Hitra Procedure Kz01 CG Pro 53 0113 A02

Khazzan
Project
Security Classification:
Project Internal
Contract No. CO-BPXO-12-0376
Khazzan Commissioning
Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment
(HITRA) Procedure (CPF)
Khazzan Project
Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)
Revision History
Amendment
Date
Revision
Number
Amender
Initials
24/02/2016
A01
RT
Amendment
Related Documents
Document Number
Document Name
Description of Content
Petrofac Golden Rules of

Safety
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0107
Khazzan Commissioning
Control of Work
KZ01-SA-PLN-53-0005
Emergency Response &

Crisis Management Plan
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0111
Energy Isolation
Procedure
A02
24/02/2016
A01
Khazzan Project Commissioning Energy Isolation procedure
RE-ISSUED FOR REVIEW
05/02/2016
Rev.
Commissioning specific CoW process including PtW and

Authorisations
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
Date
Reason for Issue
RT
CM
VK
Author
EC
Checked
CE
ELIE
LAHOUD
Approved
Rev.
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Holds
Section Number
Short Description of Hold
Abbreviations
AA
Area Authority
AAD
Area Authority Designate
ALARP
As Low as Reasonably Practicable
CoW
Control of Work
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CSE
Confined Space Entry
GPO
BP Global Projects Organisation
GRoS
BP Golden Rules of Safety
HITRA
Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment
ISA
Isolating Authority
MOC
Management of Change
PA
Performing Authority
PTW
Permit to Work
PTWC
Permit to Work Coordinator
SA
Site Authority
TBT
Toolbox Talk
TRA
Task Risk Assessment
TRAT
Task Risk Assessment Table
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0.
2.0.
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................
1.1.
PURPOSE......................................................................................................................................
1.2.
SCOPE...........................................................................................................................................
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES............................................................................

2.1.
SINGLE POINT OF ACCOUNTABILITY.........................................................................................
2.2.
SITE AUTHORITY..........................................................................................................................
2.3.
AREA AUTHORITY.........................................................................................................................
2.4.
AREA AUTHORITY DESIGNATE....................................................................................................
2.5.
PERFORMING AUTHORITY..........................................................................................................
2.6.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF HITRA FACILITATORS..........................................................................

2.6.1.
HITRA LEVEL 1 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY PA) 10
2.6.2. HITRA LEVEL 2 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY AA OR REPRESENTATIVE FROM

THE HSE SITE TEAM) 10
3.0.
4.0.
5.0.
6.0.
7.0.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW

.......................................................................................................................
3.1.
TASK RISK ASSESSMENT LEVELS............................................................................................
3.2.
HITRA PROCESS STEPS............................................................................................................
3.3.
LEVEL 1 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................
3.4.
LEVEL 2 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................
ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK.............................................................

4.1.
HAZARDS.....................................................................................................................................
4.2.
DETERMINING CONSEQUENCES.............................................................................................
4.3.
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK RANKING.................................................................................
4.4.
IDENTIFICATION OF CONTROLS...............................................................................................
PERFORM TASK................................................................................................
5.1.
PERMIT TO WORK AND COMMUNICATION..............................................................................
5.2.
PERFORMING THE TASK............................................................................................................
5.3.
MONITOR FOR CONDITION CHANGE.......................................................................................
5.4.
LESSONS LEARNED...................................................................................................................
TRAINING AND COMPETENCY............................................................................

6.1.
GENERAL.....................................................................................................................................
6.2.
LEVELS OF TRAINING................................................................................................................
TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)..............................................................
APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS.....................................................................

APPENDIX B HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROMPTS.........................................................
APPENDIX C IMPACT ASSESSMENT TABLE....................................................................
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APPENDIX D RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX......................................................................

APPENDIX E APPROVAL MATRIX..................................................................................
APPENDIX F TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT).....................................................
APPENDIX G LEVEL 1 RISK ASSESSMENT PRO FORMA...................................................
APPENDIX H HITRA FORM...........................................................................................
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1.0. INTRODUCTION
Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (HITRA) is used during the planning and execution stages
of Commissioning Control of Work (CoW) to identify hazards associated with performing tasks. It prescribes
the control measures to implement during task execution to prevent or eliminate, isolate or minimize task
risks so that work is executed in a safe, systematic and compliant manner. This document should be read in
conjunction with Khazzan Commissioning Control of Work Procedure KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0107 and the
Energy Isolation Process KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0111
1.1. Purpose
The purpose of this procedure is to describe how to identify work-related hazards and assess risks
associated with activities undertaken as part of the Khazzan Project Commissioning scope. It provides the
necessary detail to illustrate what good hazard identification and task risk assessment looks like.
The HITRA process forms an essential part of the Commissioning Control of Work (CoW) process.
Before conducting HITRA, evaluate:
1. Is the job really necessary?
2. Is there an alternate way(s) to do the work that eliminates inherent hazard(s) involved?
It is a Khazzan Project principle that no unnecessary work will be done. Only work that provides business
value will be undertaken.
1.2. Scope
This procedure applies to work undertaken inside the CPF boundary limits. See Figure 1 below illustrating
the CPF Commissioning CoW document structure. An equivalent approach managed by BP for GWES
Category 1 scope.
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Figure 1: Commissioning CoW Document Structure
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2.0. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1. Single Point of Accountability

Khazzan CPF HITRA Single Point of Accountability (SPA) is the Petrofac Commissioning Manager and is
responsible for ensuring that:
All activities within their area of responsibility comply with this procedure
Delegation of any of the CoW roles responsibility is documented
CoW audit, assurance and self-verification systems are in place, including lessons learned and continual
improvement processes
Sufficient resources (time, people and budget) are allocated to implement this procedure
Personnel involved in facilitating HITRA are properly trained and competent
Periodic self-verification against the requirements in this procedure is undertaken
Responsibility can be delegated but not accountability. This delegation must be documented (Refer to CPF
Commissioning CoW ProcedureKZ01-CG-PLN-53-0107.
2.2. Site Authority

The Site Authority (SA) is responsible to:
Ensure that an adequate number of competent persons are appointed to manage the work and the
associated risks, as defined in this procedure
Confirm that a process is in place to manage the appointment of competent persons as:
o
Authorizing signatories for Level 1 and Level 2 HITRAs,
Level 1 HITRA completers,
Team Leaders to facilitate the Level 2 HITRA process.
Ensure that the HITRA process is in place and followed consistently
Review and self-verify the HITRA process to confirm that the quality of the HITRAs and areas of
improvement have been identified and implemented
Ensure that the HITRA process is subject to regular monitoring and Self Verification , acting upon the
results of Self Verification to maintain the integrity of the system and proposing any recommendations for
system improvement
Ensure that formal records of all TRAs are maintained
Ensure that the training and competency standards, and formal authorization of personnel, as defined in
this document and in Control of Work Procedure (KZ01-CG-PLN-53-0107) are followed
Manage the TRAT
Note: The SA is the Single Point of Accountability for CoW on their site. The responsibilities but not the
accountabilities can be delegated to a competent person with proper documented approval from the SPA.
Review and authorization of all Level 1 & 2 HITRA should be commensurate with the level of risk. It is
incumbent on the SA to request a higher level of risk assessment should they consider that risks have not
been fully addressed.
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2.3. Area Authority

The Area Authority (AA) role is central to the site CoW process for the management and control of CoW
tasks. AAs are accountable for task hazard identification and risk control measures associated with work
performed in their area of responsibility. The number of areas can be depending on the complexity and the
footprint of the work to be undertaken.
Responsibility can be delegated but not accountability. This delegation should be through documented
approval from the SA.
The Area Authorities are responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this procedure are adhered to for
all TRAs conducted within their area of responsibility. The AA or their competent delegate (AAD) shall be
trained and competent to lead the team in performing a Level 2 HITRA. They shall be responsible to:
Ensure that everyone associated with the work activity is aware of the requirements of HITRA, permit to
work conditions and any risks or hazards
Ensure that the appropriate level of risk assessment is conducted for the task
Organise and participate in the HITRA process
Ensure that the Performing Authority (PA. Refer to Section 2.5) participates in risk assessments and
conducts Tool Box Talks associated with the work activity
Ensure that the HITRA is communicated to the workforce in commonly used language(s)
Ensure that the risk assessment requirement is included in the planning for each work activity
Ensure that a pre-job site visit is conducted with the PA to identify all hazards and appropriate controls
that need to be included in the Work Permit or risk assessment
Ensure that the appropriate level of HITRA has been carried out for the task
Ensure that all the appropriate control measures have been put in place prior to a permit being issued,
confirming that the PA fully understands the scope of work and tasks involved
Ensure that active permits and hazard control measures are effective at the work site and can continue
simultaneously with other PTW tasks
Ensure that the PA is competent to perform the task and HITRA
Promote the culture to STOP the Job if anyone feels unsafe.
2.4. Area Authority Designate

The AAD serves as a delegate for the AA, can facilitate L1 HITRA, participate in L2 HITRA and perform site
visit for low residual risks tasks. Only certain elements of the AA role can be delegated by the AA to the
AAD. The accountability for ensuring hazards are identified and the associated risks are controlled cannot
be delegated. The AA cannot delegate worksite visit for high residual risk tasks or approval of Level 2 HITRA
that requires AA approval as per the Approval Matrix (Appendix E)
2.5. Performing Authority

The Performing Authority (PA) is the person responsible for the activity being carried out under the Permit to
Work. For permit-related work, the PA should perform the Level 1 HITRA assessment. The PA may also
participate in Level 2 HITRAs.
The PA shall be competent to supervise performance of the task and be very familiar with the equipment
and tools being used. The PA may be the person carrying out the task or supervising a group of people
carrying it out.
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The PA can be responsible for more than one task at a time providing they can safely manage the tasks
simultaneously. This should be discussed and agreed with the Area Authority
The PA shall ensure that:
All personnel under their supervision comply with this procedure when involved in risk-assessed activities
Level 1 HITRA is completed where required and that adequate consultation has taken place, typically with
AA and the line supervisor
The necessity of Level 2 HITRA is identified and participate in Level 2 HITRA
Risk assessment has been performed and a toolbox talk conducted
Where other persons are involved in the task, they fully understand the scope of the work and the
hazards and controls for the job by holding a toolbox talk meeting. This includes ensuring that all of those
involved in the specific work activity sign the worksite hard copy of the Work Permit
The controls identified in the HITRA are effectively in place and that the activity is executed in accordance
with this procedure
Work activity is STOPPED if an unsafe situation occurs
Work activities have been reviewed and pertinent information exchanged with all other affected parties
Appropriate authorisation is obtained prior to the commencement of work
The proposed controls reduce the risks associated with the task; consider the controls specified by any
relevant local procedure and the capability of the person in charge.
Work is stopped immediately when there is any change to the Work Permit conditions, including an
emergency, and that hazards and risks are reassessed before the work is resumed
A culture prevails to STOP the Job if anyone feels unsafe.
2.6. Responsibilities of HITRA Facilitators

1.1.1.
HITRA Level 1 Facilitator (Typically PA)
The Level 1 HITRA Facilitator should:
Complete Level 1 HITRAs
Confirm that adequate consultation has taken place, typically with the AA and / or line supervisor
Confirm appropriate authorisation is obtained prior to the commencement of work
1.1.2.
HITRA Level 2 Facilitator (Typically AA or
representative from the HSE site team)
The main responsibilities are to:
Lead the assigned team in performing a Level 2 HITRA as described in this procedure
Ensure the team understands the assessment process and its objectives
Take responsibility for maintaining the quality of the HITRA
Ensure that the assessment team includes personnel with the necessary experience, knowledge and
competence for the task involved
Ensure that the HITRA includes a worksite visit prior to issuing PTW
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Ensure that all members of the HITRA team have full opportunity to contribute and that the details of the
assessment are agreed by all team members
Ensure that the details of the assessment are accurately recorded and correspond with the agreed level
of risk
Take appropriate guidance on health, safety and environmental legislation and consequent limits on
operation
3.0. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW

This section outlines the HITRA process for systematically examining a task to identify the hazards, evaluate
the risks and specify appropriate controls.
3.1. Task Risk Assessment Levels

There are two levels of Task Risk Assessment (TRA).
Level 1 TRA includes a detailed overview of the task to identify the hazards involved and required controls.
It is conducted by one or more competent persons, typically the Performing Authority (PA) and / or the Area
Authority (AA).
Level 2 TRA includes a structured semi-quantitative assessment, conducted when the Site Authority (SA) or
AA determines that there are greater hazards or complexities associated with the task, necessitating a more
rigorous assessment. Level 2 TRA is performed by a TRA team.
The reasons for a Level 2 HITRA include, for example:
The task is new and unfamiliar
It is not possible to comply fully with the standards in a relevant local procedure or other recognized
source of guidance
Previously used controls may not be reasonably practicable in this case
The task is complex and/or has potential impact on other activities.
Energy of significant magnitude will be introduced into the system/process
The following activities require a Level 2 TRA:
Confined space entry
Excavation of a trench or pit more than 4 feet or 1.2 metres deep or other ground disturbance, such as
piling
Working at heights, where a fall could result in serious injury
Work on energised systems
Complex (Category 2) or critical (Category 3) lifting operations
Activities that could involve exposure to substances for which there are defined exposure limits,
including:
hydrogen sulphide (H2S)
products that contain benzene
inert gases
Work that could result in performance or availability of safety critical equipment or systems falling
below expected standards, for example:
o
Removal or inhibition of protective devices
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Blocking of escape routes
Taking a fire pump or emergency generator offline
Note, safety critical performance shall be considered with respect to the hazards present in a
Commissioning, pre hydrocarbon environment.
Online connections to process equipment tanks or pipelines, including hot tapping.
Planned deviation from an existing policy, procedure or practice.
More examples of activities, and whether they warrant Level 1 or Level 2 assessment, are included in the
TRAT, Appendix F.
3.2. HITRA Process Steps
Identify the site and process hazards that could result in harm such as injury, illness, damage to the
environment, plant or process
Identify risk; determine the credible consequences and their probabilities to assess the level of risk(consequence x probability = risk) including who or what could be affected
Reduce risk by eliminating or substituting the hazards AND controlling and / or mitigating the risks
Evaluate residual risk that remains with all the planned controls in effect. Confirm that residual risk has
been considered and no additional controls are needed for the task(s) to be conducted safely
Document in a standard format the hazards, controls and residual risk
Record approvals of the HITRA document
Communicate the hazards and controls to all personnel involved in performing the task. Confirm that
the controls are effective throughout the task.
Monitor the on-going work to identify any new hazard that may be introduced during or because of the
activities.
3.3. Level 1 HITRA Process

A Level 1 HITRA involves a review of the task by the PA in consultation with the AA to identify the hazards
associated with the task and appropriate control measures required to manage these hazards. The PA uses
their technical knowledge and task information to select job hazards from the prompt list on the permit (see
Figure 2 below). The PA should not be constrained by the list and must use their judgement to identify any
other hazards and record on the space provided on the permit.
The PA then uses the controls listed to show how the hazards will be managed. Once again, the PA should
not be constrained by the list and must use their judgement to identify any other control measures and
record on the space provided on the permit.
The AA with the PA will review task details, hazards and control measures described on the permit along
with any documentation. Prior to the commencement of the job, they will visit the worksite to confirm all
hazards have been identified and adequately controlled.
During Commissioning, where there will be repetitive low risk tasks carried out such as instrument loop
checks, or uncoupled motor runs; a Level 1 risk assessment may be carried out and recorded on a specific
L1 risk assessment pro forma, included in Appendix G These risk assessments shall be held in the PtW
office and given a unique reference number. The assessment shall be reviewed, copied and attached to
subsequent equivalent permits as required. This will ensure a level of consistency in low risk activities.
Additional site specific hazards can be added directly to the permit as required.
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This approach shall also be followed when considering Risk Assessed Procedures and the existing HITRA
shall be reviewed for applicability and any lessons learned from previous application of the procedure.
Figure 2: Example from Cold Work Permit - Hazards and Controls Checkboxes
Figure 3: Level 1 HITRA Flowchart

If the proposed controls are adequate for the identified risks of the task, and the task can be conducted
safely, the task risk assessment is approved. If, considering any residual risks, the authorised signatory
doubts that the risks are adequately controlled by the proposed means, they will request a Level 2 HITRA.
Those who conducted the Level 1 HITRA may also participate in the Level 2 HITRA.
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3.4. Level 2 HITRA Process

A Level 2 HITRA is a structured examination of all hazards associated with a task to devise a set of control
measures that reduce the level of risk sufficiently to allow a task to proceed safely. If the risk cannot be
sufficiently reduced, alternative methods must be found before the task can proceed.
The Level 2 method uses a risk assessment proforma sheet and a suite of matrices to help to determine the
consequences and likelihood of hazardous conditions in a consistent and repeatable manner.
To complete a Level 2 risk assessment, a team is formed with a minimum of 3 persons with suitable
experience, led by a competent Level 2 HITRA facilitator appointed by the AA. The objective of forming a
team is to bring together understanding and experience of the task to examine all the hazards and devise a
set of controls that will ensure that the level of risk is reasonable.
Where larger tasks, series of tasks or significant introduction of energy is planned the potential to require
Level 2 HITRAs should be identified early, to allocate time in the plan to complete the HITRAs.
A Level 2 HITRA can be carried out at any stage in the work process if the PA, AA, a member of
management or any other personnel believes that significant risks exist which will not be adequately
controlled without a more rigorous assessment and the application of additional controls. The AA is
responsible for deciding whether a L2 HITRA is required.
The decision about when Level 2 Risk Assessment is required is somewhat subjective, depending on the
people involved, but the following rules should be applied to ensure a consistent level of assessment is
being carried out across the organization.
Figure 4: Level 2 HITRA Flowchart
4.0. ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK

This section provides guidance on the use of an energy source approach to identify hazards and clarifies
the differences between hazards and risks.
4.1. Hazards
Hazards are anything with the potential to result in harm such as injury, illness or damage.
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NOTE: Through Commissioning, the absence of hydrocarbons and associated SIMOPs makes the process
of hazards identification and risk assessment less complex than Operational facilities.
To identify all the hazards, consider the aspects below:
Affected Hazards: The energy sources affected by the work, e.g. commissioning fluids and the system in
which they are transported and contained (e.g. operations equipment).
Applied Hazards: Uncontrolled or unwanted contact with an energy source that may occur while setting
up tools and equipment at the job site.
Ambient Hazards: The site conditions that may cause uncontrolled or unwanted contact with an energy
source (e.g. weather conditions or concurrent work).
Other considerations may include;
Characteristics of the plant and / or systems involved:
Access
Type of service (e.g., water, diesel, inert gas)
Likelihood of foam, sand, and sludge, types of scale
Sensitivity of the location within the premises, including proximity to Health, Safety, Security and
Environment (HSSE) critical plant or systems such as:
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) intakes
Flare header
Emergency Shut Down Valves (ESDVs)
Escape routes, fire pumps, large inventories (pipelines, vessels or tanks)
Possible interactions between simultaneous activities within the task, or with another task taking place
nearby, that call for close coordination or controls.
Energy Sources and Hazard Identification prompts are found in Appendices A and B.
Also, consider what would occur in the event of an emergency.
4.2. Determining Consequences

After identifying the hazards, the potential credible consequences should also be identified, taking into
consideration any impact on personnel or plant.
The worst reasonably credible consequences should be identified and recorded for each hazard. There may
be more than one consequence per hazard. Refer to Appendix C: Impact Assessment Table for guidance on
determining the level of impact for each of: Health and Safety, Environment or Financial consequences.
4.3. Risk Assessment and Risk Ranking

Risk assessment assigns semi-quantitative values for each consequence and probability. The product of
these values lies inside or outside the allowed limits. The risk created by each hazard on the list should be
evaluated according to:
The worst reasonably credible impact, should anything go wrong (taken from Appendix C) AND the
probability of such an impact being realized (from Appendix D)
The result is a numerical risk ranking which must be recorded and approved according to the requirements
found in Appendix E.
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For example, impact level F and probability level 4 gives a ranking of 6, which falls in Risk Area II, requiring
approval by Site Authority.
4.4. Identification of Controls

For each risk, control measures shall be identified.
The HITRA Facilitator works systematically through the list of hazards to specify all the methods necessary
to control each of the associated risks. Existing controls are recorded along with any additional controls that
the team considers necessary to achieve a sufficient level of overall control. The hierarchy of controls
shown below should be used as a guide to confirm that a full range of options is considered.
Note: As consequences are deemed reasonably credible, then control measures should be
reasonably practicable. They should be chosen to adequately reduce the identified risk.
Figure 5: Hierarchy of Controls

Two types of control measures should be identified from a Level 1 or Level 2 HITRA process:
Prerequisite controls that should be in effect prior to job execution. These may or may not include a
PTW.
Supplementary controls that should be applied during the job. Consideration should be given whether
supplementary controls introduce another hazard, while in effect.
Before the task is authorised to start, the person controlling the work activity should confirm that:
All the prerequisite controls are in effect
The persons allocated to perform the task are competent to initiate and manage the supplementary
controls
The output from the risk assessment (with Work Permit where applicable) has been communicated in
writing and signed off by all involved in the task
Monitoring activities are arranged e.g. controls are still effective, no new hazard is introduced
Actions in the event of an emergency are understood by all involved in the task.
Controls Check
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Consideration should be given to the following questions:
Have all the necessary control measures been fully identified?
Is an engineering change necessary for eliminating or reducing the risk?
Are any additional capabilities needed to complete the task?
Should the plant or process be shut down?
Is the residual risk at a level to allow the task to be safely completed?
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Residual Risk Check

A. If the residual risk is not at a level to allow the task to be completed safely, the hierarchy of controls
should be used again with emphasis on the most effective or prevention categories.
If any control measures are practicable to implement and would reduce the residual risk, they should be
recorded.
If further control measures cannot reduce the risk to a level that allows the task to be completed safely,
the HITRA team cannot authorize the task and should refer back to the work requester.
B. The HITRA team will document:
The assessment including all the identified control measures that should be in effect for the defined task.
The residual risk level for each identified hazard, with the highest residual risk defining the level of
approval. (Appendix E)
C. Agreement on risks and controls
Approval to proceed is sought when the HITRA team unanimously agrees that the hazards and risks are
controlled to the point that the task(s) can be conducted safely
D. Documentation and records
The HITRA team shall record the findings in the HITRA format included as Appendix G
E. Approval levels are explained in Appendix E.
5.0. PERFORM TASK
5.1. Permit to Work and Communication

This section discusses the approval to proceed and the importance of communication to the success of
HITRA.
Before work commences, the risk assessment shall have been approved based on the residual risk and
according to the approval matrix Appendix E.
The success of a HITRA depends on the effective communication of its results, so that people who execute
the job are fully aware of and thoroughly understand the hazards and the controls in effect.
The HITRA document is used as the basis for workforce communications so that all personnel concerned
have an understanding of the following:
The steps involved in carrying out the job
The hazards they may encounter at each step
Control measures in effect or planned and how they relate to the hazards
Individual actions and responsibilities at various steps in the work
All involved in the task have the opportunity to identify further hazards and control measures that may have
been overlooked in the HITRA. The HITRA Facilitator should be notified if such improvements are identified.
5.2. Performing the Task

Each person involved in actually performing the task should:
Be satisfied that all the defined controls are actually in place and effective (even though the task has been
duly authorised)
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Feel empowered (and obliged) to voice any concerns to their supervisor and not start the job if they do
not think it can be completed safely
5.3. Monitor for Condition Change

The HITRA includes a monitoring frequency for the work. However, personnel who execute the task should
monitor their activities on an on-going basis and be alert to:
Any new or unauthorised personnel
Conditions at the work site (e.g. isolations, weather, SIMOPS)
Hazards generated by the activity
Hazards not originally covered by the HITRA
Whether controls are still effective
If necessary, personnel should stop the job so that the hazards and risk can be re-assessed.
5.4. Lessons Learned

It is important to capture lessons learned upon completion of work and incorporate the lessons into the
process. This may be in the form of changes or revisions to:
Links between a procedure and the underpinning HITRA.
HITRA records.
The HITRA process, including team composition.
Lessons learned should be communicated to all concerned through existing methods such as meetings,
circulars, training and toolbox talks.
6.0. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY
6.1. General
All personnel involved in the HITRA process are trained on HITRA process & procedure and competent.
The competency of all relevant personnel shall be established during the planning process for a particular
risk assessment. The AA shall ensure that the personnel involved in the activity have the correct
competencies through training records or requesting individuals to produce relevant certification.
While it is simple, successful application of the HITRA method depends upon participants having industry
experience, different perspectives and understanding of relevant hazards, realistic consequences and a
hierarchy of risk reduction measures (hierarchy of controls is shown in Section 4.5 above).
All personnel involved in the HITRA process should complete the fundamental training module (Refer to
Section 6.2 below for links) which covers:
Definitions of hazard, consequence, probability, risk, control, hierarchy of controls and risk matrix
The principles and process of HITRA
When to conduct Level 1 and 2 HITRAs
HITRA tools (checklists, prompts)
Expectations of team members: the need to contribute personal experience, reach agreement and record
divergent views
Responsibility after the completion of the HITRA (communication, responding to changes at the task
location)
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 19 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Before selection for training, Level 2 HITRA Facilitators should be able to demonstrate an extensive
knowledge of the work environment. They should be able to apply informed judgment when using checklists
and other available tools.
6.2. Levels of Training

All members defined in the Control of Work team (PA, AA, , AAD, PTWC, SA, ISA, AGT) are required to
carry out HITRA awareness training. This will capture HITRA level 1 and a summary of what level 2 risk
assessment includes and awareness of why and when it should be used.
Personnel identified to be Level 2 facilitators, shall carry out further training to HITRA Level 2 facilitator level.
Personnel shall only take on the roles of authorised signatory or HITRA Facilitator after successfully
completing the supplementary training and competency assessment.
Training and Competency Matrix:
Role
SA
Experience
1. Has led and facilitated
Level 1 and 2 HITRAs
using the HITRA process.
Training
1.
2. Practical demonstration
in leading a level 2 HITRA
2.
AA
1.
2.
PA
Has led and facilitated

Level 1 and 2 HITRAs
using the HITRA
process.
Practical
demonstration in
leading a level 2
HITRA.
Explain the PAs role in

worksite visits and Level 1
HITRA or equivalent.
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
1.
Completed
training for both
HITRA
participation and
facilitation
modules.
Satisfactorily
passed the HITRA
knowledge
assessment
criteria.
Complete the
HITRA
participation and
facilitation training
course.
HITRA Awareness
(participation)
Page 20 of 41
Assessment Criteria
Practical field assessment shall include:
1.
Can lead a Level 2 TRA.
2.
Can articulate the difference between

a hazard and a risk.
3.
Can state the difference between Level

1 and 2 HITRAs.
4.
Understands how residual risk is

determined and the approval process.
5.
Leads a field CoW verification/audit,

including HITRA.
6.
Can articulate the HITRA hierarchy of

controls.
Field assessment shall include/verify the

following:
1.
He or she has led a Level 2 HITRA.
2.
Demonstrate that they understand the

HITRA and approval process.
3.
Explain the difference between Level 1

and Level 2 HITRAs.
4.
Demonstrate ability to lead a L2

HITRA.
5.
Apply the HITRA tools and approval

process.
6.
Explain the HITRA hierarchy of

Controls and residual risk.
Assessment shall include:

1.
What is a Level 1 HITRA, and what are

the key principles
2.
Name the energy sources and identify

hazards.
3.
What hazards to look for during a

worksite visit
4.
When to escalate to Level 2 TRA
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Assessor
SPA with
support
from
Technical
Discipline
Engineers
(if needed)
SA
AA
Khazzan Project
7.0. TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)

TRAT lists typical Commissioning activities, prescribing Level 1 or 2 HITRA, recommended participants and
approver. The TRAT table included in Appendix F is based on BP Upstream guidance The purpose of the
TRAT is to:
Categorise a number of standard tasks according to their residual risk level
List the appropriate permit to work types (including procedures and routine)
Define the required Level (1 or 2) of TRA and the approval/authorization level
The Site Authority is accountable for the management of the TRAT. When a task is not covered in the TRAT,
the Site Authority will determine the level of TRA required by applying the HITRA process.
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 21 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS

Energy
sources
Description / guidance
Biological - including wildlife and viruses or bacteria, e.g., as found in sewage systems, drain
lines, cooling towers
Biological
Body Mechanics - human strength and agility applied to a task involving lifting, pushing,
pulling, climbing or positioning
Body
Mechanics
Chemical - in the form of reactive or life-threatening gases, liquids, solids, e.g., water, methane,
nitrogen, process chemicals, etc.
Chemical
Electrical - includes all types and voltages of electricity: high voltage power systems ( (AC),
battery systems (DC) and static.
Electrical
Consider whether the task:
Requires equipment related to the task or in the area of the task to be

isolated.
Involves electricity powered equipment.
Is in an area where there is vulnerable electrical equipment such as

insulated cabling, un-insulated overhead power lines, etc.
Involves transfer of fluids, powers, etc. or friction between nonconducting materials which could generate static electrical charges. Are
systems and equipment where this could occur adequately grounded and /
or bonded.
Gravity - causes tools, equipment or people to fall or move. This affects lifting task, work at
height and potential dropped objects
Gravity
Mechanical - includes mobile equipment as well as moving parts on stationary equipment and
rotating equipment. Even though items are non-powered, their momentum as they are moved
may crush or cut people or vulnerable equipment. Also includes sharp edges of tools and / or
equipment.
Mechanical
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 22 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Energy
sources
Description / guidance
Noise - A form of pressure energy.
Consideration should be given to whether:
The task is in a high noise area.
Noisy tools / equipment will be used.
Noise could cause communication problems, including in any

emergency.
Noise
Pressure - air, water, pneumatics, springs, gases are all possible sources of significant
pressure.
Pressure
Consideration should be given to:
Non-Return Valves (NRVs) where system contents may be trapped

between the NRV and an isolation point.
Section of equipment in which trapped or undrained contents may

remain.
General equipment / line condition, e.g., area of corrosion, where a

pressure leak is foreseeable.
Reaction forces from a pressure leak, which may move an

unrestrained item, such as a hose, cylinder or pipe segment.
Radiation - in the form of sunlight, radio waves or ionizing radiation (radioactivity)

Radiation
Thermal - energy associated with hot or cold surfaces and fluids, undesired chemical reactions
and / or ambient temperatures.
Thermal
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 23 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
APPENDIX B HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROMPTS

Category
Mechanical
Type of harm
Trapping (crushing, pressing, drawing in
and shearing injuries)
Examples
Two moving parts, or one moving
part and a fixed surface
Conveyor belt and drive
V belt and pulley
Power press
Using hammer
Hoist, crane
Impact (includes puncture) / mobile

equipment
Something that may strike or

stab someone or may be struck
against
Moving vehicle, machine, aircraft
Drill, lathe
Crane hook or load
Contact (cutting, friction or abrasion)
Something sharp or with a rough

surface
Knife, chisel, saw
Fan blade
Circular saw blade
Sanding belt
Abrasive wheel
Entanglement (rotating parts)
Power take-off shaft

Pipe threading machine
Abrasive wheel
Ejection (of work piece or part of tool)
Cartridge tool
Hammer and chisel
Abrasive wheel
Abrasive blasting
Electrical
Shock / burn / fire /
Electricity > 240v, 240v, 110v
Explosion
DC electricity, especially
batteries (hydrogen gas) when
charging
Ignition sources
Static
Batteries
Pressure
Release of energy
Compressed air
(explosion / injection /
Compressed gas
implosion)
Process fluid
Steam
Vacuum
Hydraulic system
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 24 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Category
Type of harm
Examples
Hydro-blasting
Stored energy
Flying objects,
Springs under tension
Electrical / hydraulic / pneumatic systems
Springs under compression

Turbine variable inlet guide
vanes
Conveyor tension weight
Counterweight
Accumulators/ pulsation
dampers
Gravity
Struck by falling objects
Overhead work areas / platforms

Items mounted or stored on
ceilings or on walls
High rack storage areas
(warehouse)
Hoist platform cage
Load carried by crane
Raised tipper lorry body
Thermal
Burns / fires / scalds / frostbite
Hot surface
Welding flame / arc
Refrigerant
Steam
Process fluid, heat transfer
medium
Radiation
Ionizing radiation
Burns, cancer, sunburn, melanoma, skin

cancer
X Rays
or radiation
Ultra violet
Non ionizing radiation
Burns
Micro wave
Radio frequency
Laser
Infrared
Noise
Hearing loss, tinnitus
Noise > 85 dB(A) continuous

Noise >? dB impact
Vibration
Vibration white finger, whole body effects
Pneumatic drill
Driving mobile plant
Using jackhammer
Stability
Crushing
Inadequate crane base

Fork lift truck on slope
Machine not bolted down
Mobile scaffold too high
Scaffold not tied
Overload or defect due to

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Crushing
Page 25 of 41
Crane overload
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Category
Type of harm
mechanical failure
Examples
Chain sling
Scaffold overload
Structure overload, especially
extreme weather
Fire / explosion
Burns
Combustion
Paper store
Grease
Plastic foam
Flammable substances
(highly and extremely
flammable)
Burns
Petrol, diesel, avgas

Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Hydrogen
See also explosive below

Oxidizing substance
Burns
Organic peroxide, other oxidising

agents
Nitric acid
Gas explosions
Burns, structural failure
Flammable gas or liquid above

its flash point in a confined space
Dust explosions
Burns, structural failure
Wood dust
Health hazards
Skin, eyes and respiratory track effects;

noise
Sulphuric acid, other acids

especially hydrofluoric
Corrosive / irritating
materials
Caustic soda, other alkalis

Ammonia, chlorine
Sensitising materials and

particulates
Sensitisation, fibrosis and cancers of the

lungs irritation / injury to eyes
Silica dust
Wood dust
Iron dust
Vapours
Acute and chronic effects on health
Benzene
Toluene
Acetone
Fumes
Acute and chronic effects on health (local

and systemic effects)
Lead fume
Rubber fume
Asphalt fume
Gases
Acute and chronic effects on health and

death
Carbon monoxide
Hydrogen sulphide
Sulphur dioxide
Mists
Acute and chronic effects on health
Oil mist, cutting fluids

Printing ink mist
Detergents
Aerosols
Asphyxiates
Acute and chronic effects on health and

death
Nitrogen
Carbon monoxide
Smoke
Argon
Health hazard by ingestion

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Burns to upper alimentary tract

Page 26 of 41
Corrosive liquids
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Category
Type of harm
Examples
Poisoning
Toxins
All harmful aerosols
Polluted water
Contaminated food and drink
Hazards by contact
Cuts, abrasions
Metal swarf
Concrete blocks
Environmental Hazards
Biological / hazardous waste
storage and disposal
Burns, frostbite;
Molten metal
also structural failure
Cryogenic gases
Sewage systems / groundwater / soil

pollution / biohazardous waste and sharps /
influenza / malaria
Crude / condensate
transportation and storage
Storage of hazardous sludge /
material in pits
Infectious and non-infectious
diseases, parasites
Human factors / fatigue
Injuries, illness
Shift work
Work patterns
Driving
Poor ergonomic design of plant
Control / alarm systems
Procedures
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 27 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment
APPENDIX C IMPACT ASSESSMENT TABLE

Severity
Health and Safety

Levels A-C
maintain the
visibility of
risks with the
potential for
catastrophic
impact even if
their
probability of
occurrence is
extremely low.
The upper
level of this
framework is
defined by the
most severe
level of impact
ever seen in
industry.
Comparable to the most catastrophic

health/safety incidents ever seen in industry.
The potential for 100 or more fatalities (or onset
of life threatening health effects) shall always
be classified at this level.
Catastrophic health/safety incident causing very

widespread fatalities within or outside a facility.
Catastrophic health/safety incident causing

widespread fatalities within or outside a facility.
Environmental
Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any

environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5
years.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which

remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and

which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more
than 1 and up to 5 years.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and

which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.

can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1
and up to 5 years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and


which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.



can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.

which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Every employee associate with this project has the ultimate responsibility for Health, Safety, Security & Environmental performance. This will be achieved through a
positive HSSE culture at all the levels and by implementing a robust HSSE Management system. Petrofac and its Sub-Contractor management will continually strive
towards reducing HSSE risks to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) in all its operations to achieve the Project HSSE goals.
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 28 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Severity
Health and Safety

Very major health/safety incident
The potential for 3 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening
health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
30 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or
requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
Major health/safety incident

1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic, actual or alleged.
10 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or
requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
High impact health/safety incident

Permanent partial disability(ies)
Several non-permanent injuries or health impacts.
Days Away From Work Case (DAFWC)
Medium impact health/safety incident

Single or multiple recordable injury or health effects from
common source/event.
Low impact health/safety incident
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 29 of 41
Environmental

Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which

can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.


can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and



can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and


which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment

and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and

Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment

Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Severity
Health and Safety

First aid
Single or multiple over-exposures causing noticeable irritation but
no actual health effects
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 30 of 41
Environmental
and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or
weeks.
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
Financial Impact
Severity
Non-financial Business Impact
(equipment damage, business value

lost)
Public or investor outrage on a global scale.

Threat of global loss of license to operate.
>$20 billion
Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market US, EU, Russia.
Intervention from major Government US, UK, EU, Russia.
Public or investor outrage in major western markets US, EU.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.
$5 billion - $20 billion
Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset in a major
market.
Intervention from other major Government.
Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration.
$1 billion - $5 billion
Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets in a major
market.
Interventions from non-major Governments.
Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited interest-group outrage in a major
market.
Prolonged adverse national or international media attention.
Widespread adverse social impact.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment.
$100 m to $1 billion
Other adverse enforcement action by regulators.

Limited interest-group outrage in non-major market.
Short term adverse national or international media coverage.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU.
$5m -$100m
Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level consequence
Prolonged local media coverage.
Local adverse social impact.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).
$500k-$5m
Short term local media coverage.

Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours).
$50k -$500k
Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise episode).
<$50k
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 31 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
APPENDIX D RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

1
Impact
Level
A similar
A similar
Similar
Similar
A similar
Likely to Event likely Common
event has event has event has event has event has occur once
to occur
occurrence
not yet
not yet
occurred
occurred occurred, or or twice in
several
(at least
occurred in occurred in somewhere somewhere is likely to the facility times in the annually) at
our industry our industry.
in our
within the
occur,
lifetime.
facility
the facility.
and would
industry.
BP Group. within the
lifetime.
only be a
lifetime of
remote
10 similar
possibility.
facilities.
8
7
6
9
8
7
10
9
8
11
10
9
12
11
10
13
12
11
14
13
12
15
14
13
10
11
12
10
11
Area
IV
10
Area
III
Area
II
Area
I
A
B
Probability
Less than Less than Less than Less than Less than Less than Greater
1 in a
1 in
1 in
1 in 1,000 1 in 100 1 in 10
than 1 in
million
100,000 10,000
10
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 32 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Greater
than 1 in
4
Area
V
Khazzan Project
APPENDIX E APPROVAL MATRIX

Minimum level of approval
Residual risk
Area V
Area IV
Area III
Area II
Area I
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Not allowed
Not foreseen during commissioning phase
Project Director
Commissioning Manager / Deputy Commissioning Manager
Site Authority
Page 33 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
APPENDIX F TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)

The following tables are based on Khazzan Operational risk assessment guidance
Risk area I
Legend: CW (Cold Work),HW (Hot Work), HWSP (Hot Work Spark Potential), MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet),
Task
Permit to work type
Abrasive blasting: not on live equipment and

not in a hazardous area
CW
Area lighting repairs (lamp replacement)
HW spark potential
Supplementary
certificates
Other CoW
documentation to
consider
Chemical data sheet
CW on proven isolated equipment, no breaking

CW
containment
ICC if relevant
Risk assessment
Minimum
recommended TRA
participants
TRA Approval
Level 1
AA/AAD, PA
AA
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
ICC if not a personal

isolation
Isolation plan
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Electrical heat tracing work (isolated)
CW or HW spark
potential (task
dependent)

isolation
Isolation plan
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Electrical work, isolated in non-hazardous

areas
CW

isolation
Isolation plan
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Electrical work isolated in hazardous areas
HWSP

isolation
Isolation plan
Level 1
Field instrument testing and minor repairs
CW, HW spark
potential,
(task dependent)

isolation
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Commissioning loop checks in

non-hazardous areas
CW

isolation
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Isolating electrical equipment (by Electrical ISA CW or HW spark

- only site defined low voltage); no exposure to potential,
live conductors
(task dependent)
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

isolation
Page 34 of 41
Isolation plan
Rev: A02
Project Internal
AA
Khazzan Project

Risk area I
Legend: CW (Cold Work),HW (Hot Work), HWSP (Hot Work Spark Potential), MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet),
Task
Permit to work type
Supplementary
certificates
Other CoW
documentation to
consider
Risk assessment
Minimum
recommended TRA
participants
TRA Approval
Isolation plan,
Locked Open/Locked Level 1
Closed register
AA, PA
AA (or based on
residual risk in
approval table)
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
CW
Chemical data sheet,

Level 1
procedure
AA, PA
AA
Insulation removal and reinstatement for

inspection - no known leak or heat trace
removal
CW
Insulation procedure,
Level 1
chemical data sheet
AA, PA
AA
Scaffolding at or above grade not over side:

erecting, dismantling or modifying (connected
to plant, equipment and structure)
CW
Scaffolding procedure Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Ground disturbance (with no identified buried

cables/pipework)
CW
Level 1
AA, PA
AA
Isolation of twinned relief valve not in service

(not removal)
CW
Radiography (if no nucleonic instruments on

live units in affected area)
CW, HW spark
potential (dependent
on equipment used)
Painting and insulation work
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Ground disturbance
Page 35 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project

Risk area II and III
Legend: CW (Cold Work), HW (Hot Work), HWSP (Hot Work Spark Potential), MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet), Ops (operations) RA (Risk Assessment)
Task
Breaking containment
(as per isolation procedure)
Permit to work
type
CW
Supplementary
certificates
Other CoW
documentation to
consider
Risk assessment
TRA Approval
Minimum
(or
higher, based on
recommended TRA
the
residual risk in
participants
the approval table)
ICC
Isolation plan, chemical

data sheet
Level 1 or Level 2 (task

dependent)
PA, AA, ISA
AA
Level 2
PA, AA, ISA
SA
Breaking containment
(does not meet energy isolation
procedure)
CW
ICC
Procedure,
non-conformant
isolations approval,
chemical data sheet
Tasks in CSE: vessels with positive

isolation
Task dependent
CSE, ICC
ERRP, chemical data

sheet
Level 2
PA, AA
Site Authority
Tasks in CSE: vessels in Greenfields (not

Task dependent
connected to system)
CSE
ERRP
Level 2
PA, AA, HSE

specialist
Site Authority
Use of mechanical device (stopple/plug

for secondary isolation method)
ICC
Isolation plan, isolation

device procedure,
chemical data sheet
Level 2
PA, AA, Site

Authority
Site Authority
Field instrument work (isolation of a safety

CW or HW spark
critical device, when the device is in use
potential
ICC
for its intended purpose, not
(task dependent)
Commissioning fault finding)
Bypass/inhibit override
register; temporary
operating procedure, if
required
Level 2,
PA, AA, Lead

Discipline
Commissioning
Engineer
Site Authority
Level 2/ Level 1
(AA to determine
appropriate level of risk
assessment based on local
conditions and plant status)
PA, AA, HSE

specialist
Site Authority
Level 2
PA, AA, Lead

Discipline Engineer
HW open flame in
non-classified hazardous area or
greenfield
CW
HW open flame
Commissioning of mechanical machinery.

generators, compressors, pumps, fans
Task dependent
(i.e. equipment listed in handover
package)
ICC
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 36 of 41
Commissioning
procedure
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Site Authority
Khazzan Project

Risk area II and III
Task
Permit to work
type
Supplementary
certificates
Other CoW
documentation to
consider
Risk assessment
TRA Approval
Minimum
(or
higher, based on
recommended TRA
the
residual risk in
participants
the approval table)
Isolation of protective device (when level

of protection is reduced, e.g. single relief
valve)
CW
ICC
(task dependent)
Bypass/inhibit override
register, Locked
Open/Locked Closed
register, isolation plan,
temporary operating
procedure
Lift over live equipment
CW
Lifting plan
Level 2
PA (for lifting task),

AA, Site Lifting
competent person
Site Authority
CW
Pressure/leak test
procedure, chemical
data sheet, isolation
plan
Level 2
PA, AA
Site Authority
Specific procedure,
competency verification, Level 2
ERRP
PA, AA, HSE

specialist
Site Authority
Energized electrical
Commissioning
procedure
Level 2
AA, PA, Electrical

Engineer
Site Authority
Ground disturbance (with identified buried

CW
cables/pipework)
Ground disturbance
CSE (if applicable)
Specific risk- assessed

procedure, ERRP,
chemical data sheet
Level 2
PA, AA, Discipline

Engineers
Site Authority
High pressure nitrogen/helium leak

testing
ICC
Leak testing procedure,

isolation plan
Level 2
PA, AA, ISA
Site Authority
Pressure/leak testing
ICC
Work at height (no fixed access platforms,

walkways or installed approved scaffold, CW
use of fall arrest system)
Energized electrical commissioning
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
HWSP
CW
Page 37 of 41
Level 2/ Level 1
(AA to determine
appropriate level of risk
assessment based on local
conditions and plant status)
PA, AA, Lead

Discipline Engineer
Site Authority
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project

Risk area IV (excluding C+)
Task
Permit to work
type
Supplementary
certificates
Other CoW
documentation to
consider
Risk assessment
No Risk Area IV identified for CPF

facilities
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 38 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Minimum
recommended
Level 2 TRA
participants
TRA Approval (or

higher, based on the
residual risk in the
approval table)
Khazzan Project
APPENDIX G LEVEL 1 RISK ASSESSMENT PRO FORMA

Level 1 Risk Assessment
Date:
Performing Authority:
Task
description
Hazard Tasks, process and worksite

The hazards directly related to performing the task steps, using the tools and equipment at this jobsite.
Body
Toxic
Biological mechanics
substances Electrical
Gravity
Thermal Mechanical
Hazard description
What, How and Detail
Noise
Pressure Radiation
Human
factors
Control measures
What, How and Detail
SIMOPS
Hazardous
Weather process
materials
Pre
requisite
Y/N
Residual Risk:
Eliminate Substitute Engineering Isolation/Segregation Administrative PPE
PA
Signature
AA
Signature
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 39 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
Khazzan Project
APPENDIX H HITRA FORM

INSTALLATION :
PERMIT No :
if not known now, complete

DATE :
later
DEPARTMENT/SYSTEM/LOCATION:
HITRA REF No :
RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM (Name of Facilitator first)

NORMAL HITRA
SORA
RISK ASSESSMENT TYPE:
date of assessment
ORA
NAME
POSITION
TASK DESCRIPTION:
Who, What, Why, How and When. As the task becomes more complex, the level of detail and
supporting documentation increases. Consider system boundaries, the extent of equipment, hardware,
or software affected by the activity.
Will the work be carried out on isolated or un-isolated systems? Where are the isolations, or interfaces
with other systems?
What area could be affected in an accident? People working or passing nearby, working on related
activities or connected systems.
Time and duration of work, one shift or multiple shifts? During the day, night or both?
Tools and equipment to be used: hand tools, power tools, ladders, lifting equipment, specific PPE?
Interfaces with adjacent work fronts, will work affect or be affected by other simultaneous work?
I, the HITRA Facilitator confirm that the HITRA has been reviewed to ensure that the risks
identified are relevant and that all control measures are in place.
Name:
Date:
Sign:
REFERENCES AND OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION :

CONFIRMED ALARP
(e.g. Emergency Provision Required, Competency requirements, Tools & Equipment, additional PPE, P&IDs, Drawings, PTW,
HITRA APPROVED: REFER APPROVAL MATRIX
Procedures, Certificates, other Risk Assessments)
NAME (PRINT):
SIGNATURE :
POSITION :
DATE :
TASK DESCRIPTION SUMMARY :
HITRA REF No :
Give the completed form to the Permit to Work Coordinator

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
Page 40 of 41
Rev: A02
Project Internal
sign after worksheets are complete and the AA

accepts the TRA
Khazzan Project
1. SubTask No
2. Sub-Task Activity 3. Hazard

/ Description
Description

4. Hazard Impact 5. Existing Control
category
Measures
safety, health,
environment and
business
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113
6. Initial Risk
7.List All Risk Reduction

Measures Required
9. Residual Risk
10.
Approver
Required for L1 and L2

impact, probability
and rating
Page 41 of 41
impact, probability and

rating
Rev: A02
Project Internal
11. Actions
closed

Hitra Procedure Kz01 CG Pro 53 0113 A02

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Khazzan

Contract No. CO-BPXO-12-0376

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

Petrofac Golden Rules of

Emergency Response &

Khazzan Project Commissioning Energy Isolation procedure

RE-ISSUED FOR REVIEW

Commissioning specific CoW process including PtW and

ISSUED FOR REVIEW

Reason for Issue

Short Description of Hold

Area Authority Designate

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

Confined Space Entry

BP Global Projects Organisation

BP Golden Rules of Safety

Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment

Permit to Work Coordinator

Task Risk Assessment

Task Risk Assessment Table

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES............................................................................

SINGLE POINT OF ACCOUNTABILITY.........................................................................................

AREA AUTHORITY DESIGNATE....................................................................................................

RESPONSIBILITIES OF HITRA FACILITATORS..........................................................................

HITRA LEVEL 1 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY PA) 10

2.6.2. HITRA LEVEL 2 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY AA OR REPRESENTATIVE FROM

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW

TASK RISK ASSESSMENT LEVELS............................................................................................

HITRA PROCESS STEPS............................................................................................................

LEVEL 1 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................

LEVEL 2 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................

ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK.............................................................

RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK RANKING.................................................................................

PERMIT TO WORK AND COMMUNICATION..............................................................................

PERFORMING THE TASK............................................................................................................

MONITOR FOR CONDITION CHANGE.......................................................................................

TRAINING AND COMPETENCY............................................................................

TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)..............................................................

APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS.....................................................................

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

APPENDIX D RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX......................................................................

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

Figure 1: Commissioning CoW Document Structure

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

2.0. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. Single Point of Accountability

Delegation of any of the CoW roles responsibility is documented

Personnel involved in facilitating HITRA are properly trained and competent

Periodic self-verification against the requirements in this procedure is undertaken

2.2. Site Authority

Authorizing signatories for Level 1 and Level 2 HITRAs,

Level 1 HITRA completers,

Team Leaders to facilitate the Level 2 HITRA process.

Ensure that the HITRA process is in place and followed consistently

Ensure that formal records of all TRAs are maintained

Manage the TRAT

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

2.3. Area Authority

Organise and participate in the HITRA process

Ensure that the PA is competent to perform the task and HITRA