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General Provisions

1. Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right


and duty of parents over the person and
property of their unemancipated children,
parental authority and responsibility shall
include the caring for and rearing of such
children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their
moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.
2. MEDINA V. MAKABILI [27 SCRA 502] While the law recognizes the right of a parent to
the custody of his/her child, courts must not
lose sight of the basis principle that in all
question on the care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latter's welfare shall
be paramount, and that for compelling reasons,
even a child uinder seven may be ordered
separated from the mother.Patria potestas has
been transformed from "jus vitae ac necis (the
right of life and death) of the Roman Law, under
which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his
parents into a radically different institution. The
obligational aspect of parents to rear and care
for their children is now supreme. The right of
parents to the company and custody of their

children is but ancillary to the proper discharge


of parental duties to provide the children with
adequate support, education, moral, intellectual
and civic training and development.The best
interest of the minor can override the right of
parents to the custody of their children the
parent/s is/are proved to be remiss in these
sacred duties.
3. UNSON V. NAVARRO [101 SCRA 183] Mother of child is having an affair with brotherin-law. With this premise in view, it is in the
best interest of the child to be freed from the
obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral
influence that the mother has placed herself.
The situation might affect the moral and social
outlook of the child who is in her formative
years and most impressionable stage in her life.
4. Art. 210.
Parental authority and
responsibility may not be renounced or
transferred except in the cases authorized
by law.
5. SANTOS V. CA [242 SCRA 407] - The
right of custody accorded to parents springs
from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman

Law is the juridical institution whereby parents


rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required
by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations w/c the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation
and dev't, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their hearts and
senses. As regardas parental authority, "there
is no power, but a task; no complex of rights,
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor.Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law.
The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such
as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody and
it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifested, the law still disallows the same.The
father and mother, being the natural guardians
of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and

entitled to keep them in their custody and


company. Only in cases of the parent's death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
6.
Art. 211. The father and the mother
shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order
to the contrary.Children shall always
observe respect and reverence toward their
parents and are obliged to obey them as
long as the children are under parental
authority.
7. Art. 212. In case of absence or death of
either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. The
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not
affect the parental authority over children,
unless the court appoints another person to
be the guardian of the person or property of
the children.
8. Art. 213. In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be

exercised by the parent designated by the


Court. The Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.No child
under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
9. HONTIVEROS V. IAC [132 SCRA 745]SC
relates Art.213 with Art.363 (CC) and Art. 17
(PD 603, CYWC).A363: In all questions on the
care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount.
No mother shall be separated from her child
under 7 years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measures.A17: In
case of separation of his(her) parents, no child
under five years of age shall be separated from
his (her) mother, unless the ct. finds compelling
reasons to do so.(PD 603, dated Dec. 10,1974)
Art.213 (FC): In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the court. The court
shall
take
into
account
all
relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.

10. ESPIRITU V. CA [242 SCRA 362] Whether a child is under or over seven years of
age, the paramount criterion must always be
the child's interest. Discretion is always given
to the court to decide who can best assure the
welfare of the child, and award the custody on
the basis of that consideration.
11. Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. In case several
survive, the one designated by the court,
taking into account the same consideration
mentioned in the preceding article, shall
exercise the authority.Art. 215.
No
descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal
case to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony
is indispensable in a crime against the
descendant or by one parent against the
other.
Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a
judicially appointed guardian, the following

persons shall exercise substitute parental


authority
over the child in the order
indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as
provided in Art. 214;
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by
the surviving grandparent. In case
several survive, the one designated by
the court, taking into account the same
consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the
authority.
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over
twenty one years of age, unless fit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over
twenty one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial
guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed.

Art. 217. In case of foundlings,


abandoned, neglected or abused children
and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted in
summary judicial proceedings to heads of
children's homes, orphanages and similar
institutions duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
Art. 218. The school, its administrators
and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have
special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply
to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.

EXCONDE V. CAPUNO [101 P 843]


Capuno, a student and a Boy Scout, attended a
Rizal Day parade, drove a jeep recklessly
resulting in the death of two passengers. Father

was held solidarily liable for damages. SC, in an


obiter, exculpated the school (not a party to the
case) on the ground that it was not a school of
arts and trades. Justice JBL Reyes, with whom
Padilla concurred, dissented arguing that it was
the school authorities who should be held liable.
Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed
on (1) teachers in general; and 2)heads of
schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause "of establishment of arts and
trades should apply only to "heads" and not to
"teachers".
MERCADO V. CA [109 P 414] (elaborates on
the Exconde decision)
A student cut a classmate with a razor blade.
Parents of victim sued the culprit's parents for
damages. SC held in an obiter again (school
not a party again) that the school was not liable;
it's not an establishment of arts and trades.
Custody requirement had not been proved as
this "contemplates a situation where the student
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents.
PALISOC V. BRILLANTES [41 SCRA 548]
(supersedes obiter in Exconde and Mercado) A

16 year old student killed by classmate with fist


blows in the school laboratory.
Although
wrongdoer was already of age and was not
boarding with the school, head and teacher
were held solidarily liable with him. The phrase
"so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they
are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil
or student who commits the tortious act must
live and board in the school as erroneously held
by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as
well as in Exconde on w/c it relied) w/c must
now be deemed to have been set aside.
Note: (By JBL) Even students already of age
were covered by the provision since they were
equally in the custody of the school and subject
to its discipline.
AMADORA V. CA [160 SCRA 315]
Amadora's son was shot to death by Daffon, a
classmate at school auditorium. The son was

in school to submit physics project. The school


contends that the semester had already ended.
HELD: It is immaterial whether the semester
has already ended for students were there for a
legitimate purpose. He was still in the custody
of the school authorities.
Even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the
school premises is a legitimate purpose w/c
would also bring him in the custody of the
school. The school principal and dean are not
liable bec. not teachers-in-charge, but are
merely exercising general authority, not direct
control and influence. But even the teacher-incharge is not liable bec. there is no showing
that the teacher was negligent in enforcing
discipline upon Daffon nor had he waived
observance of school rules and regulations.
His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him bec. he was
not supposed or required to report to school on
that day. So who is liable here? It's probably
the dean of the boys.
He had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned it to the latter w/o taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. But while he was clearly
negligent, it does not necessarily link him to the

shooting since it was not shown that the gun


was the one used to kill petitioner's son. Who
is really liable here? Nobody, since none of
them was found to have been charged w/ the
custody of the offending student, or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties. While the
court deeply sympathizes w/ the petitioners, the
court cannot extend material relief as a balm to
their grief.
PASCO V. CFI [160 SCRA 784] - Art. 2180,
NCC w/c refers to liability of teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades for
damages caused by students who are in their
custody, does not apply to the school or the
university itself or to educational institutions
which are not schools of arts and trades. The
provision concerned speaks only of "teachers
or heads."
YLARDE V. AQUINO [163 SCRA 697] - As
regards the principal, We hold that he cannot
be made responsible for the death of child
Ylarde, he being the head of an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades. xxx
Under Art. 2180, it is only the teacher and not

the head of an academic school who should be


answerable for torts committed by their
students. This Court went on to say that in a
school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable.
Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in charge of such student
following the first par. of the provision. This is
the gen. rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only
he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the gen. rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their
students except where the school is technical
in nature, in w/c case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable.
SALVOSA V. IAC [166 SCRA 274] - Under
the penultimate par. of Art. 2180, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are
liable for "damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody." The rationale of such liability
is that so long as the student remains in the
custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a
certain exten, in loco parentis (as to the

student) and (is) called upon to exercise


reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
(student.) Likewise, "the phrase used in (Art.
2180)-- so long as the (students) remain in their
custody' means that the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor
shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
not apply if it is proved that they exercised
the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and
the preceding articles shall be governed by
the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts.

Balane: Art. 218 and 219


Five (5) points to remember:
1. the rules are not limited to schools of arts
and trade...now "all schools"
2. authority and responsibility applies to
activities inside and outside...provided the
activity is an authorized one
3. the liability of the school administrators
and/or teachers is solidary and primary...the
liability of the parents is subsidiary
4. negligence is presumed...the burden is
on the school/teacher to prove diligence
5. scope of liability of school...extends only
to damage caused by the child in the course of
an authorized school activity.
Suppose the injuries were inflicted on the
student by persons other than fellow
students...then do not apply 219 nor 2180NCC
The school is liable in such a case base on
culpa contractual (PSBA v. CA)...school is liable
for injury caused by elements coming from
outside of the school
Liability for injuries caused by students:

a. below 18 (RA 6809)


1. school admi/teachers are principally and
solidarily liable
negligence is prima facie presumed
2. parents/guardian is subsidiarily liable
b. 18 and above
(Art 2180 NCC continues to apply)
1. applies to academic and non-academic
institutions
a. academic institutions: liability attaches to
teacher
b. non-academic institutions: liability attaches to
head of establishment.
Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of
the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those
exercising parental authority shall have with
respect to their unemancipated children or
wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to


support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide
for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;
(2) To give them love and affection,
advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and
spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, selfreliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their
interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and
maintain their physical and mental health at
all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and
wholesome educational materials, supervise
their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad
company, and prevent them from acquiring
habits detrimental to their health, studies
and morals;
(6) To represent them in all matters
affecting their interests;
(7) To demand from them respect and
obedience;

(8) To impose discipline on them as may


be required under the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are
imposed by law upon parents and
guardians.
LUNA V. IAC [137 SCRA 7]
The
manifestation of the child Shirley that she would
kill herself or run away from home if she should
be taken away from the petitioners
(grandparents) and forced to live w/ her natural
parents is a circumstance that would make the
execution of the judgment in the special proc.
inequitable, unfair, unjust, if not illegal. The
threat may be proved empty, but Shirley has a
right to a wholesome family life that will provide
her w/ love, care and understanding, guidance
and couselling, and moral and material security.
But what if the threat is for real. Besides, in her
letters to the members of the court, Shirley
depicted her biological parents as selfish and
cruel and who beat her often; and that they do
not lover her. To return her to the custody of
the private resps. would be traumatic and cause
irreparable damage to the child.

Art. 221. Parents and other persons


exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a
guardian of the child's property, or a
guardian ad litem when the best interests of
the child so require.
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence
or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may
petition the proper court of the place where
the child resides, for an order providing for
disciplinary measures over the child. The
child shall be entitled to the assistance of
counsel, either of his choice or appointed by
the court, and a summary hearing shall be
conducted wherein the petitioner and the
child shall be heard. However, if in the same
proceeding the court finds the petitioner at
fault, irrespective of the merits of the
petition, or when the circumstances so

warrant, the court may also order the


deprivation or suspension of parental
authority or adopt such other measures as it
may deem just and proper.
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the
preceding
article
may
include
the
commitment of the child for not more than
thirty days in entities or institutions
engaged in child care or in children's homes
duly accredited by the proper government
agency.
The parent exercising parental authority
shall not interfere with the care of the child
whenever committed but shall provide for
his support. Upon proper petition or at its
own instance, the court may terminate the
commitment of the child whenever just and
proper.
Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property
of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall,
jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemacipated common
child without the necessity of a court

appointment. In case of disagreement, the


father's decision shall prevail, unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property
or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
required to furnish a bond in such amount
as the court may determine, but not less
than 10% of the value of the property or
annual
income,
to
guarantee
the
performance of the obligations prescribed
for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the
bond shall be filed in the proper court of the
place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper
court of the place where the property or any
part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a
summary special proceeding in which all
incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in
the second paragraph of this Article shall be
heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall
be merely suppletory except when the child
is under substitute parental authority, or the
guardian is a stranger, or a parent has

remarried, in which case the ordinary rules


on guardianship shall apply.
PINEDA V. CA [226 SCRA 754] - It is clear
from Art. 225 that regardless of the value of the
unemancipated common child's property, the
father and mother ipso jure become the legal
guardian of the child's property. However, if the
market value of the prop. or the annual income
of the child exceeds P50,000, a bond has to be
posted by the parents concerned to guarantee
the performance of the obligations of a general
guardian. It must, however, be noted that the
2nd par. of Art. 225 speaks of the market value
of the property or the annual income of the
child," w/c means, therefore, the aggregate of
the child's prop. or annual income; if this
exceeds P50T, a bond is required. There is no
evidence that the share of each of the minors in
the proceeds of the group policy in question is
the minor's only property. W/o such evidence, it
would not be safe to conclude that, indeed, that
is his only property.
Art. 226.
The
property of
the
unemancipated child earned or acquired
with his work or industry or by onerous or

gratuitous title shall belong to the child in


ownership and shall be devoted exclusively
to the latter's support and education, unless
the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits
and income of the child's property shall be
limited primarily to the child's support and
secondarily to the collective daily needs of
the family.
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the
management or administration of any of
their properties to an unemancipated child,
the net proceeds of such property shall
belong to the owner. The child shall be
given a reasonable monthly allowance in an
amount not less than that which the owner
would have paid if the administrator were a
stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire
proceeds to the child. In any case, the
proceeds thus given in whole or in part shall
not be charged to the child's legitime.
Balane: This article refers to profectitious
property owned by the parents and given to the
child for administration

Ownership belongs to
Usufruct belongs to minor

parents,

The
child
is
entitled
to
reasonable
allowance...not less than what a 3rd person
would get if management was entrusted to such
3rd person, administration belongs to the child.
Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates
permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child;
(3) Upon emancipation of the child.
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived
by a final judgment, parental authority also
terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general
guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of
abandonment of the child in a case filed for
the purpose;

(4) Upon final judgment of a competent


court divesting the party concerned of
parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence
or incapacity of the person exercising
parental authority.
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended
upon conviction of the parent or the person
exercising the same of a crime which carries
with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The
authority is automatically reinstated upon
service of the penalty or upon pardon or
amnesty of the offender.
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for
the purpose or in a related case may also
suspend parental authority if the parent or
the person exercising the same; (1) Treats
the child with excessive harshness or
cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders,
counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg, or
(4) Subject the child or allows him to be
subjected to acts of lasciviousness.

The grounds enumerated above are


deemed to include cases which have
resulted from culpable negligence of the
parent or the person exercising parental
authority.
If the degree of seriousness so
warrants, or the welfare of the child so
demands, the court shall deprive the guilty
party of parental authority or adopt such
other measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be
revoked and the parental authority revived
in a case filed for the purpose or in the same
proceeding if the court finds that the cause
therefor has ceased and will not be
repeated.
CHUA V. CABANGBANG [27 SCRA 792] - F:
This is a petition for habeas corpus by Pacita
Chua against Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome
Cabangbang to recover custody of Betty Chua
alias "Grace Cabangbang," the natural
daughter of Pacita, who was a hostess.

HELD: Abandonment is one of the grounds for


depriving parents of parental authority over their
children.
xxx
Petitioner surrendered the custody of her
child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited
until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of 5
long years, before she brought action to recover
custody. Her claim that she did not take any
step to recover her child bec. the Cabangbangs
were powerful and influential, does not deserve
any modicum of credence. Xxx
For 5 long yrs. and thereafter, she did not
once move to recover the child.
She
continuously shunned the natural and legal
obligations w/c she owed to the child;
completely withheld her presence, her love, her
care, and the opportunity to display maternal
affection; and totally denied her support and
maintenance. Her silence and inaction have
been prolonged to such a point that her
abandonment of the child and her total
relinquishment of parental claim over her, can
and should be inferred as a matter of law.

Art. 232. If the person exercising


parental authority has subjected the child or
allowed him to be subjected to sexual
abuse, such person shall be permanently
deprived by the court of such authority.
Art. 233. The person exercising
substitute parental authority shall have the
same authority over the person of the child
as the parents.
In
no
case
shall
the
school
administrator, teacher or individual engaged
in child care exercising special parental
authority, inflict corporal punishment upon
the child.