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G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, SECOND
While it is true that the statutory fiat under
Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the
surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather
than the object of adoption proceedings.
Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
Maximo Alcala, Sr., and Segundina Y. Alcala.
When he was but two and a half years old and
then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister
Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they
were, with the consent of their natural parents and
by order of the court in Special Case No.
593] issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,
both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now
deceased, was an insurance agent while
Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher.
They decided to adopt the children as they
remained childless after fifteen years of marriage.
The couple showered their adopted children with
parental love and reared them as their own
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two,
respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his
name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. He averred that the
use of surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same
suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is aMuslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being
ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to

revert to his former surname. RTC granted the
petition and CA affirmed.
1) Are the reasons given by private
respondent in his petition for change
of name valid, sufficient and proper
to warrant the granting of said
petition? Yes
2) Will the change of name affect his
status as an adopted child? No
It bears stressing at this point that to
justify a request for change of name, petitioner
must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.[24] Among
the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the
change will avoid confusion;[25] (d) Having
continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her
alien parentage;] (e) A sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody;[27] and (f) When the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for
change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of
the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best
evidence available.[29] Summarizing, in special
proceedings for change of name, what is involved
is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications

mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 19 SCRA 721). much less can it bar resort. in the same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock. the Family Code. to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents. and it may be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion. it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. CA.) xxx A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surname. 147 SCRA 82). In other words. Adoption shall have the following effects: (1) For civil purposes. 189. Article 365 is not an exception. in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy. In the instant case. we do not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child. Inc. under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances.] It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child's person. If a legitimate person may. including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters. vs. thus its ‘factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count heavily and need not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (Baliwag Transit. The law fixes the surname that may be used by a person. Section 1 of Rule 103.[30] The act of adoption fixes a status. the trial court could take judicial notice of other existing factors . to Rule 103. viz. Moreover. it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. there is unanimous agreement. and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation. the adopted shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child.. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. at least inceptively. subject. "Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose which (State) is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest (Calderon vs. More technically. While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.[33] More specifically under the present state of our law. the court a quo found the petition of Maximo Wong for change of name justifiable after due hearing. petition the court for a change of name. that of parent and child. the duty of obedience owing by the child.[31] The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. however. uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status.[34] relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the issue involved in this case: "Art." (Emphasis supplied. On this point. Republic.advanced in support thereof. superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code on the matter.

Corazon filed a motion for taking deposition on the ground that she received an urgent call from the United Nations requiring her to report for work so she will not be able to testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be scheduled. While it is true that in an action in personam. Pinky Punsalan. The judge issued an order setting the hearing for the petition for adoption and directed the publication of the said order. ZENAIDA ELEPANO & CORAZON PUNSALAN G." It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the use of the name of his parents by nature as crass ingratitude. the counsel for Corazon presented evidence. SECOND DIVISION (Paras. personal service of summons within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case is essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the taking of a deposition.” Corazon Punsalan filed a verified petition for adoption praying that after due notice and hearing. After the notice of the hearing had been duly published. J. the OSG failed to appear in the said hearing and all other hearings. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. no representative from the OSG appeared to oppose the taking of the deposition. herein respondent accordingly filed a petition pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court which was granted by the Court a quo. In such case. Corazon's deposition was taken. A copy of said order as well as a copy of the said petition for adoption was likewise sent to the OSG. the daughter of her full blood brother. The judge granted the petition. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but the judge denied. His experience with regards (sic) his social and business dealings is personal and it is only him (sic) who can attest to the same. the OSG contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the defendant but the judge denied the opposition. Judge Elepano granted the motion and ordered that notice of the taking of the deposition be furnished to the OSG (the only known oppositor). The OSG filed an opposition to the deposition averring that Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court allows deposition by leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or property subject of the action. HON.) Key Doctrine: “In an adoption case which involves the status of a person. x x x. Despite notice. To go by the Solicitor General's suggestion that private respondent should have his adoption revoked if he wants to use the surname of his natural father would be to exact too dear a toll for making use of an appropriate and valid remedy available under the law. October 15. there is no particular defendant to speak of since the action is one in rem. 1991. in an adoption case which involves the status of a person. The rule cited by the OSG is inapplicable. be declared her daughters by adoption. Finding his predicament's proper remedy is solely through legal process. 92542. "Additionally. jurisdiction over the . Since the jurisdictional requirement of publication has not been complied with. No. there is no particular defendant to speak of since the action is one in rem. and Ellyn Mae Urbano.R. the daughter of her full blood sister. ISSUES: Are depositions not allowed in adoption proceedings until publication has been complied with? HELD: No. Despite the community where herein respondent which it considers material in its judicious determination of the case. herein respondent is already of age and as such he can decide what is best for him.

No. Charmaine. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. They further agreed that the children shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1. Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie.000 and that Anna Maria shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with another without the written consent of her husband or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband’s consent. J. was notified of the scheduled taking of the deposition. had been helping her in taking care of the children. Finally. that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano. Publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for adoption is necessary for the validity of a decree of adoption but not for the purpose merely of taking a deposition. begot three children. September 25. namely: Keith.R. FACTS. 1973. and Joseph Anthony.person of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the taking of a deposition for the jurisdiction of the court is based on its power over the res. The OSG. but the OSG chose not to attend ALL the said hearings. that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business. private respondent spouses Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano. to render judgment with respect to such "thing" (or status. who were married on January 27. Nevertheless. a family friend of the Clavanos. no substantial rights are affected since depositions may or may not be presented or may even be objected to when formally offered as evidence at the trial of the main case later on. During the early years of their marriage. The record shows that Corazon's adoption of the minors shall redound to the best interests of the latter. Anna Maria filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed until Anna Maria learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital affairs with Wilma Soco. as in this case) so as to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection against the right so established. without explanation. HERBERT CANG v. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children. 1998. respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Maria filed a Special Proceeding for the adoption of the three minor Cang children. Corazon could not be present to testify at the trial of the main case for adoption. Due to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her control. Romero. and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children for the following reasons: . In taking a deposition. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES RONALD CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO G. Thereafter. Meanwhile. as well as of all the hearings of the petition for adoption. 105308. leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) jobseeking venture abroad. the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.

he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love. Her husband had divorced her. RTC of Cebu City Branch 19 rendered an order finding that Anna Maria had. Physical estrangement alone. alleging that. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the US. In the instant case. Upon learning of the petition for adoption. care and support for his children. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption. While admittedly. The RTC of Cebu City Branch 14 issued a decree of adoption. ISSUE. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract without her husband’s written consent. Nevertheless. taking into consideration among others the fact that the Cang children had since birth developed close filial ties with the respondents and that they had substantial assets and income to support the children. 2. and 3. Article 188(2) of the Family Code provides that the written consent of the parents by nature of the child x x x shall be necessary. he could not in conscience. the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. relinquished custody over her children and therefore such custody should be transferred to the father. petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. is not tantamount to abandonment. allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children. Notably.1. petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. without financial and moral desertion. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States.” The CA affirmed the decree of adoption. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. YES. The decision in the Civil Case No. The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the . such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs. in effect. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. The RTC also quoted with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her Child Study Support that abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? HELD. records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.

117209.However. relatives and friends since May 6. in substance and purpose. the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition. The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise. deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. 1996. IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE. SECOND DIVISION. J. being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. VS. filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. HERNANDEZ. of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. respondent spouses. even if not prayed for by petitioner. On the other hand.beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom. and by which he has been called by his adoptive family. alleging the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the ROC. PETITIONER. PASIG CITY AND SPOUSES VAN MUNSON Y NAVARRO AND REGINA MUNSON YANDRADE. *NB this case was decided prior to AM 02-602 SC Facts On March 10.R. BRANCH 158. G. the given or proper name. are different from and are not related to each other. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which. 5 Rule 2 of the ROC allowing permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and argues that under the rules. JOSE R. The . The trial court ruled in favor of respondent spouses. The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. there is not prohibition against a joinder for adoption and a change of name. 1993 when he arrived at private respondents’ residence. Regalado. respondent spouses also prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to “Aaron Joseph”. as a matter of right and obligation. No. of necessity. HON. should be understood in its proper context and perspective. Petitioner opposed the petition for change of name on the ground that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. February 09. In the very same petition. with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. Key Doctrine: The change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. in fact. respondent spouses predicated their basis on Sec. RESPONDENTS. to bear the surname of the adopter. upon issuance of the decree of adoption. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. also known as the first or Christian name. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court. 1994. though the law allows the adoptee. Issue Is the lower court erroneous for granting the prayer for change of name? Is there a lawful ground for the change of name? Ruling No. ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

J. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees. JUDGE CESAR M. where it was docketed as Spec.R. upon the death of Serafin Delos Santos. 1998.) It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into the public records. stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. FIRST DIVISION. Book No. Tarlac. Reyes likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. No. . upon payment of a bond. a record of the change. A fortiori. wherever possible. Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. 1970.automatic change thereof. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem. (Ynares-Santiago. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate. as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals. Corazon L. as in this case. No. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31. Tarlac. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have. G. strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Elena Lising. as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of Ana Joyce S. 1968 decreeing Reyes’s adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. No. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding. such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption. 167405. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. REYES v. Ana Joyce Delos Santos. claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband. Reyes. death benefits were paid to his widow. pending settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs. is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding. She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary. The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. If a change in one’s name is desired. and his "daughter". Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition. wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. the official repository of which. No. Tarlac stating that on page 76. et al. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui. governed by its own set of rules. 43 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. and in keeping with the object of the statute. a grandniece of the deceased. 16 February 2006. in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. cannot properly be granted. a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change. Reyes attachedthe Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui. who died on November 30. SOTERO. Serafin Delos Santos. Proc. in and by itself. Proc. ANA JOYCE S. Reyes also submitted a Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City. 204. premised solely upon the adoption thus granted. The deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui. 1410 on December 21. is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered the judgment. Proc.

For this reason. cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat Reyes’s claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. should be deemed legitimate. LANDINGIN v. Chichioco. The Court agrees with Reyes that she need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court. 204 should be dismissed. it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The CA dismissed SP No. Judge Cesar M. the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of Reyes’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody. 164948 | 2006-06-27 KEY DOCTRINES/TOPICS: Adoption Statutes are Liberally Construed for the Benefit of the Child. et al. Sotero. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate. As such. 53457. the certifications regarding the matter. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Is the CA correct in holding that Reyes had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities in view of section 47 of rule 39? RULING: NO. et al. Persons Whose Written Consent are Needed to the Adoption. Therefore. No. To recall. genuine and real. Chichioco. Proc. Jr. cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate. the Court agrees with Reyes that Spec. for as long as Reyes’s adoption is considered valid. Reyes’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as special administrator. Citing Balanay. They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of Reyes took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Reyes’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud. Martinez. as categorically held in Santos v. v. Chichioco.Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No. are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void. et al. In this regard. as well as the facts stated therein. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s properties." The CA rendered judgment nullifying the resolutions of the trial court. Moreover. REPUBLIC (2006) G. 53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4. the CA reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. It held that the presiding judge. No.R. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Accordingly. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered. Atty. These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. Aranzanso. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of Reyes’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Reyes submitted a certification from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. Purpose for the Indispensable Requirement of Consent and .

FACTS: Petitioner Diwata Landingin was an American citizen of Filipino parentage. (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died. if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse. It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept that adoption statutes. ten (10) years of age or over. or the legal guardian. the minors were being supported by the petitioner. (e) The spouse. . if any. B. needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Despite such. remarried there and had 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicated from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. of the adopter. ISSUES & RULINGS: A. hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes. who were all the natural children of Manuel Ramos. She filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors. 2. and Amelia Ramos. (b) The biological parent(s) of the child. ten (10) years of age or over. of the person adopting or to be adopted. if ten (10) years of age or over. being humane and salutary. The written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (a) The adoptee. (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters. their biological mother went to Italy. Adoption Statutes are Liberally Construed for the Benefit of the Child 1. the appellate court reversed the assailed decision. A Social Worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia had been consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children. if known. The Petitioner Should Have Adduced the Written Consent of the Legal Guardian. When Amelia Left for Italy. The Financial Capacity of the Prospective Parents Should be Carefully Evaluated. When the Republic appealed before the Court of Appeals. Diwata’s brother. parental care and education for unfortunate. Persons Whose Written Consent are Needed to the Adoption 3. if any. the children were left to their paternal grandmother because Amelia. Abandonment Should Evince a Settled Purpose to Forego all Parental Duties. After the paternal grandmother passed away. she voluntarily consented. of the adopter(s) and adoptee. if any.Notice to the Natural Parents. The Affidavit of Consent of Petitioner’s Presented are Inadmissible as Evidence. or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Petitioner failed to present the social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia to the adoption. Her children abroad gave their written consent for their adoption. She Did Not Intend to Abandon her Children. the trial court granted the petition.

Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. 12. 8. that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. Indeed. the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. the authenticity of which she. or by evidence of the . the opportunity to display filial affection. 9. 5. D. Abandonment Should Evince a Settled Purpose to Forego all Parental Duties 14. As the alleged written consent of petitioner's legitimate children did not comply with the law. When Amelia left for Italy. Petitioner failed to offer in evidence the DSWD Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children. abandons the child. failed to prove. she had not intended to abandon her children. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment. she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her mother-in-law. The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. The Petitioner Should Have Adduced the Written Consent of the Legal Guardian 6. When Landingin filed her petition with the trial court. love. 10. in effect. 15. and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. which was not done by the petitioner. To dispense with the requirement of consent. thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian. the parent. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. Rep. Purpose for the Indispensable Requirement of Consent and Notice to the Natural Parents 4. as claimed by petitioner. she should. it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. If. Amelia. the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written. care. even while abroad. Abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. The adoption of the minors will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother. The Affidavit of Consent of Petitioner’s Presented are Inadmissible as Evidence E. Act No. and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country. the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. When Amelia Left for Italy. F. likewise. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers. If a parent withholds presence. G. 8552 was already in effect.C. or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. 7. 16. and neglects to lend support and maintenance. is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. She Did Not Intend to Abandon her Children 11. 13. and the adoptees. Yet. 2103.

H. the same is inadmissible in evidence. in keeping with the means of the family. Given the facts of the case. Certainly. the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children. Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child. it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the United States.genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers. No further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children. it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. The Financial Capacity of the Prospective Parents Should be Carefully Evaluated 18. 19. and she is rather of age. She only has a part-time job. 17. From: MyLegalWhiz (edited for the digest pool) .