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(a) Britain
Even in the earliest years of British Parliament, broad power to legislate by
proclamation remained with the Crown. In 1539 Royal Power to issue proclamation
for good order and governance was recognized by T4enry VIII’ s Statute of
Proclamations and such proclamations were enforced as if made by Act of Parliament
However the aforesaid statute was replaced in 1547. Thereafter the Acts of Parliament
delegated power to the crown to make laws. 19th century saw a great increase in the
delegation of legislative power to Government departments and other bodies
Delegated legislate ton is an inevitable feature of modem governance for several
reasons like pressures on parliamentary time, technicality of subject-matter, the need
for flexibility and the State of emergency. U.K. Emergency Power Act, 1920 makes
permanent provisions enabling the Executive to legislate subject to parliamentary
safeguards in the event of certain emergencies.
In 2006 the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act was passed, which gives mm- is
ters certain powers to make orders i. e. legislative reform orders that remove or reduce
burden resulting directly or indirectly from legislation.
The validity of statutory instrument may be challenged on two main grounds i.e. the
content and substance of the instrument is ultra vires the parent Act and that the
correct procedure has not been followed in making the instrument. 1 However, since
1998 the scope for challenges to the validity of delegated legislation has been
significantly widened. In 1998, the Parliament enacted Human Rights Act, 1998.
Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, 1998 casts a duty to interpret the legislation
consistently with the European Convention Rights where it is possible to do so. Thus,
the requirement of a valid subordinate law is that it should be in conformity with
European Convention Law. A Northern Ireland Sex discrimination order made a
certificate of the Secretary of State Conclusive evidence of the ground of dismissal of

R v. Environment Sec. Exp. Spath Holme Ltd., (2001) 1 All ER 195 : (2001) 2 AC 349. See also,
Rohinson v. Secretary ofStatefor Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland), (2002) UKHL 32.

a woman public officer which was violate of an European Community Council directive requiring an effective judicial remedy. 1964. (1975) 3 WLR 865 : (1976) AC 609. where Inland revenue made regulations taxing dividends and interest paid by building societies on which tax had already been paid they were declared ultra vires. v. It was held that dismissed officer could enforce the remedy in a domestic court. Lord Chancel exp. (1969) 2 All ER 582 : (1969) 1 WLR 697. (1985) 3 WLR 1027 : (1986) QB 716. R. House of Lords in Hotel & Catering Industry Training Board v. The House of Lords in Daymond . (1991) 4 All ER 92: (1990) 1 WLR 1400. Similarly.7 A provision of the prison Rules was declared ultra vires because it authorized excessive interference with prisoner’ 5 2 3 4 5 6 7 Johnston v. Ministry of Agriculture3 a ministerial order was held to be unlawjj on account of conflict with EC treaty. Automobile Ply Ltd.6 declared invalid an order of Mister of Labor which would have imposed Industrial Training Levy on Clubs which were not within the Industrial Training Act. facilities provided. In R. Inland Revenue Commissioner exp. (1997) 2 All ER 779 : (1998) QB 575. chief Constable. Woolwich Eqitable Building Society. Witham 4 the principle that no one should be deprived of access to courts except by clear words of Parliament was recognized. or rights made available. (1986) 3 All ER 135 : (1987) QB 129 (ECJ). In Britain executive has no inherent legislative power. . The Water Act 1973 empowered the authorities to levy such charges as they thought fit for services performed. V. Statutory Authority is indispensable. It is a well settled legal proposition by a catena of decisions that Parliament not intend delegated powers to be exercised for certain purposes unless by express words or by necessary implication it clearly authorizes them. The delegated legislation does not have any immunity from challenge in courts which Acts of Parliament enjoy as there is a fundamental difference between a sovereign and a subordinate law making power. Plymouth City Council 5 criticized the provisions of the Act holding that such wide language must be given limited construction so that sewage charges could not be imposed on properties not served by the city council. 2 In Bourgeois v. in such matters.

Where there is a duty to consult r because of statutory duty or a consistent practice of consultation.come support was held to deprive that person of constitutional right of access to Court. Also see. v. the consultation to be under-when the proposal is at formative stage.8 Where a building bye-law required an open space to be left at the rear of every new building. so that in many cases it became impossible to construct new buildings. sections 8 and 9 of the Tribunals and Enquiries Act. 1974 SLT 253. Court of Session in 1973 declared ultra vires a regulation made by Secretary of State for Scotland which sought to remove from qualified teachers the riht to continue education with. (1918) 2 KB 133. Minister ofAgriculture and Fisheries. Cinnamond v. (1994) QB 198 : (1993) 3 WLR 1125.out first registration with a statutory teaching council. London Passenger Transport Board v. Mundowa. Hall. (1992) 3 All ER 606 CA. See also Black Pool Corporation V. v. (1935) 154 LT 108 ( byelaw prevailing non-payment of fare unreasonable). (1980) 2 All ER 368 : (1980) 1 WLR 582. bye-laws benevolently and upholds them if possible. Similarly. Leech (No. Repton School Governors v.12 ø principle that delegates non protest delegate i. v. Locker. Malloch v. Aberdeen Corp.13 some Acts have made provisions for consultations of interest. it was held to be unreasonable. Sections 170 and 174 of the Social Services and Administration Act. has also been recogs by the courts. the courts laid down the criteria for proper consultation. Allinghans v. Lightfoot. British Airport Authority. Home Secretary exp. Secretaryfor the Home Department exp.correspondence. 2).. (1948) 1 All ER 780 DC. 1992 provides for consul. i. R. (1948) 1 KB 349 CA. Also see. Lord Chancellor exp. 11 an order by Lord Chancellor increasing court-fee payable for litigation and requiring them to be paid by someone on in. Summer. Repton RDC. (1997) QB 924 CA. Percy v. Courts have declared invalid statutory instruments which have purported to have retrospective effect in the absence of clear authority from Parliament. z contain provisions for consultation of interest. a person to whom power has j1egated cannot in turn delegate the power to another.9 But the court normally construes.J of interest. sufficient reasons must be given for proposal to enable an informed response to be 8 9 10 11 12 13 R.e.10 In R. (1999) 2 WLR 1 126 : (2000) QB 597. .e.

and the courts have power to interpret the Constitution and declare a Congressional statute unconstitutional if it does not conform with their view of the Constitution. v. (1981) 1 WLR 1522 : (1981) 3 All ER 285. 16 Where a Department failed to allow sufficient time it was held that there was no effective consultation.17 The doctrine of severability has also been applied in the context of delegated legisolation. Hutchinson. Fxparte U. In the United States.15 A ban on oral snuff was held illegal. Where there was duty to consult intended organizations before regulators were made. v. Woolwich Building Society. (1986) 1 WLR 1 (1986) 1 All ER 164. see also The Northem Ireland Commission for Children and Young People v. Coughian.. North Devon Health Authority exp. Evans. 1992 QB 53.14 A serious procedural error of a department would lead to an instrument being deader invalid.. The U. Secretary ofState. v. R. it was held mere sending of a letter to an organization didn’t amount to consultation. (1990) 3 WLR 196 : (1990) 2 AC 783. 19 (b) U. 17 R. It has been held that where either on the grounds of substance or procedure an instrument is to some extent defective this does not mean necessarily that whole instrument is a nullity. IRC exp.S. It was further held that unfair consultation process can lead to instrument being quashed. Congress functions under a written Constitution. Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd.given. Tobacco International Inc.S. (1972) 1 WLR 190 : (1972) 1 All ER 280. It may be operative to its lawful extent or be binding on the persons not affected by the defect of procedure. Agricultural Training Board v. In the 14 R. The Secretary of State. Association of Metropolitan Authorities.S. 19 DPP v. v.18 The decision of such severance is permissible only when after deletion the unlawful part of substance of provision remains essentially unchanged in purpose and effect from what had been intended.A. Peter Ham. 18 Dunkley V. Social Services Secretary exp. 15 . as during consultation process the company was not given scientific grounds on which the ban was made. (1991) 4 All ER 92. adequate time must be al4 for the response to proposals and product of consultation must be taken into account when decision is made. the position is substantially different from what prevails in Britain. 16 R. (2000) 2 WLR 622 : (2000) QB 213. (2007) NIQB 52.

as discussed earlier. 395 U.S. JAFFE.celebrated case of Yongstown & Tube Co. On the one hand. HORST P EHMKE.. AN ESSAY ON DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE PowER. 579.. in course of time.22 In the U. the U. that delegation should not be vagrant and uncontrolled. If Congress were not willing to delegate law-making power to some agency then it may be impossible for it to enact the kind and quantity of legislation which the country may need.21 Besides. being a delegate of the people.20 the United States Supreme Court ruled that American Constitution is inconsistent with the notion of executive law making authority. 47 Col LR 359 (1947). v. for to do so would amount to 20 21 22 343 U. subject to the rider that the Congrass itself should lay down standards or policies for the guidance of the delegate.A. the doctrine of separation insists that the legislative function be kept aloof and distinct from the executive function.S. cannot further delegate its law-making functions to any other agency. DELEGATE POTESTAS NOR POTEST DELEGARI—A MAxIM OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION LAw. .S. Thus. the question of delegation of legislative powers thus involves a conflict of values. i. Powell v. The doctrine means that a delegate cannot further delegate its powers.S. Mc Cormack. On the other hand. 47 Cornell LQ 50 (1961). Sawyer.A. the exigencies of modern Government make it practically impossible to concentrate all legislative power in the hands of the Congress which cannot possibly dispose of all legislative work by itself in the sense of turning out a comprehensive legislation complete in all details on every subject it undertakes to legislate upon.S. the courts have relaxed the rigors of the doctrine of separation of powers and permitted broad delegation of power. Supra. The courts thus argue that the Congress. 589 (1952). as already noted. 486 (1969). pragmatic considerations have prevailed over theoretical objections and. 369 U. 186 (1962. There also prevails the doctrine of separation of powers in the U. Baker v. Supreme Court has also invoked the doctrine of delegatus non potest delegare against delegation by the Congress. Carr. Ch. that Congress should not give a blank cheese to the executive to make any rules it likes.S.

the courts insist that the Congress should not delegate uncontrolled power to the Executive.25 is a case on the other side of the line. for the Congress declared no policy. Ryan. CASES. I. 321 US 414 (1944). The majority of the U. the statute doing so will be unconstitutional.S. Therefore. no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation was to be allowed or prohibited. If Congress transfers to others “the essential legislative functions with which it is vested”.S. There was no requirement. 434 (1935). See. becomes the primary legislator. 24 the Congress authorised the President to ban oil in inter-state commerce when produced in excess of the quota fixed by each State. Supreme Court held the Act bad. v. 293 US 388. U.23’ The principle that authority granted by the Legislature must be restricted by an adequate standard serves the theory of “separation” by ensuring that fundamental policy decisions must be made by the Legislature and not by officials. the agency. the office of the Price Administrator was set up to control prices. v. 30. and laid down no rule. JAIN. During World War II. This case is known popularly as the Hot Oil case. The relevant Act declared that the prices fixed ought to effectuate the declared policy of the Act to stabiornmodity prices with a view to prevent wartime inflation and its disruptive 23 24 25 Panama Refining Co. but that the Congress should itself declare the policy regarding the subject-matter of legislation. in the words of Justice CARDOZO. The working of the rule can be illustrated with reference to the following two cases. iii) Yakus V. established no standards. If the statute contains no standard to limit delegation of power. rather than the Congress. The test. and only the power to lay down details to effectuate that policy may be delegated to the abdication of its functions by the Congress. 293 US 388. is that “to uphold the delegation there is need to discover in the terms of the Act a standard reasonably clear whereby the discretion must be governed”. thus. (i) In Panama Refining Co.. 434 (1935). . Ryan. it amounts to giving a blank cheque to make law in the delegated area of authority and.

is a matter on which courts have adopted a liberal attitude. was. 334 US 742 (1948). but whether this test is satisfied or not in case of a specific legislation. two other cases are : Schechter v. held valid by d Supreme Court for the Congress had stated the legislative objective and had prejbed the method of achieving that objective—maximum price-fixing—and had laid down the standards to guide the Administrator’s determination. Carter v. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54 (1951). U. Carter Coal Co.S. Only in three cases of significance has the delegation been held to be excessive 50 far. In fixing prices the Administrator had to give due consideration to the prices prevailing 1ün a designated base-period. The basic premise still remains that Congress cannot delegate legislative power without prescribing standards. The delegation. There are not many examples of the United States Supreme Court declaring Congressional legislation unconstitutional because of excessive delegation of legislative power..ISLATIVE POWER. nevertheless. 298 US 238 (1936). in fixing the designated prices had conformed to those standards. AN ESSAY ON DELEGATION OF LEG.. U. .S. the prices fixed had to be fair and equitable. JAFFE. The Court found a t the standards prescribed were sufficiently definite and precise so as to enable every one to ascertain whether or not the Administrator. though in effect extremely broad. DAVIS. the courts do reserve to themselves the power to declare delegation of legislative power unconstitutional if they feel that in a given case the delegation is too broad and indefinite.causes and effects. In addition. very broad delegations have been upheld and very vague phrases have been held to be adequate as laying down standards. 295 US 495 (1935). Till that extreme point is reached. 47 Col LR 359 (1947). courts permit delegation realising that Legislature to-day has to deal with complex socio-economic problems and it may not be practical for it to meticulously lay down standards for the delegate to follow.. Lichter v. In many cases. so much so that one cornmentator has remarked that “judicial language about standards is artificial”. ALSO. 27 But still.26 The exigencies of modem Government have persuaded the çpurts to relent in their attitude towards delegation. 26 27 Besides Panama.

30 However.”31 The development of extent of delegated legislation in United States has been equally striking as in Britain. Supreme Court has upheld broad delegations because of the exigencies of the Government in modern times.S. justice Frank Furter49 has aptly warned “the power which must more and more be lodged in administrative experts. like all power is open to abuse unless it’ s exercise is properly circumscribed and zealously scrutinized for we have greatly widened the field of administrative discretion and thus opened the doors to arbitrariness.S. it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise at large by providing the courts with some measure against which to judge the official action that has been challenged. 415 US 336 (1974). 157 (1930). the people. 389 US 258 (1967). even from those who have antipathy towards social legislation. Robel. Second. v. the academic and judicial view is in favour of maintaining the docthne that delegation by Congress should be accompanied by discernible standards. California. JUSTICE HARLAN (Joined by JUSTICES DOUGLAS AND STEWART) in Arizona v. Formulation of policy is the primary responsibility of the Legislature which task is entrusted to it by the electorate. U. the public and its Government. the existence of t doctrine may lead the court to read the delegating provisions narrowly to avoid co stitutional problems. SKELLY WRIGHT.28 Even though the U. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—A CASEBOOK 1 19 (1977). 373 US 546 (1963). the Court always reiterates the doc trine of excessive delegation. .S. 81 Yale U 575 (1972). there have been calls for revitalization of th excessive delegation doctrine from many quarters. BEYOND DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE. it ensures that the fundamental policy decisions will be made not by an appointed official but by the body elected by. “In the words of leading American official study. National Cable Television Assn.29 In recent years. Also. The doctrine has never been repudiated. FRANK FURTER. U. immediately responsible to. acting under statutory authority has been a normal feature of Federal administration ever since Government was es 28 29 30 31 J. First. SCHWARTZ. v.Nevertheless. It is argued that the doctrine serves two primary functions.. “The promulgation of general regulations by the executive. though in ts practical application the courts adopt a flexible approach.

S. Just on the eve of independence. which of the two models. for many years now. in both countries. the Congress does seek to lay down some standards in the legislation delegating legislative power. in which laws enacted by the congress are published.should be followed in Indian? 32 33 34 35 See BERNARD SCHWARTz.”32 In U. See. .S. then the next question was. Province of Bihar34 that there could be no delegation of legislative power in indian beyond “ conditional legislation”-a concept referred to later.tablished. Though..S. there is a real doctrinal difference between Britain and the U. Because of the doctrine of excessive delegation in the U.S. Report of the ATTORNEY GENERAL’s COMMITTEE ON ADMIMSTRATION PROCEDURE 97 (1841) AIR 1949 FC 175. in theory. delegation of legislative power has come to be established as a technique of legislative and administrative process.A. the federal register in which delegated legislation is published is more voluminous than the statutes at Large. the last word rests with the courts on the question as to how much delegation would be permitted in a given situation. AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SECOND EDITION. while in the U. But then the broader question was whether the Legislature in Independent India should be restricted to this limited form of delegation. and broad delegations have come to be permitted.A. (c) India The question of permissible limits of delegation of legislative power became important in Independent India. or should it be given a greater freedom to resort to this technique? If the Legislature were to be permitted a greater freedom.A.A.35 This is an extremely restrictive form of delegation.the British or the American which differ from each other rather fundamentally.. yet. the Federal Court had held in Jatindra Nath v..S. on the question of delegation.A. in Britain it rests with Parliament as there is no constitutional limitation to restrain Parliament from assigning power where it likes. Chapter 3 & 6.33’ In spite of the dilution of the theory of non-delegation in the U.

British and the American Constitutions..S.A. on the other. on the oue hand.S. But then. India and ‘ftain both have parliamentary formof Government in which the Executive is also a nart of the Legislature and can be closely supervised by it. the same does not prevail in Britain. the Indian system does not follow that principle in the area of Executive-Legislative relationship. while India. it was open to the Supreme Court in Independent India to follow either the English or the American model on the question of delegation of legislative power. while dia has a wanton constitution.. rather unison. has the system of judicial review of legislation. and the Constitutions of Britain and the U. of the two organs. 36 Also. This means that while the courts in India can declare law unconstitutional. Further. Britain functions mostly under an unwritten constriction. àcs could not give to the delegate unlimited powers. The Indian Parliament is a creature of the Constitution and its powers privileges and obligations are specified and limited by the Constitution. but on that of co-operation. The parliamentary form of Governmint is based not on the principle of separation. (2007) 3 5CC 184. para 720 : (2007) 2 JT 1. the presidential form of Government is based on the principle of separation of powers. On the other hand. Therefore. or permitting the Legislature of delegate its legislative power to the Administration. The British Parliament is Sovereign.A.. Because of these similarities and dissimilarities between the Indian.S. One of the hallmarks of such sovereignty is the right to make or unmake any law which no court or body or person can seethed or override. such a power is not available to any court in Britain. while in the U. There are similarities and dissimilarities between the Indian Constitution. the constitution of India is neutral on this point as there is nothing in the Indian Constitution either by way of expressly prohibiting. Hon ‘ble Speaker Lok Sabha.A. like the U.The courts could hold either that a Legislature in India could delegate as much power as it liked following the British model. like the American congress. if the 36 Rajaram Patel v. or else that it. and that it should State the l icies subject to which the delegate is to function in making legislation. .

courts head to find any restrictions on the Legislature in the matter of delegation. paras 34. it had to be on the basis of some general theories and principles of constitutional law and not on the basis of some henral theories and principal of constitutional law and not on the basis of any specific provision in the constitution. 105. Parliament had to legislate for these States. without having a Legislature of their own. Rajaram Patel v. And if there was already a law in force in concerned Part C State on the point. . 37 and 39 : AIR 2004 SC 1442. 106. Undoubtedly. para 104. para 38 : (2005) AIR SCW 3208. (2000) 7 5CC 719. (2009) 2 5CC 1. (2004) 1 1 5CC 766. M. State ofKarnataka. State of Rajasthan v. (2001) 4 5CC 227. Krishna Bhat v. under the direct administration of the Central Government. any enactment in force in a Part A State. Seven Judges participated in the decision and seven opinions v’ delivered 37 AIR 1951 SC 332. As it was very difficult for Parliament to find the necessary time to do so in view of its other manifold en. 154. The Act authorized the Central Government to extend to any Part C State.P. it could either be repeated or modified by Government when the law was being extended. (2004) 2 5CC 476. para 19 : AIR 2005 SC 3401.37 (d) Delhi Laws Act Case There were a few (Delhi being one of them) Part C States. para 90 : 1951 SCR 747. the Part C States (Laws) Act. 35 and 36 : (2009) 1 5CC (Cr1) 620. Union ofindia. para 720. While doing so. (2005) 12 5CC 77. (2006) 2 SCC 1 . (2007) 3 5CC 184. the Government could repeal or amend any corresponding law (other than a Central Law) which might be operative at the time in the Part C State concerned. High Court Bar Association v. Delhi being one of these. para 12. Union ofindia. The supreme Court of India was faced with all these questions in the famous case of in re Delhi laws Act. Hon ‘ble Speaker Lok Sabha. Union of India. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. 196 and 201 : AIR 2006 SC 980. it was a very sweeping kind of delegation. Parliament passed a law. The Government c extend to a Part C State any law made by a State Legislature (and not by Parliam at any time (not only laws prevailing in 1950 but even those made subsequently). B. para 36. para 5 : AIR 2001 SC 1885. 1 17.agreements. with such restrictions and modificatiolis as it thought fit. Raineshwar Prasad v. Basant Nahata.. The Supreme Court was called upon to adjudge the validity of this above-minted provision. Also see Mahmadhusen Abduirahirn Kalota Shaikh v. even modify the law before extension. Kiran Gupta v. Union ofindia. State of UP. 1950.

exhibiting a cleavage of judicial views on the question of limits subject which the Legislature in India should be permitted to delegate legislative power. however. they could not be allowed the same freedom as the British Parliament in the matter of delegation. keeping the exigencies of the modern Government in view. Two. By a majority. which meant that the Legislature should never give up its control over the delegate.ory at least is somewhat more restrictive than the first. Parliament a well as State Legislatures in India need to delegate the legislative power if they be able to face the multitudinous problems facing the country. ‘j on two points there was a unity of outlook amongst all these opinions. since the Legislatures derive their powers from the written constitution which creates them. or abdicate its powers. The Judges. that it must not destroy its own legislative power. The other view which approximated to the American approach. the Court laid down. in the instant case. that it must retain in its hands the ultimate control over the authority so as to be able to withdraw the delegation when.ever the delegate did something wrong or foolish. and which in the. for it is neither practical nor feasible to expect that each legislative body could turn out a complete r comprehensive legislation on all subjects sought to be legislated upon. that the Legislature should not delegate its essential legislative function which comprises the formulation of policy . differed on the question as to what were to be the permissi ble limits within which the Indian Legislature could delegate its legislative power? One view propounded was that the Indian Legislature could delegate its power to any extent subject to the limit that it did not efface itself. That means that the Legislature should lay down standards or policy in the delegating Act and the delegate may be left with the power to execute the policy. was that the Legislature should not delegate its essential legislative function which comprised the formulation of policy and enacting it into a binding rule of conduct. and that some limits should be set on their capacity to delegate. First.

parliament as well as the State Legislatures in India need to delegate the legislative power if they are to be able to solve the multitudinous problems facing the country. The Delhi Laws Act case achieved two ends: (1) it legitimized delegation of legislative power by the Legislature to administrative organs. No Indian Legislature can delegate unlimited legislative power to the Administration. paras 19 and 20 : AIR 2005 SC 3401. keeping the exigencies of the modern Government in view. (2) the power to effect modifications in a State law in its application to a Part C State envisaged only such modifications as did not change the underlying policy of the law sought to be extended. (2) it imposed an outer limit on delegation by the Legislature. The Supreme Courtropuiided the thesis in the instant case that the Legislature is the care Ctureorme Constitution. State ofRajasthan v. the constitution-makers have placed their confidence in the collective wisdom of the Legislature.and enacting it into a binding rule of conduct. for it is neither practicable nor feasible to expect that each legislative body could turn 38 Same proposition is reiterated in later case.38 The specific provision involved in the instant case was held valid by a majority of Judges subject to two riders: (1) that part of it was bad which authorised the Government to repeal a law already in force in a Part C State. viz. Basant Nahata. . (2001) 5CC 212. the Legislature should itself lay down standards or policy in the delegating Act leaving the delegate with the power to make rules to execute the policy laid down by the Legislature. (2005) 12 5CC 77. the constitution has chosen to vest legislative power in the elected representatives of the people.. the courts can declare the same as excessive and hence invalid. If delegation is too broad. para 18 : AIR 2001 SC 1493. It is inevitable that the Legislature should itself discharge the essential legislative function. Union oflndia. See Krishna Prakash Sharma v. The Court realized that.

Hence. JAIN. . Union of India. and that some restriction should be set on their capacity to delegate. they could not enjoy the same freedom as the British Parliament in the matter of delegation of legislative power. has been held valid. and the delegate would then legislate to further the legislative policy. The Court was also agreed that since the various Legislatures in India derive their powers from the written constitution which creates them. CASES. 39 AIR 1990 SC 560 : 1989 Supp(1) 5CC 430.39 a provision relating to Chandigarh similar to the one involved in the Delhi Laws Act case regarding Delhi. or lay down standards or policy in the delegating Act. I. In Ramesh Birch V.out a complete and comprehensive legislation on all subjects sought to be legislated upon. the majority on the Bench opted for the American position that the Legislature itself must set the essential policy. This has come to be known as the Doctrine of Excessive Delegation of Legislative Power. 72.