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US v Vaquilar


Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of

killing his wife and his daughter, as well
as injuring other persons with a bolo.


Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant

appeared to be insane prior to the
commission of the crimes.


They also testified that the appellant was

complaining of pains in his head and
stomach prior to the killing.


The witnesses




appellants eyes were very big and red with

his sight penetrating at the time he was killing his

Held: The evidence is insufficient to declare him

insane. The appellants conduct was consistent
with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a
person with an unsound mind at the time he
committed the crimes.

The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive

that he is insane.
The popular meaning of
crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms
insane. The conduct of the appellant after he
was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the
actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the
cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected
and felt remorse after the commission of the

The court further held that mere mental depravity

or moral insanity which results not from any
disease of the mind, but from a perverted
condition of the moral system where the person is
mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal
responsibility. In the absence of proof that the
defendant had lost his reason or became
demented after a few moments prior to or during
the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that
he was in a normal state of mind.

he looked at me he was crazy because if

he was not, he wouldnt have killed his family

at the moment of cutting those people, he

looked like a madman; crazy because he would
cut anybody at random

sister said, then he pursued me.he

must have been crazy because he cut me

Issue: WON these pieces of evidence are

sufficient to declare the accused as insane,
therefore exempt from criminal liability?

Atizado v People
Facts: On June 20, 1994, the petitioners ( Atizado
and Monreal,17 at the time the crime was
committed) were charged the following offenses:
murder with treachery by killing Rogelio Llona y
Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla,
Petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the
information on November 7, 1994, the trial
During the fiesta the wife of the victim witnessed
the crime and she saw Atizado shooting his
husband and Monreal also pointed his gun at her
while moving to and fro. Then the petitioners fled
the scene of the shooting. So she rushed to the
house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing

(Lagonsing) to report the shooting and they

brought his husband to the hospital but it was
declared dead on arrival.
One of the accused (Danilo) was discharged
because of a strong alibi that he was not present
during the commission of the crime.
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
(Atizado and Monreal) convicted guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime , with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Reclusion Perpetua
plus damages. (80k)
On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed an denied the MR.

matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon

if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
NCC 220 - Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising
parental authority shall have with the respect to






following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and

Hence the petition for review of certiorari

good example, and to provide for their upbringing

in keeping with their means;

Issue: WON the

criminally liable?





Held: SC affirmed their conviction, but reduced

the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because
the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his
minority at the time of the commission of the
crime. So Monreal was released because he
already served his sentence, but he still needs to
pay civil damages to the heirs of the victim.
Ratio: The RTC and the CA did not appreciate
Monreals minority at the time of the commission
of the murder probably because his birth
certificate was not presented at the trial.
B. Nature of Marriage in Philippine Law
FC, Art 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)
Rule 131 Sec.3 (1989 Rules on Evidence)
Sec. 3 . Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal,
the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and

counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire
in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect
them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be
required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed
by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)

Muslim Code ( PD.1083, Sec 14)

Article 14. Nature. Marriage is not only a civil
contract but a social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this
Code and the Shari'a and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage settlements
may to a certain extent fix the property relations
of the spouse.
Goitia v Campo-Rueda






This is an action for support by Goita

(wife) against Rueda (husband).
The parties were legally married in the
city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino
where they lived together for about
a month, when the plaintiff returned to
the home of her parents.
After 1 month of marriage, Rueda
repeatedly demanded from Goita to
perform "unchaste and lascivious acts on
Rueda's genitals." Because of Goita's
refusal, Rueda maltreated Goita by word
and deed, inflicting bodily injuries on
To escape Rueda's lewd designs and
avoid further harm, Goita left the conjugal
home and took refuge in her parent's
Goita filed an action for support w/ the
trial court. This was dismissed on the
ground that Rueda could not be
compelled to give support if Goita lived
outside of the conjugal home, unless
there was a declaration for legal
Goita appealed.

Issue: WON there was any reason to prevent the

exercise of the option granted by article 149 of
the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish
subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own
house the one who is entitled to receive it?
HELD: Marriage is something more than a mere
contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties,
and obligations of which
rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general
law w/c defines and prescribes those rights,
duties, and obligations.

object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its

continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable.

The law provides that the Husband, who is obliged

to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, the option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the Husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the
wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because. of the Huband's own wrongful acts.
In this case, where the wife was forced to leave
the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assaults of the Husband, the Wife
may claim support from the Husband for separate
maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
Sermonio V Republic
On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was
charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br.
151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes
Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior
marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid
and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the
ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge
denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992,
he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his
order of denial.

Marriage is an institution; in the maintenance of

which in its purity the public is deeply interested.
It is a relation for life and the parties cannot
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make. The reciprocal rights
arising from this relation, so long as it continues,
are such as the law determines from time to time
and none other.
When the legal existence of the parties is merged
into one by marriage, the new relation is
regulated and controlled by the state or govt.
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of
society as well as the parties. And when the

Petitioner challenged the above orders before the




for certiorari and







decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was

dismissed for lack of merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his
criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated
by prescription. He avers that since the second
marriage contract was duly registered with the

Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of

registration makes it a matter of public record and
thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The
offended party therefore is considered to have












commenced to run on the day the marriage

contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have
been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that
the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of
discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C.
Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed?
HELD: No. The non-application to the crime of
bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is
not contrary to the well entrenched policy that
penal laws should be construed liberally in favor
of the accused. To compute the prescriptive
period for the offense of bigamy from registration
thereof would amount to almost absolving the
offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said
to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful
as he conceals from the officiating authority and
those concerned the existence of his previous
subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them
that he is still a married person. He likewise
conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous







bigamous marriage in a place where he is not

known to be still a married person. And such a






circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous

marriage is rendered quite difficult and would
take time. It is therefore reasonable that the
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said
crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agency.

People v De la Cruz
Facts: On 18th day of August, 2002 in Bulacan
Victoriano (husband) killed his wife with intent his
Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was
united in lawful wedlock, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, use personal violence and stab her hitting
the latter on her trunk and on the different parts
of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious
physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Prosecution: A witness testified that the couple
was fighting. But he didnt see that actual act of
killing. Suddenly the accused asked for help. So
they rushed to the hospital but the wife died. The
police did an investigation and the accused was
turned over to them. Also a Doctor stated that the
victim died because of "hemorrhagic shock as a
result of a stab wound, trunk."
Defense: The accused testified that he was drunk
and they were really fighting. But he didnt kill his
wife. She just pushed his wife so he could go out
but she fell on a jalousie window and she he
helped her standing up he noticed that her back
was punctured by a piece of shattered glass.
RTC: Convicted beyond reasonable doubt of
Parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
late Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz the following
sums of money.
civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 and the
award of exemplary damages is deleted.Hence,
this appeal for reversal of CAs decision.
Issue: WON marriage being binding among
spouses can even be used as grounds for
Held: The crime of Parricide is defined and
punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.

It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)

the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.
The key element in Parricide other than the fact
of killing is the relationship of the offender to
the victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse,
the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. In this case, the testimony of the
accused that he was married to the victim, in
itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against
penal interest.19 Clearly, then, it was established
that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

C. Agreements prior to marriage

1.Stipulations in marriage
FC Art.1 Marriage definition
NCC 221
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997,
Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal)
sought Omaa's legal advice on whether they
could legally live separately and dissolve their
marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" and was notarized
by a staff only without the presence of the lawyer.
Espinosa found out that the contract was invalid
from a law graduate. So they filed for a complaint
in the SC.
Issue: WON dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is valid even
if notarized?
Held: No. This Court has ruled that the
partnership without judicial approval is void.
The Court has also ruled that a notary public
should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership,which is
exactly what Omaa did in this case.

(1) Any contract for personal separation

between husband and wife;
2. Breach of promise to marry
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement,
during marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between
husband and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of
legal separation, or of annulment of
(4) Any simulated alienation of property
with intent to deprive the compulsory
heirs of their legitime.

Espinosa v Atty.Omana

NCC 19 -21
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-

existing contractual relation between the parties,

is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his

22. Breach
contract. Any person who has entered into a
contract to marry but subsequently refuses
without reasonable ground to marry the other
party who is willing to perform the same shall pay
the latter the expenses incurred for the
preparation of the marriage and such damages as
may be granted by the court.
Hermosisma V CA

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of

Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following
cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action, unless the same, or
some note or memorandum, thereof, be in
writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or
by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another;




(c) An agreement made in consideration of

marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels
or things in action, at a price not less than five
hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and
receive part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidences, or some of them, of such things in
action or pay at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when a sale is made by
auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his
sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount
and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price,
names of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale of real
property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of
giving consent to a contract.



An appeal by certiorari, on October 4,

1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter
referred to as complainant, filed with the
acknowledgment of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as a natural child of said
petitioner, as well as for support of said
child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of the
child and expressed willingness to
support the latter, but denied having ever
promised to marry complainant.
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born
in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a
teacher and petitioner who was almost
ten years younger than her used to go
around together and were regarded as
engaged, although he made no promise
of marriage thereto.
In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter
where intimacy developed between her
and petitioner, since one evening in 1953
when after coming from the movies, they
had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board MV Escano to which he was then
attached as apprentice pilot.
In February 1954, Soledad advised
petitioner that she was pregnant,
whereupon he promised to marry her.
However, subsequently, or on July 24,
1954, defendant married one Romanita

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are

recoverable under our laws for breach of promise
to marry.
HELD: No. It appearing that because of the
defendant-appellants seductive prowess, plaintiffappellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded

to his sexual desires in spite of her age and selfcontrol.

In the present case, the court is unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten years younger
but also because the CFI found that complainant
surrendered herself to the petitioner because
overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to
bind him by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy.
Wassmer v Velez
DOCTRINE: Mere breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong exception when it is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P.
Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4,
1954 as the big day.
On September 2,1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be: Stating that her mother oppose the
marriage and he enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon."
But he never returned and was never heard from
again. Beatriz sued Velez for damages. Velez filed
no answer and was declared in default.
Then beatriz adduced evidence before clerk of
court. Velez. filed a "petition for relief from orders,
judgment and proceedings and motion for new
trial and reconsideration."
But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the
parties and their attorneys to appear before it on
August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an
amicable settlement.
But no amicable settlement took place despite
another chance given by the court.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order
denying defendants aforesaid petition. Defendant
through his counsel filed a motion for new trial,
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary
to law. The reason given is that "there is no

provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action

for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals(L-14628,
Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa
vs.Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new
Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not this is a case of "mere
breach of a promise to marry" and; 2) Whether it
is an actionable wrong.
HELD: That court held that surely this is not a
case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walkout of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the
extent to which acts not contrary to law maybe
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. "
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued
(Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances
(Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party dresses and other apparel for the important
occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for
the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two
days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My
mother opposes it ... "He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before

the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed

rest assured returning soon." But he never
returned and was never heard from again.

To justify suspension or disbarment, the act

complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral.
A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.

Abanag V Mabute
FACTS: The complainant alleged that respondent
courted her and professed his undying love for
her. Relying on respondents promise that he
would marry her, she agreed to live with him.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of respondent

considered as disgraceful or immoral conduct.

She became pregnant, but after several months

into her pregnancy, respondent brought her to
a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take
drugs to abort her baby.

Held: No. The SC finds that the acts complained

of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly
immoral conduct. Mere sexual relations between
two unmarried and consenting adults are not
enough to warrant administrative sanction for
illicit behavior.

When she did not agree, the respondent turned

cold and eventually abandoned her. She became
depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She
also stopped schooling because of the humiliation
that she suffered.
complainants allegations and claimed that
charges against him were baseless, false
fabricated, and were intended to harass him
destroy his reputation.


letter complaint, which was written in the
vernacular, was prepared by Tordesillas who is
from Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the respondent
would have used the "waray" or English language
if she had written the letter-complaint.
The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she
herself wrote the letter-complaint. She belied the
respondents claim that she was being used by
Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him.
of the



It defined what immoral conduct is as conduct

is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.


voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman
who are not married, where both are not under
any impediment to marry and where no deceit
exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled
act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary
While the Court has the power to regulate official
conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct,
it is not within our authority to decide on matters
touching on employees personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their familys
We cannot intrude into the question of whether
they should or should not marry.
However, we take this occasion to remind
judiciary employees to be more circumspect in
their adherence to their obligations under the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of
court personnel must be free from any taint of
impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to
their official duties but also in their behaviour
outside the Court as private individuals. This is
the best way to preserve and protect the integrity
and the good name of our courts.
D. Requisites for a valid marriage
Mariategui v CA
Facts: Lupo
marriages during his lifetime. On his first wife,

Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8,

1904, he begot four children, Baldomera, Maria
del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his second
wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter
named Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa
Velasco, he begot three children, namely Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina.
At the time of Lupos death he left certain
properties with which he acquired when he was
still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his
death, descendants from his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children on
Lupos third marriage filed with the lower court an
amended complaint claiming that they were
deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were
owned by their common father. The petitioners,
children on first and second marriage, filed a
counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and also the
complaint by the respondents, children on third
Respondents elevated the case on CA on the
ground that the trial court committed an error for
not finding the third marriage to be lawfully
married and also in holding respondents are not
legitimate children of their said parents. CA
rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo, including the respondents,
are entitled to equal shares of estate of their
father. However, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision.
Issue: Whether or not respondents were able to
prove their succession rights over the said estate.
Ruling: With respect to the legal basis of private
respondents' demand for partition of the estate of
Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held
that the private respondents are legitimate
children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged
to have been lawfully married in or about 1930.
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that "when his father was still living, he
was able to mention to him that he and his
mother were able to get married before a Justice
of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and
were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced

to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to

controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact
that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock,
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and
board is legitimate; and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Makati Shangri-La v Harper

FACTS: November 1999, Christian Harper came
to Manila on a business trip as the Business
Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power
Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide
operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel.
He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In
the early morning of that date, however, he was
murdered inside his hotel room by still
unidentified malefactors.
It appears that at around 11:00 am of November
6, 1999, a Caucasian male entered the Alexis
Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed interest
in purchasing a Cartier lady's watch valued at
P320,000.00 with the use of two Mastercard credit
cards and an American Express credit card issued
in the name of Harper. But the customer's
difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a
credit card representative sufficiently aroused the
suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba),
who asked for the customer's passport upon
suggestion of the credit card representative to put
thecredit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble
for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store,
andleft the three credit cards and the passport
In the meanwhile, Harper's family in Norway must
have called him at his hotel room to inform him
about the attempt to use his American Express
card. Not getting any response from the room, his
family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty
Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on
Harper'sroom. Alarcon and security personnel

went to Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and were

shocked to discover Harper's lifeless body on the
Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to
pertinently alleging:
The murderer succeeded to trespass into the
area of the hotel's private rooms area and into the
room of the said deceased on account of the
hotel's gross negligence in providing the most
basicsecurity system of its guests, the lack of
which owing to the acts or omissions of its
employees was the immediate cause of the tragic
death of said deceased.
RTC ruled in

favor of the respondents. CA

Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove

its negligence; that Harper's own negligence in
allowing the killers into his hotel room was the
proximate cause of his own death; and that hotels
were not insurers of the safety of their guests.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had committed
negligence and corollarily, whether its negligence
was the immediate cause of the death of Christian
HELD: YES. Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress, is
a five-star hotel. The "reasonable care" that it
must exercise for the safety and comfort of its
guests should be commensurate with the grade
and quality of the accommodation it offers. If
there is such a thing as "five-star hotel security",
the guests at Makati Shangri-La surely deserve
just that.
When one registers (as) a guest of a hotel, he
makes the establishment the guardian of his life
and his personal belongings during his stay. It is a
standard procedure of the management of the
hotel to screen visitors who call on their guests at
their rooms. The murder of Harper could have
been avoided had the security guards of the
Shangri-La Hotel in Makati dutifully observed this
standard procedure. "It could be gleaned from
findings of the trial court that its conclusion of
negligence on the part of defendant-appellant is
grounded mainly on the latter's inadequate hotel
security, more particularly on the failure to deploy
sufficient security personnel or roving guards at
the time the ghastly incident happened. A review

of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that

on direct examination he testified that at the time
he assumed his position as Chief Security Officer
of defendant-appellant, during the early part
of 1999 to the early part of 2000, he noticed that
some of the floors of the hotel were being
guarded by a few guards, for instance, 3 or 4
floors by one guard only on a roving manner. He
then made a recommendation that the ideal-set
up for an effective security should be one guard
for every floor, considering that the hotel is Lshaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be
seen. At the time he made the recommendation,
the same was denied, but it was later on
considered and approved on December 1999
because of the Centennial Celebration.
It could be inferred from the foregoing
declarations of the former Chief Security Officer of
defendant-appellant that the latter was negligent
in providing adequate security due its guests.
With confidence, it was repeatedly claimed by
defendant-appellant that it is a five-star hotel.
Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at
the time of the death of Christian Harper, it was
exercising reasonable care to protect its guests
from harm and danger by providing sufficient
security commensurate to it being one of the
finest hotels in the country. In so concluding, WE
are reminded of the Supreme Court's enunciation
that the hotel business like the common carrier's
business is imbued with public interest. Catering
to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide
not only lodging for hotel guests but also security
to their persons and belongings. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business.

Kinds of requisites & effects of noncompliance

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these

essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of

provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

the following causes, existing at the time of the

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with


the appearance of the contracting parties before


(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to

declaration that they take each other as husband

have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of

and wife in the presence of not less than two

age or over but below twenty-one, and the

witnesses of legal age.

marriage was solemnized without the consent of






the parents, guardian or person having substitute

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or

parental authority over the party, in that order,


unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such






void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

party freely cohabited with the other and both

lived together as husband and wife;

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall

not affect the validity of the marriage but the

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless

party or parties responsible for the irregularity


shall be civilly, criminally and administratively

cohabited with the other as husband and wife;







liable. (n)
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained



by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full

impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38,

knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,

may contract marriage.

freely cohabited with the other as husband and







Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained

from the beginning:

by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen

the same having disappeared or ceased, such

years of age even with the consent of parents or

party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as


husband and wife;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally

authorized to perform marriages unless such

(5) That either party was physically incapable of

marriages were contracted with either or both

consummating the marriage with the other, and


such incapacity continues and appears to be







solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do

incurable; or

(3) Those solemnized without license, except

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-

those covered the preceding Chapter;

transmissible disease found to be serious and

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not

appears to be incurable. (85a)

failing under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the other;

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry


again after compliance with the requirements of

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void

the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the

under Article 53.

subsequent marriage shall be null and void.c

RPC 350-251

Several months after, the complainant discovered

that respondent a subsequently married a certain
Lydia Geraldez, thus, the basis of this complaint.

Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions

of laws. The penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods shall be

Issue: WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be

imposed upon any person who, without being

suspended from his practice of law.

included in the provisions of the next proceeding

article, shall have not been complied with or that








impediment.chanrobles virtual law library

Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional


If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the

consent of the other by means of violence,


intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the


maximum period of the penalty provided in the


next preceding paragraph.chanrobles virtual law




Art. 351. Premature marriages. Any widow who

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

shall marry within three hundred and one day

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

from the date of the death of her husband, or

before having delivered if she shall have been

The Supreme Court found the respondent

pregnant at the time of his death, shall be

engaging in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

punished by arresto mayor and a fine not

deceitful conduct and recommends SUSPENSION

exceeding 500 pesos.chanrobles

with the specific WARNING that a more severe

penalty shall be imposed should he commit the
same or a similar offense hereafter.

De Mijares v Villaluz
Facts: Respondent a Justice of the Court of


Essential requisites

Appeals was charged with Bigamy by complainant

and is being recommended for suspension from



Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre

Villaluz married each other pending the court's


Legal Capacity

FC Art. 2
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless
these essential requisites are present:

decision on the former's marriage.

However, their relationship was short-lived as
right after the marriage, the complainant left their
would-be-honeymoon place after some
unbearable utterances made by the respondent.

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting

parties who must be a male and a
female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not

falling under the preceding Article, only
Silverio v Republic

the properties acquired by both of the










industry shall be owned by them in

common in proportion to their respective

FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Rommel

contributions. In the absence of proof to

Jacinto Dantes Silverio field a petition for



the change of his first name Rommel

corresponding shares are presumed to be

Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male

equal. The same rule and presumption

to female in his birth certificate in the RTC

shall apply to joint deposits of money and

of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex

evidences of credit.





He alleged that he is a male transsexual,

If one of the parties is validly married to

he is anatomically male but thinks and

another, his or her share in the co-

acts like a female. The Regional Trial

ownership shall accrue to the absolute

Court ruled in favor of him, explaining


that it is consonance with the principle of




existing in such valid marriage. If the

justice and equality.

party who acted in bad faith is not validly

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a

married to another, his or her shall be

petition for certiorari in the Court of

forfeited in the manner provided in the

Appeals alleging that there is no law

last paragraph of the preceding Article.

allowing change of name by reason of sex


The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall

Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was

likewise apply even if both parties are in



Hence, this petition.

faith. (144a)

ISSUE:WON change in name and sex in

birth certificate are allowed by reason of
sex reassignment.





privilege and not a right.

It may be allowed in cases where the





dishonour, or difficult to pronounce or

write; a nickname is habitually used; or if
the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioners basis of the change of his
name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does
not prejudice him at all, and no law allows
the change of entry in the birth certificate















Art. 5. Any male or female of the age
of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may
contract marriage
Art.35 Void at the beginning

Art. 21. When either or both of the

contracting parties are citizens of a
foreign country, it shall be necessary
for them before a marriage license
can be obtained, to submit a
certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage, issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular