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The Boeing 777: A Financial Analysis of New Product Launch

Eduardo Lioy
Keya Williams
Ritwik Malvi
Jonas Angeles
Alexis Heideck

1. Introduction/ Case Summary:

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The Boeing Company is an Industrial Aircraft Design and Manufacturing Firm, diversified in its
offering of products for both the Defense Industry and the Commercial Airline Industry. In
October 1990, CEO Frank Shrontz has announced the launch of a new product, the Boeing 777.
A medium-to-large passenger aircraft, the 777 would enable the flexibility to carry passenger
loads ranging from 350-390 passengers, over distances up to 7600 nautical miles. Already,
Boeing has received orders from United Airlines, with delivery expected in May 1995 (p. 198).
Aside from the technological advances represented in the 777, the launch of this new product
promises some potential distinct strategic advantages. The launch of the 777 would provide a
medium-to-large aircraft, filling a gap in Boeings total passenger aircraft product line. Boeing
would now have a complete suite of aircrafts capable of addressing passenger loads ranging from
100-500. The 777 is specifically targeted to service routes in a high growth segment of the
market, influenced heavily specifically by the high growth rate of the Asian market. The
following is a financial analysis of the anticipated launch of the 777 product line. The analysis
includes a comprehensive quantitative financial analysis of the projects profitability along with a
qualitative analysis of the strategic importance of the project in the economic and political
context of the time and an assessment of how those key factors can impact the profitability of the
project. Also offered are global recommendations regarding the Boeing 777 project, given the
results of financial analysis and the consideration of other key factors.
2. Profitability measures and the Boeing 777 project
Return on Equity (ROE) is a commonly used profitability measure; according to the case,
maximizing ROE is also a key objective of Boeings CEO Frank Shrontz. ROE is defined as the
ratio between net income and total equity; it is an accounting measure of how well stockholders
fared during the year. By improving the ROE, shareholders wealth would be increased.
Therefore, it appears that Franks goal of improving Boeings ROE is in line with that of
increasing shareholders wealth.
However, accounting book values are significantly impacted by the firms accounting practices,
and what is really relevant for the shareholders are actual cash flows to stockholders. As such,
the key measures from the stockholders wealth perspective are dividends and stock value
(dividend gains and capital gains). In order to really increase shareholders wealth, the
companys equity (the stock) needs to provide a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital
that could be earned elsewhere on the capital market for an investment of comparable risk.
The Boeing 777 Project may contribute to an improvement in net income and ROE if, over time,
total revenues generated by the project exceed total cost and the resulting returns from the
investment are higher than Boeings opportunity cost of capital. In other words, the 777 Project
will improve shareholders wealth as long as the NPV of its cash flows is positive (as long as the
IRR is greater than the opportunity cost of capital).
If Boeings revenue and cost forecast in Exhibit 6 is accurate (1000 planes sold over 10 Years at
$130M per plane), the 777 Project would deliver an IRR of 18.9%; thus, shareholders wealth
would be increased as long as the relevant opportunity cost of capital is <18.9%.
3. Strategic relevance of the Boeing 777 project
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The 777 project is important because it fulfills a market need for a medium to large aircraft
which carries 350-390 passengers over 7,600 miles. With airline traffic expected to increase by
5.2% annually from 2005, this presents a key opportunity for Boeing to grow its commercial
airline business and increase revenue. Boeing estimates that 75% of all aircraft sales will be in
this market segment, and if it maintains a 50% market share, it will sell 1000 units for $130
million each by 2005. Production costs will be high initially but will decrease over time.
Another key aspect of the 777 project is related to the strategic need to respond to the
competitors aggressive plan to launch airliners in the same segment.
3.1 SWOT Analysis:
Strengths:
Boeing is the worlds leader in the manufacturing of commercial aircraft, with an overall market
share of 53%. The market demand for medium to large size commercial aircraft is expected to
increase by 5.2% per year with aggregate sales of $615 billion. The 777 would be the largest and
longest haul twin-bodied jet and the most cost efficient plane ever made. In addition the 777
would fill a market niche and a gap in Boeings current product line. The aircraft meets customer
passenger seat and distance requirements, as it is able to fly up to 14,000 miles and can carry up
to 390 passengers. The aircrafts folding wing tips allows it to fit into smaller slots in airport
terminals. Boeing is looking to release the 777 aircraft in May 1995 to United Airlines, who had
placed a firm order in 1990.
Boeing is able to leverage some technology from the Defense divisions R&D process and apply
it to the commercial aircraft process, which enables them to incorporate fly-by-wire and
advanced flying technology. The savings realized in R&D expenditures could therefore be used
to develop other aircraft at a reduced cost. Boeing hopes that the new design/production
approach would save as much as 20% of the estimated $4 to $5 Million development costs. The
aircraft offers high flexibility and cost efficiencies in designing the interior and incorporates the
involvement of airlines and engineering to ensure that it meets customer preferences and
expectations.
Weaknesses
At the end of 1989, Boeing had $97 billion in outstanding back orders on aircrafts. It would take
Boeing about 3 years to complete these back orders. Other than the order placed by United
Airlines, there have not been any other firm orders to date. Although Boeing would be able to
leverage some of the design specs from its other four lines, the total R&D expenses are high and
would cost $4 to $5 Billion. There would also be large capital expenditures on manufacturing
facilities and training. On average, the project would take 12 to 20 years to break even because
there will be negative cash flows before the company would see a profit on this product line. If
the product line is not successful, Boeing risks substantially depleting its book value of equity.

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Opportunities
The Boeing 777 is in the fastest growing market segment of the commercial airline industry.
Overall, airline traffic is expected to increase at annual rate of 5.2% with a 10.6% increase
specifically in the Asian market. There is an increasing number of existing aircrafts that will be
aging and will present a demand for the replacement of 642 large passenger aircrafts. Boeing has
four aircrafts developed with established production facilities. A derivative of these planes and
the production facilities can be utilized to reduce design costs and common production facility
costs. Overall costs savings can be utilized in the development of the Boeings super jumbo jet.
Threats
Boeings top two customers, Airbus Industrie and McDonnell Douglas, have already announced
the production of their own comparable aircraft, targeting the same niche market as the 777.
They have a sizable head start on orders and their R&D costs are about 50% less than Boeings
777. With lower costs, Airbus Industrie and McDonnell Douglas could drive down the selling
price of the 777 from $130 million to $100 million per aircraft. Due to the impact of the war
between Iraq and Kuwait and the unstable political and economic climate, oil prices have
increased which has resulted in decreased air travel and overall demand. This could have a
negative impact on Boeings stock price, as the demand for aircraft would decrease as airlines
cancel orders. Ultimately, the overall duration of the war and the long range impact on Boeings
stock price due to the demand for commercial aircraft orders remains unknown.
4. Estimating opportunity cost of capital for the Boeing 777 project
The opportunity cost of capital can be estimated using the following formula:
rWACC

E
D
requity rdebt 1 t
V
V

4.1. Key Assumptions for the calculation:

:
The first step in the calculation is to determine the appropriate value for Boeings . For our
calculation we referred to 's from Exhibit 9 and selected the value for Boeing calculated in
comparison to the S&P 500 Index for the previous 12 months ( = 1.37). The rationale for our
selection is that Boeing is listed in the S&P 500 and the index represents a close group of peers
for Boeing primarily listing US large cap companies as Boeing. We have chosen the 12 months
considering that a twelve months period is a good reflection of current market conditions. We
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considered that the longer 58 month range would provide an outdated picture of market
conditions while the short term 60 day period would be strongly biased by short term market
fluctuations and would be significantly affected by the noise derived from those fluctuations.
Risk free rate:
The risk free rate used was 8.82 percent this rate was chosen because in October 1990, the yield
on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds was 8.82 percent and those bonds are considered
risk free investments.
Market Risk Premium
Market risk premium used was 5.4% percent as suggested in the case and based on the 64 year
geometric average equity-market risk premium.
4.2. WACC calculation:
In order to calculate the s of the two main divisions of Boeing, we first need to determine the
for one division. In Exhibit 9, we have been given the s for three peer firms that are mainly in
the defense industry1 (Grumman, Northrop and Lockheed). From the information given for the
S&P 500 12 month comparative s, and given Market-value debt/equity ratios for the firms, we
can calculate the unlevered 's for each company using the following equation:

unlevered

levered
debt
1 (1 - t)
equity

The Average s for the three pure play defense aviation companies is Avg = 0.372 (see
attachment I).
From there, we can use our newly calculated industry average for the defense aviation industry
to calculate the levered for Boeings defense division using the following equation:

debt
0.372 1 (1 - 0.34) 0.018 0.376
defense unlevered 1 (1 - t)
equity

The result for levered for Boeings defense division is 0.376 (see attachment I)
The total firm levered for Boeing is comprised of a weighted sum of the two levered of each of its
two divisions:
for MD was not used because of the larger proportion of civil aircraft business compared to
the other three companies (exhibit 9)
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Boeing % defense defense % commercial commercial

We can calculate for Boeings commercial division by resolving the equation for commercial :

commercial = 1.719
From this we can calculate the rate of return on equity for the commercial division, using the
following equation:
requity r free (rmarket - r free ) commercial 0.0882 (0.054) 1.719 18.10%

To estimate rdebt, which is essentially the cost of capital from the debt portion of Boeings capital
structure, we can use market rates of Boeings corporate bonds. Given that Boeings long-term
debt consist entirely of two bond issues (Exhibit 2), we can calculated a weighted average of the
market rate these two issues to arrive at a combined rdebt as follows:

rdebt

Vbond1
V
234.5
37
rbond1 bond2 rbond 2
0.0973
0.0931 9.67%
Vbond 1 2
Vbond 1 2
234.5 37
234.5 37

The final step in the calculation is to now plug the values for r debt, requity and the relative equity
and debt proportions:
rWACC

E
D
14896.76
271.5
requity rdebt 1 t
18.10%
9.67% 1 0.34 17.89%
V
V
14896.76 271.5
14896.76 271.5

The final result for the opportunity cost of capital is:

rWACC = 17.89 %

4.2.1. Explanation of Capital-structure weights

To calculate the unlevered s for Boeings the three peer firms operating mainly in the defense
industry, which we used as proxies for Boeings defense division, we used their respective capital
structures. This provides an insight of what their s would be if their operations were purely
financed through equity.
To calculate Boeings commercial divisions we now unlever those s applying Boeings own
capital structure, this is because we assume Boeing would finance operations of its commercial
division using that proportion of debt and equity.

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4.2.2. Explanation of WACC:

WACC reflects the relative weighted costs of different sources of capital. From the given
capital-structure weights, the rates for debt and equity calculated above, and the given marginal
tax rate, we can now calculate Boeings Weighted Average Cost of Capital for Commercial
Division:
rWACC

E
D
requity rdebt 1 t = 17.894%
V
V

4.3 Potential long-term & short-term impacts of economic climate and impending war
Given the context that the launch of the Boeing 777 is coming on the eve of war, conceivably the
assumptions shown above in the calculation of the total for the firm may change. As shown
above, total for the firm is given as a weighted sum of the 's for each division (commercial
and defense). If the demand for defense products increases with the war, perhaps the relative
weighting of the defense divisions should likewise increase. The percent weighting used
above was taken from given information of the relative percent of revenues generated by each
division. As the relative percent of revenue changes in each division, likewise the weighting of
the divisions s will also change.
As explained in the given case information, regarding Boeings commercial aircraft division,
growth in demand in the commercial airline industry is a function of increases in passenger air
traffic, which itself is a function of overall economic growth. The two form a direct relationship,
such that as the economy grows, so does passenger air traffic, and therefore demand for
commercial aircraft also grows. Any decline or stagnation in economic growth results in a
corresponding decline or stagnation in passenger air traffic, and therefore demand for
commercial aircraft. Regarding Boeings defense division, increased demand for defense aircraft
leads to growth in the defense division. Although speculative in nature, it is probable from past
precedent that the impending war will cause growth in both of Boeings major divisions
(commercial and defense). Regarding commercial, war often leads to a general period of
economic growth. Increased government spending is a large driver of this temporary growth, and
specifically relevant to Boeing is increased government spending for defense aircraft. Therefore,
revenues in Boeings defense division will likely increase leading to growth. The general period
of economic growth precipitated by war will likely cause an increase in passenger air travel,
given the direct relationship already discussed herein. Therefore, the likely impact of war will be
growth in the commercial division, as well. Both of these scenarios show the potential impact of
war and general economic prognosis on demand in the commercial and defense divisions.
However, short-term impacts will be potentially quite opposite. As per the case, the recent
events in Kuwait had led to an increase in fuel prices. This conceivable could cause increased
expenses for airline service providers, and may translate into direct price increases. These
increased expenses and corresponding price increases to consumers will likely lead to a
temporary dip in passenger air traffic, and therefore a corresponding contraction of demand for
products in Boeings commercial division. However, as the Boeing 777 launch is slated as a 35
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year project, the long-term impacts of general economic growth and the impact of this impending
war are likely more relevant than the short-term impact of escalated fuel costs.
5. Assessment of the Boeing 777 project based on the estimated WAAC
5.1 Revenue/cost scenarios & the project profitability Sensitivity analysis
In order to assess the potential impact relevant scenarios to be considered are those that impact
the project overall cash in- and out-flows by either impacting the project revenue (Sales volumes
or price) or by impacting the project expenditures (e.g. R&D and SG&A expenses).
Base Scenario (Boeings assumptions)
Given the information in the case, we can see that Boeings analysts are currently projecting a
project IRR of 18.9% (Exhibit 7, p. 203). This IRR value aligns with their assumed 1000 Unit
sales volume, and $130M Unit Price. From the information given in Exhibit 6, Boeing has a
historical ratio of GS&A expense-to-sales ratio of about 4% (historical range 2-5%). Given also
in Exhibit 6 is an estimated 3% ratio of R&D expense-to-sales. Using these ratios, the IRR is
18.9% as seen in Exhibit 7s Sensitivity Analysis table. Given the projects WACC calculated
above as 17.89%, IRR > WACC in the expected case. Therefore if Boeings sales and cost
assumptions are accurate the project is economically attractive.
We can see that these 4 variables, Sales Volume, Sales Price, R&D expense-to-sales ratio, and
GS&A expense-to-sales ratios all impact the forecasting model for the project returns.
To examine the potential downside/upside ranges for variations in these assumptions, we can use
Exhibit 7 to find the IRRs for the extreme hi-/lo-values to get a sense of the modeling sensitivity
to fluctuations in different assumptions.
First, regarding Revenue Assumptions of Sales Price and Sales Volume, we can calculate the
range of IRRs resulting from fluctuation in this metric (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 - Sensitivity Analysis: Revenue Assumptions
Extreme
Low

Expected

Sales Volume
(Units)

700

1000

1200

Sales Price
($ Millions)

$100

$130

$130

Extreme High

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IRR

13.9%

18.9%

20.6%

Regarding Expenditure Assumptions of % R&D Expense/Sales and %GS&A/Sales, we can

calculate the range of potential impact on IRR in the Sensitivity Analysis shown in table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Expenditure Assumptions

Extreme Low Expected

Extreme
High

% GS&A/Sales

% R&D/Sales

13.5%

18.9%

23.5%

IRR

Given the exposition of hi-/lo- scenarios above, we can see that the model is sensitive to
fluctuations in the assumptions used. Analyzing these Key Assumptions in consideration of
external Real World Forces shows us that there are a few scenarios of special significance to
potential outcomes.
Pessimistic Scenarios
One pessimistic scenario calculated assumes that, due to competition from Airbus and
McDonnell/Douglas in the mid-to-large passenger aircraft segment, pricing for Boeings 777
may be forced downward to $100M from the baseline assumption of $130M. From a modeling
of this scenario, for a given $100M Sales price and using Boeings current baseline assumption
of 1000 sales units, we arrive at an IRR of 16.1% Under this scenario, and considering our
estimated WACC the project would not be economically attractive. Clearly the impact of
competition on price will affect IRR and the overall project profitability.
In another significant scenario, analyst estimation of economic decline may force unit sales
downward to 700 versus the baseline assumption of 1000. From modeling this scenario with 700
assumed sales units and the baseline assumption of $130M sales price, we arrive at an IRR of
16.3%. Again also under this scenario, and considering our estimated WACC the project
would not be economically attractive
Optimistic Scenario
Another factor that could impact scenarios is Boeings assertion that it can reduce total R&D
Investment by 20% by use of the current engineering approach (p.203). Boeing expects to
leverage its knowledge and expertise in the defense division to reduce ongoing R&D
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Expenditures. The calculations both for baseline as well as hi- lo- cases in the sensitivity analysis
above do not reflect this projected reduction. Therefore, should Boeing actually realize a
reduction in R&D expense, the resulting net cash flows would increase, and IRR would also
increase above all values shown above. To illustrate this potential optimistic scenario, we must
first quantify this projected reduced R&D expense. R&D Expense is expressed as a percentage
of sales per Exhibit 7. Therefore, we can quantify the 20% reduction in ongoing R&D expense as
follows:
20% Reduction = 3% R&D Expense/Sales at Baseline 20%*(3% R&D Expense/Sales)
= 2.6% R&D Expense/Sales
From Exhibit 7, we can see that the assumptions for %R&D Expense/Sales and for
%GS&A/Sales are show in 1% increments. At the baseline assumption of %GS&A = 4%, we can
see that for every 1% increase in % R&D Expense/Sales, IRR increases by approximately 1%.
Therefore we can infer that at 2.6% R&D Expense/Sales, IRR will be approximately 19.5%

5.2. Limitations of discounted cash flow analysis

Discounted cash flow analysis has limitations. Modeling of cash flow is a static model. It
assumes you will proceed with the very assumptions used on day 1 for the entire projected length
of the project. In reality, this is hardly ever the case. Often, you will reassess and potentially
vary your investments and expenditures over the course of the project. Likewise, DCF ignores
several factors that resist financial modeling, for example external threats and the competitive
landscape, the relationship or interaction between one part of the business and another, and
sometimes the impact of organizational learning and a reduction in expenses that comes from
improvements in efficiency over time. Specifically in this case, the cash flow analysis
assumptions were calculated and utilized above ignoring Boeings assertion that it will reduce
total R&D expense by 20% over the project, and it also ignored sunk costs, which were R&D
expenditures prior to October 1990.
6. Recommendation for Boeings CEO Frank Shontz
Innovation and investment in innovation are the keys to success for any corporation. Therefore
we suggest that Boeings CEO Frank Shontz should continue to innovate and invest in new
projects to remain competitive and successful. Boeings current fleet of aircrafts is ageing and
Boeing needs to update its fleet to compete successfully with Airbus.
Finally, Shontz also needs to decide which investment is correct for its strategic goals. The data
and calculations done above suggest that the 777 project is a perfect opportunity for Boeing to
update in ageing fleet and take advantage of prevailing market conditions. The Boeing 777 also
fits a gap in terms of range and passenger capacity which Boeing is currently lacking.
The IRRs for the Boeing 777 project range from 13.6% in a pessimistic case to a potential
upside of 23.6%. Given that the discount rate ranges from 10% to 20%, we can see that the
project performance IRR exceeds the baseline discount rates (representing the market return
rate). Therefore, quantitatively, the data supports the strategic advantages outlined above for the
investment in the Boeing 777 launch.
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Attachment I - Cost of capital calculations

Grunman
0.87
0.73
1.756
0.34
2.15896
0.338

% Revenues from Defense

S&P 500 12 month Levered
Market-Value D/E
Tax Rate
1+ (1-T)* D/E
Unlevered Defense division
Average for Defense for all
3 Defense Companies

0.372

Boeing Market-Value D/E

Levered Defense for Boeing

0.018
0.376

Total Boeing=
Therefore Commercial =
'=

r equity =
r equity =

Northrop
0.89
0.72
1.288
0.34
1.85008
0.389

Lockheed
0.85
0.69
1.182
0.34
1.78012
0.388

(% defense * Defense ) + (% Commercial * Commercial)

( Total - (% Defense * Defense))/(% commercial)
1.719
Risk free rate + (Market Rate - Risk
Free Rate)* commercial
0.0882 + 0.054*1.719 = 0.18103814

Market Rate - Risk Free rate = Market Premiu

given in case

Rdebt is the weighted average of the interest rates of 2 outstanding bonds issues in
exhibit 2
r debt

0.0967

Market Value of Equity

14896.76

Market Value of Debt

Total Value of Firm

271.5
15168.26

r (wacc) =

(given in footnotes of
Exhibit 2)
(given in footnotes of
Exhibit 2)

0.17894

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Attachment 2: Pessimistic Revenue Assumptions

Attachment 3: Optimistic Expenditure Assumptions

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