Game Theory Applied to Law Enforcement Management

Jacintho Del Vecchio Junior - Military Police of So Paulo

jdelvecchio@policiamilitar.sp.gov.br
delvecchio@usp.br

Motivations & Objectives

The operational level: strategies in crises involving hostages

The proposal of this work is the use of game theory as a resource to law enforcement management, focusing mainly the
efforts on prevention of crimes and deterrence/dissuasion of criminals. My main objectives are: 1) to demonstrate the
compatibility between the criminological contemporary thought and game theory, and 2) to show that governmental decisions on
law enforcement may be supported and improved by game theory.
This task is performed by the insertion of generic game-theoretic models and the study of their respective strategies in typical
scenarios where public security is involved. Two levels of application are exemplified here: first, the strategic level, which refers to
governmental policies adopted in the management of law enforcement; and second, the operational level, related to the
decisions of managers and agents of police in practical circumstances.

Occurrences which involve hostages are circumstances where police officers are seriously compelled to consider the use of force
(even lethal force) in the name of restoring public order. The process of negotiation in occurrences involving hostages must privilege
the best ways to achieve pacific solutions to the conflict and preservation of life, which naturally demands the understanding of the
circumstances and goals that lead the hostage-keepers.
Thus, three structurally similar games are built: the terrorist game, the manic-depressive game and the ordinary criminal game. The
best strategies to achieve police goal (i.e., preservation of life) vary according to the possibilities glimpsed in each case, which are
briefly outlined below, using three models structurally identical, but qualitatively different.

Theoretical background and methodology

Gary Beckers economic approach on crime and punishment shows that economic thought is able to bring to light some
crucial mechanisms of criminal phenomena and to guide public policies which follow from their existence. This approach is
centered into classical microeconomic arguments: the rational behavior of individuals as a way to maximize their own utility, the
scarcity of supplies, the natural equilibria that follow from free decisions, etc. Becker introduces a very interesting marginalist
explanation of the genesis and motivations of crimes, as well as important considerations concerning public policies that may
derive from them.
Considering that, the principles assumed by the economic theory of crime are, evidently, very close to those required by game
theory. This scenario allows considering that game theory may be taken, I think, as a kind of useful derivation of Beckers original
criminological approach, which can even offer much more practical results than the simple prescriptions that constitute the main
contributions of Beckers work.
The methodology employed in the construction of structures of games follows the usual standards of game theory (in what
respects the types of games, their representations and strategies), but always assuming a consistent set of factual
presuppositions and a satisfactory level of empirical corroboration, in order to preserve its factual relevance, no matter its strong
hypothetical nature.

The strategic level: modeling the market of drugs

Drug trafficking is focused in the terms of the market that it feeds. Criminal organizations are conceived in this scenario as
economic agents who take into account risk and profitability of their actions. Police forces, in turn, maximize their utility with the
control of drug dealing due to two main reasons: first, all relevant drug traffic is directly related to some web of organized crime;
second, Illicit drug use is closely linked to crime, in various ways.
The study of the best strategies to combat drug dealing (i.e., the priority given to investment on prevention or deterrence)
takes into account three games, which are called 1) the narcos siege game; 2) the potential consumer game; and 3) the game of
drug market.

The terrorist game may be expressed extensively, as seen in figure 2. The game has three players: terrorist, police and chance. The
game involves a hypothetical terrorist with suicidal behavior, to whom staying alive is important until the consummation of his task.
Thus, his negative payoff is just the outcome of the event without death.
As one of the main goals of terrorists is to give visibility to their purposes and convictions, they normally intend to delay the
resolution of the crisis as much as possible, and so the negotiation tends to mere procrastination. Once identified these conditions,
polices attempts to negotiate must seek for providing a better understanding of the scenario, by means of obtaining information that
may dissuade the terrorist, or creating a favorable condition for tactical invasion or sniper shooting.
Figure 2 The game of terrorist

The narcos siege game is a perfect information and zero-sum game. The current state of the market is based on empirical data
of Brazils Southeast, where some regions indicate 3,7% of the population between 12 and 65 years old as regular consumers of
cocaine. This average is taken also as the reference of the current payoffs and, from the point of view of police forces, the
reference of a low level of prevention and repression of drug trafficking. Thus, considering as valid the hypothesis coeteris
paribus, the actual level L expressed in yellow at the table below is conceived as:
=

(1)

Where:
L: percentage of cocaine users among potential users;
c: constant coefficient (invariable in function of state actions);
p: preventive actions; and
r: repressive actions.
Hypothetically, one shall consider a variation of 10% to every initiative of the state or of organized crime in order to maximize
their respective payoffs. For the "high" levels of state repression and prevention, it is considered a variation of 20%. The variation
of L is then obtained by:

= =

()

Then, the game may be represented by the following normal-form game. The green ordered pair indicates the strict
dominance, the weak dominance and Nash equilibrium, which have coincident values in this game:
The narcos siege game
Players
and Strategies

State

Organized Crime
abandon

reduce

maintain

increase

ignore

(100; 0)

(96; 4)

(95,56; 4,44)

(95,12; 4,88)

low level of prevention

(100; 0)

(96,34; 3,66)

(95,93; 4,07)

(95,52; 4,48)

high level of prevention

(100; 0)

(96,67; 3,33)

(96,30; 3,70)

(95,93; 4,07)

low level of repression

(100; 0)

(96,34; 3,66)

(95,93; 4,07)

(95,52; 4,48)

high level of repression

(100; 0)

(96,67; 3,33)

(96,30; 3,70)

(95,93; 4,07)

low level of prev./rep.

(100; 0)

(96,67; 3,33)

(96,30; 3,70)

(95,93; 4,07)

low prevention/high repression

(100; 0)

(97; 3)

(96,67; 3,33)

(96,34; 3,66)

high prevention/low repression

(100; 0)

(97; 3)

(96,67; 3,33)

(96,34; 3,66)

high level of prev./rep.

(100; 0)

(97,34; 2,66)

(97,04; 2,96)

(96,74; 3,26)

Backward induction should then be performed, putting in the background the alternative "negotiating", because the recurring
character of this game tends to increase, in the long run, the terrorists payoff. Considering that, the tactical employment of assault
troop or the sniper shot may be the only options to raise the polices payoff and minimize the deceases, which consists into a maxmin
strategy.
The probabilistic analysis of each payoff obviously depends on several factors, such as technical preparation of the troop, the
tactical choices, the real conditions to perform a sniper shot, and even the positions of the terrorist and the hostage in the scenario.
However, positive outcomes to police are quite improbable, due to the extremely unfavorable design of the game.
The manic-depressive game is partially described here. Figure 3 represents the game in the obsessive phase. Despite the violent
behavior, the hostage-keeper considers his life as important. So, the gain of time is crucial in order to make clear the best options to
the manic. Negotiation is also important because the capability of reaction of the manic-depressive tends to decrease with depression,
and time runs in favor of police to a better solution to the crisis.
Thus, in both scenarios (i.e., the obsessive and the depressive phases), the best payoffs available to the manic-depressive are
concentrated in surrender and release the hostage. However, due to his mental fragility, one cannot expect a perfect rational attitude.
One should therefore seriously consider applying the trembling hands and the regret strategies.
Figure 3 The manic-depressive game obsessive phase

Thus, the most appropriate strategies are evidenced: organized crime shall attempt to increase its potential market, while the
State shall implement the highest levels of prevention and repression, considering a constant level of resources and risks.
From the standpoint of the potential consumer, the player is always the same, but his preferences are altered in accordance
with sequential choices made:
Figure 1 The potential consumer game

The ordinary criminal game allows a simpler and more direct approach on game theory, since there is a confluence of interests of
the hostage-keeper and the police: both seek to solve the crisis, and the negotiation clearly tends to releasing the hostage, if well
conducted. In the case of the ordinary criminal, continuous negotiation and the elapsed time contribute to a pacific solution to the
crisis, considering that they promote a more lucid understanding of criminals better options.
Thus, unlike the terrorist game (in which negotiation has very narrow limits) or manic-depressive game (where one simply cannot
expect a solution to the problem relying on the rationality involved in their choices), the game that involves the ordinary criminal
presumably offers more positive payoffs to police, considering that the rational decision of the criminal is expectable, when he realizes,
for instance, that the arrest for theft or robbery is much more desirable than the arrest for murder, and therefore it becomes very
important to preserve the lives of hostages and surrender peacefully. Nash equilibrium is a useful strategy under this perspective.

John, a hypothetical player, is tempted to try cocaine. The decisions made today will have consequences for the next days.
"John today" is taken, then, as a different player from "John tomorrow," different from "John the day after tomorrow", and so on.
In this particular case, the trend is to repeat the former behavior, corroborating previous choices. Therefore, John tends to
decrease his risk of becoming dependent if he gradually postpones the decision of cocaine first experiment.

The game of drug market is also a zero-sum game with perfect information, but differs essentially from the narcos siege game
considering the strategies to be adopted. Thats because 1) prevention is far from being efficient when the drug market is
installed (due to the consonance of objectives of dealers and consumers), and only the actions of repression shall be considered
as really relevant; 2) the game of drug market is more stable that the siege game, due to the inelasticity of demand in function of
price (in the case of more potent drugs, like cocaine, crack and heroine), or the risk involved, from the point of view of consumers
(something that tends to reduce the costs and risks of drug dealers).
Thus, assuming the previous premises and developing a similar reasoning as that in the narcos siege game, the results
indicate that the dominant strategy of criminals is the expansion of their activities. Polices dominant strategy, in turn, excludes
only the act of ignoring the criminal activities. Then, considering the costs involved in the activity of repression, from the point of
view of the police, the game of the drug market indicates that the best strategy is the low level of enforcement activities.
The combination of these three games (the narcos siege game, the potential consumers game and the drug market game)
indicates that, as a general rule of government policies, the investment in prevention of drug dealing shall be more efficient than
the actions of deterrence available to police forces.

Preliminary conclusions and next steps

The models of game theory are theoretical resources able to improve the methods of decision and analysis of police managers in what
respects real problems. Due to this fact, it can be a good way to search for better results of efficiency concerning the policies related to
public security, above all considering the fragility and chronic lack of systematicity of some decision procedures in law enforcement
management, sometimes based solely on trial and error processes.
The next steps of the research involve mainly: 1) the application of game theoretic models in particular cases (i. e., real circumstances),
in order to verify the levels of empirical corroboration that may be expected; 2) turn game theory into an usual method of crime
analysis and strategic planning in the Military Police of the State of So Paulo; and 3) if the previous steps become successful, the
method may be hereafter consolidated as a useful theoretic resource to law enforcement management.

Main Bibliographic references

BECKER, G. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, v. 76, n. 2, p. 169-217, 1968.
DIXIT, A.; SKEATH, S. Games of Strategy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004.
DUARTE, P.; STEMPLIUK, V.; BARROSO, L. (Org.). Relatrio brasileiro sobre drogas. Braslia: SENAD, 2009.
GAMBIT. Version 0.2007.12.04. The Gambit Project. Available at <http://www.gambit-roject.org/doc/index.html#>.
SHOHAM, Y.; LEYTON-BROWN, K. Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic and logical foundations. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
VECCHI, G.; VAN HASSELT, V.; ROMANO, S. Crisis (hostage) negotiation: current strategies and issues in high-risk conflict resolution.
Aggression and violent behavior, Elsevier, n. 10, p. 533551, 2005.

International Workshop on Game Theory and Economic Applications of the Game Theory Society - 2014