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PEOPLE VS TACAN
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran
City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition and murder
in 2 separate criminal cases.
Tac-an (18)was under the influence of drugs and without any license or permit from the
proper authorities, (SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver) with Five (5) spent
shells and Five (5) live ammunitions and without shoot one Francis Ernest Escano III(15)
causing his death(multiple gunshot: head&chest)
FACTS: Tac an and escano III were classmates and belong to the same
gang(BRONX). Tac-an had been to the house of Escano III, her mother notice that
Tac an carries a handgun and advise his son(Escano) to distance himself to TacAn.
Escano the withdrew from the gang and the relationship between the two turned
sour.
(quarreled and was brought to the principal; Tac an together with other members
looking for Escano to beat him; theres a graffiti in the wall and armchair deprecating
the Bronx gang and describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual))
On the day of the incident, around 2 oclock, Renato attended his English class, he
placed his scrapbook in the armchair and approach his teacher to raise a
question. When he returned to his chair he saw francis seating on his scrapbook.
Angered by this he kicked the chair, a fist fight would have occurred were if not
for the intervention of his classmate and teacher. (both seated on opposite side{last
row})
After the class resumed Tacan slipped out and went to his house to get his gun
and was back 15 mins later.
Around 3 oclock, the mathematics class had just started, Tac an, holding a
revolver, burst into the room and looking for Escano(shut the door and with both
hands raised, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?")
1. Upon sighting Francis seated behind and to the light of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired
at Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and
Ruel jumped up and with several of their classmates rushed forward towards the teacher's
platform to seek protection from their teacher.
2. Renato fired a second time, this time hitting the blackboard in front of the class. Francis
and the other students rushed back towards the rear of the room.
3. Renato walked towards the center of the classroom and fired a third time at Francis,
hitting the concrete wall of the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed
towards the door, the only door to and from Room 15.
4. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform nearest the door and for the fourth time fired
at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door.this time, Francis was hit on the head
and he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor. Ruel was pulled out of the room by a
friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely.

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5. Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr.
Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis,
approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the
room. Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is
still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom
floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis'
back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple.

Renato left her room, some teachers and students came to rescue Escano but could not
open the door which Tacan had locked behind him. One of the student entered the room by
climbing(window) and open the door. Escano was brought to a hospital(|by PC Soldier
Celestino)
Upon investigation the revolver that the empty cartridge cases had been fired from the
revolver recovered from Renato.
ISSUE:Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to
the public authorities.?
HELD: We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978
and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall
be deemed as such. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other
articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board,
or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code,
teachers, professors and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be
deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No. 299, September 19,
1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority,"
such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles

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148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised
Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific
articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested
with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be
given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the
ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe
that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a
"public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code,

1RENATO TAC AN=SELF DEFENSE or at least in incomplete self-defense.


That Francis uttered words of provocation( advising him to get his gun and if he did not
comply Escano would kill his family)
a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the aggression; and
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.

2HE ALLEGED THAT PD 1866 is not applicable to him as it is only applicable during
marshall law.
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
SC: There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which
suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law

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imposed upon the country by former President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain any
provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of the
state or period of martial law.
2DOUBLE JEOPORDY
CHARGED with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition aggravated by used of
such firearm to commit murder
CHARGED with murder "with the use of an unlicensed [firearm],
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts,
there is no prohibited double jeopardy.
4THERE IS NO TREACHERY
Renato had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement
was a warning to Francis and that the first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were
merely warning shots.
SC= tacan knew that Escano was inside
He block the only possible exit(no means of escape)
The warning shot he claimed(poor marksmanship)
5NO EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
(a) the time when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime;
(b) an action manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination to
commit the crime; and
(c) of the passage of a sufficient interval of time between the determination of the offender
to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.
The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time Renato
left his English III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was testimony to
the fact that before that fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment had welled
up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing when Renato
had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis.
6UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a
crime is committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous
drugs, such state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the definition of a crime and the application of the penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
No medical evidence had been submitted by the prosecution to show that Renato
had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis.
7VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

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Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by handing over the weapon through the
balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his brother, who was
not in any case a person in authority nor an agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato
did not surrender himself he was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist
arrest, did not constitute voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had
surrendered himself, such surrender cannot be regarded
asvoluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the faculty room, in effect holding
some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room was surrounded by Philippine
Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him. He was not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

well-respected citizen of the municipality of Leon, was a member of the municipal council, and had twice served as
municipal president. He was also at the time a candidate for reelection to the latter office.

US VS TABIANA
FACTS: a warrant of arrest was issued, Callado and Cabilitasan found the
dependant around 4pm. Instead of coming he told the policemen that he would
come in later and report at the municipal building with his herdsman, the other defendant
named in the warrant.
At around 6pm, the defendant not having appeared, the policemen were directed
by the chief of police too find him. They found him at his house with his friends.
The policemen announced their errand tabiana showed further resentment over
the idea of arrest but yielded and started to the municipal bldg with the two. In
passing the market detached himself from the custody of the policemen without
the consent and entered the market.
The police men wait for about half an hour, and then later went into the market
and found tabiana with some friends. The defendant(tabiana) asked for a warrant,

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callado then drew the warrant the defendant took, looked and put it into his
pocket. After that he said come along and gave the policeman a push, as did also
by his friends.
When they arrived at the municipal the chief of police and other officials were gone. This
angered tabian, tabiana and his friends left the municipal saying that they would find the
justice of the peace.(one is looking for chief of police)
The chief of police arrived at the municipal bldg. and learning what happened he order the
two policeman together with Cajilig to find and bring tabiana back and to procure the return
of warrant of arrest. Upon finding tabiana, in his tienda with his friends, he denied having
taken the warrant. One of his friend shouted that "If he has no warrant send him up for a
beating." Tabiana then approached callado and hit him in the breast with his hand/fist, at
which instance seized him. The policeman started to carry him, when two bystander
interfered and took him away from the policeman. Justice of the peace Julian canillas then
arrived on the scene and hit callado in the back.
Mean-while Tabiana seems to have retired to his apartment, and Julian Canillas directing
himself to the policeman said, "Go back to the municipal building and to-morrow you will
take those clothes off," referring to the uniforms worn by the policemen.
The policemen then went away, which may be attributed not only to the command of the
justice of the peace but also to the fact that some of Tabiana's friends indicated a
determination to fight if the policemen should persist in their purpose of arresting Tabiana.
HELD: Yes he is liable. Based on the proofs of records the defendant clearly shows resistance
and grave disobedience. that everything done by Tabiana upon this occasion is properly
referable to the idea of resistance and grave disobedience. We discern in his conduct no
such aggression as accompanies the determination to defy the law and its representative at
all hazards. Upon the previous occasions of his contact with the policemen on this day,
Tabiana yielded, though with bad grace; and it is evident that he would upon this occasion,
have gone to the police station again if it had not been for the acts of others in rescuing him,
and for the intervention of the justice of the peace, who ordered the policemen to
desist.chanroblesvirtualawlibra
As to the defendant Julian Canillas we find that he participated in the offense committed on
this occasion, knowing that the defendant Tabiana was liable to arrest under the warrant
issued by himself; and he is therefore punishable in the same manner.chanroblesvirtualawli
Physician, Dr. Bienvenido Allas, who autopsied the cadaver, found thirty-two (32) bolo
wounds on the victim's head, neck, abdomen and arms.
PEOPLE VS RILLORTA
FACTS: Romy Ramos, a thresher operator, recounted that while they were threshing the palay stock
near the premises of the victim, the accused Pascual Baylon Rillorta accosted Ramos and threatened
him with a gun saying "Damn you, you better go home or I'll kill you here" (p. 7, t.s.n., December 19,
1979). Rillorta resented the threshing of palay in his barrio by the Ramos' threshing party, whom he
regarded as outsiders, because he wanted the palay stocks in his barrio to be threshed in his own
thresher.

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On their way home to Bo. Calapugan, Ramos and his companions, Romy Elizaga and Ceferino Facon,
aboard their thresher, were stopped by the three accused. Pascual Rillorta, who was armed with a bolo,
warned them not to return to thresh palay in barrio Barangobong. Barangay Captain Doton, who was
following behind Ramos' group, advised the accused to let the threshing party pass. The three (3)
accused chased Doton. Upon overtaking him, they surrounded him and pushed him toward the creek.
Pascual Rillorta hacked him with a bolo while his sons (co-accused Wesley and Wilson) held Doton's
hands. Doton yelled "I'm going to die, they are going to kill me." (Patayendacon in Ilocano.)

ISSUE: wheter or not the defendant committed assault upon a persin in authority?

YES. when Doton intervened to prevent a violent encounter between the accused and
Ramos' group he was discharging his duty as barangay captain to protect life and property
and enforce law and order in his barrio.
Under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code and P.D. 299, a barangay captain (formerly a
"barrio lieutenant") is a person in authority

DEFENSE : Pascual Rillorta : denied having killed Doton. He alleged that the deceased attacked
him.
That it was daton who attacked him first with bolo, which he parried away. That daton even chased
him, and when daton was about to hacked pascual, Wilson hacked daton at the back

The assault upon the deceased was not attended by treachery for it was preceded by a heated
exchange of words between the appellants and the deceased (People vs. Ibanez, 56 SCRA 210; People
vs. Quiban, 131 SCRA 459; People vs. Visagar, 93 Phil. 319). It cannot be said that the deceased was
caught completely by surprise when the accused took up arms against him. Therefore, the killing was
only homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder.

But the crime was a complex one of homicide with assault upon a person in authority under
Articles 249 and 148 of the Revised Penal Code in view of the circumstance that when Doton
intervened to prevent a violent encounter between the accused and Ramos' group (pp. 12,
14 & 25, t.s.n., Dec. 19, 1979), he was discharging his duty as barangay captain to protect life
and property and enforce law and order in his barrio.
Under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code and P.D. 299, a barangay captain (formerly a
"barrio lieutenant") is a person in authority

WESLY DEFENSE(DEFENSE ON RELATIVE) For his part, Wesley alleged that he simply defended his
father who was attacked by Doton.

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REJECTED. Wesley Rillorta's plea that he acted in legitimate defense of his father for the deceased had
not committed any unlawful aggression against Pascual. From the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, and
judging from the number, location, and nature of the deceased's wounds, the appellants were the
aggressors.

WILSONS DEFENSE(not there)


His alibi may not prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witness. it was not
physically impossible for him to have returned to Barangobong at 10:00 p.m. when the barangay
captain was killed. (40mins travels)
the mobile car while the third gunman whom they identified as accused Rolando Dural

PEOPLE VS DURAL
FACTS:"At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of them (prosecution witnesses Rener Ramos
and Dennis Santos) were at the Macaneneng Street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City as they were supposed to go a
(sic) "tupadahan" however, they were not able to arrive at the tupadahan because while on their way or from a
distance of twelve (12) arms-length they heard successive gunfires (sic) so they run (sic) and hid themselves in a
concrete fence near a store; from the place they were hiding or from a distance of ten (10) arms-length they saw
three (3) men each of them armed with .45 (sic) pistol, firing upon at (sic) the two Capcom soldiers on board a
Capcom mobile car which was then on a full stop although its engine was still running; two of the gunmen positioned
themselves beside each of the side of the mobile car while the third gunman whom they identified as accused
Rolando Dural otherwise known as Ronnie Javelon (Dural for brevity) claimed the hood of the mobile car and
positioned himself in front of the car; after the two Capcom soldiers were immobilized, the gunman standing near the
driver's seat opened the left front door of the car and got the .45 (sic) service pistol and armalite of the Capcom
soldiers; thereafter, the three gunmen left; during the shooting incident they also noticed the presence of two persons,
one was inside an owner jeep while the other one whom they identified as accused Bernardo Itucal, Jr. (Itucal for

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brevity) was standing near the scene of the incident with one of his arm (sic) raised while one of his hand (sic) was
holding a .45 caliber pistol; immediately after the three (gunmen) who fired at the Capcom soldiers left; (sic) the man
who was riding on the owner jeep told accused Itucal that he was leaving and instructed Itucal to take care of
everything; witness Dennis Santos even quoted the very word (sic) of the man on board the owner jeep Pare, bahala
ka na diyan; after that, the accused Itucal walked away; two days after the incident or on February 3, 1988
eyewitnesses Ramos and Santos voluntarily went at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan
City to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought them at (sic) the Capcom
headquarters at Bicutan then at (sic) Camp Panopio Hospital; at the said hospital, they saw one of the three gunmen
(referring to accused Dural) who shot the two Capcom soldiers; then they went back at (sic) Bicutan headquarters
where they gave their respective statements (Exhs. "D" and "E")

ISSUE: w/n they committed direct assult?

YES. appellant Dural and the two (2) other gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
Mangligot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform
and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims, who were agents of persons in authority, were in the performance of
official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. For having assaulted and killed the said victims, in conspiracy with
the other two (2) gunmen, appellant Dural also committed direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority. Pursuant then to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of the penalty for the more
serious crime which is murder, should be imposed. The maximum of the penalty prescribed for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code is death penalty
(1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) is
concerned, the Decision of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. C30112, subject to the above modification of the death penalty.
As to alibi, it is a fundamental juridical dictum that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 29 In
the instant case, Dural was positively identified by the principal witnesses for the prosecution. It is equally settled that
for alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that the accused was at some other place at the time of the incident but
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 30 This
was not proven by Dural.
The People 12 maintains, however, that conspiracy was established by the presence of the appellants and their
companions at the scene of the crime and their participation in the killing of the victims. Witnesses Ramos and
Santos testified that they saw Dural go atop the hood of the CAPCOM car and fire a shot at one of the CAPCOM
soldiers seated in the front seat. One Edwin Balag, a witness for the prosecution and a neighbor of Itucal, testified
that he had witnessed the shooting of the CAPCOM soldiers and thereafter saw Itucal go atop the hood of the
CAPCOM car 13 and shout "Mabuhay and Sparrow."
A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. 14 Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, it may be shown by acts and circumstances
from which may be logically inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the crime
charged. 15 It is sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. 16 Confederacy was established beyond cavil in this case among appellant Rolando Dural, a.k.a. Ronnie
Javelon, and the two (2) other gunmen. Armed with deadly weapons, they arrived together, each proceeding directly
to a pre-assigned spot from where they suddenly and unexpectedly shot their victims. They then fled together toward
the same direction after divesting the victims of their firearms. All these acts are eloquent proof of a common plan and
design deliberately and carefully executed with precision through coordinated action.

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(2) ACQUITTING, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR.; and
The 2 witness admitted on cross-examination that he saw Itucal for the first time only after the gunmen had left the
scene
If Itucal was the lookout, he had to come either ahead of or simultaneously with the gunmen. By the very nature of his
duty or task, a lookout should not come to the scene of the crime after its consummation. There is absolutely no
evidence that Itucal came ahead of or simultaneously with the gunmen; on the contrary, as shown above, he was
seen for the first time only after the gunmen had walked away. That he was armed, which could have enhanced the
prosecution's theory that he was a co-conspirator, was not likewise sufficiently proven. While Rener Ramos testified
that he was, his companion, Dennis Santos, who similarly focused his eyes on Itucal and the others and witnessed
almost everything that took place, did not notice any weapon in Itucal's possession. According to Rener Ramos, Itucal
"had his arm raised and one of his hand (sic) was holding a 45 caliber pistol." If such were indeed the fact, Dennis
Santos would not have failed to see it. That is not all to it. Another prosecution witness, Edwin Balag who even
testified that he had seen Itucal, his neighbor whom he had known for more than two (2) years, 22 climb atop the hood
of the CAPCOM car after the gunmen shot the soldiers and shout "mabuhay ang sparrow" did not state that Itucal
was armed. 23 The prosecuting Fiscal did not attempt to extract any information or testimony to that effect from him. It
was the court which asked the appropriate question after the re-direct examination of Balag, but the witness
categorically admitted that Itucal was not armed at that time,
That Itucal shouted "mabuhay ang sparrow" and was told by the driver of the owner-type jeep: "Pare, bahala ka na
diyan," do not conclusively prove that he was a co-conspirator in the absence of any evidence, as in this case, that he
was a member of a subversive organization which operates the sparrow unit and that the driver of the owner-type
jeep was also a co-conspirator. Even assuming for the sake of argument that he was a sympathizer of such a
subversive organization, mere sympathy is not enough to prove his participation in the conspiracy. The parting
statement of the driver of the owner-type jeep could be addressed to anybody at the scene and is susceptible of two
(2) interpretations, one of which is inconsistent with the participation of Itucal either in the planning of the crime or in
the execution of such plan. In the light of the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution, and in the
absence of credible inculpatory evidence, that interpretation in his favor must prevail. While admittedly the alibi of
Itucal is weak, the evidence of the prosecution against him is likewise feeble. The prosecution cannot use the
weakness of Itucal's defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. 25 And considering
that Itucal's culpability could only be anchored on his participation in a conspiracy, such participation must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence. The prosecution has failed to successfully discharge that burden in this case,
leaving this Court unconvinced, due to reasonable doubt, of the guilt of Itucal.
(3) Ordering accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) to pay one-half (1/2) of the
costs.
SO ORDERED.

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GELIG VS PEOPLE
FACTS: Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at
the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydias son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at
the time material to this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from
Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and
pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent assault,
Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate 5 issued by a
doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and
started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern
Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly,
a medical certificate6 was issued.

The Defenses Version


Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling her son names, so
that his classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her hands
and kicking her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall.
CA: Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in
authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the
matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia.8 Likewise, Lydias purpose was not to defy the authorities but
to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son.
Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there was no evidence that she was aware
of Gemmas pregnancy at the time of the incident.10 However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty
of slight physical injuries

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ISSUE: whether or not accused commited direct assault?

HELD: yes. Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon
or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.1avvphi1
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may be
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ
force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. 14

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its
elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d)
makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official
duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official
duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils
who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when
she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be
pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim.
Gemma then proceeded towards the principals office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of

13
force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemmas fall to the
floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the provision
reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority Who shall be deemed as such.

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities,
and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873,
approved June 12, 1985).

FACTS: there was an ordinance which prohibits the loading and unloading of chicken manure along the

sidewalks or road shoulders or within 15 meters from the center of the Halsema Highway located at La
Trinidad, Benguet.
Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo, and SPO1 Joseph Basquial were conducting routinary patrol on board a
police car somewhere in Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet when they came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken
dung at the stall of accused Enrique "Totoy" Rivera which was located along the Halsema Highway at Shilan,
La Trinidad, Benguet. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop unloading the manure as it the said ordinance.
The driver complied with the police directive. The policemen then escorted the truck back to Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet and proceeded to the police headquarters.

Not long after, SPOI Jose Bangcado and SPOI Rivera Dayap, members of the La Trinidad Police under
Inspector Leygo were conducting patrol aboard a police car somewhere at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet when
they observed a truck loaded with chicken dung proceeding towards Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet.Immediately
they called Inspector Leygo on the radio and informed him that they stopped a truck carrying chicken dung.
Inspector Leygo ordered them to restrain the truck, as he would be proceeding to the area.

Knowing that the truck being restrained by the two policemen was the same truck which they had escorted
earlier from Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet, Inspector Leygo felt ignored and insulted. He immediately called
SPO4 Justino Tiwtiwa, SPO1 Baldwin Ngolab and SPO1 Joseph Basquial and the group sped to Cruz, La
Trinidad, Benguet.

the accused arrived before the group of Inspector Leygo did and ordered the driver not to obey the policemen
but instead obey him, as he (accused) was the boss. The truck driver followed the accuseds order and drove
the truck towards Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet with the accused following closely behind in his vehicle.

14

Inspector Leygo and his group arrived in time to see the truck pulling away and so they gave chase. The police
were able to overtake and stop the truck at Dengsi, Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. Inspector Leygo confronted
the truck driver and asked him why he still insisted on proceeding to Shilan to unload chicken manure despite
the fact that he was ordered to go back earlier in the evening. The truck driver stated that he was just following
the orders of the accused. Immediately, Inspector Leygo turned around to see the accused who had at that
time alighted from his vehicle behind the truck. Inspector Leygo asked the accused why he insisted on defying
the ban on the unloading and loading of chicken manure. Instead of answering however, the accused pointed a
finger on the policeman and uttered words like "Babalian kita ng buto" (Ill break your bones). "Ilalampaso kita"
(Ill scrub you). "Pulis lang kayo" (you are only policemen) and other unsavory and insulting words. Inspector
Leygo who was a little bit angry warned the accused to stop uttering further insulting words and cautioned him
to take it easy and then informed him that he was being arrested for violation of the chicken dung ordinance.
The accused removed his jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance and challenged the
policeman. Inspector Leygo then approached the accused and warned him anew that he was being arrested.
The accused responded by punching Inspector Leygo on his face, particularly on his lip. The two then grappled
as Inspector Leygo tried to hold the accused. Finally, with the help of Policemen Dayap and Bongcado, the
accused was subdued. The accused was then pushed into one of the police cars but he resisted until Alfredo
Castro, one of the chicken dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car to accompany him.

HELD: direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.9
Unquestionably, petitioners case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and
is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or
employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority.

ABALOS CASE

Facts: around 8pm while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police Major
Cecilio Abalos, were having a heated argument(because of the berating his
employees and his son talked to him not to scold his employees as they would go to
a festival), a woman shouted Police officer, help us! Somebodys making trouble
here. The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then appeared at the scene and asked Major
Abalos, What is it, sir? The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to
face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and
procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet
long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle. He then swiftly returned and
unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the

15
policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in
a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that
blow. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder
ISSUE: w/n the accused committed direct assault?
HELD: yes. Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan,
Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no dispute that he was in the
actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was
maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant
himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman and, in fact,
Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred
appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he
really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for
that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or
homicide. The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified
by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted. Pfc. Labine was struck
from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant's
father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim
whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.
DEFENSE: that he thought his father is being attacked and that he could no identified the victim due to
poor visibility. And questioning the credibility of testimony(*1witness)
appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm
is rather preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman
would assault a police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of
the incident was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim's
assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent
death.
Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a
long-time resident of that municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located
along the road and which, by appellant's own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from them.
[13] Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast by
the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the
combatants.

Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 194367


15 June 2011VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals which denied petitionersappeal. The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with
violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to
Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail bakery but
wasrefused because it was found out that it was fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the

16
matter to jail officers. Consequently,the jail guards conducted a surprise inspection and
found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the accused. Thedefense of the accused
was the defense of frame up. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubtof the crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding
that the counterfeit money werediscovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise
inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money were planted to incriminate
petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces involved. As to the elements
of thecrime, the RTC held that the fact that the P
500.00 bills found in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by
the certification issued by the Cash Department of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the
elements of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established
because theinformant Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.
Issue:
Whether all the elements of the crime of
Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note
in this case are present?
Resolution:
Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby
ACQUITTED
of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.The elements of the crime charged for
violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation
and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of
credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender
knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or
possessed with intent to use
any of such forged or falsified instruments. In thiscase, the prosecution failed to show that
petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis
dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was
not presented incourt. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela
Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buysoft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a
fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personalknowledge that petitioner
asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not
basedon the personal knowledge. In this case, the non-presentation of the informant as
witness weakens the prosecution'sevidence since he was the only one who had knowledge
of the act which manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had
every opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed,
but itdid not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it evidence of an
essential element of the crime

Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. The elements of the crime committed under Article 168
of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other
obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit

17
not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the
said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of
such forged or falsified instruments.
Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. In this case, the Supreme Court, citingPeople v.
Digoro, reversed and set aside thefindings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of
Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code. In Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not
acriminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be
with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show that
petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to
whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court.
According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter
to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have
personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use the P500 bill. Their account, however,
is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the
Philippines,

DEL ROSARIO VS PEOPLE


FACTS: Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso
Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of

18
illegal possession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of
P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate
part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8
months and 1 day of prision mayor. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by
Sergio del Rosario.
It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso
bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to
believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in
fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each
of which had been altered and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in
obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the
avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the
Philippines. The only question raised in this appeal is whether the possession of said Exhibits
C, E, G and H constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant
maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession thereof
cannot be illegal. We find no merit in this pretense.lawphil.net
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had
been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been
made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit in
Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.

Issue:Whether the accused-appellants are liable for the crime of illegal possession
and use of false treasury or bank notes under Art. 168?
Held:It is clear from the provisions Art 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code that
the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures,
letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with
knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and his codefendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168,
in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs.
Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785). Being in accordance with the
facts and the law, the decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs
against petitioner Sergio del Rosario.
Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other
instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions
of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his
possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in
this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said
articles.

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ART. 169. How forgery is committed. The forgery referred to in this section may be
committed by any of the following means;
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to
order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures,
letters, words or signs contained therein.