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette
University, 2011

(Risa, Muslim Homegrown Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the
Threat?, International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011, pp. 7-47, Project
MUSE, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Despite the concerns expressed by many analysts and public officials, the evidence does not
support the conclusion that Americans face a growing threat of deadly
attacks plotted by Muslims in the United States. First, it is unclear that
more American Muslims are intent on mounting such attacks. Although it may yet
prove to be the case, the evidence at present does not substantiate such a
finding. The exploratory nature and approach of studies of [End Page 36] radicalization provide limited tools for
evaluating whether Muslim Americans are increasingly exhibiting cognitive and behavioral changes that predispose

Even if the behaviors and beliefs sometimes associated with


radicalization are detected, it is unclear that they will culminate in
individuals undertaking terrorist activity, and if so, in what incidence
individuals will engage in violent acts. Other evidence that radicalization is increasing,
such as a surge in arrests, is also a poor indicator of a growing inclination toward
them to violence.

violence. The surge could be the result of a clustering of arrests of those long engaged in militancy or the
apprehension of large groups, such as the members of the Daniel Boyd network or the al-Shabaab recruits.
Improvements in detection or other actions by law enforcement could also be contributing to an increase in the
number of individuals charged with terrorist offenses independent of any larger trends in the population.

Second, there is a dearth of evidence suggesting that American Muslims,


even if they were to aspire in greater numbers to plot deadly attacks,
would be more capable of doing so without being prematurely
apprehended than their counterparts in the past. The evidence cited above suggests
that a significant grassroots investigative and monitoring architecture is in place in the United States, such that

those who do aspire to plot will continue to be hard pressed to do so


undetected. There is no basis for anticipating that the security
environment has become more permissive for terrorists. If anything, the
commitment to a steady growth of resources, an emphasis on federal, state, and
local cooperative initiatives in counterterrorism, ongoing signs of societal vigilance, and
continued resistance to militancy in Muslim communities suggest that
terrorist plots, as in the past, have a high probability of being detected and
foiled before they culminate in the deaths of Americans. Finally, even if attacks are not
foiled, there is little basis for anticipating that those that are executed will
be less prone to failure than in the past. Muslim homegrown terrorists in
2009 or 2010 do not appear to have been better equipped to overcome the
challenges of bomb making, or preparing attacks, than in prior years. Indeed, mistakes in
operational security and tradecraft are common even among skilled
terrorists and, in the case of the mostly inexperienced and unprofessional cohort of American terrorists, may
be endemic.110 The evidence from several 2010 cases, including those of Finton, Smadi, Farooque, Martinez, and
Mohamud, suggests that militants make even the most basic mistakes in terrorist tradecraft, including soliciting
help from friends for their plots, advertising their intentions on the internet, and trusting [End Page 37] informants
and undercover agents often with few questions asked.111 Even the most capable homegrown terroristssuch as
those few who managed to navigate security obstacles to obtain overseas training and guidanceran into difficulty

in preparing for their attacks. For example, both Zazi and Shahzad had to contend with serious technical problems
and committed errors in operational security.

Empirics flow aff-religious radicalism is not a threat and


treating it as such is unjustified
Kundnani 15 (Arun Kundnani is an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay
College, A Decade Lost Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism, January 2015,
http://mabonline.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Claystone-rethinkingradicalisation.pdf)
This study by a neoconservative think-tank in Washington, DC, is an empirical examination of
119 homegrown jihadist terrorists. Based on this data, it claims that the most significant
factor associated with terrorism is religious ideology. However, the study does not use a control
group to test whether the same indicators of religious ideology might also
be associated with people who are not terrorists. Even according to the
studys own data, radical political views appear to be more significant
than radical religious views.

2AC AT: Terrorism DA AT: Radicalization


Useless policing strategies based on Radicalization put a label
on every Muslim as a potential terrorist Most of these
programs are completely ineffective and have shown little to
no results in actually stopping terrorism. (Card could probably
be recut as an example of islamophobia being ingrained in the
scholars)
Kundnani 14 (Arun Kundnani is an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York
University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism,
and the Domestic War on Terror //ASG)

radicalization is
essentially a theological-psychological process in which dangerous
religious beliefs and identities, activated by group dynamics or cognitive openings,
transform individuals into terrorists has been influential among law
enforcement agencies. In 2007, the Intelligence Division and Counter-Terrorism Bureau of
the NYPD published a study, entitled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, that
outlined a simplified version of this kind of radicalization model. It was the
first time the NYPD had chosen to publish a document that claimed any kind of
scholarly credentials; it did so, it stated, in order to contribute to the debate among intelligence and
Radicalization Models as Policing Tools The view shared by Sageman and Wiktorowiczthat

law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat. The report is backed by outside experts,
such as Brian Jenkins Mead of the RAND Corporation, and strongly influenced by the work of Sageman and
Wiktorowicz; it identifies jihadist ideology as the key driver of radicalizatio n
and suggests four phases an individual passes through in going from being unremarkable to a person quite likely
to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act: preradicalization (before they are exposed to
jihadi- Salafi Islam); self-identification (they begin to explore Salafi Islam as a result of a cognitive opening, which
leads to the breakdown of an existing identity and to associations with like-minded others); indoctrination (the
progressive intensification of their beliefs which, as a result of group socialization, leads to the complete adoption of
the ideology); and jihadization (their acceptance of their individual duty to participate in jihad). These four stages
are described as a funnel through which ordinary persons become terrorists, as their religious beliefs become

The NYPD study argues that each of these four stages of


radicalization has a distinct set of indicators that allow predictions to be
made about future terrorist risks. For example, stage two of the radicalization
process has typical signatures that include: becoming alienated from ones former life;
progressively more radical.

affiliating with like-minded individuals; joining or forming a group of like-minded individuals in a quest to
strengthen ones dedication to Salafi Islam; 99 giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop

gangster clothes; wearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard; becoming


involved in social activism and community issues. The study acknowledges that these behaviors are subtle and
non-criminal, but nevertheless, the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible stage

means that intelligence gathering based on these indicators is the critical


tool in helping to thwart an attack.28 The NYPDs study bases its analysis on eleven actual and
alleged plots that took place in the US, the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, and Australia, each involving a
handful of perpetrators. Not only is this too small a sample upon which to base positive knowledge claims about the
relationship between religious behaviors and terrorism, it also lumps together individuals in widely varying social
and political contexts. Additionally, there is no control group of individuals who fit the pattern of religious behaviors
associated with radicalization but do not become terrorists. In order to show a correlation between a set of religious
behaviors and terrorism, it would be necessary not only to show that terrorists are statistically likely to have passed
through a process in which those behaviors were manifest, but also that nonterrorists are statistically unlikely to
show the same behaviors. In fact, the behaviors the NYPD study associates with

radicalization are

common to large numbers of people who never become terrorists . Likewise,


the study does not consider cases of terrorism that are not carried out by
Muslims, for example, terrorist activity carried out by individuals in far Right movements. By failing to compare
across cases of terrorism with different ideological motivations, the study ignores the possibility of indicators of risk
that are not specific to Muslims but have a general applicability to terrorism in general. The claim that terrorism

carried out by Muslims is driven by a radicalization process different from other forms of terrorism should, if made,
be derived from whatever case-based evidence is available to support it rather than assumed as a given in the
design of the study. Finally, even constraining ourselves to the small number of cases the NYPD study actually
describesand ignoring the absence of a control group and the absence of comparisons with other forms of
terrorismthe study offers weak evidence for any correlation between religious behaviors and terrorist activity,
because its assertions linking religious behaviors and terrorist acts are generally impressionistic, arbitrary, and
lacking in any analytic rigor. Following Sageman and Wiktorowiczs emphasis on the group dynamic in
radicalization, the NYPD considers it crucial to identify the venues where socialization into radical ideology is
occurring, what it refers to as radicalization incubators. These the study describes as places where like-minded
individuals will congregate as they move through the radicalization process. They can be mosques but are more
likely to be cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, non-governmental organizations,
hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores [or] extremist 100 websites and chat-rooms.29 Thus, in
the hands of the NYPD, Sagemans and Wiktorowiczs radicalization scholarship becomes a prospectus for mass
surveillance of Muslim populations.

Radicalization efforts are counterproductive they try to guess


when terrorism will strike by following a simple guide process
that is not complex enough to address the threat of terrorism
Patel 2011
(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)
In recent years, Americans have grown increasingly concerned about the threat
of homegrown terrorist attacks. Most notably, the near-detonation of a car bomb in Times
Square in 2010 raised alarms that the next phase in terrorism would be directed by Americans, at Americans, in

Government at all levels has stepped up efforts to prevent such violence.


government officials have sought to understand
radicalization, which they define as the process by which American citizens and residents turn to
violence, using Islam as an ideological or religious justification.1 They hope that by
America.

As part of this drive,

understanding radicalization, they can identify homegrown terrorists


before they strike .2 Combating radicalization is now a specific goal of the National Security Policy
articulated by President Barack Obama.3 In Congress, the new chair of the House Homeland Security Committee
has launched hearings on the subject.4 Officials and experts divide sharply on the extent of the threat posed by
homegrown terrorism. The Intelligence Community has traditionally judged the threat to be limited. Local law
enforcement agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), on the other hand, have suggested it is more

within government, however, is that the homegrown threat


demands attention. Myriad federal and state agencies have devoted extensive resources to
studying radicalization and designing a response. Radicalization is complex. Yet a thinlysourced, reductionist view of how people become terrorists has gained
unwarranted legitimacy in some counterterrorism circles. This view corresponds with
and seems to legitimize counter-radicalization measures that rely heavily on non-threatbased intelligence collection, a tactic that may be ineffective or even
widespread. The consensus

counterproductive . Only by analyzing what we know about radicalization


and the governments response to it can we be sure that these reactions
are grounded in fact rather than stereotypes and truly advance our
efforts to combat terrorism.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) are the federal governments lead agencies to combat radicalization.5 These
expert agencies have made public statements that recognize the complexity of the radicalization process. But they
have not expressly repudiated theories suggesting that it is possible to detect radicalization long before people take
concrete steps toward violence. Nor have they proposed a unified set of responses that take account of the
difficulty of combating radicalization without impinging on the Constitution.6 Domestic law enforcement agencies,

They have
developed simplistic theories of how American Muslims become
radicalized. These theories suggest, contrary to empirical social science studies, that the path to
terrorism has a fixed trajectory and that each step of the process has
specific, identifiable markers. They imply that by closely monitoring the communities deemed
including the FBI and state and local police departments,7 have stepped into the breach.

susceptible to radicalization, law enforcement officials can spot nascent terrorists and prevent future 25 attacks.
Since the markers of radicalization they identify are inextricably linked to Muslim religious behavior, these theories
justify broad monitoring of American Muslim communities,8 including in their places of worship. Indeed, the theories
are characterized by the view that there is a sort of religious conveyor belt that leads from grievance or personal
crisis to religiosity to the adoption of radical beliefs to terrorism, with each step along that continuum identifiable to
law enforcement officials who know how to recognize the signs.

Their evidence Radicalization Models are false the literature


doesnt show a relationship between theology and violence
Kundnani 14 (Arun Kundnani is an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York
University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism,
and the Domestic War on Terror //ASG)

Radicalization models, whether based solely on theology or including a social psychological component,
have encouraged national security establishments to believe they can
preempt future terrorist attacks through intensive surveillance of the
spiritual and mental lives of Muslims. As noted earlier, radical religious ideology
has been defined as a kind of virus infecting those with whom it comes
into contact, either by itself or in combination with psychological processes. But we have seen
that the radicalization literature fails to offer a convincing demonstration
of any causal relationship between theology and violence , and there is no
evidence of any significant statistical correlation between the supposed
indicators of radicalization and terrorist violence. Moreover, the concept of
radicalization tends to confuse a propensity for violence with an interest
in radical ideas, leading the question of what causes violence to be insufficiently isolated from the question

of how belief systems and ideologies come 103 to be adopted. In a paper that is less widely read than his better
known books on Islam, the French sociologist Olivier Roy, a widely respected authority on European Muslims, argues
that it makes more sense to separate theology from violence: The

process of violent
radicalisation has little to do with religious practice , while radical theology, as salafism,
does not necessarily lead to violence.46 The leap into terrorism is not religiously inspired but better seen as
sharing many factors with other forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-left), or behavioural: the fascination for
sudden suicidal violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random shootings in schools (the Columbine
syndrome).47 While a Salafi vocabulary is used by certain groups to articulate their narratives, this by itself is not
evidence that religious ideology is causing violence, merely that, within this milieu, theological references provide a
veneer of legitimacy. Religious ideology seems to play at most an enabling role in cohering a group rather than

the radicalization concept


continues to be popular among policy makers in Europe and the US. And the
alternative possibilities of conceiving of terrorism, particularly of viewing
it as a mode of political action, are neglected. While policing agencies search for
being the underlying driver of terrorism. In spite of its analytical problems,

scholarship that can give them a magical formula to predict who will be a future terrorist, the microlevel question of
what causes one person rather than another in the same political context to engage in violence is probably beyond
analysis and best seen as unpredictable.48 Sizable resources have been allocated to finding a general formula of
radicalization, yet no plausible one has been offered. At best, the path to becoming a terrorist can be reconstructed
on an individual basis after the event. For law enforcement agencies, the best approach is therefore to investigate
the active incitement, financing, or preparation of terrorist violence rather than wider belief systems which are
wrongly assumed to be its precursors. On the other hand, the mesolevel question of what conditions are likely to
increase or decrease its legitimacy for a particular political actor (either a social movement or a state) is amenable
to productive analysis. So too is the macrolevel question of how particular social movements and states are
constituted to be in conflict with each other, and how the interaction between these different political actors
produces a context in which violence becomes seen as a legitimate tactic.49 An objective study would examine how

state and nonstate actors mutually constitute themselves as combatants in a global conflict between the West and
radical Islam and address under what conditions each chooses to adopt tactics of violence, paying close attention to
the relationships between their legitimizing frameworks.

Radicalization theory is wrong-means no internal link to


Muslim homegrown terror
Kundnani 15 (Arun Kundnani is an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and

Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay
College, A Decade Lost Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism, January 2015,
http://mabonline.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Claystone-rethinkingradicalisation.pdf)
The author, who later served on President Obamas National Security Council, spent a number of months in London
in 2002 conducting ethnographic fieldwork with al-Muhajiroun, the radical Islamist group founded by Omar Bakri
Muhammad. The study seeks to answer the question of why thousands of young Britons are attracted to the
panoply of radical Islamic movements with bases or branches in the United Kingdom, including Hizb ut-Tahrir,
Supporters of the Shariah, al- Muhajiroun, and al-Qaeda. Al-Muhajiroun is taken as a case study. Like Sageman, he
emphasizes the importance of social networks and refers to the importance of psychological crises in which
previously accepted beliefs are shaken and an individual becomes receptive to radical views and perspectives. 29

the individuals studied by Wiktorowicz are radical activists not terrorists, a


distinction that gets lost in the attempt to construct a model of
radicalisation. Most of al-Muhajirouns activities were ideological but the group supported violence in certain
But

contexts and individual activists and former activists have been involved in violent actions. Wiktorowicz offers little
reflection on what factors legitimise or delegitimise the use of violence within the group. Instead, the question of
what causes people to adopt radical religious beliefs becomes a proxy for the question of what causes violence. As

the social psychological process by


which individuals become active in radical Islamist groups is not all that
different from moderate, non-violent Muslim groups or from non-Islamic
social movements, even if the content of the ideology differs; it therefore
becomes impossible to use his account of that process to credibly explain
why terrorism occur In opposition to these studies, there is an increasing
number of scholars sceptical of the concept of radicalisation and its
implication that radical ideas produce terrorist violence . Marc Sageman, for example,
Wiktorowicz himself acknowledges at the end of his study,

has moved away from his earlier emphasis on religious ideology as a significant factor in causing terrorism. In 2013,

governments should stop being brainwashed by this notion


of radicalisation. There is no such thing. Some people when theyre
young acquire extreme views; many of them just grow out of them. Do not
overreact youll just create worse problems. Another prominent terrorism expert who
he suggested that

has highlighted problems with the notion of radicalisation is John Horgan, director of the International Center for the
Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University. He comments that: The

idea that radicalization


causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism
research ... [First], the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical
beliefs do not engage in violence. And second, there is increasing
evidence that people who engage in terrorism dont necessarily hold
radical beliefs.

2AC AT: Terrorism DA Tradeoff White Collar


Crime
Funding tradeoff DA- Representing Muslims as terrorists forces
the FBI to focus on preventing terrorism, allowing white-collar
crime to go unpunished
Brooks, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette
University, 2011
(Risa, Muslim Homegrown Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the
Threat?, International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011, pp. 7-47, Project
MUSE, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
This article demonstrates that the threat posed by Muslim homegrown terrorism is
not particularly serious, and it does not appear to be growing , especially in its
most lethal incarnationdeadly attacks within the United States. Indeed, many analysts and public
officials risk overstating the threat posed by Muslim American terrorism.
Mischaracterizing that threat, in turn, is potentially costly and
counterproductive for the security of the United States and the welfare of
its citizens, for several reasons. [End Page 42] First, misjudging the homegrown threat
could lead the country to overinvest or poorly spend on counterterrorism
initiatives. Since the September 11 attacks, the governments investments in
resources oriented toward grassroots homeland security have risen
steadily. Although these are modest in comparison with other federal expenditures, they nevertheless detract
from other priorities. Consider, for example, how the reallocation of resources toward
terrorism within the FBI has undermined its capacity to pursue whitecollar crimes. After 2001, the FBI reduced the number of agents for its criminal program by 30 percent (from
6,179 in 2001 to 4,353 in 2008), while the number of agents specifically allocated for white-collar crime fell by 36

Consequently, the number of cases brought forward


related to financial institution fraud plummeted by 48 percent (dropping from
2,435 to 1,257), and during the height of the 2008 financial crisis, the FBI was
left struggling to find resources to investigate major financial and other
mortgage and securities crimes.141 In short, the terrorism trade-off can be significant,
percent, from 1,722 to 1,097.

especially if serious questions remain about whether that investment is warranted.142

2AC AT: Terrorism DA AT: Dirty Bomb Retal


Dirty bombs dont cause retaliation
Medalia 11 (Jonathan Medalia, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Dirty
Bombs: Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for
Congress, June 24, 2011, Congressional Research Service,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41890.pdf)
Radiological forensics differs from nuclear forensics in various ways, as Table
1 shows. Some differences are technical. A nuclear explosion produces hundreds of
radionuclides; materials that might be used in an RDD, excepting spent fuel, would
likely have one or a few radionuclides, providing fewer clues. RDD radionuclides
have half-lives measured in years, not hours or less, so collecting samples would not
be as time-urgent as for a nuclear explosion. Other differences are political. Nuclear
forensics could support retaliation, depending on the country of origin of the
material. (It is almost inconceivable that the United States would retaliate against
Russia following an IND attack; retaliation against some other nations is plausible.)
Radiological forensics would probably not support retaliation. RDD
material might be produced in one country, distributed by a second, sold
to a third, and perhaps resold to a fourth, where terrorists might steal it.
Argentina, Canada, several European countries, and Russia are the main producers
of key radionuclides, 222 which they sell in legitimate commercial transactions, so
tracing material to the producer would not provide a basis for retaliation. If
terrorists obtained material through theft, illicit purchase, or an inside
job, it would be hard to assign malevolent intent to the country involved.

2AC AT: Terrorism DA Domestic Terror Threat


Low Cites
No status quo trend towards homegrown terror-their
methodology is flawed-also, most homegrown terror plots have
no impact
Brooks 11 (Risa A. Brooks is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette
University, her research focuses on issues related to civil-military relations, military
effectiveness, and militant & terrorist organizations, The Exaggerated Threat of
American Muslim Homegrown Terrorism, December 2011, Belfer Center,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/brooks_policybrief_dec_2011.pdf)
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, American Muslims do not appear to be
increasingly motivated to commit terrorist acts in the United States . Recent
studies of the radicalization of American Muslims accused of engaging in domestic terrorism have
explored the life histories of these individuals, and they have provided insight into the extremist beliefs and

offer little evidence that


American Muslimseven those exhibiting the danger signs of
radicalizationwill increasingly engage in acts of terrorism against fellow
Americans. In fact, there is minimal evidence that American Muslims are
becoming more radical in their beliefs . Surveys in 2011 by the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press reveal no trend of growing support for militancy among American Muslims. In addition, a
surge in the number of American Muslims arrested on terrorism-related
offenses in recent years does not mean that this segment of society is
more prone to engage in terrorism. As a result of expanded initiatives in
domestic counterterrorism by the Department of Homeland Security and
new FBI authority to undertake assessments and open preliminary
investigations of suspect Americans, officials increasingly have the tools
to detect terrorist activity in its early stages. According to the New York Times , from
changes in behavior that preceded the turn to violence. Yet these studies

March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2011, the FBI initiated more than 82,000 assessments of individuals and groups

Combine this enhanced


ability to detect aspiring terrorists with law enforcements frequent use of
sting operations to advance plots that might have otherwise gone
nowhere, and one can largely account for the spike in terrorist-related
arrests . For example, of the eighteen attacks attempted against U.S. targets since September 11 that reached
suspected of being involved in terrorist activities in the United States.

some level of operational development (targets chosen, surveillance undertaken, and the like), twelve involved the
use of federal officials at the plots formative stages.

2AC AT: Terrorism DA - AT: Dirty Bomb


No dirty bomb, no nuke-homegrown terrorists cant hurt usand they tend to expose themselves even without invasive
spying programs in place
Brooks 11 (Risa A. Brooks is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette
University, her research focuses on issues related to civil-military relations, military
effectiveness, and militant & terrorist organizations, The Exaggerated Threat of
American Muslim Homegrown Terrorism, December 2011, Belfer Center,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/brooks_policybrief_dec_2011.pdf)
Even if more American Muslims were to engage in homegrown terrorism,
their attacks would likely fail either because of technical error or because authorities were able to
discover their plots before they could be executed. Unlike the September 11 hijackers,
American Muslim homegrown terrorists tend to be amateurs and often
lack the basic skills of terrorist tradecraft. Moreover, opportunities to
enhance their skills are limited. Technical information available online is
often incomplete or poorly presented, and perfecting the skills to
manufacture explosives and cultivate other expertiseincluding the
ability to maintain operational security when preparing attacks and
recruiting other militantsincreases the risk of exposure . For these reasons,
every attempted terrorist plot by American Muslims in the United States
has ended in the arrests of the would-be perpetrators, with the exception of Shahzad
and two others, Carlos Bledsoe and Maj. Nidal Hasan.

2AC AT: Cooperation CP


The CP backfires creates distrust, the epistemological
questioning of the 1AC is a prerequisite for the CP being
effective.
German 14 (Michael German, fellow with the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty
and National Security Program, author, and Bachelor of Philosophy, "Stigmatizing
Boston's Muslim Community is No Way to Build Trust," Brennan Center for Justice at
NYU Law, October 9th 2014 https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/stigmatizingboston-muslim-community-no-way-build-trust)
The Justice Department announced last week that it is partnering with the White House, Department of Homeland

counter violent
extremism (CVE) in Boston, Minneapolis and Los Angeles. The program, which aims to
bring community and religious leaders together with law enforcement to
develop comprehensive local strategies and share information on best
practices may sound nice, but no one should be surprised that civil rights groups and American
Muslim communities were less than enthusiastic about this news. CVE meetings are not
new. Previous FBI outreach efforts to Muslim communities have been less about
curbing violence than thinly veiled attempts to recruit informants and gather
intelligence. Some Justice Department-sponsored community outreach
events, like a workshop in Seattle focused on improving police relations with the Muslim community, was
seen as offensive. Other unannounced FBI community outreach visits to peoples homes have bordered
Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center to launch a new pilot program to

on harassment. DHS launched a new outreach effort in 2011 which generated similar frustrations. Last April,
National Security Advisor Lisa Monaco announced to community groups at Harvards Kennedy School that DHS
would be sending an envoy to Boston to conduct training to community groups so they could recognize extremist

There is no doubt that many dedicated federal


employees at these agencies are deeply committed to building relationships and
addressing community concerns about crime and policing issues that
affect them. But the unmistakable implication behind CVE programs is
behaviors that need to be reported to police.

that certain communities are suspect and particularly vulnerable to


becoming terrorists . There were no DHS or Justice Department CVE programs, for example, directed to
white, Christian communities after former Ku Klux Klansman Fraizer Glenn Miller murdered people at a Jewish
community center last April, even though West Points Combatting Terrorism Center reported that far right

The overarching problem with


CVE programs is their reliance on simplistic theories of terrorist radicalization
that have long been discredited by empirical studies. The overwhelming consensus from
these studies is that there is no profile for terrorists, no discernible pattern or pathway
that individuals follow to becoming terrorists, and no reliable indicators
that can be used to predict who will become a violent. Yet these CVE programs
pretend there are, based on flawed theories promulgated by the FBI and others. The FBIs theory of
extremists attack and kill more Americans than any other terror groups.

terrorist radicalization claims that the commonplace activities of many American Muslims, including wearing
traditional religious attire, frequent attendance at mosques, participating in a pro-Muslim social group or political
cause, or even growing facial hair, are indicators in a four-step process toward becoming a terrorist. A 2008 FBI
counterterrorism textbook teaches agents they can quantitatively gauge whether a Muslim is militant by asking a
series of questions about his or her political and religious beliefs. It is no wonder that civil rights groups are
concerned about CVE programs that falsely identify religious practices and political opinions as terrorism indicators.
Monaco told the Harvard Kennedy School audience that community members could help prevent violence by
identifying even more subtle warning signs of radicalization, which included sudden personality changes in their
children, clashes over ideological differences, or watching violent material. Many parents of teenagers would
recognize their children in some or all of these attributes, and become unnecessarily alarmed about entirely normal
adolescent behavior. After the Kennedy School speech, the Brennan Center for Justice and several national and local
civil rights and advocacy groups wrote a letter to DHS requesting a meeting to discuss the program and review the

materials supporting it. There was no response, raising further concerns that these new CVE programs will rely on

CVE
programs that rely on false theories of terrorist radicalization will only
spread fear, distrust and dissension within communities, and lead to unwarranted
the same old discredited theories. All communities want to protect themselves from crime and violence.

law enforcement reporting. Instead of wasting resources chasing false leads, police should focus their resources

If the Justice Department and DHS want to


educate and empower communities they need to ground their counterterrorism
programs in sound empirical research, and tailor their community outreach
programs to address community needs. Stigmatizing Bostons minority
communities as potential terrorists, however, is no way to build trust.
where they have evidence of criminal activity.

Plan come first otherwise distrust is inevitable


Patel 2011

(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)
The net effect of the monitoring and surveillance that has come to light, as well as other government programs that
are explicitly aimed at Muslims, is that American Muslims often believe they are treated as a suspect class.169

a communitys perception of the legitimacy of


police tactics greatly influences its willingness to partner with law
enforcement agencies. Unsurprisingly, American Muslims view of their
treatment has led to a growing guardedness in their relationships with law
enforcement agencies. Although Despite near-unanimity about the difficulty of identifying early signs of
Decades of research demonstrate that

radicalization, some law enforcement agencies believe that a properly trained patrol officer would be able to do so
in the course of writing a ticket. 24 | BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE

American Muslims have thus

far been instrumental in assisting law enforcement agencies in thwarting


terrorist plots , there is a risk that the tactics spawned by the religious conveyor belt
theory of radicalization, such as broad surveillance and intrusion into
religious spaces, could create barriers to this cooperation. American Muslims
view that law enforcement agencies regard them as a suspect community
has been widely noted by community leaders. At a hearing on racial profiling, the head of a national Muslim civil

monitoring had led American Muslims to perceive


themselves as unjustly targeted by law enforcement agencies .170 She
emphasized that this type of attention was counter-productive because it
rights organization explained that

increased fear and suspicion within the Muslim community toward law
enforcement and made individuals more reluctant to call the
authorities when needed. 171 Similarly, a representative of another major American Muslim group
testified that [t]he perception of the community has become one where they believe
they are viewed as suspect rather than partner in the War on Terror , and that
their civil liberties are justifiably sacrificed upon the decisions of federal
agents.172 Ingrid Mattson, the president of the Islamic Society of North America, and an influential American
Muslim voice, has also noted the deterioration of relations between Arab American groups and law enforcement
agencies.173 Highprofile cases of the type discussed above have sown a corrosive fear among their people that
F.B.I. informers are everywhere, listening.174 In general, Mattson stated, There is a sense that law enforcement is
viewing our communities not as partners but as objects of suspicion.175

2AC AT: Ks Coalitions Perm


Coalition building between different racial groups is necessary
to stop racism and the racial profiling that is intertwined with
surveillance serve as a point of cooperation
Wing, Distinguished Professor of Law, 2003
(Adrien Katherine, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. Princeton, 1978; M.A. UCLA, 1979; J.D.
Stanford, 1982, Spring 2003, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis,
Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 La. L. Rev. (2003),
http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=5987&context=lalrev&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F
%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dguantanamo%2B%2522critical
%2Brace%2Btheory%2522%26btnG%3D%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt
%3D0%252C5%26as_vis%3D1#search=%22guantanamo%20critical%20race
%20theory%22, accessed 7/10/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Because of the various problems with coalition building, several scholars
do not endorse it. For example, Delgado advocates laboring within your own
group for the social justice goals you support. "For some projects, justice turns out to be a
solitary though heroic quest, and the road to justice is one that must be traveled alone, or with our deepest, most
trusted companions."' 4 Haunani-Kay Trask states that real organizing of native Hawaiians takes place outside of
coalitions.205 She supports Malcolm X's claims that whites need to tackle racism within their own communities,

Despite the
frictions and problems between various traditional and nontraditional
groups, coalition building can be a useful tool of critical race praxis in the
current period. African Americans have been used to being the dominant
minority in the United States, able to keep their concerns at the center of
the civil rights movement. Latinos are now surpassing Blacks
numerically,208 and are the majority in California already.2 They will be 25% of the U.S. population by
rather than in coalition." "Work in conjunction with us-each working among our own kind."207

2050.210 Blacks will have to learn to work in coalition with Latinos to ensure that Black concerns are not lost in a

While the Latinos are becoming the majority


minority, they are not as politically organized as the Blacks yet, with many being
recent immigrants or noncitizens, who may not speak English.21 ' Thus in some instances, Latinos
will need to learn from African Americans, and with them, to achieve
various goals. Coalition is good for Asians because although they score higher
on standardized tests and have a higher income level than the other minority
groups, history has already shown that they remain regarded as perpetual
foreigners,1 2 once subject to internment. 3 Native Americans constitute only two million people," 4
and can benefit from linking with the larger groups, some of whom may
resent those tribes, who now profit from gambling casino wealth." 5 Arabs
and Muslims need to join in coalition with the other groups because they
are too small and too recent as immigrants in comparison to the other
groups to go it alone. As the current personification of evil of the moment, they need to draw upon the
resources of other groups for support. Coalition building does not happen in a vacuum.
It must coalesce around particular projects where there is commonality of
interest. For instance, Frank Valdes has noted that Latinos and Asians share a common interest in legal issues
new dispensation of "favored minority."

that involve "immigration, family, citizenship, nationhood, language, expression, culture, and global economic

Racial profiling is a potential issue for cooperation as it affects


all the major minority groups. I will use it for illustrative purposes in the remainder of this section, even
restructuring."216

though it is only one of various issues that could be the basis for coalition building. Asian scholars have noted how

the recent mistreatment of Chinese American scientist Dr. Wen Ho Lee 2


and the interning of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II
could both be regarded as cases of racial profiling.218 Kevin Johnson has called for
Asians and Latinos to form political coalitions to challenge arbitrary INS conduct . 21 He also wants
Blacks and Latinos to form coalitions to work on issues of racial profiling,
as well.22 In the war against terrorism, racial profiling is particularly
affecting Blacks, Latinos and South Asians who look Arab, creating an
ideal intersectional issue for coalition building. 22 ' Coalescing around profiling in these
both
17

times will not be easy. In his timely book, Justice at War: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in a Time of Crisis, Richard
Delgado, a founder of CRT, queries, "Will the establishment insist on Americanism and toeing the line in the war on
terrorism, and demand that minorities demonstrate loyalty, in return for a symbolic concession or two?.. .Will it

There are
several foreseeable scenarios in this regard. For example, the Bush
administration could reconfigure rather than terminate various federal
affirmative action programs after an expected hostile Supreme Court
decision in the upcoming Michigan cases,223 to attempt to ensure Black
support for the war efforts. The administration's rejection of the pro-affirmative action position of the
University of Michigan may have attracted some Asian support.224 The perpetuation of the forty
year old blockade against Cuba despite U.S. business opposition ensures
Cuban American loyalty,225 and the rumored appointment of a Hispanic for
the next U.S. Supreme Court vacancy may attract other Latinos .22 ' Delgado
wonders whether people of color will "be able to work together toward
mutual goals--or [will] the current factionalism and distrust continue into
the future, with various minority groups competing for crumbs while
majoritarian rule continue[s] unabated? 22
choose one minority group for favored treatment, in hope of keeping the others in line."2'22

2AC AT: Feminism K


The permutation solves best patriarchy is not a single
system, but exists on localized levels, reinforced and shaped
by Western colonization. Our criticism of Islamophobia is key
to challenge the Wests role in shaping systems of patriarchy
while concealing its own instances of patriarchy
Grosfoguel and Mielants 6 (Ramn Grosfoguel, University of California - Berkeley, and Eric
Mielants, Fairfield University, The Long-Dure Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the
Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology
of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5:Iss. 1, Article 2., 23 September 2006,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2, da 10-12-13) PC

what we have in the world today is not a clash of civilizations but a


clash of fundamentalisms (Ali 2002) and a clash of patriarchies. The Bush
administration has defended Christian fundamentalist arguments to characterize
the Islamic enemy as a part of the old crusade wars, while Islamic
fundamentalists use a similar language (Ibid). The former, in the name of civilization
and progress, defends a Western form of patriarchy with the monogamist
family at its center, while the latter defends a non-Western form of
patriarchy with polygamy authorized as central to the family structure .
However, as Islamic feminist have sustained, patriarchal versions of Islam are
not inherently Islamic but represent the colonization of Islam by
patriarchy (Mernisi 1987). The interpretation of the original sacred scriptures
where hijacked by men throughout the history of Islam . The same thing
could be said of the Jewish and Christian sacred texts. Interpretations were controlled
Thus,

by patriarchal interpretations of the scriptures as the dominant perspective in these world religions. Therefore,

there is no patriarchy as a single system in the world-system today, but


patriarchies in the sense of several systems of gender domination of
men over women. The patriarchal system that was globalized in the
present world-system is to a certain degree the Western Christian form of
patriarchy. Non-Western forms of patriarchy have co-existed with the West in
the peripheral regions of the world-system and in many epochs of colonial
history the West was complicit with them in their colonial/imperial
projects. To talk as if patriarchy, as a system of gender domination, is external to the
West and located in Islam is a historical Orientalist distortion that goes
back to Western representations of Islam in the 18th century. European
colonial expansion has exported not only capital and militarism but also patriarchy
around the world, and often used as well as reinforced local patriarchies in the
periphery in the service of its imperial strategy . It is important to keep in mind that
Orientalist views are characterized by racist, exotic and inferior
essentialist representations of Islam as frozen in time (Said 1979). These Orientalist
representations of Islam after the 18th century were preceded by three hundred years of Occidentalism (the belief
in superiority of the West over the rest) from the late 15th century until the emergence of Orientalism in the 18th
century (Mignolo 2000). The historical and political conditions for the emergence of Orientalism are located within
Occidentalism.

Only an intersectional analysis of gender and Islam takes into


account the unique oppressions faced by Muslim women.
Contemporary feminist approaches are paternalistic and
marginalize the racial component of oppression.
Aziz, Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, 12
[Sahar, former Senior Policy Advisor at the Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties at
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist:
Muslim American Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality, 9 Hastings Race &
Poverty L.J. 191, Summer 2012, RSR]
The deafening silence about Muslim women's perspectives in the post-9/11
debates is analogous to Black women's experiences in antiracist politics .
Thus, Kimberle Crenshaw's seminal piece on the intersectionality of race and gender
informs the analysis of Muslim women's experiences in the post-9/11 era .
n138 Crenshaw argues that any analysis of antidiscrimination doctrine and antiracism
politics "that does not take intersectionality into account cannot
sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are
subordinated." n139 For example, the centrality of White female experiences
conceptualizes gender discrimination while the centrality of Black male
experiences conceptualizes race discrimination. Thus, Black women are
protected only to the extent that their experiences coincide with those of
Black men or White women. n140 Intersectionality claims go beyond
aggregation of factors such as race, gender, or religion n141 by
acknowledging the discrimination that arises from an interaction of these
characteristics. n142 "Intersectionality aims to provide an account of a
whole person whose subjectivity is shaped by different discourses, always
in a particular social historical context." n143 Therefore, the headscarved [*224] Muslim
woman does not face one-dimensional discrimination as a woman, a
practicing Muslim, or a person of color. She faces intersectional
discrimination experienced only by "headscarved Muslim women. " In application,
an intersectional analysis seeks to understand discrimination against "headscarved Muslim women" qua headscarved Muslim women. An
intersectional analysis, therefore, interrogates the behavior that conforms
to stereotypes specific to headscarved Muslim women, such as the
oppressed, subjugated, and domesticated woman. After 9/11, as this article argues, the headscarved
woman faces an additional stereotype-a disloyal and anti-American terrorist or terrorist-sympathizer. n144 For these reasons, intersectionality is

Like Black
women, headscarved Muslim women often experience discrimination as
Muslim women - not the sum of race, religion, and sex discrimination . n146 Yet,
their rights are protected [*225] only to the extent that Muslim males or
White women experience the same type of discrimination. While Muslim
women experience some forms of discrimination in ways similar to Muslim
males, the headscarf engenders subordination of women in ways
overlooked by generic strategies against anti-Muslim (male)
discrimination. Specifically, her headscarf marks her as a terrorist, terrorist
sympathizer, unassimilable foreigner, and an oppressed woman. If she has
an ostensibly assertive personality and strong intellect, then she is also
prone to being stereotyped as a "bad woman," often pejoratively labeled a
"bitch." Broader societal biases against women coupled with the visibility of the distinctly female headscarf expose Muslim women to discrimination
different in form and frequency from Muslim males. If a co-worker, neighbor, or other member of the public has never
interacted with a headscarved Muslim woman, she is more likely to be
particularly germane to Muslim women. n145 A. POSITIONED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RACIAL, GENDER, AND RELIGION HIERARCHY

treated according to negative stereotypes, namely that she is associated


with terrorists and oppressed by her terrorist husband or father . n147 Meanwhile,
although the stereotype of subjugation has been eclipsed by the "Terrorist
other" stereotype, it still lingers in the background such that if a Muslim
woman manages to evade one, she is likely to be subjected to the other .
n148 Additionally, within the Muslim community, she continues to be subjected to
cultural norms that mirror mainstream gender stereotypes of the "good
Muslim woman" as docile, deferential to male authority figures, and
prioritizing her family over her career. n149 Hence Muslim women, [*226] unlike
Muslim men, are ordained to subordination whether as terrorists, terrorist
sympathizers, or victims of Muslim male patriarchy . n150 Take for instance the situation of an
educated and ambitious headscarved Muslim woman with an assertive personality. This archetype, which is quite common among Muslim women in
America, n151 faces multiple stereotypes that implicate her gender, religion, and race.

Thus, the discrimination she

faces is tailored to her intersectional position such that there may be


Muslim men and White women who do not experience discrimination in
the same manner . Her demonstrably smart, ambitious, and self-confident
characteristics do not comport to a "good female employee" who is softspoken, deferential, and mild-mannered. n152 Her male colleagues perceive her as the stereotypical "bitch"
who exhibits an inappropriate sense of entitlement. Consequently, she is denied a promotion and raise, given poor evaluations based on pretextual

Similar to a White woman in her


circumstances, but for the headscarf, she is held to a different and more
rigorous standard than a similarly situated white male . Placed at the bottom of the gender
hierarchy, n153 she faces gender discrimination. Meanwhile, some of the Muslim woman's colleagues
(both men [*227] and women) hold bias against Muslims due to a variety
of factors including personal experiences, national events, and negative
stereotypes promoted in the media. n154 These co-workers and
supervisors believe Muslims are disloyal to America, are probably
terrorists, and oppress women. n155 This is manifested through offensive comments about Muslims as terrorists and
reasons such as needing to "improve her attitude" and be a better team player.

misogynists. The Muslim woman's loyalty to the nation and right to be in the workplace, especially in a leadership capacity, is explicitly or implicitly

Placed at the bottom of the


religion hierarchy, she experiences anti-Muslim discrimination. Her
headscarf also marks her as an unassimilable foreigner with the attendant
suspicions of disloyalty and anti-Americanism. n157 The dominant assimilationist culture in the United
questioned. In general, she feels unwelcome at least partially because of her religion. n156

States interprets her refusal to uncover herself as unpatriotic and unappreciative of the opportunities America makes available to immigrants and women.
In exchange for such opportunities, immigrants are expected to assimilate by adopting the predominant Anglo-Saxon culture, dress, and mannerisms. And

Unlike a Muslim
man who can shave his beard without violating a mandatory religious
obligation, she does not have the [*228] option of "passing" without
abandoning her religious beliefs. n158 Placed at the lower rungs of the racial hierarchy, she experiences racial or ethnic
origin discrimination. The headscarved Muslim woman is also still susceptible to
stereotypes that she is oppressed and subjugated by her husband, father,
and religion. Before 9/11, this stereotype often evoked pity and sympathy
n159 but increasing anti-Muslim sentiment now produces anger and
disgust. Her presence is just another reminder of what is wrong with
women are expected to uncover to look more "Western." Refusing to do so becomes a basis for legitimate suspicion.

Islam and make her deserving of mistreatment for continuing to adhere


to this violent and pathologically dysfunctional ideology . n160 Hence, she faces
gender, race, and religious discrimination in ways that a Muslim man, a
White woman, or another racial minority would not face . Facing three levels of subordination,
the headscarved Muslim woman finds herself caught in a "Catch 22"
because she is unable to "pass," "convert," or "cover" as a means of

avoiding discrimination. n161 A "conversion" for purposes of identity performance is effectively a religious conversion of sorts, as
she replaces her orthodox religious beliefs with a secularized interpretation of Islam. n162 Removing her headscarf,
therefore, requires her to abandon a fundamental religious belief. n163 [*229]
Nor can the headscarved Muslim woman "pass" as a non-Muslim because
there is no acceptable way of wearing a headscarf that circumvents
stereotypes. n164 Despite the various fashionable ways to wear a headscarf, it remains the marker of the terrorist, the terrorist's wife, the
unwelcome foreigner, and the oppressed woman. In the eyes of many Americans, the only "good Muslim woman" is
the one that does not cover her hair and secularizes, which brings her
back to having to effectively convert out of her religious beliefs. For similar reasons,
she cannot "cover" as a means of downplaying her differences with mainstream groups. n165 Some women wear make-up, modern suits, and adopt
dominant cultural mannerisms as a means of "covering." But so long as that "cover" is on her head, her differences are on full display, rendering attempts

Further exacerbating the


marginalization of Muslim women's rights is the privileging of male
perspectives in the American Muslim leadership. On the surface, this outcome appears to be a
byproduct of patriarchal institutions founded before September 11th. However, a more complex explanation exists
that mirrors experiences of women in other minority communities. As articulated by
legal scholars Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, "political agendas of identity groups tend to focus
on the interests of the privileged within the group ." n166 Because Muslim
women are generally politically subordinated within Muslim communities,
especially where community activities center around a mosque, the
articulation of political claims for equality by Muslims privileges the
experiences of Muslim males over the experiences of Muslim females . n167 This
intra-racial hierarchy further constricts the agency of Muslim women in the post-9/11 era. They live in a community that
is defined and subordinated by the racialized "Muslim" identity and culture
while also subjected to varied degrees [*230] of patriarchy within their
own communities. n168 Predominantly male perspectives cause resources
to be directed at forms of discrimination common to Muslim men such that
distinct discrimination experienced by Muslim women is obscured. n169 Muslim
to "cover" futile. B. THE PRIVILEGING OF THE MALE PERSPECTIVE IN AMERICAN MUSLIM LEADERSHIP

leaders and spokespersons claim to speak for "Muslims" but often fail to incorporate the perspectives of Muslim women beyond a superficial defense of
her right to wear a headscarf. n170 Community-wide protests against unlawful government action often focus on cases involving profiling of Muslim men
in airports and immigration enforcement. Selective anti-terrorism investigation and prosecution of Muslim men is also a source of grievance. With regard
to private acts of discrimination, resources are expended towards protecting the right to build mosques, the right to religious accommodation in the
workplace, and negative stereotyping in the media. The focus on discrimination of women is often limited to a case-by-case basis rather than a more
effective systemic approach. Underrepresentation of Muslim women's issues by Muslim civil rights and cultural organizations takes on additional
importance in light of recent efforts by the government to correct culturally insensitive counterterrorist practices. n171 On February 8, 2012, the FBI
[*231] Director of Public Affairs met with leaders of several Muslim and Interfaith organizations to discuss changes in FBI training materials. n172 While the
government's overture to the Muslim American community was a positive step in dealing with the contentious topic of offensive FBI training material, the
meeting unintentionally highlighted the danger that underrepresentation of Muslim women in these organizations presents. Namely,

government policy makers will not receive an adequate representation of


issues facing all Muslims, women included, unless those representative
organizations include women in positions to direct advocacy efforts. While the

Muslim organizations that met with Mueller have women in leadership roles, only one has women visibly directing advocacy efforts. n173 While these are
legitimate concerns that warrant attention and affect both men and women, they constitute only part of the post-9/11 adverse impact on Muslim
communities in America. For instance, in the context of religious accommodation in the workplace, the Muslim woman faces discrimination against her

A strategy that considers this intersectionality would


work with both women's rights and civil rights groups to defend the right
of religious minorities and the rights of women to have equal opportunity
in the workplace. Thus, if the religious freedom issue is resolved, then the gender equality issue need not fall by the wayside. Meanwhile,
faith and discrimination against her gender.

Muslim civil rights groups focus solely on the discrimination she faces as a Muslim who wears a headscarf. Should [*232] she choose not to wear it, yet
nonetheless face discrimination; it is unlikely that community resources are expended in her defense. n174 If groups do offer to assist the headscarved
woman, they often do so through agendas based on a male-centric definition of anti-Muslim bias that does not see the issue beyond the right to practice
one's faith. Muslim civil rights groups may even decide that she is to blame for the discrimination because of her "bad attitude," mirroring mainstream
American gender stereotypes of the "good woman" as obedient and deferential. . C. SACRIFICING MUSLIM WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO DEFEND MUSLIM (MALE)

Like many women of color in communities experiencing systemic


discrimination, Muslim women are ambivalent about the degree of
political and social capital that should be expended toward challenging
gender barriers within their communities. Muslim women are understandably hesitant to compromise the
CIVIL RIGHTS

broader Muslim civil rights agenda by challenging the patriarchy within their communities and institutions. n175 As Muslim communities across the
country experience mosque vandalizations, n176 hate [*233] crimes, n177 forced exile on No Fly lists, n178 profiling in airports, n179 and aggressive law
enforcement tactics that border on entrapment, n180 intra-community gender rights are quickly marginalized. Further complicating women's predicament
is the likelihood that internal power struggles based on allegations of male domination, even if true, only reinforce negative stereotypes of (male) Muslims

Challenging male patriarchy within


the Muslim communities also subjects a woman to allegations of harming
the collective interests of Muslims in America - additional harms they
cannot afford in light of political and physical attacks by the public and
the government. These practical concerns deny Muslim women the [*234]
ability to contest gender-biased interpretations of religious doctrine and
cultural practices thereby stifling a healthy evolution of Islam in America.
as oppressive, pathologically authoritarian, and deserving of suspicion. n181

n182 Consequently, a significant portion of the new generation of Muslim women leaders may have little choice but to support defensive strategies that
collectively marginalize Muslim women as a group. n183 Notably, and perhaps in response to the effects of intersectionality, a new generation of Muslim
women post-9/11 have begun to break into the community leadership. Although Muslim women collectively remain at the periphery of community
leadership, women are founding and managing some new organizations. Organizations founded and operated by highly educated Muslim women include:
Muslim Advocates, n184 South Asian Americans Leading Together, n185 and Karamah. n186 These represent the few examples of female leadership at the
national level. n187 While there are certainly other talented Muslim female [*235] professionals in leading roles, many of them work for and report to
predominantly male executives and male board members. n188 Another consequence of women's exclusion from American Muslim leadership is the rise
of female dissidents who converted out of Islam and now ally with far right organizations holding anti-Muslim bias. Women such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, n189
Wafa Sultan, n190 Bridgette Gabriel, and Nonie Darwish n191 hold themselves out as experts on Islam but proffer views highly controversial, if not
outright offensive, to a vast majority of Muslims in America. n192 These women, with no identifiable Muslim constituency, are often touted by their
benefactors as courageous voices against the oppressive ideology of Islam. While they may hold sincere views, they appear to be exploited to do the
bidding of right-wing political groups with clear anti-Muslim agendas, which further objectifies [*236] Muslim women within the larger culture war. Indeed,

many Muslims perceive such women as mere pawns in the larger assault
on Muslim's civil rights in America. As a result, Muslim women trapped at
the intersection of race, religion, and gender tend to suffer in silence to
preserve community cohesion during a time of siege, take on the
monumental endeavor of starting their own organizations and competing
with legacy organizations, or become surrogates of opponents of
mainstream Muslim organizations as a channel for expressing their
dissent. To prevent such distorted consequences, Muslim American women
should have opportunities to play meaningful roles in existing institutions
whose mandates are to defend the rights of women, Muslims, or civil
liberties in the post-9/11 era. Those roles should not be limited to those
associated with traditional gender roles such as mothers, nurses, or
teachers. Similarly, American feminist groups have an obligation to
include American Muslim women in their leadership and gender rights
agenda and advocacy campaigns. Civil liberties groups focused on adverse
consequences of national security laws would also be more effective if
they included American Muslim women in their discussions on identifying
violations of individual rights in the American Muslim communities. Their
strategies would be more informed in ensuring all those caught in the
post-9/11 counterterrorism preventive dragnet n193 benefit from
advocacy projects, not just males. Until such changes occur, American
Muslim women are likely to remain caught at the intersection of bias
against gender, race, and religion with little recourse . D. THE FAILURES OF AMERICAN WOMEN'S
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS Some American feminists' near obsession with Muslim women's rights abroad n194 makes their ten-year silence over the various

Western feminists have failed to identify


with Muslim women beyond wanting to "liberate" them from oppressive
[*237] patriarchies originating from their "Eastern" cultures; at the same
time, they fail to recognize how their own "Western" patriarchy prevents
some Muslim women from attaining the economic independence necessary
for exercising individual rights. n195 Western feminists' silence exposes their
failure to recognize the significance of excluding women, whatever their
religion or racial identity, from the courtroom, the work place, and the
political process. Instead, the cases are narrowly viewed as anti-Muslim (male) religious discrimination. n196 These cases
also highlight Western feminists' double standards as they criticize
"Eastern" practices that subordinate Muslim women while failing to
acknowledge their "Western" society's subordination of the same women .
n197 Specifically, Western feminist groups such as Vital [*238] Voices, CODE Pink,
forms of discrimination against Muslim women in America ironic.

EQUALITY NOW, and the Feminist Majority Foundation have consistently


called for the ban of the burqa and spoken out in defense of women's
rights in Iraq, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern nations while
remaining silent on a Muslim woman's right to wear the hijab free of
discrimination and violence in the United States. n198 While Western feminists' focus on equal pay,
abortion rights, and other gender specific issues certainly benefit Muslim women, the American women's rights
agenda fails to address the unique forms of subordination experienced by
Muslim women in the United States . Thus, the supposedly patriarchal "East"
can no longer be the sole culprit for a Muslim woman's economic and
political marginalization in America. It is long overdue for those concerned
with gender rights of Muslim women abroad to acknowledge her
subordination in the post-9/11 era in the United States. American women's rights groups
overlook gender discrimination because they may mistakenly believe the bias is solely on account of her religion and thus not within their mandate. n199
Likewise, spokespersons of Muslims in America should acknowledge the domination of male voices whose focus on women is limited to her religious right
to wear a headscarf within the broader agenda of protecting Muslim (males) civil rights. Both Muslim civil rights and women's rights groups are likely to

advocacy groups that defend the


civil rights of persons within a particular Muslim woman's racial group will
not recognize the racial component of the discriminatory animus. n200 When you add
overlook one of the two dimensions of the bias, either gender or religion. Meanwhile,

the dimension of race or ethnicity, then a third layer of intersectionality exacerbates her predicament. In the case of an African American headscarved
Muslim woman, rarely, if ever, [*239] have Black civil rights groups taken on these issues directly. n201 And while Arab or South Asian groups may be
sensitized to the ethnic origin bias underlying the discrimination, they often punt the case as an anti-Muslim or anti-Black case. In all scenarios, few of the
organizations recognize the gender dimension in the same way they would had the discrimination occurred within the pre-9/11 subjuga-tion paradigm.
Quite the opposite,

many groups vociferously defended the scarf as a liberating

practice from the base sexualiza-tion of women in the West . n202 Consequently, the
analysis of
antidiscrimination that does not take intersectionality of race, religion,
and gender into account cannot sufficiently address the particular ways in
which Muslim women are subordinated. n203 As demonstrated in Section V below, Muslim women donning a
headscarved Muslim woman is caught in the crosshairs of intersectionality at her own peril. Consequently,

headscarf face palpable discrimination in employment and public spaces. Some are physically attacked in conjunction with accusations of terrorism. Their
children are also bullied as their mother's headscarves "out" them as the same Muslims the bully's parents vilify at the dinner table. Headscarved Muslim
women have also been evicted from courthouses and law enforcement agencies for pretextual reasons. n204

Permutation solves best our critical examination of


Islamophobia is compatible with a gendered analysis of
international relations, and it prevents feminist discourse from
getting coopted to justify colonialist interventions that mask
structural violence against women
Volpp 2 (Leti Volpp, Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 2002, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575) PC
Rather than understand Orientalism as solely a creature of purported racial difference, it is important to point out

American Orientalism, like European Orientalism, is gendered.


Historically, the status of women in need of uplift was a source of
justification for Western colonization of regions of the world n43 - "white
men saving brown women from brown men." n44 The aftermath of
September 11 witnessed the redeployment of this idea. One of the stated
justifications for American intervention in Afghanistan - made by both President George
Bush and First Lady Laura Bush - was that Afghan women needed to be saved from the
Taliban and Islamic barbarism. n45 But long before the Feminist Majority Fund began campaigning
on the issue of Afghan women, many women in Afghanistan had been starving and
faced with violence not only because of the Taliban regime but also
because of a long history of conflict in the region in which the U nites S tates
that

has been deeply implicated. n46 We must remember where the Taliban came [*1588] from, that U.S.
administrations thought that religious fundamentalists made better anti-Communist fighters, and so supported the

Saving women from purdah has been


propounded as a reason for bombardment, even while, ironically, the
epidemic of hate violence in the U nited S tates has led to the seclusion of
many women identified as "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" who
otherwise face harassment and violence when they venture outside of
their homes. n48 Furthermore, the long-term impact of the war on the "liberation" of the women of
Afghanistan remains an open question. n49 In part, the gendering of colonial and Orientalist
discourses was achieved by collapsing non-Europeans and women into an
undifferentiated field in which passion reigned, not reason . n50 The East
was the site of passivity [*1589] and irrationality, awaiting the conquest by
the masculine and rational West. n51 This bifurcation continues to describe the
way in which the U nited S tates genders the sites of its interventions, which in
turn shapes the relationship of U.S. national identity to race, gender, and
sex. n52 We should understand nationalism to be constituted through the
simultaneous interworkings of racism, sexism, and homophobia. Fliers
have circulated in New York City depicting Osama Bin Laden being
sodomized by the World Trade Center, with the caption, "You like
skyscrapers, bitch?" n53 Post-September 11 nationalist discourses
reinscribe both compulsory heterosexuality n54 and the dichotomized
gender roles upon which it is based: the masculine citizen-soldier, the
patriotic wife and mother, and the properly reproductive family . n55
mujahideen who became the Taliban. n47

Western feminist movements fail the debate over the veil


proves that they have Orientalist assumptions deny agency to
women in the third world. Only an intersectional approach
opposes the false choice of anti-racism or anti-sexism.
Bilge, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Montreal, 10
[Sirma, the director of the Intersectionality Research Pole at the Centre for Ethnic
Studies of Montreal Universities (CEETUM), Beyond Subordination vs. Resistance:
An Intersectional Approach to the Agency of Veiled Muslim Women, Journal of
Intercultural Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, February 2010, RSR]
Predominant in European controversies about the veil, this mode of
thinking equates the Muslim veil with womens oppression by Islamic
patriarchy, and asserts its incompatibility with European values and
national character. It argues that veiled women are either coerced to
wear the veil or develop a false consciousness; in both cases they are devoid

of agency . Yet, this mode of thinking simultaneously associates the veil


with political Islam, ultimately turning veiled women from unconscious
agents into dangerous agents of Islam qua diasporic political force
threatening Western Weltanschauung . These concurrent depictions, initially grounded on the
same thesis, are well illustrated in feminist interventions in the French hijab debates. In France during
the decade-long controversies over veiling, feminists have predominantly
adopted a position equating voile (veil) with womens subjugation, and
have supported its banning from public schools in the name of womens
rights, and as a defence of French la cite (secularism) against the
menace of political Islam. The idea of (male) manipulated veiled girls threatening the Republic

Depicting the veil as a


proselytising symbol of religious affiliation created a chain of meanings
making veiling anti-secular, hence anti-French (Keaton 181). Ultimately, being
against the ban came to mean being not only against gender equality but
also against the integration of Muslims, as argued by Bernard Stasi, the
state ombudsman who headed the Commission on the application of the
principle of la cite which recommended a law against veiling (Duval
Smith). Central to this meaning-making is the equation of the veil with
womens oppression, which is itself achieved by denying agency to veiled
women a pervasive reasoning among French feminists. For example, Yvette Roudy,
the national secretary for womens rights in the Socialist Party, argued in Le Monde (Affaire 14): The
headscarf is a sign of subjugation, whether consented or imposed, in
fundamentalist Muslim society [ ... ]. Accepting the veiling would mean
agreeing with womens inequality in the French Muslim society . If Roudy does
coloured not only right-wing rhetoric but also feminist discourse. 7

not elaborate on whether consented or imposed, other French feminists unequivocally invalidate the possibility of
consent, coupling the voluntary submission argument with a false consciousness. Anne Zelensky and Anne Vigerie

[W]earing the voile is not only a sign of


belonging to a religion. It symbolizes the place of women in Islam as
Islamism understands it. That place is in the shadow, downgraded and
submitting to men. The fact that some women demand it does not change
its meaning. We know that dominated people are the most fervent
supporters of their domination. (in Bowen 229) Evidently, what veiled women
have to say about their veiling is irrelevant, and cannot change the
meaning of the veil, since they are alienated and unwittingly adopt the
views of their oppressors. In contrast, French feminists qua emancipated
subjects have access to the real meaning of the veil: it is both a symbol
and an instrument of womens oppression by men. Yet in the contemporary economy of
legitimate knowledge and authority over voice and representation, French feminists cannot
credibly hold an authoritative speaking position without insider allies who
can provide them expert testimonies . At that political moment, a new figure of native
argue in another Le Monde article (29 May 2003):

informant 8 akin to the classical anthropological sidekick emerges to spread relatively constant ideas about her
culture and community (Ansari 50), and justify state intervention to outlaw the veil. Far from being voiceless,

this new subaltern is urged to speak, for the conditions of speaking have
been reconfigured in a way congruent with contemporary expectations of
self-representation, but her speech should benefit dominant sites (52).
These new figures, 9 who play an important role in contemporary feminist
politics, can be thought of as internal feminist Orientalists for they
endorse feminist orientalism (Zonana) and bestow on it the legitimacy
and epistemic privilege of cultural insiders . Their contributions, uttered
from the authoritative standpoint of insiders, have been central to making
gender paradigmatic of the civilisational gap between the West and the
rest. Yet the ambiguity of their positioning, which entails a complex
Orientalist dialectic, should be highlighted. Not only does their portrayal
of veiled women as oppressed sustain the image of Western women as
emancipated, but also it functions as a mirror to good Muslims, those
who are les e volue s ; unveiled, enlightened Muslim women like
themselves and secular, gentle Arab men who accompany them a couple
to be opposed to bad Muslims; veiled girls and violent Arab/Muslim boys
(Gue nif-Souilamas; Bowen). In the French headscarf debates, these accredited insiders were
French women of Muslim background who publiclyopposed the veil , and

whilst those who wore the veil were


rejected as legitimate sources of knowledge. Their exclusion from public
debates, particularly from the Stasi Commissions hearings, relied on the
submission/false consciousness thesis, as put by Delphy, one of the few renowned French
feminists to have publicly opposed the ban, in a public lecture: these women cannot be heard,
received much media attention and political acclaim,

since they are veiled, which means they are either alienated or
manipulated into wearing the symbol of their own oppression (Intervention).
Conversely, those who opposed the veil offered highly praised expert testimonies to the Stasi Commission.
Chahdortt Djavann, whose claim to expertise relied on her own experience in Iran after the revolution and who
fiercely opposed the veil, offered sensationalist tales of womens oppression in Muslim countries (Scott 163). Her
incendiary pamphlet begins with: For ten years I wore the veil. It was either the veil or death. I know what I am
talking about (Djavann 7). Another figure, Fadela Amara, the leader of the organisation Ni Putes Ni Soumises
(NPNS 10 ), and a strong supporter of the ban, declared before the Stasi Commission: I consider the veil to be first
and foremost a tool of oppression (Audition). She has received extraordinary attention and recognition from
media and politicians. In early 2004, at the same time as French legislators were debating the bill banning religious
symbols in public schools, Amaras book, co-authored with a journalist from Le Monde , received an emblematic
prize, the political book of the year, granted by the Parliament. As cogently put by Bowen: [F]or politicians the NPNS
analysis was a pure gift. NPNS explained the problem of violence in terms of sexism in the underdeveloped portions
of urban France rather than the result of policies of labor migration and residential segregation. Problems of labor
and discrimination would require imaginative, expensive policies; Arab sexism called for denunciation and a law

The casting veiled women as unconscious agents of


their own manipulation at the (male) hands of Muslim fundamentalism was
reinforced by recurrent references to fundamentalist regimes, such as
Afghanistan under the Taliban or Iran after the revolution where veiling
has been violently forced upon women. Both ethnic French feminists and
cultural insiders, who were given a priori epistemic privilege and
legitimacy to represent their oppressed/alienated sisters thanks to their
real or purported first-hand experience of those regimes, used these
references to justify hard-line legislation in France . E lisabeth Badinter, a well-known
affecting Muslim women. (216)

feminist philosopher, for whom allowing girls to wear headscarves in public schools meant that the French republic
had given up on gender equality for the sake of religious tolerance (Murphy cited in Bilge 122), invited European
feminists to learn a lesson from the French ban:

Soon feminists in the rest of the Europe

will realise the headscarf is a terrible symbol of submission . You cannot


denounce what has been going on in Afghanistan while tolerating the veil
in Europe even if women claim they are wearing it voluntarily . (in Duval Smith,
emphasis mine) Of particular relevance for us, is the fact that her apparent distrust of what
veiled women say about their veiling suggests that , for her, veiling cannot
involve a choice since it signifies renouncing ones personal autonomy .
Indeed, for Badinter, even if Muslim girls might appear to choose this practice autonomously, this does not mean

This is because the content of their cultural norms


namely, the Muslim values of female restraint, modesty and seclusion are
opposed to personal autonomy. (in Mookherjee 33) Tellingly, her understanding of
agency does not refer to the ability to act in ones best interests, but
rather implies a value judgment on the actions content . Such a contentthat they are autonomous.

dependent definition of agency, a truly humanistic one resonating with the Millsian premise that one cannot freely
submit to slavery, nor prefer a slothful life to one of Socratic questioning (Mookherjee 33), is not uncommon either

Mack cites a study in which the


voluntary commitment of a devout woman to an authoritarian religious
order is read as an example of the wrong use of agency , since she
abdicates her complete individual autonomy (150 51 emphasis mine). It is worth
noting that while most associations between veiling and the threat of
political Islam depict veiled women as (non-agentic) political tools manipulated
by male militants, recent analyses suggest a shift . Drawing on their analysis of the
in feminist scholarship on women and religion. For instance,

British controversy on the niqab following the October 2006 comments of Jack Straw, then Labour leader of the
Commons, that niqab signified separation and impeded communication, Khiabany and Williamson (77) argue that
media representation of veiled Muslim women moved from the one of oppressed victims without agency who need
to be saved by the West to that of aggressors who have been conceded too much agency by Western liberalism.

The idea of veiled women qua aggressors also coloured French debate s.
Once it was established that veiling troubled public order, it was difficult to maintain the view that Muslim girls and
women were victims; wearing the headscarf itself became an act of aggression. Jacques Chirac said as much in a
speech in Tunisia in December 2003. Wearing

the veil, whether intended or not, is a


kind of aggression. (Scott 158) Ultimately, the veil has become an overdetermined cultural signifier predominantly disqualifying its wearer as a
free-willed agentic subject, since one cannot voluntarily choose to wear
such a symbol of female submission, while at the same time making her a
dangerous agent, a civilisational threat to Western modernity . What needs to be
underlined is the fact that throughout the hijab controversy French feminists have solely problematised intra-group
(Muslim) gender relations, over- looking the politics of nation played through this very problematisation. From an
intersectional perspective, such an exclusive focus on minority gender relations conceals forms of oppression
operating on majority/minority level via other social divisions such as nation, class and race (Mohanty), and
obscures how assumptions about gender are racialised and how cultural othering is modulated by gender.

Feminist interventions in the French case demonstrate that political


strategies that challenge only certain subordinating practices while
maintaining existing hierarchies not only marginalize those who are
subject to multiple systems of subordination but also often result in
oppositionalizing race and gender discourses (Crenshaw 112 13). In such a polarised
debate, one is called upon to choose between anti-sexism and anti-racism,
and a political position combining the two and cognizant of the
intersectionality of axes of oppression, is simply deemed unthinkable (Delphy
Antisexisme). In sum, feminist readings of the controversy were saturated with
Orientalist assumptions and heavily relied on a subordination/false
consciousness frame, over- looking the social (relational and contextdependent) nature of agency, and resulting in a conception of the freewilled individual as a socially unfettered concept (Ahearn Language and Agency
114). Their content-dependent understanding of agency, recognising as
choices only those in line with Western secular/liberal values, maintain
unequal power relations within which the ideal of the autonomous subject
is always already embedded (Bilge 122). Accordingly, the eviction of veiled women
from the realm of agency is achieved through a syllogism: Agency involves
free-will; no woman freely chooses to wear the veil because it is
oppressive to women; thus veiled women have no agency . The
construction of veiled women as non-agentic and the veil as a tool for
womensoppression are hence intertwined and inseparable meaningmaking processes. What is less expected is that a similarconception of
agency, one tying agency to theideal of autonomous subject, also infuses
the opposite interpretation: the veil as resistance.

2AC AT: Cap K


Racism destroys class solidarity and serves as a pillar of
stability for the capitalist social order through a sense of
superiority of non-elite whites
Kundani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication, and Kumar, associate professor of Media
Studies and Middle East Studies, 2015
(Arun, New York University, Deepa, Rutgers University, Race, surveillance, and
empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, International
Socialist Review issue # 96, spring 2015, accessed 6/29/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Once the legal and ideological work had been done to naturalize race as a
visible marker of inherent difference and to separate us from them, it could be
made use of as a stable category of surveillance; the patrols set up to
capture runaway slavesarguably the first modern police forces in the United States20needed
only to see race in order to identify suspects. Moreover, the plantation
system was stabilized by enabling non-elite whites to see security as a
racial privilege and shared responsibility. W. E. B. Du Bois argued in Black Reconstruction
that, in the slave plantations of the South, poor whites were brought into an identification
with the planter elite by being given positions of authority over Blacks as
overseers, slave drivers, and members of slave patrols. With the associated feeling of superiority,
their hatred for the wider plantation economy that impoverished them
was displaced onto Black enslaved people: class antagonism was
racialized and turned into a pillar of stability for the system . Meanwhile, in the

North, labor leaders had little appetite for abolition, fearing competition from a newly freed Black workforce.21 After

Du Bois
used the term psychological wage to describe this sense of superiority
granted to non-elite whites in the South: It must be remembered that the white group of
laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated by a sort of
public and psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because
abolition, the same racial anxieties were mobilized to disenfranchise the Black laborer in the South.

they were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and
the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent under their votes, treated
them with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. On the other hand, in the same way, the Negro was subject
to public insult; was afraid of mobs; was liable to the jibes of children and the unreasoning fears of white women;

The result of this was


that the wages of both classes could be kept low, the whites fearing to be
supplanted by Negro labor, the Negroes always being threatened by the
substitution of white labor.22 We suggest below that, since the 1970s, neoliberalism
has involved a similar kind of process, in which the social wage of the New
Deal welfare state was progressively withdrawn and racialized notions of
security offered in its place as a psychological compensation.
and was compelled almost continuously to submit to various badges of inferiority.

Marxisms exclusive focus on class struggle is rooted in


Western-centric, epistemic racism used to justify the
colonization of non-Western countries also means their
alternative gets coopted, because Marxist philosophy is used
to justify Capitalisms expansion outside of the West
Grosfoguel 10 (Ramn Grosfoguel, Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences, Human
Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self- Knowledge: Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 5, 2010,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol8/iss2/5, da 11-15-13) PC
But the same problem of epistemic Isla- mophobia we find in Marx and Engels. Although Marx spent two months in

Marx had an
orientalist epistemic racist view of non-Western peoples in general of which he did
write extensively (Moore 1977). Moreover, his close collaborator, Fre- derick Engels, did write about
Muslim people and repeated the same racist stereo- types that Marx used
against Oriental people. Talking about French colonization of Algeria,
Engels said: Upon the whole it is, in our opinion, very fortunate that the Arabian chief
has been taken. The struggle of the Bedouins was a hopeless one , and though
the manner in which brutal soldiers, like Bugeaud, have carried on the war is highly blamable, the conquest
of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization. The
Alg- iers in 1882 recovering from a sickness, he wrote almost nothing on Islam. However,

piracies of the Barbaresque states, never interfered with by the English government as long as they did not disturb
their ships, could not be put down but by the conquest of one of these states. And the conquest of Algeria has
already forced the Beys of Tunis and Tripoli, and even the Emperor of Morocco, to enter upon the road of civilization.
They were obliged to find other employment for their people than piracy... And if we may regret that the liberty of
the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of
robberswhose principal means of living consisted of making excursions either upon each other, or upon the
settled villagers, taking what they found, slaughtering all those who resisted, and selling the remaining prisoners as

All these nations of free barbarians look very proud, noble and glorious at a
distance, but only come near them and you will find that they , as well as the more
civilized nations, are ruled by the lust of gain, and only employ ruder and more cruel means. And
after all, the modern bourgeois, with civilization, industry, order, and at least relative enlightenment
following him, is preferable to the feudal marauding robber, with the barbarian
state of society to which they belong. (Engels, French Rule in Algiers, The Northern Star,
slaves.

January 22, 1848, in: MECW, Vol.6, pp.469- 472; quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Mod-

Engelss option is quite clear: to support colonial


expansion and bring Western Civilization even if it is bourgeois and brutal
in order to overcome a barbarian state of affairs. The superiority of the
West over the rest and, in particular, over Muslims is quite clear in this
ernization (Doubleday: New York, p. 43)

statement. Talking about India, the irrational fanaticism of Muslims is expressed in the following quote of Engels:
The insurgent warfare now begins to take the character of the Bedouins of Algeria against the French; with the
difference that the Hindoos are far from being so fanatical, and that they are not a nation of horsemen. (Engels:
New York Daily Tribune, July 21, 1858, MECW, Vol.15, p. 583) If there is any doubt about Marxs shared views with
Engelss on the inferior- ity of Muslims and non-Western people relative to the West, the following quote is a
confirmation: ... The question ... is not whether the English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to
prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton. England has to
fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regeneratingthe annihilation of old Asiatic society, and
the laying of the material foundations of West- ern society in Asia. Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moguls, who had successively overrun India, soon became Hinduized, the barbarian conquer- ors being, by an eternal law of his- tory,
conquered themselves by the superior civilization of their sub- jects. The British were the first con- querors superior,
and, therefore, inaccessible to Hindu civilization... The day is not far distant when by a combination of railways and
steam vessel, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and
when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western World .... (Marx, The Future Results

Marx
did not have much hope in the proletarian spirit of the Muslim masses
when he stated in relation to the Ottoman Empires expansion to Eastern
European territories the following: The principal power of the Turkish population
in Europe, indepen- dently of the reserve always ready to be drawn from Asia, lies in the mob of
of the British Rule in India written on July 22, 1853, in Marx and Engels On Colonialism, page 81-83...)

Constantinople

[Istanbul] and a few other large towns. It is essentially Turkish, and although it finds its

it maintains with great jealousy the


imaginary superiority and real impunity for excesses which the privileges
of Islam confer it as compared with Christians . It is well known that this mob in
every important coup detat has to be won over by bribes and flattery. It is
this mob alone, with the exception of a few colonized districts, which offers a compact and
imposing mass of Turkish population in Europe. Certainly there will be ,
sooner or later, an absolute necessity for freeing one of the finest parts of this
continent from the rule of a mob, compared with which the mob of
Imperial Rome was an assemblage of sages and heroes. (Turkey, New York Daily
principal livelihood by doing jobs for Christian capitalists,

Tribune, April 7, 1853, written by Engels at Marxs request, quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and

For Marx, similar to Weber, Muslim people from


Turkish origin are a mob of ignorant people that made the mobs of the
Roman Empire look like sages. He called for a struggle of liberation
against the Muslim mobs. Accordingly, for Marx, Western civilization is superior
and, thus, called to civilized the non-Western Muslims. In his perspective,
better is the Western colonial expansion rather than leaving intact in a
timeless stage a barbarian inferior people. Marx distrusted Muslim people
and was convinced of the inherently xenophobic traits in Islam and, thus, wrote
apologetically about Western colonialism. Marx said: As the Koran treats all foreigners as
foes, nobody will dare to present himself in a Mussulman country without having taken his precautions. The first
Modernization (Doubleday: New York, p. 54)

European merchants, therefore, who risked the chances of commerce with such a people, contrived to secure
themselves an exceptional treatment and privileges originally personal, but afterwards extended to their whole
nation. Hence the origin of capitulations. (The Outbreak of the Crimean WarMoslems, Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Empire, New York Daily Tribune, April 15, 1854, quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and

Marx said, repeating the typical epistemic


racism of the orientalist vision of his time, that: The Koran and the
Mussulman legislation emanating from it reduce the geography and
ethnography of the various peoples to the simple convenient distinction of
two nations and of two countries; those of the Faithful and of the Infidels.
The Infidel is harby, i.e. the enemy. Islamism proscribes the nation to the
Infidels, constituting a state of permanent hostility between the
Mussulman and the unbeliever. (The Outbreak of the Crimean WarMoslems, Christians and Jews
Modernization (Doubleday: New York, p. 146)

in the Ottoman Empire, New York Daily Tribune, April 15, 1854, quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on

These simplified, essentialist and


views of Islam from a Judeo/ Christian-centric, Western-centric
perspective was part of the Orientalists epistemic racism and
condescending paternalism towards Islamic thought of which Marx was no
exception. Marx believed that secularism was fundamental for revolution
to have a chance in Muslim lands. He said: ...if you abolish their subjection under the Koran,
Colonialism and Modernization (Doubleday: New York, p. 144)
reductionist

by a civil emancipation, you cancel at the same time their subjection to the clergy, and provoke a revolution in their

If you supplant the Koran by a code civil, you


must Occidentalize the entire structure of Byzantine society. (The Outbreak of
social, political and religious relations....

the Crimean WarMoslems, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, New York Daily Tribune, April 15, 1854,

This
secularist view of Marx was a typical colonial strategy promoted by the
Western Empires in order to destroy the ways of thinking and living of the
colonial subjects and, thus, impede any trace of resistance. By arguing that
Muslim people are subjected to the rule of a religion, Marx projected in
Islam the cosmology of the secularized Western-centric, Christian- centric view.
Islam does not consider itself a religion in the Westernized,
Christianized sense of a sphere separated from politics, economics, etc.
quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (Doubleday: New York, p. 146)

Islam is more a cosmology that follows the notion of Tawhid which is a


doctrine of unity, a holistic world view, that the Eurocentric Cartesian
modern/colonial world view destroyed in the West and with its colonial
expansion attempted to destroy in the rest of the world as well. The
practice of colonial Christianization in the early modern/colonial period
and secularism after the later 18th century colonial expansion was part of
the epistemicide and religiouscide, that is, the extermination of nonWestern spirituality and ways of knowledge implemented by Western
colonial expansion. Epistemicide and religiouscide made possible the
colonization of the minds/ bodies of colonial subjects.

2AC AT: Anti-Blackness


Anti-blackness as the root cause of Islamophobia is
ahistorical---its the other way around
Timothy Charoenying 8, Citing Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Professor at Cal-

Berkeley, "Islamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical Approach", Fall,


crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach
The year 1492 marked a major turning point in the trajectory of Western
Civilization. Elementary age children are taught this as the year Columbus famously crossed the Atlantic. An equally
significant event that year, was the Spanish conquest of al-Andalusa Moorish
province on the southern Iberian peninsula established eight centuries earlierand more
importantly, the last major Muslim stronghold on the European continent.
Critical race scholars have argued that these two events would not only
shift the geopolitical balance of power from the Orient to the Occident,
but fundamentally alter conceptions about religious and racial identity .
According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, of the University of California, Berkeley, the expulsion of
the Moors from continental Europe marked a transition from an age of
imperial relations between Christian and Muslim empires, to an age of
European colonial expansion throughout the known world . The discovery of godless
natives in the Americas would also inspire the great debates between Las Casas and Seplveda in 1550 on the nature of the human

Such a geopolitical and philosophical shift, Maldonado-Torres argues, would lead to a


Eurocentric, re-categorization of humanity based upon religousand
ultimately racialdifferences. Maldonado-Torres has proposed that anti-black racism is
soul.

not simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks , but rather,
is an amalgam of old-world Islamophobia linked to the history of the
Iberian peninsula, and to the notion of souless beings embodied in popular
conceptions about the indigenous natives of the Americas. These beliefs
would contribute to an ideological basis for, and justification of, colonial conquests
in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way
for the enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.

All types of racism existed independent of and before contact


w/ whiteness
Radha Jhappan 96, Associate Professo, Dept of pol sci, Carleton University. PostModern Race and Gender Essentialism or a Post-Mortem of Scholarship,
http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/viewFile/6876/3857

Whites are responsible for racism Race essentialist positions almost always set up a white/non-white dichotomy.
There is a tendency to simplify the sources of oppression, to take the position, "whites did it to us," as if whites
invented racism, imperialism and slavery. They did not. They have just been more successful over the last few
centuries, and they have managed to impress an ideology of white supremacy on the world, thanks in part to their

to speak as if
whites invented racism, imperialism, and slav- ery is to ignore five to ten
dedication to improving the technologies of travel, communications, and warfare. But

thousand years of human history featuring various empires, interracial/ethnic/religious wars, and slavery in many areas of the world. It is
also to aggregate and romanticize all non-white (indigenous, Asian,
African, Australian, and South American) societies prior to contact with Europeans as

if they existed in some happy past free of war, imperialism, patriarchy,


racism, social stratification, exploitation, and oppression. The race essentialist
position appears to homogenize all whites as "our oppressors," without acknowledging the pos- sibility that "we"

I
am not referring here only to the historical facts that it was African
slavers who sold their peoples into slavery to the Europeans, or that the
European imperial powers in non-settler colonies such as India depended
upon local elites, who were only too happy to support the British rulers
who were helping them to maintain their castel ethnic privileges and
oppress others. As elsewhere, so complete was their dependence on the collaboration of Indian elites that
may do our own oppressing based on cul- tural systems and the economic and power interests of certain classes.

the British contemplated creating "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in
morals and in intellect.t'J> Yum yum yum, said the little aliens as they lined up for implantation. However, as
Mohanty notes, "all forms of ruling operate by constructing and consolidat- ing, as well as transforming, already
existing social inequali- ties." As well as constructing "hegemonic masculinities as a form of state rule, the colonial
state also transformed ex- isting patriarchies and caste/class hierarchies.t'-v It seems that they did not need to
implant very many aliens; they were already present. In arguing that people of colour do our own oppressing,

a number of racially xenophobic,


patriarchal, and deeply- ingrained caste/class structures which pre-date
European global dominance, and which are transplanted from continent to continent with the mass
migrations that have characterized the last century. My knowledge and direct experience of South Asian
culture tells me that, although altered somewhat by European imperialism, that culture was never and is
not now characterized by gender, racial, or class equality . Fur- ther, Friedman notes
sometimes quite independently of whites, I am also referring to

that there were forty-eight ethnic wars/conflicts being fought in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle
East during 1993.37 Many of these conflicts were/are based on ethnic animosities wherein each party has racialized
an ethnic "other." In many cases such "othering"

pre-dated or has survived (in modified forms)


European imperialism (for example, the long-standing Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India,
manifested today in various insurgencies including the Kashmiri independence move- ment; the Buddhist
Tamil struggle against the Hindu Sinhalese in Sri Lanka; clan warfare in Somalia; and tribal
warfare in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire). Indeed, many racisms in dif- ferent
parts of the world (such as Japanese racism against Koreans) seemingly
have nothing to do with Europeans at all , while others (such as the generalized racism
throughout Asia against the many thousands of exported Filipina domestic workers and nurses, and male Filipino
labourers exported for the construction and shipping trades) are indirectly caused by European imperialism by
virtue of its stunting of economic development in various regions. Finally, it is important to remember the ongoing
complic- ity of the elites of third world countries and cultures in buttressing European/American economic
imperialism and white supremacy because it serves their immediate interests. The specificities of their geopolitical
positions, the machi- nations of international capitalism, and the legacies of co- lonialism may well explain the
behaviour of "comprador" elites, but they are not thereby absolved of responsibility for oppressing certain

Race essentialist
positions that hold only whites accountable for racial oppres- sion are overly simplistic, miss the
complexity of the issues involved, and encourage a focus on only one set
of villains.
ethnic/cultural/religious groups, classes, or women within their populations.

Wildersons scholarship isnt intended to preclude goaloriented political change


Frank b. Wilderson 10 III, Prof at UC Irvine, speaking on a panel on literary
activism at the National Black Writers Conference, March 26, "Panel on Literary
Activism", transcribed from the video available at http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/id/222448, begins at roughly 49:10
Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself

we
are not just black writers, we are black people and as black people we live every
day of our lives in an anti-black world. A world that defines itself in a very
whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because

fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our


lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers
might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us
tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political

my writing is self consciously about radical


change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my
labor has been intentional and goal oriented. For example, I organized, with a
purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the
prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to
abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I
want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to
impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results , I think that something really debilitating will
happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in
the ways that which I want my writing to have an impact on political
struggle what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I
don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should
have on political struggle, is that the relationship of literature to struggle is not
struggle. I am a political writer which is to say

one of causality but one of accompaniment , when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my
political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look

I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the


writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to
and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people
to take risk or when a political organization is presetting a list of demands ,
arie, in this way

I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America

I've been involved with some really


radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of
and its anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba,

the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, if I can think
of my writing as something that accompanies political struggle as
opposed to something that will cause political struggle then maybe just maybe I will be
able to explore forbidden territory, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I cant say when I am trying
to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement
can't always accommodate, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.

Anti-blackness is not an ontological antagonism---conflict is


inevitable in politics, but does not have to be demarcated
around whiteness and blackness---the alts ontological fatalism
recreates colonial violence
Peter Hudson 13, Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg , South Africa, has been on the editorial board of the Africa
Perspective: The South African Journal of Sociology and Theoria: A Journal of Political
and Social Theory and Transformation, and is a member of the Johannesburg
Workshop in Theory and Criticism, The state and the colonial unconscious, Social
Dynamics: A journal of African studies, 2013
Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an
outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from
which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009,
220). But although the excluded place which isnt excluded insofar as it is
necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be
universal (may be considered ontological), its content (what fills it) as well as the mode

of this filling and its reproduction are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the
signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of
exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for
deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere
engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled.
the curvature of intersubjective space (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific
modes of the othering of otherness are nowhere decided in advance (as a
certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social
Put differently,

does not have to be divided into white and black , and the meaning of these
signifiers is never necessary because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism
institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks who are not. But this
ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic that is, of all contingently
constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers
to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the
white man doesnt exist, the black man doesnt exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate

division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division.


Whiteness may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the
ontological difference (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply
sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of
the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not
follow that the void of black being functions as the ultimate
substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of
structuring relations

sociality

rest . What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of


its constitutive axis, its ontological differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened
off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary
give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the
lived experience (vcu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is traversing the fantasy (Zizek 2006a,
4060) all the time; the void of the verb to be is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the
subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work , who
is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 Fixed into non-fixity, he is eternally suspended
between element and moment5 he is where the colonial symbolic falters
in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into
the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are
(sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the
structuring relation of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which,
no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial i.e., anti-white
modes of struggle are not (just) psychic 6 but involve the reactivation (or de-sedimentation)7 of
colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism.
are said to

Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the
existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time because it is the presence of one object in another undermines any identity ever being
(fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of
antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All

symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it


cant totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its
real:9 an errant object that has no place of its own, isnt recognised in the
categories of the system but is produced by it its part of no part or
object small a.10 Correlative to this object a is the subject stricto sensu i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an
identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the

real of the social, as distinct from subject position based on a


determinate identity.

Policy focus key to combat racism---anti-blackness is not


ontological
Jamelle Bouie 13, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling
Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism
Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public
policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all
levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as
we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choicesthe decision to
exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do
with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to dismantle
this prejudice using public policy. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of

sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans
understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgans work and actually see racism being inscribed in
the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that
it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us
and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be
ultimately destroyed by policy. Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I dont believe the law created
racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound
aspects of human psychology it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can
no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such
hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more
manageable goal than TNCs utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant
to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you
define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyaltybasically just prejudicethen Sullivan is right to throw
water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But

there's nothing natural about the black/white


divide that has defined American history . White Europeans had contact with
black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade without the emergence
of an anti-black racism . It took particular choices made by particular people in this
case, plantation owners in colonial Virginiato make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a
defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured
servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility,
colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the
ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then
justified continued enslavementblacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery
(and later, Jim Crow) wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in
tandem with it. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white
supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded
Coates is making a more precise claim: That

slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit
for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially
sanctioned behaviorowning a home, getting marriedand then blame them for the adverse consequences.
Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact
dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not
because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active
with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get
away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of
monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social
stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To
deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But
with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a
sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument,
that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed
as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize
their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire
encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this

If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma,


then lifting itas we've seen over the last decadehas helped destroy it. There's no
reason racism can't work the same way .
institution."

Wilderson is overly reductive---he has no way to explain


historical resistance to anti-blackness because his theory
pigeon holes all oppression into the non-falsifiable register of
psychoanalysis
Sar Maty B 11, prof of film at Portsmouth University, The US Decentred,
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/article/view/2304/2474

As we shall see below, blacks in the US cannot and do not have ontology, or so Wilderson argues, denying with the
same breath the workability of analogy as a method, because analogy can only be a ruse. Thus, what he calls the
ruse of analogy grants those who fall for it, for example, Black film theorists or Black academics, an opportunity to
reflect on (black) cinema only after some form of structural alteration. (38) Analogy does seem tricky if one follows
Wildersons line of thought, that is, the Holocaust/Jews and slavery/Africans. Jews entered and came out of
Auschwitz as Jews whereas Africans emerged from the slave ships as Blacks.2 Two types of holocaust: the first
Human, the second Human and metaphysical, something which leads to Wilderson saying that the Jews have the

for Wilderson,
blacks are socially and ontologically dead in the sense that the black body has been violently
Dead ... among them; the Dead have the Black among them. (38) It bears reiterating that

turned into flesh, ripped apart literally and imaginatively, that it is a body vulnerably open, an object made
available (fungible) for any subject and not in the world or civil society the way white bodies are. (38)

differences between black and white ethical


dilemmas separate them dialectically into incompatible zones . As illustration
Furthermore, Wilderson argues that

Wilderson reflects on black women suffering in US prisons in the 1970s and then juxtaposes the suffering with white
womens concurrent public preoccupations in civil society. For example, the violence and neglect underwent by
Safya Bukhari Alston3 in solitary confinement at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women is linked to the similar
plight of another black woman, Dorothy, in Haile Gerimas Bush Mama (1977) before Wilderson questions what both
situations mean in relation to images of [w]hite women burning bras in Harvard Square ... marching in ...
Manhattan campaigning for equal rights. (135) Wildersons answer is that the images of female black pain and
white activism are irreconcilable precisely because they cannot be read against one another without such an
exercise appearing intellectually sloppy. However,

he does not develop this point , preferring

instead to examine suffering through a libidinal economy (131) leading ,


predictably, to the conclusion that white radicalism, white political cinema and
white supremacy are one and the same thing. Most unfortunate though inevitable is
the reason Wilderson gives to justify this: a socalled antiBlackness that, [wilderson

quote begins] as opposed to white apathy, is necessary to White political radicalism and to White political cinema
because it sutures affective, emotional, and even ethical solidarity between the ideological polar extremes of
Whiteness. This necessary antiBlackness erects a structural prohibition that one sees in White political discourse
and in White political cinema. (131) [wilderson quote ends] undamentally, the first three chapters of Red, White
and Black are concerned with what it takes to think blackness and agency together ethically, or to permit ourselves
intellectual mindful reflections upon the homicidal ontology of chattel slavery. Wilderson posits ways through which
the dead (blacks) reflect on how the living can be put out of the picture. (143) There seems to be no let off or
way out for blacks (The Slave) in Wildersons logic, an energetic and rigorous, if unforgiving and sustained,
treadmill of damning analysis to which Indians (The Savage/The Red) will also be subjected, first through

yet Wildersons highlighting is problematic because it overlooks


the Diaspora or African Diaspora, a key component in Yearwoods thesis that, crucially, neither
navelgazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly
engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and
Savage film analysis. <cont> And

approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is
problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the interconnectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in
point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lotts mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwoods idea of
African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been
fundamentally questioned since Lotts 1990s theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of

ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wildersons corpus of films as


unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to
advance. Here, beyond the UScentricity or social and political specificity of [his] filmography, (95) I am

talking about Wildersons choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked
unfairly for failing to acknowledge a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black body, the Black
home, and the Black community (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughess Menace II Society (1993),
overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act(STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wildersons dubious and questionable
conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by

for exaggeration

Wildersons propensity

and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, Savage Negrophobia, he writes

[wilderson

quote begins] The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture
became Black style ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold
territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or
direct this process ... Anyone can say nigger because anyone can be a nigger. (235)7 [wilderson quote ends]

Black is
irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right
Similarly, in chapter ten, A Crisis in the Commons, Wilderson addresses the issue of Black time.

historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are the ship
hold of the Middle Passage: the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time but also the moment of
no time at all on the map of no place at all. (279) Not only does Pinhos more mature analysis expose this point as

I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless


historians and sociologists works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during
the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazzstudies books on cross
preposterous (see below),

cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once
Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while
dismissing jazz as belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking, (225)
there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that
Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his
sustained bashing of blacks and anti Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly
plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood films badly planned sequel: How does one deconstruct life? Who would
benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow. (340)

***NEG***

***T/Framework***

T/Framework Islamophobia Policy Key


The law is key to combat Islamophobia on both a legislative
and discoursive front we should use political coalitions to
engage in incremental reforms that dismantle Islamophobia
Yazdiha 13 (Haj Yazdiha, PhD in Sociology at the University of North Carolina,
"Law as Movement Strategy: How the Islamophobia Movement Institutionalizes Fear
Through Legislation," Social Movement Studies
First, the successful use of law as strategy brings Islamophobia into an elite
political sphere. Any movement to successfully counter Islamophobias
legislative efforts must

also

gain access to the political arena and the

support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
attempted counter- movements.

donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.

A shift in cultural consciousness and discourse is as much a goal of

the Islamophobia movement as is its legislative gains . Furthermore, these broader


cultural successes create further discursive opportunities on which
movements can build and through which related movements can be
framed.

The state is able to reduce discrimination towards Muslims by


taking policy steps to make their laws less discriminatory
Amnesty International, 2012
(Choice and Prejudice: Discrimination Against Muslims in Europe,
https://www.aivl.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/Rapportchoiceandprejudice.pdf,
accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
States have an obligation to take measures to prevent discrimination, not
only by their own officials but also by private individuals or other nonstate actors To achieve this aim, laws should prohibit discrimination on grounds
of religion or belief, and on any other grounds such as ethnicity and
gender, in all areas of life including employment . Such legislation should be effectively

applied in the private sector. Amnesty International maintains that differences of treatment implemented by
private, and in some cases public, employers against Muslims wearing religious and cultural symbols and dress with
the purpose of promoting a specific corporate image, pleasing clients, or enforcing a concept of neutrality, amount

states and European institutions


should ensure that laws combating discrimination in employment are
effectively implemented in a way which is consistent with human rights
standards. States should avoid introducing general bans on cultural and
religious symbols or dress which apply to pupils and students . Although pupils
to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Therefore,

rights to freedom of expression and religion or belief may sometimes be restricted by individual schools to achieve
a legitimate aim, such as the need to promote human rights of the others, states should ensure that schools do not

implement restrictions which are not necessary or proportionate to the sought aim . When a restriction on religious
or cultural symbols or dress is applied to pupils, it is up to the restricting authority to prove it is in line with
international human rights standards and it does not result in the violation of the best interest of the child.

Amnesty International is concerned about the lack of adequate places of


worship in Catalonia, which results in Muslims praying in outdoor spaces such as football courts or car parks,
and about the discriminatory provision prohibiting the building of minarets in Switzerland. States should
ensure that the right to have adequate places of worship, which is a key
component of the right to freedom of religion or belief, is fulfilled. To this end,
states should ensure that provision is made for space which can be used
for building new places of worship in the same way as they make provision
for space to establish other community facilities which the local
community needs. Local authorities should genuinely consult religious associations when developing
urban management plans, refrain from supporting campaigns against the establishment of new places of worship
and put in place effective policies aimed at resolving disputes between local residents and Muslim associations.

Public debate about restrictions on religious and cultural symbols and


dress perceived as Muslim has focused largely on the headscarf or fullface veil worn by women. Sometimes anxiety about womens status in Islam has been proposed as a

justification for such measures. States are required to bring an end to discrimination against women in the
enjoyment of their rights, which includes eradicating all forms of violence against women, irrespective of the
religion, culture, or racial and ethnic identity of the victim or perpetrator, and effective prevention consists in states

But it is stereotypical to assume that


women who wear certain forms of dress do so only under coercion. Space
offering appropriate services to women at risk.

should be made for women and girls in diverse religions and traditions to debate and inform others about the reality

They should be free to challenge religious and cultural practices


or not to, to discuss how they can be changed or maintained without
pressure or constraints imposed by the state or by any non-state actor
likely to strengthen prejudices instead of counteracting them. States should
of their lives.

adopt a more rational approach to concerns about womens equality in minority religions and cultures based on the
views and preferences of the women themselves and their experience of discrimination either by those who claim
to be in their community, or those from other parts of society.

***Islamophobia Debate***

Islamophobia No Impact
Muslims arent being solely focused- other religions are
discriminated as much as Islam is
Goldberg 10

(Jonah, Jonah Jacob Goldberg is an American conservative syndicated columnist and author.
Goldberg is known for his contributions on politics and culture to National Review Online, of which he is editor-atlarge. He is the author of Liberal Fascism (2008), which reached #1 on the New York Times Best Seller list..
Islamophobia? Not Really Los Angeles Times. August 24)

hate crimes against Muslims increased by a staggering 1,600% in


2001. That sounds serious! But wait, the increase is a math mirage. There were 28 antiIslamic incidents in 2000. That number climbed to 481 the year a bunch of Muslim terrorists
murdered 3,000 Americans in the name of Islam on Sept. 11. Now, that was a hate crime.
According to the FBI,

Regardless, 2001 was the zenith or, looked at through the prism of our national shame, the nadir of the much-

following year, the number of antiIslamic hate-crime incidents (overwhelmingly, nonviolent vandalism and nasty
words) dropped to 155. In 2003, there were 149 such incidents. And the number has
hovered around the mid-100s or lower ever since. Sure, even one hate crime is too many.
But does that sound like a anti-Muslim backlash to you ? Let's put this in even sharper
focus. America is, outside of Israel ,probably the most receptive and tolerant country in the
world to Jews. And yet, in every year since 9/11, more Jews have been hatecrime victims than Muslims. A lot more. In 2001, there were twice as many antiJewish incidents as there were anti-Muslim, again according to the FBI. In 2002 and pretty
much every year since, anti-Jewish incidents have outstripped anti-Muslim ones by at
least 6 to 1. Why aren't we talking about the anti-Jewish climate in America?
Because there isn't one. And there isn't an anti-Muslim climate either. Yes, there's
a lot of heated rhetoric on the Internet. Absolutely, some Americans don't like Muslims. But if
discussed anti-Muslim backlash in the United States. The

you watch TV or movies or read, say, the op-ed page of the New York Times never mind left-wing blogs

you'll hear much more open bigotry toward evangelical Christians (in blogspeak, the
"Taliban wing of the Republican Party") than you will toward Muslims. No doubt some
American Muslims particularly young Muslim men with ties to the Middle East and South Asia
have been scrutinized at airports more than elderly women of Norwegian extraction, but does
that really amount to Islamophobia, given the dangers and complexities of
the war on terror?

Islamophobia is not real- Jews receive way more hate crimes


than Muslims do
Jacoby 10

(Jeff, An Op-Ed columnist and nationally recognized conservative voice, Jacoby was hired from the
Boston Herald in 1987. He briefly practiced law and was a commentator for WBUR-FM. His awards include the 1999
Breindel Prize and the 2004 Thomas Paine Award.. The Islamophobia Myth The Boston Globe. December 8)

America is many things, but Islamophobic plainly isnt one of them. As Time
itself acknowledged: Polls have shown that most Muslims feel safer and freer in the US
than anywhere else in the Western world. That sentiment is powerfully buttressed by the FBIs
newly released statistics on hate crimes in the United States. In 2009, according to data gathered from
more than 14,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide, there were 1,376 hate crimes
motivated by religious bias. Of those, just 9.3 percent fewer than 1 in 10 were
committed against Muslims. By contrast, 70.1 percent were committed against Jews, 6.9 percent were

Hate crimes driven by antiMuslim bigotry were outnumbered nearly 8 to 1 by anti-Semitic crimes. Year after
year, American Jews are far more likely to be the victims of religious hate crime than
members of any other group. That was true even in 2001, by far the worst year for
anti-Muslim incidents, when 481 were reported less than half of the 1,042 antiJewish crimes tabulated by the FBI the same year. Does all this mean that America is in
reality a hotbed of anti-Semitism? Would Times cover have been closer to the mark if it had asked: Is
America Judeophobic? Of course not. Even one hate crime is one too many, but in a
nation of 300 million, all of the religious-based hate crimes added together amount to
less than a drop in the bucket. This is not to minimize the 964 hate crimes perpetrated against Jews
aimed at Catholics or Protestants, and 8.6 percent targeted other religions.

last year, or those carried out against Muslims (128), Catholics (55), or Protestants (40). Some of those attacks were
especially shocking or destructive; all of them should be punished. But surely the most obvious takeaway from the
FBIs statistics is not that

anti-religious hate crimes

are so frequent

in America. It is that they

are so rare.

Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes are not as bad- some hate crimes


against Muslims in only 2014 alone are hoaxes and just are
used to help Islamophobic Myths. More hoaxes are to come
Spencer 14

(Robert, Robert Spencer is an American Author. he has published twelve books, including two
New York Times best-selling books. In 2003 he founded and has since directed Jihad Watch. He has also co-founded
Stop Islamization of America (SIOA) and the Freedom Defense Initiative with blogger Pamela Geller, with whom he
also co-authored a book, The Post-American Presidency: The Obama Administration's War on America. The Top
Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Hoaxes of 2014 The Counter Jihad Report. December 29.)

a man drove up to the Islamic Cultural Center in Fresno,


threw rocks through the windows, and then entered the center and
destroyed things inside. The local ABC outlet, KFSN, reported Friday that Fresno Police Chief
Jerry Dyer says it is clear the incident is a hate crime which is why the FBI is also investigating this
case. But on Saturday, it turned out that the incident was not an anti-Muslim hate
crime at all: the vandal was Asif Mohammad Khan, a Muslim. The destruction at the Islamic
On Christmas morning,

Cultural Center in Fresno was yet another in a long series of fake hate crimes designed to prop up the fiction that

According to Khans sister


Samia, the vandal is (like the recent French attackers who screamed Allahu akbar while trying to kill
infidels) mentally ill. She also said that he was a devout Muslim who prayed five times daily. Dyer
revealed that Khan had in recent days written that Osama bin Laden was the
most inspirational person in his life. Dyer explained that Khans vandalism of the mosque was not
Muslims in the U.S. are routinely targets of discrimination and harassment.

geared towards the Islamic community, it was not geared to the Islamic faith or any of those things and was simply
to get back at a few people at the center who had belittled him and in his eyes bullied him. Dyer and other law
enforcement authorities were extremely unlikely to consider it as they investigated Khans crimes, but the Hamas-

Muslims have on many occasions in


the past not hesitated to stoop even to fabricating hate crimes, including attacks
linked Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and other

on mosques. CAIR and other groups like it want and need hate crimes against Muslims, because they can use them
for political points and as weapons to intimidate people into remaining silent about the jihad threat.

This has

happened many times in 2014. Here are five of the most egregiously manipulative examples: 1. The
Saleh and Akbar viral video. In October, the Muslim bloggers Adam Saleh and Sheikh Akbar
released a video entitled Racial Profiling Experiment. It showed the duo in
Western clothing, coming to blows in front of an indifferent NYPD cop. In the
second part of the video, they pass by the same cop in Muslim garb, arguing
mildly only to be harassed and frisked by the same policeman. The video went viral. The
Huffington Post hysterically proclaimed that it offered a small glimpse into the ugly world of racial profiling.

it turned out that the whole thing had


been staged. The Smoking Gun called the video a cynical and duplicitous
attempt to capitalize on New York Citys documented racial profiling
problems. 2. The German mosque arson. Another Islamophobic hate crime took place in Germany in
February, when there was an arson attack at the Central Mosque in Cologne. But in
October, a Muslim who had been held in a psychiatric ward ever since he had
been arrested (as the mainstream media and law enforcement officials have now apparently agreed
that all Muslims who commit acts of violence are mentally ill) confessed to
having set the fire. I wanted to make a clear sign, the arsonist explained. Because they treated me
Hamas-linked CAIR called for an investigation. But then

badly at the Koran school. It has always hurt me. He also had tried to burn down two other mosques; it wasnt
reported whether or not he had been to Quran school and been treated badly in all three. But until he was

his arson attacks provided rich material for the Islamophobia


mythmakers. 3. The burned Qurans in Dearborn. Last June, after three burned Qurans were
found in front of the Karbalaa Islamic Educational Center in Dearborn, the mosques
apprehended,

imam, Sheikh Husham Al-Husainy met with lawyers to discuss his proposal for a statute criminalizing the
desecration of holy books. We want all of the religions to cooperate with us, he declared, to bring respect to the

as it turned out, the Quran barbecuer was


a Muslim named Ali Hassan Al-Assadi. Al-Husainy opined that al-Assadi
was (surprise, surprise) mentally unstable. Crazy or not, the discovery that
al-Assadi had burned the Qurans threw a large monkey wrench into al-Husainys plans to use
the incident as the cornerstone of his campaign against the freedom of
expression. 4. The Montclair State University attack. Combine the relentless Muslim striving for victimhood
with the cult of victimhood on college campuses these days, and even non-Muslims get into the
faked hate act. Last April at Montclair State University in New Jersey, a student claimed that
three white men in jeans and hoodies assaulted him. They called him an
Islamic terrorist. MSU police began an investigation, only to find that the whole
incident was a hoax: a student named Navjoat Aulakh had filed a false report.
Aulakh may not even be a Muslim. His full name is Navjoat Singh Aulakh; Singh is a name closely
associated with Sikhs. The Aulakhs are a Jat clan from the Punjab area, and while many Jats are Muslims,
word of God, whether the Quran, Bible, or Torah. But
none other than

the name Singh here suggests that this young man is himself a Sikh. His Facebook page gives no sign that he cares
about much of anything but sports and babes, but apparently he does have some significant political concerns. If he
is a Sikh, this would by no means be the first time that Sikhs have served as useful idiots for the Islamic
supremacist victimhood posturing enterprise. Sikhs even stood with Hamas-linked CAIR to call for the allowance of
hijabs on an amusement park go-kart ride that had already seen one Muslima killed as her hijab was caught in the

a Sikh apparently tried to aid the false Muslim victimhood


narrative. And failed. 5. The Shaima Alawadi murder. Last April in El Cajon, California, an Iraqi
Muslim named Kassim Alhimidi was found guilty of murdering his wife, Shaima
Alawadi, after she had told him that she wanted a divorce. Before Alhimidi was
arrested, this murder was widely reported as an Islamophobic hate crime : a
note was found by Alawadis body that read, Go back to your country, you
terrorist. Leftists and Islamic supremacists made a great deal of this, claiming that
the murder was the work of an Islamophobe who hated Shaima Alawadi for wearing a hijab.
axle. In this case,

They even staged a campaign, One Million Hijabs for Shaima Alawadi. Reza Aslan, the celebrated author of Zealot,
bashed out a sub-literate tweet blaming Pamela Geller and me for the murder: If a 32 year old veiled mother is a
terrorist than [sic] so am I you Islamophobic fucks Gellar [sic] Spencer et. [sic] al. Come find me. This tweet
indicated how much mileage the Islamophobia propaganda machine thought it could get from the Alawadi murder
in its efforts to intimidate people into thinking it wrong to oppose jihad terror.

Yet it was another fake

hate crime. And since the mainstream media remains so uncritical about Muslim claims of having been
victimized, there will be many more in 2015.

Britain proves Islamophobia is overblown


Malik 06

(Kenan, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. I am a presenter of Analysis, BBC Radio 4's flagship
current affairs programme and a panelist on the Moral Maze. I used to present Nightwaves, BBC Radio 3's wonderful
arts and ideas programme. I have also written and presented a number of radio and TV documentaries including
Disunited Kingdom, Are Muslims Hated?, Islam, Mullahs and the Media, Skullduggery and Man, Beast and Politics.
My books include From Fatwa to Jihad (2009), Strange Fruit (2008), Man, Beast and Zombie (2000), and The
Meaning of Race (1996). I am currently writing a history of moral thought. The Islamophobia Myth KenanMalik
February.)

does Islamophobia really exist? Or is the hatred and abuse of Muslims being
exaggerated to suit politicians' needs and silence the critics of Islam? The trouble with Islamophobia is that it
But

is an irrational concept. It confuses hatred of, and discrimination against, Muslims on the one hand with criticism of

'Islamophobia' is all too often used not to highlight racism but


to stifle criticism. And in reality discrimination against Muslims is not as great
as is often perceived - but criticism of Islam should be greater. In making a film on Islamophobia for
Channel 4 what became clear is the gap between perception and reality. Islamophobia driven by what
people want to believe is true, rather than what really is true. A good example is the
debate about police harassment of Muslims. Last summer the Home Office published figures that
revealed a 300 per cent increase in the number of Asians being stopped and
searched under Britain's anti-terror laws. Journalists, Muslim leaders and even the Home
Office all shouted 'Islamophobia'. 'The whole Muslim community is being targeted by the police', claimed
Khalid Sofi of the Muslim Council. Certainly, the bald figure of a '300 per cent increase'
suggests heavy handed policing and continual harassment. But dig a little
deeper and the figures reveal something very different. They show that just 3000
Asians had been stopped and searched in the previous year under the
Terrorism Act. Of these probably a half were Muslim. In other words around 1500
Muslims out of a population of more than 1.6 million had been stopped and searched under the
terror laws - hardly a case of the police targeting every Muslim A total of 21,577
had been stopped and searched under the terror laws. The vast majority of these 14,429 - were in fact white. Yet when I interviewed Iqbal Sacranie, general secretary of the Muslim Council
of Britainhe insisted that '95-98 per cent of those stopped and searched under the anti-terror laws are
Muslim'. The real figure is actually 15 per cent. But however many times I showed him the true statistics
he refused to budge. I am sure he was sincere in his belief. But there is no basis for his claim that
virtually all those stopped and searched were Muslim - the figures appear to have been
Islam on the other. The charge of

simply plucked out of the sky. There is disproportion in the treatment of Asians. Asians make up about 5 per cent of
the population, but 15 per cent of those stopped under the Terrorism Act. Could this be because of anti-Muslim
prejudice? Perhaps. It's more likely, however, to be the result of majority of anti-terror sweeps taking place in areas
- near Heathrow Airport, for instance - where there happen to be higher numbers of Asians. Almost two thirds of
terrorism stop and search operations took place in London, where Asians form 11 per cent of the population. The

claims of Islamophobia become even less credible if we look at all stop and
searches. Stop and searches under the Terrorism Act form only a tiny
proportion of the 900,000 stop and searches that took place last year. If there
was widespread Islamophobia within the police force we should expect to find Asians
in disproportionate numbers in the overall figures. We don't. Asians are stopped and searched
roughly in proportion to their population once age structure is taken into account. All these figures are in the public
domain and easily available. Yet not a single reputable journalist challenged the claim that Asians were being
disproportionately stopped and searched. So pervasive is the acceptance of

even bothers to check if it is true

Islamophobia, that no-one

Islamophobia Word Bad


Use of the term Islamophobia otherizes Muslim-Americans
and prevents analysis of the hostility.
Basu, 14 (Tanya Basu; former editorial fellow with The Atlantic, social science

reporter at New York Times; 10/15/14, What Does Islamophobia Actually Mean?,
Atlantic; http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/is-islamophobiareal-maher-harris-aslan/381411/)
But is the term 'Islamophobia' itself, with its connotations of a
psychological disorder, an offensive word? Offensiveness is in the eye of the
beholder, said William Downes, a linguist with a focus on religion at York University
in Toronto. The key question is offensive to whom? The term might be
offensive if it reminded the Islamic community ... that there were those in
society who actively disliked it and feared it because they identify it with
a terrorist threat or an existential threat , he continued, noting that
using the word contributed to othering Muslims as a group . Richardson,
for his part, regrets employing the term in his 1997 Runnymede report and has
outlined eight problems with using 'Islamophobic' as a descriptor of an anti-Islamic
individual or activity. Characterizing someone as an Islamophobe, he says,
implies that they are "insane or irrational," which impedes constructive
dialogue, obscures the context-specific roots of the observed hostility,
and erroneously portrays anxiety about Muslims as a minority condition.
"All racism and bigotry is phobic in one sense or the other." The key phenomenon
to be addressed is arguably anti-Muslim hostility, namely hostility towards an ethnoreligious identity within western countries (including Russia), rather than hostility
towards the tenets or practices of a worldwide religion, Richardson writes. The
1997 Runnymede definition of Islamophobia was a shorthand way of referring to
dread or hatred of Islamand, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims. In
retrospect, it would have been as accurate, or arguably indeed more accurate, to
say a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of all or most Muslimsand,
therefore, dread or hatred of Islam.

The term Islamophobia is flawed preventing dialogue and


effective analyses, blurs important distinctions, and absolves
personal responsibility.
Richardson, 13 (Robin Richardson, a former director of the Runnymede Trust

and the editor of Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All; Islamophobia or anti-Muslim


racism or what? concepts and terms revisited; http://www.insted.co.uk/antimuslim-racism.pdf)
The disadvantages of the term Islamophobia are significant . Some of them
are primarily about the echoes implicit in the concept of phobia. Others are about
the implications of the term Islam. For convenience, they can be itemised as follows.

1. Medically, phobia implies a severe mental illness of a kind that affects only a tiny
minority of people. Whatever else anxiety about Muslims may be, it is not
merely a mental illness and does not merely involve a small number of
people.
2. To accuse someone of being insane or irrational is to be abusive and, not
surprisingly, to make them defensive and defiant. Reflective dialogue with
them is then all but impossible.
3. To label someone with whom you disagree as irrational or insane is to
absolve yourself of the responsibility of trying to understand , both
intellectually and with empathy, why they think and act as they do, and of
seeking through engagement and argument to modify their perceptions
and understandings.
4. The concept of anxiety is arguably more useful in this context than the
concept of phobia. It is widely recognised that anxiety may not be (though
certainly may be) warranted by objective facts , for human beings can on
occasions perceive dangers that do not objectively exist, or anyway do not
exist to the extent that is imagined . Also it can sometimes be difficult to
identify, and therefore to name accurately, the real sources of an anxiety.
5. The use of the word Islamophobia on its own implies that hostility
towards Muslims is unrelated to, and basically dissimilar from, forms of hostility
such as racism, xenophobia, sectarianism, and such as hostility to socalled fundamentalism (Samuels 2006). Further, it may imply there is no
connection with issues of class, power, status and territory; or with issues
of military, political or economic competition and conflict.
6. The term implies there is no important difference between prejudice
towards Muslim communities within ones own country and prejudice
towards cultures and regimes elsewhere in the world where Muslims are
in the majority, and with which the West is in military conflict or economic
competition.
7. The term is inappropriate for describing opinions that are basically
anti-religion as distinct from anti-Islam . I am an Islamophobe, wrote the
journalist Polly Toynbee in reaction to the Runnymede 1997 report, adding I am
also a Christophobe. If Christianity were not such a spent force in this country, if it
were powerful and dominant as it once was, it would still be every bit as damaging
as Islam is in those theocratic states in its thrall If I lived in Israel, I'd feel the
same way about Judaism.
8. The key phenomenon to be addressed is arguably anti-Muslim hostility,
namely hostility towards an ethno-religious identity within western
countries (including Russia), rather than hostility towards the tenets or
practices of a worldwide religion. The 1997 Runnymede definition of
Islamophobia was a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam and,
therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims. In retrospect, it would have been

as accurate, or arguably indeed more accurate, to say a shorthand way of referring


to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims and, therefore, dread or hatred of Islam.

The use of the term "islamophobia" precludes solvency for


people with phobic" perspectives
Emily, 11 (Last name withheld to preserve privacy, social activist for transgender
and disability rights, Why you shouldnt conflate bigotry and phobia, April 30,
Online: http://eateroftrees.wordpress.com/2011/04/30/why-you-shouldnt-conflatebigotry-and-phobia/)
Phobias are real things that impact the lives of many people. Bigotry and
oppressive forces are also a thing that impacts the lives of many people.
But theyre not the same thing. At all. Specifically phobias are when
something or other produces an extremely strong unpleasant emotional
reaction, mostly fear or panic. You see a bee, and you completely freeze up and
cant move because the bee is going to hurt you (even though, logically, you know
thats unlikely and if it did the pain would be annoying and not serious) Phobias
are not generally taken very seriously. This is a recurring problem; wherein
people will try to expose you to your phobia for a variety of reasons, possibly
because they think you need exposure therapy and have decided to skip the
informed consent stage. Or possibly because they find it funny, or any variety
of reasons. All of which are extremely ableist ; at best trying to help you in
a way that denies your agency, at worst outright abuse. And further, people will
often treat people with phobias very condescendingly. Insisting that you
should just magically get over it or that your emotional reaction is a sign
of weakness or any other variety of derogatory treatment for it. People will
completely disregard the needs of their readers, and, for example, illustrate their
writing with pictures of blood or insects in ways that make it hard to avoid said
pictures; assuming that their readers emotional safety is just a concern to be
casually tossed aside. (Further ignoring the fact, of course, that if you trigger your
readers, they are unlikely to remain your readers.) The thing is, the suffix -phobia
is used for two completely different things. One thing is phobias; which are a
mental process that is rather disruptive and tends to preclude clear
thinking. The other is bigotry. Bigotry is hate. Its treating people as less
than human. Its systematically denying people basic rights and disrupting
their lives. But its not a phobia. Calling it one gives reasonability to the
panic defense; when someone claims that they just panicked because the
victim of a hate crime was different and that made them commit said
crime. Because phobias do result in an inability to think clearly, although
they dont usually result in violence so much as hiding. Further calling
bigotry a phobia serves to make oppressors sympathetic. After all, their bigotry is
just an out of control emotional reaction. It says that they are the ones who are
suffering, not the people who they are oppressing. Using -phobia to discuss
bigotry shames phobias as well . Telling people that their emotional reactions
are as bad as forces that systematically dehumanize and kill people on a
regular basis prevents people from being able to discuss their reactions

without being read as terrible people. It prevents people from being able
to deal with their phobias in useful ways, whether by avoiding them or by
attempting to find treatment for them. It encourages people to hurt
themselves by entering painful situations and ignoring the pain, because the pain is
seen as a manifestation of their own personal failures. Using -phobia for
bigotry is an example of bigotry and is definitely oppressive. This becomes
especially a problem because occasionally oppression and phobias overlap. If you
spend your life shamed for expressing a personality trait or because of your mind,
and are constantly harassed and demeaned because of something about you, and
see people around you who exhibit said trait be harassed and treated as jokes or
disgusting or terrible people, you can quickly develop a phobia of said trait. But
then, when you have that reaction, everyone around you uses the words to describe
your reaction to describe the people who hate you. Whose oppression has caused
this reaction in the first place? You have panic attacks when you try to transition
because youve been bombarded by messages that trans people are terrible and
freaks. Only then, you cant talk about it. You cant say Oh hey I have a phobia of
being trans because transphobia isnt anxiety about stepping outside of prescribed
gender roles, its oppression of people who do that. Calling oppression of trans
people transphobia is likely to be oppressive to trans people. Fighting bigotry
with bigotry isnt just helping one group at the expense of another , its
hurting the group youre trying to help, and makes their oppressors
sympathetic. This is, understandably, problematic. Further, there are
relatively reasonable replacements for many common -phobia terms,
that often serve better to explain what the oppressive forces are. For
example, cissexism much more clearly encompasses all the manifestations of
oppression and erasure of transness, not merely the overt violence. Monosexism,
cissexism, and heterosexism are all words that much more clearly discuss how
erasure and normativizing one group at the expense of others is a problematic
element of society. (In addition, replacing phobia with -hate or bigotry can serve to allow discussion of specifically more overt violence ,
or in cases where there isnt such an obvious replacement term.)

The term Islamophobia prevents rational analysis and


legitimate criticisms of Muslims.
Allen 7 (Allen, Chris; British sociologist at the Institute of Applied Social Studies
(IASS) at the University of Birmingham, named by the Deutsche Welle as an expert
on the topic of contemporary Islamophobia; Islamophobia and its Consequences,
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007, p. 148 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=45668)
However both the report and its model have failed to stand the test of time and a
detailed analysis highlights a number of serious flaws.20 The most obvious
disadvantage of the term is that it is understood to be a phobia. As phobias are
irrational, such an accusation makes people defensive and defiant, in turn making
reflective dialogue all but impossible. Likewise, Islamophobia as a separate and
stand-alone concept implies that prejudice against Muslims is unrelated

to other forms of prejudice , for example prejudice based around physical


appearance and skin colour; prejudice against immigrants; prejudice
against military, religious or economic rivals; and prejudices around class,
power and status. The separateness of the concept can also imply that Muslims
themselves want to be separate or different even, thereby failing to recognise or
accept the similarities and overlaps that also exist. Relevant to the contemporary
climate in particular is that the continued use or over-use of the term
prevents either inadvertently or deliberately, depending upon the
sources in question, legitimate criticisms of Muslims being voiced , let
alone attended to. Elsewhere it has been used far too indiscriminately and
inappropriately, failing to differentiate between opinions that are anti-religion per se
from those that are specifically anti-Islam. For example, I am an Islamophobe, yes,
said Polly Toynbee in the Guardian newspaper, But I am a Christophobe and
Judeophobe too.21 As Halliday has argued, the key phenomenon to be addressed is
an anti-Muslim hostility directed at an ethno-religious identity rather than the tenets
of a religion.22 In terms of the Runnymede model and Rokeachs Dogmatism Scale
upon which it was based therefore, the instrument does not measure up to the
theory.23

***Coopteration CP***

1NC
The United States federal government should ban the use of
Muslim community outreach programs for surveillance
purposes; and it should establish an ongoing, impartial, and
transparent review of law enforcements surveillance of
Muslim communities.
Distinguishing between these two forms of engagement
creates cooperation between law enforcement and muslim
communities and makes counter terrorism more effective
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2014

(September 2014Federal Civil Rights Engagement with Arab and Muslim American
Communities, http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ARAB_MUSLIM_9-30-14.pdf, accessed
7/9/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
In its examination, the Commission found that [t]here are two trends in
addressing major civil rights and national security challenges: the
suspect trend of engagement which encourages aggressive intelligence
and surveillance activities; and the partnership trend of engagement
where local communities have developed strong relationships with law
enforcement agencies and local government agencies. 1 The goals of constructive
partnership engagement and aggressive intelligence gathering are prone to work at cross purposes. As the

[f]ederal programs which intertwine civil rights protections


with other policy and legal priorities undermine efforts to reduce prejudice
and discrimination against American Arabs and Muslims .2 The Commission also
identified as a Key Issue the fact that [i]nvestigatory/enforcement techniques used by
some federal agencies have had excessive overlap with those same
agencies community engagement activities. This has made numerous
Arab and Muslim Americans feel that they were being harassed and
denied civil rights, and for some, lessened their trust in the very federal
agencies that were in part supposed to be protecting them .3 Unfortunately, some
Commission found,

of the governments actions not only deepened mistrust, but became flagrant violations of the civil rights of Arab

The governments conduct in the name of national security


has been egregious in a number of circumstances. For example, the Commission found
and Muslim Americans.

large-scale profiling by Customs and Border Patrol, the Transportation Safety Administration and the [FBI]. 4 The
Commission found that the federal government has maintained secret watch lists.5 Also of concern is the fact that
[t]raining materials used by the FBI post-9/11 undermined their relationship with (and were harmful to) the Arab
and Muslim American communities due to incorrect and discriminatory content. The FBIs initial denial of the

It is well
past time for all involved federal agencies to countenance any violations
of the civil rights of Arab and Muslim Americans. To the extent that
ongoing engagement with these communities is important for purposes of
legitimate information-gathering, it should be carried out through as much
constructive engagement as is feasible. This engagement must respect to
the fullest extent possible the distinction between the suspect trend of
engagement and the partnership trend of engagement . A solid example of an agency
materials existence, and later refusal to reveal the content, further lowered the communities trust.6

which has done so is the U.S. Department of Justices (DOJ) Civil Rights Division (CRD).

Independent investigations allow for more transparency in


policing by exposing racist practices and allowing for oversight
and accountability measures to be put in place
Aleef, attorney specializing in criminal justice policy, 2015
(Junaid, former executive director of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater
Chicago, and a Truman National Security Project Political Partner, Why Independent
Investigations Promote Trust Between Communities and Law Enforcement,
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2015/03/why-independent-investigationspromote-trust-between-communities-and-law-enforcement/, accessed 7/4/2015 JCP
PB @ GDI)
Not all accusations of police abuse may be legitimate, but for all but the most spurious allegations, the truth
can only be uncovered after an impartial and transparent review. This is
why independent investigations, at home and abroad, are indispensable for
maintaining trust between the public and those charged with securing the
publics safety. Whether it is a municipal police department in Ferguson, MO, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations pursuit of violent extremists within the American Muslim community, or Britains MI5 seeking to

law enforcement organizations need better


oversight mechanisms to hold themselves accountable to the public . In
America, we see what happens in communities where citizens distrust law
enforcement: The criminals benefit, the community suffers and the
innocent may be targeted. Victims and witnesses are reluctant to
cooperate with law enforcement, and as consequence, the criminals go
unpunished (and free to prey on the community even more). A report released last week by the
U.S. Justice Department on its investigation into the Ferguson Police Department (in Ferguson, MO)
revealed widespread racism in that police force. It is this racism that sows
the seeds of distrust of law enforcement among African Americans in Ferguson.
Independent Investigations in Ferguson, MO The Justice Department investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department found African Americans disproportionately
stopped by the police, and it also concluded that the police regularly used
excessive force against African Americans. Additionally, the investigation found evidence
that the police targeted African Americans for petty violations as a means of generating revenues from fines. The
community knew this was happening, but their complaints fell on deaf
ears. Only now, with an independent investigation concluded, can there be
some measure of accountability enforced upon the Ferguson Police
Department. Without the investigation the problems between law
enforcement and Fergusons African American community would have
faded from the publics eye a while ago, and with that, so too would any
hope of fixing the problems.
interdict the next Jihadi John, these

The CP is key to resolving bias and making domestic


surveillance effective only confidence building and improved
relations lead to effective intelligence gathering.
Beutel 09 (Alejandro Beutel, Researcher for Countering Violent Extremism at the

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),
"Muslim Americans and US Law Enforcement: Not Enemies, But Vital Partners," The
Christian Science Monitor, December 30th 2009
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1230/Muslim-Americans-andUS-law-enforcement-not-enemies-but-vital-partners)

stigma on Muslim Americans worsened in 2009. The latest events,


including arrests of the Newburgh Four in New York, Michael Finton in Illinois, and Hossam Smadi in
Texas; then the Fort Hood, Texas, massacre by Nidal Malik Hasan; and most recently the arrest in
Pakistan of five young Muslim men from Virginia attempting to join a
militant group there have only added to difficulties. Each of these events was unique. The first
The

three involved the questionable use of FBI informants, one case involved a man going on a violent
rampage, and another involved youth seeking violent adventures abroad. Yet, at a time when
terrorism remains a challenge to US national security, these events feed into the false and

dangerous fear that Muslim Americans cannot be trusted. America cant


afford that. The US must identify and apprehend terrorists while avoiding
the alienation of its mainstream Muslim communities. And it is critical that
tactics used by law enforcement agencies to achieve the first goal do not
undermine the second, as it is not only contrary to the values of a free and
democratic society, it creates counterproductive counterterrorism. In the
current climate of fear, its difficult to gain trust. In order to heal relations between Muslim
American communities and law enforcement, and create a more effective barrier against
terrorists, both sides need to revise their respective approaches to extremism and
violence. Many Muslims Americans are concerned by news that paid FBI
informants, including ex-con men such as Craig Monteilh in southern California and Shahed
Hussain in New York, have been targeting impressionable Muslim Americans to
incite and then entrap them. The Muslim community is also concerned by reports that law
enforcement agents are coercing Muslim Americans to serve as informants in exchange for
immigration ease. This should matter to all Americans, because fearful

communities are less willing to talk to law enforcement and we need all
the help we can get from Muslim Americans. After years of building trust with local law
enforcement, the Pakistani community in Lodi, Calif., is trying repair relations that were tattered by the
highly questionable use of an FBI informant in a counterterrorism investigation just after Sept. 11.
Muslims themselves have helped authorities in two recent cases . The Virginia men in
Pakistan were detained and the Detroit-bound airline bomber was flagged because

family members bravely stepped forward to tell law enforcement about


suspicious activity. However, fear within communities can cut off the
goodwill and sources of information needed to prevent another attack. The
Texas arrest of Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a 19-year-old charged with attempting to use a weapon of
mass destruction, is a case in point. Normally, individuals with extremist views would be identified by
local community members and religious leaders would intervene to conduct an ideological detox. No
such intervention took place because those doing the intervention were worried that they, too, would
become subjects of an investigation. Enforcement actions running afoul of the Constitution such as
the surveillance of individuals without a legal standard of reasonable suspicion and the questionable
use of informants must be investigated and policies allowing it to occur must be revised. Another
example of many problematic procedures is in the FBI Domestic Investigation Operations Guidelines
issued last fall. It effectively sanctions racial and religious profiling. Such tactics are ill-considered.
They may be seen as preventive actions by law enforcement but they waste limited investigative
resources and, more important, give undue credibility to extremists false narrative of a war against
Islam. Developing and maintaining partnerships between the American
Muslim community and law enforcement can be challenging, but they are possible
and theyre vital to our national security. To improve them, several steps are in
order: First, law enforcement must rely on credible information to develop its understanding of Muslim
communities. There is far too much shallow analysis being fed to law enforcement from a cottage
industry of anti-Muslim bigots. In the complex arena of law enforcement, theres no substitute for solid
facts and thorough analysis.

2NC Transparency
The Muslim community distrusts the police now due to
surveillance and informants and only independent
investigations restore that trust
Aleef, attorney specializing in criminal justice policy, 2015
(Junaid, former executive director of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater
Chicago, and a Truman National Security Project Political Partner, Why Independent
Investigations Promote Trust Between Communities and Law Enforcement,
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2015/03/why-independent-investigationspromote-trust-between-communities-and-law-enforcement/, accessed 7/4/2015 JCP
PB @ GDI)

The African American community is not alone when it comes to having a strained relationship with law enforcement.

The American Muslim community is also very distrustful of law enforcement


as a result of the increased scrutiny placed on it in the past 14 years
through the global war on terror. American Muslims have legitimate reasons to be wary of law
enforcement too. (The problem pales in comparison to what the African American community has endured, but it

The FBI uses


confidential informants (the community calls them agents provocateur), and some of the
indictments that stem from these operations look like entrapment. Some of
the prosecutions of American Muslims on terrorism-related charges have been specious. The N ew Y ork
merits fixing nonetheless) Why Some American Muslims Mistrust Law Enforcement

City P olice D epartment instituted a massive and unconstitutional


surveillance program targeting their Muslim residents. In July 2014 Human
Rights Watch released a scathing reported titled Illusions of Justice
which detailed many of these abuses, which raised fear and suspicion of
law enforcement among American Muslim communities. To date there have not been
investigations similar to the one in Ferguson into perceived abuses by the FBI. While the use of
confidential informants is an established law enforcement tactic that is
used in many other criminal investigations, whom to use as a confidential
informant, when to use a confidential informant and how a confidential
informant is to be used are judgment calls made by law enforcement . When it
appears that bad judgment has been exercised, or that policies have been violated, then the law
enforcement officers involved should be held accountable . The use of deadly force is
necessary from time to time in criminal investigations. However, whenever there is an instance of deadly force used

there needs to be an independent mechanism to determine if


it was a justifiable use of force. To hold law enforcement accountable does
not require that an officer be found guilty of any wrongdoing unless the
facts support such a conclusion. It requires only that fair and impartial
investigations be conducted.
by law enforcement,

Trust between the community and the police is necessary to


combat crime and extremism, that trust can only be
established through the impartial investigations establish that
trust
Aleef, attorney specializing in criminal justice policy, 2015
(Junaid, former executive director of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater
Chicago, and a Truman National Security Project Political Partner, Why Independent
Investigations Promote Trust Between Communities and Law Enforcement,

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2015/03/why-independent-investigationspromote-trust-between-communities-and-law-enforcement/, accessed 7/4/2015 JCP


PB @ GDI)
There is still a lot of work to be done. For example, the deaths of Eric Garner (New York City) and Tamir Rice

The
national Countering Violent Extremism program is predicated on a
collaboration between law enforcement and the community. Until those
cases of questionable conduct by the FBI with regard to its use of
confidential informants and unlawful surveillance are properly addressed,
the community will remain hesitant, and the CVE effort will falter . And as
(Cleveland) at the hands of law enforcement still need to be investigated by independent authorities.

mentioned above, the British government needs to conduct an independent investigation into MI5s conduct with

The misconduct and the bad


judgment of a few officers can taint the entire relationship between law
enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. Police officers, FBI agents
the British Muslim community. Accountability, Trust, Public Safety

and MI5 officers have difficult and dangerous jobs, but their work can be made easier and safer when they have the

From getting drugs and illegal guns off


the streets to countering violent extremism, community members can
make a significant contribution towards public safety. In order to achieve
real collaboration in investigating crimes and in stopping young people
from getting into trouble in the first place, the community must trust the
men and women charged with protecting them. This trust will come
through more rigorous oversight and accountability. And that, in turn,
helps keep everyone safe.
cooperation of the communities in which they work.

2NC Blurring Bad


The blurring between outreach and intelligence gathering
erodes support between law enforcement and Muslim
communities.
Price, counsel for the Brennan Centers Liberty and National
Security Program, 2015

(Michael, January 29, 2015, Community Outreach or Intelligence Gathering?,


https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/community-outreach-or-intelligencegathering, accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Community outreach programs are not new to law enforcement. But past outreach efforts have
raised the specter that the FBIs true purpose is to gather intelligence on
American Muslim communities. From New York to Los Angeles, mixed-motive programs have had
the effect of undermining critical trust between law enforcement and these communities. In MinneapolisSaint Paul, outreach efforts focused on the local Somali community have been
touted as a national model.3 But according to documents obtained by the Brennan Center for
Justice,4 that outreach quietly morphed into a source of intelligence for federal
agencies, similar to other controversial efforts in California and New York .5
Following reports that young men from the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area traveled to Somalia and joined the terrorist

the FBI worked with local police to transform existing


outreach efforts into a counter-radicalization operation. Funded by a 2009 grant from
the Department of Justice, the initiative proposed to exploit the nascent trust
established between the police and the Somali community , which is predominantly
Muslim. Local police promised to shift their outreach efforts from addressing
community concerns about access to social services to making a list of
radicalized youth and keeping it on a police database shared with the
FBI.6 This appears to be part of a larger paradigm shift in community
engagement championed by the FBI and replicated in cities across the
country including Cincinnati, Seattle, San Diego, Washington, and Denver.7 Community outreach
can be a valuable tool for law enforcement; it gives marginalized
communities an opportunity to bring their concerns to police. But using
community outreach as a front for intelligence gathering is a shortsighted
strategy likely to erode community trust and prove counterproductive. The
FBI acknowledged this problem in 2010 and issued a new policy on conducting community outreach, also
obtained by the Brennan Center. 8 It recognized that members of the public contacted
through a community outreach activity generally do not have an
expectation that information about them will be maintained in an FBI file
or database. But the rules it established fell short of meaningful reform.
group al-Shabab in 2007,

They contain significant loopholes, and based on recent incidents in Seattle9 and Minnesota, 10 they do not appear
to have had much effect. The FBI reportedly revised the policy in 2013,11 a copy of which the Brennan Center has

If the Obama administration is serious about countering violent


extremism in the U.S., it should ensure that community outreach efforts
are not used for intelligence gathering.
requested.

The blurring of community outreach and surveillance has


created distrust in the muslim community
Currier, Journalist at the intercept, 2015

(Cora, 01/21/2015, SPIES AMONG US: HOW COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROGRAMS TO


MUSLIMS BLUR LINES BETWEEN OUTREACH AND INTELLIGENCE,

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/21/spies-among-us-community-outreachprograms-muslims-blur-lines-outreach-intelligence/, accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @


GDI)
To keep other youth from following Yusufs path, U.S. Attorney Andrew Luger recently said that the
federal government would be launching a new initiative to work with
Islamic community groups and promote after-school programs and job trainingto address the root
causes of extremist groups appeal. This is not about gathering intelligence, its not
about expanding surveillance or any of the things that some people want
to claim it is, Luger said. Lugers comments spoke to the concerns of civil
liberties advocates, who believe that blurring the line between
engagement and intelligence gathering could end up with the monitoring
of innocent individuals. If past programs in this area are any guide, those
concerns are well founded. Documents obtained by attorneys at the Brennan Center for Justice at
New York University School of Law, and shared with the Intercept, show that previous community
outreach efforts in Minnesotalaunched in 2009 in response to the threat
of young Americans joining the al-Qaeda-linked militia al-Shabab, in Somalia
were, in fact, conceived to gather intelligence. A grant proposal from the St. Paul
Police Department to the Justice Department, which the Brennan Center obtained through a Freedom of Information

lays out a plan in which Somali-speaking advocates would


hold outreach meetings with community groups and direct people toward
the Police Athletic League and programs at the YWCA. The proposal says
that the team will also identify radicalized individuals, gang members,
and violent offenders who refuse to cooperate with our efforts.
Act request to the FBI,

2NC Solvency Trust Down


Trust between the government and Muslim communities is
down now an increase is needed to prevent US youth from
joining ISIS
Schmitt, 14 (10/5/2014, Eric, U.S. Is Trying to Counter ISIS's Efforts to Lure
Alienated Young Muslims, Lexis, JMP)

DUBLIN, Ohio -- In this central Ohio town, parents and community leaders are expressing growing fears
that their

youths may succumb to the Islamic State's savvy social media

appeal to join its fight on battlefields in Iraq and Syria .

But when Homeland

Security Secretary Jeh Johnson showed up recently at the Noor Islamic Cultural Center here to offer a
sympathetic ear and federal assistance, he faced a litany of grievances from a group of mostly Muslim
leaders and advocates. They complained of humiliating border inspections by brusque federal agents,
F.B.I. sting operations that wrongly targeted Muslim citizens as terrorists and a foreign policy that leaves
President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in place as a magnet for extremists.

''Our relationship has to be

built on trust, but the U.S. government hasn't given us very many reasons
to build up that trust,''

said Omar Saqr, 25, the cultural center's youth coordinator. As the

the Obama
administration is redoubling its efforts to stanch the flow of radicalized
young Muslim Americans traveling to Syria to join the fight and
potentially returning as well-trained militants to carry out attacks here .
United States carries out yet another bombing campaign across two Islamic countries,

American law enforcement and intelligence officials say more than 100 Americans have gone to Syria, or
tried to so far. That number of Americans seeking to join militants, while still small, was never seen
during the two major wars fought in Afghanistan and Iraq after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The
threat of homegrown radicals like the Boston Marathon bombers has prompted the F.B.I., the
Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies to try to forge ties with community
leaders and police departments as a front line in the war against a sophisticated online propaganda
and recruiting effort mounted by the Islamic State. But as administration officials attempt to
accelerate their own lobbying campaign, they have found that

security rules put in place to

defend America from a terror attack have played a role in alienating


young Muslim men and women
State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

--

the exact group being courted by the Islamic

Law enforcement agrees that building trust


relationships key to solve terrorism. Harris 10.
(David, May 6, Professor of Law at University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Law
Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After
9/11, https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/law-enforcement-andintelligence-gathering-in-muslim-and-immigrant-communities-after-911-harris.pdf)
the consensus on the importance of building trust-based
relationships as a way to fight terror cannot surprise anyone in law
enforcement: we know this method works. In fact, building good relations with Muslim
communities has paid off against terrorists in the most direct way
possible. The Lackawanna case30 remains a showcase example. The men apprehended in
For at least one reason,

that case, who were characterized by the U.S. Department of Justice as a sleeper cell waiting for the word to put

might have attacked except for the fact that the local
Muslim community passed crucial information to the FBI that prompted
their investigation. And the Lackawanna case does not stand alone. For example, in the Toledo terrorism
their deadly agenda into action,

case mentioned by FBI Director Robert Mueller in his 2006 speech in Cleveland,31 the Muslim community played
the same kind of critical role. When the FBI announced the indictments of the three individuals in Toledo, Ted Wasky,
the FBIs Special Agent in Charge of the Cleveland field office, explicitly acknowledged the help of Toledos
Muslims.32 Wasky praised the extensive and essential cooperation of members of the local Muslim community in

this cooperation resulted in important information flowing


to law enforcement.33 [The members of the Toledo Muslim community] are the ones who deserve the
the case, and said that

most credit, Wasky said. The ability to prevent another terrorist attack cannot be won without the support that the

The widespread agreement in law enforcement that the


cooperation of Muslim communities remains vital to the success of antiterrorism efforts owes much to the strong consensus in law enforcement ,
community gave.34

building for at least twenty years, on the basic principles, goals, and benefits of community policing.35 Law
enforcement almost everywhere acknowledges that police efforts alone cannot make cities and towns safe from

public safety requires a partnership between police and


the community that encourages communication about people and events
on the ground.36 Community policing means far more than community relations or shallow, one-off efforts
by police agencies to exhibit sensitivity or hear the concerns of the communities they serve. Rather, it
requires a deep commitment to the idea that success in public safety
efforts of any kind can only occur when strong, positive connections exist
between police and those whom they servethat is, through partnerships based on trust.37
crime and criminals; rather,

That type of partnership requires sustained effort by both the police and communities to build trust through
establishing relationships and networks with each other, to develop a track record of joint efforts toward common

if we
believe that potential terrorists lurk in our Muslim communities, we must
have good communications with them. This requires relationships built on
trustjust like everything else in community policing .
goals, and to respect each other as real partners.38 The lessons for our antiterrorism efforts seem clear:

2NC Solvency General


The CP resolves distrust in the government which leads to
psychological violence based on exclusion this is key to
preventing future terror attacks
Gillum 12 (Rachel Gillum, Stanford Department of Political Science, "Examining
Muslim Americans' Confidence in Government Institutions," Sanford Islamic Studies,
April 4th, 2012 http://web.stanford.edu/dept/islamic_studies/cgi-bin/web/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/gillum.pdf)
The findings in this study have important implications for the welfare of Muslims in the United States.
As mentioned, increasing levels of distrust in the government as a result of
stigmatization and discontent with U.S.'s foreign policies may further discourage

Muslims from participating in America's political system in a democratic


fashion. As a group which already experiences lower levels of political engagement, community
leaders may face difficulties mobilizing the community for common goals, reducing the group's
overall representation. In addition to suppressing political involvement and representation ,
social psychology research has consistently demonstrated that experiences of
discrimination and stigma not only reduce self-esteem, but several other
physical and mental well-being indicators. The findings of this study also carry significant
national security implications. Muslims have been heavily involved in assisting and
cooperating with law enforcement in finding terrorism suspects . As of 2010,
tips provided by the Muslim American community accounted for about 40
percent of all disrupted terrorism plots since 2001 , one of the single largest sources of
leads. If Muslim Americans lose trust in the government, particularly institutions
relating to national security and the rule of law, they may be less willing to cooperate
and assist with security operations and leads. This suggests that indiscriminate
profiling and stigmatization of the community by law enforcement and
government officials could result in a loss in confidence, heightening
security challenges and potentially decreasing the flow of information that
could help prevent future attacks.

Stronger relationships between the US and Muslim


communities are necessary now
The Leadership Group on U.S -Muslim Engagement 08 (September,
Changing Course - A New Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World,
http://www.usmuslimengagement.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=21&Itemid=50)
Creating partnerships for peace with Muslim countries and communities is
one of the greatest challengesand opportunitiesfacing the United
States today. Currently, conflict, misunderstanding, and distrust plague
U.S. relations with Muslims in many countries, imperiling security for all. Maintaining the status quo
raises the specter of prolonged confrontation, catastrophic attacks, and a cycle of retaliation. Despite these

Americans and Muslims around the world want peace,


amicable relations, good governance, prosperity, and respect. Policies and
actionsnot a clash of civilizationsare at the root of our divisions. This
tensions, the vast majority of

Report outlines a comprehensive strategy for the U.S. to enhance international security by improving relations with
key Muslim countries and communities. The strategy reflects the consensus of 34 American leaders, including 11

Muslim Americans, in the fields of foreign and defense policy, politics, business, religion, education, public opinion,
psychology, philanthropy, and conflict resolution. We come from different walks of life, faiths, political perspectives,
and professional disciplines. Our shared goal is to develop and work to implement a wise, widely supportable
strategy to make the U.S. and the world safer by responding to the primary causes of tension between the U.S. and
Muslims around the world. We believe that a strategy that builds on shared and complementary interests with
Muslims in many countries is feasible, desirable, and consistent with core American values. The central message of

the U.S. government, business, faith, education, and media


leaders must work with Muslim counterparts to build a coalition that will
turn the tide against extremism. Our recommendations are directed primarily to U.S. leaders and
our strategy is that

institutions, but we can succeed only if counterparts in Muslim majority countries and communities also take
responsibility for addressing key challenges: reducing extremism, resolving political and sectarian conflicts, holding
governments accountable, creating more vibrant economies, correcting misconceptions, and engaging in dialogue
to build mutual respect and understanding.

2NC Solvency Intelligence


Modern counterterrorism efforts need to include good
relationships between law enforcement and the community
being surveilled
Quinlan & Ramirez 13 (6/24/2013, Tara Lai Quinlan, Lawyer and criminologist,
and Deborah Ramirez, The Boston Tragedy Reveals the Need for Community-Based
Counterterrorism Strategies, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborahramirez/counterterrorism-strategy-boston-bombing_b_3148235.html, JMP)
As part of the Boston community, we share the sadness of last week's Boston Marathon bombings. Thanks to
excellent police work and public cooperation, Tamerlan and Dzokhar Tsarnaev were identified as the perpetrators

going forward, how can law


enforcement increase its ability to identify would-be terrorists operating
below the radar? Experts point out that many terrorist groups like al Qaeda are
and are reportedly unaffiliated with any larger terrorist network. But

increasingly decentralized, making them difficult to monitor and infiltrate .


Experts also highlight the limited ability of the federal counterterrorism infrastructure to identify
independent terrorist cells and lone wolf terrorists; the difficulty of identifying readers of extremist
propaganda; and, most importantly, the challenges determining which individuals will turn to violent
action. In this case, the FBI questioned Tamerlan Tsarnaev in 2011, possibly about his interest in extremist Internet
propaganda or ties to Chechnya, but apparently lacked sufficient information to detain him further. With this in

how can law enforcement gain the intelligence necessarily to stop


potential terrorists before they act? Congressman Peter King, Chairman of the House
mind,

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, has one proposal: he has renewed calls for
increased surveillance of all Muslim communities. King asserts that this is the same practice used against
Irish and Italian gangsters involved in organized crime. But that is simply not the case.

Monitoring

individuals suspected of involvement in organized crime is readily


distinguishable from surveilling millions of American Muslims absent any
reasonable suspicion criminal wrongdoing.

Moreover,

there is now significant

consensus among most intelligence experts that profiling based on


religious affiliation is ineffective because it is too widely shared a
characteristic to be a shortcut for identifying those who might engage in
violence. Furthermore, as civil liberties experts have long argued, profiling
based on religion unnecessarily alienates communities that could
potentially serve as important partners for law enforcement in countering
terrorism. Rather than support Congressman King's approach, we believe
the Boston tragedy offers lessons to improve our national security
infrastructure but remain more consistent with our democratic values of
justice, fairness, and human decency. In this case, it is now emerging from
friends and associates of the Tsarnaevs that, upon reflection, they sensed
something might have been amiss before the attacks . For example, Tamerlan Tsarnaev
reportedly twice disrupted services at a local mosque. And there may be an additional trail of unusual speech or
behavior -- refusing to see friends or family, posting violent messages on the Internet, contemplating death -- that
would have alerted family, friends or community members to something being out of place. But whom could they
have alerted to these concerns? Could they have confidence that information shared with law enforcement would
be discreetly and professionally handled? Could they be assured that police would not overreact, but would instead

For law enforcement


to benefit from voluntary community intelligence they must create trust
relationships allowing community members to articulate concerns that
may or may not indicate an intention to engage in violence. This also means
incorporating collaborative, long-term community-police partnerships into the
rationally determine if there were genuine issues requiring further investigation?

national counterterrorism strategy. But partnerships are not easy to build.

Partnerships are not


achieved through coercion, force, or infiltration. They require voluntary
engagement with communities through mutual trust and cooperation.
This means winning the hearts and minds of communities so they become
real partners in counterterrorism efforts

and work collaboratively to address problems

of common concern. Partnerships have already been piloted in domestic counterterrorism efforts, and have been
used for years in cities like Dearborn, Los Angeles, and London. And beyond the counterterrorism context,
partnerships have achieved success in reducing gang violence in cities like Boston and Glasgow, and drugs sales in
places like High Point, North Carolina. It is by relying on common sense that the national security infrastructure can
be expanded to address some of its current limitations. It is true that not all terrorist acts in the United States can

incorporating voluntary, partnershipbased community intelligence gathering practices into our national
security infrastructure, we can improve our chances of preventing some
attacks.
be avoided, and unfortunately more will succeed. But by

The only way to accurately acquire data is to both surveil and


build trust surveillance alone prohibits cooperation from
existing
Stabile 14 (Emily--- J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law,
February, California Law Review, Recruiting Terrorism Informants: The Problems
with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, Lexis, JMP)

Many argue that tactics like recruiting informants through immigration law and surveilling mosques are necessary
to prevent terrorist attacks, and that national security must be the nation's top priority, whatever the cost. These

when informants lack a specific target and direction,


the gathered intelligence does not necessarily enhance the nation's
security. Instead, the FBI - with little concern for the actual gravity of the original threat posed by the suspect arguments fail to recognize that

creates an elaborate terrorism plot for the surveillance targets to participate in. n100 After 9/11, many individuals
who showed no signs of violence or extremism prior to involvement with informants and government-created plots
have been prosecuted under terrorism charges. n101 Until the informants provided the means, these individuals did
not have the finances or the proper connections to conceive and carry out these terrorism plans. Although
orchestrating these plots makes the FBI's preventative stance appear successful in the public eye, it diverts law
enforcement resources from focusing on real targets . Moreover, Professor David A. Harris claims that "the
unregulated use of informants in mosques and other religious and cultural settings can also do great damage

our best possible source of intelligence: the


voluntary, cooperative relationships that have developed between law
enforcement and Muslim communities." n102 Having community members report suspicious
information to the FBI may be a more effective way of obtaining reliable terrorism
intelligence from these communities. n103 For example, in the few domestic terrorist
because it poses the risk of cutting off

prosecutions where a terrorist attack plan actually existed prior to informant involvement, community members

since
9/11, community members have assisted law enforcement in stopping
potential terrorism plots in a number of cases. n105 A [*252] recent example, the case of
who had noticed something amiss were the first to alert the FBI and identify the subjects. n104 In fact,

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the "Underwear Bomber," shows that the attempted bombing could have been
prevented had law enforcement heeded the warnings that Abdulmutallab's father gave the CIA at the U.S. embassy
in Nigeria. n106 As the president of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and former criminal prosecutor, David
Chiu testified regarding the Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian communities in San Francisco:

"Without that level of cooperation, that level of trust, everything falls


apart ... . Surveillance only serves to continue to drive wedges when
cooperation is what is needed most."

Relationships between the government and Muslim


communities need to be strengthened without ending
surveillance
No Author 06 (An article posted on the FBI Website, Building Trust: FBI At the
Table with Muslims, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2006/october)

A U.S. Muslim leader who addressed 500 agents during a recent training seminar at the FBI Academy in Virginia

the relationship between his constituents and the FBI isnt perfect, but
its never been better. Its a very healthy relationship, said Nawar Shora of the American-Arab Antisaid

Discrimination Committee, the largest Arab-American civil rights group in the U.S. We may not always agree, but

both sides know that we need to be sitting at the table having that
dialogue. The dialogue began in earnest in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The FBIs Washington field office

helped create an advisory council of Arab, Muslim, and Sikh leaders to improve relations with communities that
might be helpful in the search for intelligence. Shoras group, meanwhile, formed a Law Enforcement Outreach
Program in early 2002 to ensure the lines of communication with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies were
wired for two-way conversations. The effect has been a slow build-up of trust through casual gatherings, periodic
meetings, and training seminars for agents like the event at the FBI Academy earlier this month. This

is an
area where we need to develop better relationships, said Joseph Persichini Jr., acting
assistant director in charge of the Washington field office, the second largest of 56 field offices in the U.S. We
must maintain a robust intelligence gathering mechanism. If we dont
have an understanding of the communities that we serve, how can we do
that? To that end, Persichini has Muslim leaders on his speed-dial and recently began requiring all new agents

in his field office to meet with community leaders and visit area mosques. Whats important here is were going to
their community and meeting their community. Its not them coming to us, Persichini said.

Cooperation between Muslims and law enforcement is key now


and critical to breaking down Islamophobia.
Silk 10.

(Phillip, professor at University of Georgia, Planning Outreach Between Muslim


Communities and Police in the USA and the UK,
https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/silk_phillip_d_201005_phd.pdf)
Law enforcement organizations and Islamic groups have emphasized that
cooperative work between Muslims and police is extremely important (such
as in Downing, 2007; HM Government, 2009; Hughes, 2009; Al-Marayati, 2007),
perhaps now more than ever. But Muslims in the USA and the UK have also
expressed very specific concerns about their interaction between law enforcement
and Muslims in both countries (Ramirez, OConnell, & Zafar, 2004; Spalek, El Awa, &
McDonald, 2009), stressing fears of law enforcement practices that appear
to discriminate against Muslims. Clearly, these perceptions pose
substantial challenges to both Muslim communities and police in their
efforts to build beneficial community-police relationships and provide
needed law enforcement services. That members of American and British Muslim
communities may find interaction with local law enforcement difficult is especially
worrisome given that the foundation of policing in the United States and the United
Kingdom expressly relies on the assumption that the police are both part of the
public, and also answerable to the public. Sir Robert Peelthe founder of the
London Metropolitan Police Force and considered by many to be the father of
contemporary policingnoted in 1829 that the role of police includes an
unavoidable responsibility to work with, as well as for, the public. Peels emphasis
on the relationship between the police and the public is clear in his admonitions
regarding these responsibilities for police personnel: To recognize always that
the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on

public approval of their existence, actions, and behaviour, and their ability to
secure and maintain public respect. 4 To recognize always that to secure and
maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing
of willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of
laws. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the
historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police
(Myhill, 2006, p. 3) It is evident from these statements that Peel placed value on
maintaining a positive relationship built between the police and the public they
serve. A modern iteration of Peels philosophy in the United States and the
United Kingdom can be found in the practice of community policing,
which may be seen as a return to the foundations of the police role Peel outlined
early in the 19th century (Myhill, 2006; Peak, Bradshaw, & Glensor, 1992). Just what
constitutes community policing? Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman (2004) suggest that:
From its title, community policing infers a partnership between the police
and the people they serve. This partnership is designed to improve the quality of
life in the community through the introduction of strategies designed to enhance
neighborhood solidarity and safety. It is expected that the police and citizens of the
community will work together to address issues of crime and social disorganization.
(p. 2) Much like Peel approximately 175 years earlier, these modern authors
emphasize the relationship maintained between the public and the police.
In the most basic sense, community policing is therefore essentially any effort
designed to bring together the public and the police, in which this
togetherness is understood as a shared understanding of problems
that require attention, as well as some degree of joint responsibility in
undertakings to deal with those problems (Mastrofski, 1993, p. 65). The emphasis
on themes such as partnership, collaboration, and 5 relationships are foundational
aspects of the human side of community policing, included in nearly every
explanation of the topic (Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998; Ren, Cao, Lovrich, & Gaffney,
2005; Vito, Walsh, & Kunselman, 2004), and the importance of this interpersonal
side of community policing is therefore difficult to overstate. It is clear that
community policing simply cannot take place without efforts in which the
public and police depend on the relationships built between one another.
Indeed, Ren, Cao, Lovrich, and Gaffney point out that the desire to
improve the relationship between the public and the police since the
1970s was perhaps one of the greatest driving forces behind the
movement toward community policing (2005, p. 56). The particular type of
community policing activity may vary widely (community problem-solving meetings,
neighborhood watches, joint crime prevention efforts, etc.), but in the end, it is the
relational aspect which is emphasized so often as a cornerstone of the
community policing philosophy, without which community policing, by
definition, would not exist. As Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller point out
Almost any activity that increases face-to-face interactions with the public and
builds relationship with the community may qualify as a form of community
policing (2006, p. 6)

Muslim cooperation with law enforcement more popular than


infiltration.
Harris 10.
(David, May 6, Professor of Law at University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Law
Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After

9/11, https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/law-enforcement-andintelligence-gathering-in-muslim-and-immigrant-communities-after-911-harris.pdf)
Using informants in Muslim religious and cultural contexts too frequently
and casually damages the FBIs critical and generally successful efforts to
build partnerships with Muslim and Arab American communities. It will
cause lasting damage to efforts to bring Muslim communities and law
enforcement together to build a common cause against extremism, and it
will harm efforts to obtain intelligence from these communities through
carefully-built cooperative relationships established in the last five years.
The reaction of Muslim communities to news of the involvement of informants in
terrorism cases has, in fact, seemed especially sharp precisely because it comes
against a background of police and community efforts to engage in purposeful
cooperation. When Muslims learn that the government has used informants,
members of these communities feel used and betrayednot partners of
law enforcement, but suspects, each and every one.23 We can ill afford to
damage the possibility that these partnerships can serve as sources of information;
they remain our bestperhaps our onlyhope for obtaining the intelligence we
need to head off the damage of actual terrorist attacks in the future. Constructing
these law enforcement/community partnerships requires great efforts to
build trust;24 as a result, when the use of informants has come to light, the
community perceives this as a betrayal of that trust. As it now stands, the law
provides virtually no legal protection against the use of government
informants. The Fourth Amendment imposes no standards for, and does
not require any judicial oversight of, police use of informants.25 Neither
substantive criminal law defenses26 nor civil actions27 hold any promise of
restraining this type of government activity. Therefore, we find ourselves at a
sensitive crossroads. On the one hand, we cannot wholly discount the possibility
that very small groups of terrorists in our country may attempt to do catastrophic
damage. And it remains at least possible that infiltration of these groups by
informants could prevent a disaster. On the other hand, the unregulated use of
informants in mosques and other religious and cultural settings can also
do great damage because it poses the risk of cutting off our best possible
source of intelligence: the voluntary, cooperative relationships that have
developed between law enforcement and Muslim communities.

***AT: Critical Terrorism Studies***

AT: CTS Pragmatism


The logic that violence is equivalent to terror is false-it has
specific usages that critical terrorism scholars muddle so as to
prevent pragmatic solution. There may be almost no
homegrown terrorists-but the few are dangerous
Jones and Smith, 9 (University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND **

King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,We're All


Terrorists Now: Criticalor HypocriticalStudies on Terrorism?, Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 302, Taylor and Francis)
At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism
that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore,
Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western
governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are

In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if


not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular,
critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth
the greater terrorists.

terror has multiple forms (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of global

Only the engagee intellectual academic finding in


deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal
neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism
and the democratic state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify
the real terror lurking behind the manipulation of the politics of fear (p.
75). Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires
not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for
development whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the
editors contend that the only solution to the world-historical crisis that is
facing human society globally (p. 76) is universal human emancipation.
This, according to Burke, is the normative end that critical theory
pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted
capitalism (p. 75).

communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living
conditions, and the political taming of unbounded capitalism, but also in the telos of mutual understanding.
Only through this telos with its strong normative bias towards nonviolence (p. 43) can a universal condition of
peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting
around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama,
and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate
norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish a

In the end, uncoerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how
it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate
critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise
of soi-disant cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes
the human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the
cosmos and each other (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya. In
analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way
that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a
secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values (p. 46).

struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean

Booth further
maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is
something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as
university international relations departments are not now, it would seem,
struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy,

in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as


cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision. Overall, the journal's
fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim
to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative
approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist
or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal
solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in
the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep
intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western

It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of


thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words
mean exactly what the critical theorist chooses them to meanneither
more nor less. However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they
have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study . Having
politicians and the Western media.6

identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the
notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly
manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to other minority communities and create a politics
of fear.

AT: CTS Scholarship


Critical terror studies refusal to engage in proper academic
study and tendency to accuse the state of bias with no logical
credibility behind these arguments. The affs arguments are
based on studies too-make them defend a credible study
methodology
Jones and Smith, 9 (University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND **
King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,We're All
Terrorists Now: Criticalor HypocriticalStudies on Terrorism?, Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 302, Taylor and Francis)
Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the
ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact
seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by
conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted
scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy petitio

critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb)


its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual
standards of academic inquiry. Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without
the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved
state centricity of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further
unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline . Jackson and his
principii. But

fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that orthodox analysts
rarely bother to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity (p. 2) or spend any time on the
ground in the areas most affected by conflict (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the
ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of Meibion
Glyndwr who would as a matter of principle avoid pob sais like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism first


advertised the problem of talking to terrorists in 2001 and has gone to
great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing
articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban,
Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. A consequence of avoiding primary
research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to
apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of
study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional
calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that

terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with the particular dynamics of the political world (p. 70).

Analogously, Stohl claims that the US and English [sic] media exhibit a tendency
to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces structural and political
problems into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this
problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts
have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research
ethics.

The constant need for terror scholars to empathize with the


other obscures legitimate terror studies in the name of
appeals to emotion. Do not treat terrorists like rational actorsthey arent
Jones and Smith, 9 (University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND **
King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,We're All

Terrorists Now: Criticalor HypocriticalStudies on Terrorism?, Studies in Conflict


& Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 302, Taylor and Francis)
The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward
terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral
confusion . This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of
their responsible research ethics. The paradox is resolved when one realizes that
critical moralizing demands the ethics of responsibility to the terrorist
other. For Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing with the ethic
of responsibility faced by those who, in extremis have some
explosives (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious
normativism requires the analyst , not only to critique the strategic languages of the West,
but also to take in the side of the Other or more particularly engage
with the highly developed forms of thinking that provides groups like Al
Qaeda with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some
profundity (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only to empathize with the
other, but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his Messages to the
West and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto Milestones not
only offer well observed criticisms of Western decadence , but also converges
with elements of critical theory (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an
analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and

Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only


toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre
ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other
are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social
have done much to shape.

sciences, is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it? Strauss explains,
if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my
capacity as a social scientist. In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the
perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems. I go through the process of empathetic
understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic

It is
also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open
society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy
with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit
loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures
this constituting fact.
understanding. This means, however, that such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.5

AT: CTS Methodology


The methodology of most critical terrorism studies is
fundamentally flawed-the community does not use a scientific
approach with empiricism and constant updates based on new
data-also, your scholars assume ours dont know what theyre
talking about, but they do take variables into account
Boyle, 08 (Michael J. Boyle, School of International Relations, University of St.
Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism,
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, A Case
Against Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 5164)
Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed
Orthodox Terrorism Studies. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its
state centricity, (3) its problem-solving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security

Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the


other hand, should be a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism
knowledge. An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars
have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of
study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological
problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these
problems, but also have provided their own searching critiques of the field
at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon
projects.

1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, Understanding Terrorism). Some of those scholars most associated with the critique
of empiricism implied in Orthodox Terrorism Studies have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the

For example, Jackson (2007a)


regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to
support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact
was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the
second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on
theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure to address
persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the
field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on
nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism.

terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly,

Silke's (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research


performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in
particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A non-reflective
community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its
own work.

***Terrorism DA***

1NC Terrorism DA
Surveillance of Muslim communities is necessary to prevent
domestic terrorist attacks
Barkan 15

(Ross, Ross Barkan is a senior political reporter at The New York Observer and working in City Hall.
Congressman Says French Hostage Siege Shows Why Muslim Surveillance Is Necessary. The New York Observer.
Jan, 09.)

congressman argued today that two dangerous hostage situations in


show why surveillance of Muslim communities in New York is necessary.
Congressman Peter King, a Long Island lawmaker and former chair of the House Committee on
Homeland Security, said the fatal attacks on Charlie Hebdo, a satirical French magazine,
coupled with todays hostage siege were yet more evidence for why local Muslims
need to be aggressively watched by police. Mr. King, speaking with Geraldo Rivera on WABC,
Republican

France

said the NYPD has been demoralized in recent years by the New York Times, the Associated Press and lawsuits
basically saying the surveillance they were doing into these Muslim communities is illegal, its unconstitutional. I

certainly believe it was not and its been one of the reasons why weve been able to
hold off any major attacks in New York, he added. While critics of the NYPDs Muslim
surveillance program argued it amounted to unnecessary racial profiling, Mr. King, a longtime proponent of the
program, said it was important. Im not talking about illegal wiretapping or breaking into peoples homes but to

to know somebody new has moved in that has a


pro-terrorist background or whether or not his people in the local mosque who are
being incendiarythey should be watched, he said. French security services confronted two
hostage situations, one outside Paris involving the two suspects in Wednesdays attack on Charlie
Hebdo, and another that suddenly erupted today at a kosher supermarket on the eastern edge of Paris. At least
two people have been killed in the assault on a kosher supermarket, according to reports. One of the two
brothers suspected of killing 12 people, including two police officers, in the Charlie Hebdo attack
was trained by an Al Qaeda affiliate, according to reports. Both brothers were suspected for years
to have terrorist links. Mr. King said he believed the NYPD would be able to respond to
potential terrorist threats here, even as police unions war with Mayor Bill de Blasios City Hall. The
have sources in the community, to know whos who,

NYPD, they are the best. Theres nobody in the country or the world who I think is better at monitoring and
responding, Mr. King said. Now, theyve had a rough time over the last few years, because of whether its the
media or whether its Mayor Bill de Blasio and his campaign or theyre talking about how this is profiling and how
terrible isthe fact is this has worked.

Specifically its key to prevent a dirty-bomb attack


Sudnik 6 (John Sudnik, Borough Commander at New York City Fire Department,
Masters in Homeland Security from Naval Postgraduate School, DIRTY BOMB
ATTACK: ASSESSING NEW YORK CITYS LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS FROM A FIRST
RESPONDERS PERSPECTIVE, March 2006, https://fas.org/irp/threat/sudnik.pdf)
Consequently, any future NYC attack could be largely based upon an Islamic
fundamentalist ideology but, the type of potential perpetrator may run the
gamut from the consummate professional to the initiated walk-in amateur.
The nature of the next attack could be predicted by determining whether the attack is religiously or politically
motivated. For example, the 1997 failed plot by the unaffiliated team of abu Mezer and Khalil seemingly upholds
David C. Rapoports argument, Most observers of Islam know that [terrorism] fuses religion and politics in ways
unparalleled in other major religions, a fact reflected in Ayatollah Khomeinis constantly re-iterated phrase that
politics and religion are one. 34 Meanwhile, the attack perpetrated by the Blind Shiek on the WTC in 1993
supports the theory that the more serious terrorist attacks, in terms of casual ties or politics, have shown religion as
a prime motivator. 35 Hence, based solely upon the fact that the 1993 and 2001 WTC attacks were more successful
and damaging than either the 1997 and 2004 failed subway plots, it appears that purely religious-inspired and

the lethal potential


of the less structured political and religiously motivated individuals, or
organized groups are more professional and thus, extremely dangerous. However,

local walk-ins, should not be underestimated. It could be only a matter of


time before pay dirt is hit. 4. Types of Attacks of Greatest Concern It is the profound belief of one top
NYC public safety official that the next attack could be at the hands of a suicide bomber. 36 In his opinion, several
suicide attacks occurring a few days apart in the transportation hubs of Penn Stat ion, Grand Central Station, and
the subway system would psychologically cripple the general public Lending support to this conjecture, Dr. Irwin
Redlener from the Columbia University Center for Disaster Preparedness expects an event similar to the Madrid
train bombings to take place in Penn Station. 37 Coincidentally, in a recent dissertation, Scott Atran states,
...terrorists are becoming increasingly effective by using suicide attacks, and the trend points to a catastrophic
unconventional terrorist attack that could make the March 11 attacks in Madrid and the September 11 attacks in
New York and Washington pale in comparison. Contrary to this suicide bomber estimation, however, is the basic
argument that these types of attacks have not yet materialized in NYC. Hence, it is the viewpoint of at least one
U.S. intelligence specialist that a potential suicide terrorist experiencing social exposure to American people
inherently becomes more comfortable with his surroundings, thus decreasing his desire to follow through with a
suicide attack. 39 Apparently lending support to this theory, it is suggested that the 19 hijackers on 9/11 were able
to sufficiently isolate themselves with frequent and unrestricted travel; therefore, effectively breaking any
emotional ties with society. It is important to note that, although not well-known or publicized, a terrorist suicide
attack has already taken place in NYC. In 1997, at the Empire State Building, a Palestinian man shot and killed one
man, injured several others, and then turned the gun on himself. An apparent suicide note found in the killers
possession pointed to the "enemies of Palestine" as the reason for the attack. 40 Thus, it can be surmised that a
suicide attack is well within the realm of would-be terrorists in NYC. The cohesiveness and sustainability of such

Since 9/11, much attention has been


focused on local preparedness for an attack involving WMD. As a direct result of
occurrence s, however, remains somewhat uncertain.

the lessons learned on that one particular day, first responder agencies have been the recipients of a major influx in
federal funding. The intended use of these grants is to enhance and increase the capability and expertise of illequipped organizations to res pond to such events. For example, in 2004 alone, the FDNY had completed training
for 46 technically enhanced and specialized hazardous materials units in preparation for a potential WMD attack. 41
Additionally, new equipment, including a state-of-the-art mobile command center and chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-rated self-contained breathing apparatus, has been introduced to further augment
the Department s ability to operate at these incidents effectively and safely. Surprisingly, John V. Parachini, a no
table policy analyst at RAND, seemingly disagrees with the formula of increasing spending for first responder WMD
preparedness at the expense of law enforcement, intelligence, border patrol, diplomacy and military action. 42 In an
attempt to dispel this line of reasoning one may ask, How likely is it that a WMD attack will occur in NYC? In
building his WMD argument Parachini states, More than anything else...the mindset of leadership, opportunity and
technical capacity are the factors that most significantly influence a [terrorist] groups propensity to seek, to
acquire and to use unconventional weapons. 43 In his analysis of each fact or he primarily takes a stand against
the eventuality of a WM D attack, claiming that historically there exists no proof of relative success. However,
Parachinis effort pre-dates the recent public announcement by a former Central Intelligence Agency officer of the
2003 fatwa, issued by the well- known Islamic cleric Sheik Nasir bin Ha mid al Fahd, permitting the use WMD as a
means of attack. 44 Hence, it would be imprudent to disregard the obsessive mindset of the al-Qaeda leadership
evident in this important religious ruling. Recent data obtained from military operations in Afghanistan supports the
popular belief that al-Qaeda has persistently tried to acquire materials for the development of biological and

the opportunity needed to obtain material for


unconventional weapons is not beyond the imagination or means of even a
small group of terrorists. In a New York Times article entitled Nuclear Nightmares, author Bill Keller
explains that cobalt-60, a radioactive material that could potentially be used
in a dirty bomb, is commonly found in hospitals and food irradiation
plants. 46 Regarding the technical capacity needed to disperse this substance, Keller cites an FAS deposition
radiological weapons. Moreover,

outlining the catastrophic effects of this easily improvised homemade device. In assessing the realistic threat of a
WMD terrorist attack, Parachini gets it right when he states, Al-Qaeda...continues to be interested in [WMD] but is
also willing and able to conduct significant, multiple, and near simultaneous attacks with conventional means. 48

the threat of a WMD attack


cannot be downplayed. To suggest that any significant effort made toward
increasing preparedness be undermined for the sake of marginal economic
efficiency is irrational given the severe consequences of such events.
Generally speaking, this assessment holds true; however, in NYC

Extinction
Barrett, Carnegie Mellon Engineering and Public Policy PhD, 2013

(Anthony, Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between
the United States and Russia, Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for
Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2,
Taylor & Francis)

War involving

the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the
largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely
reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization
worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could
significant fractions of

occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and
inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to
maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes
without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate
information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is
under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies
incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise
accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of

deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were


taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war.
For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained
significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a
intentional attack through development of

subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the
other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides development of capabilities to detect a
first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that
with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of EastWest nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war
between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and
Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in

False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in


several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack,
response to indications of attack. 8

including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded

terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the


United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the
at the wrong time. 9 Second,

other nation by actions such as exploding a

improvised nuclear bomb ,


10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of
nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or
construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States . 13 Other methods
stolen or

could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14
It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.Russian
crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.Russian

There are a variety of


ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia,
making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks . 16
relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions.

2NC UQ Yes Lone Wolfs Now


Al-Qaeda creates domestic lone wolves who make domestic
surveillance a priority
Rasmussen 15 (Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism

Center, HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE


Current Terrorist Threat to the United States, February 15, 2015,
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Current_Terrorist_Threat_to_the_United_States.pdf)
Despite the persistent concerns over aviation security, we also still face a range of moderate
and small scale threats from a small, but persistent number of
transnationally-oriented groups, including al-Qaida and some of its
affiliates and allies. These groups remain intent on striking the United
States and are content to patiently develop their access and operational plans over multiple years. I will go into
greater detail on the threats we see from specific terrorist actors later in my statement.

We face a much greater recurring threat from lone offenders and possibly
loose networks of individuals. Of the eleven attacks in the West since last
May, ten were conducted by individual violent extremists. Two occurred in the U.S.
one in September, and another in October. The majority of these NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 2015
lone offender attacks more closely resemble the size, scale, and sophistication of random acts of violence than they
do the destructiveness of the organized and well-developed plots that we witnessed in the years after September

These attacks have happened more frequently, yet thankfully


resulted in relatively few casualties. We expect that individuals and small
networks will try to maintain and build upon this momentum and
capitalize on the media coverage that these attacks generate.
11, 2001.

The other team is right-9/11 isnt going to happen again, and


fears of it being the case are unfounded. However,
contemporary Al-Qaeda is specifically focusing on home-grown
terrorism, meaning domestic surveillance specifically is key
Jenkins Liepman and Willis 14 (Brian Michael Jenkins is a senior adviser to
the president of the RAND Corporation and author of numerous books, reports, and
articles on terrorism-related topics, Andrew Liepman is a senior policy analyst at the
RAND Corporation. He retired in August 2012 as the Principal Deputy Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center after a career of more than 30 years in the CIA,
Henry H. Willis, Ph.D. is director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center
and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, Identifying Enemies Among
Us Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence
Collection and Information Sharing,
2010,http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/R
AND_CF317.p df)
The dispersal of al Qaedas training camps in Afghanistan and the death or
arrest of key figures have degraded al Qaedas operational capabilities,
especially those of its central command in Pakistan, while improvements in intelligence and unprecedented

None of this,
however, seems to have dented al Qaedas determination. Always
resilient, it has morphed to exploit new opportunities in North Africa and
the Middle East. Al Qaedas affiliates current presumed operational
capabilities are sufficiently lethal and their supposed geographic range is
extensive enough to make the U.S. government close 19 diplomatic offices
international co-operation have made the terrorists operating environment more hostile.

on the strength of reports indicating a terrorist threat. Although the closures took
place while these proceedings were being reviewed and edited, they reflect assessments that were in place at the

Al Qaeda is more
decentralized, more dependent on its affiliates and allies, and reliant on
its ability to inspire homegrown recruits to carry out terrorist attacks. It is
still unquestionably a dangerous organization, but its ability to launch a
9/11-scale spectacular has been substantially lessened, if not eliminated . Al
Qaedas international plotting persists, but fewer of the plots are core-connected . Al Qaeda affiliates
and homegrown terrorist plots now constitute a bigger part of the threat.
While al Qaeda remains committed to ambitious strategic attacks, it also has embraced do-ityourself terrorism, exhorting followers to do whatever they can,
wherever they are. Thus far, however, its efforts to mobilize homegrown terrorists have achieved only
time of the conference. Todays threat environment is more diffuse.

limited success.

2NC UQ Yes Homegrown Now


The threat of homegrown terror is real, if enough attempts
happen, it is inevitable that one of them will succeed
Jenkins 10 (Brian Michael Jenkins is an expert on terrorism and transportation

security, No Path to Glory: Deterring Homegrown Terrorism, May 2010,


http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2010/RAND_CT348.pdf)
The United States remains al Qaedas primary target . Some analysts believe
that al Qaeda is under growing pressure to prove that it can carry out
another attack on U.S. soil in order to retain its credentials as the
vanguard of the jihadist movement. Such an attack could take the form of an
operation planned from abroad, like the Christmas Day airline bombing attempt, or
it could be do- it-yourself attempts by homegrown terrorists responding to
al Qaedas call to action. Inevitably, one or more of these attacks may
succeed. Terrorist attempts are not evidence of our failure to protect the nation
from terrorism, nor should they be cause for feigned outrage and divisive fingerpointing. They provide opportunities to learn lessons and improve defenses. The
attempts reflect that we are at waralthough the term has been largely discarded
and as in any war, the other side attacks. Americas Homegrown Terrorists
According to a recent RAND paper, there were 46 reported cases of
radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism in the United States
between 9/11 and the end of 2009. 3 This number does not include attacks
from abroad. In all, 125 persons were involved in the 46 cases. Two more cases and
several more arrests in 2010 bring the total to 131 persons. Half of the cases
involve single individuals; the remainder are tiny conspiracies. The number of
cases and the number of persons involved both increased sharply in 2009.
Whether this presages a trend we cannot yet say. But these cases tell us that
radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism do happen here. They
are clear indications of terrorist intent. The threat is real.

Information diffusion makes homegrown terrorism the real


threat-and it specifically spreads in Muslim communities,
making surveillance of those communities necessary
Mitchell and Bhatt 7 (Mitchell Silver has been commissioner for the New York
City Parks Department since May 2014, former senior intelligence analyst, Arvin
Bhatt is a senior intelligence analyst for NYPD intelligence)
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the United States military
and law enforcement captured, killed, or scattered much of al - Qaedas
core leadership eliminating its sanctuary and training camps in
Afghanistan. As a result, the threat from the central core of al - Qaeda was significantly diminished.
However, as al - Qaedas central core of leaders, operatives, and foot soldiers
shrunk, its philosophy of global jihad spread worldwide at an exponential rate via
radical Internet websites and chat rooms, extremist videotapes and
literature, radical speeches by extremist imams often creating a radical
subculture within the more vulnerable Muslim diaspora communities. This
post - September 11 wave of militant ideological influences underpins
radicalization in the West and is what we define as the homegrown threat.

Moreover, in the years since 2001, the attacks of Sept ember 11 stand out as both the hallmark al - Qaeda attack as

well as the singular exception. Bali [2002], Casablanca [2003], Madrid [2004], and London [2005] all fit a different

The individuals who conducted the attacks were for the most part
all citizens or residents of the states in which the attacks occurred. Although a
paradigm.

few may have received training in al - Qaeda camps, the great majority did not. While al - Qaeda claimed
responsibility for each attack after the fact, these attacks were not under the command and control of al - Qaeda
central, nor were they specifically funded by al - Qaeda central. Rather ,

they were conducted by


local al - Qaeda inspired affiliate organizations or by local
residents/citizens, who utilized al - Qaeda as their ideological inspiration.

2NC Links Domestic Surveillance


Curtailing surveillance and informants within Muslim
communities eliminates the only reliable method to prevent
terrorist attacks
Abrahms, Research Associate at the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, 2008

Max, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, What Terrorists


Really Want Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy, International Security,
Volume 32, Number 4, Spring 2008, pp. 78-105, Project Muse, accessed 7/4/2015
JCP PB @ GDI)
Both supply-side and demand-side counterterrorism strategies must be informed by the terrorist's incentive

Supply-side strategies can help law enforcement identify potential


terrorists, unravel covert networks, and even thwart terrorist attacks by
exploiting the knowledge that people tend to participate in terrorist
groups to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists . There is no single
"terrorist personality," but certain communities are prone to terrorism . Law enforcement
must pay greater attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden. This includes
diaspora communities in Western countries that host large unassimilated,
dislocated populations such as the Maghrebin in France; single, unemployed, Islamist men residing in
structure.

comparatively secular Muslim countries such as in Pakistan; restive, youthful populations that feel estranged from
the state such as in Saudi Arabia; and prison populations, which, by definition, are home to the socially isolated and

These are impossibly large groups of people to monitor. Law


enforcement can tighten the noose considerably by exploiting the fact
that terrorist groups are composed of networks of friends and family
members, and that knowing one of them is the key scope condition for
entry into the group. Governments should utilize this knowledge to aggressively
boost funding of social network analysis (SNA) research. SNA is a mathematical
method for mapping and studying relationships between people, with untapped counterterrorism potential. The
basic idea is to trace the social relations or "links" emanating from known
terrorists or suspects, and then connect the dots between these "nodes" of people, to estimate
dislocated.

the probability of their involvement in the terrorist network. People who email, talk on the phone, or intentionally

SNA can
help law enforcement identify and then surveil the inner circle. Because
acquaintances can also play a critical role in the network, greater data-mining power and
accuracy need to be developed to expose these weak ties without undue
meet with terrorists or their close friends are statistically more likely to be complicit. In this way,

infringements on civil liberties.137 Demand-side strategies should focus on divesting terrorism's social utility, in two

it is vital to drive a wedge between organization members. Since the


advent of modern terrorism in the late 1960s, the sole counterterrorism strategy that was
a clear-cut success attacked the social bonds of the [End Page 104] terrorist
organization, not its utility as a political instrument. By commuting prison sentences in the early 1980s in
ways. First,

exchange for actionable intelligence against their fellow Brigatisti, the Italian government infiltrated the Red
Brigades, bred mistrust and resentment among the members, and quickly rolled up the organization.138 Similar
deals should be cut with al-Qaida in cases where detainees' prior involvement in terrorism and their likelihood of

Greater investment in developing and seeding


double agents will also go a long way toward weakening the social ties
under-girding terrorist organizations and cells around the world . Second,
rejoining the underground are minor.

counterterrorism strategies must reduce the demand for at-risk populations to turn to terrorist organizations in the
first place. To lessen Muslims' sense of alienation from democratic societies, these societies must improve their
records of cracking down on bigotry, supporting hate-crime legislation, and most crucially, encouraging moderate
places of worshipan important alternative for dislocated youth to develop strong affective ties with politically
moderate peers and mentors. In authoritarian countries, an abrupt transition to democracy risks empowering

extremists.139 These regimes must, however, permit the development of civil society to provide opportunities for
the socially disenfranchised to bond in peaceful voluntary associations. Counterterrorism operations must also
redouble their efforts to minimize collateral damage, which invariably creates dislocation, social isolation, and calls
for revenge. Such policies will help reduce the incentive and therefore incidence of terrorism by diminishing its
social benefits, which are what its practitioners apparently value most.

Homegrown terrorism is on the rise-and law enforcement is


key to stopping it
Smith and Beall 15 (Carrie Blackmore Smith and Joel Beall are reporters for

The Cincinnati Enquirer, Number of homegrown terrorists is rising, usatoday.com,


January 17, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/17/numberof-homegrown-terrorists-is-rising/21940159/)
From Sept. 11, 2001, to January 2014, there were 74 known terrorist plots
perpetrated by Americans, lawful U.S. residents or visitors largely
radicalized here in the United States, according to the most recent data reported by the
Congressional Research Service.

Five of those plots were carried out before law enforcement was able to
intervene.
Fifty-three of the cases almost 72 percent happened after April 2009.
That's a 152 percent increase over that time period and constitutes a
spike, according to the report by the service, an agency that works exclusively for the U.S. Congress, providing
policy and legal analysis to committees and members of the House and Senate.

Domestic intelligence gathering is key to solving for terrorist


plots-if anything, the squo is insufficient because local law
enforcement isnt doing enough searching
Jenkins 10 (Brian Michael Jenkins is an expert on terrorism and transportation

security, No Path to Glory: Deterring Homegrown Terrorism, May 2010,


http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2010/RAND_CT348.pdf)
Twenty-five of the reported cases of homegrown terrorism involved plots
to carry out attacks in the United States. Only three including the failed
Times Square bombing attemptgot as far as implementation, an undeniable
intelligence success. And no doubt, other terrorist plots have been
disrupted without arrests, while the publicized success of authorities has
had a deterrent effect on still other plotters. Intelligence has improved
since 9/11. Federal government agencies share more information with
each other and with local police departments and fusion centers, although
there are still some problems. But connecting dots is not enough, and the
emphasis on information-sharing should not distract us from the difficult
and delicate task of domestic intelligence collection. Domestic Intelligence
Collection Remains Haphazard The diffuse nature of todays terrorist threat
and the emphasis on do-it-yourself terrorism challenge the presumption
that knowledge of terrorist plots will come first to federal authorities, who
will then share this information with state and local authorities. It is just as likely
perhaps more likelythat local law enforcement could be the first to pick
up the clues of future conspiracies. Local police departments are best
placed to collect domestic intelligence. Their ethnic composition reflects
the local community. They know the territory. They dont rotate to a new city
every three or four years. They report to local authorities. But they often lack an
understanding of intelligence and require resources and training. Despite the clear
need for improved domestic intelligence, collection remains haphazard. The Joint

Terrorism Task Forces are extremely effective, but they are case-oriented, and
investigation differs from intelligence. The fusion centers are venues for sharing
information and have diverse responsibilities, but few collect intelligence.

Domestic surveillance policies such as mosque informants are


demonstrably necessary-theyre not everything, but they do
prove successful-empirics prove
Kurzman 14 (Charles Kurzman is a Professor of Sociology at University of North

Carolina at Chapel Hill who specializes in Middle East and Islamic studies, MuslimAmerican Terrorism in 2013, February 5, 2014,
http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Terrorism_in_2013.pdf)
Of the violent plots that were disrupted, most (7 of 12 individuals) were
discovered through the suspects own statements. Two of these involved
statements to informants at mosques. 9 Another two individuals (Shelton
Thomas Bell and a minor whose name was not released) appear to have been
brought to the attention of law enforcement authorities by fellow mosque - goers
who were concerned about their extremist comments. 10 Another individual
bragged on Facebook about militant activities in Syria (Eric Harroun), and another
two alerted law enforcement by contacting fake Syrian rebel web pages operated by
the FBI (Basit Sheikh and Abdella Tounisi ). Since 9/11, 54 Muslim - American
terrorism suspects and perpetrators were brought to the attention of law
enforcement by members of the Muslim - American community, out of 188
individuals where the initial tip was made public. Another 52 individuals
were discovered through U.S. government investigations .

2NC Internals Surveillance Solves Lone Wolves


Surveillance is the only way to detect and prevent lone wolf
terrorist attacks
Bakker, professor of terrorism studies, and de Graff, Fellow of
the International Centre for Counter Terrorism, 2011
(Edwin, Institute of Public Administration of Leiden University, and Beatrice,
Associate Professor at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism/Leiden
University, Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: some CT Approaches Addressed,
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/preventing-lonewolf/html, Perspectives on Terrorism, volume 5, No 5-6, accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @
GDI)
How to deal with the threat of lone wolf terrorism and the challenge of
identifying, targeting, and arresting persons who act entirely on their
own? The question has not yet been sufficiently answered and poses the problem of how to reconcile
fundamental principles of open societies with guaranteeing security to citizens. One thing, however, is clear: the
challenge is enormous, especially when confronted with a person like Anders Breivik who used years to
meticulously prepare his horrible attacks the Oslo bombing (8 killed) and the Utoya massacre (69 killed).

the above described commonalities and challenges provide some


clues as to where to start with CT responses. First of all, according to Alex Shone of
the Henry Jackson society, a British-based think-tank, the key factor of the UKs CT response
concerning locating lone wolf attacks is in knowing not who will carry out
an attack (almost an impossibility) but rather in knowing how such attacks are
formulated. In his essay, Shone stresses the need to learn about the
radicalization processes of lone wolves. He shows that insight into these
processes open up possible avenues for effective CT measures to prevent
or counter the threat of lone wolf terrorism.[18] Knowing how lone operator
attacks are formulated requires a far more sensitive detection system at
the tactical, sharp-end of operations than most CT organizations currently
use. According to Shone, CT services need to be far more attuned to those
signals, as minimal as they might be, that any individual with a terrorist
intent will inevitably give off in preparing his attack. This requires not only
effective data capture and exploitation enabled by efficient overall
information management, but also fused intelligence products. This
requires intelligence analysts and collectors to work in far closer union.
Nonetheless,

Only better intelligence gathering can prevent lone wolf


terrorist attacks because of the subtle signatures that these
people give off
Hamm, Professor of Criminology, and Spaaij, Senior Research
Fellow at the Center on Terrorism, 2015
(Mark, Indiana State University, and Ramon Spaaij, John Jay College at the the City
University of New York, February 2015, Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using
Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf, accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @
GDI)
The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and
prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of the

radicalization process that lone wolves go through prior to their attacks. Insight
into these processes may provide investigators with a sort of detection
system, or signaturesas minimal as they may appearthat an individual with a
terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Such signatures include
the combining of personal and political grievances, broadcasting of
terrorist intent, an affinity with online sympathizers/or extremist groups,
the reliance on enablers, and triggering events. When fused with
intelligence assembled by area specialists (religious scholars, psychologists,
communications experts, explosive specialists and the like), these signatures could identify
indicators of how lone wolf attacks are formulated. Equally important,
investigators must have an understanding of counterterrorism efforts that
have proven successful in the past, and the extent to which these
successes have derived from an operational understanding of the
radicalization process.

Surveillance is the only effective method of preventing lone


wolf terrorist attacks
Simon visiting lecturer of political science, 2013
(Jeffery, UCLA, April 18, 2013, What makes lone-wolf terrorists so dangerous?
http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/what-makes-lone-wolfe-terrorists-245316,
accessed 7/9/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
As valuable as the Internet is for lone wolves, it can also cause them
problems. Lone wolves become most vulnerable to discovery by law
enforcement whey they surface online. Whether it is by announcing to the
world, as LaRose did, that she was ready, willing, and able to commit terrorist
acts, or by posting manifestos as Breivik did, lone-wolf terrorists can leave
many Internet clues. The chat rooms they frequent and the online searches they conduct can all be

potential pitfalls. In fact, had the Internet been accessible during Kaczynski's reign of terror, he probably would have

Kaczynski desperately sought an outlet for the


dissemination of his anti-technology, anti-industrial-society views. That is why he demanded that
newspapers publish his manifesto. He very likely would have posted his writings online
early in his terrorist career (despite his distaste for technology). The scenario that played out years
been caught a lot earlier.

later his brother turned him in after reading the manifesto in a newspaper would have likely occurred once his
brother read it online. Subsequent attacks may have therefore been prevented.
Another lesson learned from the study of lone-wolf terrorists is that lone wolves are not as crazy as many people
assume. While some are mentally ill, such as Kaczynski and Kurbegovic, and others have psychological problems,
such as Breivik, many are not "abnormal' in the psychological sense, such as Rudolph and Choudhry. While some
lone wolves combine personal grievances and problems with a political or religious cause to justify their violence,

It is also a
myth that little can be done to preventlone-wolf terrorism. In addition to
monitoring the Internet, other measures can be taken to reduce the risk of
lone-wolf attacks. These include the continual development of devices to
identify package bombs or letters containing anthrax spores; the expansion of closedcircuit television cameras in public settings; and further advances in
biometrics, including the use of gait analysis, which can determine if a person is carrying a bomb, and facialmany others are as dedicated to the issues for which they are fighting as are "regular" terrorists.

expression analysis, which can predict hostile intent. In addition, there is the obvious, but usually ignored, public
responsibility to report unattended packages at airports, bus terminals, shopping malls and other possible targets.
We don't yet know how long the bags containing the bombs were left unattended at the Boston Marathon's finish
line, but there might have been enough time for somebody to notify the police and begin moving people away from
danger.

2NC AT: Radicalization Theory Wrong


Radicalization theory is true-the few can influence the many,
and the unique nature of todays world makes surveillance
more necessary than ever
Musa and Bendett 10 (Samuel Musa is a Senior Research Fellow and the
Homeland Security Science and Technology Chair at the Center for Technology and
National Security Policy (CTNSP), Samuel Bendett is a Research Associate with the
CTNSP Homeland Security Team, National Defense University. His previous work
encompassed security and foreign policy issues at the U.S. Congress and a range of
private and non-profit consulting companies, Islamic Radicalization in the United
States New Trends and a Proposed Methodology for Disruption, September 2010,
http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2013/07/DTP-077.pdf)
Recent events have brought to light the evolving nature of an individuals
relationship and interaction with radical versions of Islam. The larger
communitythe house of worship, family and friends, constant presence
of cultural and social backgroundsare no longer necessary. While in
some cases, the community acts as a backdrop to an individuals
perception of his or her role as a devout Muslim, in others it is the quest
of the individual, far away from such community and connecting via
Internet, that could lead to acts of terrorism. In such cases, individuals
gain access to knowledge databases radical teachings, sermons,
preaching, essays, audio and video clips available on various websites
and content-sharing sites like YouTube. A leader who personally directs an
individual toward more radicalized Islamic teachings may not be necessary at
this crucial stage, making it harder for law enforcement to determine the
origin and scope of motives that could le ad to terrorist acts. Already in
2007, the intelligence community warned in an assessment that the
spread of radical Internet websites and a growing number of selfgenerating cells in Western countries "indicate that the radical and violent
segment of the West's Muslim population is expanding, including in the
United States." 10 By mid-2010, recruitment efforts are not fully known, nor can
they be accurately determined. According to Richard Nelson, a retired naval officer
who served with the National Counterterrorism Center, points to the difficulty of
tracking a trend that involves multiple groups with varying objectives. 11 What is
now becoming clear is that past benchmarks for engaging, identifying, surveying,
and interdicting potential domestic terrorists must be constantly updated to
correspond with the evolving threat.

Radicalization is being made possible by dissemination of


electronic information-electronic and physical surveillance
methods are both necessary, to stop radicalization at its
source and find the signs of it, respectively
Musa and Bendett 10 (Samuel Musa is a Senior Research Fellow and the

Homeland Security Science and Technology Chair at the Center for Technology and
National Security Policy (CTNSP), Samuel Bendett is a Research Associate with the
CTNSP Homeland Security Team, National Defense University. His previous work

encompassed security and foreign policy issues at the U.S. Congress and a range of
private and non-profit consulting companies, Islamic Radicalization in the United
States New Trends and a Proposed Methodology for Disruption, September 2010,
http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2013/07/DTP-077.pdf)
It is, therefore, essential to assess the emerging trends in domestic radicalization and treat this menace not just as

The discussion, communication, and


interaction over the Internet that targets the United States and its core
values now take place in English, and very specific content is now aimed
at American audiences with websites, videos, and messages. This is a
major difference form the earlier communication and indoctrination tools,
when the potential terrorists had to be present in Muslim countries and territories
for training and preparation. Such activity 27 would draw domestic and international
attention from entities responsible for interdicting such actions. Today, that
dynamic is changingColeen La Rose, Alessa, and Almonte exemplify the
new trend, and Shahzad reinforces it by virtue of being considered a
successful, assimilated naturalized U.S. citizen with perceived loyalties to
the United States and its value system . If this new trend is reinforced by the
Internet, then the American law enforcement and intelligence communities
must target the source and dissemination tactics of radicalized Islamist
propagandathe websites, chat rooms, and Internet videos that spread
such messages. Such information outlets must be shut down, taken out of
commission, removed from servers, and otherwise disabled in order to minimize
potential exposure to its hateful content by impressionable or desperate individuals.
The proliferation of such Internet -based content can be greatly reinforced
by a variety of new technologies like smart phones; as long as such
information remains in the open, it can potential recruit numerous
individuals to undertake radical actions.
a law enforcement issue, but as information warfare.

2NC Turns Case


Detonation of a dirty bomb would cause massive government
crack-down and xenophobic policies
Ignatieff 4 [Michael, former director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard, former Professor in Human Rights Policy at the University of Toronto and a senior fellow of
the university's Munk Centre for International Studies; Could We Lose the War on Terror? Lesser Evils, New York
Times Magazine, 5/02]

Consider the consequences of a second major attack on


the mainland United States -- the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb, perhaps,
or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a subway. Any of these events
could cause death, devastation and panic on a scale that would make 9/11
seem like a pale prelude. After such an attack, a pall of mourning, melancholy, anger and fear would
hang over our public life for a generation. An attack of this sort is already in the realm of
possibility. The recipes for making ultimate weapons are on the Internet, and the
materiel required is available for the right price. Democracies live by free markets, but a free market in
everything -- enriched uranium, ricin, anthrax -- will mean the death of democracy. Armageddon is being privatized,
and unless we shut down these markets, doomsday will be for sale. Sept. 11, for all its horror, was a conventional

A democracy can allow its leaders


one fatal mistake -- and that's what 9/11 looks like to many observers -- but Americans will not
forgive a second one. A succession of large - scale attacks would pull at
the already-fragile tissue of trust that binds us to our leadership and destroy the trust we have in
one another. Once the zones of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find
ourselves, in short order, living in a national-security state on continuous
alert , with sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent
detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might
disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation
cells. The worst of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny on a
cowed populace. We would demand it for our own protection . And if the
attack. We have the best of reasons to fear the fire next time.

institutions of our democracy were unable to protect us from our enemies, we might go even further, taking the law
into our own hands. We have a history of lynching in this country, and by the time fear and paranoia settled deep in
our bones, we might repeat the worst episodes from our past, killing our former neighbors, our onetime
friends. That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would
no longer recognize ourselves. We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples. Alarmist? Consider
where we stand after two years of a war on terror. We are told that Al Qaeda's top leadership has been decimated
by detention and assassination. True enough, but as recently as last month bin Laden was still sending the
Europeans quaint invitations to surrender. Even if Al Qaeda no longer has command and control of its terrorist
network, that may not hinder its cause. After 9/11, Islamic terrorism may have metastasized into a cancer of
independent terrorist cells that, while claiming inspiration from Al Qaeda, no longer require its direction, finance or
advice. These cells have given us Madrid. Before that, they gave us Istanbul, and before that, Bali. There is no
shortage of safe places in which they can grow. Where terrorists need covert support, there are Muslim
communities, in the diasporas of Europe and North America, that will turn a blind eye to their presence. If they need
raw recruits, the Arab rage that makes for martyrs is still incandescent. Palestine is in a state of permanent
insurrection. Iraq is in a state of barely subdued civil war. Some of the Bush administration's policies, like telling

anyone who
says "Relax, more people are killed in road accidents than are killed in
terrorist attacks" is playing games. The conspiracy theorists who claim the
government is manufacturing the threat in order to foist secret government upon us ought
to wise up. Anyone who doesn't take seriously a second major attack on
the United States just isn't being serious. In the Spanish elections in March, we may have
Ariel Sharon he can keep settlements on the West Bank, may only be fanning the flames. So

had a portent of what's ahead: a terrorist gang trying to intimidate voters into altering the result of a democratic
election. We can confidently expect that terrorists will attempt to tamper with our election in November.
Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said in a recent television interview that the Bush administration is
concerned that terrorists will see the approaching presidential election as "too good t