TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
HELD: Under the Corporation Code, Naguait is liable bec: (1) he actively managed the business; (2) there was evidence that CFTI obtained reasonably adequate insurance; and (3) there was a corporate tort in this case. Our jurisprudence is wanting to the definite scope of “corporate tort.” Essentially, “tort” consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, it is a breach of legal duty.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 1

CLASS NOTES

Torts: not defined in the NCC nor in any Philippine Law BUT many scattered provisions on tortuous acts -usually defines as: (1) what it is not; (2) remedies granted; (3) social/public policy protected Damages: much longer treatment in the NCC; more practical importance on damages Practical Legal Relevance: vehicular accidents Intentional tort: not a delict (any act or omission punishable by law) Why? Intentional act causing damage to another, not a crime Act: intentional, voluntary -damage -may or may not violate a crime Negligence: any act or omission causing damage to another but w/o intent (only difference w/intentional tort) Strict liability: it doesn’t matter if you’re negligent or if you intended it as long as sets of circumstances make you liable

*Negligence: involves voluntary acts or omissions which result in injury to others, without intending to cause the same -actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or omissions *Strict Liability: where the person is made liable independent of fault or negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts DE LEON (pp. 1-3) Tort: common law expression -used in French to mean “wrong”, derived from Latin “tortus” meaning twisted, as if to say tortuous conduct is twisted conduct or conduct that departs from the existing norm - a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is subject to civil liability -fundamental concept of tort: wrongful act or omission + resulting in breach of a private legal duty (distinguished from a mere breach of contractual duty) + damage from said breach of duty (of such character as to afford a right of redress at law in favor of the injured party against the wrongdoer) Note (explained definition in Naguiat vs. NLRC): the term “tort” used by SC has same meaning as tort in common law jurisdictions, as it was used in cases involving QD and delicts Tortious act: a wrongful act -commission or omission of duty of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation (74 Am. Jur. 2d 620) Essence of tort: defendant’s potential for civil liability to the victim for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victim’s potential fro compensation or other relief

CLASS NOTES

CORPORATE TORT: in regards to liability of President of CFTI: no definition of corporate tort 2 definitions: long and short (legal basis) Short definition: from a law dictionary What’s wrong with the definition in Naguiat? TOO BROAD. Any breach of legal duty becomes a tort (so it would include crimes, QD, breach of contract) …very sloppy definition but it’s the only case that defines Tort Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine the liability of the officers (Naguiat) so is it part of the ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFTI liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to establish liability through tort AQUINO (pp. 1-2) Tort: taken directly from the French and is derivation of the Latin word “torquere” meaning “to twist” -common law: an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages -an act or omission producing an injury to another, without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident (other definitions not discussed) -no universal formula for torts liability -includes intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability *Intentional tort: includes conduct where the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act or believes the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. -includes assault, batter, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy and interference of property

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Definitions 1. Tort and Quasi-delict a. Tort Naguiat v NLRC
FACTS: Naguiat is the president and a stockholder of Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFT). Due to the phase-out of the US bases in the country, Clark Air Base was closed and the taxi drivers of CFTI were separated from service. The drivers filed a complaint for the payment of sep. pay due to the termination/phase-out. NLRC held Naguiat and the company solidarily liable for the payment of sep. pay. ISSUE: WON Naguait should be held solidarily liable with CFTI. YES.

Art. 2176, NCC Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

b. Quasi-delict

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Elcano v Hill
FACTS: In criminal case where Reginald Hill was charged with the killing of Agapito Elcano, the former was acquitted for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” The deceased’s parents thereafter sued Reginald and his father for dmages. CFI dismissed the civil cases on the ground of res judicata. ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages is barred by Hill’s acquittal in the crim case. NO. HELD: Hill’s acquittal in the crim case has not extinguished his liability for QD, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant civil action. Art. 2176 where it refers to “fault or negligence,” covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 2

CLASS NOTES

A 2176 explanation: First sentence refers to ALL CIVIL LIABILITIES. Second sentence limits QD.

Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction bet. Damage to persons and damage to property.

Barredo v Garcia
FACTS: A Head-on collision between a taxi and carretela resulted in the death of a 16-yr old boy who was a passenger of the carretela. The taxi driver was convicted in a crim case but the right to file a sep civil action was reserved. The parents of the boy sued Barredo, the driver’s employer for damages. Barredo contends that under the RPC, his liability is only subsidiary, hence he cannot be held liable as no civil action has been filed against the driver. ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs, may bring this separate civil action against Barredo, making him primarily liable as employer under the CC. YES. HELD: The same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability arising from a crim under the RPC or create an action for quasi-delict under the CC. Thus, there were 2 liabilities of Barredo: a subsidiary one arising from the driver’s crim negligence nd a primary one as employer under the CC. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. They were acting within their rights in doing so.

CLASS NOTES

Relevance: clarified that QD includes damage to property (same highlight in reviewer) Problem: A2191(2) gave example where QD and damage to property [liability of proprietors of excessive smoke]; but this is a Tort on STRICT LIABILITY, not QD!

Baksh v CA
FACTS: Baksh was sued for damages for his breach of promise to marry. CA affirmed TC’s award of damages, relying on Art. 21 CC. ISSUE: WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry based on Art. 21 of the CC. YES. HELD: Art. 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Art. 2176 which defined a QD is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willingness or intent. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana bec. it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well.

CLASS NOTES

CLASS NOTES

-why make intentional acts under QD? To make father and son liable -A 2177, NCC expressly points out that there’s a separate civil liability from criminal negligence BUT it seems to apply to QD only so court dealt with this limitation by upholding the construction that upholds “the spirit that giveth life rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker” (A2176 is not just QD, so A2177 really has no problem)

-during that time, culpa aquiliana (QD) doesn’t cover acts against law? A1903, old CC expressly exclude acts not punishable by law -SC needed to have very strong reason not to follow what the old law says because if A1903 applied literally there would be no culpa aquiliana, if read together with RPC (all acts would be under criminal negligence and imprudence) -so in this case, emphasize scope of culpa aquiliana and delict; why needed? Barredo was arguing that he was not solidarily liable and should only be subsidiarily liable -if applied today, would the result be the same? YES through stare decisis + QD definition changed, removed phrase “not punishable by law”

Cinco v Canonoy
FACTS: Cinco’s car and a eepney collided. Cinco filed a civil action for damage to property against the eepney’s driver and operators. Thereafter, he also filed a crim case against the eepney driver. CFI upheld the suspension of the civil case pending the determination of the crim case. ISSUE: WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action. YES. HELD: Liability being predicated on a QD, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action as specifically provided for in Art. 2177 of the CC.

CLASS NOTES

so what’s correct? Include or not to include intentional acts? In Baksh, Davide showed role of A21, so he limited A2176 to negligent acts or omissions. A2176 discussion is not necessary for the disposition of the case (OBITER) THEREFORE, QD still includes intentional acts! ***Issue: WON QD covers intentional acts or not? If it covers intentional acts.. Fr litigation pt of view: it doesn’t matter

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Kinds: compensatory, punitie, liquidated damages (damages recoverable upon breach of a contract, as stipulated by the parties), nominal damages (given in vindication of a breach of duty which does not result in any actual or pecuniary damages) Damage, damages, injury: material distinctions Injury: Illegal invasion of a legal right Damage: loss, hurt, or harm which results from an injury; in a popular sense, it is the depreciation in value, regardless if caused by a wrongful or legal act; as defined by statutes providing for damages: actionable loss, injury or harm which results from unlawful act, omission or negligence of another -not synonymous to example, fine, penalty, punishment, revenge, discipline, chastisement Damages: recompense or compensation awarded for damages suffered. Pecuniary loss: loss of money or something by which money or something of money value may be acquired

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 3

Fr academic pt of view: it matters!

2. Damages
AQUINO (pp. 842-843) -Reason behind the NCC Title on Damages: to see to it that whenever a right is transgressed, every manner of loss or injury is compensated for in some way or another. -A2195, NCC: provisions on damages are applicable to all obligations regardless of source (delict, QD, contract, or quasi-contract). -A2196: rules under title of damages are w/o prejudice to special provisions on damages provided elsewhere in the Code. -A2198: principles of general law on damages are adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with the NCC. -Indemnity has to be proportionate to the fault and to the loss caused thereby. -In actions for damages, courts should award an amount (money value) to the winning party and not its equivalent in property. SANCO, (pp. 940-941) Basis of Law: introduced in NCC mostly from American Law since they were either not expressly recognized or rarely allowed under old code, particularly on subject of moral damages Scope of applicability of provisions on damages: applicable to all obligations arising from sources enumerated in A1157, NCC, without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in said code. -don’t apply to compensation of workmen and other employees in cases of death, injury or illness -in other special laws: same rules observed insofar as not in conflict with Civil Code Concept of damages: Damages: the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act -pecuniary consequences which law imposes for breach of some duty or violation of some right.

FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the passageway to Mabasa’s apartment narrower. Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant of easement of right of way against them. CA, aside from granting right of way, awarded damages to Mabasa. ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO HELD: In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Custodio et al’s act of constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Damage is the loss, hurt or harm, which results from the injury. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded fro the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.

People v Ballesteros
FACTS: Ballesteros et al were convicted of murder. They were ordered to pay actual, compensatory, and moral damages to the heirs of the deceased. ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES HELD: Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. The party claiming such must present the best evidence available such as receipts. Moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission.

b. Damnum absque injuria
AQUINO (pp. 843-845) -“There is no liability even if there is damage because there was no injury.” Mere damage without injury does not result in liability. -A related maxim is qui jure suo utitir nullum damnum facit – one who exercises a right does no injury.

Custodio v CA, supra
“Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.”

B. History and Development AQUINO (pp.1-5)
“Tort” provisions in our NCC were derived from Spanish, French and Anglo-American Law. Therefore, RP SC borrows heavily from decisions of the Court in other countries especially Spain and US and relies from annotation of foreign author.

Custodio v CA

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
1889 Civil Code 1. Civil Liability Arising From Criminal Offenses A1089: Civil obligations arise only from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law and quasi-delicts. -civil obligations from crime or misdemeanor was governed only by Penal Code (A1092) so when criminal action was instituted, the civil action arising from the crime is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately (A122, Law of CrimPro) -right to recover damages arising from crime is completely dependent on the result of the criminal case. If an earlier civil action is instituted, upon start of criminal case, the civil action is suspended and would be determined by the result of the criminal case. If criminal action is dismissed, civil action is also deemed dismissed, regardless if instituted with the criminal action or separately. Civil liability is treated as purely incidental to the criminal liability of the offender. The cases of Springer vs. Odin, Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., US vs. Guy Sayco, US vs. Bernardo, and Wise & Co. vs. Larion were ruled using this principle. As ruled in rakes, any civil action not predicated on offense committed or charged (based on law, contract, quasicontract, or QD) cannot be instituted with the criminal action. -When Penal Code revised, RPC retained what is now contained in A100; Rules on CRimPro retained what is contained in Rule 107 (check if still correct) 2. Civil Liability arising from QD A1902: Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable fro the damage done In re: A1903: punish wrongful acts or omissions not punishable by law -said articles are not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute either punishable offenses(delicts) or breach of contract. -thus, the liability of employers, et. al. under now A2180 are only subsidiary (in accordance with penal laws) -QD or culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual culpa: causative act or omission not punished by law and is done ONLY negligently, where civil liability could arise as governed by the Civil Code (not by penal laws), and the party aggrieved could file an ordinary civil action for

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 4

Roman Law served as main inspiration of NCC, as quite evident in the field of QD: it added 4 new category of obligations that arise quasi ex delicto (a. liability of a judge who misconducts a case or gives a wrong decision; b. liability of an occupier of a building for double the damage caused by anything thrown or forced out of the building, no matter by whom, on to a public place[A2193]; c. liability of the occupier if he keeps any object suspended from the building which would do damage if it fell; and d. the liability of the shop keeper, innkeeper, or keeper of a stable for any theft or damage caused by slaves or employees, or in case of the innkeepers, of permanent residents [A2000].) -Code Commission initially wanted to adopt the word “tort” in our NCC but decided later against it because “tort” in Anglo-American law “is much broader (includes negligence, intentional criminal acts, false imprisonment, deceit) than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. Intentional acts would be governed by RPC. However, some provisions used “tort” and therefore recognize it as a source of liability [Sec22 & 100, Corporation Code; Art.68 Child and Youth Welfare Code; Sec. 17(a)(6) of the Ship Mortgage Decree]. Even SC used the term tort in deciding cases involving negligent acts or omissions as well as involving intentional acts. They defined it in Naguiat vs. NLRC. -There is an evident intent to adopt the common law concept of tort and to incorporate the different, intentional and unintentional common law torts in the NCC. Tortious conduct for which civil remedies are available are embodied in different provisions of the code. E.g. Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36; A2199 on contributory negligence and proximate cause (however, a blending of American and Spanish-Philippine Law) NCC

damages using only preponderance of evidence. It gives rise only to civil liability. Here, the employer’s liability for his employee’s NONCRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is direct and primary and not subsidiary, and he could be directly imputed in an action for recovery of damages. -an act or omission will give rise to civil liability only if it causes damage or injury to another or others.

DE LEON (pp.4-8)
Tort law emerged out of criminal law; originally concerned principally with violent breaches of the place. (1) Common law tort – judges usually define what counts as torts and how compensation is to be measured. Still, a statute or even Consti may make certain conduct legally wrongful and may permit recovery of damages for such conduct. (2) No clear distinction between tort and crime – initially, this was the case sine the development of anything like a clearly formulated conception of a tort is comparatively recent. (3) Notion of tort as a specific wrong – there was an attempt in 1720 to consider several specific wrongs in a work consolidating them under the general heading of torts. Torts of a specific character have been increasing. (4) Place of torts in the Philippine law – even if RP was a civil law country, some of the provisions in the 1889 CC dealth with cases of the nature of torts + with US occupation, a number of laws patterned after Anglo-American models have been passed amplifying the field of torts in Philippine legal system. Functions or goals of tort law Medieval England: discourage violence and revenge Today: compensation of injured persons and deterrence of undesirable behavior: System of thoughts (sorry, no parallelism in the enumeration of de leon): (1) Morality or corrective justice – defendants should be liable fro harms they wrongfully caused and no others; liability imposed when and only when it is “right” to do so (2) Social utility or policy – a good-for-all-of-us view: provide a system of rules that works toward the good of society (3) Legal process – litigation process is a good to be preserved rather than abstract ideal of justice or social utility

SANGCO (pp. xxxi-xl)
Civil Code of the Philippines: based on Civil Code of 1889 (Spanish and French in origin); but many provisions from codes of other countries were adopted. Rules from Anglo-American law were adopted because of element of American culture that has been incorporated into Fil life during US occupation; because economic relations that continue between US and RP; and because US and English Courts have developed certain equitable rules that are not recognized in the 1889 Civil Code

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
(4) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and (5) the absence of preexisting contractual relations between the parties. The allegation that private respondents violated traffic rules does not detract from the nature and the character of the actions as one based on culpa aquiliana. Excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. 

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 5

(4) potential conflicts – between justice and policy outlook and legal process outlook (5) distribution of loss – the cost of loss suffered by plaintiff is not simply transferred to the defendant but is distributed through the defendant to a large number of individuals (6) redress of social grievances – tort law a popular mechanism that permits ordinary people to put authority on trial (7) a mixed system – tort law a “mixed” set of functions CLASSES OF TORTS: Property torts and Personal torts

Important: Take note of 3 elements of QD: (1) damages suffered by plaintiff; (2) fault or negligence of defendant; (3) fault of defendant caused damages suffered by plaintiff

Taylor v MERALCO
FACTS: 15-year old David Taylor with 2 others (Manuel and Jessie) experimented with detonating caps were taken from the premises of MERALCO. David and Manuel ignited the contents of the cap, resulting in an explosion which led to David’s loss of his right eye. David’s father filed an action for damages. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff can recover damages in this case. HELD: NO. In order to recover damages, the following must be established: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

II. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT
A. Elements
Art. 2176, NCC Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.



CLASS

NOT E

Important: Take note of 4 elements of QD: (1) acts or omission constituting negligence; (2) damage; (3) direct causal connection between damage and act or omission; (4) no preexisting contractual relation. The case mentions 5 elements but Prof. Casis mentioned 4.

Garcia v Florido
FACTS: A public utility car and a bus collided, resulting in injuries to Garcia et al. The chief of police filed a criminal case against the bus driver. Garcia et al filed a civil action for damages against the owners and drivers of both vehicles. Bus company and driver filed a motion to dismiss. CFI dismissed the civil action holding that the right to file a separate civil action was not reserved and that the action was not based on QD. ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case was proper. NO HELD: The action was based on QD and it may proceed independently. The essential averments for a QD action are present in this case, namely: (1) act or omission of private respondents; (2) presence of fault or negligence or lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus by its driver resulting in the collision; (3) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;

Andamo v CA
FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette caused the construction of waterpaths and contrivances in its compound. This allegedly caused flooding and damage to the adjacent lot, property of the Andamo spouses. The Andamos filed a criminal case for destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a civil action for damages against respondent corporation. The civil case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the crim case was field ahead of it. ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper. HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may proceed independently of the criminal case. All the elements of QD are present in the complaint, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.


CLASS

NOT E

Important: Qualification of negligence – fault or negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause and effect

Tayag v Alcantara
FACTS: Tayag who was riding on a bicycle along McArthur Highway was bumped by a bus and died. His heirs sued the bus owner and driver for damages. A crim case was also filed against the bus driver. The bus driver was acquitted in the crim case on the ground of reasonable doubt. CFI sustained private respondents’ MTS the civil case on the ground of lack of COA due to the acquittal of the bus driver in the crim case. ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper. HELD: No. The petitioner’s COA being based on a QD, the acquittal of the driver in the crim case is not a bar to the civil case for damages based on QD.

CLASS

NOT E

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Negligence is the “failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. When the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care.” Negligence is conduct, not a state of mind or the use of sound judgment. Negligence is a matter of risk – that is to say, of cognizable danger of injury. The actor does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that they are substantially to occur, or believe they will. There is merely a risk of such consequences sufficiently great to lead a reasonable man in his position to anticipate them, and to guard against them. The culpability of the actor’s conduct must be judged in the light of the possibilities apparent to him at the time and not by looking backward “with the wisdom born of the event.” The standard must be one of conduct, rather than consequences. At the same time, the standard imposed must be an external one, based upon what society demands of the individual rather than upon his own notion of what is proper. Intentional omissions must not be treated as cases of negligence. These are not cases of omissions; they are cases of positive action.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 6

All the essential averments for a QD action are present, namely: 1) Act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; 2) Damage caused by the said act or omission; 3) Direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission; and 4) No pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

physical condition and other circumstance regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate not he danger clearly manifest.

-

Barredo v Garcia, supra
RULE: A QD or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the CC, with a substantially all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from crime.

CLASS

NOT E

Important: There must exist a direct causal connection 1. act or omission I SANGCO (pp. 1-4) Conduct may be legally described in terms of action and inaction or “misfeasance” or “nonfeasance.” Misfeasance is active misconduct working positive injury to others; while nonfeasance is passive inaction or failure to take steps to protect them from harm Liability in tort may be predicated upon an injury resulting from an unlawful or illegal act or omission, whether injury is on property or person 2. cause damage I SANGCO (pp. 87-90) QD liability presupposes 2 conditions: (1) a connection of cause and effect between the person liable and the fact from which damage results; (2) a fault of this person, which implies at once an act of intelligent volition that is illicit, or contrary to law It must be shown that the damage to the plaintiff, who must prove it, was the natural and probable, or direct and immediate consequence of defendant’s culpable act or omission Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. -

CLASS

NOT ES Quasi-Delict Private interest Civil Code Any kind of negligence Preponderance evidence

Delict Public interest Penal Code Punished only by penal law Guilt beyond reasonable doubt

fault

of of

-

People v Ligon
FACTS: Based on the testimony of a taxi driver, Gabat was convicted of Robbery with Homicide committed against a 17-yo student working as a cigarette vendor. ISSUE: WON Gabat’s guilt was proven BRD. HELD: NO. Gabat’s guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt, but preponderance of evidence establishes that by his ct or omission, with fault and negligence, he caused damage to the victim and should answer civilly for the damage done. It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal case must be established BRD, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

B. Distinguished A. Quasi-delict v Delict
Art 2177, NCC Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Art 365, RPC. Imprudence and Negligence. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,

3. fault or negligence I SANGCO (p5-7)

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES
NOT ES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 7


CLASS


CLASS

NOT E

34 & 2176 of the CC shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any crim prosecution based on the same act.

Need to indemnify heirs even if not criminally liable.

Padilla v CA
FACTS: Padilla, a municipal mayor, together with policemen and a civilian, demolished a store and took away its contents, pursuant to a municipal ordinance. CA acquitted them of the charge of grave coercion based on reasonable doubt but ordered them to pay damages. ISSUE: WON CA erred in requiring petitioners to pay damages after acquitting them of the criminal charge. HELD: NO. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable count as only a preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. There is nothing contrary to Art 29,CC in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is a clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

Important: elements of reckless imprudence: (1) the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) doing or failure to do the act is voluntary; (3) without malice; (4) material damage results from the reckless imprudence; (5) there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place


CLASS

NOT E

Important: Clarified 2000 Rules of Court

B. Quasi-Delict v. Breach of Contract
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. Notes: Negligence for BoC and QD are defined in the same way as provided by Art 2178.Therefore, if you sue for negligence, you can base the action on quasi-delict, delict, or contract.

Philippine Rabbit v People
FACTS: Philippine Rabbit’s employee was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property, and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The driver jumped bail. Phil Rabbit’s notice of appeal was dismissed. ISSUE: WON an employer who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. NO. HELD: The subsidiary liability of Phil. Rabbit is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and executory by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Under the 2000 Rules of Crim Proc., the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime is deemed impliedly instituted in a crim action unless the offended party waives the action, reserves the rt to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the crim action. Hence, the subsidiary liability of the employer under Art 103, RPC, may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee. The 2000 Rules of Crim Proc deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Arts 32, 33,

Cruz v CA
FACTS: Ninevetch Cruz, a surgeon, was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. ISSUE: WON Cruz’s conviction is supported by the evidence. HELD: Her guilt was not proved BRD. However, the Court finds her civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction requires proof BRD, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
need not proven be

c(~_∗)o
1. moral damages

PAGE 8
Recoverable only if passenger dies or there is malice or bad faith (proof of due diligence not available) Injury to passenger. No need to prove it was carrier’s Fault

Cangco v Manila Railroad
FACTS: Cangco’s arm was amputated because he was drawn from under a railroad car. His foot alighted upon a melon at the moment he stepped upon the platform. He sues for negligence in the performance of a contract. MR argues that [1] the breach was due to negligence of servant and [2] it exercised due diligence in selection and supervision. Held: MR is liable. The contract to transport carries with it the duty to provide safe means of entering and leaving the train. It is unnecessary for plaintiff for BoC to prove the breach was due to negligence. When a contractual relation exists, the obligor may break the contract by means of an act which would have constituted a violation of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed. Doctrine: QD and BoC are concentric, and QDs are broader. Plaintiff with a pre-existing contractual relation may still sue for QD so long as “had there been a no contract, there is still a quasi-delict.” Notes: SC held there was a contract of carriage even if Cangco did not pay for a ticket. Also, Sir took note of the 4 main differences of QD and BoC in this case: Under QD 1. liability of defendant employer 2. defendant employer’s defense Presumptive liability Rebut presumption through proof of the exercise of due care in selection and supervision Created by the wrongful or negligent act/omission itself Defendant’s fault or negligence Under BoC Direct immediate Prove performance contract contributory negligence and


  

Anywhere there are physical injuries (Art 2219[2]) Proof of due diligence in selection and supervision Carrier’s fault or negligence

CLASS

NOT ES 2. defendant carrier’s defense 3. what plaintiff needs to prove

  

 

What is the breach of contract committed? Negligence, failure to exercise due care Art. 1903 not applicable in cases where there is preexisting relationship Cangco did not pay for his fare so why is a contract of carriage at issue? It should be a contract of employment. MERALCO was held liable for breach of contract. What was the breach? Failure to exercise due diligence This is a landmark case because there is a glaring statement in Cangco that contradicts the other cases True of False-a breach of contract is not a basis for QD: FALSE Court in Sangco said that the circle is CONCENTRIC: QD is larger and that culpa contractual is the yolk So Cangco doesn’t say that the two are mutually exclusive and therefore Cangco is consistent with Air France Vinculum juris distinction doesn’t matter because here the act & the breach coincided



CLASS

NOT ES

 

Does not say that when there is a contract, you can’t sue for QD. A2176 expressly excludes cases where there is a pre-existing contractual relationship. But even if there is a pre-existing contractual relationship, there is still a cause of action for quasi-delict since it is not expressly prohibited. The ruling on the interpretation of A2176 is not ratio, just obiter. Case is not basis of mutual exclusivity

Fores v Miranda
FACTS: Miranda was a passenger of a jeep which hit a wall and fractured his right humerus. He sues under contract of carriage. CA awarded him with moral damages. HELD: SC deleted moral damages. Moral damages are not recoverable for actions based on BoC unless there is bad faith. There was no bad faith because: [1] mere carelessness of the driver does not justify the inference of bad faith; and [2] under Art 1756, the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously) Doctrine:

Rakes v Atlantic
FACTS: Rakes’s leg was amputated because it was crushed by an iron rail he was carrying on a hand car for Atlantic, his employer. He sues for damages because of Atlantic’s negligence in not repairing the weakened track. Atlantic argues that remedey for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action HELD: Atlantic’s liability to Rakes ariss out of the contract of employment because failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for its workmen Doctrine: Employer’s liability arising out of negligence in contract of employment may be enforced separate from criminal action.

of or

3. vinculum juris (legal tie)

Independent the breach of the duty assumed by the parties The contract and its nonperformance. The negligence

4. what a plaintiff needs to prove

Differences between QD and BoC in
Under QD Under BoC

this case:

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES
NOT ES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
oppressive or malevolent (Art. 2232)

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 9


CLASS

Statement that you can’t sue for QD when there is a contract is mere obiter, not ratio. Court already decided that employee is liable Art 1092 & 1903 come from pre existing relationship Rakes is not the basis of the doctrine that quasi-delict may arise from breach of contract. If there is no contract, it does not mean that there is no existing relationship

breaks the contract may also bea tort” only applies if the BoC was done in [1] bad faith and [2] in violation of Art 21 (willfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy)


Air France v Carrasco
FACTS: Carraso was told by the manager that he must vacate his 1st class seats because a white man who had a better right to it. RTC and CA awarded moral damages. Air France argues that there was no finding of bad faith to justify the award of moral damages HELD: Although there was a pre-existing contract, the stress of the action was put on the wrongful expulsion, which is a violation of a public duty, which is a QD. Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.



  

CLASS

NOT E

Far East v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Luna got a Far East credit card which was dishonored at a despedida party due to a hotlist policy compelled by the loss of the complementary card. He sues for damages. RTC awarded him moral and exemplary damages. HELD: Complaint is based on contract because without the contract, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be an actionable tort. Moral damages were deleted because negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luna is not gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Exemplary damages were deleted because DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether QD can be deemed to underlie the BoC s where, without a preexisting contract between 2 parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself.

CLASS

NOT ES

Doctrine: The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.  why discuss this? To determine damages  contradicts A2176? No. This is tort not QD

QD not applicable when there is a contract According to Prof. Casis, the court said that A2176 only applies if no contract exists. But in the latter part, it ruled that A2176 can apply if a contract exists. This statement (can’t have QD if there’s a contract) contradicts Air France yet later on it cites Air France Based on the cases, the second statement of 2176 defines a QD but it is not laying down a rule that when there is a pre-existing contractual relationship, there can be no QD. Air France is safer, it said “tort” referring to first sentence of 2176 such that if there is preexisting contractual relationship there can still be a tort.

Syquia v CA
FACTS: The parents and siblings of the deceased Syquia file suit for damages arising from BoC and/or QD against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery because the coffin was flooded due to a hole in the wall of the concrete vault placed by defendants. CA determined that there was no negligence. HELD: Action is based on BoC. The Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care govern the relation of the parties and defined their rights and obligations. There is no stipulation that the vault would be waterproof. Plus, Memorial exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of the water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth. Doctrines:[1] If there is a pre-existing contractual relation, then any negligence would be actionable under BoC, not QD. [2] If there is no stipulation or legal provision to the contrary, the diligence to be observed in

PSBA v CA
FACTS: A PSBA student was stabbed and killed by non-students while in the school premises. His parents sued PSBA and its officers under A2180 for ther negligence, recklessness and lack of security measures. Defendants argue that they are not covered by 2180 as they are an academic institution. RTC and CA denied motion to dismiss. HELD: The school is not liable under QD because [1] A2180 applies only if damage was caused by students or pupils [2] a 2176 applies only if there isno contractual relation. However, the SC ordered the remand of the case because there was a contractual obligation to provide both education and security. Trial must proceed to determine if the breach was due to negligence. Doctrine: Qualified Air France v Carrasco’s pronouncement by saying the phrase, “the act that


CLASS

NOT E

Qualifies Air France case: QD should be independent of BoC

Notes: Differences between QD and BoC in this case: Unde QD Under BoC 1. award for Injury If there was bad moral damages faith or gross negligence 2. award for Gross negligence Act that is exemplary as to wanton, damages approximate fraudulent, malice (Art 2231) reckless,

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
breach would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability has the contract not existed.

c(~_∗)o
No presumption that defendant was at fault or negligent

PAGE 10
Mere proof of existence of a contract and its breach raises presumption of fault or negligence Governed by Arts. 1170- 1174

the performance of a contractual obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.


CLASS

NOT ES

The notes in this case are rather confusing. Prof. Casis asks how putting a hole in the vault would prevent water from entering it.

AQUINO (pp. 25-26) 1. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Culpa Contractual Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Culpa Contractual (BoC) Independent contract Foundation of liability is the contract and its breach Defense is available No defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees Employer’s responsibility presumptive employer’s liability is direct and immediate

is

De Leon (pp.157-160) 1. Requisites of QD: a. An act or omission by defendant b. Fault or negligence by defendant c. Damage or injury to plaintiff d. Direct relation of cause and effect between act or omission and the damage e. No pre-existing contractual relationship 2. Burden of Proof a. Falls on the person claiming damages b. To be established with satisfactory evidence c. Negligence is not presumed. Only under Arts. 2180, 2183, and 2191 is presumed and burden of proof shifts to defendant 3. QD arising from BoC a. “the existence of a contract does not preclude the commission of a QD..” b. Contractual responsibility and extracontractual liability exclude each other and cannot be cumulated. Tort liability arises from BoC when the is act or omission is in itself wrongful independent of the contract, the breach of which being merely incidental to the commission of the tort. Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual Distinguished Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Culpa Contractual (BoC) Wrongful or negligent The act or omission is act or omission itself merely an incident in the source of the the performance of an obligation obligation Plaintiff has burden to Plaintiff need not prove the defendant plead or prove it was was at fault or defendants fault or negligent negligence 4.

Governed by Art. 2176; and also governed by Art. 1172-1174 under Art. 2178 Based on voluntary act or omission which has caused damage to another Requires only preponderance of evidence


CLASS

NOT ES

Note from discussion: (hindi ko alam kung saang case to related) if there is a pre-existing contractual relation, base action on Art. 21.

III. NEGLIGENCE
A. Concept of Negligence 1. Definition; Elements
Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. If the law or contact does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a father of a family shall be required.

2. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Crimes Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Crimes Affect Private Public Interest Concerns Indemnification Penal Code Punishes Repairs Damage or Corrects Broad- include all acts Narrow – punished where any fault or only if there is a penal negligence intervenes law punishing it Employer’s liability is Employer’s liability is direct and primary subsidiary 3. Concurrence of Causes of Action - Far East Banc v. CA – a single act or omission may give rise to two or more causes of action (i.e. delict, QD, or BoC) - liability for a tort may arise even under a contract, where tirt us that which breaks the contract, where an act which constitutes a

CLASS

NOT ES

AQUINO on negligence (pp. 23-27) Actionable negligence may either be culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana and criminal negligence. Thus, an action for damages for the negligent acts of the defendant may be based on contract, quasi-delict or delict. The bases

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
 Test: prudent man o fictitious character: ordinary prudent man o can be reasonably foreseen o knowledge of tortfeasor at that time

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 11

of liability are separate and distinct from each other even if only one act or omission is involved.

siren of the oncoming train, stopped and allowed the train to pass; [3] the train driver had already applied its brakes and was running at 23-30kph; and [4] he had the duty to stop his jeep to avoid a collision because the driver of the locomotive was not qualified to do so at the time. Doctrine: Negligence is defined as the “want of care required by the circumstances.” It is not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a higher degree of care is necessary. Notes: Sir says that based on jurisprudence, the standard of care required for crossing railroads is “stop, look and listen.” Nevertheless as provided by the SC in this case, we cannot provide a standard for all specific cases because it is difficult. There is no formula to determine negligence. Every case must be dependent of its facts.

Picart v Smith
FACTS: Picart improperly pulled his horse on the right side (wrong side of the road) of the bridge. Smith drove his car toward the horse, veering away only when the car was only a few feet away from the horse. The horse got spooked and got killed. HELD: Smith is liable for damages because applying the standard of a prudent man, he was negligent. A prudent man “would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable consequence of that course.” Smith should have: 1. Stopped 2. Slowed down or 3. Veered to the right. Doctrines: 1. The Constitutive fact of negligence is the reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this pre-vision. 2. Test of negligence – “would a prudent man… foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued?” 3. Take note however, that a person can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Omniscience of the future is not a requirement. Notes: The car was on the proper side of the bridge. Sir thinks that the ruling is problematic because had the car veered away, it would then be on the improper side of the road.

Wright v MERALCO
FACTS: An intoxicated Wright was thrown off his calesa after it was pitched forward by Meralco’s protruding railtrack. CFI awarded him damages but apportioned the same since he was negligent as well, although not as negligent as Meralco in failing to maintain the tract. Both appealed. HELD: Wright was not negligent because the sudden falling of the horse, would ordinarily be sufficient to throw a sober man from the vehicle. Doctrine: If a person’s conduct is characterized by s proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether hi is drunk or sober. Notes: Sir asks the question following the doctrine: If this happened today, would an intoxicated driver be held liable for hitting a man?

Valenzuela v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Valenzuela was hit by defendant’s car while she was attending to a flat tire. She sued for damages based on QD. He argues that he is not liable because of her contributory negligence in parking in a no-park zone and he was driving at a safe speed of 55kph. HELD: The average motorist alert to road conditions would have had no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by him. Therefore his failure to be alert must be due either to his intoxication or his speeding. Also there was no contributory negligence because the Emergency Rule exempts plaintiff from negligence since the time for reflective thought or opportunity to weight the situation was absent because she was confronted by danger. Doctrines: [1] adds to the definition in Corliss v. Manila negligence is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others it is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury [2]the emergency rule can be considered a defense. Notes: SC took into consideration “normal human circumstances” in determining WON defendant was


-

CLASS

NOTES

mere intoxication is not in itself negligence inconclusive factor

Corliss v Manila
FACTS: Plaintiff orliss’ husband died of some serious burns because the jeep he was driving collided with Manila Railroad’s train at the railroad crossing because of his eagerness to beat the locomotive and reach the other side. HELD: Complaint is dismissed. Husband was negligent because [1] one approaching a railroad crossing do so cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track; [2] a prudent man under similar circumstances would have heeded the


CLASS

NOTES

definition: conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Doctrines: [1] An object can still be placed negligently even if it has a ‘legitimate purpose’ for being there. [2] Definition of gross negligence as equivalent to “notorious negligence” which “consists in the failure to exercise even slight care” Notes: SC, just like in Valenzuela v. CA, took into consideration “normal human circumstances” (i.e. that people would be looking up) in determining WON defendant was negligent. But sir asks, “what if the planes had already landed?”

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 12

negligent. (Examples: the light rainfall, visibility of the street 100 meters away, etc.)


 

CLASS

NOT ES

Far Eastern v CA
FACTS: While on compulsory pilotage for docking, the vessel rams into pier because anchor did not take hold HELD: Both the shipmaster and compulsory pilot are liable. The shipmaster is liable because of his blind reliance on the compulsory pilot and because he “supinely stood by” with no watchful vigilance on his part. The compulsory pilot is liable because he failed to react (or reacted too late) and because he miscalculated the bulk and size of the vessel. Doctrines: [1] Unmindful disregard or neglectful relinquishment of duty is tantamount to negligence [2] Extraordinary risk demands extraordinary diligence. [3] The presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object is rebuttable by proof that the driver was without fault, the collision was the fault of the stationary object, or that it was the result of an inevitable accident. Notes: The defense of liability of another person is not available to join tortfeasors.

The new law on negligence of children would still not affect the laws on negligence outlined by Sangco because it does not expressly repeal the provisions of the RPC. RA 9344 does not affect presumptions of negligence. However, it affects Art. 2180, CC.

Taylor v Manila Railroad
FACTS: David Taylor, 15, and MANUEL, 12, were experimenting with fulminating caps they found lying around the company’s premises. After applying a lighted match to an opened cap, it exploded causing injuries. David’s father filed a complaint for damages. HELD: In the Turntable and Torpedo cases, the owner of the premises was held liable because of the doctrine of implied invitation1. This doctrine, however was overturned by Railroad Company vs. Stout which held that while it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts. Plaintiff was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted for his own deliberate act. Although the owner of the premises was
1

2. Standard of conduct 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. the prudent men children experts. Professionals intoxication insanity

1. The Prudent Man Picart v Smith
Doctrines: [1] The standard of care is that of a “prudent man” [2] the conduct of a prudent man is determined “in the light of human experience an in the particular case” I Sangco (pp.7-8) – 1) STANDARD OF CONDUCT - it is impossible to fix in advance definite rules for all conceivable human conduct because of the infinite variety of situations which may arise - standard of conduct must be: i. external and objective ii. the same for all persons iii. must make allowance for the risk apparent to the act for his capacity to meet it and for the circumstances under which he must act

Civil Aeronautics v CA
FACTS: The plaintiff broke his thigh bone because he slipped over a 4-inch elevation at the end of the viewing deck of the airport since he wanted a better view of the incoming passengers including his future son- in- law. He filled an action for damages based on QD. HELD: Defendant is liable for exemplary damages since there was gross negligence in failing in its duty to insure the safety of the viewers because the tendency of the viewers on the deck would be to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement.

a. Children
Article 8, RPC A minor fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to be held criminally liable therefore. (this was in Taylor. This also might mean Art 80 RPC)???

In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and perhaps, if one were to throw upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Jarco Marketing v CA
FACTS: Zhieneth, 6, was pinned by the bulk of the department store’s gift-wrapping counter/structure and died. The department store contended that it was the child’s own act of climbing into the structure that was the proximate cause of the fall of the counter. HELD: (Citing Sangco) Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under 9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that the child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. RULE: A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Casis: Does this mean that Sangco did not set a standard of conduct for children but merely a formula? No. The court did not cite him correctly. Sangco had the standard of an ordinary prudent child. 

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 13

negligent leaving the caps exposed n its premises, plaintiff’s own act was the principal and proximate cause of the accident. RULE: The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only and this is to be determines in each case by the circumstances of the case.

presumption), if above 9 and below 15, rebuttable presumption of incapacity of negligence, if above 15, that of a prudent child or adult. Prof. Casis asks what about a child who is exactly 9 years old? Apply the rules on above 9 below 15 because the law should be construed in favor of the accused. Is there mutual exclusivity between negligence and accident? According to the Jarco case, none.


CLASS

NOTES

Magtibay v Tiangco
FACTS: Rowel Tiangco, under 18, was found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Being under 18, his sentence was suspended until he reached majority. Later, in view of his conduct, his lawyer recommended the dismissal of his case. CFI dismissed but reversed the right of the heirs to recover damages in a civil action. HELD: The suspension of sentence did not wipe out his guilt, but merely put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. When, therefore, after he had observed good conduct, the criminal case was dismissed, this does not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged, but simply that he would suffer no penalty. Nor did such dismissal of the case obliterate is civil liability for damages. RULE: Liability of an infant in a civil action for his torts is imposed as a mode, not of punishment but of compensation. For every tortuous act of violence or other pure tort, the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and in the same extent as an adult.

when children trespass child & adult: not same appreciation with regard to contributory negligence for children, you don’t stop at age, you look at circumstances as well 2 cases: “Torpedo (flare gun cases)” and “Turntable” (DJ stuff) cases: the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had a good reason to suppose, children who would likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine. In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable. Examples: What if it’s a 25-year old with the mental capacity of a 9-year old? What if it’s a 9-year old with the mental capacity of a 25-year old? Would the doctrine still apply?



CLASS

NOTES

Make a distinction between children as a tortfeasor and children as a victim If a child is 8 years old and makes a counter fall over another person who dies, QD can still be filed because negligence is not equal to liability Difference between accident and negligence: an accident cannot be foreseen while negligence can be foreseen. So in this case, negligence and accident cannot coincide. Company’s counterargument: “It never happened before.” In citing Sangco, there is an analogy between the RPC and the new Civil Code. If below 9, presumed incapable of negligence (conclusive


CLASS

NOTES

 

Minority is not a factor to escape liability because even though minority is not a factor for negligence, it is a factor for liability

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
HELD: The child Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence. (citing Sangco) The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person engendered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his own age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. (RULE)

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 14

Del Rosario v Manila Electric
FACTS: Alberto Del Rosario, 9, despite the warning of one of his companions, after saying that he had been in the habit of touching wires, put out his index finger and touched a fallen electrical wire. He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming “Ay! Madre”. The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. Upon being taken to the hospital, he was pronounced dead. HELD: It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not alter the case. But even supposing that the contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case,not having been the determining cause of the accident. RULE: It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and natural curiosity.

1. type of activity involved is one that is usually engaged in by children 2. one involving the use of “potentially dangerous, adult-oriented” instrument, like a car. WHERE CHILD IS HELD TO THE STANDARD OF CARE OF AN ADULT, his violation of a statute or other enactment entails the same consequences as those of an adult.



CLASS

NOTES

3. Experts, professionals Culion v Phil. Motors

Kid was 10/11 yo: *disputable presumption under Sangco* *in a case between children and adults, the trend is that adults should know better*

SANGCO (pp. 70-74) UNDER 9 YEARS  conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment and is exempt from criminal liability OVER 9 BUT UNDER 15  may or may not be guilty of contributory negligence, depending upon his mental development and other circumstances (rebuttable presumption) OVER 15 YEARS  presumed to have sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of danger with the power to avoid it (STANDARD is still that of a child his age and capacity, and not that of an adult.) STANDARD: ORDINARILY PRUDENT CHILD  The standard of conduct which a child must conform for his own protection is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience under like or similar circumstances or that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. TEST as to whether an infant can be subjected to the same standard of care as an adult:

FACTS: When Culion wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went to PMC where Quest, PMC”s manager decided to oversee the repairs. Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and dripped down to the engine compartment. Quest attention was called on this but he took it lightly. When the engine was started, there was a backfire and burned the boat. HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but here the leak along the pipeline and the flooding of the carburetor created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of boat engines, would have taken precaution to avoid. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Quest is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A person skilled in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned by the circumstances to cause him to take precaution against the danger. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine on boats. RULE: When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill,



CLASS

NOTES

Different from Taylor: o Taylor – contributory negligence, child as tortfeasor o Del Rosario – victim only Immaturity and natural curiosity taken into account

Ylarde v Aquino
FACTS: Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig beside a 1 ton concrete block in order to make a whole to bury huge stones. He left four of them to level the loose soil around the open hole but allegedly telling them “not to touch the stone”. They, however, playfully jumped into the pit and caused the top of the concrete block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasn’t able to climb out and he died because of the injuries sustained.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 15

he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.



CLASS

NOTES


  

CLASS

NOTES

Johnny Quest when a person who holds himself out as being competent to do things, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care & skill of an expert high degree of care

Relationship: danger o pharmacist: knowledgeable o buyer: can’t check for himself Consider nature of work and danger involved

FACTS: BPI’s money market people pre-terminated Fernando’s placement through a phone call and only verified her identity by phone. The phony Fernando deposited the two BPI checks to China Bank and thereafter withdrew it all. BPI claimed reimbursement from China Bank under its clear warranty. HELD: By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervisions of employees. RULE: The banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of employees (stems from the nature of their industry)

Cruz v CA
FACTS: Lydia Umali underwent a surgery under Dr. Ninevetch Cruz wherein the untidy clinic ran out of medicine, blood and oxygen that the patient had to be transferred to another hospital, where she died. HELD: While it may be true that the circumstances seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. RULE: The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating.

US v Pineda
FACTS: Pineda, a pharmacist, sold barium chlorate(poisonous) instead of potassium chlorate which killed 2 horses. HELD: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as “ordinary care”, “care of a specially high degree”, “the highest degree of care known to practical men”, which is “the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, in order that human life may not constantly be exposed to danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poison for harmless medicine”. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. The question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. RULE: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as “ordinary care”, “care of a specially high degree”, “the highest degree of care known to practical men”.


CLASS

NOTES

Nature of banks: imbued with public interest so there is a higher degree of diligence required

4. Intoxication



CLASS

NOTES

Not negligence in itself but it can be a factor *questions to ask: (1) how do you know if a person is intoxicated or not? (2) when is it a factor enough that it impairs your judgment?*


Wright v Manila Electric
FACTS: Plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike out of the rails with great force, throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries. The tops of the rails

CLASS

NOT ES

Plaintiff has burden of proof; present expert testimony

BPI v CA

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Even though the former are nor engaged in any business or industry. The state is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Art. 2182 If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 16

appear to be 5 or 6 inches more above the level of the street. Plaintiff was intoxicated at the time. HELD: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. General rule: it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If one’s conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions. A horse crossing the tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. RULE: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care.

insane party under their care or guardianship, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part; but if the demented person or imbecile lack a guardian or some person charged with his care, or if the latter be insolvent, then his own property must meet the civil liability. RULE: Although he may not be held criminally liable, a lunatic or imbecile is still held civilly liable. The person in the first place liable is those who have the insane party under their care or guardianship.


CLASS

NOTES

Exemption form criminal liability doesn’t mean exemption from civil liability

B. Degrees of Negligence
Art. 2231 In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.


 

CLASS

NOTES

US v Baggay
FACTS: In a song service, Baggay suddenly, without provocation attacked a woman with a bolo on her head , from which she died. He likewise inflicted various wounds on other women with the same bolo, including his own mother. Since defendant was suffering from mental aberration, trial court rendered him exempt from criminal liability but was obligated to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman. HELD: In the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer from the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. According to law, the person in the first place liable are those who have the

CLASS

NOTES

Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence Inconclusive factor

5. Insanity
Art. 2180, NCC The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.

Grossly negligent vs slightly negligent  degree of danger  cf. value  RA 9044 Sec. 6: child 15 & below-incapable of negligence  question still to be resolved is the law’s effect on 2180 CC

Amedo v Rio
FACTS: Filomeno Manguit, a seaman, jumped overboard from his ship into the water to retrieve a 2peso bill that was blown by the breeze to the sea. He drowned.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Marinduque Iron Mines v Workmen's Compensation
FACTS: Mamador hitched a ride together with other laborers on a company-owned truck. When the truck tried to overtake another truck, it collided with a coconut tree, which resulted in his death. There was a company prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks. Petitioner claims that such violation was the laborer's “notorious negligence” which, under the law, precludes recovery. HELD: Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. Violation of a rule promulgated by a commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence. Under the circumstances, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence since the prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of riders. Getting or accepting a free ride on the company's haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence, because “no danger or risk was apparent”. RULE: Violation of a rule promulgated by a commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 17

HELD: He failed to exercise “even the slightest care and diligence”, that he displayed a “reckless disregard of the safety of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences” of his carelessness and that he was “indifferent, or worse, to the danger of his injury”. There is more reason to hold that his death was caused by his notorious negligence. If while he was working, his bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked it up from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled to compensation, his act being obviously innocent. Jumping into the sea, however, is entirely different, the danger which it entails being clear, potent and obvious. RULE: “Notorious negligence” has been held to be tantamount to “gross negligence”, which is want of even slight care and diligence. what determines if an act if negligent is the danger of an act the nature of the act of jumping into the sea involves danger CLASS NOTES

foresight are accustomed to use. (failure to exercise care) GROSS NEGLIGENCE – described as failure to exercise even that care which a careless person would use. There is no generally accepted meaning, but the probability is that it signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less than conscious indifference to consequences. (extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care) WILFUL, WANTON, AND RECKLESS – “quasi-intent”, lying between intent to do harm and the mere reasonable risk of harm to another. They apply to conduct which is still merely negligent but which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were intended (actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probably that harm would follow). There is often NO CLEAR DISTINCTION between the above and “gross”, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning as an AGGRAVATED form of negligence, differing in QUALITY rather than in DEGREE from ordinary lack of care.


  

What determines if an act if negligent is the danger of an act. The nature of the act of jumping into the sea involves danger per se. Why notorious negligence? Because compared with other cases, the danger is apparent and imminent because the shore is 1½ miles away from the location of the ship. It was not a case of the money falling off someone’s pocket to the floor. He is not said to be a good swimmer but he jumped into the water as opposed to Cuervo vs. Barretto wherein the emoloyer ordered him to jump into the water to protect the property of the company. What determines the grossness of negligence? The degree of danger and other factors which would justify the dangerous act.


 

CLASS

NOTES

C. Proof of Negligence 1. Burden of Proof
RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF PRESUMPTIONS BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS AND

There’s only an alleged prohibition on part of employer Even if there was indeed a prohibition, violation of policy is not necessarily negligence per se but it may be an evidence of negligence

SANGCO (10-12) The amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable conduct must be proportionate to the apparent risk. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE: SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE - an absence of that degree of vigilance which persons of extraordinary prudence and

Sec. 1. Burden of proof in civil cases. - Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. Evidence need not be given in support of a negative allegation except when such negative allegation is an essential part of the statement of the right or title on which the cause of action or defense is founded, nor even in such case when the allegation is a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the opposite party. The burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side. Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases. Sec. 3. Conclusive presumptions.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. Art. 2185 Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Art. 2188 There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. Art. 1734 Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Art. 1735 In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.

c(~_∗)o
o

PAGE 18

Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy. Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence; (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such , whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction; (p) That private transactions have been fair and regular; (q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed; ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature; (ff) That the law has been obeyed; Sec. 6. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation.

2x w/in the next preceeding 2 mos: guilty of reckless driving / violation of traffic rules

if the owner is not in the car, does the disputable presumption apply? o n/a when the owner is not in the car / common carrier requires conviction

Art 2185 CC  disputable presumption: violate traffic regulation o no conviction required o however, Sangco says this also requires conviction  ** but when is one “found guilty” of traffic violation? Art 2188  prima facie presumption o injury results from possession of dangerous weapons/ substances, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation/business Arts 1734 & 1735  common carriers  loss, destroyed, deteriorate  presume negligence common carrier o UNLESS prove extraordinary diligence SANGCO (18-27) It is NEGLIGENCE PER SE when: 1. a professional driver permits any unlicensed person to drive the car placed under his responsibility 2. violation of an ordinance prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a street in places other than regular cross-walks 3. driving a motor vehicle without a license, at a high rate of speed and under the influence of alcohol Where there is NO local regulation restricting the pedestrian’s rights in the use of a street, a pedestrian HAS THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL upon roads and streets

1. Presumption
Art. 2184 In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless


CLASS

NOTES

Art 2184 CC disputable presumption:

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
determining negligence. liability where there is  

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 19

WHETHER THERE BE SIDEWALKS OR NOT, although he should have due regard for the rights of motor vehicles and should exercise due care for his own safety. Where proof of violation makes: 1. a prima facie case of negligence 2. gives rise to a presumption of lack of ordinary care PRESUMPTION IS REBUTTABLE FOUR GENERAL GROUNDS OR EXCUSES FOR VIOLATION OF A STATUTE: 1. anything that would make it impossible to comply with the statute or ordinance 2. anything over which the defendant has no control and which places him or an instrumentality that he is operating in a position contrary to that required by the statute or ordinance 3. an emergency not of the actor’s own making which causes him to fail to obey the enactment 4. conduct which comes within an excuse or exception provided in the statute One who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality EXTREMELY DANGEROUS in character is bound to take EXCEPTIONAL precautions to prevent injury being done thereby. The care required is a great or high degree, or the HIGHEST degree of precaution. The presumption DOES NOT APPLY to those whose occupation or business REQUIRES the possession or use of a firearm, such as peace officers or armed forces, or in the case of poison, the drug companies or stores. WRT to COMMON CARRIERS Common carriers from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in the vigilance over the goods and safety of passengers transported by them according to all circumstances of each case. The law on averages under the Code of Commerece cannot be applied in

IN ALL CASES, violation must be the PROXIMATE CAUSE.

RIL made a special defense by Isidro to allege negligence of the truck driver and Layugan. IAC ruled RIL as the basis for holding Layugan negligent. RIL N/A because there’s direct (clear & convincing) evidence Why? Because the mode of proof only, so when there’s evidence, use evidence / facts so that judgment will be based on facts and not presumptions

 

3. Res Ipsa Loquitor Layugan v IAC
FACTS: A truck bumped into the plaintiff while he and a companion were repairing the tire of their parked truck along the right side of the highway. He sustained injuries. Defendant contends that the proximate cause was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install an early warning device. IAC concluded that under the doctrine, the plaintiff was negligent. The question is whether the doctrine was applicable. HELD: Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself) – Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have he management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It is not rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. It can be involved when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. It cannot be availed of when the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant to the occurrence appear. The absence of want of care of the driver has been established by clear and convincing evidence. The doctrine does not apply. RULE: Res ipsa can be involed when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

Ramos v CA
FACTS: Ramos, undergoing a gall bladder operation, went comatose because she was incorrectly intubated. HELD: Res ipsa (The thing or transaction speaks for itself) – the fact of the occurrence of the injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Requisites are: 1. the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence 2. it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants 3. the possibility of contributing conduct which would make plaintiff responsible is eliminated. The fundamental element is “control of instrumentality” which caused the damage. Generally, expert testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine is availed of by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. The doctrine is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able

CLASS

NOTES

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
accomplished if the problem is based on medical science (Cruz vs. CA). But if common knowledge can be applied, RIL applies. 

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 20

to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. RULE: In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.

Batiguin v CA
FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation on a patient. Afterwards, she was found to be feverish. When the patient submitted herself to another surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst on the left and right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material was embedded on the right side of the uterus. HELD: Res ipsa – Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from ordinary want of care. All the requisites are present in this case. (1) The entire proceedings of the caesarian were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. (2) The patient underwent no other operation which could habe caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that it could habe only been a by-product of the caesarian section. RULE: Res ipsa – Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the Defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care.

Theoretical basis for RIL: The proof should come from the defendant (RIL is the “bridge” which allows the plaintiff to reach the defendant).

DM Consunji v CA
Facts: A construction worker fell from the 14th floor when the platform assembly he was standing on fell down. Held: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that the necessary evidence is not available. The defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff has no such knowledge. It furnishes a bridge by which the plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. It is a rule of necessity. Rule: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity.


        

CLASS

NOTES

RIL applicable: No expert testimony Court adjudicated based on common knowledge fund The foundation of RIL is common knowledge evidentiary rule: doesn’t do away with presenting evidence must prove these elements: accident doesn’t occur w/o person’s negligence defendant has exclusive control over the instrumentality no contributory negligence on plaintiff’s part RIL & malpractice suits: o Gen rule: expert testimony needed (Cruz v CA) o Exception: If case can be gleaned from common knowledge (Ramos v CA) in Cruz, they didn’t provide expert testimony therefore they lost in Ramos, can use common knowledge medical malpractice domain of medical science: expert needed RIL common knowledge: no need for expert preparation for procedure if there’s failure / didn’t get the results expected, RIL n/a *question: when is a medical malpractice case common knowledge or in the domain of medical science?* RIL is NA in malpractice suits if the only showing is that the desired result was not


 

CLASS

NOTES

  

RIL applies theoretical basis: o proof is in exclusive control of defendant o bridge that connects plaintiff to the proof Prof. Casis’s problem: there’s evidence (police report, testimony & affidavit). It is like saying that even if there is evidence, one could still argue RIL to win the case. Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victim’s fault for falling off the platform.


    


 

CLASS

NOTES 

RIL applies; all elements present: o entire C-section under control & management of doctor o no other operation after C-section although there is no proof directly linking Dr. Batiquin to the rubber, applying RIL, Dr. is liable

SANCO (27-32) RES IPSA LOQUITOR – the facts or circumstances attending an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or permit an inference, of negligence on

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 21

the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. It relates to the MODE rather than the BURDEN of establishing negligence. It is NOT an exception to the rule of initial presumption of negligence, but is DESCRIPTIVE of a class of cases wherein the initial presumption is overcome by evidence inherently carrying with it implications of negligence without the necessity of proof of specific facts or conduct. WHEN DOES IT APPLY? Upon the satisfaction of 3 conditions: 1. The accident was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur unless someone is negligent 2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence 3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured COURTS ADD A FURTHER CONDITION: 4. Plaintiff had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident

automobile, and those to the plaintiff’s car were caused by plaintiff’s own negligence.


CLASS

NOTE

Applies only when both parties are negligent.

Manila Electric v Remonquillo
FACTS: Magno was repairing the “media agua” when he was electrocuted to death. The galvanized iron sheet he was holding came in contact with the electric wire. HELD: Court said Meralco was not negligent. But assuming it was Magno’s heirs still can’t recover because the proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire but the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without precaution. It is assumed that due to his age and experience, he was qualified to do the job.

HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in handling their automobile so both cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a negligence action by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant is the proximate cause of the accident, they cannot recover from each other.

Bernal v House
FACTS: Mother and child were walking along a street, with the child a few steps ahead. She got startled by an automobile and ran back to her mother. She fell into a ditch with hot water and later died. CFI denied damages to parents because they were negligent. HELD: SC held they were not. Mother and child had a right to be on that street. There was nothing abnormal in letting a child run along a few paces ahead of the mother. Contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery but could only result in reduction of damages.


CLASS

NOTES

F. DEFENSES
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Plaintiff’s negligence Contributory negligence Fortuitous event Assumption of risk Due diligence Damnum absque injuria Prescription Double recovery

proximate cause: negligence of repairman in turning with GI sheet difference between this & Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co.: o Meralco would’ve had to have been more careful if public place * The son could have sued stepbrother of his father for building the house so close to the wire*


 

CLASS

NOTES

No contributory negligence of mother & kid Even if they did have contributory negligence, it is not a bar to recovery; only mitigates

1. Plaintiff’s Negligence
Art. 2179, NCC When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Bernardo v Legaspi
FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff’s automobile by reason of defendant’s negligence in causing a collision. Court also dismissed a crosscomplaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages on the ground that the injuries sustained by his

PLDT v CA
FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Esteban’s jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
HELD: Court said that the alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 22

HELD: The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio. His jeep was running along the inside lane of the street but it swerved abruptly, causing the jeep to hit the mound. Proximate cause was the unexplained and abrupt swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the jeep was running too fast. The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife, but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. NOTES: negligence imputed included knowledge of the place. The Estebans passed that mound several times.

FACTS: For over a year, RMC’s secretary had been depositing the company’s money to her husband’s bank account, without the company noticing it. RMC sued PBC to collect the money. HELD: Court held that the proximate cause was the negligence of the bank. The bank teller was negligent in validating the duplicate copy of the deposit slip even if ccount name was left blank, contrary to the bank’s selfimposed procedure; and PBC was negligent in the selection and supervision of employees. However, Court found that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account for more than one year. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to it. Therefore: 60 - 40 ratio in damages.

Rakes v Atlantic
FACTS: The truck plaintiff was riding fell because the track sagged. The rails that they were transporting slid off the truck and caught his lag. Later, his leg was amputated. Company said Rakes was negligent because: (1) he continued his work despite having noticed the depression in the track, and (2) he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards. HELD: As to the first, Court held that Rakes had been working for less than 2 days. He could not have known that one rail was lower than the other or that the stringers and rails joined in the same place. As to the second, Court found that there was a general prohibition against walking by the side of the car. The disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not its primary cause. The Court made a distinction between the accident and the injury. If the plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the accident, he cannot recover. But if his negligence only contributed to his injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the accident should pay fpr the injury, less a sum deemed an equitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

2. Contributory Negligence
Art. 2179, NCC When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n) Art. 2214, NCC In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.


 

CLASS

NOTES

Both negligent but proximate cause is the teller allowing the practice of validating incomplete form Solution to proximate cause issue: 60-40 *Sir has doubts as to the use of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in this case*


CLASS

NOTE

Contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in awarding damages.

3. Fortuitous Event
Art. 1174, NCC Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.


 

CLASS

NOTES

Genobiagon v CA
FACTS: Rig driven by appellant bumped an 81 y.o. lady who was crossing the street. His defense was that it was the old lady who bumped his car. TC and CA found him guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.

accident v. injury o accident: can’t recover  contrib. to primary event o injury: may recover  Defendant’s contrib. – Plaintiff’s contrib. = Recovery 2 kinds of contribution: (1) contribution to the principal event; (2) contribution to his own injury

Phil. Bank of Commerce v CA


CLASS

NOTES

** Is this really a defense? **

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
FACTS: Hernandez encashed 2 checks – salaries of employees and operating expenses of the project. He chose to bring the money with him to his house in Bulacan instead of returning to the office in Cavite. On his way home, 2 robbers boarded the jeep and took the money. He ran after them, but was only able to apprehend one. He filed a request for relief from money accountability. COA denied the request. HELD: SC held in favor of Hernandez. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the 2 robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep, while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was a result of his imprudence and negligence. It was a fortuitous event, something that could not have reasonably be foreseen though it could have happened, and it did. NOTES: This case doesn’t say that robberies are fortuitous events. It just said that this particular robbery was a fortuitous event.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 23

 

there’s only one case cited because in Transpo course, Court was not always consistent whether a tire blowout is a fortuitous event or not *how different is a tire blowout from a fire?* *memorize elements of Fortuitous Event*

without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected. (3) Assuming that the cause was force majeure, Gotesco could still be held liable because it was guilty of negligence. NOTE: Res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.

NOTES: Sir said force majeure is not the same as Acts of God.

Juntilla v Funtanar
FACTS: Plaintiff was seated in the front passenger seat of a public utility jeepney when the right tire blew up. He was thrown out of the jeep and suffered injuries. He also lost his omega watch. HELD: SC said that there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. Jeep was running at a very fast speed and was overloaded. In this case, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of human will. It was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical defects in the tire. CHARACTERISTICS OF CASO FORTUITO: 1. Cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation must be independent of human will. 2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it is impossible to avoid. 3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. Obligor must be free from participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.


  

CLASS

NOTES

Ong’s incompetence is not equal to Act of God not necessarily Act of God just because there are no / unknown explanations even assuming that there’s FE, Gotesco is still liable because there’s implied warranty in public places o still negligent Just because you cannot explain it, it does not necessarily mean that it is fortuitous.

Servando v Philippine Steam
FACTS: Plaintiffs loaded their cargo on board appellant’s vessel. Cargoes were discharged unto the warehouse of Bureau of Customs. A fire of unknown origin razed the warehouse, destroying the remaining cargo. HELD: Court said that where the fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. Caso fortuito – an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. In this case, there was not a shred of proof that the cause of the fire was in any way attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. NOTE: event. This case established that fire is a fortuitous


  

CLASS

NOTES

robbery in this case was FE o but not all robberies are FE’s some human acts can be considered FE it may be an accident but not really FE

Gotesco Investment v Chato
FACTS: Chato and 15 yo daughter went to see a movie at the theater owned by Gotesco. Balcony collapsed and they sustained injuries. Chato even went to Illinois for further treatment. Gotesco’s defense: force majeure. HELD: (1) Having interposed force majeure as a defense, Gotesco had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. This Gotesco did not do. Its own witness admitted that he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. (2) Force majeure – inevitable accident or casualty; even which we could neither foresee nor resist; any accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively


 

CLASS

NOT ES

Many possibilities were pposed by the Court to justify that the tire blowing up was not a fortuitous event. Important: memorize characteristics of caso fortuito


CLASS fire was FE

NOTES

Hernandez v COA

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted by the engineers, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the incident. Respondents did not even show that the plans, specs and design of the school building were defective. On the other hand, city building official testified that the school obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy; same official gave go signal for repairs of damage of typhoon and subsequently authorized the use of the entire 4th floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and repair of the school building was regularly undertaken; and that no complaints have been lodged in the past. Therefore, petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of the school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause. CASO FORTUITO – event which takes place by accident and could not have been reasonably foreseen, it is an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. 2 GENERAL CAUSES: 1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc. 2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibition, etc.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 24

*it was taken for granted that a fire is a fortuitous event (there was no explanation given why fire was a fortuitous event)*

Afialda v Hisole
FACTS: Caretaker of carabaos was gored by a carabao and he later died as a consequence of his injuries. Action was predicated on Art 1905 CC. HELD: Court said A1905 makes possessory user of animal liable for any damages it may cause. In this case, the animal was under the control of the caretaker. It was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal under these circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

National Power v CA
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for damages against NPC for loss of lives and property caused by the flooding of Norzagaray, Bulacan. They claimed that despite knowledge of the impending entry of the typhoon Kading, NPC failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level so when the water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit, NPC suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened 3 of the dam’s spillways. HELD: SC did not accept defense of force majeure. PRINCIPLE OF ACT OF GOD strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering inot the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether to be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized.


CLASS

NOTES

inherent risks voluntarily & knowingly assumed by caretaker when he agreed to be caretaker

Ilocos Norte v CA
FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her house to check on her grocer store. She waded in waistdeep flood and got electrocuted. According to the NPC Engr, there were no INELCO linemen who were going around. HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioner’s claim, the maxim “violenti non fit injuria” does not apply here. Isabel should not be punished for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal in injury. A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger, he must abide by the consequence, if an emergency is found to exist, or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.


  


CLASS NOTES the flooding of the Angat River was not FE but due to the negligence of NPC is typhoon a force majeure? No because in this case there was negligence *so is force majeure really a defense then?*     

CLASS

NOTES

Southeastern College v CA
FACTS: During a typhoon, school’s roof was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of respondent’s house. A team of engineers conducted an ocular inspection and found that the causes may have been the U-shaped formation of the building and the improper anchorage of the trusses to the roof beams.

typhoon is FE flying roof is FE typhoon was proximate cause of damage to neighboring house *take this case for definition of force majeur* *credibility of ocular inspection discredited so this is strange because this runs counter to Gotesco* *they could have used RIL*


CLASS

NOTES

4. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Rule is the Emergency Rule: A person is excused from the force of the assumption of risk rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
FACTS: A jeep and a bus collided. Their owners refused to pay damages to the injured passenger. HELD: SC held that testimonial evidence of due diligence, in order to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence. Mere formulation of various company policies on safety (as testified by Christian Bautista), without showing documentary proof that they were being followed or complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. NOTES: defense of due diligence is plausible when defendant has presented enough evidence to overcome the presumption of negligence. It is not enough that it is alleged. (Sir: MMTC said that it was not enough to issue manuals etc, but implementation or actual enforcement is more important.)

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 25

consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. *SANGCO (pp.81-84) NOTES: VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: applies to noncontractual relations; 3 requisites: (1) plaintiff had actual knowledge of the damage; (2) he understood an appreciated the risk from danger; (3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.

Allied Banking v CA
FACTS: Apr 1, 1976 – Yujuico obtained loan fr GenBank payable on or before Apr 1, 1977 - Mar 25, 1977 – Monetary Board issued resolution forbidding GenBank from doing business in Phils. - Allied acquired all assets and assumed all liabilities of GenBank - Feb 7, 1979 – Allied filed complaint against resp Joselita for collection of a sum of money - 1987 – in the course of the proceedings, resp sought to implead Central Bank and Aurellano as 3rd party defendants. It was alleged that by reason of the tortous interference by the CB with affairs of GenBank, resp was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan. - RTC denied admission of 3rd party complainant. - Petitioner claims that cause of action has already prescribed. Since it was founded on tortuous interference, it prescribes in 4 yrs. Petitioner believes that the cause of action accrued on Mar 25, 1977, the date when Monetary Board ordered GenBank to desist from doing business in the Philippines. Complainant should have filed before Mar 25, 1981. - Respondent relies on the Doctrine of Relations or Relations Bank Doctrine to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed 3rd party defendant accrued only on Dec 12, 1986 when the decision became final and executory. Thus, it is contended that while the 3rd party complaint was filed only on Jun 17, 1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on Feb 7, 1979, when the complain in the case was filed. HELD: Action for damages arising from QD should be filed within 4 yrs from the day cause of action accrued. The cause of action in this case accrued on Mar 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GenBank to desist fr doing biz in the Phils, while 3 rd party complaint was filed only on Jun 17, 1987 the action has prescribed. NOTE, MEMORIZE ME (in footnote so not doctrine)! “Relations Bank Doctrine” – principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law to have been done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well recognized application to proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or to

5. DUE DILIGENCE Ramos v PEPSI
FACTS: Ramos’ car collided with Pepsi truck driven by Andres Bonifacio. HELD: SC found Bonifacio negligent, but absolved Pepsi for having sufficiently proven that it exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver (background check, clearance, previous experience, physical exam, driver’s exam- theoretical and practical driving exams). In order that defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver’s license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service. The presumption of negligence on the part of the master or employer, either in the selection of servant/ employee or in their supervision, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant/employee may be rebutted if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision, he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family.


 

CLASS

NOTES

it is not enough that the company provides manuals there has to be proof of enforcement and actual application

6. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA 7. PRESCRIPTION Kramer v CA
FACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided - 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collision was due to M/V Asia’s negligence -1982: Coast Guard suspended 2nd mate of M/V Asia. -1985: Petitioners instituted complaint for damages against respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on the basis of prescription. HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to Art. 1146, action based on quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 yrs. Prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict was committed.

Metro Manila v CA

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it, and that the lighted torch set it on fire. ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 26

prevent injustice and the occurrence of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy.

ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the death of the victims? HELD: The proximate cause of the death of the victims was their failure to take precautionary measures for their safety. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank, especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person would undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. More so with Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. Note: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of proximate cause.


 

CLASS

NOTES

Take note of Relations Bank Doctrine *Not sure if Relations Bank Doctrine is ratio in this case*

HELD: The overturning of the bus, and not the fire that burned the bus, is the proximate cause. The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of the passengers and the call for outside help.

8. DOUBLE RECOVERY
Art. 2177, NCC Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.


CLASS

NOTES

IV.

CAUSATION 

Definition #1 of proximate cause according to Bataclan v. Medina: Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Definition #2 of proximate cause according to Bataclan vs. Medina: More comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an in jury to some person might probably result therefrom.


    

CLASS

NOT ES

A. Proximate cause

CLASS

NOTES

Government negligence was not the proximate cause because it was not continuing. The claimant must establish that he had no negligence. A higher degree of diligence is expected from an expert. Prof. Casis included the case to show that it is not necessary to attend school to be an expert. Quoted Taylor, but it should have been Rakes

Usually it’s the shorter definition that’s being cited in the other cases. So for our purpose-shorter version The longer version can be shortened by removing “sufficient intervening cause” *memorize definition of proximate cause*

Urbano v IAC
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. On November 14, he died of tetanus. ISSUE: WON the hacking by Urbano of Javier was the proximate cause of Javier’s death. ---NO. HELD: The tetanus, not the hacking, was the proximate cause of Javier’s death. The death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused (People v Cardenas). Medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The

1. Definition Bataclan v Medina
FACTS: A bus speeding on its way to Pasay City at 2am when one of its front tires burst, as a result of which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch, and turned turtle. 4 passengers were unable to get out of the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in the neighborhood. At 2:30am, 10 men came, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick fueled with petroleum. When they approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4 passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline

Fernando v CA
FACTS: Bertulano was invited to bid for the reemptying of a septic tank, which had not been cleaned for 19 years. Before the award was made (he lost), he and 4 companions surreptitiously entered the septic tank, without clearance from the market master. They died in the septic tank due to the intake of toxic gas produced from the waste matter therein.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Pilipinas Banking v CA
FACTS: Florencio Reyes issued two post-dated checks. To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB to effect a withdrawal from his savings account there and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Santos, who made the deposit, wrote the wrong account number on the deposit slip, but wrote the name of Florencio Reyes as the depositor’s name. The Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, seeing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, deposited the amount in the account of Florencio Amador. ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to Reyes? HELD: The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of Pilipinas Bank’s employee in erroneously positing the cash deposit of Reyes in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. The employee should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption. Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary care that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable cause. Note: Different definition of PC from Bataclan case. This case adds the element of foreseeability. Prof. Casis’s opinion: There’s no basis for this additional element. Under Art. 2202, foreseeability should not be a factor.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 27

infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Note: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of proximate cause.

Quezon City v Dacara
FACTS: At about 1AM, Dacara, (son of petitioner), while driving a Toyota Corolla, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings (accident mound) found at Matahimik St. The lower court found that no evidence was presented that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed in the said street. ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident? HELD: The negligence of the Quezon City Government was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Note: Followed Bataclan’s definition.

Phoenix Construction Inc. v IAC
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the right hand side of the street in such a manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna St., partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30AM, Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on “bright” and saw the truck looming 2 ½ meters away from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck. ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident? HELD: The wrongful and negligent parking of the truck, and not the negligence of Dionisio, was the proximate cause of the accident. The truck driver’s negligence was far from being a passive and static condition and was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision of Dionisio’s car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver’s negligence. The improper parking of the truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna St. and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held liable. What the petitioners describe as an “intervening cause” was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. Quoting Posser and Keeton on “Foreseeable intervening causes”: If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonable to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent xxx because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may e negligent only for that reason. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence. Note: Court mentioned foreseeability.


CLASS

NOT ES

An admission by the court that proximate cause is what they think is fair in each case.

2. Distinguished from other kinds a. Remote Gabeto v Araneta
FACTS: Gayetano (husband of plaintiff) and Ilano took a carromata to go to a cockpit. When the carromata was about to move, Araneta held the reins of the horse, saying he hailed the carromata first. Driver Pagnaya pulled the reins to take it away from Araneta’s control, as a result of which, the bit came off the horse’s mouth. Pagnaya fixed the bridle on the curb. The horse, free form the control of the bit, moved away, causing the carromata to hit a telephone booth and caused it to crash. This frightened the horse and caused it to run up the street with Gayetano still inside the carromata.

CLASS

NOT ES

*Sir said that there is a problem with foreseeability as an element. So as a solution, if there’s a case similar to Pilipinas Bank, apply Pilipinas Bank definition*

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened except but for such condition or occasion.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 28

Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, causing injuries from which he soon died. ISSUE: WON Araneta is liable for Gayetano’s death. ---NO. HELD: Araneta’s act of stopping the rig was too remote from the accident to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. After Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and an appreciable interval of time elapsed before the horse started to career up to the street. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

CL ASS

NOTE


If the concurrent act was the proximate cause, the degree of participation does not matter.  What is the rule on liability? –liability is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury

CL ASS

NOTE

The remote cause was noted to be the wound of Urbano.

Sabido v Custodio
FACTS: Custodio, a passenger of a bus, was hanging onto its left side. While the bus was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and downward slope, a speeding truck going in the opposite direction side-swiped Custodio, who died as a result thereof. ISSUE: Who was negligent and what is the extent of liability? ---BOTH solidarily liable. HELD: The carrier and its driver were negligent for allowing Custodio to hang by the side of the bus. The truck driver was also negligent for speeding through the middle portion of the road. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of Custodio’s death. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor.

b. Concurrent Far Eastern Shipping Company v CA
FACTS: A ship owned by FESC rammed into the apron of the pier. Kavankov was the master of the vessel. Gavino was the compulsory pilot. ISSUE: Who was negligent --- Gavino or Kvankov? ---BOTH. HELD: Both Gavino (compulsory pilot) and Kavankov (master of the vessel) were concurrently negligent. Gavino was negligent for failing to react on time; Kavankov was negligent in leaving the entire docking procedure up to Gavino instead of being vigilant. Negligence, in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. Where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the whole damage. Reason: It is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Note: Liability of concurrent negligence = solidary.


 

CLASS

NOT ES

Classical description of remote cause with series of events. It is not the counting of the time but the SERIES

Urbano v IAC
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. On November 14, he died of tetanus. ISSUE: WON the hacking was the proximate cause of Javier’s death. ---NO. HELD: There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with which Urbano had nothing to do. Citing Manila Electric v. Remoquillo: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than


CL ASS

NOTE

Prof. Casis thinks that this is a problematic case because the facts would indicate that the victim was at fault because he was negligent.

3. Tests

a. “But for” Bataclan v Medina

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES

Prof. Casis thinks that this case should not be cited for the substantial factor test because the SC did not apply the test; only the CA did. Substantial factor = Main cause, not the only cause Important : memorize the test *This is the only case that defines substantial factor test* *Also see Pilipinas Bank*

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 29

Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Note: Italicized phrase=”but for” test

   


 

because an actor’s negligence is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm was sustained even if the actor were negligent. The converse of the rule: a negligent act cannot be said to be the proximate cause of an accident unless the accident could have been avoided without such negligent act.

CL ASS

NOTE

Refers to absolute cause This is the strictest test

b. Substantial Factor

1 SANGCO (pp. 103-114) Tests of proximate cause 1. Cause in fact  Traditionally, courts have used the term proximate cause as descriptive of the actual “cause in fact” relation which must exist between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury before liability may arise.  The first step is to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was a factor in causing plaintiff’s damage.  If the injury as to causes, in fact show that the defendant’s conduct was not a factor in causing plaintiff’s damage, the matter ends there. But if it shows that his conduct was a factor in causing such damage then the further question is whether his conduct played such a part in causing the damage as would make him the author of such damage and be liable in the eyes of the law. 2. Effectiveness of the cause; ‘but for’ rule

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v IAC
FACTS: A jeep was carrying passengers to Pangasinan when its right rear wheel became detached, causing it to be unbalanced. The driver stepped on the brake, which made the jeep turn around, encroaching on the opposite lane. A Philippine Rabbit Bus from the opposite lane bumped the rear portion of the jeep. Three passengers of the jeep died as a result. The Court of Appeals ruled that the bus driver was negligent. It applied the substantial factor test: It is a rule under this test that if the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. ISSUE: Who is liable?-Jeep. HELD: The Supreme Court was not convinced by the application of the substantial factor test. Even though the bus was driving at 80-90 kph, it was still within the speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver had little time to react and had no options available: it could not swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and had tall grasses; already near the canal) or to the left (it would have it the jeep head-on). Note: The substantial factor test contains no element of foreseeability.

3. Substantial factor test under Restatement  Question to ask: Was the defendant’s conduct a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries?  The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if: a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm b) there is no law relieving the actor of liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm  It is preferable to use the ‘but for’ test in connection with the substantial factor test since the former is the adverse of the restatement formulation.

The Restatement adopts the rule that if the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.

Whether such conduct is a cause without which the injury would not have taken place (referred to as the sine qua non rule) or is the efficient cause which set in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury A cause need not be the sole cause of the injury but it is enough that it should be the concurrent proximate cause It is useful and generally adequate for determining whether specific conduct actually caused the harmful result in question but it cannot be indiscriminately used as an unqualified measure of the defendant’s liability


CL ASS

N O T E S ()

4. Foreseeability test  Negligence involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened danger or injury and conduct unreasonable in proportion to danger.  Foreseeability becomes a test in an effort to limit liability to a consequence which has a reasonably close connection with the defendant’s conduct and the harm which it originally threatened.  When the result complained of is not reasonably foreseeable in the exercise of ordinary care under all the facts as they existed, an essential element of actionable negligence is lacking.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
prudent and experienced party, fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact exist, whether they could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence, or not, would have thought at the time of the negligent act as reasonably possible to follow, if they had been suggested to his mind. 8. Orbit of the risk test

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 30

The foreseeability test is applied in conjunction with the natural and probable consequences test.

5. Natural and probable consequence test  This test is designed to limit the liability of a negligent actor by holding him responsible only for injuries which are the probable consequences of his conduct as distinguished from consequences that are merely possible. For this purpose, the term “probable” is used in the sense of “foreseeable.”  An injury is deemed the natural and probable result of a negligent act if after the event, and viewing the event in retrospect to the act, the injury appears to be the reasonable rather than the extraordinary consequence of the wrong, or such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated.  The consequence of the negligent act must be within the range of probability as viewed by the ordinary man.  The natural and probable consequences have been said to be those which human foresight can anticipate because they happen so frequently they may be expected to recur. 6. Ordinary and natural or direct consequences  This test states that, as a matter of legal policy, if negligence is a cause in fact of the injury under the criteria previously discussed, the liability of the wrongdoer extends to all the injurious consequences.  This is based on the principle that in tort, the wrongdoer is liable for all the consequences which naturally flow from his wrongful act, provided only that they are not too remote, and that as far as proximate cause is concerned, the question is not whether the damage was foreseen or foreseeable, but rather, where it in fact resulted as a direct consequence of the defendant’s act. 7. Hindsight test  The hindsight test eliminates foreseeability as an element.  A party guilty of negligence or omission of duty is responsible for all the consequences which a

result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the “condition” remains static will not necessarily affect liability. It is not the distinction which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.


This was intended to be a test of duty and not a test of proximate cause. If the foreseeable risk to plaintiff created a duty which the defendant breached, liability is imposed for any resulting injury within the orbit or scope of such injury, it is not the unusual nature of the of the act resulting in injury to plaintiff that is the test of foreseeability but whether the result of the act is within the ambit of the hazards covered by the duty imposed upon the defendant. CL ASS NOTE

CLASS NOTES The cause is the active aspect whereas the condition is the passive action that may produce the injury. It is difficult to distinguish between a cause and a condition because of the time element. A condition was a cause at some point in time. It cannot be cited in saying that cause and condition are no longer applicable in our jurisdiction because it only said that it is discredited.


Prof. Casis thinks that the 8 tests mentioned in Sangco are not practical and relevant because they are all similarly described and the courts never use them.

Manila Electric v Remonquillo
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Peñaloza’s 3-storey house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 ½ feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. ISSUE: What was the cause and condition of the accident? HELD: The cause was Magno’s own negligence. The condition was the too close proximity of the media agua, or rather, its edge, to the electrical wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of media agua.

c. Cause and Condition Phoenix v CA
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the right hand side of the street, in such a manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna Street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30 am, Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on “bright” and saw the truck looming 2 ½ meters away from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck. HELD: The distinctions between cause and condition have already been almost entirely discredited. Posser and Keeton: So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the

Rodrigueza v Manila Railroad
FACTS: The house of Rodrigueza and 3 others were burned when a passing train emitted a great quantity of

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
 as 1) negligence per se or 2) prima facie evidence of negligence. It is not an efficient intervening cause when it is already in existence during the happening of the proximate cause.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 31

sparks from its smokestack. Rodrigueza’s house was partly within the property of the Manila Railroad. ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad’s negligence was the proximate cause of the fire HELD: Yes. The fact that Rodrigueza’s house was partly on the defendant’s property is an antecedent condition that may have made the fire possible but cannot be imputed as contributory negligence because: (1) that condition was not created by himself; (2) his house remained on this ground by the tolerance, and thus consent of the train company; (3) even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. Rodrigueza’s house was built on the same spot before the defendant laid its tracks over the land. Note: Condition = plaintiff’s house was partly within the defendant’s property. Cause = the sparks on the train which was the negligent act of the defendant.

tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it, and that the lighted torch set it on fire. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause – NO. HELD: The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of passengers and the call for outside help. It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highway men after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle.

McKee v IAC
FACTS: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling in opposite directions. When the car was 10 meters away from the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted into the car’s lane. The car driver blew the horn, swerved to the left and entered the truck’s lane. He then switched on the headlights, braked, and attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause – YES.


 


CLASS

NOT ES

CLASS NOTES Rodrigueza was not guilty of contributory negligence Even if condition was created, the company is not going to be justified in negligently destroying the house

4. Efficient Intervening cause

HELD: Although it may be said that the act of the car driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. It was the truck driver’s subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measure and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision, which was the proximate cause of the tragedy.

The Court did not agree with the theory of the defense that it was the bringing of the torch which was the proximate cause as it was an act of rescue and hence cannot be considered as negligence

Manila Electric v Remonquillo
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Penaloza’s 3-story house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 ½ feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause – YES. HELD: Efficient intervening cause: the negligent and reckless act of MAgno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to


   

Bataclan v Medina
CLASS NOT ES The efficient intervening cause destroys the link between the negligent act and injury. It should occur after the purported proximate cause because it would then be a condition. Negligence of the defendant if pre-empted by the negligence of the plaintiff. The efficient intervening cause is actually a proximate cause. Although there is still lack of a definite ruling by the Court, any violation of administrative ordinances and the like would either be seen FACTS: A bus was speeding on its way to Pasay City at 2AM when one of its front tires burst, as a result of which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch, and turned turtle. Four passengers were unable to get out of the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in the neighborhood. At 2:30AM, 10 men came, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick fueled in petroleum. When they approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4 passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
 *Limited application because it’s municipal ordinance. Can you apply this if what is involved is a national statute?- You might be able to use argument by analogy*

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 32

avoid its contacting the said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.


 

impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. FACTS: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of the road. Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane and so both Picart and Smith were on the same lane. Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to the other lane quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of the pony and got injured. Picart then filed a case against Smith RATIO: The negligent acts of both parties were NOT contemporaneous. Negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of Picart by an appreciable interval. th saw the pony when he was still far and he had control of the situation. was his duty to avoid the threatened harm by bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane to avoid the collision. t take into consideration the NATURE OF HORSES and the ANIMAL NOT BEING ACQUAINTED TO CARS. ligence of Smith: when it exposed Picart and pony to danger. This negligence of Smith was the immediate and determining cause of the accident and the antecedent negligence of Picart was a more remote factor -Applied the LCCD and made the defendant liable

CLASS

NOT ES

The IC here was the “turning” What could have been the IC now becomes the remote cause

Teague v Fernandez
FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had only one stairway, in violation of an ordinance requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke out in a nearby store and the students panicked and caused a stampede. Four students died. ISSUE: WON there was an independent intervening cause – NO. HELD: the violation of a stature or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended to prevent. In the present case, the violation was a continuing violation in that the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent the specific situation of undue crowding in case of evacuation. Note: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought about by the violation. However, the court did not specifically identify the violation itself as the PC.

Urbano v IAC
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. ON November 14, he died of tetanus. ISSUE: WON there was efficient intervening cause – YES. HELD: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings, in the case at bar, show that the infection of the wound by the tetanus was an effacing intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of death.


CLASS

NOT E


Important: there should be a sequence of events

CLASS

NOT E


Was there expert testimony here or did they use RIL?-no discussion in the case

Bustamante v CA
- Practical importance of LCCD • The negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff’s peril, or should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact had an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident FACTS: Collision between a truck and a bus when the bus tried to overtake a hand tractor. Bus saw that the truck’s wheels were wiggling and that truck was heading towards his lane. Still, bus driver did not mind and

CLASS

NOT ES

4. Last Clear Chance

Rule: if the injury was caused by an act which the statute violated tended to prevent, the violation of the statute can be considered negligence per se and is the proximate cause. But this is only of limited application and is not yet settled. Effects of violation of statute is not settled. It can be: a) negligence per se, b) prima facie proof of negligence, c) rebuttable proof of negligence, d) proof of negligence


CLASS

NOT ES

Take note of the definition of last clear chance in all the cases.

Picart v Smith
*Provides for the classic definition of Last Clear Chance: the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
FACTS: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails and dinner-meeting when he collided with the dumptruck of Phoenix which was parked askew at the side of the road. Thus, Dionisio filed an action for damages against Phoenix. Phoenix invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone RATIO: The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. BUT in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case stated that it does not believe so that the general concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized in our jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the fundamental law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. -LCCD was not applied because the court thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction  

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 33

instead applied more speed. Thus, many were killed and injured. Victims’ heirs filed this case to claim damages from bus and truck RATIO: Last Clear Chance Doctrine: negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. The practical import (stated above) provides that negligent defendant shall be liable to negligent plaintiff. Thus, the LCCD does not arise where the passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. The doctrine also cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test whether one of them should be liable to the injured person. So, the doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a suit between owners and drivers but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles - did not apply LCCD

Nature of negligent act should determine liability, not sequence of events Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand? Yes, because it was still used in later cases Phoenix-1987, PBC-1997: appreciably later in time

Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA
- apply the last Clear Chance Doctrine when fault or negligence is difficult to attribute FACTS: RMC had an account in PBC and Secretary of RMC was tasked to deposit its money. However, it turns out that the Secretary would leave blank the duplicate copy of the deposit slip where the bank’s teller would validate it. Instead of writing the account number of the company in the original copy retained by the bank, Secretary would write the account number of husband. Thus, RMC’s funds were now in Secretary’s husband’s account. RMC discovered this after 7 yers and then filed a case against PBC to return its money RATIO: PBC was negligent when its employee, teller, validated a blank duplicate copy of the deposit slip. PBC was also lackadaisical in its selection and supervision on the teller since it never knew that blank deposit slips were validated until this incident . Court also applied Last Clear Chance Doctrine in saying that PBC was really negligent. LAST CLEAR CHANCE • Aka supervening negligence or discovered peril • Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequence thereof The bank had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Still, court said that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Applied 2179 of CC on contributory negligence. 60-40 ratio! 40% of the damages shall be borne by RMC; 60% by PBC


CLASS

N O T E S ()

Last clear chance contemplates a series of negligent acts. The definition of last clear chance in the case of Bustamante is deemed to be the common definition (from the point of view of recovery of plaintiff) and is defined as an exception to a rule. The doctrine of last clear chance would apply even if the plaintiff is grossly negligent. Exceptions, however, include joint tortfeasors (according to Americn Jurisprudence). Last clear chance cannot apply when there are: 1) contractual relations, 2) joint tortfeasors, 3) concurrent negligence


CLASS

NOT ES

Phoenix Construction v IAC
- basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine because of Art. 2179. However, the statements made on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine were merely obiter

The issue on the element of foreseeability: There is no general concept of last clear chance. Rather, what is more important is the nature, not the order of events. In last clear chance, timing is of the essence. In the case at hand, the truck driver’s parking askew led to an increased diligence for the driver of the car.  court should allocate risks (policy of consideration) Historical function of last clear chance: mitigate harshness of doctrine of contributory negligence

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
- Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate truck driver - did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance because the other party was not negligent

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 34

-applied LCCD in knowing whether PBC was negligent


 

CLASS

NOT ES

Elements: 1) 2 parties negligent, 2) appreciable time bet. 2 negligent acts and it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused injury Problem: overlaps with doctrine of concurrent negligence


CLASS

NOT ES

How did the case of Glan People’s Lumber affect the case of Phoeix? In the case of Glan, last clear chance was deemed to be a valid defense.

Glan People’s Lumber & Hardware v IAC
- may be used as basis against the ruling made on Last Clear Chance Doctrine in the case of Phoenix FACTS • jeep and cargo truck collided • jeepney driver came from a beach party • jeep was zigzagging • cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line in the road was wrongly painted • case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died as a result of the collision RATIO: - The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be held liable. Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance also cannot apply because there is no negligence of the other party - Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance would still absolve him from any actionable responsibility for the accident because both drivers had full view of each other’s vehicle. • The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by this time, the jeep should have stopped or swerved • Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident • It was the jeep’s driver who had the duty to seize the opportunity of avoidance and not merely rely on a supposed right to expect that the truck would swerve and leave him a clear path - The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid and complete defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts

Pantranco North express Inc v Baesa
- awareness and opportunity FACTS: • Passenger jeepney and Pantranco bus collided when Pantranco bus encroached on the jeepney’s lane • Heirs of passengers in jeepney who died filed this case against Pantranco • Pantranco wants the court to apply the doctrine of Last Clear Chance against the jeepney driver saying that the jeepney driver had the last clear chance in avoiding the collision. RATIO: - Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages - Thus, Pantranco raises the doctrine in order to escape liability - However, the court said that the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied in this case! - For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedlty had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the

existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it • In this case, jeepney driver did not know of the impending danger because he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction - Court said that the doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered • In this case, Pantranco bus was speeding and at the speed of the approaching bus prevented jeepney driver from swerving to avoid collision • Jeepney driver had NO opportunity to avoid it - Sole and proximate cause of the accident: Pantranco’s driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction - did not apply LCCD because there was no opportunity to avoid the accident and the jeepney driver was not aware of the peril.


 

CLASS

NOT E

Do not apply last clear chance under the emergency rule Important: memorize emergency rule

Ong v Metropolitan Water District
-Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied in this case because there was no negligence on the part of the Metropolitan Water District FACTS • Kid drowned in one of the pools of Metropolitan Water District • Reason why the kid drowned is unknown • Employees of the Metropolitan Water District acted as soon as calls for help were heard and tried to revive the kid but he still died • Case filed by parents of kid who drowned claiming damages against Metropolitan Water District

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
truck was guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision RATIO: • Disagreed with the CA and held that both the truck and jeepney were liable • The principle of Last Clear Chance would call for the application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the 2 colliding vehicles. It does NOT arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. • For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence - did not apply LCCD because there was a contractual obligation on the part of the carrier to transport its passengers safely

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 35

• Parents of kid claim that Metropolitan Water District may still be held liable for the doctrine of Last Clear Chance because it had the last opportunity to save the kid RATIO: • There is sufficient evidence to show that Metropolitan Water District had taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patron or prevent accidents which may cause their deaths • Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: negligence of a claimant does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence • The Last Clear Chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. • In this case, it was unknown how the kid got into the pool and whether the kid violated one of the regulations of Metropolitan Water District because he went unaccompanied. It also appears that the lifeguard responded to the call for held and immediately made all efforts to resuscitate the kid • There is no room in this case for the application of the doctrine! LCCD not applied because no negligence on the part of Metropolitan Water District was proven

• ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify the identity of the sps Canlas • The Bank should have required additional proof of the true identity of the impostor aside from their residence certificate • Applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance which states that: • Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciable later in a point of time that that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom • In this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent fraud, by simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements of banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them • For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, ASB has to bear the loss sued upon -applied the LCCD

Canlas v CA
-Last Clear Chance Doctrine can apply in commercial transactions FACTS: • 2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to Manosca • Manosca issued 2 check that bounced • Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings Bank with the 2 parcels of land as security • 2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas • mortgage was foreclosed • Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the mortgage of Manosca of the 2 properties without their consent • Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of real estate mortgage against ASB RATIO:


  

CLASS

NOT ES

Anuran v Buno
FACTS: • A passenger jeepney was parked at the side of the road since one of the passengers alighted • A motor truck, speeding, then bumped into the jeepney from behind with such violence that 3 passengers died • Thus, this case was filed by the heirs of the deceased and of the injured to recover damages from the driver and owner of the truck and the owner of the jeepney • CA: applied the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance and held that only the truck was liable because although the jeepney was guilty of antecedent negligence, the

The Canlas sps. were negligent in giving their title to the property to Mañosca. With regard to the special power of attorney: the SPA given to Mañosca was to mortgage so the presence of the Canlas sps. was actually not a requirement. Was there really negligence on the part of the bank even if Manosca had an SPA and the land title? In Canlas, the Court talked about 2 definitionsshort and long: take note of these

Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v CA
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine is NOT applicable in culpa contractual FACTS: • LC Diaz had a savings account with Solidbank.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 36

• After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took so long so he had to leave the passbook • Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody else (not the messenger or any employee of LC Diaz) and was able to withdraw P300,000.00 from its account. • Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum of money against Solidbank • CA: found that Solidbank was negligent and it had the last clear chance to avoid the injury if it had only called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal RATIO: • In this case, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual • The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. However, in this case, they failed to do this. • Solidbank was supposed to return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative, but here, Solidbank through teller gave it to someone else • Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of LC Diaz


CLASS

NOT E

Implied that the last clear chance doctrine is not applicable to culpa contractual

Engada v CA
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied; instead applied the emergency rule. - Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because there was no clear chance –emergency situation. FACTS • Iran driving a tamaraw jeepney • In the other lane was an isuzu pick-up that was speeding. • Right signal light was flashing but swerved to the left and encroached on the lane of tamaraw jeepney • Tamaraw jeepney tried to avoid the Isuzu pick-up but Isuzu pick-ip swerved to where tamaraw jeepney was going and so they collided • Information was then filed against the driver of the Isuzu pick-up charging him with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence RATIO: • It was the Isuzu pick-up truck’s negligence that was the proximate cause of the collision - Isuzu abandoned his lane and did not first see to it that the opposite lane was free from on-coming traffic and was available for safe passage. - After seeing the tamaraw, Isuzu did not slow down • Iran, tamaraw driver, could not be faulted when he swerved to the lane of Isuzu to the lane of Isuzu to avoid collision • Isuzu driver’s acts had put tamaraw driver in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly • EMERGENCY RULE: an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, it not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence

• Defense of Isuzu: invoked Last Clear Chance Doctrine • SC: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident - However, no convincing evidence was adduced to support this defense - Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be applied because there was no time or opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of • Thus, driver of Isuzu guilty! - did not apply LCCD because no clear chance

1 Sangco, (pp. 74-81)
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance  Also known as the doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of supervening negligence, humanitarian doctrine, doctrine of gross negligence  The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence.  A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff’s peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. 1. As a phase of proximate cause principle  The doctrine of last clear chance negatives an essential element of the defense of contributory negligence by rendering plaintiff’s negligence a mere condition or remote cause of the accident.  The failure to avoid injuring a person occupying a position of peril may be a supervening cause. 2. Elements and conditions of doctrine  Facts required: o That the plaintiff was in a position of danger and by his own negligence became unable to escape from such position by the use

• Thus,
• •

Solidbank was negligent in not returning the passbook to messenger of LC Diaz  proximate cause CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance… Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case because Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of contractual obligation to LC Diaz This case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract

 LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor and so liability of Solidbank should be reduced.—40-60 - LCCD not applied

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
 Between the defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent.  LCC applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.

c(~_∗)o
Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA

PAGE 37
Yes Just to know if PBC was negligent but damages were divided 40-60 Truck driver (other party in the collision) was not negligent There was no opportunity to avoid the accident and driver was not aware of the peril Defendant was not negligent There was contractual relation Defendant bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud Note: there was no contractual relation between Canlas and the bank Liability of bank arose from culpa contractual and so doctrine cannot be applied

of ordinary care, either because it became physically impossible for him to do so or because he was totally unaware of the danger. o The defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a position of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the plaintiff was unable to escape therefrom o That thereafter the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed to exercise such last clear chance and the accident occurred as a proximate result of such failure  To state a cause of action, the pleader must disclose: o The exposed condition brought about by the negligence of plaintiff or the injured party o The actual discovery by the defendant of the perilous situation of the person or property injured in time to avert injury o Defendant’s failure thereafter to exercise ordinary care to avert the injury 3. Parties who invoke doctrine

RMC (one of the parties who caused the accident)

Glan v IAC

Summary on Last Clear Chance
The Last Clear Chance Doctrine renders plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a mere condition Invoked by the plaintiff Cannot be invoked by joint tortfeasors Case Plaintiff WON Why? applied the LCCD Picart vs. Picart (one YES Smith had a Smith of the parties clear who caused opportunity the collision) to avoid the accident Bustamante Passengers NO No Picart v Picart (one Yes Smith had Smith of the clear parties who opportunity caused the to avoid the collision) accident Bustamante v Passengers No No negligent CA of the bus plaintiff because the plaintiff in the case are the passengers of the bus who are asking for damages Phoenix v Phoenix No Doctrine IAC (one of the was not parties who carried over caused the to the CC collision)

Pantranco Baesa

v

Heirs of the driver of the jeep (one of the parties who caused the collision) Heirs of the passengers of jeepney (no contract)

No

No

Ong v Metropolitan Anuran Buno Canlas v CA v

Many courts take the view that the doctrine of last clear chance is not available to defendant. LCC can only be invoked in favor of the person injured, since it implies contributory negligence on his part, and is, generally speaking, only operative in those cases where, notwithstanding the injured person’s want of care, another person wantonly, or with knowledge of the perilous situation of the person injured carelessly or recklessly injured him.  The doctrine embraces successive acts of negligence: primary negligence on the part of the defendant then contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff which creates a situation of inextricable peril to him and then becomes passive or static followed by the subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to avoid injury to the plaintiff.  Although the defendant may not invoke the doctrine, it does not preclude him from proving that the plaintiff had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury complained of and thus establish that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately caused the accident and consequently bars plaintiff’s recovery.

Parents of the deceased Heirs of the passengers of jeep (with contract) Canals (one of the parties who caused the incident) – for the annulment of the deed

No No

Yes

Consolidated Bank v CA

LC Diaz – for the recovery of the sum of money

No

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES
No

- CASIS
There was no clear chance in avoiding the accident because it was an emergency situation

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
A. Possessor of animals
Art. 2183, NCC The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.  

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 38

Engada v CA

Inured party (owner of the Tamaraw)

Remote control argument does not lie. This is a strict liability case. Does it matter if the dog is tame? No. Law covers even tame animals as long as they produce injury Dog follows the house: accessory follows the principal (so would a rat living in the house make the house owners liable if the rat bites a guest and causes the latter’s death?)


CLASS

NOT ES

Vestil v IAC
FACTS: Theness Uy was bitten by Andoy, the dog of Vestil’s father, when the victim was playing with Vestil’s child in their compound. Theness, who was only 3 yrs old, was brought to the hospital and was later discharged, but after 9 days she was readmitted for exhibiting signs of hydrophobia and vomiting of saliva. The next day she died of broncho-pneumonia. -Uys sued Vestil for being the possessor of Andoy. Vestils claimed that they don’t own the dog, that it was a tame animal, and that Theness provoked the dog so it bit her. HELD: The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. - While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. - It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

B. Things thrown or falling from a building Art. 2193 The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.

According to Sangco, the last clear chance doctrine is a phase of contributory negligence. It is considered in determining proximate cause and should only apply when there is a time sequence.

Other names: doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of supervening negligence, doctrine of gross negligence, humanitarian doctrine.  Last clear chance doctrine considered to determine the proximate cause.  Last clear chance doctrine should not apply when there is a time sequence.  The elements of the doctrine of last clear chance: a) the plaintiff is in danger b) the defendant knew of plaintiff’s state c) the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident Who may invoke? Solely for plaintiff’s benefit

CLASS

NOT ES

This provision applies regardless of how things fell from the house. Dingcong v Kanaan

V. STRICT LIABILITY
Black’s Law Dictionary definition:
Liability does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe. It most often applies either to ultra hazardous activities or in product liability cases. It is also known as “absolute liability” or “liability without fault.”

FACTS: -The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central Hotel. Kanaan, et.al. rented the ground floor of house where they established the “American Bazaar”. Echeverria rented room in the hotel. -One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open when retiring to bed, causing the water to run off and spill to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the ground floor. Kanaans filed complaint for damages against Echevarria and Dingcongs. HELD: -Echevarria is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. -Dingcong, being a co-tenant and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes.


CLASS

NOT E

Test: when the conditions provided in the law exist, you are already liable

CLASS

NOT ES

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES
NOT E

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 39



CLASS

Is A2193,CC applicable in this case? Prof. Casis seems to believe otherwise since A2193 speaks of the liability of a head of family when a structure or similar object falls off the balcony or second storey of his building. Dingcong is not the head of a family. Can water be considered as a thing thrown or falling?

or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.

Afable v Singer Sewing Machine
FACTS: -One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan, a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, while riding his bicycle was run over and killed by a truck. At the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections. -The widow and children of Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812. The complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428. RATIO: -The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". -The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. -As a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. -If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle


 

CLASS

NOT E

C. Death/Injuries in the course of employment Art. 1711 Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

Defenses available to an employer: a) notorious negligence, b) voluntary act of the employee and c) drunkenness. Case distinguishes “arising out of” and “in the course of.” The first refers to the origin or cause of the accident. The latter refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.

D. Product liability
Art. 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.


  

CLASS

NOT ES

Who is liable? Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles Under what circumstances? Death or injuries caused by noxious or harmful substances Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed goods (even if goods were stolen)


  

CLASS

NOT ES

Who is liable? Employers, owners of establishment Who are they liable to? Laborers, employees Under what conditions? Death or illness arising out of the course of employment

Consumer Act
Art. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof.

Art. 1712 If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
established in the pertinent provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable. Art. 107. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any provision of this Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations with respect to any consumer product which is not food, cosmetic, or hazardous substance shall upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more that one (1) year or both upon the discretion of the court. In case of judicial persons, the penalty shall be imposed upon its president, manager or head. If the offender is an alien, he shall, after payment of fine and service of sentence, be deported without further deportation proceedings. CHAPTER VI. Prohibited Acts and Penalties (RA3720 – Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) Sec. 11. The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited: (a) The manufacture, sale, offering for sale or transfer of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. (b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic. (c) The refusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by Section twenty-seven hereof or to allow samples to be collected. (d) The giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) hereof which guaranty or undertaking is false, except by a person who relied upon a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person residing in the Philippines from whom he received in good faith the food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) which guaranty or undertaking is false. (e) Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag label, or other identification device authorized or required by regulations promulgated under the provisions of this Act.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 40

A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) presentation of product; (b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it; (c) the time it was put into circulation. A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market. The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when it evidences: (a) that it did not place the product on the market; (b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect; (c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault. Art. 99. Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) the manner in which it is provided; (b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it; (c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques. The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven: (a) that there is no defect in the service rendered; (b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault. Art. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress

( f ) The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under this Act, any information acquired under authority of Section nine, or concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection. (g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded. (h) The use, on the labeling of any drug or in any advertising relating to such drug, of any representation or suggestion that an application with respect to such drug is effective under Section twenty-one hereof, or that such drug complies with the provisions of such section. (i) The use, in labeling, advertising or other sales promotion of any reference to any report or analysis furnished in compliance with Section twenty-six hereof.


CLASS

NOT ES

Is a restaurant owner a seller or a processor? Could the company stipulate limited liability? No. A106 of the Consumer Act. If basis is not Consumer Act, you can use 2187 on strict liability which is a powerful provision except against sellers (law on SALES will be the basis in this case) Elements of 2187: 1) causal link 2) manufacturers, processors What do you mean by similar goods?-Sangcoconsumed by humans. Question: What about those consumed by animals? Do you apply strict liability even if defendant exercised due diligence? Yes. Precisely why it is called strict liability

 

Coca-Cola v CA
FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school canteen. A group of parents complained that fibrous materials were found in the softdrink bottles bought by their children. Upon inspection by the DOH, the bottles

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
article preclude an action for breach of contract and warranty. 2. Requisites of liability under Art. 2187, Civil Code (1) Defendant is a manufacturer or processor of foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods; (2) He use noxious or harmful substances in the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles consumed or used by the plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff’s death or injury was caused by the product so consumed or used; and (4) The damages sustained and claimed by the plaintiff and the amount thereof.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 41

were found to be adulterated. The sales of Geronimo drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop. She brought an action for damages against Coca-cola and the trial court ruled that the complaint was based on a contract, not quasi-delict and should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the softdrinks. Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict and should prescribe in 4 years. HELD: The Court sided with Geronimo. The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.

5. Proof of causation • One seeking recovery has the burden of proof that the resulting illness was caused by the deleterious food. • A manufacturer’s strict liability in tort should be defined in terms of the safety of the product “in normal and proper use.” The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was using the product in the way it was intended to be used. 6. Who may recover


  

The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer and particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff. 3. Persons who may be held liable, and for what products Manufacturers and processors who used noxious or harmful substances may be held liable. -sellers of the enumerated goods which turn out to be injuriously defective CANNOT be held liable for the obvious reason that they have nothing to do either with the defect or with the manufacture of such product • Products: limited to “foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods” 4. Proof that food product was defective or unwholesome • The one seeking to recover is under the duty of proving with reasonable certainty that the food eaten was in fact deleterious.

A purchasing and non-purchasing consumer or user of a defective food product or toilet article is entitled to recover damages for physical injuries caused thereby. 7. Compensable Damages • Expressly limited to “death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substance used” by “manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods.” • Applicable only to personal injuries, which includes death, and only damages arising therefrom. This precludes claims for purely pecuniary or commercial losses in absence of personal injuries. 8. Unavoidably unsafe product • The seller of unavoidably unsafe products, with qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with apparently reasonable risk. Liability for negligence in food products. • To constitute negligence an act must be one from which a reasonably careful person would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him to forego the act or to do it in a more careful manner. • Whether recovery is sought under strict liability or on fault or negligence, it would seem contributory negligence would diminish recovery.

CLASS

NOT ES

Requisites of 2187: 1) death or injury caused by noxious substance and 2) by manufacturer or processor What is “similar goods?” – Anything intended to be consumed by humans. What if the person who consumed the goods did not buy them but stole them? – The manufacturer/processor may still be held liable.

II SANGCO (p. 714-734) Product Liability 1. Governing law: Art. 2187, NCC • The elimination in this article of both fault or negligence and contract as the basis of liability thereunder are the essence of strict liability. The consumer’s cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement. • However, Art. 2187 does not preclude an action based on negligence for the same act of using noxious or harmful substance in the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles, or similar goods which caused the death or injury complained of, if the injured party opts to recover on that theory. Neither does this

Proof of a defect in the product may not be supplied by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, unless the product is one whose character and content must necessarily have remained unchanged since it left the manufacturer’s possession. • Expert testimony is generally necessary to prove the defect in the product. • It must appear that the unwholesome or unsound quality of the food product in question existed at the time the defendant sold it, and did not come into existence thereafter.

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition and subsequent mishandling or other causes makes it harmful by the time it is consumed.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 42

a. Duty of care of manufacturer or processor of food. The duty owed to the consumer by the manufacturer of food products intended for human consumption is commensurate with the danger and the possible and probable result of a lack of care. A high degree of care is required of the producer of foods (in the production of such product, advertising, inspecting the ingredients and warning the consumers of possible injury from consumption of a food). b. Duty of care of restaurant operator A restaurateur has no duty to serve “perfect” products. But the law of negligence requires him to exercise a care proportionate to the serious consequences that may follow from a want of care. c. Duty of seller other than restaurant operator. A vendor of provisions selected, sold, and delivered to the purchaser for his immediate use is bound to know the peril that the provisions are sound and wholesome and fit for immediate use, and if they turn out to be unsound and not wholesome, and the purchaser is injured thereby, the vendor is liable to him. d. Duty of warning; inspecting; testing. A manufacturer or seller of a product which, to his actual or constructive knowledge, involves danger to users has a duty to give warning of such danger. As a matter of elementary logic, no duty to warn arises with respect to a product which is not in fact dangerous. The vendor of food should indemnify his vendee against latent defects contained in the product which the vendee, by inspection or taste, could not have discovered himself. The test of commodities required is no more than that commonly or usually practised by careful dealers under the same conditions and circumstances, which is at least as high a duty of care as the consumer expects or has the right to expect of his groceryman or food dealer. Note:


 

he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered.

CLASS

NOT ES

Important: Requisites of 2187 in Sangco If it falls under A2187, can you still sue for breach of contract? Sangco says, yes.


CLASS

NOT ES

Had legal liability but not under A1314. Is malice required to apply A1314? No damages were due from Espejo because no malice was proven (the motive was only to make profit). Is malice an element of tortuous interference? Court does not say that it is.


E. Interference with contractual relations
Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. 

So Ping Bun v CA
FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease agreement with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially for 1 year but were continued on month to month basis upon expiration of the 1 yr. Tek Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek Hua formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. However, the stalls were occupied by the grandson (So Ping Bun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua under business name Trendsetter Marketing. -new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to THE, although not signed. -THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the stalls so THE would be able to go back to business BUT instead, SO PING BUN SECURED A NEW LEASE AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN. ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right. - Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.

Gilchrist v Cuddy
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the “Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. -Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. -Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties HELD: YES, Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. -ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
 Sir said that it seems this is the case right now: You can compete in Business Contracts as long as intention is financial interest and there is no malice. If this is the case, then one cannot recover from 1314 as against the third party.

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 43

- One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if: a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. - elements of tort interference: a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse - Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. - The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. - The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314.

AQUINO, (pp. 795-801) Interference with contracts: A. Statutory provision and rationale: Under Article 1314 of the Civil Code, a third party may sue a third party not for breach of contract but for inducing another to commit such breach. This tort is known as interference with contractual relations. Such interference is considered tortious because it violates the rights of the contacting parties to fulfill the contract and to have it fulfilled, to reap the profits resulting therefrom, and to compel the performance by the other party. The theory is that a right derived from a contract is a property right that entitles each party to protection against all the world and any damage to said property should be compensated. B. History: This particular tort started in the UK in Lumley vs, Gye in 1853 and was first adopted in the Philippines in 1915 in Gilchrist vs Cuddy. C. Elements: 1. Existence of a valid contract: This existence is necessary and the breach must occur because of the alleged act of interference. No tort is committed if the party had already broken the contract. Neither can action be maintained if the contract is void. However, there is authority for the view that an action for interference can be maintained even if the contract is unenforceable. The view is that inducement, if reprehensible in an enforceable contracts, is equally reprehensible in an unenforceable one. 2. Knowledge on the part of the third party of the existence of the contract: The elements do not include malice as a necessary act in interference. However, the Supreme Court in its various rulings have held that the aggrieved party will only be entitled to damages if malice was present in the commission of the tortious act. It was held that mere competition is not sufficient unless it is considered unfair competition or the dominant purpose is to inflict harm or injury. 3. Interference of the third party without legal justification or excuse: In general, social policy

permits a privilege or justification to intentionally invade the legally protected interests of others only if the defendant acts to promote the interests of others or himself if the interest which he seeks to advance is superior to the interest invaded in social importance. Competition in business also affords a privilege to interfere provided that the defendant’s purpose is a justifiable one and the defendant does not employ fraud or deception which are regarded as unfair. D. Extent of liability: The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was induced to break the contract can be held liable. This is consistent with Article 2202 if the contracting party who was induced to break the contract was in bad faith. However, when there is good faith, the party who breached the contract is only liable for consequence that can be foreseen. In fact, it is possible for the contracting party to be not liable at all, as in the case where the defendant prevented him from performing his obligation through force or fraud.

F. Liability of local government units
Art. 2189 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Guilatco v City of Dagupan
FACTS: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole at Perez Blvd. which is owned by the national Government. She fractured her right leg, thus was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. City Engineer testified that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered. City Charter of Dagupan also says that the city supervises and manages National roads and national sidewalks. HELD: City liable - The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:

CLASS 

NOT ES

  

Did not include malice as one of the elements under A1314. Then discussed Gilchrist in saying that to award damages, there should be malice but it was never mentioned in Gilchrist in the first place. Implied malice as an element. De Leon included malice as an element. Sir said as guidance: If we apply Gilchrist and So Ping Bun, we need malice in 1314. But if question is just on the elements, just answer the three elements given by So Ping Bun. So Ping Bun was okay had it not cited Gilchrist

TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

- CASIS

A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES

c(~_∗)o

PAGE 44

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. - It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. - In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from “defective streets, public buildings and other public works.”



CLASS

NOT ES

Can last clear chance apply? Wasn’t it Guilatco’s fault that she was negligent in alighting a tricycle? No because it is under strict liability. Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of PLDT and the accident mound case (DACARA)

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful