Shane Hensinger Josef Korbel School of International Studies – University of Denver Civil Wars and International Responses – Professor

Tim Sisk

Negotiation and Peacebuilding Analysis – Cyprus

Introduction........................................................................................................................3 Negotiation..........................................................................................................................4
Bargaining Framework............................................................................................................4 Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position........................................................................................6 Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position.....................................................................................7 Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating Positions......................................................9

History of the Negotiating Process..................................................................................10
The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977................................................................................................10 Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks and Subsequent Rounds of Negotiations.............................................................................................................................12

The Annan Plan................................................................................................................15
The European Union..............................................................................................................16 Turkish-Cypriots....................................................................................................................16 Turkey.....................................................................................................................................17 Greek-Cypriots.......................................................................................................................18 The Final Annan Plan (Annan V)..........................................................................................19

The Defeat of the Annan Plan.........................................................................................20
The Way Forward..................................................................................................................22 Peacebuilding in Cyprus........................................................................................................24
Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan.....................................................................................24 Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? – Drawing Down UNFICYP..................................................................26

Conclusion........................................................................................................................26 Appendix...........................................................................................................................28 Works Cited ......................................................................................................................30

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Introduction
In report I will present an analysis of the negotiating strategies of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides in the Cyprus conflict since the Turkish invasion of 1974. I will focus in particular on the negotiation processes involved in the formulation the Annan plan in 2004 and how both sides’ bargaining positions have evolved (or devolved) since negotiations on reunification and a constitutional settlement began after the Turkish invasion in 1974. I will be relying heavily on the processes laid out by Timothy Sisk in “Bargaining with Bullets,” focusing on the prenegotiation and negotiation processes between the two sides and the theoretical concept of “ripeness” as applied to the Cyprus situation after the invasion of Turkey in 1974 and preceding EU accession in 2004, while looking to the applicability of the ripeness concept to current negotiations preceding elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in mid-April 20101.

Finally I will be analyzing the negotiation process for its applicability and inducements towards the building of peace – in particular looking
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Sisk’s work is strongly applicable in the sense that he outlines a powerful case for “Peacemaking with Power” and negotiations leading to the building of effective and durable power-sharing institutions, both of which resonate strongly in the case of Cyprus. Intertwined in Sisk’s recommendations is the issue of bringing peace to warring parties, which is slightly less applicable to Cyprus due to the cessation of intercommunal violence more than ¼ of a century ago. The major issues in Cyprus have morphed from those centered around security in the traditional sense to those centered around the type of consociational model and confidence buildings measures (CBMs) necessary to convince both communities to accept a final agreement.

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at the institutions imagined in the Annan plan. I will offer specific policy recommendations towards the goal of peacebuilding in Cyprus based on the models offered by the Annan plan. In particular I will focus on Sisk’s idea of “sequencing”, but from a constitutional perspective, the various institutions of the Annan plan to different parts of the island, both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, which were more supportive of the Annan plan in the referendum of 2004 in an attempt to demonstrate the potential effectiveness and unity-enhancing role these institutions might play.

Negotiation
Bargaining Framework
The framework within which negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus have been conducted has been set by UN, in particular by a number of UN Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly resolutions. The Secretary-General of the UN has been assigned by the Security Council as a “monitor” of the talks under UNSC Resolution 353. UNSC Resolutions 359, 360, 364, 365 and 367 further established and then strengthened the Secretary-General’s role and that of the UN in the conflict.

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General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) in November 1974 “officially endorsed the preliminary intercommunal talks as the main negotiating model for resolving the Cyprus problem” as well as affirming a number of key points (Michael 46).2 As General Assembly resolutions are declarations without force of international law the UNSC passed Resolution 367 affirming the General Assembly resolution which “established intercommunal talks as the sole legitimate negotiating process and confirmed the Secretary-General as convener and facilitator of this process” (Michael 47).3 The bargaining framework put in place by the UN guaranteed the primacy of the organization and the Secretary-General in negotiations and locked-in the role of intercommunal talks as the sole bargaining framework which would be utilized going forward. By recognizing the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, mandating that all refugees be allowed to return to their homes and urging the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus the UN also endorsed a number of elements in the Greek-Cypriot bargaining position, which
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GA Resolution 3212, in part : 1. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it; 2. Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs; 5. . Considers that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end;

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UNSC Resolution 367: “Requests the Secretary General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good offices and to that end to convene the two parties under new agreed procedures and to place himself personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated (United Nations).

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had the effect of ensuring that the Turkish-Cypriot side would always be operating from a “legitimacy deficit” in the eyes of the international community and would contribute to a perception of the balance of power between the two sides.

Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position
The bargaining position of the two parties directly involved in the Cyprus conflict, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides, was each informed by the events of 1974, when Turkey invaded the island in response to a coup engineered by the junta in Greece. Following this series of events the Greek-Cypriot government, in conjunction with Greece, laid out its positions, which came to be known as “the Athens doctrine” (Michael 39). The doctrine is as follows: 1. The government of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole, legal government of Cyprus 2. Support for a multiregional, bicommunal federation 3. The area comprising Turkish Cyprus should be equivalent to their share of the population or in any case not exceed 25% of the population 4. The right of return of all refugees to their homes and property before the Turkish invasion. 5. The right of property and freedom of movement of the population. 6. The removal of all foreign troops from Cyprus The issue of international recognition of the government of the Republic of Cyprus is extremely important from an analytical 6

framework in looking at the balance of power in the conflict. The Republic of Cyprus’ recognition by the international community as well as its membership in multilateral institutions like the United Nations and (eventually) the European Union has resulted in an asymmetrical balance of power between the two sides (Schiff 390). Looking at the issue while applying Timothy Sisk’s perspective on “fluctuating stalemate” illustrates the fact of the Republic of Cyprus’s international legitimacy, endorsement of three of its bargaining position and its membership in international organizations has resulted in a situation where the Republic of Cyprus is always ascendant against the TurkishCypriot side. This has resulted in a “polarizing condition, perpetuating conflict and not leading to avenues for resolution.” (Sisk 43).

Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position
In sharp contrast to the position of the Greek-Cypriot side the TurkishCypriots regarded the Turkish invasion in 1974 as legal under Turkey’s guarantor powers. Their negotiation conditions reflected this reality and also their belief that the Republic of Cyprus as established under the 1960 constitution was no longer valid. The position of the TurkishCypriot side was in large part an attempt to lock in their gains since 1974 and consisted of the following: 1. The maintenance of the ethnic homogeneity of northern Cyprus. 2. The continuation of the Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus and the role of Turkey as a military guarantor. 7

3. The support for a bicommunal and biregional state. 4. The rejection of a unified or multiregional state as proposed by the Greek-Cypriot side. As mentioned in the sections on the negotiating framework and the Greek-Cypriot position the Turkish bargaining position was affected by a lack of international legitimacy. The Turkish Cypriots operated under a strict international embargo which impacted every area of life in Turkish Cyprus including the ability to travel abroad, to participate in international sports competitions, receive international loans and many other restrictions. None of the Turkish-Cypriot bargaining positions were legitimized by the international community and it received no international backing other than that of the Turkish government. During most of the negotiation phrase leading up to the Annan plan the Turkish-Cypriot side was punished with a number of coercive measures and offered almost no non-coercive ones, a balance of which is necessary “to induce the parties to accept the settlement plan (Sisk 39).

This isolation would negatively affect the psyche of the Turkish-Cypriot side, causing an imbalance in the perception of the symmetry of power between the two sides, and would contribute to a position of defiance on the part of the Turkish-Cypriots which was indirectly responsible for the declaration of independence of the TRNC in 1983.4 Additionally
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I am not endorsing the declaration of independence on the part of the TRNC but I am stating that their isolation and the lack of incentives extended to the Turkish Cypriots caused a hardening of their negotiating position which led to the independence declaration.

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“the Greek Cypriot economic and political embargo, aimed at preventing recognition of the Turkish Cypriot ‘state,’ only compounded the ideology of separateness,” which did not bode well for

peacebuilding efforts during the negotiation process (Michael 42).

Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating Positions
The Turkish and Greek states, as guarantor powers under the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, also had a place at the negotiating table where their positions adhered closely to those of their ethnic kin in Cyprus.

Greece followed the slogan “Cyprus Decides and Greece Follows” while Turkey adopted a paternalistic approach towards the Turkish Cypriot state. The Turkish Republic was heavily involved in the governance and subsidization of the Turkish-Cypriot state from the point of its invasion in 1974 onward.

The US has been characterized as “the most important non-primary player in the dispute (Michael 65).US strategy in the conflict was primarily concerned with keeping Cyprus out of the Soviet orbit and maintaining peace between NATO allies Greece and Turkey. US policy has also been influenced by the role of the politically important Greek-

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American political lobby in the United States. The US, since the failure of the Nimetz proposals in 1978, has tended to play a background role to that of the UNSG.

History of the Negotiating Process
The Cyprus conflict has experienced a lengthy negotiation process composed of multiparty mediation held under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG). These efforts have included representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides and at times the guarantor powers of Turkey & Greece as well as secondary powers like the United States. In this section I will focus on the major negotiating efforts in Cyprus including the talks mediated by UNSG Kurt Waldheim which resulted in high level agreements and then focus on the only agreement to have ever been submitted to both sides in the conflict for ratification – the Annan agreement.

The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977
The “Vienna Talks” held between the two sides under the auspices of the UNSG and the bargaining framework laid out by UNSC Resolution 367 comprised several rounds of negotiations from 1975 – 1977 and collapsed upon the death of Cypriot President Markarios, after which new negotiations took place under different monikers.

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The Vienna talks were plagued by a lack of convergent interests and expectations on all sides. One side would come to the table with a proposal on governance and the other would respond with proposals on territoriality. The UN was hampered by the distrust of the TurkishCypriot side, which was angered at numerous UN resolutions affirming its opponent’s negotiating points and thus couldn’t act as a “powerful peacemaker.” The Greek-Cypriot side had successfully

internationalized the issue and knew it was in an ascendant position vis-à-vis the Turkish side.

While several “High Level agreements” were negotiated over the years of negotiation they all suffered from ambiguity on terms, in particular the use of “bicommunal” as a reference point. There was a point of agreement in 1978 on the issue which was seen as a major concession by the Greek side when it acknowledged that there would be separate control by each community of different parts of the island. This concession could be interpreted as a “ripe” moment.

A ripe moment, as discussed by Sisk, usually occurs during the process of prenegotiation and is “a high-risk strategy, as the opposing party may seize upon a sign of conciliation as weakness and, rather than responding with a reciprocal act of conciliation, may “defect” or escalate in order to take advantage of the perception of weakness”

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(Sisk 46). There was no further concession on the part of the TurkishCypriot side which was symbolic of the lack of a convergence of interests between the two sides that plagued the negotiations during all of their iterations.

Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks and Subsequent Rounds of Negotiations
From an analytical framework on negotiation the following appear as the lead causes of the failure of the Vienna Talks and the subsequent rounds of negotiations leading to the Annan plan. These factors are not listed in any particular order. 1. Asymmetrical balance of power between the two sides leading to a fluctuating stalemate. 2. Lack of credible third-party guarantees. 3. Lack of “ripe moment” (convergent expectations) leading to meaningful concessions from both sides. 4. Failure to employ “peacemaking with power” on behalf of the mediator. The perception of security from each side’s perspective was radically different. Each party also saw its “sphere of power” differently and resented the power of the other, but as time would move on each party’s “sphere” would grow or shrink proportionally to the other and actions such as UN resolutions buttressing the Greek-Cypriot side (which was a deliberate and strategically important attempt by the Republic of Cyprus to “internationalize” the situation) further added to each side’s perception of the balance of power in the situation (Michael

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75). As illustrated in the section on the Greek-Cypriot bargaining position this situation has resulted in an asymmetrical balance of power which led to a fluctuating stalemate and deadlock in

negotiations.

Throughout the history of the Vienna talks and through subsequent rounds of negotiations another critical element was missing – the lack of third-party guarantees necessary to assist both sides in bridging the security dilemma which existed between them. “Credible

enforcement” is a necessary component of a functional peace agreement and in the case of Cyprus neither party was prepared to accept the guarantees the UN offered as “credible.” No additional third-party with the necessary standing amongst the two sides then stepped forward, leaving this critical element unfulfilled.

Talks between the two sides were also hampered by the lack of a “mediator with power,” as Sisk calls it. The United Nations did not have the ability to offer a package of non-coercive and coercive

inducements to both sides. Because the UN was operating under specific UNSC resolutions which had recognized a number of the bargaining positions of the Greek-Cypriots its ability to act as a “powerful peacemaker… with the [ability] to exercise strategic strength in leveraging the parties into peace” was limited by the self-

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imposed conditions under which it operated (Sisk 156). As talks were mandated to be conducted under the auspices of the UN, a body which repeatedly passed resolutions the Turkish-Cypriot side felt were in opposition to their negotiating position, this created a situation where the Turkish-Cypriot side would increasingly come to view the UN as a not a partial mediator but one biased in favor of the Greek-Cypriots. Whether this is true or not is unimportant, for what matters most in the negotiating process are the perceptions of both sides.

All of the factors discussed in this section are critical to the success of any peacemaking effort. The appearance of any one of them is troubling; the appearance of four would make it extremely difficult to achieve meaningful progress in negotiations and are directly

responsible for the failure of the Vienna talks. Because none of them were successfully ameliorated they have also played a role in the failure of subsequent negotiations up to the Annan plan.

Fact Point 1

In 1983, in response to a UNGA assembly which demanded the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from the island, the return of refugees to their homes and which called on all states to assist the government of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise “its full and effective control over the entire territory of Cyprus,” the Turkish-Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). No country other than Turkey recognized the TRNC and today Turkey remains the only country to have done so.

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The Annan Plan
The Annan Plan as submitted to the voters of Cyprus in April of 2004 was a product of prenegotiation and negotiation from 2002 – 2004, but its creation through negotiation was a product of the convergence of a number of different interests of primary and on-primary actors to the Cyprus situation. The plan can be considered the product of a “ripe moment” which was catalyzed by the decision of UNSG Kofi Annan to approach negotiations from a different perspective and attempt to ameliorate the factors discussed earlier which had led to the failure of other negotiation rounds in the past. Specifically Annan would attempt a four-pronged linkage approach to the new round of negotiations (Michael 169). 1. Annan intended to “utilize the membership applications of both Cyprus and Turkey [to the EU] as a catalyst” for settlement/membership. 2. “Enlist the active support of the main external parties to the issue – the United States and Britain.” 3. “Lock in the support of the motherlands – Greece and Turkey.” 4. “Use these pathways to alter the entrenched positions of the two communities.” Another significant factor in the negotiations was the ability of the UNSG to unilaterally impose conditions in any of the areas of the eventual agreement in the event of the two sides to find a path forward. This was unique in that it prevented either party from acting as the role of “spoiler.”

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The European Union
The European Union (EU) began membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus in 1990. This fact was viewed negatively by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership led by longtime President Rauf Denktash, because it once again reinforced their perception of asymmetry in balance of power and the always ascendant status of the Greek-Cypriot side in international legitimacy.

The decision of the European Union in 2002 to drop conditionally as a requirement for Cypriot membership “allowed the Republic of Cyprus to feel free of significant constraints and act upon its own interests in the negotiations” (Schiff 406). “The EU created a sense of crisis of impending sanctions that were directed at a single party – Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots – while Greek Cypriots were under strictly verbal pressure that was unaccompanied by any explicit theme” (Schiff 406). The EU lacked any meaningful ability to act as a “peacemaker with power” and was largely relegated to the sidelines of the negotiations

Turkish-Cypriots
The position of the Turkish-Cypriots had changed from the earlier rounds of negotiations (Vienna) due to a convergence of a number of factors within and outside the TRNC.

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1. Change in internal political dynamics/Mass & elite support for peace - Rauf Denktash’s political position was threatened due to rising economic and political discord within the TRNC. The decades of international isolation imposed on the TRNC had led to a decline in living standards amongst the Turkish-Cypriot population caused inflation and a high emigration rate and there was growing resentment to the influx of settlers from Anatolia and the continuing meddling in the affairs of the TRNC by the Turkish state (see table below). 2. The “win-set” of the TRNC changed between the rounds of negotiations after the Turkish invasion to the beginning of the negotiations on the Annan plan because “the prospect of imminent EU citizenship seemed to represent a better prospect for their future than continuing on with the existing state of affairs” (Schiff 396). 3. Support of Elites - Parliamentary elections in Dec, 2003 brought to power in the TRNC the opposition bloc, led by Mehmet Ali Talat. The new government declared it would “work to achieve a unification agreement, which would ultimately be decided in a referendum (Schiff 397). 4. Changing attitude of external ally/actor (Turkey) – the guarantors, protectors and subsidizers of the TRNC, had changed with the advent of the AKP government (discussed below) The Turkish-Cypriot side appeared motivated by the fact an agreement held “greater benefits… than they would achieve by abrogating negotiations” and returning to the status quo (Sisk 55).
Per capita income in the north and south of Cyprus, 2004 (US$1,000s) 2

Nominal North 8.1 South 19.4 Ratio 42 (north/south as a percentage) Source: World Bank (2006)

World Bank Atlas 7.2 17.6 41

PPP Corrected 14.8 22.3 66

Turkey

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Turkey’s desire to see a settlement achieved in Cyprus was motivated by its own desires to join the European Union and by the fact that the new AKP government, elected in November 2002, saw its own political fortunes as linked to European Union membership, which it knew was highly unlikely in the event a divided Cyprus was admitted to the EU with Turkish troops considered as occupiers in the north.

During negotiation over the Annan plan – through all of its iterations, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan “made it quite clear he would not be tolerating a rejectionist policy on the part of Denktash (Asmussen 7). Denktash was now boxed in – were he to choose to defy Turkey he would have to resign in which case Mehmet Ali Talat would take over as President.

Greek-Cypriots
Contrasting starkly to the changes in the position of the TRNC and Turkey the Greek-Cypriot side felt its position was assured by its guaranteed admission to the European Union regardless of whether a unification agreement was reached or not. Despite knowing its membership was a fait accompli the Greek-Cypriot side came under “considerable pressure from the US, UN, the EU and Greece” to reach a settlement before May 1st (Schiff 399). 18

There also did not exist within the Republic of Cyprus the same groundswell of either mass or grassroots support for negotiations and settlement which existed in the TRNC – which can be attributed to the fact that the populace of the Republic of Cyprus had seen itself as ascendant for a number of years and their assured admission to the European Union was the ultimate guarantee of that ascendancy. The Greek-Cypriot side felt “it could not be worse off than in the case of an agreement which failed to protect its interests” (Schiff 401).

The bargaining position of the Greek-Cypriot side was not motivated by the same combination of external and internal factors that have been shown to be present in the TRNC and Turkey. There existed no convergence of interests within the Republic of Cyprus on negotiation and for settlement.

The Final Annan Plan (Annan V)
The Final Annan plan was a complex and lengthy document with five appendices and nine annexes covering matters ranging from federal government, constitutional law and federal laws, property rights, reconciliation commissions and the “coming into being” of a new state of affairs. For the sake of expediency the focus here will be on the

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constitutional arrangements of the document under the envisioned “United Cyprus Republic” (UCR).

The Annan plan was a model of consociational power sharing. It allowed a minority veto on “matters of importance to the group,” defined proportionality as the basis for governance and allowed for substantial group autonomy (Sisk 57). It defined structures and institutions which would allow for the sequenced return of refugees, guaranteeing that for 19 years the ethnic balance of power in the different sections of Cyprus would not be impacted. It ensured adequate compensation for those who lost land and/or housing and also ensured that the process would not result in expulsions of either side from dwellings they occupied currently (Annan Plan for Cyprus).

The Defeat of the Annan Plan
There was no implementation of the Annan plan because it was defeated in a referendum in April 2004. It was approved by a majority of 64.9% on the Turkish Cypriot side but was defeated resoundingly on the Greek Cypriot side by a majority of 75.8%.

The plan suffered from a number of defects in the eyes of both sides but was supported on the Turkish side by a majority of the political

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establishment and by the consensus of Turkish Cypriots that the plan represented the best deal they were going to get.

The Greek Cypriot side had a different perspective and different realities. A majority of the political establishment (the elites) of the Republic of Cyprus, led by Papadopulous, urged a “No” vote. This judgment was based on the perception amongst the Greek Cypriot population that they had already given up enough (they had, after all, lost over 1/3 of their island to Turkish military occupation for almost 20 years at the time of the vote) and that the agreement in no way represented their ascendant position as a member of the European Union. This attitude can be encapsulated by Papdopoulos’ statement that he “did not receive a State… to deliver a ‘Community’” (Michael 180).

A “ripe moment” requires a convergence of expectations “by all sides” to be successful (Sisk 46). The entry of Cyprus to the EU, the change in the political scene of the TRNC and outside pressure were all seen as a prime motivating factor for all sides which would induce the “ripe moment” necessary to bring the conflict to a conclusion. Sadly this did not take into account the fact that for the Greek Cypriot side there did not exist that “convergence of expectations.” There was certainly a convergence of expectation of every other side – from Turkey, from the

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EU, from the Turkish Cypriots, Greece, the UN and the United States. But the Greek Cypriot side, due to its advantaged bargaining position and guaranteed entry to the EU, never had that moment of convergence critical to creating an inducement to settlement.

In addition the guarantee by the European Union of accession regardless of whether peace was reached on the island or not robbed the EU of the ability to induce a mutually-hurting stalemate. When the European Union dropped conditionality as a condition for Cypriot accession it should have “undertaken the process of socializing the Cypriot political elite to realize the post-nation character of the Union” (Kaymak and Vural 88). In this the EU failed entirely, with most of its initial focus on convincing the Turkish-Cypriot side to pass the plan.
Fact Point 2

Primary reasons for failure of Annan plan in Referendum  Lack of elite support which translated into lack of mass support within the Republic of Cyprus.  Lack of convergence of interests within the Republic of Cyprus.  Failure to use cooperate-reward, defect-punishment approach on the part of the UN or EU in reference to the Republic of Cyprus.

The Way Forward
Peacemaking efforts continue in Cyprus today and are motivated by the fact that a pro-compromise Greek President, Demetris Christofias, was elected in 2008. With the ascendance of Mehmet Ali Talat to the

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presidency of the TRNC in 2005 there could be a convergence of expectations on both sides that was lacking during the negotiation process leading up to the defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. In particular the issue of a lack of support from the elite and masses in The Republic of Cyprus may be impacted by the fact that the head of their state is in support of peacemaking efforts.

Without an agreement soon, before new presidential election in the TRNC in April 2010, the prospects for peace look grim in Cyprus. The political situation in the TRNC doesn’t look positive for the re-election of pro-Annan agreement president Talat. There exists today a dangerous situation on Cyprus where both sides have become increasingly accepting of partition – what can be referred to as the “Taiwanization” of Cyprus. Especially alarming is the fact that it is “the youngest segments of both communities that would vote “no” in the largest numbers in any referendum on the UN-mediated settlement plan: (ICG 7). The failure of the global community to live up to its promises in regards to the TRNC – the promise of aid and additional recognition if they passed the Annan plan, has been blocked in many cases by the intransigence of the Republic of Cyprus. This has led to a lessening of support from within both the elites and larger public in the TRNC and jeopardized the future passage of any peace plan in the north of the island.

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Peacebuilding in Cyprus
Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan

Varosha

Greek-Cypriot Famagusta

In the wake of the failure of the Annan plan there exists a chance to work towards peacebuilding efforts in the hopes of creating institutions spanning both sides of the island. The Annan plan was far more heavily supported in the enclaved Famagusta area of the Republic of Cyprus than in any other district (see map above). This seems to be because “individuals in this district would have been strongly and directly affected by the Annan Plan, given that within three months they would

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have regained the capital city of their district, and the whole region would have been upgraded economically, socially and culturally” (Lordos 24).

Negotiators could look to the results of the 2004 referendum on a district by district basis and seek to apply a set of the institutions on a local level in the Famagusta district as well as an equally-populated, adjacent portion of the TRNC which had supported the agreement as well. This experiment could act as a “test tube” to implement, under strict observation by both parties, certain portions of the agreement, such as a jointly-elected district/city government and the return of Varosha, or part of Varosha to the control of those who fled the area in 1974, which could then operate under joint-administration as a condition of its return. These CBMs could demonstrate (hopefully) the effectiveness and relevance to daily life of the Annan plan and contribute to acceptance of the plan on both sides.

The residents of the Famagusta district saw tangible benefits from the passage of the Annan plan and accordingly they supported it in larger numbers than anywhere else. This same situation applied in the TRNC as well. The key then is to convince the rest of the elites and the masses of the Greek Cypriot side of the tangible benefits from a new

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peace agreement. Only by doing so will any new agreement receive approval on both sides of the divided island.

Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? – Drawing Down UNFICYP
The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus has been in place since 1964 and tasked with the maintenance of its current functions since 1974. It currently consists of 1,052 personnel of which 941 are peacekeeping troops. It is routinely reauthorized every six months by the UNSC and currently is budgeted for $54.41 million on a yearly basis – of that amount 1/3 is paid by Cyprus and $6 million by Greece (UNFICYP).

There exists on Cyprus today a situation which no longer requires a UN peacekeeping force at the level UNFICYP maintains. The presence of the troops is no longer required to maintain peace but are acting to enforce the situation of partition on the island which risks becoming permanent the longer the Greek-Cypriot public feels it is not in its interest to approve a solution to the Cyprus problem. The force can be reduced in a gradual manner in order to not upset the security situation but which may act as a catalyst in inducing a ripe moment in negotiations.

Conclusion
If Cyprus at one point “lay at a crossroads,” those crossroads would have been reached in 2004 when the Annan plan laid out a future of

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federalism and unification or a future of partition. Cyprus today has moved from the crossroads of a choice of unification under a federalist approach to a growing acceptance of partition and separate status for both sides of the island – with the Greek Cypriots enjoying the fruits of international recognition and EU membership while the Turkish side continues to struggle under an internationally-recognized travel and trade embargo.

Current peace talks benefit from the fact that both sides now are represented by elites who support negotiation. This could translate into greater appeal to the larger portion of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in particular the Greek-Cypriot side – which saw a combination of elite and mass opposition to the agreement in the last referendum. This may be the last chance for peace for many years to come and it requires an intense dedication on both parts to sell the idea of peace and not partition, with real and tangible benefits, to both sides of the island.

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Appendix
1. Chronology of Key Events 1960 – Cyprus gains independence from Britain. 1963 – Outbreak of violence between the two communities. 1974 – De facto division of the island into two seats. 1977, 1979 – Signing of the “High Level Agreements.” 1983 – Declaration of the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by Rauf Denktash. 1998 – The Republic of Cyprus begins negotiations for accession into the UN. 1999 – Helsinki Summit: the EU decided that the resolution of the Cyprus conflict is not a preliminary condition for Cyprus’ entry into the EU in May 2004. November 2002 – Publication of the first version of the Annan plan. March 2003 – Hague Summit – failure of the parties discussions of the Annan Plan. Annan announces termination of his efforts. December 2003 – Papadopoulos sends a letter to the UN Secretary General requesting him to propose a new initiative. Late January – Early February 2004 – Turkish PM, Erdogan, meets with the UN Secretary General and US President Bush, and expresses Turkey’s willingness to respond positively to the Annan initiative. February 4, 2004 – Kofi Annan sends a letter to the leaders of both Cypriot communities, inviting them to New York to discuss a timetable for the resolution of the conflict. February 10–13, 2004 – The leaders meet in New York February 13, 2004 – The leaders agree to officially renew negotiations February 19-March 31, 2004 – The parties hold two rounds of talks in Nicosia and Birkenstock, Switzerland but fail to reach any new agreement. Annan uses his authority as an arbitrator and submits the proposal for referendum. April 24, 2004 – Greek Cypriots reject the Annan Plan with a 75.8% majority while a majority (64.9%) of the Turkish Cypriots approve the Plan. May 1, 2004 – Cyprus, represented by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, joins the European Union. 2006 – Talks restart between chief negotiators for late Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot president Mehmet Ali Talat.

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December 2006 – European Council suspends eight of the chapters Turkey was negotiating for possible accession to the UN under pressure from Cypriot government February 2008 – New Greek Cypriot president, Demetris Christofias, elected who is not associated with ethnic nationalism or the “No” campaign on the Annan referendum. March 2008 – Christofias and Talat meet and agree to new round of UN talks. April 2008 – New crossing point in Nicosia opened. May 2008 – Parameters agreed upon by two presidents – federation of two “constituent states” and “a single international personality.” July 2008 – Agreement reached on “single sovereignty and citizenship – a total of 22 technical agreements signed. September 2008 – Negotiations continue Source: Amira Schiff and the International Crisis Group

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Works Cited
Anastasiou, Harry. The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, NY. Print. "The Annan Plan - The Text of the Plan." THE ANNAN PLAN FOR CYPRUS. United Nations, 6 Apr. 2004. Web. 1 Mar. 2010. <http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/>. Asmussen, Jan. Cyprus after the Failure of the Annan-plan. Rep. no. 11. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 2004. Print. Cyprus: Reunification or Partition. Rep. Europe Report 201 ed. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2009. Print. Global. World Bank. Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy. By Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Harvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003. Print. Kaymack, Erol, and Yucel Vural. "Intra-communal Dynamics: European Union Discourses among Turkish-Cypriot Political Actors before and after the Failed Referenda." Cyprus a Conflict at the Crossroads. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2009. 84-101. Print. Lordos, Alexandros. "Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Surverybased Profile Analysis of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot

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Refernda Voters." Cyprus: a Conflict at the Crossroads. Vol. 1. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2009. 17-47. Print. Michael, Micha?lis S. Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print. Schiff, Amira. "Pre-negotiation and Its Limits in Etho-National Conflicts: A Systemetic Analysis of Process and Outcomes in the Cyprus Negotiations." International Negotiation 13 (2008): 387-412. Print. Sisk, Timothy D. International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets. London: Routledge, 2009. Print. "UNFICYP Facts and Figures." UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Web. 2 Mar. 2010. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/>.

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