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Process used for identification and

management of hazards associated with
hot work in a hazardous zone.

Austar Coal Mine




Located approximately 10kms south west of Cessnock.
Mines the Greta seam of coal.
Owned by Yancoal Australia Pty Ltd .
Introduced the top coal caving technology to Australia in 2006
(LTCC).
Seam gas content of the Greta Seam is 0.4m3 / tonne, of this 90%
CO2 and 10% CH4.Therefore very small amounts of methane
detected.

Flooded .b1 Roof Shield Repair Area CHPP PROPOSED SHAFTS + KITCHENER FACILITY PIT TOP #1 SHAFT Vent + 2nd Egress #3 and #4 VENT SHAFTS MINING AREA WHERE REPAIRS OCCURRED PROPOSED WORKINGS OLD ABANDONED WORKINGS #2 SHAFT .

Slide 3 b1 bmckay. 3/11/2010 .

where damage was caused to two of the 6 legged tailgate shields (Number 122 and 123). the middle two hydraulic cylinders (legs). The shield clevises were subjected to excessive tensile forces resulting in a ductile failure when the shield canopy was raised to the roof in a localised cavity. This caused severe damage to the shield canopy middle clevises. This was due to an estimated 50% reduction in roof support density (estimated by OEM Design Engineer) above any one shield that was not operating as it was designed. . were raised by the outer legs extending them into this cavity.Repair Background Recently. Due to the unique operation of the shields. A decision was made by Austar management to repair as soon as possible. The ongoing operation of these shields and possibly the adjacent shields. was definitely not sustainable. an incident occurred on the longwall face.

Longwall Equipment .

Damaged Clevis of 123 Shield .

Top Cylinder Pin Locating Bore .

Top of a Typical Shield Leg .

3. Continue to operate the longwall with the damaged clevis Remove the canopy and repair at the workshop Remove the entire shield and repair at the workshop Replace the shield Install a bolt on clevis Weld the clevis . management. OEM representatives and a local check inspector were involved in an options evaluation. 5.Methodology Identification of Repair Options and Risk Assessment A group of employees including mine workers. A risk assessment to determine the best options available to repair the shield. tradesmen. 2. 4. included the following 1. 6. engineers.

Considerations Adherence to and compliance with relevant guidelines.2 Safety in Welding & Allied Processes Part 2: Electrical . All loose coal removed inclusive of accumulations on the canopy.1 Safety in Welding & Allied Processes Part 1: Fire Precautions AS1674. standards and legislation were considered throughout the process.2 Classification of Welding Environment Part 2: Category ‘C’ environment AS1674. AS1674. with particular focus on:¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ OHS Act 2000 CMHSR 2006 MDG 25 – removal or coverage of flammable materials.

Considerations Audit check lists were developed for MDG25 and were included in all site Safe Work Procedures .

Repair Option Evaluation Option Major Advantage Major Disadvantage 1/ Use hot work to repair the clevis •Would result in the •Required an normal shield operation exemption for hot work • The quickest solution in the hazardous zone •Dust explosion 2/ Install a bolt on fork clevis •Eliminated the welding process from hot work activities •Hot work was still required •As a result of drilling processes the OEM identified that the structural integrity of the shield canopy would result .

Repair Option Evaluation Option 3/ Remove the damaged canopies and transport to a workshop Major Advantage Major Disadvantage •A full repair would be completed •Repairs undertaken in a normal environment •No roof support while the canopy was removed •Hot work may be required for lemniscate pin removal •Risks associated with the removal of a 7 tonne canopy underground .

Repair Option Evaluation Option Major Advantage Major Disadvantage 4/ Continue to operated with the damaged clevis •No underground repairs required •Uncontrolled canopy movement during operation •Reduced support density •Shield operation slower 5/ Remove the shields for workshop repairs •No hot work required underground •No roof support the beginning and end of this process 6/ Replace the •No hot work required shield with a similar underground unit • A very complex operation .

welding on the LW face had the lowest level of risk.Evaluation Outcome • The group believed with the appropriate controls in place. .

– Review of the Austar Cutting and Welding Management Plan. – Consultation and meetings with all stakeholders including DII representatives. – A summary of risks identified and controls to be implemented.Notification to I&I NSW Notification of a High Risk Activity CMH&S Reg 2006 Clause 49 High Risk Activities. – A drawing displaying the location where the hot work was to be undertaken and the associated equipment required for the task. . – Guidance Note GNC-009 requirements to be adhered too. Cutting or welding in a hazardous zone underground required the following: – Risk Assessments.

Specifically this was for the use of non Gazetted electrical equipment in the hazardous zone. .Exemption • Austar Coal Mine applied for an exemption under CMHSR2006 clause 19 (1) (c). • The exemption was time limited therefore Austar could not allow for any major delay during the repair process. A detailed time line was developed which included contingencies.

Major Hazards and Issues Identified for Hot Work Issue • Hot material Consequence Damages hydraulic hoses which could lead to high pressure fluid being released Electrical equipment damaged • Welding in a wet / damp environment Personnel receive electric shock during welding • Non explosion proof equipment Gas Ignition • Ineffective welding Another clevis failure • Dust Explosion .

• A spotter was positioned at an emergency stop while ever welding occurred. The primary welding machine was a MIG Kempi Master 5001. . • The 415 volt outlets of this transformer provided earth leakage protection. • A spotter was positioned at emergency oxygen acetylene shut off valves when this equipment was being used. • This transformer was powered via a 50mm squared cable from the longwall substation.25% was detected. This emergency stop tripped the 1000 to 415 volt transformer.Further Details • The Mig welder powered from a 1000 to 415 volt transformer. This was achieved by using 10mA earth leakage circuit breakers. • Existing tailgate methane detectors were configured to trip the welding transformer and the shield electrics if 0.

9 LnL GOAF 0.9 LnL 0.25% ADJACENT TO WELDING SITE X WELDING POINTS 124 X X PROPSETTERS & BRATTICE TIGHT ROOF TO FLOOR X OXY ACETYLENE BOTTLES MINIMUM 3m APART DCB TX 0.X WELDING SITE 415v TO 1000v TRANSFORMER AIR FLOW A3 Block Retreat Direction HAND HELD GAS MONITORING DEVICE SET TO ALARM AT 0.9 LnL 9ct EXISTING QUIKSEAL PARTIALLY REMOVED FOR VENTILATION PERMANENT GOAF STREAM SAMPLE POINT TUBE BUNDLE POINT No 5 .9 LnL 0.9 LnL MIG GAS T/G WELDING POD WING TO BE ADJUSTED FOR VENTILATION REGULATION BRATTICE WINGS AIR FLOW 5m 0.

These procedures ranged from the preparation of the site right through to the recommissioning of the shields. .Instruction • 16 site specific Safe Work Procedures were developed. #124 Prop Setters x 2 off • Link n lock packing CST DRIVE Safe work procedures were formatted in a way that allowed individuals to sign off as each step was completed.

• Welding equipment and compliance to MDG25 & AS 1674.Special Preparation • The Boilermakers and equipment needed to meet Austar and OEM competency requirements. . • Site preparation had to be audited prior to hot work commencing. A trial welding programme using these people and equipment was undertaken in the OEM’s workshop. • Non Destructive Testing personnel competence – Australian Institute for Non Destructive Testing. • I&I randomly audited the welding site during the project.2. • Continuous monitoring of the atmosphere was undertaken by a mine official. MEE & MME or their nominated delegates to audit the site every 24 hours. This was undertaken by the MME. • I&I instructed the Austar MME. MEE & MME.

This was rated at 33.Application of the Hierarchy of Controls During the hot work repairs • The OEM designed and supplied a shear pin to be installed on the bottom leg clevis.6 tonnes and was designed to fail. This still incorporated the shear pin. During the subsequent longwall relocation • The capabilities of the top clevis were increased during the longwall relocation. prior to any structural damage occurring. • Replace the six legged shields with four legged types . Longer Term • Continued mechanical and structural improvements with the six legged shields.

• The repairs were completed as per plans and without an incident. .Summary of Shield Repairs • All personnel involved contributed positively and professionally. • A failure of one welding machine occurred during the repair process. • No extra ordinary hazards or conditions were encountered during the entire repair process.