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SECTION 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers.

Within ten (10) days from receipt of the


order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses
and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers
setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
The parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses together with their position papers after the
court issues an order stating the matters taken up in the preliminary conference.
When should the parties submit these documents?
Section 10 states that the parties shall submit their position papers and affidavits 10 days after the
court issues an order which is contemplated under Section 9.
The 10-day reglementary period should not be disregarded. While the rules of procedure are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business.1
Section 10 should be read in relation to Section 14 of the same rule.
SECTION 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts
of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their
competence to testify to the matters stated therein.

A party must attach affidavits in his position paper. The affidavits will now take the place of the
testimony of the witnesses. The affidavits should be within the personal knowledge of the affiant.
However, the Supreme Court ruled in Dela Rosa v. Carlos 2, that the verified complaint of the
Spouses Dela Rosa constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required under Rule 70. For as long as the
verified position paper states that all the allegations therein are true and correct of their own personal
knowledge. Moreover, documentary evidence is attached to their position paper which strengthens
their claim of prior possession. Therefore, there is no need of separate affidavits.

JESUS DELA ROSA and LUCILA DELA ROSA, petitioners, vs. SANTIAGO CARLOS and TEOFILA
PACHECO, respondents.
G.R. No. 147549. October 23, 2003
FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry filed by Spouses Dela Rosa against Santiago and Teofila with the
Municipal Trial Court of Paombong, Bulacan.
In their complaint, the Spouses Dela Rosa alleged that they are the owners of a house and lot. The
Spouses Dela Rosa claimed that Leonardo Carlos transferred to them the ownership of the Property
under the Deed of Sale executed on 1 September 1966. The Spouses Dela Rosa registered the Deed of
Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. The Spouses Dela Rosa asserted that they renovated the
house, furnished and occupied the same from 1966 to the present. Since the Spouses Dela Rosa work
and their children study in Manila, they reside in the Property only during weekends and
holidays. However, they padlock the house on the Property while they are away and instruct relatives

1 Heirs of Ferraren v. Court of Appeals


2 October 23, 2003

who live nearby to watch over the Property.


The Spouses Dela Rosa also asserted that in October 1997, they discovered that, through stealth
and without their knowledge and consent, Santiago had built a house of strong materials on a vacant
lot of the Property. Teofila had also been transferring furniture to the house and sleeping there. The
Spouses Dela Rosa, through their counsel, demanded that Santiago and Teofila demolish the house,
remove their furniture and vacate the premises. However, Santiago and Teofila did not heed the
Spouses Dela Rosas demand.
In their answer, Santiago and Teofila alleged that they are the surviving heirs of the Spouses
Carlos. They contended that the Spouses Dela Rosa obtained the Deed of Sale through fraud and
undue influence and that their mother did not consent to the sale of the Property which they claimed
as conjugal.
After submission of the parties position papers, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses
dela Rosa. RTC affirmed the decision of MTC. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the lower
court.
The CA noted that Spouses Dela Rosas position paper did not attach the affidavits of witnesses
required under Section 10 of Rule 70. It further ruled that the Spouses Dela Rosa failed to prove prior
possession of the Property. The appellate court pointed out that instead of proving prior possession,
the Spouses Dela Rosa admitted the contrary. The Court of Appeals also held that the Spouses Dela
Rosa did not verify their complaint in violation of Section 4 of Rule 70.
ISSUE: W/N the verified position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required under Rule 70,
Section 10.
RULING: The Spouses Dela Rosa jointly verified their position paper by stating that all the allegations in
the position paper are true and correct of their own personal knowledge. The verification itself is an
affidavit. Section 4 of Rule 7 states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit. Thus, the verified
position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required under Rule 70. Certainly, the Spouses
Dela Rosa qualify as witnesses to their own complaint. While there are no affidavits of other witnesses
that support the complaint, the Spouses Dela Rosa attached to their position paper documentary
evidence that bolster their claim of prior possession.
Santiago and Teofila never raised as an issue the alleged non-attachment to the complaint of
affidavits of witnesses, either in the MTC or in the RTC. In their petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, Santiago and Teofila did not also raise this issue. The MTC and RTC apparently understood
correctly that the verified complaint of the Spouses Dela Rosa constitutes the affidavit of witnesses
required under Rule 70. We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Spouses Dela Rosa
failed to attach to their complaint the affidavits required in Sections 10 and 14 of Rule 70.

SECTION 11. Period for Rendition of Judgment Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits
and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said
period issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits
or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be
rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for
filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the

judgment.
A magistrate should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the
institution of justice, lowers its standards and brings them into disrepute. Every judge must cultivate a
capacity for quick decision; he must not delay the judgment which a party justly deserves. The public
trust reposed in a judges office imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility to promptly
administer justice
EDITHA PALMA GIL, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO H. LOPEZ, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Lupon, Davao Oriental, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453. April 29, 2003
FACTS: In an Affidavit-Complaint complainant Editha Palma Gil charged respondent Judge Francisco H.
Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, with Manifest Bias and Partiality,
Undue Delay in the Disposition of Case and Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in a case for Forcible Entry and Damages with
Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction (Civil Case No. 1110) pending before the sala of
respondent judge; and that respondent failed to render judgment therein within the thirty-day period
required by Rule 70, Section 11 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure.
In his Comment, respondent judge denied that there was a deliberate and unreasonable delay in
the resolution of the case. He alleged that aside from his court, he had to hear the cases in the
municipal courts in Governor Generoso and San Isidro, Davao Oriental due to the inhibition of the
presiding judges therein.
ISSUE: W/N respondent judge failed to resolve the case within the period prescribed by Section 11.
RULING: Considering the summary nature of Civil Case No. 1110, which is an action for forcible entry,
Rule 70, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Summary Procedure expressly provides:
Period for rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position
papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
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The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of
judgment.
Thus, respondent judge is guilty of gross inefficiency for his failure to resolve and dispose of Civil
Case No. 1110 within the period prescribed by the Rules. The penalty for gross inefficiency ranges
from reprimand and admonition[10] to removal from office and/or a fine.

DORCAS G. PETALLAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE JUANILLO M. PULLOS, MCTC, SAN FRANCISCO, SURIGAO
DEL NORTE, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004

FACTS: Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding judge of the MCTC of San Francisco, Surigao del Norte,
was charged by Dorcas G. Petallar of violating among others, Rule 70, Sections 10 and 11of the Rules
of Court; for undue delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137 for Forcible Entry.
Petallar averred that he was the plaintiff in said forcible entry case, adding that after 30 days after the
receipt of the affidavits and position papers and the expiration of the period for filing at the MCTC

Judge Pullos did not render judgment; that after two months from the submission of our position
papers, I often went to the court of Judge Pullos personally to verify if there is already a judgment;
Judge Pullos in his comment stated that he handed down his decision in Case No. 137 on June 2, 2002.
He pointed out that said decision is, in fact, the subject of an appeal. Respondent submitted that the
charges against him had become moot.
The OCA observed that said decision was rendered out of time, in breach of Rule 70, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court, which mandates that judgment must be rendered within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the affidavits and position papers or the expiration of the period for filing the same. The OCA also
found respondent omitted to come up with a satisfactory explanation as to his failure to decide the
case within the prescribed period. Nor did he ask for an extension of time within which to decide the
case. The OCA held respondent liable for undue delay in rendering judgment in violation of the Rules of
Court. On March 30, 2003, respondent retired from the judiciary.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Pullos violated Rule 70, Section 11.
RULING: Respondent indeed violated Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of Court for undue delay in
rendering judgment. The records show that the parties in Special Civil Action Case No. 137 had filed
their respective position papers as early as February 2, 2000. Thus, respondent had until March 4,
2000 to render judgment. Had there been circumstances which prevented him from handing down his
decision within the prescribed period, respondent should have at least requested from this Court for an
extension of time within which to render judgment. As respondent himself admitted, Case No. 137 was
decided only on June 2, 2002 or two (2) years and some three (3) months beyond the reglementary
period. Moreover, he could not even come up with an explanation for the delay.
A judge cannot by himself prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.
Without any order of extension granted by this Court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed
period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

CONCILIATION REQUIREMENT

SECTION 12. Referral for conciliation. Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived
only after that requirement shall have been complied with.
In case conciliation is required, and there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, the case
shall be dismissed. The dismissal, however, is one without prejudice. Hence, the case may be revived
but only if the conciliation requirement is complied with. 3
Resort to barangay conciliation is a condition precedent in both cases. The opposing party may raise as
objection the fact that the despite has not been referred to the barangay authorities for conciliation
and the same may be ground for the dismissal of the action. However, it is not jurisdictional, meaning
that it may be waived by such opposing party. It is deemed waived when the opposing party failed to
timely object to the fact of the absence of barangay conciliation.

SECTION 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions,
3 Herrera, Oscar (2006) Remedial Law, Volume III. Pg. 463

or pleadings shall not be allowed:


1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions.
Not all pleadings may be filed in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This prohibition is
consistent with the summary nature of these actions. For example, a reply, third party complaint and
pleadings-in-intervention

BAYVIEW HOTEL, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CLUB FILIPINO, INC.
DE CEBU, respondents.
G.R. No. 119337. June 17, 1997

FACTS: On May 27, 1959, petitioner Bayview Hotel, Inc. entered into a contract of lease over a parcel
of land located in Cebu City with its registered owner, private respondent Club Filipino, Inc. De
Cebu. The lease agreement gave petitioner the right to construct and operate a hotel complex known
as the Magellan International Hotel for a period of thirty (30) years. Under the agreement, petitioner
was given the option to renew the lease for ten (10) more years. Petitioner notified private respondent
of its intention to extend the lease contract for a longer period and at a rate of rent different from the
terms as originally agreed upon. There was no meeting of the minds between the parties as private
respondent's Board of Directors insisted on adhering to the provisions of the original lease contract.
Private respondent then sent to petitioner a notice to vacate the premises and to pay accrued
rentals. Private respondent claimed ownership of the building and the improvements pursuant to the
provisions of the original contract.
When petitioner failed to vacate the premises, private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Cebu a complaint for ejectment and recovery of accrued rentals.
Petitioner filed its answer to the complaint for ejectment.
Petitioner then moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which was denied
by the trial judge on the ground that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits the
motion. Aggrieved by this Order, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, a petition
for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction against private respondent and Metropolitan Trial
Court Judge Teodoro Lim.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading

under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.


ISSUE: Is the petition for certiorari filed before the Regional Trial Court proscribed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
RULING: The petition for certiorari it filed with the Regional Trial Court is not in accord with Section 19
of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure which provides. "SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.- The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not
be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
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"(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court;
The prohibition is plain enough. Its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.