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G.R. No. L-2352 July 26, 1910

Facts: This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain articles taken from a
Roman Catholic Church located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental value of the church and its
appurtenances, including the church cemetery, from the 11th day of December, 1901, until the month of
April, 1904. After hearing the evidence, the court below gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
It appears that the defendants took possession of the church and its appurtenances, and also of all of the
personal property contained therein. The plaintiff, as priest of the church and the person in charge
thereof, protested against the occupation thereof by the defendants, but his protests received no
consideration, and he was summarily removed from possession of the church, its appurtenances and
The only defense presented by the defendants, except the one that the plaintiff was not the real party in
interest, was that the church and other buildings had been erected by funds voluntarily contributed by the
people of that municipality, and that the articles within the church had been purchased with funds raised in
like manner, and that, therefore, the municipality was the owner thereof.
Issues: 1. WON the plaintiff, R.P. Alonso, is the real party in interest (No)
2.WON the Court can substitute as party plaintiff the real party in interest (Yes)
Held: 1. NO. It held that is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostic Church
itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action. Section 114
of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.
2. YES. SC ordered that the action be amended by substituting the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
inthe place and stead of Father Alonso as party plaintiff for the reason that the amendment does not
constitute change in the identity of the parties but just a formal substitution
Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides:
SEC. 110. Amendments in general. The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms, if
any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action,
in either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name of any party,
either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate
allegation or description in any other respect so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious, and inexpensive manner. The
court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be made after the time limited by
the rules of the court for filing the same. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall
be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Section 503 of the same code provides:
SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. No judgment shall be reversed on
formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced the real rights of the excepting party.
G.R. No. L-21706
March 26, 1924

FACTS: The case at bar is a sequel to case G. R. No. 21706 , Josefina Rubio de Larena vs.
Hermenegildo Villanueva, decided on March 26, 1924. In that case we affirmed a decision of the Court of
First Instance ordering the rescission of a lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Plantation and the payment by the
defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the rent for the agricultural year 1920-1922 in the sum of
P5,949.28 with interest from August 26, 1922, an for P8,000 in rent for the agricultural year 1921-1923.
The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff. Shortly
after the record was returned to the court below, a writ of execution was issued, but before levy was made
the parties came to an agreement, under which the money judgment was to be satisfied by the payment
of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a dwelling house situated in the municipality of Bais.
The agreement was carried out in accordance with its terms, and on September 30, 1924, the document
was executed by the plaintiff. The present action was brought on April 13, 1925, but the last amended
complaint, setting forth three causes of action, was not filed until June 17, 1927. The defendants alleges
that according to the pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706 , the two causes of action were included in that
case and, therefore, must be considered res judicata. In all three causes of action, the defendant sets up
as a special defense the document executed by the plaintiff on September 30, 1924, acknowledging the
satisfaction of the judgment in case G. R. No. 21706
ISSUE . W/N The doctrine of res judicata is applicable
Properly speaking, this argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known
an, in American law, firmly established principle that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause
of action an make it the basis for several suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well established that
when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment is an
independent cause of action, though it has been held and is good law, that in an action upon such a lease
for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action brought must be included in the
complaint an that failure to o so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent.
The aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706 , was brought on August 23, 1922, the plaintiff demanding payment
of then sue rent in addition to the rescission of the lease. The plaintiff also amended the prayer of the
complaint by asking judgment for rent for years subsequent to 1922. The motion was granted, and the
case came up for trial on July 30, 1923, and on September 8, 1923, the trial court rendered its decision
giving judgment for rent up to and including the rent for the agricultural year ending in 1923. The lease did
not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any definite time, an it appears plainly from the record
that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered due until the end of the corresponding year. It
follows that the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 ha not become sue time of the trial of the case
and that consequently the trial court could not render judgment therefore. The action referred to is,
therefore, no bar to the first cause of action in the present litigation.
G.R. No. L-32958

November 8, 1930

Johns, J.
FACTS: On Sept. 10, 1918, the parties entered into a contract wherein the Manila Gas undertook to
deliver to Blossom coal and water gas tar monthly for a period of 4yrs. On January 31, 1919, the contract
was amended so that it should continue to remain in force for a period of 10yrs. Plaintiff alleged that on
the last part of July 1920, defendant breached the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas
tar despite demands from the former. Thus, on November 23, 1923, plaintiff instituted an action against
defendant to recover the damages amounting to P124,848.70 which it had then sustained by reason of
such flagrant violation of said contract on the part of the defendant and to obtain the specific performance

of the said contract. CFI rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff and ordered the defendant to pay the
former the sum of P26,119.08 as the damages suffered by plaintiff from July 1920 up to and including
September, 1923. However, the court refused to order the said defendant to resume the delivery of the
coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff under said contract, but left the plaintiff with its remedy for damages
against defendant for the subsequent breaches of said contract. Such decision was affirmed by the SC on
March 3, 1926.
Manila Gas made no deliveries under its contract from July, 1920 to March 26, 1926, or until after the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court for damages. On March 3, 1927 plaintiff instituted
the present action for damages which it claims to have sustained after September 1923, arising from its
original contract. Defendant contends that there is no cause of action there being prior adjudication of all
the issues involved in this case and that plaintiff already filed an action in the CFI in which it obtained a
favorable judgment and which was further affirmed by the SC.
ISSUE: WON there is plaintiff has cause of action in the instant case.
HELD: NONE, the case is barred by res judicata. In the first action plaintiff prayed for judgment against
the defendant:
"(a) That upon trial of this this cause judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant for the sum of P124,8484.70), with legal interest thereon from November 23, 1923;
"(b) That the court specifically order the defendant to resume the delivery of the coal and water gas tar to
the plaintiff under the terms of the said contract Exhibit A of this complaint."
Thus, plaintiff must stand or fall on its own pleadings, and tested by that rule it must be admitted that the
plaintiff's original cause of action, in which it recovered judgment for damages, was founded on the tenyear contract, and that the damages which it then recovered were recovered for a breach of that contract.
Both actions are founded on one and the same contract. By the terms of the original contract of
September 10, 1018 xxx In other words, under plaintiff's own theory, the defendant was to make
deliveries from month to month of the tars during the period of ten years, and it is alleged in both
complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad faith refused to make any more deliveries.
As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its nature, so as to authorize
successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is
no bar to a suit for a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the
breach total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.
In the case of Rhoelm vs, Horst, the court held that an unqualified and positive refusal to perform a
contract, though the performance thereof is not yet due, may, if the renunciation goes to the whole
contract, be treated as a complete breach which will entitle the injured party to bring his action at once.
Further, in Pakas vs. Hollingshead, the syllabus says: Upon refusal, by the seller, after partial
performance, longer to comply with his contract to sell and deliver a quantity of articles in installments the
buyer cannot keep the contract in force and maintain actions for breaches as they occur but must recover
all his damages in one suit.
It will thus be seen that, where there is a complete and total breach of a continuous contract for a term of
years, the recovery of a judgment for damages by reason of the breach is a bar to another action on the
same contract for and on account of the continuous breach.

It is admitted that the defendant never made any deliveries of any tar from July, 1920, to April, 1936. Also
that it made nine deliveries to plaintiff of the minimum quantities of coal and water gas tar from April 7,
1926, to January 5, 1927. Plaintiff contends that such deliveries were made under and in continuation of
the old contract. However, the record (exchange of letters between the parties) tends to show that tars
which the defendant delivered after April 7, 1926, were not delivered under the old contract of January 1,
1920, and that at all times since July 1920, the defendant has consistently refused to make any deliveries
of any tars under that contract.
After careful study of the many important questions presented on this appeal in the exhaustive brief of the
appellant, we are clearly of the opinion that, as found by the lower court, the plea of res judicata must be
sustained. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005
Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc., through Atty. Leonor L. Infante (President) and Rodney David Hegerty
(Vice-President), obtained a loan from Neal B. Christian through 3 promissory notes each having a value
of $50,000 payable in 3 years at 15%/yr interest dated as follows:
1. August 7, 1996
2. March 14, 1997
3. July 14, 1997
Neal terminated the loan and demanded $150,000 plus unpaid interest of $13,500 on December 16,
1998. He then filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with RTC Baguio on February 2, 1999.
Neal allegedly agreed to waive the interest rate and accept the payment of the principal loans in
installment due to the Asian Financial Crisis. In turn, Swagman alleged for lack of cause of action
because the loans were not yet due and demandable when the complaint was filed.
RTC Baguio ruled that the first two promissory notes were already due and demandable. It
ordered Swagman to pay P100,000 representing its principal obligation with an interest of 6%/mo. until
fully paid. It ruled that even if there was no cause of action when the complaint was filed, it may be cured
by evidence presented without objection. It also ruled that there was no novation of obligation upon the
acceptance of partial payment and reduction of the amount of the obligation. The true test of novation is
when two obligations cannot stand together where each one having an independent existence.
The CA denied Swagmans appeal and affirmed the RTCs Decision. A complaint without a cause
of action can be cured by evidence presented without objection or, in the event of an objection sustained
by the court, by an amendment of the complaint with leave of court. Also it ruled that there was no
novation because it requires express agreement of the parties or acts that are too clear and unequivocal
to be mistaken.

May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of cause of
action during the pendency of the case?
NO. Both the RTC and CA interpreted Sec. 5, Rule 10, 1997 Rules of Procedure incorrectly. Amendment
to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence is only applicable only if a cause of action in fact
exists at the time the complaint is filed, but a complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential
elements are:
1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2) An obligation on the part of the named defendants to respect or not to violate such right; and
3) Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. (Rule 2, 1997 Rules of Procedure)
In the case, there was no cause of action where on February 2, 1999, the time when the action was
filed, no promissory note was yet due and demandable. The rule was made to resolve cases in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities and avoid multiplicity of suits. An
action prematurely brought is a groundless suit. Further, novation in this case however is of the
modificatory type and not the extinctive one since the obligation to pay a sum of money remains in force.
G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012
Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon) who died on November 7, 1961 and
May 5, 1974, respectively. They were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita Baylon, Victoria
Baylon, Dolores Baylon, Panfila Gomez, Ramon Baylon, and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada.
Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and was
survived by her daughter, Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by
Florante Baylon, his child from his first marriage, as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife,
and their legitimate children, namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and
Ma. Ruby, all surnamed Baylon.
On July 3, 1996, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting and damages
against Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43
parcels of land. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of the said
parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the income produced by the
said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land, Lot No. 47096 and half of Lot No. 4706,
In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the
43 parcels of land, whereas Rita actually owned 10 parcels of land out of the 43 parcels which the
petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining 11 parcels of land are separately owned by Petra
Cafino Adanza, Florante, Meliton Adalia, Consorcia Adanza, Lilia and Santiago Mendez. Further, they
claimed that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 were acquired by Rita using her own money.

During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, conveyed Lot No.
4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. On July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and without any issue.
After learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental
Pleading dated February 6, 2002, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded
in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding the existence of co-ownership but ordered the partition of the
property os Spouses Baylon, and it rescinded the donation made.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC insofar as they decreed the rescission
of the Deed of Donation. The case was remanded to the trial court for the determination of ownership of
lot no. 4709 and half of lot no. 4706.
The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable
judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses
Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission is premature. Further, the CA
ruled that the petitioners action for rescission cannot be joined with their action for partition, accounting
and damages through a mere supplemental pleading.
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in
favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that the same actually
belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon.
The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate, distinct and independent
actions partition and rescission.
The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single action.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.
It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate
suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several
distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and
subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition
of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where
possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.
Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is
subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by
special rules.
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not
be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be
overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while
an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The
variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission
precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in

determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the
presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.
A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte, may be
adjudicated by the court together with the other causes of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have
power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of
misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to
improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in
simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.


Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and
proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the
Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its
own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in
case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim
against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction
over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be
severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court
with respect to the same would be a nullity.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the petitioners action
for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission on the part of the RTC,
this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The RTC validly
adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the petitioners.
In its Decision dated October 26, 2007, the CA pointed out that the said action for rescission should have
been filed by the petitioners independently of the proceedings in the action for partition. It opined that the
action for rescission could not be lumped up with the action for partition through a mere supplemental
We do not agree.
A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation to the original
cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
The petitioners supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of the
gratuitous conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the filing of the original complaint
and prayed for additional reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the said lots form part
of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same
is rescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their original complaint remained the


FACTS: The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of EO No. 378, issued by PGMA. Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed
on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was created by virtue of EO No. 285 by Pres. Cory Aquino which provided, among others, the
creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of
the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 states that
The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:

Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national,
provincial, city and municipal governments, including government corporations
Printing of officials ballots;.
Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act,
Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine
Information Agency. x x x

On October, 2004, PGMA issued EO No. 378, amending Section 6 of EO. 285 by, removing the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. Furthermore, agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing
services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services
offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by
the NPO. It also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving EO No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now
challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of PGMA to amend
or repeal EO No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers;
and (2) EO No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO. The petition was dismissed.
Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must first delve into a procedural matter.
ISSUE : Whether or not the case instituted as a class suit qualifies as one.
HELD: No. The present petition fails to satisfy the requirements of a class suit.
Rule 3, Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them
which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all
concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to
protect his individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one
of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous
or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
An element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the
question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether
the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the
proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other
factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed EO
and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the SG, as counsel for respondents, who
pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a
small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original
petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,
ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. Counsel of the petitioners challenged the validity of
the desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to
pressure from people close to the seat of power. Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of
desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of
NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. Furthermore, only 20 petitioners were in fact
mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only
20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
SC previously held that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek
to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.
Here a Manifestation of Desistance was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers
Association (NAPOWA) expressing opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we
take into account the contention of petitioners counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing
to file such manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that there is an apparent conflict between
petitioners interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that
petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly
treated as a class suit.

G.R. No. 153788

November 27, 2009

ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de
Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES
FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money
with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin
for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a
special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a
party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) the
actionable documents on which the complaints were based.
RTC- dismissed the case but later on set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Gos
(husband) leasing business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the
inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a
cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or
supplemental pleading.
CA - denied petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.

HELD: YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as the registered
owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a
judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it
is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not
appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.

KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that

Glenn O. Go represented. In other words, by the express terms of this Lease
Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo
Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements.
The Lease Agreement expressly points that

We find it significant that the business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of
Karen T. Go,[19] who described herself in the Complaints to be a Filipino, of legal
age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and doing
business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES.[20] That Glenn Go and
Karen Go are married to each other is a fact never brought in issue in the case.
Thus, the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is registered in the name of a
married woman, a fact material to the side issue of whether Kargo Enterprises and
its properties are paraphernal or conjugal properties. To restate the parties
positions, Navarro alleges that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Gos paraphernal
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or

Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered
under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Therefore, only
one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is
an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of
the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4,
Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3, Section 11 of
the Rules of Court.
CRISTITA B. BAES, petitioners,
G.R. No. 173192, April 14, 2008
FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land located in Cebu which is covered by an OCT in the name of
13 co-owners (among them were Simplicio, Ignacio and Fortunata). Respondents (Maximo, Flaviano,
Gaudencio, Domingo and Victoria) claimed that they are the children and/or grandchildren of the
aforementioned co-owners. On the other hand, petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo are heirs of Alipio, Sr.
(hindi siya co-owner) who, during his lifetime secured Tax Declarations covering the lot without any legal
basis; that they have been leasing portions of the lot to persons who built houses thereon, and Rosendo
has been living in a house built on a portion of the lot; and that demands to vacate and efforts at
conciliation proved futile. As a result, the respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint against the
petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of
possession, and damages.
In their Answer, petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo claimed that their father Alipio, Sr. purchased via deeds
of sale the shares in the lot of Fortunata, Simplicio, Wenceslao, Geronimo, and Felix from their respective
heirs, and that Alipio, Sr. acquired the shares of the other co-owners of the lot by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription through continuous, open, peaceful, and adverse possession thereof in the concept of an
owner since 1949.
By way of Reply and Answer to the Defendants' Counterclaim, the aforementioned respondents alleged
that the deeds of sale on which Rosendo and Rodrigo base their claim of ownership of portions of the lot
are spurious, but assuming that they are not, laches had set in against Alipio, Sr.; and that the shares of
the other co-owners of the lot cannot be acquired through laches or prescription.
The aforementioned respondents filed an Amended Complaint impleading as additional defendants Alipio,
Sr.'s other heirs (petitioners Marceliana Doblas, Terolio Bacalso, Alipio Bacalso, Jr., Mario Bacalso,
William Bacalso, Alipio Bacalso III, and Christine B. Baes.) Still later, the respondents filed a Second
Amended Complaint impleading as additional plaintiffs the other heirs of registered co-owner Maximiano
(respondents Timoteo Padigos, Perfecto Padigos, Frisca Salarda, Flora Quinto, Benita Templa, Sotero
Padigos, Andres Padigos, and Emilio Padigos).
In their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, petitioners contended that the Second Amended
Complaint should be dismissed in view of the failure to implead other heirs of the other registered owners
of the lot who are indispensable parties.

A Third Amended Complaint was thereafter impleading as additional plaintiffs the heirs of Wenceslao
(respondents Demetrio Padigos, Jr., Wenceslao Padigos, and Nelly Padigos) and the heirs of Felix
(respondents Expedito Padigos (Expedito), Henry Padigos, and Enrique P. Malazarte).
Respondents admit that Teodulfo Padigos, an heir of Simplicio, was not impleaded. They contend,
however, that the omission did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because Article 487 of the Civil
Code states that "any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment."
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents declaring them to be entitled to the ownership and possession
of the lot in litigation and declaring as null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale.
The petitioners appealed. Meanwhile, the trial court issued a writ of execution which was implemented by,
among other things, demolishing the houses constructed on the lot.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. CA denied Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this present Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Teodulfo is an indispensable party in the case
HELD: Yes. The action is not for ejectment rather for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents,
recovery of possession and ownership, and damages. Arcelano v. Court of Appeals defines indispensable
parties under Section 7 of Rule 3, Rules of Court as follows: Parties-in-interest without whom there can
be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of
all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all
conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The absence then of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of a court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent party but even as to those present.
On the issue of authencity of documents (i.e. Deed of sale in favor of Alipio) baka itanong
No Forgery. Signatures geunuine and authentic. Forgery, as any other mechanism of fraud, must be
proved clearly and convincingly, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.The RTC and
CA relied on the findings of Vao, an expert witness for respondents, that Gaudencio's signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale covering Fortunata's share in the lot) and Maximo's thumbprint on Exhibit "7"
(Deed of Sale covering Simplicio's share in the lot) are spurious. Vao's findings were presented by
respondents to rebut those of Wilfredo Espina (Espina), expert witness for petitioners, that Gaudencio's
signature and Maximo's thumbprint are genuine.
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely advisory in character.
The courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them
inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert
opinions, courts give more weight and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.
The Court observes that in examining the questioned signatures of respondent Gaudencio, petitioners'
expert witness Espina used as standards specimen signatures which have been established to be
Gaudencio's, and that after identifying similarities between the questioned signatures and the standard
signatures, he concluded that the questioned signatures are genuine. On the other hand, respondents'
expert witness Vao used, as standards, the questioned signatures themselves. He identified
characteristics of the signatures indicating that they may have been forged.
Therefore, the petition is hereby granted and the civil case filed in the RTC is dismissed.
G.R. No. 177429

November 24, 2009


FACTS: The Taronas alleged that the Assessors Office of Morong in Bataan cancelled Tax Declaration
463 in the name of Juanito Tarona covering 6,186 square meters of land in Morong, Bataan. The
cancellation was based on an unsigned though notarized affidavit that Juanito allegedly executed in favor
of petitioner Tallorin, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez. In place of the cancelled
one, the Assessors Office issued Tax Declaration 6164 in the names of the three persons. The old man
Taronas affidavit had been missing and no copy could be found among the records of the Assessors
Office. The Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and
issue a new one in the name of Juanitos heirs.
The Taronas filed a motion to declare Tallorin in default for failing to answer their complaint within the
allowed time. But, before the RTC could act on the motion, Tallorin filed a belated answer, alleging that
she held a copy of the supposedly missing affidavit of Juanito who was merely an agricultural tenant of
the land. He surrendered and waived in that affidavit his occupation and tenancy rights to Tallorin and the
others in consideration of P29,240.00.
RTC rendered judgment,
a) annulling the tax declaration in the names of Tallorin, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez, and Dolores
b) reinstating the tax declaration in the name of Juanito; and
c) ordering the issuance in its place of a new tax declaration in the names of Juanitos heirs. The trial
court also ruled that Juanitos affidavit authorizing the transfer of the tax declaration had no binding force
since he did not sign it.
Tallorin appealed the above decision to the CA.
CA- rendered judgment, affirming the trial courts decision. The CA rejected all of Tallorins arguments.
Since she did not assign as error the order declaring her in default and since she took no part at the trial,
the CA pointed out that her claims were in effect mere conjectures, not based on evidence of record.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas complaint for not impleading
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez.
HELD: The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs and defendants.16
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Joining
indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. Without their
presence, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not only as to the
absent party, but as to those present as well. And where does the responsibility for impleading all
indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.
The Court cannot discount the importance of tax declarations to the persons in whose names they are
issued. Their cancellation adversely affects the rights and interests of such persons over the properties
that the documents cover. The reason is simple: a tax declaration is a primary evidence, if not the source,
of the right to claim title of ownership over real property, a right enforceable against another person.
The RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164 that belonged not only to defendant Tallorin but also
to Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, which two persons had no opportunity to be
heard as they were never impleaded. The RTC and the CA had no authority to annul that tax declaration
without seeing to it that all three persons were impleaded in the case.

But the Taronas action cannot be dismissed outright. As the Court held in Plasabas v. Court of
Appeals,22 the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. Section 11, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or
misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through
motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Only if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action.
Mendoza, J.

Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (Spouses Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two
collection cases in RTC, Branch 15, Davao City against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Two (2)
parcels of land of the defendants were later on attached, and the TCTs therein were properly annotated.
On the other hand, the same defendants, Robert Limso and So Keng Koc were also sued in another
collection case filed in RTC Branch 8 Davao City by petitioner Sy Sen Ben. Later, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its
decision based on a compromise agreement wherein the defendants in said case were directed to
transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties
to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM
A year later, Spouses Crisologo won the suit against So Keng Kok. A writ of execution was favored, and
the subject properties including the two parcels of land were subject to a public auction sale. Later, they
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject
properties. The judgement was rendered in their favor because no motion for intervention was filed prior
to the rendition of the judgment. JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was granted in
an order. Spouses Crisologo then argued that they could not be deemed as defaulting parties because
they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and order of default.
In 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
questioning the RTC-Br. 14 orders- all of which denied their motion to be recognized as parties. C.A.
denied their petition.
Hence this petition
Issue: Whether or not the the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion
in failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien..
Held: No. In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title,
the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT
Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or
injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they
are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the
many lien holders.

As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant
to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. 17
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all
possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment.

G.R. No. 186610

July 29, 2013
FACTS: Police Senior Superintendent Macawadib, pursuant to General Order No. 1168 issued by Chief of
Directorial Staff of PNP, was among those commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory
retirement on various dates in the month of January 2002 by virtue of their attainment of the compulsory
retirement age of 56. Macawadibs records as reflected in the files of the PNP Records Management
Division indicate that he was born on January 11, 1946 (56 y/o).
Macawadib filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar's Office of
Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said application, petitioner swore under oath that he was born on January
11, 1956. The application was, subsequently, approved. Then, he filed with the RTC of Marawi City,
Branch 8, a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records Regarding the Birth Date
alleging, among others, that he was born on January 11, 1956 (46 y/o).
RTC ruled in favor of Macawadib ordering the following for the correction of his birthdate (from Jan. 11,
1946 to January 11, 1956): PNP Records Management, NAPOLCOM Personnel and Records
Management Service and Records of CSC. Subsequently, the PNP Directorate for Personnel and
Records Management filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA, seeking to nullify the
above-mentioned Decision of the RTC on the ground that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the PNP, "an unimpleaded indispensable party." CA granted the petition. Macawadib filed a MR, but CA
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNP-DPRM is an indispensable party in the instance case and that the RTC have
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the PNP-DPRM.
HELD: Yes, PNP-DPRM is an indispensable party.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in
the custody of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC)
which are involved and which would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction
filed by Macawadib. The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to
the proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
In the fairly recent case of Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc., the Court had
the occasion to reiterate the principle that: Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in

interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to
be adversely affected by petitioner's petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in
petitioner's service records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner's service is extended by ten years, the government,
through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that would have to be given to
petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which may be affected by
the change should be notified or represented as the truth is best ascertained under an adversary system
of justice.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceedings, the decision of the trial court granting petitioner's prayer for the correction of entries in his
service records, is void. As mentioned above, the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.
G.R. No. 198010
August 12, 2013
FACTS: Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth and impleaded
as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Gingoog City. In her petition, she made the following
allegations: a) That she is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay, who were never
married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother; b) That her Certificate of Live Birth shows that
her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S.
Lugsanay"; c) That her school records, PRC Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport bear the name
"Norma S. Lugsanay" and d) That she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of LCR of Gingoog City
to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. However, the NSO
records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
The RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the case
for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the OSG and the City
Prosecutors Office for their information and guidance. Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied
with the publication requirement.
The RTC granted the respondents petition and ordered the LCR of Gingoog City to effect the correction
or change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioners name and citizenship so that the
RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It
also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person,
especially since the LCR of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has
continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino
citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. It held that respondents failure to implead other indispensable
parties was cured upon the publication of the Order and by serving a copy of the notice to the LCR, the

OSG and the City Prosecutors Office. As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondents
filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and
that her siblings birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is
Filipino. Petitioners MR was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
HELD: YES. In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly
those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect
the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport
and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings
who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The
changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship.
In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the
surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing
her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly,
the changes are substantial.
It was only the LCR of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This,
notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which
decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4
and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different
potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but
to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be
set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
Thus, the CA decision on the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent
Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is nullified.